Preface
This book sets Spinoza’s Latin text of the Ethics alongside an English translation, with notes to both, essays introducing each Part and several passages within the Parts, an introduction, twenty-seven letters to and from Spinoza in which he explains the Ethics and the doctrines behind it to its first readers, also in Latin and English, an epilogue on the later history of the work, appendices on the main lines of modern interpretation, on Spinoza’s relation to Descartes and on his early Short Treatise, and aids to reading. It was made in an unusual way, and the reader is entitled to know how. The translation, the notes and the essays were written by Anthropic’s Claude language models, working at the direction of Benjamin V. Lehmann in a version-controlled repository in November 2026. This preface describes what was done, the rules that governed it, and the safeguards that were put in place, so that the reader can judge how far to trust the result and where to look when in doubt.
The Latin text
The Latin is the digital transcription by Rudolf W. Meijer prepared for the Corpus Corporum of the University of Zurich, in classical orthography. It follows the text of Carl Gebhardt’s edition of 1925, without the passages from the Dutch version of 1677 that Gebhardt prints within his Latin. The transcription was divided into units, one for each paragraph of the original, under the conventional citation scheme (E1P8 for Part I, Proposition 8; E1P8S2 for its second scholium; and so on), and each unit into numbered sentences. The translation refers to these sentences by number, so that the Latin is never retyped and the two texts can be aligned mechanically.
The transcription was then checked against the principal witnesses. These were the first edition, the Opera Posthuma of 1677, with its lists of errata, from a complete scan; the Dutch translation published in the same year, De Nagelate Schriften; Gebhardt’s own text and his account of its constitution (Textgestaltung), from a scan of the 1925 volume; and the revision of Gebhardt’s text by Wolfgang Bartuschat. The nineteenth-century editions of Bruder, Ginsberg and Van Vloten and Land, and Gentile’s of 1915, were consulted where they bear on a reading. Every difference was listed and decided against the 1677 edition and Gebhardt’s grounds. Where the transcription was wrong, it was corrected, and the 164 corrections are printed in the lettered notes to the Latin, together with the readings of the first edition wherever Gebhardt departs from it, and the readings of Bartuschat where he differs from Gebhardt. The lettered notes also give, with a translation, the passages found only in the Dutch version, and the identifications of quoted authors made by nineteenth-century editors. Gebhardt’s page numbers are printed in the Latin column.
The translation
The aim was a single academic translation, as close to the Latin as English allows, with Spinoza’s technical vocabulary rendered consistently, so that a reader without Latin can follow the argument term by term. A short set of binding conventions governed the work. Every sentence of the Latin is translated, and nothing that is not in the Latin enters the English text: no bracketed glosses and no inserted Latin, explanations being reserved for the notes. Spinoza’s sentence divisions and his connectives are kept, with their logical force. The particles sive and seu, which usually introduce an equivalent description rather than an alternative, are rendered “or,” so that the English reader meets the same ambiguity as the Latin one. Proposition statements are set in italic, as in 1677. Where a clean English sentence and fidelity to the Latin pull apart, fidelity wins, and a note says what is lost.
Consistency of terminology was secured by a glossary, which records the rendering adopted for each of 156 technical terms, the place where it first occurs and, for many, the alternatives considered or a note on the choice, and which every batch of translation was required to follow; the glossary is printed at the end of the volume. Twenty-three entries were left open during the translation and decided at the end, following an audit that checked every rendering of every glossary term across the text; the conventions adopted are recorded with the entries. A running log recorded which terms and doctrines had already been explained in a note, so that later notes could refer back rather than repeat, and which renderings had been decided case by case. The text was translated in forty-four batches, in the order of the work.
Existing English translations were not consulted while translating. Two public-domain translations, those of R. H. M. Elwes and W. Hale White, were kept in the repository for comparison after the fact only. Where a note mentions how another translator or editor has rendered a passage, it is because the note is about the interpretation of that passage.
The notes
There are two series of notes. The numbered notes, some four hundred in all, are the translator’s notes to the English. They explain technical terms, point out where Spinoza is quoting or answering another author, record textual problems that affect the sense, and indicate where the text has been read in conflicting ways. The lettered notes, some two hundred and forty, are notes to the Latin, and record the textual matters described above. Quotations in Hebrew and Greek are given in the original script, never transliterated, and always translated; Hebrew is pointed where the source is pointed, and quotations from unpointed sources are left unpointed.
Every claim a note makes about another text, whether a quotation, a reference, a date or an attribution, was checked against a copy of that text held in the repository, and logged, with the evidence, in a verification record that now runs to over nine hundred entries. The texts used for this purpose include the works of Descartes in the edition of Adam and Tannery, Hobbes, Maimonides in the Judaeo-Arabic, Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew and Friedländer’s English, Crescas, the Hebrew Bible and the Vulgate, the Greek and Latin classics, Bayle’s article on Spinoza, Leibniz’s notes on the Ethics, Spinoza’s other works and letters, and a small number of modern studies. Where a claim could not be verified, it was removed or qualified. Copyrighted modern studies were used for reference only.
The essays
The essays are meant for a reader meeting the Ethics for the first time, or returning to it after a long interval. Each Part opens with an introduction that describes its place in the argument, its main doctrines and the difficulties a reader is likely to meet; and several essays stand within the Parts, at points where the argument changes direction or where a reader is most likely to need help: before the second half of Part I, before its Appendix, before the physical digression and the propositions on the will in Part II, before the Definitions of the Affects in Part III, before the portrait of the free man in Part IV, and before the propositions on the eternity of the mind in Part V. Each of these opens by saying what at that point in the text calls for comment, and closes by saying what the text does next. The essays are set apart from the text by a running head and a rule in the outer margin, and are listed separately in the contents. They quote the Ethics in the words of this translation, and their claims about other texts were verified in the same way as those of the notes.
The essays try to describe the main lines of interpretation without settling them. Spinoza’s readers have disagreed about almost every doctrine of the book, and where they disagree the essays say so, name representative positions, and send the reader to the passages at issue. The appendices take up several of these disagreements at greater length.
What a reader should keep in mind
A translation made in this way has particular strengths and particular risks. Its strengths are consistency, completeness, and a record: every rendering of a technical term can be traced to the glossary, every textual decision to the collation, every claim in the notes to the verification log, and the whole history of the work is preserved. Its risks are those of any translation, together with one that is more specific: a language model can produce fluent and confident prose that is wrong, and fluency is not evidence of accuracy. The procedures described above were designed against that risk, by requiring that claims about texts be checked against the texts themselves and by recording the checks; but they do not replace the judgment of expert readers, and the work should be regarded as a draft until it has had such a review. Corrections are welcome, and the record makes them easy to trace and to make.
The layout
This is the web edition of the book. The Latin and the English stand side by side, aligned paragraph by paragraph and, within long paragraphs, by groups of sentences; on a narrow screen each passage of Latin stands above its English, and the buttons at the top of each page show either language alone. The notes follow each passage, the lettered notes to the Latin under the Latin and the numbered notes to the English under the English. Spinoza’s internal references (“by Prop. 7”) are given in his abbreviated form and are links to the passages they cite; pointing at a reference shows the opening of the passage, and pointing at a note mark shows the note. The text is generated from the same files as the two PDF versions of the book, one for the screen and one for print, whose wording it shares. A guide for first-time readers and a note on the text follow this preface, and an introduction to the Ethics as a whole precedes the first Part.
A Guide for First-Time Readers
The Preface has said for whom the essays were written and where they stand. This guide suggests an order. The Ethics need not be read straight through as it is printed, and Spinoza himself provided a shorter way in: more than once he interrupts the demonstrations to address the reader in plain prose.
Before the text
Of the front matter, the first section of Abbreviations and Conventions should be read at once, since it explains Spinoza’s abbreviated references and the compact form (1P11D, 3P11S) of the lines headed Cited in. The Note on the Text concerns chiefly the Latin. On Translating Spinoza’s Vocabulary is worth reading before Part III, where the names of the affects begin, and at once by anyone who knows another translation, since it explains why affectus is “affect” here and laetitia “joy”. The Chronology is for reference.
The Introduction comes next. Its last two sections give the plan of the five Parts and the advice, repeated in the introduction to Part I, to read enunciations and scholia before demonstrations; its historical sections may be read at any time. How to Read a Geometrical Demonstration opens by describing the edition’s three aids to following the argument: the links or page numbers of Spinoza’s references, the Cited in lines and the Synopsis of the Propositions. Its last section, which traces a chain of references from Part I, Prop. 11 back to the definitions, is best read with those propositions open, or after them.
Spinoza’s own way in
Spinoza wrote some passages for readers not yet persuaded by demonstration. Before demonstrating the dictates of reason, he sets them out briefly, so that his meaning may be grasped more easily (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol.); and after showing that mind and body do not act on each other, he writes: “I hardly believe that men can be induced to weigh them with an equal mind unless I confirm the matter by experience” (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.). With the prefaces and the two appendices, such passages make a short route through the book in Spinoza’s own words, to be taken before the demonstrations or alongside Part I:
1. The Appendix to Part I. It opens by summarizing Part I, then traces the belief that nature acts for ends to two facts about human beings, that they are born ignorant of the causes of things and are conscious of their appetite for their own advantage, and the notions of good and evil, order and beauty, to the imagination.
2. The second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40, on the three kinds of knowledge, explained by the example of finding a fourth proportional. To understand by the third kind is, in Part V, the mind’s “highest virtue” (Part V, Prop. 25).
3. The last paragraph of the scholium to Part II, Prop. 49, on what the denial of free will contributes to life: among other things, it teaches “to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no one, to envy no one.”
4. The Preface to Part III, with its resolve to “consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies,” and the scholium to Prop. 2, which argues from sleepwalkers, drunkards and dreams that those who think they act from a free decree of the mind “dream with their eyes open.”
5. The Preface to Part IV, which defines bondage and says in what sense the book will speak of good and evil: in relation to “a model of human nature which we may look to.”
6. The scholium to Part IV, Prop. 18, the dictates of reason in brief (“To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man”); and, against any impression that this is an ethics of renunciation, the second scholium to Prop. 45: “Nothing, certainly, but grim and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves.”
7. The Appendix to Part IV, thirty-two short chapters that gather under main headings what had been “demonstrated by me piecemeal.”
8. The Preface to Part V, on the Stoics and Descartes; the scholium to Prop. 10, perhaps the most practical page of the book, on committing “sure principles of life” to memory against injury, fear and ambition; the scholium to Prop. 20, which gathers the remedies for the affects under five heads; and the last scholium, on the wise man and the ignorant.
These passages do not replace the demonstrations, since what a scholium supplies is explained rather than demonstrated; but a reader who knows where the argument is going can follow its steps.
Reading the Parts
Then read the Parts in order, each after its introduction and with the essays where they stand. Some of the essays make a first reading lighter. The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 gathers in a few sentences what the first fifteen propositions have established, and a reader who has lost the thread can take it up again there. The essay before the physical digression of Part II says that a first reading need not master all its axioms, lemmas and postulates, and names those on which the later propositions chiefly draw. Part III defines the affects one by one in its scholia and restates them in order at its end; with the essay that explains their plan, the Definitions of the Affects can serve as a reference while the Part is read. The introduction to Part IV answers in advance some of the objections first-time readers raise against it, and the introduction to Part V separates the remedies of Props. 1–20 from the more disputed propositions on the eternity of the mind, which have an essay of their own before Prop. 21.
A few letters are best read with the passages they explain. Letter 12, on the infinite, reappears in part in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15. Letter 58 shares with the scholium to Part III, Prop. 2 the infant, the angry boy and the drunkard, and adds the stone that, conscious of its striving, would believe itself free. no text outside the Ethics states the physics of Part II more fully than Letter 32, with its worm in the blood, and Letter 19, to Blyenbergh, gives the account of evil found in the Preface to Part IV. Letters that cite a passage are listed after it, under Cited in Letters; these four cite none.
After a first reading
The appendices belong to a second stage. Most take up a question on which readers have divided, and all presuppose the passages they discuss, so most are best read after the Part they concern: Appendix A on substance and mode, Appendix B on the attributes, Appendix D on necessity and purpose and Appendix F on the principle of sufficient reason after Part I; Appendix C on mind and body after Part II; Appendix G on striving after Part III; Appendix H on virtue and the free man and Appendix K on right, power and the state after Part IV; Appendix E on the eternity of the mind after Part V. Appendix I, on Spinoza and Descartes, and Appendix J, on the Ethics and the Short Treatise, look back over the whole and are best left to the end, with the Epilogue, on the book’s readers from its prohibition to modern scholarship.
The Aids to Reading, after the appendices, serve every stage. Key Concepts follows each of its terms from the place where its sense is fixed through the Parts that use it, and each entry ends by naming the essays or appendices on its subject. The Summary Tables set out the order of being, the derivation of the affects, the three kinds of knowledge and the remedies, each row with the passage where the matter is stated; they are for review. The Synopsis of the Propositions gives every enunciation in order; read straight through for one Part, it shows the route without the demonstrations. After them come the Bibliography, the Glossary and the indexes, of which the Index of Subjects gives the principal places where each subject is discussed, in the essays and letters as well as the text.
A second reading can then turn to the demonstrations, in the way the essay on reading them describes.
Note on the Text
The Latin is the digital transcription by Rudolf W. Meijer prepared for the Corpus Corporum (University of Zurich), with classical orthography. It follows the text of Carl Gebhardt’s edition (Spinoza Opera, vol. II, Heidelberg, 1925), without the passages of the Dutch version of 1677 that Gebhardt prints within it. Corrections to the transcription are printed in the lettered notes to the Latin, which also record the readings of the first edition, the Opera Posthuma of 1677 (including its lists of errata), wherever Gebhardt departs from it, with his grounds, and the readings of Wolfgang Bartuschat’s revision of Gebhardt’s text where it differs. They also give, with a translation, the passages found only in the Dutch version of 1677 (De Nagelate Schriften), which Gebhardt, following his view that the Dutch rests on an earlier draft of Spinoza’s, prints in Dutch within his Latin text; and they carry the identifications of quoted authors that the transcription marks, nearly all of them C. H. Bruder’s (1843). Gebhardt’s page numbers are given in the Latin in the form [G II 47].
Homo is rendered “man” and “men” in the generic sense of the Latin, which includes women; where Spinoza means a male (vir), the context makes it plain.
The first edition sets the enunciations of propositions in italic, and this edition follows it. It does not italicize the terms being defined; the italics on defined terms here, on both sides, are an editorial aid inherited from the transcription.
Spinoza’s internal references are given in his abbreviated form and are linked to the passages they cite; pointing at a reference shows the opening of the passage cited. Numbered notes are the translator’s notes to the English; lettered notes are notes to the Latin.
After each definition, axiom, postulate, lemma, proposition, demonstration, corollary or scholium that Spinoza cites elsewhere in the Ethics, a line in small type lists the places that cite it, in the order of the text, each linked to it. They are given in the compact form explained under Abbreviations and Conventions. A second line names the letters in this edition that cite the passage.
Abbreviations and Conventions
References to the Ethics
In the translation, Spinoza’s internal references keep his own abbreviated form: “by Prop. 7”, “by Ax. 4”, “by Def. Aff. 19” (the definitions of the affects at the end of Part III), “by Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III”, “by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part”. In the Latin they stand as he wrote them (“per prop. 7.”, “per aff. defin. 19.”). Proposition headings are numbered in Roman figures, as in the first edition; the references, the notes, the essays and the lists of contents use Arabic figures.
The lines in small type that list the places citing a passage use a compact form, without the initial E (for Ethics): the number of the Part, then P for proposition, D for definition (1D3) or, after the item it belongs to, for demonstration (1P11D), A for axiom, Post for postulate, L for lemma, C for corollary, S for scholium, Ex for explanation, Alt for an alternative demonstration, DA for the definitions of the affects, GDA for their general definition, Pref for a preface and App for an appendix. A number after D, C or S distinguishes several of them (1P11D2, 2P40S2). So 3P11S is the scholium to Proposition 11 of Part III, and 4App7 the seventh chapter of the Appendix to Part IV.
Spinoza’s other works
KV: Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en des zelfs Welstand (Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being), cited by part and chapter. TTP: Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), cited by chapter. TP: Tractatus politicus (unfinished; first printed in 1677), cited by chapter and section (TP II.8). The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and the Metaphysical Thoughts are cited by their English titles. The letters are numbered, as in the editions of Van Vloten and Land and of Gebhardt, in the order of their dates; the numbers of the 1677 edition, where they are needed, are given with its pages (OP pp. 515–517, Letter 37).
Editions
G: Carl Gebhardt (ed.), Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), cited by volume and page (G II 47). “Textgestaltung” is Gebhardt’s account of the text, printed in each volume after the texts, cited in the same way (Textgestaltung II 346).
OP: Opera posthuma ([Amsterdam: Jan Rieuwertsz], 1677), the first edition of the Ethics, the Political Treatise and the letters, cited by page (OP p. 9).
NS: De Nagelate Schriften van B. d. S. ([Amsterdam: Rieuwertsz], 1677), the Dutch translation published with it, cited by page.
VVL², VVL³: J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land (eds.), Opera quotquot reperta sunt (The Hague: Nijhoff), 2nd edition 1895 and 3rd edition 1914, cited by volume and page (VVL³ III 206).
AT: Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds.), Œuvres de Descartes (Paris: Léopold Cerf), cited by volume and page (AT VII 60; AT VIII-1 is the first part of volume VIII).
Other editions and translations are named by their editors or translators in the notes.
Notes and marks
Numbered notes are the translator’s notes to the English. Lettered notes are notes to the Latin: they record the corrections made to the transcription, in the form “reading printed] transcr. reading of the transcription”, followed by the reason; the readings of the first edition, the Dutch version and the later editions where they differ; and, with a translation, the passages found only in the Dutch version. A lettered note ending “[Bruder]” gives the identification of a quoted author made by C. H. Bruder in his edition of 1843 and carried by the transcription; one ending “[Meijer]”, an identification marked “Me.” in the transcription, which does not say whose it is. Elsewhere in the notes, “Meijer” or “W. Meijer” is Willem Meijer, whose Dutch translation of 1896 Gebhardt reports.
In the Latin, a mark such as [G II 47] shows where a page of Gebhardt’s edition begins.
In the indexes, Ep. 12 is Letter 12, and n after a reference marks a note to that passage.
On Translating Spinoza’s Vocabulary
A reader who sets this translation beside another will find some of Spinoza’s terms rendered in unfamiliar ways: affectus as “affect” rather than “emotion”, laetitia as “joy” rather than “pleasure”, fortitudo as “strength of character” rather than “fortitude”, ingenium as “temperament”. This note gives the reasons: first the principles that governed the vocabulary, then the main terms, by kind. The renderings are listed in the glossary at the end of the volume, which records for many of them the alternatives considered or a note on the choice; the translator’s notes explain many of the terms at their first important occurrence.
The comparisons are with the English translations of R. H. M. Elwes (1884) and W. Hale White (1883), which were kept with this edition and, as the Preface says, consulted only after the translation was made. They are cited to show other solutions and what follows from them: both were made for readers of their own day, and where they differ from this edition they mostly differ in judgment, not by error. Elwes is cited by the page of the second volume of his Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, White by the page of the first edition of his Ethic; the place in the Ethics is given by a link to the passage in this edition.
Principles
The aim, as the Preface puts it, was a translation with Spinoza’s technical vocabulary rendered consistently, “so that a reader without Latin can follow the argument term by term.” The geometrical order makes this more than a matter of tidiness. Spinoza demonstrates by citing his definitions, and a citation works only if the reader can recognise in the demonstration the word that was defined. When he needs, late in Part IV, the virtue that restrains daring as much as fear, he calls it “an equally great virtue of mind, or strength of character (whose definition see in Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III)” (Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem.); when he demonstrates Part I, Prop. 2, he repeats the words of Ax. 5: “the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.” A translation that varies its words at such places may read well sentence by sentence and still hide the argument. Elwes and White, as will be seen, vary them at just such places.
Hence the first rule: one English word for one Latin term. Its converse is harder to keep and accounts for many of the renderings below: an English word once given to a term is not used for another. “Joy” is reserved for laetitia, so gaudium is “gladness”; “fear” for metus, so timor, as the affect defined in the Definitions of the Affects, is “timidity”; “striving” for conatus, so that when the ambitious “seek” honour (ambire, Part V, Prop. 10, Schol.) the verb is a different one.
The second rule follows Spinoza’s own practice. He takes his words from common use and fixes their sense by definition: “my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose meaning from usage is not wholly at odds with the meaning in which I wish to use them” (Part III, Def. Aff. 20, Expl.). The translation does the same in English, choosing the word whose ordinary meaning is not wholly at odds with the definition and letting the definition do the rest. Where Spinoza takes over a traditional word and redefines it, the traditional English word is kept and a note gives his sense: “religion”, “blessedness”, “glory”, and “piety” for pietas, which he defines as “the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason” (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1). A word that stated his sense outright would make the redefinition invisible. Nor is a word chosen because it fits a later theory: “self-esteem” was rejected for acquiescentia in se ipso because it brings a modern psychological sense with it.
Where the Latin is ambiguous, the English is left ambiguous in the same way, and nothing is added to the text to explain a term; explanations are kept for the notes. The first rule bends only where a Latin word plainly has distinct senses: virtus is “power” where, in Parts I and II, it means causal efficacy; sentire is “feel”, “sense” or “think” according to the context; ingenium is “ingenuity” or “talent” where it means wit or ability. The glossary records these cases, so that the exceptions are as visible as the rule.
Terms of metaphysics
Involvere is always “involve”, never “imply”. A involves B when B is contained in the concept of A, so that A cannot be conceived without B: the cause of itself is that “whose essence involves existence” (Part I, Def. 1), and knowledge of an effect “depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause” (Ax. 4). “Imply” suggests a relation between propositions, which is not what Spinoza means. Elwes writes “involve” in Axiom 5 and “imply” in the demonstration of Prop. 2, where Spinoza repeats the axiom’s words, so that the repetition disappears (Elwes, pp. 46–47); he has “imply” again in “No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals” (Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2; Elwes, pp. 49–50). White has “involve” in both of the first places (White, pp. 2–3).
Ideatum, literally “the ideated”, that of which the idea is an idea, is “object”, with a note at its first occurrence (Part I, Ax. 6). Elwes has “its ideate or object” there (Elwes, p. 46). White usually prefers a paraphrase, “that of which it is the idea”, as in that axiom and four times in the scholium on the standard of truth (Part II, Prop. 43, Schol.; White, pp. 2, 89–90); it is exact, but it turns a noun into a clause in sentences that already carry several. “Object” has a cost. In scholastic usage, as the notes explain, a thing is “objectively” in the intellect when it is there as the content of an idea, so that the adverb points the opposite way from the noun: “A true idea must agree with its object (by Ax. 6), that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature” (Part I, Prop. 30, Dem.). “Object” also renders obiectum (Part II, Prop. 13), but there the two Latin words name the same thing.
Res singularis is “singular thing”, the term defined in Part II, Def. 7, whose second sentence uses a second term: “if several individuals so concur in one action that all are together the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.” An individual (individuum) is defined in the physical digression after Prop. 13 as a body composed of bodies. White renders res singulares as “individual things”, so that his definition considers a number of individuals “as a one individual thing” (White, p. 48). Elwes has “particular things” in the definition but “individual things” in Part III, Prop. 6, Dem. (Elwes, pp. 83, 136). Spinoza also speaks of particular things (res particulares, Part I, Prop. 25, Cor.), and treats them as close to singular ones: that demonstration of Part III cites this corollary. The translation keeps the two words apart nonetheless, so that the reader sees which one he wrote, and “singular” keeps the opposition to the universal, as when Part V sets the intuitive knowledge of singular things above “the universal knowledge which I have said is of the second kind” (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol.).
Potentia and potestas are both “power”. Spinoza distinguishes the power by which God and all things are and act from what is in someone’s power, at his disposal, and argues that in God the two coincide: “Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power necessarily is” (Part I, Prop. 35). Notes mark potestas where the difference matters, as at Prop. 17, Schol. and in the Preface to Part V. Elwes and White also write “power” in most places, as in Prop. 35 (Elwes, p. 74; White, p. 37), but both have “control” in Part V, Prop. 3, Cor. (Elwes, p. 248; White, p. 255), which this edition renders “An affect, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind is acted on by it the less, the better it is known to us.” As the note to the Preface to Part V says, the question of Part V is how far the affects are in our power in the second sense, and the answer is given in terms of the mind’s power in the first. “Control” would separate the question from the answer, and would misrender Dei potestas in Part I.
Sub specie aeternitatis is “under a species of eternity”. Elwes and White both have “under the form of eternity”, at its first occurrence “under a certain form of eternity” (Part II, Prop. 44, Cor. 2; Elwes, p. 117; White, p. 91). But “form” is needed for forma, which Spinoza uses throughout the book and with a definite sense: the form of man (Part II, Prop. 10), the form that a composite body keeps while its parts change (Lemma 4), “the form of the human body” (Part IV, Prop. 39, Dem.), “the form of love or hatred” (Part V, Prop. 2, Dem.). “Aspect” already renders ratio in “under the aspect of the good” (Part I, Prop. 33, Schol. 2). Species means a look or appearance and also a kind, as when temperance and sobriety are “species of tenacity” (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol.); “species” keeps both senses without choosing, as the note at the first occurrence says.
Mens is “mind” and anima “soul”, and “soul” occurs only where the Latin has anima. Spinoza’s word for the human mind, the idea of the body, is mens. Anima appears when he reports the views of others, those who “feign seats and dwelling places of the soul” (Part II, Prop. 35, Schol.) and Descartes, who held that “the soul, or mind” is united to the pineal gland (Part V, Preface), and once in a passage on the affects of animals, of the “idea, or soul” of each individual (Part III, Prop. 57, Schol.). Elwes uses “soul” for animus as well, calling the affect in the General Definition “a passivity of the soul” (Elwes, p. 185); White uses it for mens when he writes of those who imagine God “composed of body and soul” (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.; White, p. 14). Animus, the ordinary word for the mind as the seat of feeling and resolve, is not a term Spinoza defines. It occurs mostly in set phrases, which are usually rendered with “mind”: fluctuation of mind, contentment of mind, presence of mind. English has one word where Latin has two, and here the loss is accepted.
The affects and their names
The theory of the affects rests on the striving. Conatus and conari are “striving” and “strive”, noun and verb from one root as in the Latin: “The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself” (Part III, Prop. 7). The pairing matters because the noun is then identified with other terms: the striving related to the mind alone is will, related to mind and body together appetite (Prop. 9, Schol.); desire is defined so as to comprehend “all the strivings of human nature” (Def. Aff. 1, Expl.); and a later scholium speaks of “the striving, or desire” to eat and of “this desire, or striving” (Prop. 59, Schol.). White breaks the pair: “The effort by which each thing endeavours” (White, p. 114). Elwes keeps it in Prop. 7, “The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours” (Elwes, p. 136), but in the scholium of Prop. 59 defines one virtue with “strives” and the next with “endeavours”, where Spinoza has the same verb, and renders “this desire, or striving” as “the desire or attempt” (Elwes, pp. 171–172). “Endeavour” would have served as well as “strive” if held to; what matters is that one word is. Where conari means only a writer’s attempt, as when Descartes “tries to prove” something (Part V, Preface), it is “try”.
Affectus is “affect”. The definition makes affects a kind of affection: “By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections” (Part III, Def. 3). “Affect” keeps the tie with affectio, the word of the definition of mode (Part I, Def. 5). It also covers the active affects (Part III, Props. 58–59), which “passion” does not, and “passion” is needed for passio; “emotion” names a feeling, where Spinoza’s affect is a change in the body’s power of acting together with its idea. Elwes has “emotion” for affectus and “modifications” for affectiones, so that, although his definition calls emotions “the modifications of the body”, the name of the affect no longer recalls the word that defines it (Elwes, pp. 45, 130). White has “affect” and “affections” (White, pp. 1, 106), and this edition follows the same course.
Laetitia and tristitia are “joy” and “sadness”. Joy is “the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection”, sadness the passion by which it passes to a lesser (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol.), and joy is the passage itself, not the perfection reached (Def. Aff. 3, Expl.). The same scholium names their bodily forms: joy related to mind and body together is titillatio or hilaritas, “pleasure” or “cheerfulness”, according as one part of a man is affected more than the rest or all equally; sadness so related is dolor or melancholia, “pain” or “melancholy”. These are “only species of joy or sadness” (Def. Aff. 3, Expl.), and Part IV judges them separately: “Pleasure can be excessive and be evil; but pain can be good insofar as pleasure, or joy, is evil” (Part IV, Prop. 43). If laetitia is “pleasure”, as in Elwes, the species needs another name. Elwes calls titillatio “stimulation”, hilaritas “merriment” and dolor “suffering” (Elwes, p. 138), and later “grief” and “mirth” (Elwes, pp. 174, 217). White has “joy” and “sorrow”, with “pleasurable excitement”, “cheerfulness”, “pain” and “melancholy” (White, p. 117), close to this edition, though he too has “grief” for dolor in the explanation of Def. Aff. 3 (White, p. 162). How much the definition carries is shown by Spinoza’s own hesitation. God, who “can pass neither to a greater nor to a lesser perfection”, is affected by no joy (Part V, Prop. 17, Dem.); and when Spinoza applies the word to the love with which God loves himself, he adds, “if we may still use this word” (Prop. 36, Schol.).
The names of the particular affects follow the second rule: the word Spinoza chose is kept, and the definition corrects it. Gaudium is “gladness”, kept apart from joy. Elwes, having used “pleasure” for laetitia, uses “joy” for gaudium (Part III, Prop. 18, Schol. 2; Def. Aff. 16; Elwes, pp. 144, 177), so that “joy” in his version and in this one stand for different Latin words. Conscientiae morsus is “remorse”, though Spinoza defines it as sadness at a past thing “which has turned out contrary to expectation” (Def. Aff. 17), and a note says that it is not moral remorse. Elwes has “Disappointment”, which fits the definition but not the word (Elwes, p. 177); White has “Gladness” and “Remorse” (White, pp. 123, 165). Gloria is “glory”. Elwes has “Honour” in its definition (Def. Aff. 30; Elwes, p. 181) and calls ambition “the immoderate desire of power” (Def. Aff. 44; Elwes, p. 183), where White has “glory” (White, p. 172), though his definition of the affect itself has “Self-exaltation” (White, p. 169). The traditional word is needed in Part V, where blessedness “is called glory in the sacred books, and not without reason,” and contentment of mind “in reality is not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. 25 and 30)” (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol.).
Humanitas is “courtesy”. Spinoza introduces it as the moderate form of a striving whose excess is ambition: “This striving to do something, and also to omit something, solely in order to please men, is called ambition, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the multitude that we do or omit certain things to our own harm or another’s; otherwise it is usually called courtesy” (Part III, Prop. 29, Schol.). The definition identifies it with modestia, “the desire to do what pleases men and to omit what displeases them” (Def. Aff. 43), and “modesty is a species of ambition” (Def. Aff. 48, Expl.). The affect is a desire to please, not a kindness, and “human kindness” was rejected for that reason. Elwes and White both have “Courtesy” in the definition (Elwes, p. 183; White, p. 172), but in the scholium where the word first appears Elwes has “kindliness” and White “humanity” (Elwes, p. 150; White, p. 131), and the reader cannot see that the definition takes up the scholium.
Ethical terms
The virtues that crown Part III are named in a single passage: “All the actions which follow from the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it understands I relate to strength of character, which I divide into tenacity and nobility.” Tenacity (animositas) is “the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to preserve his being”, nobility (generositas) “the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship”; temperance, sobriety and presence of mind are species of the first, modesty and clemency of the second (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol.). Fortitudo is thus the genus of every action that follows from the mind’s understanding, whether it serves the agent or another. The English “fortitude”, White’s word (White, p. 159), names a single virtue, endurance; “strength of character” covers the whole, and keeps the link with the “strong man” (vir fortis) who, at the close of the portrait of the free man, “hates no one” (Part IV, Prop. 73, Schol.). For the species, “courage” narrows animositas to the facing of danger, though temperance and sobriety belong to it; “strength of mind” would be confused with animi fortitudo; and “generosity” means liberality in English and recalls Descartes’ générosité, from which, as the essay before the Definitions of the Affects shows, Spinoza’s generositas differs entirely. “Tenacity”, holding fast to one’s own being, and “nobility” were chosen instead.
Spinoza refers back to the scholium for the definition of fortitudo (Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem.) and of animositas (Prop. 69, Schol.), relates what was shown about freedom “to strength of character, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III), to tenacity and nobility” (Prop. 73, Schol.), and in Part V considers “all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility” (Part V, Prop. 41). In Elwes, fortitudo is “strength of character” in the defining scholium, “firmness” in Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem., “strength” in Prop. 73, Schol., and “firmness of mind” in Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. (Elwes, pp. 171, 233, 235, 269); animositas is “courage”, but “valour” in Def. Aff. 48, Expl. (Elwes, p. 184); generositas is “highmindedness”, but “nobility of character” in Prop. 73, Schol., and “kindness” in Part IV, Prop. 46 (Elwes, pp. 235, 220). White keeps “generosity” except in Def. Aff. 48, Expl., where it becomes “nobility of soul” (White, p. 173); and in Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem. he renders animi virtus seu fortitudo as “The virtue or strength of mind”, giving fortitudo the words he uses for animositas in the corollary on the same page (White, p. 236), so that the genus and its species cannot be told apart.
Acquiescentia in se ipso is “self-contentment”, and animi or mentis acquiescentia “contentment of mind”. The root sense is coming to rest (quies), and the joy is that of a man who contemplates himself and his power of acting (Part III, Def. Aff. 25). Part IV calls it “in truth the highest thing we can hope for” (Part IV, Prop. 52, Schol.), and Part V, Prop. 27 derives “the greatest contentment of mind there can be” from the third kind of knowledge, proving it from the definition of self-contentment: “(by Def. Aff. 25) from this kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment there can be” (Dem.). The citation works only if the English word is recognisably the same in both places. In Elwes the affect is “self-complacency” in Part III, Prop. 30, Schol. and “Self-approval” in the definition, and what Part V derives is “acquiescence” and “acquiescence of spirit” (Elwes, pp. 151, 178, 261, 265). White has “contentment with one’s self”, “self-approval” and “Self-satisfaction” in Part III, and “peace of mind” and “repose of mind” in Part V (White, pp. 132, 149, 167, 271, 277). “Peace of mind” was rejected here because it loses the reflexive in se ipso.
Ingenium is “temperament”, a man’s characteristic cast of mind. The word carries one of the central observations of Part III, that “each by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament” (Part III, Prop. 31, Schol.), to which Spinoza returns when he describes the man who acts from affect alone (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1) and when he shows that the same appetite is, in a man led by reason, the virtue called piety (Part V, Prop. 4, Schol.); and “Each one judges from his own temperament what is good” (Part IV, Prop. 70, Dem.). The sentence of Part III sets natura and ingenium side by side, and the English must keep them apart. Elwes renders ingenium as “natures” in the Appendix to Part I, then as “individual disposition”, “fancy” and “inclinations” (Elwes, pp. 75, 152, 212, 269); White as “mind” and “way of thinking” (White, pp. 39, 133), so that ingenium and mens coincide in English. Where it means wit, as with those who wished “to show off their ingenuity” in assigning ends (Part I, Appendix), the English says so.
Small words
Sive and seu are rendered “or”, never “that is” or “in other words”. They usually introduce an equivalent description of the same thing rather than an alternative, but the strength of the equivalence varies, and the translation leaves the reader to judge it, as the Latin reader had to. White writes “that is to say” for them in Part I, Ax. 5 and Prop. 2, Dem. (White, pp. 2–3), the phrase he also uses for hoc est; Elwes leaves sive out of the axiom and writes “in other words” in the demonstration (Elwes, pp. 46–47). Spinoza has hoc est when he means “that is”, and one demonstration can contain both: singular things are modes, “that is (by Prop. 34 of Part I), things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God”, and no thing has in itself “anything by which it could be destroyed, or which takes its existence away” (Part III, Prop. 6, Dem.). Sometimes the equivalence is plainly loose: the free man “chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, as combat” (Part IV, Prop. 69, Cor.), though presence of mind was named in Part III as one species of tenacity among several. “God, or nature” (Part IV, Preface; Prop. 4, Dem.) leaves the reader to weigh the equivalence in the same way.
Quatenus is “insofar as”, and is not varied for elegance. It restricts what is said to a respect in which a thing is considered, and the argument depends on these restrictions at every stage: “The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (Part IV, Prop. 14). Elwes renders the first quatenus “by virtue of being true” and the second “in so far as” (Elwes, p. 198), turning a restriction into a cause and losing the parallel on which the proposition turns; White keeps “in so far as” in both places (White, p. 190). Small as they are, these words carry the logic of the book.
Chronology
Dates are those of Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (2nd ed., 2018), with his qualifications; Leibniz’s visit is dated by a note of his of November 1676 reported by Gerhardt (Philosophische Schriften I 118), and the events of 1678 are from Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment (2001), pp. 291–292; the publication of the Short Treatise in 1862 is from Van Vloten’s Supplementum (1862) and Gebhardt’s Textgestaltung (G I 411–413).
- 1632
- Born in Amsterdam in November (on the 24th, according to his early biographer Colerus), the second son of Michael d’Espinoza and Hanna Deborah Senior; named Bento, in Hebrew Baruch.
- 1638
- 5 November: death of his mother.
- 1649
- September: death of his elder brother Isaac. Bento probably leaves his formal studies for his father’s import and export business in late 1649 or soon after.
- 1653–1654
- His stepmother Esther dies on 24 October 1653, and his father five months later. With his younger brother Gabriel he carries on the business, as the firm of Bento y Gabriel de Spinoza.
- c. 1654–1658
- Learns Latin at the school of Franciscus van den Enden, perhaps from about 1654 or 1655 (possibly not until 1657), and attends it until early 1658.
- 1656
- March: has himself declared an orphan, and a guardian appointed by the Orphan Masters of Amsterdam, to free himself from the debts of his father’s estate. 27 July: the governors of the Portuguese-Jewish congregation pronounce a herem, a ban, against him.
- Before 1659
- Studies at the University of Leiden, living there or visiting it; there is no record of his enrolment.
- 1659–1660
- In Amsterdam, works on the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, which he abandons in late 1659 or early 1660, and begins the Short Treatise.
- 1661
- Summer: moves to Rijnsburg, near Leiden, where Henry Oldenburg visits him in mid-July. Works on the Short Treatise through 1661 and into 1662; by the end of 1661 he is at work on the early parts of the Ethics.
- 1663
- Spring: moves to Voorburg, into the house of Daniel Tydeman (end of April). Autumn: Jan Rieuwertsz publishes his Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy, Parts I and II, demonstrated in the geometrical manner, with the Metaphysical Thoughts as an appendix, the only writings he published under his name.
- 1665
- Autumn: sets aside the Ethics, then in three parts, to write the Theological-Political Treatise.
- 1669–1670
- Moves to The Hague at the end of 1669 or early in 1670. The Theological-Political Treatise, printed by Rieuwertsz in Amsterdam without the author’s name and with a false imprint (“Hamburg, Henricus Künraht”), reaches the public early in 1670.
- 1671
- May: moves to the house of Hendrik van der Spyck on the Paviljoensgracht, his last home.
- 1672
- August: a mob in The Hague kills Johan and Cornelis de Witt. By his own account to Leibniz, Spinoza wanted to put up a placard reading ultimi barbarorum near the place, but his landlord locked the house.
- 1673
- February: offered the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg by Johann Ludwig Fabritius on behalf of the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig; after a month he declines. Late July: travels to the French camp at Utrecht, where he stays about three weeks.
- 1674
- 19 July: the Court of Holland bans the Theological-Political Treatise, together with Hobbes’s Leviathan and Lodewijk Meyer’s Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres.
- 1675
- Late July: goes to Amsterdam to have the Ethics printed, and after two weeks stops the printing.
- 1676
- By the middle of the year at work on the Political Treatise, which remains unfinished at his death. November: Leibniz visits him in The Hague.
- 1677
- 21 February, a Sunday: dies in The Hague, of consumption according to his friends; buried on 25 February at the New Church. By the end of the year his posthumous works exist in Latin and in Dutch, the Opera posthuma and De Nagelate Schriften.
- 1678
- January: Rieuwertsz begins to put copies of both into circulation. June: the States of Holland and West Friesland ban the book.
- 1862
- The Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, known until then only by report and from a summary that Eduard Boehmer published in 1852, is published by Johannes van Vloten with a Latin translation, from a manuscript found by the bookseller Frederik Muller and a second lent by Adriaan Bogaers.