Introduction to the Fourth Part
The fourth Part is called De servitute humana, seu de affectuum viribus, “Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects.” Its first sentence defines the bondage: “Man’s lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects I call bondage.” A man subject to the affects is not under his own control (sui iuris) but under that of fortune, so that he is often compelled, “although he sees the better for himself, still to follow the worse” (Preface). The words are Medea’s in Ovid, already quoted in the scholium to Part III, Prop. 2, and they state the problem of the Part. Part III explained how the affects arise; Part IV asks how strong they are, why knowledge of the good is so often powerless against them, and what in them is good or bad. Part V will then show what the mind can do against them.
Part IV is the longest Part of the Ethics, and in some ways the most varied. It contains a theory of value, an analysis of the weakness of reason, an ethics of self-preservation that turns out to be an ethics of community, a brief political philosophy, a judgment on each of the principal affects, the portrait of a free man, and an Appendix that restates the whole in continuous prose. Readers who come to it looking for the ethics promised by the title of the book find much of it here. But they should be prepared for an ethics unlike most others: one without free will, without obligation in the usual sense, without any good independent of human striving, and yet with a definite and demanding picture of how to live.
The Preface: perfection, good and evil
Before beginning, the Preface does something that might seem to undo the Appendix to Part I. There Spinoza had argued that good and bad, perfect and imperfect, order and confusion are notions men form from their own appetites and project onto nature. The Preface agrees, and gives a history of the words. “If someone has decided to make something and has finished it, he will call his thing perfect”; a house is called imperfect while it is still being built, and perfect when it has been brought to the end its author intended. That seems to have been the “first meaning” of the words. But once men began to form universal ideas and to devise models of houses, buildings and towers, each called perfect what agreed with the universal idea he had formed, and imperfect what agreed less with it, even when the builder thought it finished. Men then applied the same models to natural things, believing that nature, “which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end,” looks to these models and sets them before itself (Preface).
But nature does not act for an end. “That eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists”; as it exists for the sake of no end, so it acts for the sake of no end. What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite whose causes are unknown, as habitation is the final cause of a house only in the sense that a man, imagining the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build one. Perfection and imperfection are therefore “only modes of thinking,” notions we form by comparing individuals of the same kind with one another. Good and evil likewise “indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from the fact that we compare things with one another.” One and the same thing can be good, bad and indifferent at once: “music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who mourns, and neither good nor bad for one who is deaf” (Preface).
Yet Spinoza decides to keep the words. “For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words in the sense I have indicated.” Good will mean “that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which we set before ourselves,” and evil what we certainly know prevents us from resembling it; and men will be called more or less perfect as they come nearer to the model or are further from it. Perfection, finally, is not a change from one essence to another, “for a horse, for example, is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if into an insect,” but an increase or decrease in a thing’s power of acting. By perfection in general Spinoza understands reality, “the essence of any thing insofar as it exists and operates in a certain way, without any regard to its duration”; no thing is more perfect because it lasts longer.
The Preface is short, but it resolves a tension the reader may have felt since Part I. If good and evil are only modes of thinking, how can there be an ethics? Spinoza’s answer is that ethics does not need goods that exist in nature independently of us. It needs only a model of human nature, an idea of a human being whose power of acting is greater than ours, and the knowledge of what brings us nearer to it. The model is not an end that nature pursues. It is an idea we form, and use, because we compare, and because the comparison is useful.
Definitions and the single axiom
The definitions translate these notions into the vocabulary of utility. “By good I shall understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us” (Def. 1), and by evil “that which we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good” (Def. 2). The word “certainly” matters: Part IV is concerned with what reason knows to be good, not with what the passions take to be so. Two definitions bring back, with explicit epistemic definitions, the words “contingent” and “possible” that Part I had banished from nature. Singular things are called contingent “insofar as, when we attend only to their essence, we find nothing which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it,” and possible “insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether these are determined to produce them” (Defs. 3–4). The definitions do not reintroduce contingency into things; they name ways in which a mind ignorant of the whole order of causes must think of them. “By the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite” (Def. 7). And “by virtue and power I understand the same thing,” so that virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is “the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (Def. 8). Virtue is not obedience, and not a disposition to follow rules; it is power, the power of acting from one’s own nature.
The Part has a single axiom, and it is grim: “There is no singular thing in the nature of things than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. But given any one, there is another more powerful by which the given one can be destroyed” (Axiom). Everything finite can be destroyed by something else, and the first group of propositions draws the consequences for human beings.
Human weakness
“We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others” (Prop. 2). “The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes” (Prop. 3). It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature and should undergo no changes except those of which he is the adequate cause (Prop. 4), and so “man is necessarily always subject to passions” (Prop. 4, Cor.). The force of a passion is defined not by our own power but by the power of its external cause compared with ours (Prop. 5), and it can surpass all our other actions, “so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man” (Prop. 6). From this comes the principle on which the rest of the argument turns: “An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained” (Prop. 7).
The next propositions explain why knowledge is so often defeated. “The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it” (Prop. 8). It follows that “the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (Prop. 14). Knowledge does not stand outside the affects and command them; it can act on them only by being itself an affect, and then it is subject to the same laws of strength and weakness as any other. A desire that arises from true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished by many other desires (Prop. 15), especially by desires for things pleasant in the present when the knowledge concerns the future (Prop. 16), and still more easily when it concerns things we regard as contingent (Prop. 17). The intermediate propositions on affects toward future, past, necessary and contingent things (Props. 9–13) supply the mechanism: an image of something present is stronger than an image of something future, and an image of something necessary stronger than one of something contingent.
The scholium to Prop. 17 draws the moral and quotes two witnesses. “With these I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason.” Hence the poet’s saying, “I see and approve the better, I follow the worse,” and Ecclesiastes: “He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.” Spinoza adds at once that he does not say this in order to conclude that ignorance is better than knowledge. “It is necessary to know both the power and the lack of power of our nature, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects and what it cannot do” (Prop. 17, Schol.). The analysis of weakness is the first step toward strength.
The dictates of reason
Then the tone changes. The scholium to Prop. 18 sets out “the dictates of reason” in advance of their demonstration, “so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone.” “Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it demands, therefore, that each man love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, and want everything which really leads man to a greater perfection, and, absolutely, that each strive to preserve his own being as far as it is in him.” Since virtue is acting from the laws of one’s own nature, “the foundation of virtue is the very striving to preserve one’s own being, and ... happiness consists in a man’s being able to preserve his being.” Virtue is to be wanted for its own sake, and there is nothing more excellent for whose sake it ought to be wanted. Those who kill themselves “lack power of mind and are completely conquered by external causes opposed to their nature.”
The scholium then turns from the individual to others. We can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves, and of the things outside us none is more useful than those that agree entirely with our nature. “To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man; nothing, I say, can men wish for that is more excellent for preserving their being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body.” From this it follows that men who are governed by reason “want nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men.” Spinoza explains that he has set out these dictates in advance because some believe that the principle that everyone is bound to seek his own advantage is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety, and he wants to show briefly that the contrary is true.
Props. 19–37 demonstrate these claims. “The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue” (Prop. 20). “The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue” (Prop. 22, Cor.). To act absolutely from virtue is “to act, to live, to preserve our being (these three signify the same) from the guidance of reason, and that from the foundation of seeking one’s own advantage” (Prop. 24). Reason then defines what our advantage really is. “Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding” (Prop. 26), and “we know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding” (Prop. 27). And so: “The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God” (Prop. 28).
Agreement and the state
The ethics of self-preservation becomes an ethics of community through the notion of agreement in nature. “Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good” (Prop. 31). Insofar as men are subject to passions they do not agree in nature, and can be contrary to one another (Props. 32–34). “Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature” (Prop. 35), and so “there is no singular thing in the nature of things which is more useful to man than a man who lives from the guidance of reason” (Prop. 35, Cor. 1). The paradox is stated in the second corollary: “When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another” (Prop. 35, Cor. 2). The scholium appeals to experience, which testifies so often to this truth “that it is in almost everyone’s mouth that man is a God to man.” Men rarely live by reason, and are for the most part envious and troublesome to one another; but they can hardly lead a solitary life, and far more benefits than harms arise from their common society. “Let the satirists, then, laugh at human affairs as much as they like, let the theologians detest them, and let the melancholy praise as much as they can an uncultivated and rustic life, and despise men and admire the beasts”; men will still find that they can provide what they need much more easily by mutual help (Prop. 35, Schol.).
“The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally” (Prop. 36), since the knowledge of God is not diminished by being shared. “The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men, and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has” (Prop. 37). The first scholium to Prop. 37 defines religion, piety and honourableness in these terms: whatever we desire and do insofar as we have the idea of God is religion; “the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason I call piety”; the desire to join others to oneself in friendship is honourableness. It also contains one of the most uncomfortable sentences in the book: the principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to form close ties with men, but not with beasts, so that “the law against slaughtering beasts is founded more on empty superstition and womanish compassion than on sound reason” (Prop. 37, Schol. 1).
The second scholium sketches a political philosophy. “Each one exists by the highest right of nature,” and so by the highest right of nature each judges what is good and evil, looks to his own advantage, and avenges himself. If men lived by reason, each could exercise this right without harm to others. But because they are subject to affects that far surpass their power, they are drawn in different directions while they need one another’s help, and so, in order to live harmoniously, they must give up their natural right and make one another confident that they will do nothing to harm another (Prop. 37, Schol. 2). This is done by the principle of Prop. 7: an affect is restrained only by a stronger affect, and so society can be established if it claims for itself the right of avenging injuries and of judging good and evil, and has the power to make laws backed by threats. In such a civil state, and only there, sin, merit, justice and injustice have a meaning: sin is disobedience punished by the right of the state, merit is obedience, and justice and injustice concern what common consent has decided belongs to each. “From which it is evident that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which explain the nature of the mind.” The theory is close to Hobbes’s in its starting point, the natural right of each and the fear that makes men give it up. Its conclusion, which the Theological-Political Treatise develops, is different: “the end of the state, therefore, is really freedom” (Finis ergo Reipublicae revera libertas est; TTP ch. 20).
The evaluation of the affects
The rest of the Part evaluates. What disposes the human body to be affected in many ways and to affect other bodies in many ways is useful (Prop. 38), and what preserves the ratio of motion and rest among its parts is good (Prop. 39). “Joy is not directly evil, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil” (Prop. 41). “Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good” (Prop. 42); pleasure, which affects one part of the body more than the rest, can be excessive (Prop. 43). Love and desire can be excessive too, when they are attached to one object to the exclusion of others. “Hatred can never be good” (Prop. 45), and “he who lives from the guidance of reason strives as far as he can to repay another’s hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him with love in return, or nobility” (Prop. 46).
The judgments on the affects that ordinary morality admires are severe. “The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves” (Prop. 47). “Pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless” (Prop. 50), though Spinoza adds that “he who is moved neither by reason nor by pity to help others is rightly called inhuman” (Prop. 50, Schol.). “Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason” (Prop. 53). “Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power” (Prop. 54). Against these stands the self-contentment that arises from reason, which “is the greatest there can be” (Prop. 52), and its scholium calls it “the highest thing we can hope for.”
The judgments are tempered by a realism that is easy to miss. The scholium to Prop. 54 grants that since men rarely live by reason, humility and repentance, and hope and fear as well, “bring more advantage than harm; and so, since men must err, it is better that they err in that direction. For if men lacking in power of mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united and held together? The mob is a terror, unless it is afraid.” It is no wonder, Spinoza adds, that the prophets, who looked to the common advantage and not to that of a few, commended humility, repentance and reverence so greatly (Prop. 54, Schol.). The ethics of reason is for those who can live by it; for the rest, Spinoza allows, the passions that ordinary morality cultivates do useful work.
Reason as a guide to action
The last group of propositions before the free man shows that reason can do everything the passions do, and better. “To all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason without it” (Prop. 59). “He who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason” (Prop. 63), and “by a desire which arises from reason we follow the good directly and flee evil indirectly” (Prop. 63, Cor.). “The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge” (Prop. 64). Reason prefers a greater future good to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil to a greater future one (Prop. 66), since it regards things under a species of eternity and is not affected more by the image of a present thing than by that of a future one. The scholium to Prop. 66 contrasts the man led by affect or opinion, who “whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant,” with the man led by reason, who “complies with no one’s wishes but his own”; Spinoza calls the first a slave, the second free.
The free man and the Appendix
The last seven propositions describe the free man, and an essay before them introduces his portrait. An Appendix of thirty-two chapters follows, in which Spinoza collects what the Part has taught about the right way of living, which had been demonstrated piecemeal, and brings it under main headings in continuous prose.
Questions the reader will meet
Part IV raises more objections from first-time readers than any other part of the book, and some of them deserve an answer in advance.
The first is the charge of egoism. Spinoza says that virtue is seeking one’s own advantage, and that no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another. But the advantage reason seeks is understanding, and the highest good is the knowledge of God, which is common to all and diminished by no one’s possession of it. The man who lives by reason wants for others what he wants for himself, not as a sacrifice but because the reason that guides him is the same in them. Whether this is an ethics of enlightened self-interest or a genuine overcoming of the opposition between self and others is a question readers have answered differently, but it is not the crude egoism the first sentences of the scholium to Prop. 18 may suggest.
The second concerns obligation. There is no free will, and good and evil are modes of thinking; how then can Spinoza say what we “ought” to do? When Spinoza speaks of the “dictates” of reason he means what reason prescribes in the sense of what follows from the nature of a being that understands. The ethics of Part IV describes what a more powerful human being does, and what brings us nearer to being one. It addresses readers as beings who can understand, and whose understanding, once acquired, will act in them as an affect.
The third concerns the model of human nature. The Preface introduces it as an idea we form because we compare things, and Part I attacked the projection of models onto nature. Is the model of Part IV a relapse into the teleology of the Appendix? Spinoza’s answer is that the model is a human idea, used by human beings, and that he never claims that nature aims at it. It is useful because the mind that has it is moved by it, and because it measures what really increases our power.
The fourth concerns the strength of reason. Part IV says that true knowledge as such cannot restrain any affect, and that men are necessarily always subject to passions. How then can reason guide life at all? The answer is that knowledge is not only true but also, in us, an affect, and that affects arising from reason are related to what is common to things and so are always present to the mind, while the passions depend on what is changing and absent. Part V will develop this answer into its remedies. Part IV prepares it by showing what reason would choose if it were strong enough.
The place of Part IV in the whole
Part IV is the practical centre of the Ethics. It takes the theory of the affects from Part III and turns it into an account of how to live; it takes the theory of reason from Part II and turns it into a picture of the free man; and it takes the metaphysics of Part I, with its denial of final causes and of free will, and shows that an ethics can be built without either. Part V will add what Part IV leaves open: what the mind can actually do against the passions, and in what the freedom and blessedness of the mind consist. The closing scholium of Part IV already points there, referring everything said about the true freedom of man to strength of character, to tenacity and nobility.
The text begins with the Preface on perfection and imperfection, good and evil. It is one of Spinoza’s clearest pieces of prose, and the definitions and the single axiom that follow it should be read in its light.
Praefatio
Preface
[G II 205] Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus
servitutem voco. Homo enim affectibus obnoxius sui iuris non est, sed fortunae, in cuius potestate ita est, ut saepe coactus sit, quamquam meliora sibi videat, deteriora tamen sequi.
a Huius rei causam, et quid praeterea affectus boni vel mali habent, in hac parte demonstrare proposui. Sed antequam incipiam, pauca de
perfectione et
imperfectione, deque
bono et
malob praefari lubet.
Man’s lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects I call
bondage. For a man who is subject to the affects is not under his own control,
1 but under that of fortune, in whose power he is to such an extent that he is often compelled, although he sees the better for himself, still to follow the worse.
2 The cause of this, and what, besides, the affects have that is good or evil, I have proposed to demonstrate in this Part. But before I begin, I should like to say a few things first about
perfection and
imperfection, and about
good and
evil.
- a Vid. Ovid. metam. l. VII. v. 20. 21. [Bruder]
- b perfectione et imperfectione, deque bono et malo] transcr. perfectione et imperfectione, deque bono et malo. Italics: the emphasis is misplaced in the transcription.
- 1 sui iuris non est: literally, ‘is not of his own right’, a legal expression for one who is not subject to another’s power. The Political Treatise defines it: each is under another’s right as long as he is in another’s power, and under his own right insofar as he can repel all force and avenge an injury done to him as he judges fit, and absolutely, insofar as he can live according to his own temperament (II.9); and ‘the mind is entirely under its own right insofar as it can use reason rightly’, so that those are most under their own right ‘qui maxime ratione pollent, quique maxime eadem ducuntur’ (‘who are most powerful in reason and are most guided by it’, II.11).
- 2 Medea’s words in Ovid, Metamorphoses VII.20–21, already quoted in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. and quoted again in Prop. 17, Schol..
Qui rem aliquam facere constituit eamque perfecit, rem suam perfectam esse non tantum ipse, sed etiam unusquisque, qui mentem auctoris illius operis et scopum recte noverit aut se novisse crediderit, dicet. Ex. gr. si quis aliquod opus (quod suppono nondum esse peractum) viderit, noveritque scopum auctoris illius operis esse domum aedificare, is domum imperfectam esse dicet, et contra perfectam, simulatque opus ad finem, quem eius auctor eidem dare constituerat, perductum viderit. Verum si quis opus aliquod videt, cuius simile nunquam viderat, nec mentem opificis novit, is sane scire non poterit, opusne illud perfectum, an imperfectum sit. Atque haec videtur prima fuisse horum vocabulorum significatio.
If someone has decided to make something and has finished it, he will call his thing perfect; and so will anyone who rightly knows, or believes he knows, the mind and aim of the author of that work. For example, if someone sees a work (which I suppose not yet to be completed) and knows that the aim of its author is to build a house, he will say that the house is imperfect; and on the other hand perfect, as soon as he sees that the work has been brought to the end which its author had decided to give it. But if someone sees a work whose like he had never seen, and does not know the mind of the maker, he will certainly not be able to know whether that work is perfect or imperfect. And this seems to have been the first meaning of these words.
Sed postquam homines ideas universales formare, et domuum, aedificiorum, turrium etc. exemplaria excogitare, et alia rerum exemplaria aliis praeferre inceperunt, factum est, ut unusquisque id perfectum vocaret, quod cum universali idea, quam eiusmodi rei formaverat, videret convenire,
a et id contra imperfectum, quod cum concepto suo exemplari minus convenire videret, quamquam ex opificis sententia consummatum plane esset. Nec alia videtur esse ratio, cur res naturales etiam, quae scilicet humana manu non sunt factae, perfectas aut imperfectas vulgo appellent; solent namque homines tam rerum naturalium, quam artificialium ideas formare universales, quas rerum veluti exemplaria habent et quas naturam (quam nihil nisi alicuius finis causa agere existimant) intueri credunt sibique exemplaria proponere. Cum itaque aliquid in natura fieri vident, quod cum concepto exemplari, quod rei eiusmodi habent, minus convenit, ipsam naturam tum defecisse vel peccavisse, remque illam imperfectam reliquisse credunt. Videmus itaque homines consuevisse, res naturales perfectas aut imperfectas vocare magis ex praeiudicio, quam ex earum vera cognitione.
But after men began to form universal ideas, and to think out models of houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer some models of things to others, it came about that each called perfect what he saw agree with the universal idea he had formed of a thing of this kind, and imperfect, on the other hand, what he saw agree less with the model he had conceived, even though in the opinion of the maker it had been entirely finished. Nor does there seem to be any other reason why men commonly call natural things too, which have not been made by human hand, perfect or imperfect; for men are accustomed to form universal ideas of natural things as well as of artificial ones, which they hold as models of things, and which they believe nature (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to and sets before itself as models. When, therefore, they see something happen in nature which agrees less with the model they have conceived of a thing of this kind, they believe that nature itself has then failed or erred, and left that thing imperfect. We see, therefore, that men have been accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of them.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 162) has viderat; Van Vloten–Land, after Schmidt, Auerbach and Saisset, correct to videret, and Gebhardt (G II 206; Textgestaltung II 376) follows.
Ostendimus enim in primae partis appendice naturam propter finem non agere; aeternum namque illud et infinitum ens, quod Deum seu naturam appellamus, eadem, qua existit necessitate agit. Ex qua enim naturae necessitate existit, ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus (prop. 16. P. 1.).
b Ratio igitur seu causa, cur Deus seu natura agit et cur existit, una eademque est. Ut ergo nullius finis causa existit, nullius etiam finis causa agit; sed ut existendi, sic et agendi principium vel finem habet nullum.
For we have shown in the
Appendix of the first Part that nature does not act for the sake of an end; for that eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature,
1 acts by the same necessity by which it exists. For we have shown that it acts by the same necessity of nature by which it exists (
Prop. 16 of Part I). The reason, therefore, or cause, why God, or nature, acts and why it exists is one and the same. As, therefore, it exists for the sake of no end, so it also acts for the sake of no end; but as it has no principle or end of existing, so it has none of acting either.
- b ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus (prop. 16. P. 1.).] transcr. ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus. Vide prop.16. P. 1. As in Gebhardt (G II 206), ‘ostendimus (Prop. 16. p. 1.)’; the transcription has a separate sentence ‘Vide prop. 16. P. 1.’.
- 1 Deum seu naturam: the phrase occurs here for the first time in the Ethics, twice in a few lines, and again in Prop. 4, Dem.. The ‘or’ (seu) introduces an equivalent description, as throughout (see the note on Part I, Def. 1); the thought is that of Part I, Prop. 29, Schol., where nature as natura naturans is God. The Dutch version of 1677 omits seu naturam in both places, saying only ‘which we call God’ (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 377).
Causa autem, quae finalis dicitur, nihil est praeter ipsum humanum appetitum, quatenus is alicuius rei veluti principium seu causa primaria consideratur. Ex. gr. cum dicimus habitationem causam fuisse finalem huius aut illius domus, nihil tum sane intelligimus aliud, quam quod homo ex eo, quod vitae domesticae commoda imaginatus est, appetitum habuit aedificandi domum. Quare habitatio, quatenus ut finalis causa consideratur, nihil est praeter hunc singularem appetitum, qui revera causa est efficiens, quae ut prima consideratur, quia homines suorum appetituum causas communiter ignorant. Sunt namque, ut iam saepe dixi, suarum quidem actionum et appetituum conscii, sed ignari causarum, a quibus ad aliquid appetendum determinantur. Quod praeterea vulgo aiunt, naturam aliquando deficere vel peccare, resque imperfectas producere, inter commenta numero, de quibus in app. P. 1. egi.
But what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself,
2 insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, we certainly understand nothing but that a man, because he imagined the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So habitation, insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing but this singular appetite, which is really an efficient cause, which is considered as first because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites. For they are, as I have often said, conscious of their actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to want something. As for what they commonly say, that nature sometimes fails or errs and produces imperfect things, I number this among the fictions which I treated in the
Appendix of Part I.
- 2 So Def. 7: ‘by the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite.’ The final cause is not abolished in human action but reinterpreted as an efficient cause mistaken for a first one, because its own causes are unknown.
Perfectio igitur et imperfectio revera modi solummodo cogitandi sunt, nempe notiones, quas fingere solemus ex eo, quod eiusdem speciei aut generis individua ad invicem comparamus. Et hac de causa supra (def. 6. P. 2.) dixi me per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligere; solemus enim omnia naturae individua ad unum genus, quod generalissimum appellatur, revocare; nempe ad notionem entis, quae ad omnia absolute naturae individua pertinet. Quatenus itaque naturae individua ad hoc genus revocamus, et ad invicem comparamus, et alia plus entitatis seu realitatis, quam alia habere comperimus, eatenus alia aliis perfectiora esse dicimus; et quatenus iisdem aliquid tribuimus, quod negationem involvit, ut terminus, finis, impotentia etc., eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus,
c quia nostram mentem non aeque afficiunt, ac illa, quae perfecta vocamus, et non quod ipsis aliquid, quod suum sit, deficiat vel quod natura peccaverit. Nihil enim naturae alicuius rei competit, nisi id quod ex necessitate naturae causae efficientis sequitur; et quicquid ex necessitate naturae causae efficientis sequitur, id necessario fit.
Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are in truth only modes of thinking, namely notions which we are accustomed to feign from the fact that we compare individuals of the same species or genus with one another. And for this reason I said above (
Def. 6 of Part II) that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing; for we are accustomed to refer all the individuals of nature to one genus, which is called the most general, namely to the notion of being,
3 which pertains absolutely to all the individuals of nature. Insofar, therefore, as we refer the individuals of nature to this genus, and compare them with one another, and find that some have more being, or reality, than others, to that extent we say that some are more perfect than others; and insofar as we attribute to them something which involves negation, such as limit, end, lack of power, etc., to that extent we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind as much as those which we call perfect, and not because they lack something which is theirs, or because nature has erred. For nothing belongs to the nature of any thing except what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily happens.
- c eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus] transcr. eatenus ipsa imperfectaappellamus. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
- 3 Aristotle had denied that being is a genus: ‘οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἓν εἶναι γένος οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὄν’ (‘it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things’, Metaphysics B.3, 998b20–22). Spinoza is not taking a side in that dispute; he describes a habit of thought, the comparison of all things in terms of more or less being.
[G II 208] Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus, in se scilicet consideratis, indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos seu notiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus. Nam una eademque res potest eodem tempore bona et mala, et etiam indifferens esse. Ex. gr. musica bona est melancholico, mala lugenti; surdo autem neque bona neque mala. Verum quamvis se res ita habeat, nobis tamen haec vocabula retinenda sunt.
As for good and evil, they too indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from the fact that we compare things with one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who mourns, and neither good nor bad for one who is deaf. But although this is so, we must nevertheless retain these words.
Nam quia ideam hominis, tamquam naturae humanae exemplar, quod intueamur, formare cupimus, nobis ex usu erit, haec eadem vocabula eo, quo dixi, sensu retinere. Per bonum itaque in seqq. intelligam id, quod certo scimus medium esse, ut ad exemplar humanae naturae, quod nobis proponimus, magis magisque accedamus; per malum autem id, quod certo scimus impedire, quominus idem exemplar referamus. Deinde homines perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus, quatenus ad hoc idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt.
For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to,
1 it will be useful to us to retain these same words in the sense I have indicated. By good, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which we set before ourselves; by evil, that which we certainly know prevents us from resembling that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or more imperfect insofar as they come nearer to or are further from this same model.
- 1 exemplar: the word the previous paragraph used for the universal ideas men compare things with. The model is admitted as a useful notion, not as a form in nature. Spinoza does not mention it again; it is usually identified with the free man of Props. 67–73, who lives by the ‘dictates of reason’ of Prop. 18, Schol., though the identification has been disputed (Appendix H).
Nam apprime notandum est, cum dico, aliquem a minore ad maiorem perfectionem transire, et contra, me non intelligere quod ex una essentia seu forma in aliam mutatur (equus namque ex. gr. tam destruitur, si in hominem, quam si in insectum mutetur); sed quod eius agendi potentiam, quatenus haec per ipsius naturam intelligitur, augeri vel minui concipimus. Denique per perfectionem in genere realitatem,
a uti dixi, intelligam, hoc est rei cuiuscumque essentiam, quatenus certo modo existit et operatur, nulla ipsius durationis habita ratione. Nam nulla res singularis potest ideo dici perfectior, quia plus temporis in existendo perseveravit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit, quandoquidem rerum essentia nullum certum et determinatum existendi tempus involvit; sed res quaecumque, sive ea perfectior sit sive minus, eadem vi, qua existere incipit, semper in existendo perseverare poterit, ita ut omnes hac in re aequales sint.
For it should be especially noted that when I say that someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, and the contrary, I do not understand that he is changed from one essence, or form, into another (for a horse, for example, is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if into an insect); but that we conceive his power of acting, insofar as it is understood through his nature, to be increased or diminished.
2 Finally, by perfection in general I shall understand reality, as I have said, that is, the essence of any thing insofar as it exists and operates in a certain way, without any regard to its duration. For no singular thing can be called more perfect because it has persevered in existing for a longer time; for the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing; but any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist, so that in this respect all are equal.
- a Denique per perfectionem in genere realitatem] transcr. Deinde perperfectionem in genere realitatem. The 1677 edition (OP p. 164), Gebhardt (G II 209) and Bartuschat read ‘Denique per perfectionem’; the transcription has ‘Deinde perperfectionem’.
- 2 Becoming more perfect is not becoming something else but being more fully what one is. This is the passage to greater perfection that defines joy (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol.; Def. Aff. 3, Expl.).
Definitiones
Definitions
[G II 209] I. Per bonum id intelligam, quod certo scimus nobis esse utile.
I. By
good I shall understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
1 - 1 certo scimus: the definitions of Part IV are given from the standpoint of reason, as the Preface explained. In Part III, Prop. 39, Schol. good was whatever each judged good from his own affect.
II. Per malum autem id, quod certo scimus impedire, quominus boni alicuius simus compotes.
II. By evil, however, that which we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good.
De his praecedentem vide praefationem sub finem.
III. Res singulares voco contingentes, quatenus, dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus, quod earum existentiam necessario ponat, vel quod ipsam necessario secludat.
III. I call singular things contingent insofar as, when we attend only to their essence, we find nothing which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it.
IV. Easdem res singulares voco possibiles, quatenus, dum ad causas, ex quibus produci debent, attendimus, nescimus, an ipsae determinatae sint ad easdem producendum.
IV. I call the same singular things possible insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether these are determined to produce them.
In schol. 1. prop. 33. P. 1. inter possibile et contingens nullam feci differentiam, quia ibi non opus erat haec accurate distinguere.
In
Schol. 1 of Prop. 33 of Part I I made no difference between the possible and the contingent, because there was no need there to distinguish them accurately.
1- 1 There a thing was called contingent ‘only on account of a defect of our knowledge’. The distinction now drawn locates the defect: contingency concerns what we know of a thing’s essence, possibility what we know of its causes. Both remain relative to our knowledge; the difference matters for the strength of the affects (Props. 11–13).
V. Per contrarios affectus in seqq. intelligam eos, qui hominem diversum trahunt, quamvis eiusdem sint generis, ut luxuries et avaritia, quae amoris sunt species; nec natura, sed per accidens sunt contrarii.
V. By contrary affects I shall understand in what follows those which draw a man in different directions, even though they are of the same genus, like gluttony and greed, which are species of love; and they are contrary not by nature but accidentally.
[G II 210] VI. Quid per affectum erga rem futuram, praesentem et praeteritam intelligam, explicui in schol. 1. et 2. prop. 18. P. 3., quod vide.
Sed venit hic praeterea notandum, quod ut loci, sic etiam temporis, distantiam non nisi usque ad certum quendam limitem possumus distincte imaginari, hoc est, sicut omnia illa obiecta, quae ultra ducentos pedes a nobis distant, seu quorum distantia a loco, in quo sumus, illam superat, quam distincte imaginamur, aeque longe
a a nobis distare, et perinde ac si in eodem plano essent, imaginari solemus; sic etiam obiecta, quorum existendi tempus longiore a praesenti intervallo abesse imaginamur, quam quod distincte imaginari solemus, omnia aeque longe a praesenti distare imaginamur et ad unum quasi temporis momentum referimus.
But it should be noted here besides that, as with distance of place, so also with distance of time, we can imagine distinctly only up to a certain limit; that is, just as we usually imagine all those objects which are more than two hundred feet away from us, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we imagine distinctly, to be equally far from us, and as if they were in the same plane, so also we imagine all objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by a longer interval than we usually imagine distinctly to be equally far from the present, and we refer them as it were to one moment of time.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 166) has aequè a nobis distare; the Dutch version has even verre van ons af te zijn. Leopold rightly asks for aequè longè, as in the second half of the sentence; W. Meijer and Appuhn insert longe, and Gebhardt (G II 210; Textgestaltung II 377) prints it.
VII. Per finem, cuius causa aliquid facimus, appetitum intelligo.
VII. By the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite.
VIII. Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) virtus, quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus potestatem habet quaedam efficiendi, quae per solas ipsius naturae leges possunt intelligi.
VIII. By
virtue and
power I understand the same thing;
1 that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.
- 1 The definition gives virtus its root sense of strength or efficacy, the sense it had in Part I, Prop. 11, Schol., Part II, Prop. 1, Schol. and the Preface to Part III (‘its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same’), and which Part III, Prop. 55, Cor. 2, Dem. stated outright (‘power of acting, or (which is the same) virtue’); it joins it to the doctrine that a thing’s power is its actual essence (Part III, Prop. 7). Virtue is acting from the laws of one’s own nature, that is, being the adequate cause of what one does; hence the more each seeks his own advantage, the more virtue he has (Prop. 20).
Axioma
Axiom
Axiomata
Axioms
[G II 210] Nulla res singularis in rerum natura datur, qua potentior et fortior non detur alia. Sed quacumque data datur alia potentior, a qua illa data potest destrui.
There is no singular thing in the nature of things than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. But given any one, there is another more powerful by which the given one can be destroyed.
1- 1 Part IV has a single axiom, but it seems once to have had more. The 1677 edition cites ‘Axiom. 1. hujus’ in Prop. 7, Dem. and ‘Axiom. 3. hujus’ in Prop. 31, Dem., and corrects both to ‘Axioma hujus’ in its errata, which the Dutch version follows. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 377, 380) concludes that Spinoza first wrote at least three axioms and struck the others before the Dutch translation was made; the third, cited in Prop. 31, must have said that what is indifferent does not by its nature serve the preservation of our nature.
Propositiones
Propositions
Propositio I
Proposition I
[G II 211] Nihil, quod idea falsa positivum habet, tollitur praesentia veri, quatenus verum.
Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true.
Demonstratio. Falsitas in sola privatione cognitionis, quam ideae inadaequatae involvunt, consistit (per prop. 35. P. 2.), nec ipsae aliquid habent positivum, propter quod falsae dicuntur (per prop. 33. P. 2.); sed contra, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt (per prop. 32. P. 2.). Si igitur id quod idea falsa positivum habet, praesentia veri, quatenus verum est, tolleretur, tolleretur ergo idea vera a se ipsa, quod (per prop. 4. P. 3.) est absurdum. Ergo nihil, quod idea etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Falsity consists only in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (by
Prop. 35 of Part II), nor do they have anything positive on account of which they are called false (by
Prop. 33 of Part II); on the contrary, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by
Prop. 32 of Part II). If, therefore, what a false idea has that is positive were removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, a true idea would be removed by itself, which (by
Prop. 4 of Part III) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive which a false idea, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Intelligitur haec propositio clarius ex coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2. Nam imaginatio idea est, quae magis
a corporis humani praesentem constitutionem, quam corporis externi naturam indicat, non quidem distincte, sed confuse; unde fit, ut mens errare dicatur. Ex. gr. cum solem intuemur, eundem ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur; in quo tamdiu fallimur, quamdiu veram eius distantiam ignoramus; sed cognita eiusdem distantia
b tollitur quidem error, sed non imaginatio, hoc est, idea solis, quae eiusdem naturam eatenus tantum explicat, quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur; adeoque quamvis veram eiusdem distantiam noscamus, ipsum nihilominus prope nobis adesse imaginabimur.
Scholium. This Proposition is understood more clearly from
Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II. For an imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external body, not distinctly, indeed, but confusedly; from which it comes about that the mind is said to err. For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us; in which we are deceived as long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is known, the error is indeed removed, but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only insofar as the body is affected by it; and so, although we know its true distance, we shall nevertheless imagine it as near us.
- a Nam imaginatio idea est, quae magis] transcr. Nam imaginatio idea, est quae magis. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 211).
- b quamdiu veram eius distantiam ignoramus; sed cognita eiusdem distantia] transcr. quamdiu veram eius distantiam ignoramus. Cognita eiusdem distantia. The 1677 edition (OP p. 167), Gebhardt (G II 211) and Bartuschat read ‘ignoramus; sed cognita’; the transcription omits ‘sed’ and begins a new sentence.
Nam ut in schol. prop. 35. P. 2. diximus, non ea de causa solem adeo propinquum imaginamur, quia eius veram distantiam ignoramus, sed quia mens eatenus magnitudinem solis concipit, quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur. Sic cum solis radii aquae superficiei incidentes ad nostros oculos reflectuntur, eundem perinde, ac si in aqua esset, imaginamur; tametsi verum eius locum noverimus. Et sic reliquae imaginationes, quibus mens fallitur, sive eae naturalem corporis constitutionem, sive quod eiusdem agendi potentiam augeri vel minui indicant, vero non sunt contrariae, nec eiusdem praesentia evanescunt. Fit quidem, cum falso aliquod malum timemus, ut timor evanescat audito vero nuntio; sed contra etiam fit, cum malum quod certe venturum est, timemus, ut timor etiam evanescat audito falso nuntio. Atque adeo imaginationes non praesentia veri, quatenus verum, evanescunt; sed quia aliae occurrunt iis fortiores, quae rerum, quas imaginamur, praesentem existentiam secludunt, ut prop. 17. P. 2. ostendimus.
For as we said in the
Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part II, we do not imagine the sun so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the size of the sun insofar as the body is affected by it. So when the rays of the sun, falling on the surface of water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine it as if it were in the water, even though we know its true place. And so the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or that its power of acting is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the true, nor do they vanish by its presence. It does indeed happen, when we falsely fear some evil, that the fear vanishes on hearing true news;
1 but on the contrary it also happens, when we fear an evil which is certainly going to come, that the fear also vanishes on hearing false news. And so imaginations do not vanish by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, but because others occur which are stronger than them and exclude the present existence of the things we imagine,
2 as we showed in
Prop. 17 of Part II.
- 1 timor, here in its ordinary sense, is rendered ‘fear’, as in a few other places of Part IV (Prop. 37, Schol. 2; Prop. 63, Dem.; Prop. 63, Cor., Schol.); as the name of the affect defined in Part III, Def. Aff. 39 it is ‘timidity’, which Part III, Prop. 39, Schol. calls ‘nothing but fear’ of a certain kind. ‘Fear’ otherwise renders metus (Def. Aff. 13).
- 2 The principle of Part IV: truth as such does not dislodge an imagination or an affect; only a stronger contrary one does (Prop. 7), and true knowledge can restrain an affect only insofar as it is itself considered as an affect (Prop. 14). Part V asks what affects arise from knowledge and how strong they can be.
Propositio II
Proposition II
[G II 212] Nos eatenus patimur, quatenus naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis non potest concipi.
We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others.
Demonstratio. Nos tum pati dicimur, cum aliquid in nobis oritur, cuius non nisi partialis sumus causa (per defin. 2. P. 3.), hoc est (per defin. 1. P. 3.) aliquid, quod ex solis legibus nostrae naturae deduci nequit. Patimur igitur, quatenus naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis nequit concipi. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We are said to be acted on when something arises in us of which we are only a partial cause (by
Def. 2 of Part III), that is (by
Def. 1 of Part III), something which cannot be deduced from the laws of our nature alone. We are acted on, therefore, insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others. Q.E.D.
Propositio III
Proposition III
Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.
The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.
Demonstratio. Patet ex axiom. huius.
a Nam dato homine datur aliquid aliud, puta A potentius, et dato A datur deinde aliud, puta B, ipso A potentius et hoc in infinitum. Ac proinde potentia hominis potentia alterius rei definitur, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This is evident from the
Axiom of this Part. For given a man, there is something else, say A, more powerful; and given A, there is then something else, say B, more powerful than A; and so to infinity. And therefore the power of a man is defined by the power of another thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.
- a Patet ex axiom. huius.] transcr. Patet ex axiom. huius partis. Gebhardt (G II 212) reads ‘Patet ex Axiomate hujus’, without ‘partis’.
Propositio IV
Proposition IV
Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adaequata sit causa.
It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.
[G II 213] Demonstratio. Potentia, qua res singulares, et consequenter homo suum esse conservat, est ipsa Dei sive naturae potentia (per coroll. prop. 24. P. 1.
a), non quatenus infinita est, sed quatenus per humanam actualem essentiam explicari potest (per prop. 7. P. 3.). Potentia itaque hominis, quatenus per ipsius actualem essentiam explicatur, pars est infinitae Dei seu naturae potentiae, hoc est (per prop. 34. P. 1.), essentiae. Quod erat primum.
Demonstration. The power by which singular things, and consequently man, preserve their being is the very power of God, or nature
1 (by
Cor. of Prop. 24 of Part I), not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the actual essence of man (by
Prop. 7 of Part III). The power of man, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God, or nature, that is (by
Prop. 34 of Part I), of his essence. This was the first point.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 169) has p. 2., and so the Dutch; Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) reads p. 1. with Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder, Sigwart and Van Vloten–Land.
- 1 Dei sive naturae: with the two instances in the Preface, the only places where the phrase occurs in the Ethics.
Deinde si fieri posset,
c ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes,
b nisi quae per solam ipsius hominis naturam possint intelligi, sequeretur (per prop. 4. et 6. P. 3.) ut non posset perire, sed ut semper necessario existeret. Atque hoc sequi deberet ex causa, cuius potentia finita aut infinita sit, nempe vel ex sola hominis potentia, qui scilicet potis esset, ut a se removeret reliquas mutationes, quae a causis externis oriri possent; vel infinita naturae potentia, a qua omnia singularia ita dirigerentur, ut homo nullas alias posset pati mutationes, nisi quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt. At primum (per prop. praeced. cuius demonstratio universalis est et ad omnes res singulares applicari potest) est absurdum.
Next, if it could happen that a man could undergo no changes except those which can be understood through the nature of man himself alone, it would follow (by
Props. 4 and
6 of Part III) that he could not perish, but that he would always necessarily exist. And this would have to follow from a cause whose power is finite or infinite: namely, either from the power of man alone, who would then be able to remove from himself the other changes which could arise from external causes; or from the infinite power of nature, by which all singular things would be so directed that a man could undergo no other changes except those which serve his preservation. But the first (by
the preceding Prop., whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things) is absurd.
- b Deinde si fieri posset, ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes] transcr. Deinde si fieri posset, ut homo nullas possit pati mutationes. Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) reads ‘posset’ here, as in the rest of the sentence, after Van Vloten–Land’s correction of the 1677 ‘possit’ to the irrealis; the transcription keeps one ‘possit’.
- c The 1677 edition (OP p. 169) has possit throughout this sentence (si fieri possit … nullas possit pati … ut non possit perire) and si fieri potest in the sentence beginning Ergo; Van Vloten–Land correct to posset, as the unreal condition requires, and Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) follows.
Ergo si fieri posset, ut homo nullas pateretur mutationes, nisi quae per solam ipsius hominis naturam possent intelligi, et consequenter (sicut iam ostendimus) ut semper necessario existeret, id sequi deberet ex Dei infinita potentia; et consequenter (per prop. 16. P. 1.) ex necessitate divinae naturae, quatenus alicuius hominis idea affectus consideratur, totius naturae ordo, quatenus ipsa sub extensionis et cogitationis attributis concipitur, deduci deberet. Atque adeo (per prop. 21. P. 1.
d) sequeretur, ut homo esset infinitus, quod (per primam partem huius demonstrationis) est absurdum. Fieri itaque nequit, ut homo nullas alias patiatur mutationes, nisi quarum ipse adaequata sit causa. Q. E. D.
Therefore if it could happen that a man underwent no changes except those which could be understood through the nature of man himself alone, and consequently (as we have just shown) that he always necessarily existed, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God; and consequently (by
Prop. 16 of Part I) the order of the whole of nature, insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of extension and thought, would have to be deduced from the necessity of the divine nature insofar as it is considered as affected by the idea of some man.
2 And so (by
Prop. 21 of Part I) it would follow that the man was infinite, which (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. It cannot happen, therefore, that a man should undergo no other changes except those of which he himself is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.
- d The 1677 edition (OP p. 169) has p. 2., and so the Dutch; Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) reads p. 1. with Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land.
- 2 A man exempt from every harmful change would need either a power of his own able to repel all external causes, which Prop. 3 excludes, or a nature whose whole order was deduced from the idea of this one man. But what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is infinite (Part I, Prop. 21), so the man would be infinite, against the first part of the demonstration.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, hominem necessario passionibus esse semper obnoxium, communemque naturae ordinem sequi et eidem parere, seseque eidem, quantum rerum natura exigit, accommodare.
Corollary. Hence it follows that man is necessarily always subject to passions, and that he follows the common order of nature and obeys it, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.
1 - 1 The thought returns in the last chapter of the Appendix to this Part (ch. 32): we shall bear calmly what happens against our advantage if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that our power could not have reached so far as to avoid it, ‘nosque partem totius naturae esse, cuius ordinem sequimur’ (‘and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow’).
Propositio V
Proposition V
[G II 214] Vis et incrementum cuiuscumque passionis, eiusque in existendo perseverantia non definitur potentia, qua nos in existendo perseverare conamur, sed causae externae potentia cum nostra comparata.
The force and increase of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.
Demonstratio. Passionis essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam explicari (per defin. 1. et 2. P. 3.), hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), passionis potentia definiri nequit potentia, qua in nostro esse perseverare conamur; sed (ut prop. 16. P. 2. ostensum est) definiri necessario debet potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (by
Defs. 1 and
2 of Part III), that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in our being; but (as was shown in
Prop. 16 of Part II) it must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.
Propositio VI
Proposition VI
Vis alicuius passionis seu affectus reliquas hominis actiones seu potentiam superare potest, ita ut affectus pertinaciter homini adhaereat.
The force of some passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man.
1- 1 Prop. 44, Schol. uses the same words of the man ‘to whom one and the same affect stubbornly clings’ (quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhaereat): the lover, the miser and the ambitious man, whose greed, ambition and lust are ‘species of madness, although they are not numbered among diseases’.
Demonstratio. Vis et incrementum cuiuscumque passionis eiusque in existendo perseverantia definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata (per prop. praec.); adeoque (per prop. 3. huius) hominis potentiam superare potest etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The force and increase of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by
the preceding Prop.); and so (by
Prop. 3 of this Part) it can surpass the power of a man, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio VII
Proposition VII
Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest,
a nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectu coercendo.
An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained.
1- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 170) has Affectus coërceri, nec tolli potest; the editions since Paulus correct to nec coerceri, nec tolli, and Gebhardt (G II 214; Textgestaltung II 377) follows. Only Van Vloten–Land keep the 1677 text.
- 1 Descartes had written: ‘Nos passions ne peuvent pas aussi directement estre excitées ni ostées par l’action de nostre volonté, mais elles peuvent l’estre indirectement par la représentation des choses qui ont coutume d’estre jointes avec les passions que nous voulons avoir, et qui sont contraires à celles que nous voulons rejeter’ (‘Our passions cannot be directly excited or removed by the action of our will either, but they can be indirectly, by the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we want to have and which are contrary to those we want to reject’, Passions of the Soul, art. 45, AT XI 362–363). Spinoza keeps the indirectness and drops the will: the contrary representation does its work not because it is chosen but because it is itself a stronger affect. His criticism of Descartes’ account of the mind’s power over the passions is in the Preface to Part V.
Demonstratio. Affectus, quatenus ad mentem refertur, est idea qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat (per gener. aff. defin. quae reperitur sub finem P. 3.). Cum igitur mens aliquo affectu conflictatur, corpus afficitur simul affectione, qua eius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur.
Demonstration. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the
General Definition of the Affects, which is found at the end of Part III). When, therefore, the mind is troubled by some affect, the body is at the same time affected with an affection by which its power of acting is increased or diminished.
Porro haec corporis affectio (per prop. 5. huius) vim a sua causa accipit perseverandi in suo esse; quae proinde nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi a causa corporea (per prop. 6. P. 2.), quae corpus afficiat affectione illi contraria (per prop. 5. P. 3.) et fortiore (per axiom. huius).
a Atque adeo (per prop. 12. P. 2.) mens afficitur idea affectionis fortioris
b et contrariae priori, hoc est (per gener. aff. defin.) mens afficietur affectu fortiori et contrario priori, qui scilicet prioris existentiam secludet vel tollet; ac proinde affectus nec tolli nec coerceri potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem. Q. E. D.
Further, this affection of the body (by
Prop. 5 of this Part) receives from its cause the force of persevering in its being; which, therefore, can be neither restrained nor removed except by a corporeal cause (by
Prop. 6 of Part II) which affects the body with an affection contrary to it (by
Prop. 5 of Part III) and stronger (by
the Axiom of this Part). And so (by
Prop. 12 of Part II) the mind is affected by the idea of an affection stronger than and contrary to the former, that is (by
the General Definition of the Affects), the mind will be affected by an affect stronger than and contrary to the former, which will exclude or remove the existence of the former; and accordingly an affect can be neither removed nor restrained except by a contrary and stronger affect. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 171) has per Axiom. 1. hujus, corrected to per Axioma hujus in its errata, which the Dutch follows. Gebhardt (G II 215; Textgestaltung II 377) prints the corrected reference but takes the numeral as evidence that Part IV once had several axioms (see the note on the Axiom).
- b So the 1677 edition (OP p. 171). The Dutch has zal aangedaan worden (‘will be affected’), and Leopold, followed by Appuhn and Gebhardt (G II 215; Textgestaltung II 377), reads afficietur, in line with the following afficietur, secludet and tollet.
[G II 215] Corollarium. Affectus, quatenus ad mentem refertur, nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per ideam corporis affectionis contrariae et fortioris affectione, qua patimur. Nam affectus, quo patimur, nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum eodem fortiorem eique contrarium (per prop. praec.), hoc est (per gener. aff. defin.), nisi per ideam corporis affectionis fortioris
a et contrariae affectioni, qua patimur.
Corollary. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, can be neither restrained nor removed except by the idea of an affection of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the affection by which we are acted on. For an affect by which we are acted on can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect stronger than it and contrary to it (by
the preceding Prop.), that is (by
the General Definition of the Affects), except by the idea of an affection of the body stronger than and contrary to the affection by which we are acted on.
- a The errata of the 1677 edition (Sphalmata corrigenda) change affectionis to affectione; the Dutch translates the uncorrected text. Gebhardt (G II 215; Textgestaltung II 377–378) keeps affectionis, as Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn do without comment: with affectione, contrariae would have nothing to agree with, and the Demonstration (idea affectionis fortioris et contrariae priori) confirms the text.
Propositio VIII
Proposition VIII
Cognitio boni et mali nihil aliud est, quam laetitiae vel tristitiae affectus, quatenus eius sumus conscii.
The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.
1- 1 To know a thing as good is to be conscious of being affected with joy by it: the knowledge is the idea of the affect, and the idea of an idea is one with its object (Part II, Props. 21–22). This completes Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.: ‘we strive for, will, want and desire nothing because we judge it to be good; but on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it.’ Since knowledge of good and evil is itself an affect, it can be overcome as affects are (Props. 14–17).
Demonstratio. Id bonum aut malum vocamus, quod nostro esse conservando prodest vel obest (per defin. 1. et 2. huius), hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet. Quatenus itaque (per defin. laetitiae et tristitiae, quas vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) rem aliquam nos laetitia vel tristitia afficere percipimus, eandem bonam aut malam vocamus; atque adeo boni et mali cognitio nihil aliud est, quam laetitiae
a vel tristitiae idea, quae ex ipso laetitiae vel tristitiae affectu necessario sequitur (per prop. 22. P. 2.).
Demonstration. We call good or evil what is of use or hindrance to preserving our being (by
Defs. 1 and
2 of this Part), that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Insofar, therefore, as we perceive that some thing affects us with joy or sadness (by the definitions of joy and sadness, which see in
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III), we call it good or evil; and so the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the idea of joy or sadness which necessarily follows from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by
Prop. 22 of Part II).
- a nihil aliud est, quam laetitiae] transcr. nihil aliud, est quam laetitiae. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 215).
At haec idea eodem modo unita est affectui, ac mens unita est corpori (per prop. 21. P. 2.), hoc est (ut in schol. eiusdem prop. ostensum), haec idea ab ipso affectu, sive (per gener. aff. defin.) ab idea corporis affectionis revera non distinguitur nisi solo conceptu. Ergo haec cognitio boni et mali nihil est aliud, quam ipse affectus, quatenus eiusdem sumus conscii. Q. E. D.
But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body (by
Prop. 21 of Part II), that is (as was shown in
the Schol. of the same Prop.), this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or (by
the General Definition of the Affects) from the idea of the affection of the body, except by concept alone. Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. Q.E.D.
Propositio IX
Proposition IX
[G II 216] Affectus, cuius causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur.
An affect whose cause we imagine as now present to us is stronger than if we imagined it not to be present.
Demonstratio. Imaginatio est idea, qua mens rem ut praesentem contemplatur (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), quae tamen magis corporis humani constitutionem, quam rei externae naturam indicat (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.). Est igitur affectus (per gener. aff. defin.) imaginatio, quatenus corporis constitutionem indicat. At imaginatio (per prop. 17. P. 2.) intensior est, quamdiu nihil imaginamur, quod rei externae praesentem existentiam secludit. Ergo etiam affectus, cuius causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, intensior seu fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates a thing as present (see its definition in
Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II), but which indicates the constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by
Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II). An affect, therefore (by
the General Definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the constitution of the body. But an imagination (by
Prop. 17 of Part II) is more intense as long as we imagine nothing which excludes the present existence of the external thing. Therefore an affect too, whose cause we imagine as now present to us, is more intense, or stronger, than if we imagined it not to be present. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Cum supra in prop. 18. P. 3. dixerim, nos ex rei futurae vel praeteritae imagine eodem affectu affici, ac si res, quam imaginamur, praesens esset, expresse monui, id verum esse, quatenus ad solam ipsius rei imaginem attendimus (est enim eiusdem naturae, sive res ut praesentes imaginati simus,
a sive non simus); sed non negavi eandem debiliorem reddi, quando alias res nobis praesentes contemplamur, quae rei futurae praesentem existentiam secludunt, quod tum monere neglexi, quia in hac parte de affectuum viribus agere constitueram.
Scholium. When I said above in
Prop. 18 of Part III that we are affected by the image of a future or past thing with the same affect as if the thing we imagine were present, I expressly warned that this is true insofar as we attend only to the image of the thing itself (for it is of the same nature whether we have imagined things as present or not); but I did not deny that the image is made weaker when we contemplate other things present to us which exclude the present existence of the future thing, which I neglected to point out then because I had decided to treat of the strength of the affects in this Part.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 172) has only sive res imaginati simus, sive non simus; the Dutch has ’t zy d’ingebeelde zaak tegenwoordig is, of niet (‘whether the imagined thing is present or not’). Gebhardt (G II 216; Textgestaltung II 378) takes the Latin to be the remains of an earlier sive res, quam imaginamur, praesens est, sive non est, recast without carrying over the predicate, and supplies ut praesentes, as Meijer had proposed from the Dutch and as Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern print. Bartuschat reads sive rem ut praesentem.
Corollarium. Imago rei futurae vel praeteritae, hoc est, rei, quam cum relatione ad tempus futurum vel praeteritum secluso praesenti contemplamur, ceteris paribus debilior est imagine rei praesentis, et consequenter affectus erga rem futuram vel praeteritam, ceteris paribus remissior est affectu erga rem praesentem.
Corollary. The image of a future or past thing, that is, of a thing which we contemplate with relation to future or past time, the present being excluded, is weaker, other things being equal, than the image of a present thing; and consequently an affect towards a future or past thing is less intense, other things being equal, than an affect towards a present thing.
Propositio X
Proposition X
[G II 217] Erga rem futuram,
a quam cito affuturam imaginamur, intensius afficimur quam si eius existendi tempus longius a praesenti distare imaginaremur; et memoria rei, quam non diu praeteriisse imaginamur, intensius etiam afficimur, quam si eandem diu praeteriisse imaginaremur.
We are affected more intensely towards a future thing which we imagine will soon be present than if we imagined its time of existing to be further distant from the present; and we are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago than if we imagined it to have passed long ago.
- a Erga rem futuram,] transcr. Erga rem futuramm,. Misprint in the transcription; the 1677 edition (OP p. 173) and Gebhardt (G II 217) read ‘futuram’.
Demonstratio. Quatenus enim rem cito affuturam, vel non diu praeteriisse imaginamur, eo ipso aliquid imaginamur, quod rei praesentiam minus secludit, quam si eiusdem futurum existendi tempus longius a praesenti distare, vel quod dudum praeterierit, imaginaremur (ut per se notum); adeoque (per praec. prop.) eatenus intensius erga eandem afficiemur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For insofar as we imagine that a thing will soon be present, or has passed not long ago, by that very fact we imagine something which excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined its future time of existing to be further distant from the present, or that it had passed long ago (as is self-evident); and so (by
the preceding Prop.) to that extent we shall be affected more intensely towards it. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Ex iis, quae ad defin. 6. huius partis notavimus, sequitur nos erga obiecta, quae a praesenti longiore temporis intervallo distant, quam quod imaginando determinare possumus, quamvis ab invicem longo temporis intervallo distare intelligamus, aeque tamen remisse affici.
Scholium. From what we noted on
Def. 6 of this Part it follows that we are affected equally faintly towards objects which are distant from the present by a longer interval of time than we can determine by imagining, even though we understand them to be distant from one another by a long interval of time.
Propositio XI
Proposition XI
Affectus erga rem, quam ut necessariam imaginamur, ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga possibilem vel contingentem, sive non necessariam.
An affect towards a thing which we imagine as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a thing possible or contingent, or not necessary.
1- 1 Part V turns this into a remedy: ‘insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them’ (Part V, Prop. 6). Sadness over a lost good is eased as soon as we consider that it could not have been kept (Schol.).
Demonstratio. Quatenus rem aliquam necessariam esse imaginamur, eatenus eius existentiam affirmamus, et contra rei existentiam negamus, quatenus eandem non necessariam esse imaginamur (per schol. 1. prop. 33. P. 1.); ac proinde (per prop. 9. huius) affectus erga rem necessariam ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga non necessariam. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine some thing to be necessary, to that extent we affirm its existence, and on the contrary we deny a thing’s existence insofar as we imagine it not to be necessary (by
Schol. 1 of Prop. 33 of Part I); and accordingly (by
Prop. 9 of this Part) an affect towards a necessary thing is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a thing not necessary. Q.E.D.
Propositio XII
Proposition XII
[G II 218] Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut possibilem imaginamur, ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga contingentem.
An affect towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a contingent thing.
Demonstratio. Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur, quae rei existentiam ponat (per defin. 3. huius); sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quaedam imaginamur, quae eiusdem praesentem existentiam secludunt. At quatenus rem in futurum possibilem esse imaginamur, eatenus quaedam imaginamur, quae eiusdem existentiam ponunt (per defin. 4. huius),
a hoc est (per prop. 18. P. 3.) quae spem vel metum fovent; atque adeo affectus erga rem possibilem vehementior est. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing which posits the thing’s existence (by
Def. 3 of this Part); on the contrary (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, to that extent we imagine certain things which posit its existence (by
Def. 4 of this Part), that is (by
Prop. 18 of Part III), which encourage hope or fear; and so an affect towards a possible thing is more vehement. Q.E.D.
- a (per defin. 4. huius)] transcr. (per defin. 4 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 218).
Corollarium. Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut contingentem imaginamur, multo remissior est, quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur.
Corollary. An affect towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as contingent, is much less intense than if we imagined the thing as now present to us.
Demonstratio. Affectus erga rem, quam in praesenti existere imaginamur, intensior est, quam si eandem ut futuram imaginaremur (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), et multo vehementior est, quam si tempus futurum a praesenti multum distare imaginaremur
a (per prop. 10. huius). Est itaque affectus erga rem, cuius existendi tempus longe a praesenti distare imaginamur, multo remissior, quam si eandem ut praesentem imaginaremur et nihilominus (per prop. praec.) intensior est quam si eandem rem ut contingentem imaginaremur. Atque adeo affectus erga rem contingentem multo remissior erit, quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An affect towards a thing which we imagine to exist at present is more intense than if we imagined it as future (by
Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part), and much more vehement than if we imagined the future time to be far distant from the present (by
Prop. 10 of this Part). The affect towards a thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is therefore much less intense than if we imagined it as present; and nevertheless (by
the preceding Prop.) it is more intense than if we imagined the same thing as contingent. And so an affect towards a contingent thing will be much less intense than if we imagined the thing as now present to us. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 174) reads et multo vehementior est, si tempus futurum a praesenti non multum distare imaginaremur. The Dutch translates a text without non (zo wy ons inbeelden dat de toekomende tijt verre van de tegenwoordige af is) and adds the negation only in its list of corrections. Gebhardt (G II 218; Textgestaltung II 378–379) concludes that Spinoza’s manuscript had no non but had lost quam before the second si: with quam the two conditional clauses are parallel and the next sentence (Est itaque …) follows from them. He prints quam si … multum distare, as here. The other editions, and Bartuschat, follow the 1677 edition.
Propositio XIII
Proposition XIII
[G II 219] Affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere, ceteris paribus remissior est, quam affectus erga rem praeteritam.
An affect towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present is, other things being equal, less intense than an affect towards a past thing.
1- 1 Props. 9–13 rank affects by the way their object is imagined: present over future or past, near over remote, necessary over possible, possible over contingent, past over contingent. The ranking is applied in Props. 15–17: the desire that arises from knowledge of the good is weak because that knowledge mostly concerns the future (Prop. 16) and contingent things (Prop. 17).
Demonstratio. Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur, quae rei existentiam ponat (per defin. 3. huius). Sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quaedam imaginamur, quae eiusdem praesentem existentiam secludunt. Verum quatenus eandem cum relatione ad tempus praeteritum imaginamur, eatenus aliquid imaginari supponimur, quod ipsam ad memoriam redigit sive quod rei imaginem excitat (vide prop. 18. P. 2. cum eiusdem schol.), ac proinde eatenus efficit, ut ipsam ac si praesens esset contemplemur (per coroll. prop. 17. P. 2.). Atque adeo (per prop. 9. huius) affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere, ceteris paribus remissior erit, quam affectus erga rem praeteritam. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing which posits the thing’s existence (by
Def. 3 of this Part). On the contrary (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine it with relation to past time, to that extent we are supposed to imagine something which brings it back to memory, or which arouses the image of the thing (see
Prop. 18 of Part II with
its Schol.), and which accordingly to that extent brings it about that we contemplate it as if it were present (by
Cor. of Prop. 17 of Part II). And so (by
Prop. 9 of this Part) an affect towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present will be, other things being equal, less intense than an affect towards a past thing. Q.E.D.
Propositio XIV
Proposition XIV
Vera boni et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coercere potest; sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur.
The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.
1- 1 With Prop. 1 and Prop. 7: truth as such has no force against an affect. But knowledge of good and evil is itself an affect (Prop. 8), and as an affect it can be the stronger. Part V argues that ‘the affects which arise from reason or are aroused by it are, if account is taken of time, more powerful than those which are related to singular things that we contemplate as absent’ (Part V, Prop. 7).
Demonstratio. Affectus est idea, qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat (per gener. aff. defin.); atque adeo (per prop. 1. huius) nihil positivum habet, quod praesentia veri tolli possit; et consequenter vera boni et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coercere potest. At quatenus affectus est (vide prop. 8. huius), si fortior affectu coercendo sit, eatenus tantum (per prop. 7. huius) affectum coercere poterit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An affect is an idea by which the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by
the General Definition of the Affects); and so (by
Prop. 1 of this Part) it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true; and consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see
Prop. 8 of this Part), if it is stronger than the affect to be restrained, to that extent only (by
Prop. 7 of this Part) will it be able to restrain the affect. Q.E.D.
Propositio XV
Proposition XV
[G II 220] Cupiditas, quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, multis aliis cupiditatibus, quae ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur, oriuntur, restingui vel coerceri potest.
A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires which arise from the affects by which we are troubled.
Demonstratio. Ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec (per prop. 8. huius) affectus est, oritur necessario cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.), quae eo est maior, quo affectus, ex quo oritur, maior est (per prop. 37. P. 3.). Sed quia haec cupiditas (per hypothesin) ex eo, quod aliquid vere intelligimus, oritur, sequitur ergo ipsa in nobis, quatenus agimus (per prop. 3. P. 3.).
a Atque adeo per solam nostram essentiam debet intelligi (per defin. 2. P. 3.); et consequenter (per prop. 7. P. 3.) eius vis et incrementum sola humana potentia definiri debet.
Demonstration. From the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this (by
Prop. 8 of this Part) is an affect, there necessarily arises a desire (by
Def. Aff. 1), which is the greater, the greater the affect from which it arises (by
Prop. 37 of Part III). But because this desire (by hypothesis) arises from the fact that we understand something truly, it follows in us insofar as we act (by
Prop. 3 of Part III). And so it must be understood through our essence alone (by
Def. 2 of Part III); and consequently (by
Prop. 7 of Part III) its force and increase must be defined by human power alone.
- a So the 1677 edition, and the Dutch had the same. Van Vloten–Land, after Sigwart, change the reference to Prop. 1., followed by Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern; Gebhardt (G II 220; Textgestaltung II 379) keeps Prop. 3., whose identification of actions with adequate ideas is just what the argument needs.
Porro cupiditates, quae ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur, oriuntur,
b eo etiam maiores sunt, quo hi affectus vehementiores erunt; atque adeo earum vis et incrementum (per prop. 5. huius) potentia causarum externarum definiri debet, quae, si cum nostra comparetur, nostram potentiam indefinite superat (per prop. 3. huius). Atque adeo cupiditates, quae ex similibus affectibus oriuntur, vehementiores esse possunt illa, quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur; ac proinde (per prop. 7. huius) eandem coercere vel restinguere poterunt. Q. E. D.
Further, the desires which arise from the affects by which we are troubled are also the greater, the more vehement these affects are; and so their force and increase (by
Prop. 5 of this Part) must be defined by the power of external causes, which, if it is compared with ours, indefinitely surpasses our power (by
Prop. 3 of this Part). And so the desires which arise from such affects can be more vehement than the one which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, and accordingly (by
Prop. 7 of this Part) they will be able to restrain or extinguish it. Q.E.D.
- b quibus conflictamur, oriuntur] transcr. quibus conflictamur oriuntur. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 176) and Gebhardt (G II 220).
Propositio XVI
Proposition XVI
Cupiditas, quae ex cognitione boni et mali, quatenus haec cognitio futurum respicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate, quae in praesentia suaves sunt, coerceri vel restingui potest.
A desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for things which are pleasant in the present.
Demonstratio. Affectus erga rem, quam futuram imaginamur, remissior est, quam erga praesentem (per coroll. prop. 9. huius). At cupiditas, quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, tametsi haec cognitio circa res, quae in praesentia bonae sunt, versetur, restingui vel coerceri potest aliqua temeraria cupiditate (per prop. praeced. cuius demonstratio universalis est). Ergo cupiditas, quae ex eadem cognitione, quatenus haec futurum respicit, oritur, facilius coerceri vel restingui poterit etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An affect towards a thing which we imagine as future is less intense than one towards a present thing (by
Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part). But a desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, even if this knowledge concerns things which are good in the present, can be extinguished or restrained by some rash desire (by
the preceding Prop., whose demonstration is universal). Therefore a desire which arises from the same knowledge, insofar as this looks to the future, will be able to be restrained or extinguished more easily, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio XVII
Proposition XVII
[G II 221] Cupiditas, quae oritur ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec circa res contingentes versatur, multo adhuc facilius coerceri potest cupiditate rerum, quae praesentes sunt.
A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can be restrained still much more easily by a desire for things which are present.
Demonstratio. Propositio haec eodem modo, ac prop. praeced. demonstratur ex coroll. prop. 12. huius.
Scholium. His me causam ostendisse credo, cur homines opinione magis, quam vera ratione commoveantur, et cur vera boni et mali cognitio animi commotiones excitet et saepe omni libidinis generi cedat. Unde illud poetae natum: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.
a Quod idem etiam Ecclesiastes in mente habuisse videtur, cum dixit: Qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem.
b Scholium. With these I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil arouses disturbances of the mind and often yields to every kind of lust. Hence the saying of the poet:
I see and approve the better, I follow the worse.1 Ecclesiastes too seems to have had the same thing in mind when he said:
He who increases knowledge increases pain.2 - a Vid. Ovid. metam. l. VII. v. 20. 21. [Bruder]
- b Vid. lib. Cohel. 1. 18. (cl. v. 17.) [Bruder]
- 1 Medea in Ovid, Metamorphoses VII.20–21, already echoed in the first sentences of the Preface and in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol..
- 2 Ecclesiastes 1:18: ‘כִּי בְּרֹב חָכְמָה רָב־כָּעַס וְיוֹסִיף דַּעַת יוֹסִיף מַכְאוֹב’ (‘For in much wisdom is much vexation, and he who increases knowledge increases pain’). Spinoza’s dolorem is nearer the Hebrew מַכְאוֹב (‘pain’) than the Vulgate’s laborem (qui addit scientiam, addit et laborem). Bruder’s note in the Latin also refers to the preceding verse.
Atque haec non eum in finem dico, ut inde concludam, praestabilius esse ignorare, quam scire, vel quod stulto intelligens in moderandis affectibus nihil intersit; sed ideo quia necesse est, nostrae naturae tam potentiam, quam impotentiam noscere,
c ut determinare possimus, quid ratio in moderandis affectibus possit et quid non possit; et in hac parte de sola humana impotentia me acturum dixi. Nam de rationis in affectus potentia separatim agere constitui.
I do not say these things in order to conclude from them that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or that there is no difference between a fool and a man of understanding in moderating the affects, but because it is necessary to know both the power and the lack of power of our nature, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects and what it cannot do; and I said that in this Part I would treat only of human lack of power. For I have decided to treat of the power of reason over the affects separately.
3- c The Dutch has the reverse order (zo wel het onvermogen, als het vermogen van onze natuur), and Leopold, followed by Baensch, Meijer (second edition), Appuhn and Halpern, would read tam impotentiam, quam potentiam. Gebhardt (G II 221; Textgestaltung II 379–380) keeps the 1677 order: the sentence goes on to speak first of the power (quid ratio … possit) and then of the lack of power (quid non possit).
- 3 In Part V, De potentia intellectus, seu de libertate humana (‘On the Power of the Intellect, or on Human Freedom’); see its Preface.
Propositio XVIII
Proposition XVIII
Cupiditas, quae ex laetitia oritur, ceteris paribus fortior est cupiditate, quae ex tristitia oritur.
A desire which arises from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than a desire which arises from sadness.
Demonstratio. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia (per aff. defin. 1.) hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) conatus, quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur. Quare cupiditas, quae ex laetitia oritur, ipso laetitiae affectu (per defin. laetitiae, quam vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) iuvatur vel augetur; quae autem contra ex tristitia oritur, ipso tristitiae affectu (per idem schol.) minuitur vel coercetur. Atque adeo vis cupiditatis, quae ex laetitia oritur, potentia humana, simul et potentia causae externae, quae autem ex tristitia, sola humana potentia definiri debet; ac proinde hac illa fortior est. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Desire is the very essence of man (by
Def. Aff. 1), that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), the striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being. So a desire which arises from joy is aided or increased by the affect of joy itself (by the definition of joy, which see in
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III); but one which arises from sadness, on the contrary, is diminished or restrained by the affect of sadness itself (by
the same Schol.). And so the force of a desire which arises from joy must be defined by human power and at the same time by the power of the external cause, whereas that of one which arises from sadness must be defined by human power alone; and accordingly the former is stronger than the latter. Q.E.D.
[G II 222] Scholium. His paucis humanae impotentiae et inconstantiae causas, et cur homines rationis praecepta non servent, explicui. Superest iam, ut ostendam, quid id sit, quod ratio
a nobis praescribit, et quinam affectus cum rationis humanae regulis conveniant, quinam contra iisdem contrarii sint. Sed antequam haec prolixo nostro geometrico ordine demonstrare incipiam, lubet ipsa
rationis dictamina hic prius breviter ostendere, ut ea, quae sentio, facilius ab unoquoque percipiantur.
Scholium. With these few words I have explained the causes of human lack of power and inconstancy, and why men do not keep the precepts of reason. It remains now for me to show what it is that reason prescribes to us, and which affects agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the other hand, are contrary to them. But before I begin to demonstrate these things in our prolix geometrical order, I should like first to show briefly here the
dictates of reason themselves,
1 so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone.
- a quid id sit, quod ratio] transcr. quid id, sit quod ratio. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 178) and Gebhardt (G II 222).
- 1 rationis dictamina. What follows is stated informally and demonstrated in Props. 19–37. Acting ‘from the dictate of reason’ (ex rationis dictamine) recurs through the rest of Part IV, down to the free man of Props. 67–73.
Cum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa, ut unusquisque seipsum amet, suum utile, quod revera utile est, quaerat, et id omne, quod hominem ad maiorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat, et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse, quantum in se est, conservare conetur. Quod quidem tam necessario verum est, quam quod totum sit sua parte maius (vide prop. 4. P. 3.).
Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it demands, therefore, that each man love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, and want everything which really leads man to a greater perfection, and, absolutely, that each strive to preserve his own being as far as it is in him.
2 And this is indeed as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part
3 (see
Prop. 4 of Part III).
- 2 Reason begins with self-love. The Stoics had also derived ethics from self-preservation: ‘they say that an animal has its first impulse towards preserving itself’ (Τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό, Diogenes Laertius VII.85), and Zeno made the end ‘to live in agreement with nature’ (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, VII.87). For the Stoics, however, reason eventually supersedes the first impulse; for Spinoza the striving to persevere is the actual essence of a thing (Part III, Prop. 7), and reason only makes clear what it really requires.
- 3 Euclid’s common notion καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους μεῖζον (‘and the whole is greater than the part’, Elements I, Common Notion 8 in Heiberg’s edition). Part III, Prop. 4, that nothing can be destroyed except by an external cause, has the demonstration ‘This Proposition is evident through itself’.
Deinde quandoquidem virtus (per defin. 8. huius) nihil aliud est, quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere, et nemo suum esse (per prop. 7. P. 3.) conservare conetur, nisi ex propriae suae naturae legibus, hinc sequitur primo, virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum proprium esse conservandi, et felicitatem in eo consistere quod homo suum esse conservare potest. Secundo sequitur, virtutem propter se esse appetendam, nec quicquam, quod ipsa praestabilius aut quod utilius nobis sit, dari, cuius causa deberet appeti. Tertio denique sequitur, eos, qui se interficiunt, animo esse impotentes, eosque a causis externis suae naturae repugnantibus prorsus vinci.
Next, since virtue (by
Def. 8 of this Part) is nothing but acting from the laws of one’s own nature, and no one strives to preserve his being (by
Prop. 7 of Part III) except from the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the very striving to preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in a man’s being able to preserve his being. It follows, secondly, that virtue is to be wanted for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent than it, or more useful to us, for the sake of which it ought to be wanted. It follows, finally, thirdly, that those who kill themselves lack power of mind and are completely conquered by external causes opposed to their nature.
4- 4 animo esse impotentes. Demonstrated in Prop. 20, Schol., which distinguishes the ways in which a man may be compelled to kill himself (among them Seneca, ordered by the tyrant to open his veins) and concludes that it is as impossible for a man to strive from the necessity of his own nature not to exist as for something to come from nothing.
Porro ex postul. 4. P. 2. sequitur, nos efficere nunquam posse, ut nihil extra nos indigeamus ad nostrum esse conservandum, et ut ita vivamus, ut nullum commercium cum rebus quae extra nos sunt, habeamus; et si praeterea nostram mentem spectemus, sane noster intellectus imperfectior esset, si mens sola esset, nec quicquam praeter se ipsam intelligeret. Multa igitur extra nos dantur, quae nobis utilia quaeque propterea appetenda sunt. Ex his nulla praestantiora excogitari possunt, quam ea quae cum nostra natura prorsus conveniunt.
Further, from
Post. 4 of Part II it follows that we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being, or that we live without any commerce with things which are outside us; and if, moreover, we consider our mind, our intellect would certainly be less perfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing except itself. There are, therefore, many things outside us which are useful to us, and which are therefore to be wanted. Of these none more excellent can be thought of than those which agree entirely with our nature.
Si enim duo ex. gr. eiusdem prorsus naturae individua invicem iunguntur, individuum componunt singulo duplo potentius. Homini igitur nihil homine utilius; nihil, inquam, homines praestantius ad suum esse conservandum optare possunt, quam quod omnes in omnibus ita conveniant, ut omnium mentes et corpora unam quasi mentem, unumque corpus componant, et omnes simul, quantum possunt, suum esse conservare conentur, omnesque simul omnium commune utile sibi quaerant.
For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one.
5 To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man;
6 nothing, I say, can men wish for that is more excellent for preserving their being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should strive, as far as they can, to preserve their being, and that all together should seek for themselves the common advantage of all.
- 5 On individuals composed of several bodies, see the definition and Lemmas 4–7 of the physical digression after Part II, Prop. 13; on agreement in nature, Props. 29–35.
- 6 Homini … nihil homine utilius. Demonstrated in Prop. 35, Cor. 1 for the man who lives by the guidance of reason; the Scholium there cites the common saying that ‘man is a God to man’.
Ex quibus sequitur, homines, qui ratione gubernantur, hoc est, homines qui ex ductu rationis suum utile quaerunt, nihil sibi appetere, quod reliquis hominibus non cupiant, atque adeo eosdem iustos, fidos atque honestos esse.
From this it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who seek their own advantage from the guidance of reason, want nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men, and so are just, faithful and honourable.
7- 7 Demonstrated in Prop. 37: the good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men. Honourableness (honestas) is defined in its first Scholium, justice in the second.
[G II 223] Haec illa rationis dictamina sunt, quae hic paucis ostendere proposueram, antequam eadem prolixiore ordine demonstrare inciperem, quod ea de causa feci, ut, si fieri posset, eorum attentionem mihi conciliarem, qui credunt, hoc principium, quod scilicet unusquisque suum utile quaerere tenetur, impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis esse fundamentum. Postquam igitur rem sese contra habere breviter ostenderim, pergo ad eandem eadem via, qua hucusque progressi sumus, demonstrandum.
These are those dictates of reason which I had proposed to show here in a few words before beginning to demonstrate them in a more prolix order, which I did in order to win, if possible, the attention of those who believe that this principle, that each is bound to seek his own advantage, is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety.
1 Having, therefore, shown briefly that the matter is the other way round, I go on to demonstrate it by the same way by which we have proceeded so far.
- 1 impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis. Pietas is defined in Prop. 37, Schol. 1 as ‘the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason’, and is rendered ‘piety’ throughout (as in Part II, Prop. 49, Schol.); the Latin opposes it directly to the charge of impietas.
Propositio XIX
Proposition XIX
Id unusquisque ex legibus suae naturae necessario appetit vel aversatur, quod bonum vel malum esse iudicat.
Each one, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily wants or is averse to what he judges to be good or evil.
Demonstratio. Boni et mali cognitio est (per prop. 8. huius) ipse laetitiae vel tristitiae affectus quatenus eiusdem sumus conscii; ac proinde (per prop. 28. P. 3.) id unusquisque necessario appetit, quod bonum, et contra id aversatur, quod malum esse iudicat. Sed hic appetitus nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia seu natura (per defin. appetitus, quam vide in schol. prop. 9. P. 3. et aff. defin. 1.). Ergo unusquisque ex solis suae naturae legibus id necessario appetit vel aversatur etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The knowledge of good and evil is (by
Prop. 8 of this Part) the affect of joy or sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it; and accordingly (by
Prop. 28 of Part III) each one necessarily wants what he judges to be good, and on the contrary is averse to what he judges to be evil. But this appetite is nothing but the very essence, or nature, of man (by the definition of appetite, which see in
Schol. of Prop. 9 of Part III, and
Def. Aff. 1). Therefore each one, from the laws of his own nature alone, necessarily wants or is averse to, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio XX
Proposition XX
[G II 224] Quo magis unusquisque suum utile quaerere, hoc est, suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute praeditus est; et contra, quatenus unusquisque suum utile, hoc est, suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens.
The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue;
1 and on the contrary, insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, to that extent he lacks power.
- 1 The proposition follows from Def. 8, which made virtue the power of acting from one’s own nature, and Part III, Prop. 7, which made the striving to persevere the actual essence of a thing. It is qualified at once: acting absolutely from virtue is seeking one’s own advantage ‘from the guidance of reason’ (Prop. 24), and what reason shows to be most useful to a man is other men who live by reason (Prop. 35).
Demonstratio. Virtus est ipsa humana potentia, quae sola hominis essentia definitur (per defin. 8. huius), hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), quae solo conatu, quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, definitur. Quo ergo unusquisque magis suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute praeditus est, et consequenter
a (per prop. 4. et 6. P. 3.), quatenus aliquis suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by the essence of man alone (by
Def. 8 of this Part), that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), which is defined by the striving alone by which man strives to persevere in his being. The more, therefore, each one strives, and is able, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue, and consequently (by
Props. 4 and
6 of Part III), insofar as someone neglects to preserve his being, to that extent he lacks power. Q.E.D.
- a eo magis virtute praeditus est, et consequenter] transcr. eo magis virtute praeditus, est et consequenter. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 224).
Scholium. Nemo igitur nisi a causis externis et suae naturae contrariis victus suum utile appetere sive suum esse conservare negligit. Nemo, inquam, ex necessitate suae naturae, sed a causis externis coactus alimenta aversatur vel se ipsum interficit, quod multis modis fieri potest.
Scholium. No one, therefore, neglects to want his own advantage, or to preserve his being, unless he is conquered by external causes contrary to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, but only when compelled by external causes, is averse to food or kills himself, which can happen in many ways.
Nempe interficit aliquis se ipsum coactus ab alio, qui eius dexteram, qua ensem casu prehenderat, contorquet et cogit versus cor ipsum gladium dirigere; vel quod ex mandato tyranni, ut Seneca, cogatur venas aperire suas, hoc est maius malum minore vitare cupiat; vel denique ex eo, quod causae latentes externae eius imaginationem ita disponunt et corpus ita afficiunt, ut id aliam naturam priori contrariam induat et cuius idea in mente dari nequit (per prop. 10. P. 3.). At quod homo ex necessitate suae naturae conetur non existere vel in aliam formam mutari, tam est impossibile, quam quod ex nihilo aliquid fiat, ut unusquisque mediocri meditatione videre potest.
Namely, someone kills himself compelled by another, who twists the right hand in which he happened to have taken up a sword and compels him to direct the sword against his own heart; or because he is compelled by the command of a tyrant, as Seneca was, to open his veins,
1 that is, he desires to avoid a greater evil by a lesser; or finally because hidden external causes so dispose his imagination and so affect his body that it takes on another nature, contrary to the former, of which there cannot be an idea in the mind
2 (by
Prop. 10 of Part III). But that a man should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something should come from nothing, as anyone can see with a little meditation.
- 1 After the conspiracy of Piso, Nero ordered Seneca’s death, though, Tacitus says, without evidence against him; Seneca and his wife opened their veins: ‘eodem ictu brachia ferro exolvunt’ (‘with one stroke they cut open their arms’, Tacitus, Annals XV.63; the whole account is XV.60–64).
- 2 A change of nature short of death: Prop. 39, Schol. tells of a Spanish poet who after an illness did not believe that the stories and tragedies he had written were his, and says that a body can die without being turned into a corpse.
Propositio XXI
Proposition XXI
[G II 225] Nemo potest cupere beatum esse,
b bene agere et bene vivere, qui simul non cupiat esse, agere et vivere, hoc est, actu existere.
a No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live, that is, actually to exist.
- a agere et vivere, hoc est, actu existere] transcr. agere et viverem hoc estm actu existere. Misprints in the transcription (‘viverem hoc estm’); the 1677 edition (OP p. 181) and Gebhardt (G II 225) read ‘vivere, hoc est, actu existere’.
- b Gfroerer corrects to beatus esse; Land rightly points out that the incongruity is Spinoza’s usage (compare cupio me esse clementem), and Gebhardt (G II 225; Textgestaltung II 380) keeps the 1677 text.
Demonstratio. Huius propositionis demonstratio seu potius res ipsa per se patet, et etiam ex cupiditatis definitione.
a Est enim cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.) beate seu bene vivendi, agendi etc. ipsa hominis essentia, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), conatus, quo unusquisque suum esse conservare conatur. Ergo nemo potest cupere etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The demonstration of this proposition, or rather the thing itself, is evident through itself, and also from the definition of desire. For the desire (by
Def. Aff. 1) of living blessedly, or well, of acting, etc., is the very essence of man, that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), the striving by which each one strives to preserve his being. Therefore no one can desire, etc. Q.E.D.
- a ex cupiditatis definitione] transcr. ex cupiditatis defininitione. Misprint in the transcription; the 1677 edition (OP p. 181) and Gebhardt (G II 225) read ‘definitione’.
Propositio XXII
Proposition XXII
Nulla virtus potest prior hac (nempe conatu sese conservandi) concipi.
No virtue can be conceived prior to this one (namely, the striving to preserve oneself).
Demonstratio. Conatus sese conservandi est ipsa rei essentia (per prop. 7. P. 3.). Si igitur aliqua virtus posset hac, nempe hoc conatu, prior concipi, conciperetur ergo (per defin. 8. huius)
a ipsa rei essentia se ipsa prior; quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nulla virtus etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The striving to preserve oneself is the very essence of a thing (by
Prop. 7 of Part III). If, therefore, some virtue could be conceived prior to this one, namely, to this striving, the very essence of the thing would then be conceived (by
Def. 8 of this Part) prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.E.D.
- a (per defin. 8. huius)] transcr. (per defin. 8 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 225).
Corollarium. Conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum. Nam hoc principio nullum aliud potest prius concipi (per prop. praeced.), et absque ipso (per prop. 21. huius) nulla virtus potest concipi.
Corollary. The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue.
1 For no other principle can be conceived prior to this one (by
the preceding Prop.), and without it (by
Prop. 21 of this Part) no virtue can be conceived.
- 1 Part V returns to this Corollary: ‘the first and only foundation of virtue, or of the principle of living rightly (by Cor. of Prop. 22 and by Prop. 24 of Part IV), is to seek one’s own advantage’, and in determining what reason dictates as useful, no account was taken of the eternity of the mind (Part V, Prop. 41, Dem.).
Propositio XXIII
Proposition XXIII
Homo quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod ideas habet inadaequatas, non potest absolute dici ex virtute agere; sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit.
A man, insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands.
[G II 226] Demonstratio. Quatenus homo ad agendum determinatur ex eo, quod inadaequatas habet ideas, eatenus (per prop. 1. P. 3.) patitur, hoc est (per defin. 1. et 2. P. 3.) aliquid agit, quod per solam eius essentiam non potest percipi; hoc est (per defin. 8. huius), quod ex ipsius virtute non sequitur. At quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit, eatenus (per eandem prop. 1. P. 3.) agit, hoc est (per defin. 2. P. 3.) aliquid agit, quod per solam ipsius essentiam percipitur, sive (per defin. 8. huius) quod ex ipsius virtute adaequate sequitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Insofar as a man is determined to act from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, to that extent (by
Prop. 1 of Part III) he is acted on, that is (by
Defs. 1 and
2 of Part III), he does something which cannot be perceived through his essence alone, that is (by
Def. 8 of this Part), which does not follow from his virtue. But insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he understands, to that extent (by
the same Prop. 1 of Part III) he acts, that is (by
Def. 2 of Part III), he does something which is perceived through his essence alone, or (by
Def. 8 of this Part) which follows adequately from his virtue. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXIV
Proposition XXIV
Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud in nobis est, quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare (haec tria idem significant) idque ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi.
aTo act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve our being (these three signify the same) from the guidance of reason, and that from the foundation of seeking one’s own advantage.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 182) lacks idque; the Dutch has en dit uit de grontvest. Gebhardt (G II 226; Textgestaltung II 380) supplies it, as in the Demonstration.
Demonstratio. Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud est (per defin. 8. huius), quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere. At nos eatenus tantummodo agimus, quatenus intelligimus (per prop. 3. P. 3.). Ergo ex virtute agere nihil aliud in nobis est, quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare idque (per coroll. prop. 22. huius) ex fundamento suum utile quaerendi. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else (by
Def. 8 of this Part) but to act from the laws of one’s own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (by
Prop. 3 of Part III). Therefore to act from virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve our being from the guidance of reason, and that (by
Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part) from the foundation of seeking one’s own advantage. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXV
Proposition XXV
Nemo suum esse alterius rei causa conservare conatur.
No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing.
Demonstratio. Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, sola ipsius rei essentia definitur (per prop. 7. P. 3.), eaque sola data, non autem ex alterius rei essentia necessario sequitur (per prop. 6. P. 3.), ut unusquisque suum esse conservare conetur. Patet praeterea haec propositio ex coroll. prop. 22. huius partis. Nam si homo alterius rei causa suum esse conservare conaretur, tum res illa primum esset virtutis fundamentum (ut per se notum), quod (per praedict. coroll.) est absurdum. Ergo nemo suum esse etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is defined by the essence of the thing itself alone (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), and from this alone being given, and not from the essence of another thing, it necessarily follows (by
Prop. 6 of Part III) that each one strives to preserve his being. This Proposition is evident, moreover, from
Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part. For if a man strove to preserve his being for the sake of another thing, that thing would then be the first foundation of virtue (as is self-evident), which (by
the aforesaid Cor.) is absurd. Therefore no one strives to preserve his being, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXVI
Proposition XXVI
[G II 227] Quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere; nec mens quatenus ratione utitur, aliud sibi utile esse iudicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit.
Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; and the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding.
1- 1 Understanding here is not a narrow pursuit: the Appendix to this Part makes perfecting the intellect, which is nothing but understanding God and his attributes and actions, the one thing in which man’s highest happiness, or blessedness, consists, and the end of the man led by reason the adequate conception of himself and of everything that falls within his understanding (Appendix, ch. 4).
Demonstratio. Conatus sese conservandi nihil est praeter ipsius rei essentiam (per prop. 7. P. 3.), quae quatenus talis existit, vim habere concipitur ad perseverandum in existendo (per prop. 6. P. 3.), et ea agendum, quae ex data sua natura necessario sequuntur (vide defin. appetitus in schol. prop. 9. P. 3.). At rationis essentia nihil aliud est quam mens nostra quatenus clare et distincte intelligit (vide eius defin. in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.). Ergo (per prop. 40. P. 2.) quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere.
Demonstration. The striving to preserve oneself is nothing but the essence of the thing itself (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived to have a force for persevering in existing (by
Prop. 6 of Part III) and for doing those things which necessarily follow from its given nature (see the definition of appetite in
Schol. of Prop. 9 of Part III). But the essence of reason is nothing but our mind insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see its definition in
Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II). Therefore (by
Prop. 40 of Part II) whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding.
Deinde quoniam hic mentis conatus, quo mens quatenus ratiocinatur, suum esse conatur conservare, nihil aliud est quam intelligere (per primam partem huius), est ergo hic
a intelligendi conatus (per coroll. prop. 22. huius) primum et unicum virtutis fundamentum, nec alicuius finis causa (per prop. 25. huius) res intelligere conabimur; sed contra mens quatenus ratiocinatur, nihil sibi bonum esse concipere poterit, nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per defin. 1. huius). Q. E. D.
Next, since this striving of the mind, by which the mind, insofar as it reasons, strives to preserve its being, is nothing but understanding (by the first part of this demonstration), this striving for understanding is (by
Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part) the first and only foundation of virtue, and we shall not strive to understand things for the sake of some end (by
Prop. 25 of this Part); but on the contrary the mind, insofar as it reasons, will be able to conceive nothing to be good for itself except what leads to understanding (by
Def. 1 of this Part). Q.E.D.
- a (per primam partem huius), est ergo hic] transcr. (per primam partem huius). Est ergo hic. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 227): the clause beginning ‘Deinde quoniam’ has its main verb in ‘est ergo’.
Propositio XXVII
Proposition XXVII
Nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse, nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit, vel quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus.
We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding.
Demonstratio. Mens quatenus ratiocinatur, nihil aliud appetit quam intelligere, nec aliud sibi utile esse iudicat, nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per prop. praeced.). At mens (per prop. 41. et 43. P. 2., cuius etiam schol. vide) rerum certitudinem non habet, nisi quatenus ideas habet adaequatas, sive (quod per schol. prop. 40. P. 2. idem est
a) quatenus ratiocinatur. Ergo nihil certo scimus bonum esse, nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit; et contra id malum, quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind, insofar as it reasons, wants nothing but to understand, and judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding (by
the preceding Prop.). But the mind (by
Props. 41 and
43 of Part II; see also its
Schol.) has certainty of things only insofar as it has adequate ideas, or (what by
the Schol. of Prop. 40 of Part II is the same) insofar as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be certainly good except what really leads to understanding, and on the contrary we know that to be evil which can prevent us from understanding. Q.E.D.
- a So the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 228). Baensch asks for Schol. 2., and W. Meijer (second edition), Appuhn, Halpern and Van Vloten–Land’s separate edition of the Ethics supply it. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 380) refers the citation, as at Part III, Prop. 1, Dem., to the scholium of Part II, Prop. 40 before it was divided in two, and resolves the abbreviation as Scholios.
Propositio XXVIII
Proposition XXVIII
[G II 228] Summum mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et summa mentis virtus Deum cognoscere.
The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.
1- 1 Maimonides had placed man’s true perfection in the knowledge of God: ‘והמין הרביעי הוא השלמות האנושי האמיתי, והוא – הגיע לאדם המעלות השכליות – רצוני לומר: ציור המושכלות ללמוד מהם דעות אמתיות באלהיות’ (‘The fourth kind is the true human perfection: that man attain the rational virtues, I mean the conception of intelligibles, so as to learn from them true opinions concerning divine things’, מוֹרֵה נְבוּכִים, Guide of the Perplexed III.54, in Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew). For Spinoza the knowledge of God is not one perfection beside others but what all understanding depends on, since nothing can be or be conceived without God (Part I, Prop. 15); Part V develops it into the intellectual love of God (Part V, Prop. 32, Cor.).
Demonstratio. Summum, quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est, hoc est (per defin. 6. P. 1.) ens absolute infinitum, et sine quo (per prop. 15. P. 1.) nihil esse neque concipi potest. Adeoque (per prop. 26. et 27. huius) summum mentis utile sive (per defin. 1. huius) bonum est Dei cognitio.
Deinde mens quatenus intelligit, eatenus tantum agit (per prop. 1. et 3. P. 3.), et eatenus tantum (per prop. 23. huius) potest absolute dici, quod ex virtute agit. Est igitur mentis absoluta virtus intelligere. At summum, quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est (ut iam iam demonstravimus). Ergo mentis summa virtus est Deum intelligere seu cognoscere. Q. E. D.
Next, the mind acts only insofar as it understands (by
Props. 1 and
3 of Part III), and only to that extent (by
Prop. 23 of this Part) can it absolutely be said to act from virtue. The absolute virtue of the mind, therefore, is to understand. But the highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as we have just now demonstrated). Therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand, or know, God. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXIX
Proposition XXIX
Res quaecumque singularis, cuius natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nostram agendi potentiam nec iuvare nec coercere potest, et absolute res nulla potest nobis bona aut mala esse, nisi commune aliquid nobiscum habeat.
Any singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can neither aid nor restrain our power of acting, and absolutely, nothing can be good or evil for us unless it has something in common with us.
1- 1 An application of Part I, Prop. 3: ‘things which have nothing in common with one another cannot be the cause of one another’. The demonstration adds that the thing must be conceived under the same attribute as human nature (Part II, Prop. 6).
Demonstratio. Cuiuscumque rei singularis, et consequenter (per coroll. prop. 10. P. 2.) hominis potentia, qua existit et operatur, non determinatur nisi ab alia re singulari (per prop. 28. P. 1.), cuius natura (per prop. 6. P. 2.) per idem attributum debet intelligi, per quod natura humana concipitur. Nostra igitur agendi potentia, quomodocumque ea concipiatur, determinari et consequenter iuvari vel coerceri potest potentia alterius rei singularis, quae aliquid commune nobiscum habet, et non potentia rei, cuius natura a nostra prorsus est diversa; et quia id bonum aut malum vocamus, quod causa est laetitiae aut tristitiae (per prop. 8. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet; ergo res, cuius natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nobis neque bona neque mala esse potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The power of any singular thing, and consequently (by
Cor. of Prop. 10 of Part II) of man, by which it exists and operates, is determined only by another singular thing (by
Prop. 28 of Part I), whose nature (by
Prop. 6 of Part II) must be understood through the same attribute through which human nature is conceived. Our power of acting, therefore, however it is conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or restrained, by the power of another singular thing which has something in common with us, and not by the power of a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours; and since we call good or evil what is the cause of joy or sadness (by
Prop. 8 of this Part), that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting, a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can be neither good nor evil for us. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXX
Proposition XXX
[G II 229] Res nulla per id, quod cum nostra natura commune habet, potest esse mala; sed quatenus nobis mala est, eatenus est nobis contraria.
No thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, to that extent it is contrary to us.
Demonstratio. Id malum vocamus, quod causa est tristitiae (per prop. 8. huius), hoc est (per eius defin., quam vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) quod nostram agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet. Si igitur res aliqua per id, quod nobiscum habet commune, nobis esset mala, posset ergo res id ipsum, quod nobiscum commune habet, minuere vel coercere; quod (per prop. 4. P. 3.) est absurdum. Nulla igitur res per id, quod nobiscum commune habet, potest nobis esse mala; sed contra quatenus mala est, hoc est (ut iam iam ostendimus) quatenus nostram agendi potentiam minuere vel coercere potest, eatenus (per prop. 5. P. 3.) nobis est contraria. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We call evil what is the cause of sadness (by
Prop. 8 of this Part), that is (by its definition, which see in
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III), what diminishes or restrains our power of acting. If, therefore, some thing were evil for us through what it has in common with us, it could diminish or restrain that very thing which it has in common with us, which (by
Prop. 4 of Part III) is absurd. No thing, therefore, can be evil for us through what it has in common with us; but on the contrary, insofar as it is evil, that is (as we have just shown), insofar as it can diminish or restrain our power of acting, to that extent (by
Prop. 5 of Part III) it is contrary to us. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXI
Proposition XXXI
Quatenus res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, eatenus necessario bona est.
Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good.
Demonstratio. Quatenus enim res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, non potest (per prop. praeced.) esse mala. Erit ergo necessario vel bona vel indifferens. Si hoc ponatur, nempe quod neque bona sit neque mala, nihil ergo (per axiom. 3. huius)
b ex ipsius natura
a sequetur, quod nostrae naturae conservationi inservit, hoc est (per hypothesin) quod ipsius rei naturae conservationi inservit. Sed hoc est absurdum (per prop. 6. P. 3.). Erit ergo, quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, necessario bona. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot (by
the preceding Prop.) be evil. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. If the latter is supposed, namely that it is neither good nor evil, then (by Axiom 3 of this Part)
1 nothing will follow from its nature which serves the preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), which serves the preservation of the nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (by
Prop. 6 of Part III). It will therefore, insofar as it agrees with our nature, necessarily be good. Q.E.D.
- a nihil ergo (per axiom. 3. huius) ex ipsius natura] transcr. nihil ergo (per axiom. 3. P. 1.) ex ipsius natura. The 1677 edition (OP p. 186) and Gebhardt (G II 230) read ‘per Axiom. 3. hujus’; ‘P. 1.’ is the conjecture of Schmidt and Auerbach (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 380).
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 186) prints per Axiom 3. hujus, corrected in its errata to per Axioma hujus, which the Dutch follows (volgens de gemene Kundigheit van dit deel). Schmidt and Auerbach proposed Axiom. 3. p. 1. (the transcription’s reading), Saisset Defin. 2. et 3. p. 4., Van Vloten–Land, followed by Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern, Defin. 1. hujus. Gebhardt (G II 230; Textgestaltung II 380) keeps Axiom. 3. hujus: none of the places proposed says what the argument needs, and Spinoza is referring to a third axiom of Part IV which he afterwards struck.
- 1 Part IV has only one axiom. The reference is to an axiom that Spinoza seems to have struck, which must have said that what is indifferent does not by its nature serve the preservation of ours; see the notes on the Axiom and to the Latin here.
[G II 230] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo nobis est utilior seu magis bona, et contra quo res aliqua nobis est utilior, eatenus cum nostra natura magis convenit. Nam quatenus cum nostra natura non convenit, erit necessario a nostra natura diversa vel eidem contraria. Si diversa, tum (per prop. 29. huius) neque bona neque mala esse poterit; si autem contraria, erit ergo etiam ei contraria, quae cum nostra natura convenit, hoc est (per prop. praeced.) contraria bono seu mala. Nihil igitur nisi quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, potest esse bonum; atque adeo quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo est utilior et contra. Q. E. D.
Corollary. Hence it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or the better, it is for us, and conversely, the more useful a thing is to us, the more it agrees with our nature. For insofar as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be different from our nature or contrary to it. If different, then (by
Prop. 29 of this Part) it will be able to be neither good nor evil; but if contrary, it will therefore also be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, that is (by
the preceding Prop.), contrary to the good, or evil. Nothing, therefore, can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature; and so the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is, and conversely. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXII
Proposition XXXII
Quatenus homines passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt eatenus dici, quod natura conveniant.
Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree in nature.
Demonstratio. Quae natura convenire dicuntur, potentia convenire intelliguntur (per prop. 7. P. 3.); non autem impotentia seu negatione, et consequenter (vide schol. prop. 3. P. 3.
a) neque etiam passione. Quare homines quatenus passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt dici, quod natura conveniant. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Things which are said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), but not in lack of power, or negation, and consequently (see
Schol. of Prop. 3 of Part III) not in passion either. Therefore men, insofar as they are subject to passions, cannot be said to agree in nature. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 186) has p. 2.; the Dutch has het Byvoegsel van de darde Voorstelling in het darde deel, and Van Vloten–Land correct to p. 3., followed by Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Gebhardt (G II 230; Textgestaltung II 380).
Scholium. Res etiam per se patet. Qui enim ait, album et nigrum in eo solummodo convenire, quod neutrum sit rubrum, is absolute affirmat album et nigrum nulla in re convenire. Sic etiam si quis ait, lapidem et hominem in hoc tantum convenire, quod uterque sit finitus, impotens vel quod ex necessitate suae naturae non existit, vel denique quod a potentia causarum externarum indefinite superatur, is omnino affirmat lapidem et hominem nulla in re convenire. Quae enim in sola negatione sive in eo, quod non habent, conveniunt, ea revera nulla in re conveniunt.
Scholium. The thing is also evident through itself. For he who says that white and black agree only in this, that neither is red, affirms absolutely that white and black agree in nothing. So also if someone says that a stone and a man agree only in this, that each is finite, lacking in power, or that it does not exist from the necessity of its nature, or finally that it is indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, he affirms entirely that a stone and a man agree in nothing. For things which agree only in a negation, or in what they do not have, really agree in nothing.
Propositio XXXIII
Proposition XXXIII
[G II 231] Homines natura discrepare possunt, quatenus affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, et eatenus etiam unus idemque homo varius est et inconstans.
Men can differ in nature insofar as they are troubled by affects which are passions, and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconstant.
Demonstratio. Affectuum natura seu essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam seu naturam explicari (per defin. 1. et 2. P. 3.); sed potentia, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) natura causarum externarum cum nostra comparata definiri debet. Unde fit, ut uniuscuiusque affectus tot species dentur, quot sunt species obiectorum, a quibus afficimur (vide prop. 56. P. 3.), et ut homines ab uno eodemque obiecto diversimode afficiantur (vide prop. 51. P. 3.), atque eatenus natura discrepent, et denique ut unus idemque homo (per eandem prop. 51. P. 3.) erga idem obiectum diversimode afficiatur, atque eatenus varius sit etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature, alone (by
Defs. 1 and
2 of Part III), but must be defined by the power, that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), the nature, of external causes compared with ours. Hence it comes about that there are as many species of each affect as there are species of objects by which we are affected (see
Prop. 56 of Part III), and that men are affected in different ways by one and the same object (see
Prop. 51 of Part III), and to that extent differ in nature, and finally that one and the same man (by
the same Prop. 51 of Part III) is affected in different ways towards the same object, and to that extent is changeable, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXIV
Proposition XXXIV
Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt invicem esse contrarii.
Insofar as men are troubled by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.
Demonstratio. Homo, ex. gr. Petrus, potest esse causa, ut Paulus contristetur, propterea quod aliquid habet simile rei, quam Paulus odit (per prop. 16. P. 3.); vel propterea, quod Petrus solus re aliqua potitur, quam ipse Paulus etiam amat (vide prop. 32. P. 3. cum eiusdem schol.); vel ob alias causas (harum praecipuas vide in schol. prop. 55. P. 3.). Atque adeo inde fiet (per aff. defin. 7.) ut Paulus Petrum odio habeat, et consequenter facile fiet (per prop. 40. P. 3. cum eius schol.) ut Petrus Paulum contra odio habeat, atque adeo (per prop. 39. P. 3.) ut invicem malum inferre conentur, hoc est (per prop. 30. huius) ut invicem sint contrarii.
At affectus tristitiae semper passio est (per prop. 59. P. 3.); ergo homines, quatenus conflictantur affectibus, qui passiones sunt, possunt invicem esse contrarii. Q. E. D.
But the affect of sadness is always a passion (by
Prop. 59 of Part III); therefore men, insofar as they are troubled by affects which are passions, can be contrary to one another. Q.E.D.
[G II 232] Scholium. Dixi, quod Paulus odio Petrum habeat, quia imaginatur, id eundem possidere, quod ipse Paulus etiam amat. Unde prima fronte videtur sequi, quod hi duo ex eo, quod idem amant, et consequenter ex eo, quod natura conveniunt,
a sibi invicem damno sint; atque adeo, si hoc verum est, falsae essent prop. 30. et 31. huius partis. Sed si rem aequa lance examinare velimus, haec omnia convenire omnino videbimus.
Scholium. I said that Paul hates Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses what Paul himself also loves. At first sight it seems to follow from this that these two, from the fact that they love the same thing, and consequently from the fact that they agree in nature, are harmful to one another; and so, if this is true,
Props. 30 and
31 of this Part would be false. But if we are willing to examine the matter with a fair balance, we shall see that all these things agree entirely.
- a videtur sequi, quod hi duo ex eo, quod idem amant, et consequenter ex eo, quod natura conveniunt,] transcr. videtur sequi; quod hi duo ex eo; quod idem amant et consequenter ex eo; quod natura conveniunt,. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 232).
Nam hi duo non sunt invicem molesti, quatenus natura conveniunt, hoc est quatenus uterque idem amat; sed quatenus ab invicem discrepant. Nam quatenus uterque idem amat, eo ipso utriusque amor fovetur (per prop. 31. P. 3.), hoc est (per aff. defin. 6.) eo ipso utriusque laetitia fovetur. Quare longe abest, ut quatenus idem amant et natura conveniunt, invicem molesti sint. Sed huius rei causa, ut dixi, nulla alia est quam quia natura discrepare supponuntur.
For these two are not troublesome to one another insofar as they agree in nature, that is, insofar as each loves the same thing, but insofar as they differ from one another. For insofar as each loves the same thing, by that very fact the love of each is encouraged (by
Prop. 31 of Part III), that is (by
Def. Aff. 6), by that very fact the joy of each is encouraged. So it is far from being the case that they are troublesome to one another insofar as they love the same thing and agree in nature. But the cause of this, as I have said, is nothing else but that they are supposed to differ in nature.
Supponimus namque Petrum ideam habere rei amatae iam possessae, et Paulum contra ideam rei amatae amissae. Unde fit, ut hic tristitia, et ille contra laetitia afficiatur; atque eatenus invicem contrarii sint. Et ad hunc modum ostendere facile possumus reliquas odii causas ab hoc solo pendere, quod homines natura discrepant, et non ab eo, in quo conveniunt.
For we suppose that Peter has the idea of a loved thing already possessed, and Paul, on the contrary, the idea of a loved thing lost. Hence it comes about that the latter is affected with sadness and the former, on the contrary, with joy; and to that extent they are contrary to one another. And in this way we can easily show that the other causes of hatred depend only on the fact that men differ in nature, and not on that in which they agree.
Propositio XXXV
Proposition XXXV
Quatenus homines ex ductu rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum natura semper necessario conveniunt.
Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature.
Demonstratio. Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi (per prop. 33. huius) et invicem contrarii (per prop. praeced.). Sed eatenus homines tantum agere dicuntur, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt (per prop. 3. P. 3.); atque adeo quicquid ex humana natura, quatenus ratione definitur, sequitur, id (per defin. 2. P. 3.) per solam humanam naturam, tamquam per proximam suam causam, debet intelligi.
Demonstration. Insofar as men are troubled by affects which are passions, they can be different in nature (by
Prop. 33 of this Part) and contrary to one another (by
the preceding Prop.). But men are said to act only insofar as they live from the guidance of reason (by
Prop. 3 of Part III); and so whatever follows from human nature insofar as it is defined by reason must (by
Def. 2 of Part III) be understood through human nature alone, as through its proximate cause.
Sed quia unusquisque ex suae naturae legibus id appetit, quod bonum, et id amovere conatur, quod malum esse iudicat (per prop. 19. huius); et cum praeterea id, quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse iudicamus, necessario bonum aut malum sit (per prop. 41. P. 2.), ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt, quae humanae naturae, et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 31. huius) quae cum natura uniuscuiusque hominis conveniunt. Atque adeo homines etiam inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt. Q. E. D.
But since each one, from the laws of his own nature, wants what he judges to be good and strives to remove what he judges to be evil (by
Prop. 19 of this Part), and since, moreover, what we judge from the dictate of reason to be good or evil is necessarily good or evil (by
Prop. 41 of Part II), men, insofar as they live from the guidance of reason, to that extent only necessarily do those things which are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each man, that is (by
Cor. of Prop. 31 of this Part), which agree with the nature of each man. And so men also necessarily always agree with one another insofar as they live from the guidance of reason. Q.E.D.
[G II 233] Corollarium I. Nihil singulare in rerum natura datur, quod homini sit utilius, quam homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est, quod cum sua natura maxime convenit (per coroll. prop. 31. huius), hoc est (ut per se notum) homo. At homo ex legibus suae naturae absolute agit, quando ex ductu rationis vivit (per defin. 2. P. 3.), et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convenit (per prop. praeced.). Ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo etc. Q. E. D.
Corollary I. There is no singular thing in the nature of things which is more useful to man than a man who lives from the guidance of reason. For what is most useful to man is what most agrees with his nature (by
Cor. of Prop. 31 of this Part), that is (as is self-evident), man. But a man acts absolutely from the laws of his nature when he lives from the guidance of reason (by
Def. 2 of Part III), and only to that extent does he necessarily always agree with the nature of another man (by
the preceding Prop.). Therefore among singular things there is nothing more useful to man than a man, etc. Q.E.D.
Corollarium II. Cum maxime unusquisque homo suum sibi utile quaerit, tum maxime homines sunt sibi invicem utiles. Nam quo magis unusquisque suum utile quaerit et se conservare conatur, eo magis virtute praeditus est (per prop. 20. huius), sive quod idem est (per defin. 8. huius), eo maiore potentia praeditus est ad agendum ex suae naturae legibus, hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.) ad vivendum ex ductu rationis. At homines tum maxime natura conveniunt, cum ex ductu rationis vivunt (per prop. praeced.). Ergo (per praeced. coroll.) tum maxime homines erunt sibi invicem utiles, cum maxime unusquisque suum utile sibi quaerit. Q. E. D.
Corollary II. When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another. For the more each one seeks his own advantage and strives to preserve himself, the more he is endowed with virtue (by
Prop. 20 of this Part), or, what is the same (by
Def. 8 of this Part), the greater the power with which he is endowed for acting from the laws of his nature, that is (by
Prop. 3 of Part III), for living from the guidance of reason. But men most agree in nature when they live from the guidance of reason (by
the preceding Prop.). Therefore (by
the preceding Cor.) men will be most useful to one another when each most seeks his own advantage for himself. Q.E.D.
[G II 234] Scholium. Quae modo ostendimus, ipsa etiam experientia quotidie tot tamque luculentis testimoniis testatur, ut omnibus fere in ore sit, hominem homini Deum esse. Fit tamen raro, ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant; sed cum iis ita comparatum est, ut plerumque invidi atque invicem molesti sint. At nihilominus vitam solitariam vix transigere queunt, ita ut plerisque illa definitio, quod homo sit animal sociale, valde arriserit; et revera res ita se habet, ut ex hominum communi societate multo plura commoda oriantur, quam damna.
Scholium. What we have just shown, experience itself also testifies daily with so many and such clear testimonies that it is in almost everyone’s mouth that man is a God to man.
1 Yet it rarely happens that men live from the guidance of reason; instead, they are so constituted that they are for the most part envious and troublesome to one another. But nevertheless they can hardly lead a solitary life, so that the definition that man is a social animal has pleased most people very much; and in truth the matter stands so that far more benefits than harms arise from the common society of men.
- 1 Hobbes had set the saying beside its opposite in the dedication of De cive: ‘Profecto utrumque vere dictum est, homo homini deus, et homo homini lupus. Illud, si concives inter se; hoc, si civitates comparemus’ (‘Both sayings are certainly true: man is a God to man, and man is a wolf to man; the first if we compare citizens with one another, the second if we compare states’).
Rideant igitur, quantum velint, res humanas satyrici, easque detestentur theologi, et laudent, quantum possunt, melancholici vitam incultam et agrestem, hominesque contemnant et admirentur bruta; experientur tamen homines mutuo auxilio ea quibus indigent, multo facilius sibi parare, et non nisi iunctis viribus pericula, quae ubique imminent, vitare posse; ut iam taceam, quod multo praestabilius sit et cognitione nostra magis dignum, hominum quam brutorum facta contemplari. Sed de his alias prolixius.
Let the satirists, then, laugh at human affairs as much as they like, let the theologians detest them,
2 and let the melancholy praise as much as they can an uncultivated and rustic life, and despise men and admire the beasts; men will nevertheless find that they can procure for themselves what they need much more easily by mutual help, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers which threaten everywhere; not to mention that it is much more excellent, and more worthy of our knowledge, to contemplate the deeds of men than those of beasts. But of these things elsewhere at greater length.
- 2 The same figures appear in the Preface to Part III, where those who attribute human weakness to a vice of nature ‘weep over it, laugh at it, despise it, or, as usually happens, detest it’, and at the beginning of the Political Treatise: philosophers conceive men not as they are but as they would like them to be, ‘unde factum est, ut plerumque pro Ethica Satyram scripserint’ (‘which is why they have mostly written satire instead of ethics’, TP I.1).
Propositio XXXVI
Proposition XXXVI
Summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est, eoque omnes aeque gaudere possunt.
The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally.
1- 1 Unlike the goods men fight over, this one is not diminished by being shared. Part V draws the consequence for the love of God: it ‘cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or jealousy, but is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love’ (Part V, Prop. 20).
Demonstratio. Ex virtute agere est ex ductu rationis agere (per prop. 24. huius), et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere, est intelligere (per prop. 26. huius). Atque adeo (per prop. 28. huius) summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, est Deum cognoscere, hoc est (per prop. 47. P. 2. et eiusdem schol.), bonum quod omnibus hominibus commune est, et ab omnibus hominibus, quatenus eiusdem sunt naturae, possideri aeque potest. Q. E. D.
Scholium. Si quis autem roget: quid si summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, non esset omnibus commune? an non inde, ut supra (vide prop. 34. huius) sequeretur, quod homines, qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, hoc est (per prop. 35. huius) homines, quatenus natura conveniunt, essent invicem contrarii? Is hoc sibi responsum habeat, non ex accidenti, sed ex ipsa natura rationis oriri, ut hominis summum bonum omnibus sit commune, nimirum, quia ex ipsa humana essentia, quatenus ratione definitur, deducitur; et quia homo nec esse nec concipi posset, si potestatem non haberet gaudendi hoc summo bono. Pertinet namque (per prop. 47. P. 2.) ad mentis humanae essentiam, adaequatam habere cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.
Scholium. But if someone asks: what if the highest good of those who follow virtue were not common to all? Would it not follow from this, as above (see
Prop. 34 of this Part), that men who live from the guidance of reason, that is (by
Prop. 35 of this Part), men insofar as they agree in nature, would be contrary to one another? Let him have this answer: that it arises not by accident but from the very nature of reason that man’s highest good is common to all, namely because it is deduced from the very essence of man insofar as it is defined by reason, and because man could neither be nor be conceived if he did not have the power of enjoying this highest good. For it pertains (by
Prop. 47 of Part II) to the essence of the human mind to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Propositio XXXVII
Proposition XXXVII
[G II 235] Bonum, quod unusquisque, qui sectatur virtutem, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet, et eo magis, quo maiorem Dei habuerit cognitionem.
The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men,
1 and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has.
- 1 The demonstration of what Prop. 18, Schol. announced: men who are governed by reason ‘want nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men’.
Cited in 4P45D, 4P45C1, 4P46D, 4P50D, 4P51D2, 4P68S, 4P70D, 4P71D, 4P73D, 4P73S, 5P20D
Demonstratio. Homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, sunt homini utilissimi (per coroll. 1. prop. 35. huius); atque adeo (per prop. 19. huius) ex ductu rationis conabimur necessario efficere, ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant. At bonum, quod unusquisque, qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, hoc est (per prop. 24. huius) qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, est intelligere (per prop. 26. huius). Ergo bonum, quod unusquisque, qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet.
Demonstration. Men, insofar as they live from the guidance of reason, are most useful to man (by
Cor. 1 of Prop. 35 of this Part); and so (by
Prop. 19 of this Part) we shall necessarily strive, from the guidance of reason, to bring it about that men live from the guidance of reason. But the good which each one who lives from the dictate of reason, that is (by
Prop. 24 of this Part), who follows virtue, wants for himself is to understand (by
Prop. 26 of this Part). Therefore the good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men.
Deinde cupiditas, quatenus ad mentem refertur, est ipsa mentis essentia (per aff. defin. 1.); mentis autem essentia in cognitione consistit (per prop. 11. P. 2.) quae Dei cognitionem involvit (per prop. 47. P. 2.), et sine qua (per prop. 15. P. 1.) nec esse nec concipi potest. Adeoque quo mentis essentia maiorem Dei cognitionem involvit, eo cupiditas, qua is, qui virtutem sectatur, bonum, quod sibi appetit, alteri cupit, etiam maior erit. Q. E. D.
Next, desire, insofar as it is related to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (by
Def. Aff. 1); but the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by
Prop. 11 of Part II), which involves the knowledge of God (by
Prop. 47 of Part II), and without which (by
Prop. 15 of Part I) it can neither be nor be conceived. And so the more the essence of the mind involves knowledge of God, the greater also will be the desire by which one who follows virtue desires for another the good which he wants for himself. Q.E.D.
Aliter. Bonum, quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit, si viderit, alios idem amare (per prop. 31. P. 3.). Atque adeo (per coroll. eiusdem prop.) conabitur, ut reliqui idem ament. Et quia hoc bonum (per prop. praeced.) omnibus commune est, eoque omnes gaudere possunt, conabitur ergo (per eandem rationem) ut omnes eodem gaudeant, et (per prop. 37. P. 3.) eo magis, quo hoc bono magis fruetur. Q. E. D.
Alternatively. The good which a man wants for himself and loves he will love more constantly if he sees that others love the same thing (by
Prop. 31 of Part III). And so (by
Cor. of the same Prop.) he will strive that the others love the same thing. And because this good (by
the preceding Prop.) is common to all, and all can enjoy it, he will therefore strive (for the same reason) that all may enjoy it, and (by
Prop. 37 of Part III) the more so, the more he enjoys this good. Q.E.D.
[G II 236] Scholium I. Qui ex solo affectu conatur, ut reliqui ament quod ipse amat, et ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, solo impetu
a agit, et ideo odiosus est, praecipue iis, quibus alia placent, quique propterea etiam student et eodem impetu conantur, ut reliqui contra ex ipsorum ingenio vivant. Deinde quoniam summum, quod homines ex affectu appetunt, bonum saepe tale est, ut unus tantum eius possit esse compos, hinc fit, ut qui amant, mente sibi non constent, et dum laudes rei, quam amant, narrare gaudent, timeant credi. At qui reliquos conatur ratione ducere, non impetu, sed humaniter et benigne agit et sibi mente maxime constat.
Scholium I. He who strives, from affect alone, that others should love what he himself loves, and that others should live according to his temperament,
1 acts from impulse alone, and is therefore hateful, especially to those to whom other things are pleasing, and who therefore also strive eagerly, and with the same impulse, that others should live, on the contrary, according to their temperament. Next, since the highest good which men want from affect is often such that only one can possess it, it comes about that those who love are not at one with themselves in mind, and, while they rejoice to tell the praises of the thing they love, fear to be believed.
2 But he who strives to lead others by reason acts not by impulse but humanely and kindly, and is most at one with himself in mind.
- a ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, solo impetu] transcr. ut reliqui ex suo ingenio vivant, solo impetu. The 1677 edition (OP p. 192) and Gebhardt (G II 236) read ‘ex ipsius ingenio’ (according to his temperament); the transcription has ‘suo’.
- 1 The affect is ambition as Part III, Prop. 31, Schol. describes it: ‘each one by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament’, and since all want this equally, they are equally an obstacle to one another.
- 2 Because a listener who believed them would come to love the same thing, and a thing which only one can possess makes rivals (Part III, Prop. 32).
Porro quicquid cupimus et agimus, cuius causa sumus,
b quatenus Dei habemus ideam, sive quatenus Deum cognoscimus, ad
religionem refero. Cupiditatem autem bene faciendi, quae eo ingeneratur, quod ex rationis ductu vivimus,
pietatem voco. Cupiditatem deinde, qua homo, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, tenetur ut reliquos sibi amicitia iungat,
honestatem voco, et id
honestum, quod homines,
c qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, laudant, et id contra
turpe, quod conciliandae
d amicitiae repugnat.
Further, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I refer to
religion.
3 The desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason I call
piety. The desire by which a man who lives from the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship I call
honourableness, and I call that
honourable which men who live from the guidance of reason praise, and that, on the contrary,
base which is opposed to the forming of friendship.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 192) prints causâ (‘for the sake of which’); the Dutch has van ’t welk wy oorzaak zijn (‘of which we are the cause’), and Van Vloten–Land and Gebhardt (G II 236; Textgestaltung II 380–381) read causa.
- c et id honestum, quod homines] transcr. et id *honestum, quod homines. The transcription opens an italic span at ‘honestum’ that runs to the end of the scholium; the defined terms ‘honestum’ and ‘turpe’ are set in italics like ‘religionem’, ‘pietatem’ and ‘honestatem’ (the 1677 edition has no italics here).
- d et id contra turpe, quod conciliandae] transcr. et id contra turpe, quod conciliandae. See the preceding emendation.
- 3 Religion, piety and honourableness are defined from the knowledge of God and the guidance of reason, without reference to revelation, worship or reward. Spinoza keeps the traditional words religio and pietas but gives them his own sense: piety here is not religious observance but the desire to do good that arises from living by reason. Part V holds to them even apart from the eternity of the mind: ‘even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion’ (Part V, Prop. 41).
Praeter haec civitatis etiam quaenam sint fundamenta ostendi.
e Differentia deinde inter veram virtutem et impotentiam facile ex supra dictis percipitur: nempe quod vera virtus nihil aliud sit, quam ex solo rationis ductu vivere; atque adeo impotentia in hoc solo consistit, quod homo a rebus, quae extra ipsum sunt, duci se patiatur et ab iis ad ea agendum determinetur, quae rerum externarum communis constitutio, non autem ea, quae ipsa ipsius natura in se sola considerata postulat.
Besides these things, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are. The difference, next, between true virtue and lack of power is easily perceived from what has been said above: namely, that true virtue is nothing but living from the guidance of reason alone, and so lack of power consists in this alone, that a man allows himself to be led by things which are outside him, and is determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself alone, demands.
- e W. Meijer, followed by Baensch and Appuhn, thought the sentence out of place and would move it to the end of the Scholium with ostendam for ostendi. Gebhardt (G II 236; Textgestaltung II 381) keeps it, as the Dutch does: the preceding sentences, besides their general validity, contain the foundations of the state, the refusal of any tyranny over opinion, reason as the rule of government, religion, piety and honourableness.
Atque haec illa sunt, quae in schol. prop. 18. huius partis demonstrare promisi,
f ex quibus apparet legem illam de non mactandis brutis
g magis vana superstitione et muliebri misericordia, quam sana ratione fundatam esse. Docet quidem ratio nostrum utile quaerendi necessitudinem cum hominibus iungere;
h sed non cum brutis aut rebus, quarum natura a natura humana est diversa, sed idem ius, quod illa in nos habent, nos in ea habere. Imo quia uniuscuiusque ius virtute seu potentia uniuscuiusque definitur, longe maius homines in bruta, quam haec in homines ius habent.
And these are the things I promised to demonstrate in
Schol. of Prop. 18 of this Part, from which it is evident that the law against slaughtering beasts is founded more on empty superstition and womanish compassion than on sound reason. The principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us, indeed, to form close ties with men, but not with beasts, or with things whose nature is different from human nature; it teaches that we have the same right against them that they have against us. Indeed, because the right of each is defined by the virtue, or power, of each,
4 men have far greater right against beasts than beasts against men.
- f huius partis demonstrare promisi] transcr. huius partisdemonstrare promisi. Word division as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 192) and Gebhardt (G II 236).
- g W. Meijer would move the passage on killing animals (to Vide schol. prop. 57. P. 3.) to Prop. 39, and Baensch (second edition) took it for a later insertion. Gebhardt (G II 236–237; Textgestaltung II 381) keeps it where both the Latin and the Dutch have it: the community of reason joins men with men, not men with animals, so that right over animals belongs where the community of men is treated.
- h The 1677 edition has no punctuation here. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 381–382) takes ratio nostrum utile quaerendi together (‘the principle of seeking our own advantage’), with necessitudinem … iungere (‘to form close ties’, as consuetudines jungunt in the Political Treatise) as its object; the Dutch and Saisset construe nostrum utile quaerendi necessitudinem (‘the necessity of seeking our advantage’) instead. The translation follows Gebhardt.
- 4 Right is power, as the Political Treatise puts it: ‘each natural thing has as much right from nature as it has power to exist and to operate’ (unamquamque rem naturalem tantum juris ex natura habere, quantum potentiae habet ad existendum et operandum, TP II.3).
Nec tamen nego bruta sentire, sed nego, quod propterea non liceat nostrae utilitati consulere et iisdem ad libitum uti; eademque tractare, prout nobis magis convenit; quandoquidem nobiscum natura non conveniunt et eorum affectus ab affectibus humanis sunt natura diversi. Vide schol. prop. 57. P. 3. Superest, ut explicem, quid iustum, quid iniustum, quid peccatum et quid denique meritum sit. Sed de his vide sequens scholium.
iYet I do not deny that beasts feel; but I deny that it is therefore not permissible for us to consult our own advantage and to use them at our pleasure, and to treat them as best suits us, since they do not agree with us in nature and their affects are different in nature from human affects. See
Schol. of Prop. 57 of Part III. It remains for me to explain what is just, what unjust, what sin, and finally what merit is. But on these see the following Scholium.
- i Sed de his vide sequens scholium.] transcr. Sed de his videsequens scholium. Word division as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 193) and Gebhardt (G II 237); the stray asterisk closed the italic span opened at ‘honestum’.
[G II 237] Scholium II. In appendice partis primae explicare promisi,
a quid laus et vituperium, quid meritum et peccatum, quid iustum et iniustum sit.
Laudem et
vituperium quod attinet, in schol. prop. 29. P. 3. explicui; de reliquis autem hic iam erit dicendi locus. Sed prius pauca de
statu hominis naturali et
civili dicenda sunt.
Scholium II. In the
Appendix of the first Part I promised to explain what praise and blame, merit and sin, the just and the unjust are. Praise and blame I have explained in
Schol. of Prop. 29 of Part III; of the rest this will now be the place to speak. But first a few things must be said about the
natural and the
civil state of man.
- a In appendice partis primae explicare promisi] transcr. Inappendice partis primaeexplicare promisi. Word division as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 193) and Gebhardt (G II 237).
Existit unusquisque summo naturae iure, et consequenter summo naturae iure unusquisque ea agit, quae ex suae naturae necessitate sequuntur; atque adeo summo naturae iure unusquisque iudicat, quid bonum, quid malum sit, suaeque utilitati ex suo ingenio consulit (vide prop. 19. et 20. huius), seseque vindicat (vide coroll. 2. prop. 40. P. 3.), et id quod amat conservare, et id quod odio habet destruere conatur (vide prop. 28. P. 3.).
Each one exists by the highest right of nature,
1 and consequently by the highest right of nature each one does what follows from the necessity of his own nature; and so by the highest right of nature each one judges what is good and what is evil, and looks to his own advantage according to his own temperament (see
Props. 19 and
20 of this Part), and avenges himself (see
Cor. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part III), and strives to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he hates (see
Prop. 28 of Part III).
- 1 The doctrine is set out at length in the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 16, and the Political Treatise, chs. 2–3: whatever each one, wise or ignorant, strives for and does, ‘id summo naturae jure conari, et agere’ (‘he strives for and does by the highest right of nature’, TP II.8). Asked how he differed from Hobbes, Spinoza answered: ‘ego naturale Jus semper sartum tectum conservo’ (‘I always keep natural right intact’), the sovereign having right over the subjects only in proportion to the power by which it exceeds them (Letter 50, to Jarig Jelles).
Quod si homines ex ductu rationis viverent, potiretur unusquisque (per coroll. 1. prop. 35. huius)
a hoc suo iure absque ullo alterius damno. Sed quia affectibus sunt obnoxii (per coroll. prop. 4. huius), qui potentiam seu virtutem humanam longe superant (per prop. 6. huius), ideo saepe diversi trahuntur (per prop. 33. huius) atque sibi invicem sunt contrarii (per prop. 34. huius), mutuo dum auxilio indigent (per schol. prop. 35. huius). Ut igitur homines concorditer vivere et sibi auxilio esse possint, necesse est, ut iure suo naturali cedant et se invicem securos reddant, se nihil acturos, quod possit in alterius damnum cedere.
- a (per coroll. 1. prop. 35. huius)] transcr. (per coroll. 1. prop. 35 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 237).
Qua autem ratione hoc fieri possit, ut scilicet homines, qui affectibus necessario sunt obnoxii (per coroll. prop. 4. huius) atque inconstantes et varii (per prop. 33. huius), possint se invicem securos reddere et fidem invicem habere, patet ex prop. 7. huius partis et prop. 39. P. 3. Nempe quod nullus affectus coerceri potest, nisi affectu fortiore et contrario affectui coercendo, et quod unusquisque ab inferendo damno abstinet timore maioris damni.
But how this can come about, namely that men, who are necessarily subject to affects (by
Cor. of Prop. 4 of this Part) and inconstant and changeable (by
Prop. 33 of this Part), can make one another confident and have trust in one another, is evident from
Prop. 7 of this Part and
Prop. 39 of Part III: namely, that no affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than and contrary to the affect to be restrained, and that each one abstains from doing harm from fear of a greater harm.
Hac igitur lege
societas firmari poterit,
b si modo ipsa sibi vindicet ius, quod unusquisque habet, sese vindicandi et de bono et malo iudicandi; quaeque adeo potestatem habeat communem vivendi rationem praescribendi, legesque ferendi, easque non ratione, quae affectus coercere nequit (per schol. prop. 17. huius), sed minis firmandi. Haec autem societas legibus et potestate sese conservandi firmata
civitas appellatur, et qui ipsius iure defenduntur
cives.
By this law, therefore, a
society can be established, provided that it claims for itself the right which each one has of avenging himself and of judging good and evil, and that it therefore has the power of prescribing a common rule of life and of making laws, and of enforcing them not by reason, which cannot restrain the affects (by
Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part), but by threats. This society, established by laws and by the power of preserving itself, is called a
state, and those who are defended by its right are called
citizens.
- b Tönnies proposed formari, as in a passage of the Theological-Political Treatise; Gebhardt (G II 238; Textgestaltung II 382) keeps firmari, which is not a slip, since the expression is repeated (firmandi, firmata) and the Dutch renders it each time by bevestigen.
Ex quibus facile intelligimus, nihil in statu naturali dari, quod ex omnium consensu bonum aut malum sit, quandoquidem unusquisque, qui in statu est naturali, suae tantummodo utilitati consulit, et ex suo ingenio, et quatenus suae utilitatis tantum habet rationem, quid bonum quidve malum sit, decernit, et nemini nisi sibi soli obtemperare lege ulla tenetur; atque adeo in statu naturali peccatum concipi nequit. At quidem in statu civili, ubi et communi consensu decernitur, quid bonum quidve malum sit, et unusquisque civitati obtemperare tenetur. Est itaque peccatum nihil aliud, quam inobedientia, quae propterea solo civitatis iure punitur; et contra obedientia civi meritum ducitur, quia eo ipso dignus iudicatur, qui civitatis commodis gaudeat.
From this we easily understand that in the natural state there is nothing which is good or evil by the consent of all, since each one who is in the natural state looks only to his own advantage, and decides what is good and what evil according to his own temperament, and insofar as he takes account only of his own advantage, and is bound by no law to obey anyone but himself alone; and so in the natural state sin cannot be conceived. It is otherwise in the civil state, where it is decided by common consent what is good and what evil, and each one is bound to obey the state. Sin, therefore, is nothing but disobedience, which is for that reason punished only by the right of the state; and on the other hand obedience is counted as merit in a citizen, because by that very fact he is judged worthy to enjoy the advantages of the state.
Deinde in statu naturali nemo ex communi consensu alicuius rei est dominus, nec in natura aliquid datur, quod possit dici huius hominis esse et non illius; sed omnia omnium sunt, ac proinde in statu naturali nulla potest concipi voluntas unicuique suum tribuendi; aut alicui id, quod eius sit, eripiendi, hoc est, in statu naturali nihil fit, quod iustum aut iniustum possit dici; at quidem in statu civili, ubi ex communi consensu decernitur, quid huius quidve illius sit. Ex quibus apparet, iustum et iniustum, peccatum et meritum notiones esse extrinsecas, non autem attributa, quae mentis naturam explicent. Sed de his satis.
Next, in the natural state no one is master of anything by common consent, nor is there anything in nature which can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s; but all things are everyone’s; and accordingly in the natural state no will can be conceived of giving to each his own, or of taking from someone what is his; that is, in the natural state nothing is done which can be called
just or
unjust. It is otherwise in the civil state, where it is decided by common consent what is this man’s and what is that man’s. From which it is evident that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which explain the nature of the mind.
2 But enough of these things.
- 2 Like the agreement of an idea with its object, which Part II, Def. 4, Expl. sets aside as extrinsic, they are relations to something outside the mind (here the laws and the common consent of a state), not properties of the mind itself.
Propositio XXXVIII
Proposition XXXVIII
[G II 239] Id quod corpus humanum ita disponit, ut pluribus modis possit affici, vel quod idem aptum reddit ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, homini est utile; et eo utilius, quo corpus ab eo aptius redditur, ut pluribus modis afficiatur, aliaque corpora afficiat; et contra id noxium est, quod corpus ad haec minus aptum reddit.
What so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is useful to man;
1 and the more useful, the more capable it renders the body of being affected in many ways and of affecting other bodies; and on the contrary, that is harmful which renders the body less capable of these things.
- 1 The body’s capacities matter for the mind (Part II, Prop. 14), and Part V draws the last consequence: ‘he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal’ (Part V, Prop. 39).
Demonstratio. Quo corpus ad haec aptius redditur, eo mens aptior ad percipiendum redditur (per prop. 14. P. 2.); adeoque id, quod corpus hac ratione disponit aptumque ad haec reddit, est necessario bonum seu utile (per prop. 26. et 27. huius), et eo utilius, quo corpus ad haec aptius potest reddere; et contra (per eandem prop. 14. P. 2. inversam et prop. 26. et 27. huius) noxium, si corpus ad haec minus aptum reddat. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The more capable the body is rendered of these things, the more capable the mind is rendered of perceiving (by
Prop. 14 of Part II); and so what disposes the body in this way and renders it capable of these things is necessarily good, or useful (by
Props. 26 and
27 of this Part), and the more useful, the more capable it can render the body of these things; and on the contrary (by
the same Prop. 14 of Part II, inverted, and
Props. 26 and
27 of this Part) it is harmful if it renders the body less capable of these things. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXIX
Proposition XXXIX
Quae efficiunt, ut motus et quietis ratio, quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, bona sunt; et ea contra mala, quae efficiunt, ut corporis humani partes aliam ad invicem motus et quietis habeant rationem.
Those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved are good; and on the contrary, those are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different ratio of motion and rest to one another.
Demonstratio. Corpus humanum indiget, ut conservetur, plurimis aliis corporibus (per postul. 4. P. 2.). At id, quod formam humani corporis constituit, in hoc consistit, quod eius partes motus suos certa quadam ratione sibi invicem communicent (per defin. ante lemm. 4. quam vide post prop. 13. P. 2.). Ergo quae efficiunt, ut motus et quietis ratio, quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, eadem humani corporis formam conservant, et consequenter efficiunt (per postul. 3. et 6. P. 2.) ut corpus humanum multis modis affici, et ut idem corpora externa multis modis afficere possit; adeoque (per prop. praeced.) bona sunt.
Demonstration. The human body needs a great many other bodies in order to be preserved (by
Post. 4 of Part II). But what constitutes the form of the human body consists in this, that its parts communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio (by the
Def. before
Lemma 4, which see after
Prop. 13 of Part II). Therefore those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved also preserve the form of the human body, and consequently bring it about (by
Posts. 3 and
6 of Part II) that the human body can be affected in many ways, and that it can affect external bodies in many ways; and so (by
the preceding Prop.) they are good.
Deinde quae efficiunt, ut corporis humani partes aliam motus et quietis rationem obtineant, eadem (per eandem defin. P. 2.) efficiunt, ut corpus humanum aliam formam induat, hoc est (ut per se notum, et in fine praef. huius partis monuimus) ut corpus humanum destruatur, et consequenter ut omnino ineptum reddatur, ne possit pluribus modis affici, ac proinde (per prop. praeced.) mala sunt. Q. E. D.
Next, those things which bring it about that the parts of the human body obtain a different ratio of motion and rest bring it about (by
the same Def. of Part II) that the human body takes on another form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we pointed out at the end of the
Preface of this Part), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently that it is rendered entirely incapable of being affected in many ways; and accordingly (by
the preceding Prop.) they are evil. Q.E.D.
[G II 240] Scholium. Quantum haec menti obesse vel prodesse possunt in P. 5. explicabitur. Sed hic notandum, quod corpus tum mortem obire intelligam, quando eius partes ita disponuntur, ut aliam motus et quietis rationem ad invicem obtineant. Nam negare non audeo corpus humanum retenta sanguinis circulatione et aliis, propter quae corpus vivere existimatur, posse nihilominus in aliam naturam a sua prorsus diversam mutari. Nam nulla ratio me cogit, ut statuam corpus non mori, nisi mutetur in cadaver; quin ipsa experientia aliud suadere videtur.
Scholium. How far these things can harm or benefit the mind will be explained in Part V. But it should be noted here that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they obtain a different ratio of motion and rest to one another.
1 For I dare not deny that the human body, while the circulation of the blood and the other things on account of which the body is thought to live are retained, can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely different from its own. For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse; indeed experience itself seems to suggest otherwise.
- 1 Death is defined by the form of the body as the physical digression after Part II, Prop. 13 defines it, a fixed ratio in which the parts communicate their motions, and not by the cessation of the functions on account of which a body is thought to live. Identity through change is the subject of Lemmas 4–7 there.
Fit namque aliquando, ut homo tales patiatur mutationes, ut non facile eundem illum esse dixerim, ut de quodam hispano poeta narrare audivi, qui morbo correptus fuerat et quamvis ex eo convaluerit, mansit tamen praeteritae suae vitae tam oblitus, ut fabulas et tragoedias, quas fecerat, suas non crediderit esse, et sane pro infante adulto haberi potuisset, si vernaculae etiam linguae fuisset oblitus. Et si hoc incredibile videtur, quid de infantibus dicemus, quorum naturam homo provectae aetatis a sua tam diversam esse credit, ut persuaderi non posset, se unquam infantem fuisse, nisi ex aliis de se coniecturam faceret? Sed ne superstitiosis materiam suppeditem movendi novas quaestiones, malo haec in medio relinquere.
For it sometimes happens that a man undergoes such changes that I should not easily say he was the same man, as I have heard told of a certain Spanish poet who had been seized by an illness and, although he recovered from it, remained so forgetful of his past life that he did not believe the stories and tragedies he had written were his own; and he could certainly have been taken for a grown-up infant if he had also forgotten his native language. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of advanced age believes their nature to be so different from his own that he could not be persuaded that he had ever been an infant, if he did not make a conjecture about himself from others. But so as not to give the superstitious material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave these matters undecided.
Propositio XL
Proposition XL
[G II 241] Quae ad hominum communem societatem conducunt, sive quae efficiunt, ut homines concorditer vivant, utilia sunt, et illa contra mala, quae discordiam in civitatem inducunt.
Things which conduce to the common society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; and on the contrary, those are evil which introduce discord into the state.
Demonstratio. Nam quae efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, simul efficiunt, ut ex ductu rationis vivant (per prop. 35. huius), atque adeo (per prop. 26. et 27. huius) bona sunt, et (per eandem rationem) illa contra mala sunt, quae discordias concitant. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For things which bring it about that men live harmoniously at the same time bring it about that they live from the guidance of reason (by
Prop. 35 of this Part), and so (by
Props. 26 and
27 of this Part) they are good; and (by the same reasoning) on the contrary those are evil which arouse discords. Q.E.D.
Propositio XLI
Proposition XLI
Laetitia directe mala non est, sed bona; tristitia autem contra directe est mala.
Joy is not directly evil, but good;
1 sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil.
- 1 ‘Directly’: in itself, as an increase of the power of acting. Props. 43 and 44 show how a joy can become evil through excess, and how a sadness can then be good by restraining it.
Demonstratio. Laetitia (per prop. 11. P. 3. cum eiusdem schol.) est affectus, quo corporis agendi potentia augetur vel iuvatur; tristitia autem contra est affectus, quo corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) laetitia directe bona est etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Joy (by
Prop. 11 of Part III with
its Schol.) is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is increased or aided; sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained; and so (by
Prop. 38 of this Part) joy is directly good, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio XLII
Proposition XLII
Hilaritas excessum habere nequit, sed semper bona est, et contra melancholia semper mala.
Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good; and on the contrary, melancholy is always evil.
Demonstratio. Hilaritas (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) est laetitia, quae, quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod corporis omnes partes pariter sint affectae, hoc est (per prop. 11. P. 3.) quod corporis agendi potentia augetur vel iuvatur, ita ut omnes eius partes eandem ad invicem motus et quietis rationem obtineant; atque adeo (per prop. 39. huius) hilaritas semper est bona, nec excessum habere potest.
Demonstration. Cheerfulness (see its definition in
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III) is a joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this, that all the parts of the body are equally affected, that is (by
Prop. 11 of Part III), that the body’s power of acting is increased or aided in such a way that all its parts maintain the same ratio of motion and rest to one another; and so (by
Prop. 39 of this Part) cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive.
At melancholia (cuius etiam defin. vide in eodem schol. prop. 11. P. 3.)
a est tristitia, quae quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod corporis agendi potentia absolute
b minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) semper est mala. Q. E. D.
- a (cuius etiam defin. vide in eodem schol. prop. 11. P. 3.)] transcr. (cuius etiam defin. vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 198) and Gebhardt (G II 242) read ‘in eodem Schol.’; the transcription omits ‘eodem’.
- b in hoc consistit, quod corporis agendi potentia absolute] transcr. in hoc solo consistit, quod corporis agendi potentia absolute. The 1677 edition (OP p. 198), Gebhardt (G II 242) and Bartuschat have no ‘solo’ here.
Propositio XLIII
Proposition XLIII
[G II 242] Titillatio excessum habere potest et mala esse; dolor autem eatenus potest esse bonus, quatenus titillatio seu laetitia est mala.
Pleasure can be excessive and be evil; but pain can be good insofar as pleasure, or joy, is evil.
Demonstratio. Titillatio est laetitia, quae, quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod una vel aliquot eius partes prae reliquis afficiuntur (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.),
a cuius affectus potentia tanta esse potest, ut reliquas corporis actiones superet (per prop. 6. huius), eique pertinaciter adhaereat, atque adeo impediat, quominus corpus aptum sit, ut plurimis aliis modis afficiatur; adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) mala esse potest. Deinde dolor, qui contra tristitia est, in se solo consideratus non potest esse bonus (per prop. 41. huius).
Demonstration. Pleasure is a joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this, that one or several of its parts are affected more than the rest (see its definition in
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III); the power of this affect can be so great that it surpasses the other actions of the body (by
Prop. 6 of this Part) and clings stubbornly to it, and so prevents the body from being capable of being affected in very many other ways; and so (by
Prop. 38 of this Part) it can be evil. Next, pain, which on the contrary is a sadness, cannot, considered in itself alone, be good (by
Prop. 41 of this Part).
- a (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.)] transcr. (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11 P. 3.). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 242).
Verum quia eius vis et incrementum definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata (per prop. 5. huius), possumus ergo huius affectus infinitos virium concipere gradus et modos (per prop. 3. huius); atque adeo eundem talem concipere, qui titillationem possit coercere, ut excessum non habeat, et eatenus (per primam partem prop. huius) efficere, ne corpus minus aptum reddatur, ac proinde eatenus erit bonus. Q. E. D.
But because its force and increase are defined by the power of an external cause compared with ours (by
Prop. 5 of this Part), we can therefore conceive infinite degrees and modes of the strength of this affect (by
Prop. 3 of this Part); and so we can conceive it such that it can restrain pleasure so that it is not excessive, and to that extent (by the first part of
this Prop.) bring it about that the body is not rendered less capable; and accordingly to that extent it will be good. Q.E.D.
Propositio XLIV
Proposition XLIV
Amor et cupiditas excessum habere possunt.
Love and desire can be excessive.
Demonstratio. Amor est laetitia (per aff. defin. 6.) concomitante idea causae externae. Titillatio igitur (per schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) concomitante idea causae externae amor est; atque adeo amor (per prop. praeced.) excessum habere potest. Deinde cupiditas eo est maior, quo affectus, ex quo oritur, maior est (per prop. 37. P. 3.). Quare ut affectus (per prop. 6. huius) reliquas hominis actiones superare potest, sic etiam cupiditas, quae ex eodem affectu oritur, reliquas cupiditates superare, ac proinde eundem excessum habere poterit, quem in praeced. prop. titillationem habere ostendimus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Love is joy (by
Def. Aff. 6) accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Pleasure, therefore (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III), accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love; and so love (by
the preceding Prop.) can be excessive. Next, desire is the greater, the greater the affect from which it arises (by
Prop. 37 of Part III). Hence, as an affect (by
Prop. 6 of this Part) can surpass the other actions of a man, so also the desire which arises from that affect can surpass the other desires, and accordingly can have the same excess which we showed in
the preceding Prop. that pleasure has. Q.E.D.
[G II 243] Scholium. Hilaritas, quam bonam esse dixi, concipitur facilius, quam observatur. Nam affectus, quibus quotidie conflictamur, referuntur plerumque ad aliquam corporis partem, quae prae reliquis afficitur, ac proinde affectus ut plurimum excessum habent, et mentem in sola unius obiecti contemplatione ita detinent, ut de aliis cogitare nequeat; et quamvis homines pluribus affectibus obnoxii sint, atque adeo rari reperiantur, qui semper uno eodemque affectu conflictentur, non desunt tamen, quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhaereat.
Scholium. Cheerfulness, which I said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affects by which we are daily troubled are generally related to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest, and so the affects are for the most part excessive, and so hold the mind in the contemplation of one object alone that it cannot think of others; and although men are subject to many affects, and so few are found who are always troubled by one and the same affect, still there are not lacking those to whom one and the same affect stubbornly clings.
Videmus enim homines aliquando ab uno obiecto ita affici, ut, quamvis praesens non sit, ipsum tamen coram habere credant, quod quando homini non dormienti accidit, eundem delirare dicimus vel insanire; nec minus insanire creduntur, qui amore ardent, quique noctes atque dies solam amasiam vel meretricem somniant, quia risum movere solent. At cum avarus de nulla alia re, quam de lucro vel de nummis cogitet, et ambitiosus de gloria etc., hi non creduntur delirare, quia molesti solent esse et odio digni aestimantur. Sed revera avaritia, ambitio, libido etc. delirii species sunt, quamvis inter morbos non numerentur.
For we see that men are sometimes so affected by one object that, although it is not present, they still believe they have it before them; and when this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those believed to be less mad who burn with love, and who dream night and day only of a mistress or a courtesan, because they usually provoke laughter. But when a greedy man thinks of nothing else but profit or money, and an ambitious man of glory, etc., they are not believed to be delirious, because they are usually troublesome and are thought worthy of hatred. But in truth greed, ambition, lust, etc., are species of madness, although they are not numbered among diseases.
Propositio XLV
Proposition XLV
Odium nunquam potest esse bonum.
Hatred can never be good.
Demonstratio. Hominem quem odimus destruere conamur (per prop. 39. P. 3.) hoc est (per prop. 37. huius) aliquid conamur quod malum est. Ergo etc. Q. E. D.
[G II 244] Scholium I. Nota me hic et in seqq. per odium illud tantum intelligere quod est erga homines.
Scholium I. Note that here and in what follows I understand by hatred only hatred towards men.
Corollarium I. Invidia, irrisio, contemptus, ira, vindicta et reliqui affectus, qui ad odium referuntur vel ex eodem oriuntur, mali sunt, quod etiam ex prop. 39. P. 3. et prop. 37. huius patet.
a Corollary I. Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, vengeance and the other affects which are related to hatred or arise from it are evil, which is also evident from
Prop. 39 of Part III and
Prop. 37 of this Part.
- a et prop. 37. huius patet] transcr. et prop. 37 huius patet. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 244).
Corollarium II. Quicquid ex eo, quod odio affecti sumus, appetimus, turpe et in civitate iniustum est. Quod etiam patet ex prop. 39. P. 3., et ex defin. turpis et iniusti, quas vide in schol. prop. 37. huius.
a Corollary II. Whatever we want from the fact that we are affected with hatred is base, and in the state unjust. This is also evident from
Prop. 39 of Part III, and from the definitions of base and unjust, which see in the Scholia of Prop. 37 of this Part (
Schol. 1,
Schol. 2).
- a quas vide in schol. prop. 37. huius] transcr. quas vide in schol. 1. et 2. prop. 37. huius. The 1677 edition (OP p. 200), Gebhardt (G II 244) and Bartuschat read ‘in Schol. Prop. 37. hujus’, without the numbers.
Scholium II. Inter irrisionem (quam in coroll. 1. malam esse dixi) et risum magnam agnosco differentiam. Nam risus, ut et iocus, mera est laetitia; adeoque modo excessum non habeat, per se bonus est (per prop. 41. huius). Nihil profecto nisi torva et tristis superstitio delectari prohibet. Nam qui magis decet famem et sitim extinguere, quam melancholiam expellere?
Scholium II. Between
mockery (which I said in
Cor. 1 is evil) and
laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, like jest, is pure joy; and so, provided it is not excessive, it is good in itself (by
Prop. 41 of this Part). Nothing, certainly, but grim and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves. For why is it more fitting to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive out melancholy?
Mea haec est ratio et sic animum induxi meum. Nullum numen, nec alius nisi invidus, mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur, nec nobis lacrimas, singultus, metum et alia huiusmodi, quae animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit; sed contra, quo maiore laetitia afficimur, eo ad maiorem perfectionem transimus, hoc est, eo nos magis de natura divina participare necesse est. Rebus itaque uti et iis, quantum fieri potest, delectari (non quidem ad nauseam usque, nam hoc delectari non est) viri est sapientis.
This is my reasoning, and so I have persuaded myself.
1 No deity, nor anyone else but an envious man, takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune, or counts as virtue our tears, sobs, fear and other things of this kind, which are signs of a mind lacking in power; on the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, that is, the more we must participate in the divine nature. It is the part of a wise man, therefore, to use things and to take pleasure in them as far as possible (not, indeed, to the point of disgust, for that is not taking pleasure).
- 1 Mea haec est ratio et sic animum induxi meum: the words of Micio, the indulgent father in Terence’s Adelphoe (line 68): ‘Mea sic est ratio, et sic animum induco meum’.
Viri, inquam, sapientis est moderato et suavi cibo et potu se reficere et recreare, ut et odoribus, plantarum virentium amoenitate, ornatu, musica, ludis exercitatoriis, theatris et aliis huiusmodi, quibus unusquisque absque ullo alterius damno uti potest.
It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with ornament, music, sports, theatres and other things of this kind which anyone can use without any harm to another.
Corpus namque humanum ex plurimis diversae naturae partibus componitur, quae continuo novo alimento indigent et vario, ut totum corpus ad omnia, quae ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, aeque aptum sit, et consequenter ut mens etiam aeque apta sit ad plura simul intelligendum. Hoc itaque vivendi institutum et cum nostris principiis et cum communi praxi optime convenit; quare si quae alia, haec vivendi ratio optima est et omnibus modis commendanda, nec opus est de his clarius, neque prolixius agere.
For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which continually need new and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things at once. This way of life, therefore, agrees best both with our principles and with common practice; so, if any other, this way of living is the best and is to be commended in every way; nor is there any need to treat of these things more clearly or at greater length.
Propositio XLVI
Proposition XLVI
[G II 245] Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest, conatur alterius in ipsum odium, iram, contemptum etc. amore contra sive generositate compensare.
He who lives from the guidance of reason strives as far as he can to repay another’s hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him with love in return, or nobility.
1- 1 The precept resembles the Gospel’s ‘diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos’ (‘love your enemies, do good to those who hate you’, Matthew 5:44, Vulgate), but it is derived from the laws of the affects: hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred and can be extinguished by love (Part III, Props. 43–44).
Demonstratio. Omnes odii affectus mali sunt (per coroll. 1. praeced. prop.); adeoque qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest conabitur efficere, ne odii affectibus conflictetur (per prop. 19. huius), et consequenter (per prop. 37. huius) conabitur, ne etiam alius eosdem patiatur affectus. At odium odio reciproco augetur et amore contra extingui potest (per prop. 43. P. 3.), ita ut odium in amorem transeat (per prop. 44. P. 3.).
Ergo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, alterius odium etc. amore contra compensare conabitur, hoc est, generositate (cuius defin. vide in schol. prop. 59. P. 3.). Q. E. D.
Therefore he who lives from the guidance of reason will strive to repay another’s hatred, etc., with love in return, that is, with nobility (whose definition see in
Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III). Q.E.D.
Scholium. Qui iniurias reciproco odio vindicare vult, misere profecto vivit. At qui contra studet odium amore expugnare, ille sane laetus et secure pugnat; aeque facile pluribus hominibus ac uni resistit,
a et fortunae auxilio quam minime indiget. Quos vero vincit, ii laeti cedunt, non quidem ex defectu sed ex incremento virium. Quae omnia adeo clare ex solis amoris et intellectus definitionibus sequuntur, ut opus non sit eadem sigillatim demonstrare.
Scholium. He who wants to avenge injuries by reciprocal hatred lives miserably indeed. But he who strives, on the contrary, to conquer hatred by love certainly fights joyfully and securely; he resists many men as easily as one, and needs the help of fortune least of all. Those whom he conquers yield joyfully, not from a lack but from an increase of their powers. All these things follow so clearly from the definitions of love and intellect alone that there is no need to demonstrate them one by one.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 201) has aeque facile uni homini, ac pluribus; the Dutch first translates this and then, in its list of corrections, turns it round (veel menschen, als een enige), which, as Leopold remarks, is certainly what Spinoza meant to write. Gebhardt (G II 245; Textgestaltung II 382) prints the corrected order.
Propositio XLVII
Proposition XLVII
Spei et metus affectus non possunt esse per se boni.
The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves.
[G II 246] Demonstratio. Spei et metus affectus sine tristitia non dantur. Nam metus est (per aff. defin. 13.) tristitia, et spes (vide explicationem aff. defin. 12. et 13.) non datur sine metu. Ac proinde (per prop. 41. huius) hi affectus non possunt esse per se boni, sed tantum quatenus laetitiae excessum coercere possunt
a (per prop. 43. huius). Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The affects of hope and fear are not given without sadness. For fear is (by
Def. Aff. 13) sadness, and hope (see the explanation of
Defs. Aff. 12 and 13) is not given without fear. And accordingly (by
Prop. 41 of this Part) these affects cannot be good in themselves, but only insofar as they can restrain an excess of joy (by
Prop. 43 of this Part). Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 202) has excessus, which might be meant as excessûs; the Dutch has d’overmaat, and Gebhardt (G II 246; Textgestaltung II 382) reads excessum, as Halpern asks, comparing the phrase in Props. 42–43.
Scholium. Huc accedit, quod hi affectus cognitionis defectum et mentis impotentiam indicant; et hac de causa etiam securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiae morsus animi impotentis sunt signa. Nam quamvis securitas et gaudium affectus sint laetitiae, tristitiam tamen eosdem praecessisse supponunt, nempe spem et metum. Quo itaque magis ex ductu rationis vivere conamur, eo magis spe minus pendere et metu nosmet liberare, et fortunae, quantum possumus, imperare conamur, nostrasque actiones certo rationis consilio dirigere.
Scholium. Add to this that these affects indicate a lack of knowledge and a lack of power of the mind; and for this reason also confidence, despair, gladness and remorse are signs of a mind lacking in power. For although confidence and gladness are affects of joy, they still presuppose that a sadness has preceded them, namely hope and fear. The more, therefore, we strive to live from the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear, to command fortune as far as we can, and to direct our actions by the sure counsel of reason.
Propositio XLVIII
Proposition XLVIII
Affectus existimationis et despectus semper mali sunt.
The affects of overestimation and scorn are always evil.
Demonstratio. Hi enim affectus (per aff. defin. 21. et 22.) rationi repugnant; adeoque (per prop. 26. et 27. huius) mali sunt. Q. E. D.
Propositio XLIX
Proposition XLIX
Existimatio facile hominem, qui existimatur, superbum reddit.
Overestimation easily makes the man who is overestimated proud.
Demonstratio. Si videmus, aliquem de nobis plus iusto prae amore sentire, facile gloriabimur (per schol. prop. 41. P. 3.) sive laetitia afficiemur (per aff. defin. 30.
a), et id boni, quod de nobis praedicari audimus, facile credemus (per prop. 25. P. 3.). Atque adeo de nobis prae amore nostri plus iusto sentiemus, hoc est (per aff. defin. 28.
b) facile superbiemus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If we see that someone, out of love, thinks more highly of us than is just, we shall easily exult in glory (by
Schol. of Prop. 41 of Part III), or be affected with joy (by
Def. Aff. 30), and we shall easily believe the good which we hear predicated of us (by
Prop. 25 of Part III). And so, out of love of ourselves, we shall think more highly of ourselves than is just, that is (by
Def. Aff. 28), we shall easily become proud. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 202) has per 29 Affect. Defin., and so the Dutch; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to 30., and Gebhardt (G II 246; Textgestaltung II 382–383) follows.
- b The 1677 edition has per Def. 27. Affect., and so the Dutch; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to 28., and Gebhardt (G II 246; Textgestaltung II 383) follows. He infers from the two references, each one too low, that Spinoza added a definition of the affects after this demonstration was written.
Propositio L
Proposition L
[G II 247] Commiseratio in homine, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala et inutilis est.
Pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless.
Demonstratio. Commiseratio enim (per aff. defin. 18.) tristitia est, ac proinde (per prop. 41. huius) per se mala. Bonum autem, quod ex ea sequitur, quod scilicet hominem cuius nos miseret, a miseria liberare conamur (per coroll. 3. prop. 27. P. 3.), ex solo rationis dictamine facere cupimus (per prop. 37. huius), nec nisi ex solo rationis dictamine aliquid, quod certo scimus bonum esse, agere possumus (per prop. 27. huius). Atque adeo commiseratio in homine, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala est et inutilis. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For pity (by
Def. Aff. 18) is sadness, and accordingly (by
Prop. 41 of this Part) in itself evil. But the good which follows from it, namely that we strive to free the man we pity from his misery (by
Cor. 3 of Prop. 27 of Part III), we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone (by
Prop. 37 of this Part), and only from the dictate of reason alone can we do something which we certainly know to be good (by
Prop. 27 of this Part). And so pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod homo qui ex dictamine rationis vivit, conatur, quantum potest, efficere ne commiseratione tangatur.
Corollary. Hence it follows that a man who lives from the dictate of reason strives, as far as he can, not to be touched by pity.
Scholium. Qui recte novit, omnia ex naturae divinae necessitate sequi et secundum aeternas naturae leges et regulas fieri, is sane nihil reperiet, quod odio, risu aut contemptu dignum sit, nec cuiusquam miserebitur; sed quantum humana fert virtus, conabitur bene agere, ut aiunt, et laetari.
Scholium. He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature and happen according to the eternal laws and rules of nature will certainly find nothing worthy of hatred, laughter or contempt, nor will he pity anyone; but as far as human virtue allows, he will strive to act well, as they say, and to rejoice.
1 - 1 bene agere, ut aiunt, et laetari. The saying recalls Ecclesiastes 3:12: ‘יָדַעְתִּי כִּי אֵין טוֹב בָּם כִּי אִם־לִשְׂמוֹחַ וְלַעֲשׂוֹת טוֹב בְּחַיָּיו’ (‘I know that there is nothing better for them than to rejoice and to do good in their life’; Vulgate: non esset melius nisi laetari, et facere bene in vita sua).
Huc accedit, quod is, qui commiserationis affectu facile tangitur et alterius miseria vel lacrimis movetur, saepe aliquid agit, cuius postea ipsum poenitet; tam quia ex affectu nihil agimus, quod certo scimus bonum esse, quam quia facile falsis lacrimis decipimur. Atque hic expresse loquor de homine, qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam qui nec ratione, nec commiseratione movetur, ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur; nam (per prop. 27. P. 3.) homini dissimilis esse videtur.
aAdd to this that he who is easily touched by the affect of pity, and moved by another’s misery or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets, both because from affect we do nothing which we certainly know to be good, and because we are easily deceived by false tears. And here I speak expressly of a man who lives from the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor by pity to help others is rightly called inhuman. For (by
Prop. 27 of Part III) he seems to be unlike a man.
- a Gebhardt (G II 247; Textgestaltung II 383) adds from the Dutch version, at the end of the Scholium, of alle menschelijkheit uitgetrokken te hebben (‘or to have stripped off all humanity’), which is missing from the 1677 Latin.
Propositio LI
Proposition LI
[G II 248] Favor rationi non repugnat, sed cum eadem convenire et ab eadem oriri potest.
Favour is not opposed to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.
Demonstratio. Est enim favor amor erga illum, qui alteri benefecit (per aff. defin. 19.). Atque adeo ad mentem referri potest, quatenus haec agere dicitur (per prop. 59. P. 3.), hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.) quatenus intelligit; ac proinde cum ratione convenit etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For favour is love towards one who has benefited another (by
Def. Aff. 19). And so it can be related to the mind insofar as the mind is said to act (by
Prop. 59 of Part III), that is (by
Prop. 3 of Part III), insofar as it understands; and accordingly it agrees with reason, etc. Q.E.D.
Aliter. Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, bonum, quod sibi appetit, alteri etiam cupit (per prop. 37. huius). Quare ex eo, quod ipse aliquem videt alteri benefacere, ipsius benefaciendi conatus iuvatur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) laetabitur,
a idque (ex hypothesi) concomitante idea illius, qui alteri benefecit; ac proinde (per aff. defin. 19.) ei favet. Q. E. D.
Alternatively. He who lives from the guidance of reason desires for another also the good which he wants for himself (by
Prop. 37 of this Part). Hence from the fact that he sees someone benefit another, his own striving to do good is aided, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III), he will rejoice, and that (by hypothesis) accompanied by the idea of the one who benefited another; and accordingly (by
Def. Aff. 19) he favours him. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 204) has per Prop. 11. p. 3., and so the Dutch; Van Vloten–Land correct to per Schol. Prop. 11. p. 3., and Gebhardt (G II 248; Textgestaltung II 383) follows.
Scholium. Indignatio, prout ipsa a nobis definitur (vide aff. defin. 20.), est necessario mala (per prop. 45. huius). Sed notandum, quod quando summa potestas desiderio, quo tenetur, tutandae pacis, civem punit, qui alteri iniuriam fecit,
a eandem civi indignari non dico, quia non odio percita ad perdendum civem, sed pietate mota eundem punit.
Scholium. Indignation, as it is defined by us (see
Def. Aff. 20), is necessarily evil (by
Prop. 45 of this Part). But it should be noted that when the sovereign power, from the desire by which it is bound to preserve peace, punishes a citizen who has done an injury to another, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it punishes him not because it is roused by hatred to destroy him, but because it is moved by piety.
- a civem punit, qui alteri iniuriam fecit] transcr. civem punit qui, alteri iniuriam fecit. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 204) and Gebhardt (G II 248).
Propositio LII
Proposition LII
Acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oriri potest, et ea sola acquiescentia, quae ex ratione oritur, summa est quae potest dari.
Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only that self-contentment which arises from reason is the greatest there can be.
Demonstratio. Acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur (per aff. defin. 25.). At vera hominis agendi potentia seu virtus est ipsa ratio (per prop. 3. P. 3.), quam homo clare et distincte contemplatur (per prop. 40. et 43. P. 2.). Ergo acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oritur.
Demonstration. Self-contentment is a joy arising from the fact that a man contemplates himself and his power of acting (by
Def. Aff. 25). But a man’s true power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by
Prop. 3 of Part III), which man contemplates clearly and distinctly (by
Props. 40 and
43 of Part II). Therefore self-contentment arises from reason.
Deinde nihil homo, dum se ipsum contemplatur, clare et distincte sive adaequate percipit, nisi ea quae ex ipsius agendi potentia sequuntur (per defin. 2. P. 3.), hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.), quae ex ipsius intelligendi potentia sequuntur. Adeoque ex sola hac contemplatione summa, quae dari potest, acquiescentia oritur. Q. E. D.
Next, a man, while he contemplates himself, perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except those things which follow from his power of acting (by
Def. 2 of Part III), that is (by
Prop. 3 of Part III), which follow from his power of understanding. And so from this contemplation alone arises the greatest self-contentment there can be. Q.E.D.
[G II 249] Scholium. Est revera acquiescentia in se ipso summum, quod sperare possumus. Nam (ut prop. 25. huius ostendimus) nemo suum esse alicuius finis causa conservare conatur; et quia haec acquiescentia magis magisque fovetur et corroboratur laudibus (per coroll. prop. 53. P. 3.), et contra (per coroll. prop. 55. P. 3.)
a vituperio magis magisque turbatur, ideo gloria maxime ducimur et vitam cum probro vix ferre possumus.
Scholium. Self-contentment is in truth the highest thing we can hope for.
1 For (as we showed in
Prop. 25 of this Part) no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of some end; and because this self-contentment is more and more encouraged and strengthened by praise (by
Cor. of Prop. 53 of Part III), and on the contrary (by
Cor. of Prop. 55 of Part III) is more and more disturbed by blame, we are therefore led most by glory and can hardly bear a life in disgrace.
- a (per coroll. prop. 55. P. 3.)] transcr. (per coroll. 1. prop. 55. P. 3.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 205) and Gebhardt (G II 249) read ‘per Coroll. Prop. 55. p. 3.’, without the number.
- 1 Part V returns to the phrase: ‘from this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be’ (Part V, Prop. 27). The Appendix to this Part identifies blessedness with ‘the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God’ (ch. 4).
Propositio LIII
Proposition LIII
Humilitas virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur.
Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.
Demonstratio. Humilitas est tristitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur (per aff. defin. 26.). Quatenus autem homo se ipsum vera ratione cognoscit, eatenus suam essentiam intelligere supponitur, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) suam potentiam. Quare si homo, dum se ipsum contemplatur, aliquam suam impotentiam percipit, id non ex eo est, quod se intelligit, sed (ut prop. 55. P. 3. ostendimus)
a ex eo, quod ipsius agendi potentia coercetur.
Demonstration. Humility is a sadness which arises from the fact that a man contemplates his lack of power (by
Def. Aff. 26). But insofar as a man knows himself by true reason, to that extent he is supposed to understand his essence, that is (by
Prop. 7 of Part III), his power. So if a man, while he contemplates himself, perceives some lack of power of his, this does not come from his understanding himself, but (as we showed in
Prop. 55 of Part III) from his power of acting being restrained.
- a (ut prop. 55. P. 3. ostendimus)] transcr. (ut prop. 55. P. 3.ostendimus). Word division.
Quod si supponamus, hominem suam impotentiam concipere ex eo, quod aliquid se potentius intelligit, cuius cognitione suam agendi potentiam determinat, tum nihil aliud concipimus, quam quod homo se ipsum distincte intelligit sive (per prop. 26. huius),
b quod ipsius agendi potentia iuvatur. Quare humilitas seu tristitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur, non ex vera contemplatione seu ratione oritur, nec virtus, sed passio est. Q. E. D.
But if we suppose that a man conceives his lack of power from the fact that he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his power of acting, then we conceive nothing else but that the man understands himself distinctly, or (by
Prop. 26 of this Part) that his power of acting is aided. So humility, or the sadness which arises from the fact that a man contemplates his lack of power, does not arise from true contemplation, or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 205) has no sive: quod homo se ipsum distinctè intelligit, (per Prop. 26. hujus) quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur. The Dutch has of before the reference, and Gebhardt (G II 249; Textgestaltung II 383–384), as Leopold asks, inserts sive, since the reference justifies only the equation of self-knowledge with an increase of power.
Propositio LIV
Proposition LIV
[G II 250] Poenitentia virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur, sed is, quem facti poenitet, bis miser seu impotens est.
Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power.
Demonstratio. Huius prima pars demonstratur ut praeced. prop. Secunda autem ex sola huius affectus definitione (vide aff. defin. 27.) patet. Nam primo prava cupiditate, dein tristitia vinci se patitur.
Demonstration. The first part of this is demonstrated like
the preceding Prop.; but the second is evident from the definition of this affect alone (see
Def. Aff. 27). For he allows himself to be conquered first by an evil desire, then by sadness.
Scholium. Quia homines raro ex dictamine rationis vivunt, ideo hi duo affectus, nempe humilitas et poenitentia, et praeter hos spes et metus plus utilitatis, quam damni afferunt, atque adeo quandoquidem peccandum est, in istam partem potius peccandum. Nam si homines animo impotentes aeque omnes superbirent, nullius rei ipsos puderet, nec ipsi quicquam metuerent, qui vinculis coniungi constringique possent?
a Terret vulgus, nisi metuat.
Scholium. Because men rarely live from the dictate of reason, these two affects, namely humility and repentance, and besides these hope and fear, bring more advantage than harm; and so, since men must err, it is better that they err in that direction. For if men lacking in power of mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united and held together? The mob is a terror, unless it is afraid.
1 - a The 1677 edition (OP p. 206) has quo vinculis; the Dutch has met welke banden (‘with what bonds’). Schmidt, Auerbach and Land take quo as an interrogative ablative; W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) read qui, as Appuhn prints, and Gebhardt (G II 250; Textgestaltung II 383–384) observes that this qui is Spinoza’s usage elsewhere. He keeps the question mark, which the older editions after Paulus changed to a full stop.
- 1 Terret vulgus, nisi metuat: after Tacitus, Annals I.29, ‘nihil in vulgo modicum; terrere ni paveant’ (‘there is no moderation in the mob: it terrifies unless it is afraid’). The Political Treatise quotes the saying among those who confine to the common people the vices that are in all mortals, and answers that nature is one and common to all (TP VII.27).
Quare non mirum, quod prophetae qui non paucorum, sed communi utilitati consuluerunt, tantopere humilitatem, poenitentiam et reverentiam commendaverint. Et revera qui hisce affectibus sunt obnoxii, multo facilius, quam alii duci possunt, ut tandem ex ductu rationis vivant, hoc est ut liberi sint et beatorum vita fruantur.
So it is no wonder that the prophets, who looked to the common advantage and not to that of a few, commended humility, repentance and reverence so greatly. And in fact those who are subject to these affects can be led far more easily than others to live, in the end, from the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
Propositio LV
Proposition LV
Maxima superbia vel abiectio est maxima sui ignorantia.
The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of oneself.
Demonstratio. Patet ex aff. defin. 28. et 29.
Propositio LVI
Proposition LVI
Maxima superbia vel abiectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat.
The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest lack of power of mind.
[G II 251] Demonstratio. Primum virtutis fundamentum est suum esse conservare (per coroll. prop. 22. huius) idque ex ductu rationis (per prop. 24. huius). Qui igitur se ipsum ignorat, omnium virtutum fundamentum, et consequenter omnes virtutes ignorat.
Demonstration. The first foundation of virtue is to preserve one’s being (by
Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part), and that from the guidance of reason (by
Prop. 24 of this Part). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently of all the virtues.
Deinde ex virtute agere nihil aliud est, quam ex ductu rationis agere (per prop. 24. huius), et qui ex ductu rationis agit, scire necessario debet se ex ductu rationis agere (per prop. 43. P. 2.). Qui itaque se ipsum, et consequenter (ut iam iam ostendimus) omnes virtutes maxime ignorat, is minime ex virtute agit, hoc est (ut ex defin. 8. huius patet) maxime animo est impotens; atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) maxima superbia vel abiectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat. Q. E. D.
Next, to act from virtue is nothing but to act from the guidance of reason (by
Prop. 24 of this Part), and he who acts from the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he acts from the guidance of reason (by
Prop. 43 of Part II). He, therefore, who is most ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) of all the virtues, acts least from virtue, that is (as is evident from
Def. 8 of this Part), is most lacking in power of mind; and so (by
the preceding Prop.) the greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest lack of power of mind. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc clarissime sequitur,
a superbos et abiectos maxime affectibus esse obnoxios.
Corollary. Hence it follows most clearly that the proud and the self-abased are most subject to affects.
- a Hinc clarissime sequitur] transcr. Hinc clare sequitur. The 1677 edition (OP p. 207) and Gebhardt (G II 251) read ‘clarissimè’.
Scholium. Abiectio tamen facilius corrigi potest, quam superbia, quandoquidem haec laetitiae, illa autem tristitiae est affectus; atque adeo (per prop. 18. huius)
a haec illa fortior est.
b Scholium. Self-abasement, however, can be corrected more easily than pride, since pride is an affect of joy and self-abasement an affect of sadness; and so (by
Prop. 18 of this Part) the former is stronger than the latter.
- a (per prop. 18. huius)] transcr. (per prop. 18 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 251).
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 207) has hâc illa; the Dutch rightly has deze leste … sterker dan d’ eerste, in line with the preceding haec … illa, and Van Vloten–Land, followed by Gebhardt (G II 251; Textgestaltung II 384), restore haec illâ (‘the latter [pride] stronger than the former [self-abasement]’).
Propositio LVII
Proposition LVII
Superbus parasitorum seu adulatorum praesentiam amat, generosorum autem odit.
The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates that of the noble.
Demonstratio. Superbia est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo de se plus iusto sentit (per aff. defin. 28. et 6.), quam opinionem homo superbus, quantum potest, fovere conabitur (vide schol. prop. 13. P. 3.). Adeoque superbi parasitorum
a vel adulatorum (horum definitiones omisi, quia nimis noti sunt) praesentiam amabunt, et generosorum, qui de ipsis, ut par est, sentiunt, fugient. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Pride is a joy arising from the fact that a man thinks more highly of himself than is just (by
Defs. Aff. 28 and
6), an opinion which the proud man will strive to encourage as far as he can (see
Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part III). And so the proud will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (I have omitted their definitions because they are too well known), and will flee that of the noble, who think of them as is right. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 207) has adeoque parasitorum, vel adulatorum praesentiam amabunt, passing abruptly into the plural; Appuhn would read amabit, de ipso, fugiet. The Dutch has De verwaanden (glossed Superbi), and Gebhardt (G II 251; Textgestaltung II 384) supplies superbi.
[G II 252] Scholium. Nimis longum foret, hic omnia superbiae mala enumerare, quandoquidem omnibus affectibus obnoxii sunt superbi, sed nullis minus, quam affectibus amoris et misericordiae. Sed hic minime tacendum est, quod ille etiam superbus vocetur, qui de reliquis minus iusto sentit, atque adeo hoc sensu superbia definienda est, quod sit laetitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se supra reliquos esse putat. Et abiectio huic superbiae contraria definienda esset tristitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se infra reliquos esse credit.
Scholium. It would take too long to enumerate here all the evils of pride, since the proud are subject to all affects, but to none less than the affects of love and compassion. But here it must by no means be passed over in silence that he too is called proud who thinks less of others than is just; and so in this sense pride is to be defined as a joy arising from the false opinion by which a man thinks he is above others. And the self-abasement contrary to this pride would be defined as a sadness arising from the false opinion by which a man believes he is below others.
At hoc posito facile concipimus, superbum necessario esse invidum (vide schol. prop. 55. P. 3.) et eos maxime odio habere, qui maxime ob virtutes laudantur, nec facile eorum odium amore aut beneficio vinci (vide schol. prop. 41. P. 3.), et eorum tantummodo praesentia delectari, qui animo eius impotenti morem gerunt et ex stulto insanum faciunt.
But on this supposition we easily conceive that the proud man is necessarily envious (see
Schol. of Prop. 55 of Part III), that he hates most those who are most praised for their virtues, that his hatred of them is not easily conquered by love or benefit (see
Schol. of Prop. 41 of Part III), and that he takes pleasure only in the presence of those who humour his mind lacking in power and make a madman out of a fool.
Abiectio quamvis superbiae sit contraria, est tamen abiectus superbo proximus. Nam quandoquidem eius tristitia ex eo oritur, quod suam impotentiam ex aliorum potentia seu virtute iudicat, levabitur ergo eius tristitia, hoc est, laetabitur si eius imaginatio in alienis vitiis contemplandis occupetur, unde illud proverbium natum: Solamen miseris socios habuisse malorum; et contra eo magis contristabitur, quo se magis infra reliquos esse crediderit. Unde fit, ut nulli magis ad invidiam sint proni,
a quam abiecti, et ut isti maxime hominum facta observare conentur ad carpendum magis, quam ad eadem corrigendum, et ut tandem solam abiectionem laudent eaque glorientur, sed ita, ut tamen abiecti videantur.
Although self-abasement is contrary to pride, the self-abased man is still very near to the proud. For since his sadness arises from the fact that he judges his lack of power from the power, or virtue, of others, his sadness will therefore be relieved, that is, he will rejoice, if his imagination is occupied in contemplating the vices of others; hence the proverb: It is a comfort to the wretched to have had companions in misfortune; and on the contrary he will be the more saddened, the more he believes himself to be below others. Hence it comes about that no one is more prone to envy than the self-abased, that they strive most to observe men’s deeds, to find fault with them rather than to correct them, and that finally they praise only self-abasement and glory in it, but in such a way that they still seem self-abased.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 208) has no magis; the Dutch has geen meerder. Gfroerer, without knowing the Dutch, inserted magis, followed by Bruder, Van Vloten–Land and the translations, and Gebhardt (G II 252; Textgestaltung II 384) prints it.
Atque haec ex hoc affectu tam necessario sequuntur, quam ex natura trianguli, quod eius tres anguli aequales sint duobus rectis; et iam dixi me hos et similes affectus malos vocare, quatenus ad solam humanam utilitatem attendo. Sed naturae leges communem naturae ordinem, cuius homo pars est, respiciunt; quod hic in transitu monere volui, ne quis putaret me hic hominum vitia et absurda facta narrare, non autem rerum naturam et proprietates demonstrare voluisse.
And these things follow from this affect as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and similar affects evil insofar as I attend only to human advantage. But the laws of nature concern the common order of nature, of which man is a part; I wished to point this out here in passing, so that no one should think that I wanted here to tell of the vices and absurd deeds of men, rather than to demonstrate the nature and properties of things.
Nam, ut in praef. P. 3. dixi, humanos affectus eorumque proprietates perinde considero, ac reliqua naturalia. Et sane humani affectus, si non humanam, naturae saltem potentiam et artificium non minus indicant, quam multa alia, quae admiramur quorumque contemplatione delectamur. Sed pergo de affectibus ea notare, quae hominibus utilitatem adferunt, vel quae iisdem damnum inferunt.
For, as I said in the
Preface of Part III, I consider human affects and their properties just like other natural things.
1 And human affects certainly indicate, if not human power, at least the power and art of nature no less than many other things which we admire and in the contemplation of which we take pleasure. But I go on to note those things about the affects which bring advantage to men, or which inflict harm on them.
- 1 The Preface had promised to consider human actions and appetites ‘just as if it were a question of lines, planes or bodies’.
Propositio LVIII
Proposition LVIII
[G II 253] Gloria rationi non repugnat, sed ab ea oriri potest.
Glory is not opposed to reason, but can arise from it.
Demonstratio. Patet ex aff. defin. 30. et ex defin. honesti, quam vide in schol. 1. prop. 37. huius.
Scholium. Vana quae dicitur gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso, quae sola vulgi opinione fovetur, eaque cessante cessat ipsa acquiescentia, hoc est (per schol. prop. 52. huius) summum bonum, quod unusquisque amat. Unde fit, ut qui vulgi opinione gloriatur, quotidiana cura anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur, ut famam conservet.
Scholium. What is called empty glory is a self-contentment which is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude, and when that ceases, the self-contentment itself ceases, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part), the highest good which each one loves. Hence it comes about that he who glories in the opinion of the multitude, anxious with daily care, strives, acts and tries in order to preserve his reputation.
Est namque vulgus varius et inconstans, atque adeo, nisi conservetur fama,
a cito abolescit; imo quia omnes vulgi captare applausus cupiunt, facile unusquisque alterius famam reprimit, ex quo, quandoquidem de summo, quod aestimatur, bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem quocumque modo opprimendi, et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis, quod alteri obfuit, quam quod sibi profuit. Est igitur haec gloria seu acquiescentia revera vana, quia nulla est.
For the multitude is changeable and inconstant, and so, unless a reputation is preserved, it quickly vanishes; indeed, because all desire to capture the applause of the multitude, each one readily represses the reputation of another; and from this, since the contest is over what is esteemed the highest good, there arises an immense lust to crush one another in any way whatever, and he who finally emerges victorious glories more in having harmed another than in having benefited himself. This glory, or self-contentment, is therefore truly empty, because it is nothing.
- a The Dutch has zo het niet waargenomen word, which might answer to nisi observetur (so Leopold, and Bartuschat prints observetur); Gebhardt (G II 253; Textgestaltung II 384) keeps the 1677 conservetur, since Spinoza is unlikely to have changed the expression after ut famam conservet.
Quae de pudore notanda sunt, colliguntur facile ex iis, quae de misericordia et poenitentia diximus. Hoc tantum addo, quod ut commiseratio, sic etiam pudor, quamvis non sit virtus, bonus tamen est, quatenus indicat, homini, qui pudore suffunditur, cupiditatem inesse honeste vivendi, sicut dolor, qui eatenus bonus dicitur, quatenus indicat, partem laesam nondum esse putrefactam. Quare quamvis homo, quem facti alicuius pudet, revera sit tristis, est tamen perfectior impudenti, qui nullam habet honeste vivendi cupiditatem.
What should be noted about shame is easily gathered from what we have said about compassion and repentance. I add only this, that, like pity, shame, although it is not a virtue, is still good insofar as it indicates that the man who is suffused with shame has a desire to live honourably, just as pain is called good insofar as it indicates that the injured part is not yet putrefied. So although a man who is ashamed of some deed is in truth sad, he is still more perfect than the shameless man, who has no desire to live honourably.
1
[G II 254] Atque haec sunt, quae de affectibus laetitiae et tristitiae notare susceperam. Ad cupiditates quod attinet, hae sane bonae aut malae sunt, quatenus ex bonis aut malis affectibus oriuntur. Sed omnes revera, quatenus ex affectibus, qui passiones sunt, in nobis ingenerantur, caecae sunt (ut facile colligitur ex iis, quae in schol. prop. 44. huius diximus), nec ullius usus essent, si homines facile duci possent, ut ex solo rationis dictamine viverent, ut iam paucis ostendam.
These are the things I had undertaken to note about the affects of joy and sadness. As for desires, they are certainly good or evil insofar as they arise from good or evil affects. But all of them, insofar as they are generated in us from affects which are passions, are in truth blind (as is easily gathered from what we said in
Schol. of Prop. 44 of this Part), nor would they be of any use if men could easily be led to live from the dictate of reason alone, as I shall now show in a few words.
Propositio LIX
Proposition LIX
Ad omnes actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo a ratione determinari.
To all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason without it.
1- 1 The same action can follow from a passion or from reason; what differs is its cause. Part V gives an example: the appetite by which each wants others to live according to his own temperament is, in a man not led by reason, the passion called ambition, and in one who lives from the dictate of reason, an action or virtue called piety, pietas (Part V, Prop. 4, Schol.).
Demonstratio. Ex ratione agere nihil aliud est (per prop. 3. et defin. 2. P. 3.) quam ea agere, quae ex necessitate nostrae naturae in se sola consideratae sequuntur. At tristitia eatenus mala est, quatenus hanc agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet (per prop. 41. huius). Ergo ex hoc affectu ad nullam actionem possumus determinari, quam non possemus agere, si ratione duceremur.
Demonstration. To act from reason is nothing but (by
Prop. 3 and
Def. 2 of Part III) to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. But sadness is evil insofar as it diminishes or restrains this power of acting (by
Prop. 41 of this Part). Therefore from this affect we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason.
Praeterea laetitia eatenus mala est,
a quatenus impedit, quominus homo ad agendum sit aptus (per prop. 41. et 43. huius) atque adeo eatenus etiam ad nullam actionem determinari possumus, quam non possemus agere, si ratione duceremur. Denique quatenus laetitia bona est, eatenus cum ratione convenit (consistit enim in eo, quod hominis agendi potentia augetur vel iuvatur), nec passio est nisi quatenus hominis agendi potentia non eo usque augetur, ut se suasque actiones adaequate concipiat (per prop. 3. P. 3. cum eius schol.). Quare si homo laetitia affectus ad tantam perfectionem duceretur, ut se suasque actiones adaequate conciperet, ad easdem actiones, ad quas iam ex affectibus, qui passiones sunt, determinatur, aptus, imo aptior esset.
Further, joy is evil insofar as it prevents a man from being capable of acting (by
Props. 41 and
43 of this Part); and so to that extent too we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason. Finally, insofar as joy is good, to that extent it agrees with reason (for it consists in this, that a man’s power of acting is increased or aided), and it is a passion only insofar as a man’s power of acting is not increased to the point where he conceives himself and his actions adequately (by
Prop. 3 of Part III with
its Schol.). So if a man affected with joy were led to such perfection that he conceived himself and his actions adequately, he would be capable, indeed more capable, of the same actions to which he is now determined from affects which are passions.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 210) has eatenus tantum mala est, and the Dutch alleenlijk shows that Spinoza wrote it. W. Meijer (second edition), followed by Baensch and Appuhn, strikes the senseless tantum, and Gebhardt (G II 254; Textgestaltung II 384–385) omits it, while Halpern keeps it. Gebhardt defends the following reference to Props. 41 and 43 against Meijer’s and Baensch’s 43. et 44.
At omnes affectus ad laetitiam, tristitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur (vide explicationem aff. defin. 4.), et cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.) nihil aliud est, quam ipse agendi conatus. Ergo ad omnes actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo sola ratione duci. Q. E. D.
But all affects are related to joy, sadness or desire (see the explanation of
Def. Aff. 4), and desire (by
Def. Aff. 1) is nothing but the very striving to act. Therefore to all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be led by reason alone without it. Q.E.D.
[G II 255] Aliter. Actio quaecumque eatenus dicitur mala, quatenus ex eo oritur, quod odio aut aliquo malo affectu affecti sumus (vide coroll. 1. prop. 45. huius). At nulla actio in se sola considerata bona aut mala est (ut in praef. huius ostendimus) sed una eademque actio iam bona, iam mala est. Ergo ad eandem actionem, quae iam mala est, sive quae ex aliquo malo affectu oritur, ratione duci possumus (per prop. 19. huius). Q. E. D.
Alternatively. Any action is called evil insofar as it arises from the fact that we are affected with hatred or some evil affect (see
Cor. 1 of Prop. 45 of this Part). But no action, considered in itself alone, is good or evil (as we showed in the
Preface of this Part), but one and the same action is now good, now evil. Therefore we can be led by reason (by
Prop. 19 of this Part) to the same action which is now evil, or which arises from some evil affect. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Explicantur haec clarius exemplo. Nempe verberandi actio quatenus physice consideratur, et ad hoc tantum attendimus, quod homo brachium tollit, manum claudit totumque brachium vi deorsum movet, virtus est, quae ex corporis humani fabrica concipitur. Si itaque homo ira vel odio commotus determinatur ad claudendam manum vel brachium movendum, id, ut in parte secunda ostendimus, fit quia una eademque actio potest iungi quibuscumque rerum imaginibus; atque adeo tam ex iis imaginibus rerum, quas confuse, quam quas clare et distincte concipimus, ad unam eandemque actionem determinari possumus.
Scholium. These things are explained more clearly by an example. Namely, the action of striking, insofar as it is considered physically, and we attend only to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist and moves his whole arm forcefully downwards, is a virtue, which is conceived from the structure of the human body. If, therefore, a man moved by anger or hatred is determined to clench his fist or move his arm, this happens, as we showed in Part II, because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things whatever;
1 and so we can be determined to one and the same action as much from the images of things which we conceive confusedly as from those which we conceive clearly and distinctly.
- 1 By the association of images (Part II, Prop. 18 and its Schol.). Part V uses the same principle as a remedy: an affect separated from the thought of its external cause and joined to other thoughts destroys the love or hatred towards that cause (Part V, Prop. 2).
Apparet itaque, quod omnis cupiditas, quae ex affectu, qui passio est, oritur, nullius esset usus, si homines ratione duci possent. Videamus iam, cur cupiditas quae ex affectu, qui passio est, oritur, caeca a nobis appellatur.
It is evident, therefore, that every desire which arises from an affect which is a passion would be of no use if men could be led by reason. Let us now see why a desire which arises from an affect which is a passion is called blind by us.
Propositio LX
Proposition LX
Cupiditas, quae oritur ex laetitia vel tristitia, quae ad unam vel ad aliquot, non autem ad omnes corporis partes refertur, rationem utilitatis totius hominis non habet.
A desire which arises from a joy or sadness that is related to one or several, but not to all, of the parts of the body has no regard for the advantage of the whole man.
[G II 256] Demonstratio. Ponatur ex. gr. corporis pars A vi alicuius causae externae ita corroborari, ut reliquis praevaleat (per prop. 6. huius); haec pars vires suas amittere propterea non conabitur, ut reliquae corporis partes suo fungantur officio. Deberet enim vim seu potentiam habere vires suas amittendi; quod (per prop. 6. P. 3.) est absurdum.
Demonstration. Suppose, for example, that part A of the body is so strengthened by the force of some external cause that it prevails over the others (by
Prop. 6 of this Part); this part will not for that reason strive to lose its powers so that the other parts of the body may perform their function. For it would have to have a force, or power, of losing its powers, which (by
Prop. 6 of Part III) is absurd.
Conabitur itaque illa pars, et consequenter (per prop. 7. et 12. P. 3.) mens etiam illum statum conservare; adeoque cupiditas, quae ex tali affectu laetitiae oritur, rationem totius non habet. Quod si contra supponatur pars A coerceri, ut reliquae praevaleant, eodem modo demonstratur, quod nec cupiditas, quae ex tristitia oritur, rationem totius habeat. Q. E. D.
That part will therefore strive, and consequently (by
Props. 7 and
12 of Part III) the mind also will strive, to preserve that state; and so the desire which arises from such an affect of joy has no regard for the whole. But if, on the contrary, part A is supposed to be restrained, so that the others prevail, it is demonstrated in the same way that the desire which arises from sadness has no regard for the whole either. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Cum itaque laetitia plerumque (per schol. prop. 44. huius) ad unam corporis partem referatur, cupimus ergo plerumque nostrum esse conservare nulla habita ratione integrae nostrae valetudinis. Ad quod accedit, quod cupiditates quibus maxime tenemur (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), temporis tantum praesentis, non autem futuri habent rationem.
Scholium. Since, therefore, joy is generally related to one part of the body (by
Schol. of Prop. 44 of this Part), we generally desire to preserve our being without any regard for our health as a whole. Add to this that the desires by which we are most held (by
Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part) have regard only for the present time, not for the future.
Propositio LXI
Proposition LXI
Cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit.
A desire which arises from reason cannot be excessive.
Demonstratio. Cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.) absolute considerata est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus quocumque modo determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum. Adeoque cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.) quae in nobis ingeneratur, quatenus agimus, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus determinata concipitur ad agendum ea, quae per solam hominis essentiam adaequate concipiuntur (per defin. 2. P. 3.). Si itaque haec cupiditas excessum habere posset, posset ergo humana natura in se sola considerata se ipsam excedere, sive plus posset, quam potest, quod manifesta est contradictio. Ac proinde haec cupiditas excessum habere nequit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Desire (by
Def. Aff. 1), considered absolutely, is the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined in any way to do something. And so a desire which arises from reason, that is (by
Prop. 3 of Part III), which is generated in us insofar as we act, is the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as it is conceived to be determined to do those things which are conceived adequately through the essence of man alone (by
Def. 2 of Part III). If, therefore, this desire could be excessive, human nature, considered in itself alone, could exceed itself, or could do more than it can, which is a manifest contradiction. And accordingly this desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Propositio LXII
Proposition LXII
[G II 257] Quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, aeque afficitur, sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis.
Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.
Demonstratio. Quicquid mens ducente ratione concipit, id omne sub eadem aeternitatis seu necessitatis specie concipit (per coroll. 2. prop. 44. P. 2.), eademque certitudine afficitur (per prop. 43. P. 2. et eius schol.). Quare sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis, mens eadem necessitate rem concipit, eademque certitudine afficitur, et sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis, erit nihilominus aeque vera (per prop. 41. P. 2.), hoc est (per defin. 4. P. 2.) habebit nihilominus semper easdem ideae adaequatae proprietates. Atque adeo quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, eodem modo afficitur, sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives all of it under the same species of eternity, or necessity (by
Cor. 2 of Prop. 44 of Part II), and is affected with the same certainty (by
Prop. 43 of Part II and
its Schol.). So whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certainty; and whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, it will nevertheless be equally true (by
Prop. 41 of Part II), that is (by
Def. 4 of Part II), it will nevertheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea. And so, insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Si nos de rerum duratione adaequatam cognitionem habere, earumque existendi tempora ratione determinare possemus, eodem affectu res futuras ac praesentes contemplaremur, et bonum, quod mens ut futurum conciperet, perinde ac praesens appeteret, et consequenter bonum praesens minus pro maiore bono futuro necessario negligeret, et quod in praesenti bonum esset, sed causa futuri alicuius mali, minime appeteret, ut mox demonstrabimus.
Scholium. If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine their times of existing by reason, we would contemplate future things with the same affect as present ones, and the mind would want the good which it conceived as future just as if it were present; and consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser present good for a greater future good, and would by no means want what was good in the present but the cause of some future evil, as we shall soon demonstrate.
Sed nos de duratione rerum (per prop. 31. P. 2.) non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus, et rerum existendi tempora (per schol. prop. 44. P. 2.) sola imaginatione determinamus, quae non aeque afficitur imagine rei praesentis ac futurae. Unde fit, ut vera boni et mali cognitio, quam habemus, non nisi abstracta sive universalis sit, et iudicium, quod de rerum ordine et causarum nexu facimus, ut determinare possimus, quid nobis in praesenti bonum aut malum sit, sit potius imaginarium, quam reale. Atque adeo mirum non est, si cupiditas, quae ex boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec futurum prospicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate, quae in praesentia suaves sunt, coerceri potest, de quo vide prop. 16. huius partis.
aBut we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (by
Prop. 31 of Part II), and we determine the times of existing of things by the imagination alone (by
Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II), which is not equally affected by the image of a present and of a future thing. Hence it comes about that the true knowledge of good and evil which we have is only abstract, or universal, and the judgment which we make about the order of things and the connection of causes, in order to determine what is good or evil for us in the present, is imaginary rather than real. And so it is no wonder if a desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this looks to the future, can be more easily restrained by a desire for things which are pleasant in the present; on which see
Prop. 16 of this Part.
- a The 1677 edition and the older editions have Propositionem 18.; Schmidt and Auerbach correct to 15, Van Vloten–Land rightly to 16, and Gebhardt (G II 258; Textgestaltung II 385) follows.
Propositio LXIII
Proposition LXIII
[G II 258] Qui metu ducitur et bonum, ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.
He who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.
Demonstratio. Omnes affectus, qui ad mentem, quatenus agit, hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.), qui ad rationem referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam affectus laetitiae et cupiditatis (per prop. 59. P. 3.). Atque adeo (per aff. defin. 13.) qui metu ducitur et bonum timore mali agit, is ratione non ducitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. All the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, that is (by
Prop. 3 of Part III), which are related to reason, are none other than affects of joy and desire (by
Prop. 59 of Part III). And so (by
Def. Aff. 13) he who is led by fear, and does good from fear of evil, is not led by reason. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Superstitiosi, qui vitia exprobrare magis, quam virtutes docere norunt et qui homines non ratione ducere, sed metu ita continere student, ut malum potius fugiant, quam virtutes ament, nil aliud intendunt, quam ut reliqui aeque ac ipsi fiant miseri; et ideo non mirum, si plerumque molesti et odiosi sint hominibus.
Scholium. The superstitious, who know how to reproach vices rather than to teach virtues, and who strive not to lead men by reason but to hold them in check by fear, so that they flee evil rather than love virtues, intend nothing else but that others should become as wretched as they are themselves; and so it is no wonder that they are generally troublesome and hateful to men.
Corollarium. Cupiditate, quae ex ratione oritur, bonum directe sequimur et malum indirecte fugimus.
Corollary. By a desire which arises from reason we follow the good directly and flee evil indirectly.
Demonstratio. Nam cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, ex solo laetitiae affectu, quae passio non est, oriri potest (per prop. 59. P. 3.), hoc est, ex laetitia, quae excessum habere nequit (per prop. 61. huius), non autem ex tristitia. Ac proinde haec cupiditas (per prop. 8. huius) ex cognitione boni, non autem mali oritur atque adeo ex ductu rationis bonum directe appetimus, et eatenus tantum malum fugimus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For a desire which arises from reason can arise only from an affect of joy which is not a passion (by
Prop. 59 of Part III), that is, from a joy which cannot be excessive (by
Prop. 61 of this Part), and not from sadness. And accordingly this desire (by
Prop. 8 of this Part) arises from the knowledge of good, not of evil; and so from the guidance of reason we want the good directly, and only to that extent flee evil. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Explicatur hoc corollarium exemplo aegri et sani. Comedit aeger id, quod aversatur, timore mortis; sanus autem cibo gaudet et vita sic melius fruitur, quam si mortem timeret, eamque directe vitare cuperet. Sic iudex qui non odio aut ira etc., sed solo amore salutis publicae reum mortis damnat, sola ratione ducitur.
Scholium. This Corollary is explained by the example of the sick man and the healthy man. The sick man eats what he is averse to from fear of death; but the healthy man enjoys his food, and in this way enjoys life better than if he feared death and desired to avoid it directly. So a judge who condemns a guilty man to death not from hatred or anger, etc., but only from love of the public welfare, is led by reason alone.
Propositio LXIV
Proposition LXIV
[G II 259] Cognitio mali cognitio est inadaequata.
The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.
Demonstratio. Cognitio mali (per prop. 8. huius) est ipsa tristitia, quatenus eiusdem sumus conscii. Tristitia autem est transitio ad minorem perfectionem (per aff. defin. 3.) quae propterea per ipsam hominis essentiam intelligi nequit (per prop. 6. et 7. P. 3.). Ac proinde (per defin. 2. P. 3.) passio est, quae (per prop. 3. P. 3.) ab ideis inadaequatis pendet, et consequenter (per prop. 29. P. 2.) eius cognitio, nempe mali cognitio, est inadaequata. Q. E. D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod si mens humana non nisi adaequatas haberet ideas, nullam mali formaret notionem.
Corollary. Hence it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.
1 - 1 Applied in Prop. 68: if men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.
Propositio LXV
Proposition LXV
De duobus bonis maius et de duobus malis minus ex rationis ductu sequemur.
Of two goods we shall follow, from the guidance of reason, the greater, and of two evils the lesser.
Demonstratio. Bonum quod impedit, quominus maiore bono fruamur, est revera malum; malum enim et bonum (ut in praef. huius partis ostendimus) de rebus dicitur, quatenus easdem ad invicem comparamus, et (per eandem rationem) malum minus revera bonum est. Quare (per coroll. prop. 63. huius)
a ex rationis ductu bonum tantum maius et malum minus appetemus seu sequemur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A good which prevents us from enjoying a greater good is in truth an evil; for evil and good (as we showed in the
Preface of this Part) are said of things insofar as we compare them with one another; and (for the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good. So (by
Cor. of Prop. 63 of this Part) from the guidance of reason we shall want, or follow, only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 215) has per Coroll. Prop. praec., and so the Dutch; the reference can only be to the Corollary of Prop. 63. Since the same error recurs in the next Corollary, Gebhardt (G II 259; Textgestaltung II 385) infers that Prop. 64 was inserted later; it also interrupts the sequence.
Corollarium. Malum minus pro maiore bono ex rationis ductu sequemur, et bonum minus, quod causa est maioris mali, negligemus. Nam malum quod hic dicitur minus, revera bonum est, et bonum contra malum; quare (per coroll. prop. 63. huius)
a illud appetemus, et hoc negligemus. Q. E. D.
Corollary. From the guidance of reason we shall follow a lesser evil for the sake of a greater good, and neglect a lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here called lesser is in truth a good, and the good, on the contrary, an evil; so (by
Cor. of Prop. 63 of this Part) we shall want the former and neglect the latter. Q.E.D.
- a Again per Coroll. Prop. praec. in the 1677 edition (OP p. 216) and the Dutch; here Schmidt, Auerbach and Van Vloten–Land had already corrected to Prop. 63 (Gebhardt, G II 260; Textgestaltung II 385).
Propositio LXVI
Proposition LXVI
[G II 260] Bonum maius futurum prae minore praesenti, et malum praesens minus prae maiore futuro
b ex rationis ductu appetemus.
a From the guidance of reason we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.
- a et malum praesens minus prae maiore futuro ex rationis ductu appetemus] transcr. et malum praesens, quod causa est futura alicuius mali, ex rationis ductu appetemus. The transcription follows Bruder (‘futura’ for the 1677 ‘futuri’) in the corrupt 1677 text ‘malum praesens minus, quod causa est futuri alicujus mali’, and drops ‘minus’. Gebhardt (G II 260; Textgestaltung II 385–386) prints the correction of Schmidt, Camerer, Land and Van Vloten–Land, ‘malum praesens minus prae majori futuro’.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 216) reads et malum praesens minus, quod causa est futuri alicujus mali, which makes reason want a present evil because it causes a future one. The Dutch translates een minder tegenwoordig quaat, ’t welk oorzaak is van enig toekomend groter goet, and Gfroerer, Saisset and Pollock correct accordingly; Land objects that this thought belongs to the Corollary. Schmidt, Auerbach, Camerer and Land read malum praesens minus prae majore futuro, which gives the sense and restores the parallel, and Van Vloten–Land, Meijer, Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Gebhardt (G II 260; Textgestaltung II 385–386) print it. Gebhardt thinks that in the manuscript the beginning of the Corollary had already slipped into the Proposition. The transcription had Bruder’s text, with futura for futuri and without minus.
Demonstratio. Si mens rei futurae adaequatam posset habere cognitionem, eodem affectu erga rem futuram ac erga praesentem afficeretur (per prop. 62. huius). Quare quatenus ad ipsam rationem attendimus, ut in hac propositione nos facere supponimus, res eadem est, sive maius bonum vel malum futurum, sive praesens supponatur. Ac proinde (per prop. 65. huius) bonum futurum maius prae minore praesenti etc. appetemus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If the mind could have adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be affected with the same affect towards a future thing as towards a present one (by
Prop. 62 of this Part). So insofar as we attend to reason itself, as we suppose ourselves to do in this proposition, the thing is the same whether the greater good or evil is supposed to be future or present. And accordingly (by
Prop. 65 of this Part) we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, etc. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Malum praesens minus, quod est causa maioris futuri boni, ex rationis ductu appetemus, et bonum praesens minus, quod causa est maioris futuri mali, negligemus. Hoc coroll. se habet ad praeced. prop. ut coroll. prop. 65. ad ipsam prop. 65.
Corollary. From the guidance of reason we shall want a lesser present evil which is the cause of a greater future good, and neglect a lesser present good which is the cause of a greater future evil.
This Corollary is related to
the preceding Prop. as the
Cor. of Prop. 65 is to
Prop. 65 itself.
Scholium. Si igitur haec cum iis conferantur, quae in hac parte usque ad prop. 18. de affectuum viribus ostendimus, facile videbimus, quid homo, qui solo affectu seu opinione, homini, qui ratione ducitur, intersit. Ille enim, velit nolit, ea quae maxime ignorat, agit; hic autem nemini nisi sibi morem gerit, et ea tantum agit, quae in vita prima esse novit, quaeque propterea maxime cupit; et ideo illum
servum, hunc autem
liberum voco,
a de cuius ingenio et vivendi ratione pauca adhuc notare libet.
Scholium. If, therefore, these things are compared with those which we have shown in this Part up to
Prop. 18 about the strength of the affects, we shall easily see the difference between a man who is led by affect alone, or opinion, and a man who is led by reason. For the former, whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant; but the latter complies with no one’s wishes but his own, and does only those things which he knows to be most important in life, and which he therefore desires most; and so I call the former a
slave, but the latter
free;
1 about whose temperament and way of life I should like to note a few things more.
- a illum servum, hunc autem liberum voco] transcr. illum servum, hunc autem liberum voco. Italics confined to the two defined terms (the 1677 edition, OP p. 216, has none).
- 1 servum … liberum. The slave is the man in the bondage (servitus) of the Part’s title; the free man is described in Props. 67–73. Freedom was defined in Part I, Def. 7: a thing is free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone.
The Free Man
The last seven propositions of Part IV describe a figure the Preface had announced: the “model of human nature” which we may look to (Preface). They are written differently from the rest of the Part. The preceding propositions measured the force of the affects and set out the dictates of reason one by one; these gather the results into the portrait of a single man, and it is worth being clear in advance about what kind of figure he is and in what sense he is called free.
Slave and free
The Scholium to Prop. 66 introduces him by contrast. The man led by affect alone, or opinion, “whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant”; the man led by reason “complies with no one’s wishes but his own, and does only those things which he knows to be most important in life, and which he therefore desires most.” Spinoza calls the first a slave and the second free. The word answers to the title of the Part, De servitute humana, and to the definition of freedom in Part I, Def. 7: a thing is free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. Only God is free in the full sense. A man is free to the extent that what he does follows from his own nature, that is, to the extent that he is the adequate cause of his actions, and Part III has shown that this is the case insofar as he has adequate ideas (Part III, Prop. 3). Freedom, for Spinoza, is a matter of degree, and it is the same thing as understanding.
This sense of freedom is easily misunderstood. It is not the absence of causes, since everything has a cause; it is not the ability to have done otherwise, since nothing could have been otherwise; and it is not doing whatever one wants, since the man led by his passions does what he wants and is a slave. The free man is free because his actions express his own nature rather than the pressure of external things on it, and because he knows what he is doing and why. The rest of the portrait spells out what such a man would be like.
Death
The portrait begins with death. “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life” (Prop. 67). The sentence answers a long tradition. Cicero had repeated the saying of Plato’s Socrates that “tota enim philosophorum vita … commentatio mortis est” (“the whole life of philosophers is a preparation for death,” Tusculan Disputations I.74). Spinoza’s demonstration is short: the free man is not led by fear (Prop. 63), but desires the good directly (Prop. 63, Cor.), that is, to act, to live and to preserve his being. The thought of death belongs to fear, and the free man is not led by fear.
It may seem strange that a book which ends with an account of the eternity of the mind should forbid the thought of death. But there is no conflict. Part V will not console the reader with the prospect of a life after death; it will argue that something of the mind is eternal now, in the sense of Part I, Def. 8, and that “the more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death” (Part V, Prop. 38). The free man thinks of life, not because he avoids an unpleasant subject, but because what he understands is the power by which things exist and act, not their destruction, which comes from outside.
Born free: the story of the first man
Prop. 68 then supposes men born free and concludes that they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free, since the knowledge of evil is inadequate (Prop. 64) and good and evil are correlative. The Scholium at once declares the hypothesis false: it can be conceived only if we attend to human nature alone, or to God not as infinite but only as the cause of man’s existence, and Prop. 4 showed that a man cannot but be a part of nature.
The Scholium then reads the story of the first man as an allegory of the doctrine. In it, Spinoza says, no other power of God is conceived than that by which he created man, a power that consulted only man’s advantage. God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and as soon as he ate of it, “he would at once fear death rather than desire to live.” Finding a wife who agreed entirely with his nature, he knew that nothing in nature could be more useful to him than she; “but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he at once began to imitate their affects ... and to lose his freedom, which the patriarchs afterwards recovered, led by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man is free” (Prop. 68, Schol.). The Theological-Political Treatise had read the command to Adam in the same way: God commanded him to do good from the love of good and not from fear of evil (ch. 4).
The reading is remarkable for what it does with each element of the story. The knowledge of good and evil is not a forbidden wisdom but the inadequate knowledge that comes with fear; the fall is not disobedience but the imitation of affects proper to another nature; and redemption is not a supernatural grace but the idea of God, which the reader of Part II has already learned that every human mind possesses (Part II, Prop. 47). The phrase “led by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God” is characteristic of the way Spinoza uses religious language: he does not reject it, but tells the reader what, in his view, it really means.
Among others
The remaining propositions show the free man among others. “The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them” (Prop. 69), and “to a free man, therefore, timely flight is ascribed to as great a tenacity as battle; or, the free man chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, as combat” (Prop. 69, Cor.). The point is not that cowardice is acceptable, but that courage is not recklessness: the same strength of character that makes a man stand firm when that is reasonable makes him withdraw when withdrawal is reasonable.
“A free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to decline their favours” (Prop. 70), so as to follow his own reason rather than their appetite, and not to be hated for repaying less than they expect. But the scholium adds a qualification that shows how far Spinoza is from a lofty indifference to ordinary people: “although men are ignorant, they are still men, who in times of need can bring human help, than which nothing is more excellent,” and so it is often necessary to accept their favours and thank them in their own way; and “caution must be exercised even in declining favours, so that we do not seem to despise them” (Prop. 70, Schol.). “Only free men are most grateful to one another” (Prop. 71); the gratitude of men led by blind desire “is for the most part a bargain or a hunt for gain rather than thankfulness” (Prop. 71, Schol.).
Good faith
“A free man never acts deceptively, but always in good faith” (Prop. 72). The scholium raises the hardest case. “What if a man could free himself by perfidy from a present danger of death? Would not reason, for preserving his being, entirely advise him to be perfidious?” The answer is that “if reason advises this, it therefore advises it to all men, and so reason entirely advises men to make no agreements to join their forces and to have common rights except deceptively, that is, not really to have common rights, which is absurd” (Prop. 72, Schol.).
The scholium has puzzled readers, because it seems to sit uneasily with the ethics of self-preservation. If virtue is seeking one’s own advantage and preserving one’s being, why should the free man not lie to save his life? Spinoza’s answer turns on the universality of reason. What reason advises one man it advises to all, since reason is the same in all, and a policy of deceit when convenient, adopted by all, would destroy the trust on which common life depends. The argument resembles later arguments for the universalizability of moral principles, and readers have asked whether it is consistent with the rest of Part IV. But the scholium also says something about what the free man is. He does not calculate whether a lie would serve him on this occasion, because the reason that guides him does not take the point of view of this occasion. His good faith is not a rule he obeys but an expression of the kind of understanding he has.
Freedom in the state
“A man who is led by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone” (Prop. 73). The proposition completes the movement of the Part from the individual to the community. It may seem paradoxical that a man should be freer under laws than without them, but it follows from everything Spinoza has said. The free man is not led by fear to obey the laws, and he desires to live by the rule of common life and common advantage, which the laws express; the state supplies the security and the help of others without which he could not live by reason at all. Solitude is not independence. It is exposure to the power of external causes without the help of those whose nature agrees most with one’s own.
Strength of character
The closing Scholium refers everything said about “the true freedom of man” to strength of character, that is, to tenacity and nobility (Prop. 73, Schol.), and declines to demonstrate separately all its properties, “and much less that a strong man hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is least of all proud.” These follow easily from the propositions that hatred is to be conquered by love and that each one led by reason desires for others the good he wants for himself. The strong man considers above all “that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature,” and that whatever he finds troublesome and evil, impious, horrible, unjust and base arises from his conceiving things in a disturbed, mutilated and confused way; and so he strives above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, hatred, anger, envy, mockery and pride. The ethics of Part IV ends where Part V will begin, with the improvement of understanding.
Reading the portrait
Two things should be kept in view. First, the free man is a model, not a description of anyone. Men are necessarily always subject to passions (Prop. 4, Cor.), and the Scholium to Prop. 68 calls the hypothesis of a man born free false. What the propositions describe is the direction in which a man becomes more perfect, that is, more powerful, as he comes to understand; the Preface had said that men are called more or less perfect insofar as they come nearer to the model or are further from it. The portrait is meant to be useful, as the Preface promised, not to be matched.
Second, the portrait is of a social being. The free man’s freedom is not independence from others but agreement with them: he seeks his own advantage from the guidance of reason, and nothing is more useful to him than other men who live by reason (Prop. 35, Cor. 1). That is why the series ends with the state, and why the virtues it describes are almost all virtues of common life: courage, gratitude, good faith, obedience to common law. The solitary sage of some ancient traditions has no place here.
The Appendix
An Appendix follows in which Spinoza collects what the Part has taught about the right way of living, which had been demonstrated piecemeal, and brings it under main headings in thirty-two short chapters of continuous prose. Its fourth chapter states the final end of a man led by reason: “In life, therefore, it is above all useful to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and in this one thing man’s highest happiness, or blessedness, consists” (Appendix, ch. 4). Other chapters treat friendship, the education of others to live by reason (ch. 9), flattery, money and marriage, which “agrees with reason if the desire for bodily union is generated not from beauty alone but also from love of begetting children and educating them wisely,” and if the love of each has as its cause “chiefly freedom of mind” (ch. 20). The last chapter returns to the theme of human weakness with which the Part began, and turns it into a source of contentment: human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by external causes, but if we understand clearly that we are a part of the whole of nature whose order we follow, “that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be entirely content with it,” since “insofar as we understand, we can want nothing but what is necessary” (ch. 32).
As the text continues, the portrait runs from Prop. 67 to Prop. 73, and the Appendix follows. How far human power can go in attaining the freedom described here is the subject of Part V.
Propositio LXVII
Proposition LXVII
[G II 261] Homo liber de nulla re minus, quam de morte cogitat, et eius sapientia non mortis, sed vitae meditatio est.
A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.
1- 1 The proposition inverts a philosophical commonplace: ‘Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est’ (‘the whole life of philosophers, as the same man [Socrates] says, is a preparation for death’, Cicero, Tusculan Disputations I.74).
Demonstratio. Homo liber, hoc est, qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit, mortis metu non ducitur (per prop. 63. huius), sed bonum directe cupit (per coroll. eiusdem prop.), hoc est (per prop. 24. huius) agere, vivere, suum esse conservare ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi. Atque adeo nihil minus, quam de morte cogitat, sed eius sapientia vitae est meditatio. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A free man, that is, one who lives from the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear of death (by
Prop. 63 of this Part), but desires the good directly (by
Cor. of the same Prop.), that is (by
Prop. 24 of this Part), to act, to live, to preserve his being from the foundation of seeking his own advantage. And so he thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation on life. Q.E.D.
Propositio LXVIII
Proposition LXVIII
Si homines liberi nascerentur, nullum boni et mali formarent conceptum, quamdiu liberi essent.
If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.
Demonstratio. Illum liberum esse dixi, qui sola ducitur ratione. Qui itaque liber nascitur et liber manet, non nisi adaequatas ideas habet, ac proinde mali conceptum habet nullum (per coroll. prop. 64. huius), et consequenter (nam bonum et malum correlata sunt) neque boni. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas, and accordingly has no concept of evil (by
Cor. of Prop. 64 of this Part), and consequently (for good and evil are correlative) none of good either. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Huius propositionis hypothesin falsam esse, nec posse concipi, nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam, seu potius ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus, sed quatenus tantummodo causa est, cur homo existat, patet ex prop. 4. huius partis. Atque hoc et alia, quae iam demonstravimus, videntur a Mose significari in illa primi hominis historia.
Scholium. It is evident from
Prop. 4 of this Part that the hypothesis of this proposition is false and cannot be conceived except insofar as we attend to human nature alone, or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite, but only insofar as he is the cause of man’s existing. And this, and other things which we have now demonstrated, seem to have been signified by Moses in that history of the first man.
In ea enim nulla alia Dei potentia concipitur, quam illa, qua hominem creavit, hoc est, potentia, qua hominis solummodo utilitati consuluit, atque eatenus narratur, quod Deus homini libero prohibuerit, ne de arbore cognitionis boni et mali comederet, et quod, simulac de ea comederet, statim mortem metueret potius, quam vivere cuperet.
For in it no other power of God is conceived than that by which he created man, that is, a power by which he consulted only man’s advantage; and to that extent it is narrated that God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, he would at once fear death rather than desire to live.
1- 1 Genesis 2:17: ‘וּמֵעֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְךָ מִמֶּנּוּ מוֹת תָּמוּת’ (‘but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for on the day that you eat of it you shall surely die’). Spinoza reads the threatened death as the fear of death. In the Theological-Political Treatise the command means that God commanded Adam ‘bonum agere & quaerere sub ratione boni, & non quatenus contrarium est malo’ (‘to do and seek the good under the aspect of the good, and not insofar as it is the contrary of evil’), that is, from love of the good and not from fear of evil (ch. 4).
Deinde, quod inventa ab homine uxore, quae cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat, cognovit nihil posse in natura dari, quod ipsi posset illa esse utilius; sed quod, postquam bruta sibi similia esse credidit, statim eorum affectus imitari inceperit (vide prop. 27. P. 3.) et libertatem suam amittere, quam patriarchae postea recuperaverunt, ducti spiritu Christi, hoc est, Dei idea, a qua sola pendet, ut homo liber sit, et ut bonum quod sibi cupit, reliquis hominibus cupiat, ut supra (per prop. 37. huius) demonstravimus.
Next, it is narrated that when the man had found a wife who agreed entirely with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him than she;
2 but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he at once began to imitate their affects (see
Prop. 27 of Part III) and to lose his freedom, which the patriarchs afterwards recovered, led by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man is free, and that he desires for other men the good which he desires for himself, as we have demonstrated above (by
Prop. 37 of this Part).
- 2 Genesis 2:23: ‘זֹאת הַפַּעַם עֶצֶם מֵעֲצָמַי וּבָשָׂר מִבְּשָׂרִי’ (‘this at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh’), read as agreement in nature (Prop. 35, Cor. 1).
Propositio LXIX
Proposition LXIX
[G II 262] Hominis liberi virtus aeque magna cernitur in declinandis, quam in superandis periculis.
The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them.
Demonstratio. Affectus coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi affectu contrario et fortiore affectu coercendo (per prop. 7. huius).
a At caeca audacia et metus affectus sunt, qui aeque magni possunt concipi (per prop. 5. et 3. huius). Ergo aeque magna animi virtus seu fortitudo (huius defin. vide in schol. prop. 59. P. 3.) requiritur ad audaciam, quam ad metum coercendum, hoc est (per aff. defin. 40. et 41.) homo liber eadem animi virtute pericula declinat, qua eadem superare tentat. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to and stronger than the affect to be restrained (by
Prop. 7 of this Part). But blind daring and fear are affects which can be conceived to be equally great (by
Props. 5 and
3 of this Part). Therefore an equally great virtue of mind, or strength of character (whose definition see in
Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III), is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear, that is (by
Defs. Aff. 40 and
41), the free man declines dangers by the same virtue of mind by which he tries to overcome them. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition has per Prop. 9. hujus, and so the Dutch; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to 7., and Gebhardt (G II 262; Textgestaltung II 386) follows.
Corollarium. Homini igitur libero aeque magnae animositati fuga in tempore, ac pugna ducitur; sive homo liber eadem animositate seu animi praesentia, qua certamen, fugam eligit.
Corollary. To a free man, therefore, timely flight is ascribed to as great a tenacity as battle; or, the free man chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, as combat.
Scholium. Quid animositas sit, vel quid per ipsam intelligam, in schol. prop. 59. P. 3. explicui. Per periculum autem id omne intelligo, quod potest esse causa alicuius mali, nempe tristitiae, odii, discordiae etc.
Scholium. What tenacity is, or what I understand by it, I have explained in
Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III. But by
danger I understand everything which can be the cause of some evil, namely of sadness, hatred, discord, etc.
Propositio LXX
Proposition LXX
Homo liber qui inter ignaros vivit,
a eorum, quantum potest, beneficia declinare studet.
A free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to decline their favours.
- a The Dutch translator misread ignavos here and in the following ignarus, ignaris, ignari (de bloden, ‘the timid’), and corrects to onkundigen, onkundige (‘the ignorant’) in the list of errors (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 386).
[G II 263] Demonstratio. Unusquisque ex suo ingenio iudicat, quid bonum sit (vide schol. prop. 39. P. 3.). Ignarus igitur, qui in aliquem beneficium contulit, id ex suo ingenio aestimabit, et si minoris ab eo, cui datum est, aestimari videt, contristabitur (per prop. 42. P. 3.).
Demonstration. Each one judges from his own temperament what is good (see
Schol. of Prop. 39 of Part III). An ignorant man, therefore, who has conferred a favour on someone, will value it according to his own temperament, and if he sees that it is valued less by the one to whom it was given, he will be saddened (by
Prop. 42 of Part III).
At homo liber reliquos homines amicitia sibi iungere (per prop. 37. huius), nec paria hominibus beneficia ex eorum affectu referre, sed se et reliquos libero rationis iudicio ducere et ea tantum agere studet, quae ipse prima esse novit. Ergo homo liber, ne ignaris odio sit, et ne eorum appetitui, sed soli rationi obsequatur, eorum beneficia, quantum potest, declinare conabitur. Q. E. D.
But the free man strives to join other men to himself in friendship (by
Prop. 37 of this Part), and not to repay men with favours that are equal by the measure of their affect, but to lead himself and others by the free judgment of reason, and to do only those things which he himself knows to be most important. Therefore the free man, so as not to be hated by the ignorant, and so as to comply not with their appetite but with reason alone, will strive as far as he can to decline their favours. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Dico quantum potest. Nam quamvis homines ignari sint, sunt tamen homines, qui in necessitatibus humanum auxilium, quo nullum praestabilius est, adferre queunt. Atque adeo saepe fit, ut necesse sit ab iisdem beneficium accipere, et consequenter iisdem contra ex eorum ingenio congratulari. Ad quod accedit, quod etiam in declinandis beneficiis cautio esse debet, ne videamur eosdem contemnere, vel prae avaritia remunerationem timere, atque ita, dum eorum odium fugimus, eo ipso in eorum offensionem incurramus. Quare in declinandis beneficiis ratio utilis et honesti habenda est.
Scholium. I say as far as he can. For although men are ignorant, they are still men, who in times of need can bring human help, than which nothing is more excellent. And so it often happens that it is necessary to accept a favour from them, and consequently to thank them in return according to their temperament. Add to this that caution must be exercised even in declining favours, so that we do not seem to despise them, or to fear repayment out of greed, and so, while we flee their hatred, by that very fact incur their offence. So in declining favours account must be taken of what is useful and honourable.
Propositio LXXI
Proposition LXXI
Soli homines liberi erga invicem gratissimi sunt.
Only free men are most grateful to one another.
Demonstratio. Soli homines liberi sibi invicem utilissimi sunt et maxima amicitiae necessitudine invicem iunguntur (per prop. 35. huius et eius coroll. 1.), parique amoris studio sibi invicem benefacere conantur (per prop. 37. huius). Adeoque (per aff. defin. 34.) soli homines liberi erga se invicem gratissimi sunt. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Only free men are most useful to one another and are joined to one another by the closest bond of friendship (by
Prop. 35 of this Part and
its Cor. 1), and strive to do good to one another with equal zeal of love (by
Prop. 37 of this Part). And so (by
Def. Aff. 34) only free men are most grateful to one another. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Gratia, quam homines, qui caeca cupiditate ducuntur, invicem habent, mercatura seu aucupium potius, quam gratia plerumque est. Porro ingratitudo affectus non est. Est tamen ingratitudo turpis, quia plerumque hominem nimio odio, ira vel superbia vel avaritia etc. affectum esse indicat.
Scholium. The thankfulness which men led by blind desire have for one another is for the most part a bargain or a hunt for gain rather than thankfulness. Further, ingratitude is not an affect. Yet ingratitude is base, because it generally indicates that a man is affected with excessive hatred, anger, or pride, or greed, etc.
Nam qui prae stultitia dona compensare nescit, ingratus non est, et multo minus ille, qui donis non movetur meretricis, ut ipsius libidini inserviat,
a nec furis, ut ipsius furta celet, vel alterius similis. Nam hic contra animum habere constantem ostendit, qui scilicet se nullis donis ad suam vel communem perniciem patitur corrumpi.
For he who from foolishness does not know how to repay gifts is not ungrateful, and much less he who is not moved by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, nor by those of a thief to conceal his thefts, or by those of anyone similar. For such a man, on the contrary, shows that he has a constant mind, namely one which does not allow itself to be corrupted by any gifts to its own or the common ruin.
- a Gebhardt (G II 264; Textgestaltung II 386) adds from the Dutch, after libidini, en wulpsheit (‘and wantonness’); the Dutch has aan de lust en wulpsheit der ontuchtigen.
Propositio LXXII
Proposition LXXII
[G II 264] Homo liber nunquam dolo malo, sed semper cum fide agit.
A free man never acts deceptively, but always in good faith.
Demonstratio. Si liber homo quicquam dolo malo, quatenus liber est, ageret, id ex dictamine rationis ageret (nam eatenus tantum liber a nobis appellatur); atque adeo dolo malo agere virtus esset (per prop. 24. huius), et consequenter (per eandem prop.) unicuique ad suum esse conservandum consultius esset, dolo malo agere, hoc est (ut per se notum) hominibus consultius esset verbis solummodo convenire, re autem invicem esse contrarios; quod (per coroll. prop. 31. huius) est absurdum. Ergo homo liber etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If a free man, insofar as he is free, did anything deceptively, he would do it from the dictate of reason (for only to that extent do we call him free); and so to act deceptively would be a virtue (by
Prop. 24 of this Part), and consequently (by
the same Prop.) it would be more advisable for everyone, for preserving his being, to act deceptively, that is (as is self-evident), it would be more advisable for men to agree only in words, but in fact to be contrary to one another, which (by
Cor. of Prop. 31 of this Part) is absurd. Therefore a free man, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Si iam quaeratur: “Quid si homo se perfidia a praesenti mortis periculo posset liberare, an non ratio suum esse conservandi omnino suadet ut perfidus sit?” respondebitur eodem modo: “Quod si ratio id suadeat, suadet ergo id omnibus hominibus, atque adeo ratio omnino suadet hominibus, ne nisi dolo malo paciscantur, vires coniungere et iura habere communia,
a hoc est, ne revera iura habeant communia, quod est absurdum.”
Scholium. If it is now asked, ‘What if a man could free himself by perfidy from a present danger of death? Would not reason, for preserving his being, entirely advise him to be perfidious?’, the answer will be the same: ‘If reason advises this, it therefore advises it to all men, and so reason entirely advises men to make no agreements to join their forces and to have common rights except deceptively, that is, not really to have common rights, which is absurd.’
1 - a The Dutch implies non nisi dolo malo paciscantur, vires conjungere, et jura habere communia (three coordinate acts), which W. Meijer (second edition) proposes and Appuhn thinks admissible; Gebhardt (G II 264; Textgestaltung II 386) keeps the 1677 text, in which joining forces and having common rights are the content of the agreement, and suspects a mistranslation in the Dutch.
- 1 The Political Treatise is more guarded about promises: ‘Fides alicui data … tamdiu rata manet, quamdiu ejus, qui fidem dedit, non mutatur voluntas’ (‘a promise given to someone remains valid as long as the will of the one who gave it does not change’, TP II.12), since in the natural state each is his own judge whether keeping it will bring more harm than advantage. The Scholium here speaks of the man who lives by reason, who cannot want reason to advise deceit to all.
Propositio LXXIII
Proposition LXXIII
Homo, qui ratione ducitur, magis in civitate, ubi ex communi decreto vivit, quam in solitudine, ubi sibi soli obtemperat, liber est.
A man who is led by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone.
[G II 265] Demonstratio. Homo, qui ratione ducitur, non ducitur metu ad obtemperandum (per prop. 63. huius), sed quatenus suum esse ex rationis dictamine conservare conatur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 66. huius) quatenus libere vivere conatur, communis vitae et utilitatis rationem tenere (per prop. 37. huius), et consequenter (ut in schol. 2. prop. 37. huius ostendimus) ex communi civitatis decreto vivere cupit. Cupit ergo homo, qui ratione ducitur, ut liberius vivat, communia civitatis iura tenere. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A man who is led by reason is not led to obey by fear (by
Prop. 63 of this Part); but insofar as he strives to preserve his being from the dictate of reason, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 66 of this Part), insofar as he strives to live freely, he desires to keep to the principle of common life and common advantage (by
Prop. 37 of this Part), and consequently (as we showed in
Schol. 2 of Prop. 37 of this Part) to live according to the common decree of the state. A man who is led by reason desires, therefore, in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec et similia, quae de vera hominis libertate ostendimus, ad fortitudinem, hoc est (per schol. prop. 59. P. 3.) ad animositatem et generositatem referuntur. Nec operae pretium duco, omnes fortitudinis proprietates hic separatim demonstrare, et multo minus, quod vir fortis neminem odio habeat, nemini irascatur, invideat, indignetur, neminem despiciat minimeque superbiat. Nam haec et omnia, quae ad veram vitam et religionem spectant, facile ex prop. 37. et 46. huius partis convincuntur; nempe quod odium amore contra vincendum sit, et quod unusquisque, qui ratione ducitur, bonum quod sibi appetit, reliquis etiam ut sit, cupiat.
Scholium. These and similar things which we have shown about the
true freedom of man are related to strength of character, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III), to tenacity and nobility. Nor do I think it worthwhile to demonstrate here separately all the properties of strength of character, and much less that a strong man hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is least of all proud. For these things, and all that concern
true life and
religion, are easily proved from
Props. 37 and
46 of this Part: namely, that hatred is to be conquered by love in return, and that each one who is led by reason desires for others also the good which he wants for himself.
Ad quod accedit id, quod in schol. prop. 50. huius partis et aliis in locis notavimus, quod scilicet vir fortis hoc apprime consideret, nempe quod omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae sequantur, ac proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat et quicquid praeterea impium, horrendum, iniustum et turpe videtur, ex eo oritur, quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate et confuse concipit; et hac de causa apprime conatur res, ut in se sunt, concipere et verae cognitionis impedimenta amovere, ut sunt odium, ira, invidia, irrisio, superbia et reliqua huiusmodi, quae in praecedentibus notavimus; atque adeo, quantum potest, conatur, uti diximus, bene agere et laetari.
Add to this what we noted in
Schol. of Prop. 50 of this Part and in other places, namely that the strong man considers this above all, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and accordingly that whatever he thinks troublesome and evil, and whatever besides seems impious, horrible, unjust and base, arises from his conceiving things in a disturbed, mutilated and confused way; and for this reason he strives above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, mockery, pride and the rest of this kind which we noted in what precedes; and so, as far as he can, he strives, as we have said, to act well and to rejoice.
Quousque autem humana virtus ad haec consequenda se extendat et quid possit, in sequenti parte demonstrabo.
But how far human virtue extends in attaining these things, and what it can do, I shall demonstrate in the following Part.
[G II 266] Appendix. Quae in hac parte de recta vivendi ratione tradidi, non sunt ita disposita, ut uno aspectu videri possint, sed disperse a me demonstrata sunt, prout scilicet unum ex alio facilius deducere potuerim. Eadem igitur hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui.
Appendix. The things I have taught in this Part about the right way of living have not been so arranged that they could be seen at a glance, but have been demonstrated by me piecemeal, namely as I could more easily deduce one from another. I have proposed, therefore, to collect them here and to bring them under main headings.
Caput I. Omnes nostri conatus seu cupiditates ex necessitate nostrae naturae ita sequuntur, ut vel per ipsam solam tamquam per proximam suam causam possint intelligi vel quatenus naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis individuis non potest adaequate concipi.
Chapter I. All our strivings, or desires, follow from the necessity of our nature in such a way that they can be understood either through it alone, as through their proximate cause, or insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived adequately through itself without other individuals.
1
Caput II. Cupiditates, quae ex nostra natura ita sequuntur, ut per ipsam solam possit intelligi,
a sunt illae quae ad mentem referuntur, quatenus haec ideis adaequatis constare concipitur; reliquae vero cupiditates ad mentem non referuntur, nisi quatenus res inadaequate concipit, et quarum vis et incrementum non humana, sed rerum, quae extra nos sunt, potentia definiri debet. Et ideo illae recte
actiones, hae autem
passiones vocantur.
b Illae namque nostram potentiam semper indicant, et hae contra nostram impotentiam et mutilatam cognitionem.
Chapter II. Desires which follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood through it alone are those which are related to the mind insofar as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; the other desires are not related to the mind except insofar as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase must be defined not by human power but by the power of things which are outside us. And so the former are rightly called actions, and the latter passions. For the former always indicate our power, and the latter, on the contrary, our lack of power and mutilated knowledge.
- a So Gebhardt (G II 266); the 1677 edition (OP p. 222) and Bartuschat have possint, as the plural subject requires.
- b illae recte actiones, hae autem passiones vocantur] transcr. illae recte actiones, hae autem passiones vocantur. Italics confined to the two defined terms.
Caput III. Nostrae actiones, hoc est, cupiditates illae, quae hominis potentia seu ratione definiuntur, semper bonae sunt; reliquae autem tam bonae, quam malae possunt esse.
Chapter III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man’s power, or reason, are always good; the others can be good as well as evil.
[G II 267] Caput IV. In vita itaque apprime utile est, intellectum seu rationem, quantum possumus, perficere, et in hoc uno summa hominis felicitas seu beatitudo consistit; quippe
beatitudo nihil aliud est, quam ipsa animi acquiescentia, quae ex Dei intuitiva cognitione oritur. At intellectum perficere nihil etiam aliud est, quam Deum
a Deique attributa et actiones, quae ex ipsius naturae necessitate consequuntur, intelligere. Quare hominis, qui ratione ducitur, finis ultimus, hoc est, summa cupiditas, qua reliquas omnes moderari studet, est illa, qua fertur ad se resque omnes, quae sub ipsius intelligentiam cadere possunt, adaequate concipiendum.
Chapter IV. In life, therefore, it is above all useful to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and in this one thing man’s highest happiness, or blessedness, consists; for
blessedness is nothing but the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God.
1 But to perfect the intellect is also nothing else but to understand God, and the attributes and actions of God which follow from the necessity of his nature. So the final end of a man who is led by reason, that is, the highest desire by which he strives to moderate all the others, is the one by which he is carried to conceive adequately himself and all the things which can fall within his understanding.
- a nihil etiam aliud est, quam Deum] transcr. nihil etiam aliud, est quam Deum. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 267).
- 1 The only reference in Part IV to intuitive knowledge, the third kind of knowledge of Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2. Part V shows that the greatest contentment of mind arises from it (Part V, Prop. 27), and that ‘our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom’ consists in a constant and eternal love towards God (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol.).
Caput V. Nulla igitur vita rationalis est sine intelligentia, et res eatenus tantum bonae sunt, quatenus hominem iuvant, ut mentis vita fruatur, quae intelligentia definitur. Quae autem contra impediunt, quominus homo rationem perficere et rationali vita frui possit, eas solummodo malas esse dicimus.
Chapter V. There is, therefore, no rational life without understanding, and things are good only insofar as they aid man to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined by understanding. Those things, on the contrary, which prevent man from being able to perfect his reason and to enjoy the rational life, those only we say are evil.
Caput VI. Sed quia omnia illa, quorum homo efficiens est causa, necessario bona sunt, nihil ergo mali homini evenire potest, nisi a causis externis; nempe quatenus pars est totius naturae, cuius legibus humana natura obtemperare, et cui infinitis modis pene sese accommodare cogitur.
Chapter VI. But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can happen to man except from external causes, namely insofar as he is a part of the whole of nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is compelled to accommodate itself in almost infinite ways.
[G II 268] Caput VII. Nec fieri potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars, et communem eius ordinem non sequatur; sed si inter talia individua versetur, quae cum ipsius hominis natura conveniunt, eo ipso hominis agendi potentia iuvabitur et fovebitur. At si contra inter talia sit, quae cum ipsius natura minime conveniunt, vix absque magna ipsius mutatione iisdem sese accommodare poterit.
Chapter VII. And it cannot happen that man should not be a part of nature and not follow its common order;
1 but if he lives among such individuals as agree with man’s nature, by that very fact his power of acting will be aided and encouraged. But if, on the contrary, he is among such as agree very little with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without a great change in himself.
Caput VIII. Quicquid in rerum natura datur, quod iudicamus malum esse, sive posse impedire, quominus existere et vita rationali frui queamus, id a nobis removere ea via, quae securior videtur, licet; et quicquid contra datur quod iudicamus bonum sive utile esse ad nostrum esse conservandum, et vita rationali fruendum, id ad nostrum usum capere et eo quocumque modo uti nobis licet. Et absolute id unicuique summo naturae iure facere licet, quod ad ipsius utilitatem conferre iudicat.
Chapter VIII. Whatever there is in the nature of things which we judge to be
evil, or able to prevent us from existing and enjoying the rational life, it is permissible for us to remove from ourselves by the way which seems safer; and whatever, on the contrary, there is which we judge to be
good, or
useful, for preserving our being and enjoying the rational life, it is permissible for us to take for our use and to use in any way whatever. And absolutely, it is permissible for each one, by the highest right of nature, to do what he judges to contribute to his advantage.
1
Caput IX. Nihil magis cum natura alicuius rei convenire potest, quam reliqua eiusdem speciei individua; adeoque (per cap. 7.) nihil homini ad suum esse conservandum et vita rationali fruendum utilius datur, quam homo, qui ratione ducitur. Deinde quia inter res singulares nihil novimus, quod homine, qui ratione ducitur, sit praestantius, nulla ergo re magis potest unusquisque ostendere, quantum arte et ingenio valeat, quam in hominibus ita educandis, ut tandem ex proprio rationis imperio vivant.
Chapter IX. Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species; and so (by
ch. 7) nothing is more useful to man for preserving his being and enjoying the rational life than
a man who is led by reason.
1 Next, because among singular things we know nothing more excellent than a man who is led by reason, there is no way in which each one can better show how much he is worth in skill and talent than by so educating men that they finally live under the rule of their own reason.
[G II 269] Caput X. Quatenus homines invidia aut aliquo odii affectu in se invicem feruntur, eatenus invicem contrarii sunt, et consequenter eo magis timendi, quo plus possunt, quam reliqua naturae individua.
Chapter X. Insofar as men are carried against one another by envy or some affect of hatred, to that extent they are contrary to one another, and consequently are the more to be feared, the more they can do than the other individuals of nature.
Caput XI. Animi tamen non armis, sed amore et generositate vincuntur.
Chapter XI. Minds, however, are conquered not by arms, but by
love and
nobility.
1
Caput XII. Hominibus apprime utile est, consuetudines iungere, seseque iis vinculis astringere, quibus aptius de se omnibus unum efficiant, et absolute ea agere, quae firmandis amicitiis inserviunt.
Chapter XII. It is above all useful to men to form close associations, and to bind themselves by those bonds by which they may more aptly make one out of all of them, and absolutely to do those things which serve to strengthen friendships.
Caput XIII. Sed ad haec
ars et
vigilantia requiritur. Sunt enim homines varii (nam rari sunt, qui ex rationis praescripto vivunt), et tamen plerumque invidi et magis ad vindictam, quam ad misericordiam proclives. Unumquemque igitur ex ipsius ingenio ferre et sese continere, ne eorum affectus imitetur,
a singularis animi potentiae opus est.
Chapter XIII. But for this skill and watchfulness are required. For men are changeable (for those who live by the prescription of reason are rare), and yet for the most part envious and more inclined to vengeance than to compassion. So to bear with each one according to his temperament, and to restrain oneself so as not to imitate their affects, is a work of singular power of mind.
- a W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) propose imitemur. Gebhardt (G II 269; Textgestaltung II 387) keeps imitetur: the construction is faulty either way, the infinitives ferre and sese continere rendering too literally a modern-language construction with an impersonal subject, from which the subject of the ne-clause is to be understood; imitemur would require nos continere.
At qui contra homines carpere et vitia potius exprobrare, quam virtutes docere et hominum animos non firmare, sed frangere norunt, ii et sibi et reliquis molesti sunt. Unde multi prae nimia scilicet animi impatientia falsoque religionis studio inter bruta potius, quam inter homines vivere maluerunt; ut pueri vel adolescentes, qui parentum iurgia aequo animo ferre nequeunt, militatum confugiunt et incommoda belli et imperium tyrannidis prae domesticis commodis et paternis admonitionibus eligunt, et quidvis oneris sibi imponi patiuntur, dummodo parentes ulciscantur.
But those who, on the contrary, know how to find fault with men, and to reproach vices rather than teach virtues,
1 and to break men’s minds rather than strengthen them, are troublesome both to themselves and to others. Hence many, no doubt from excessive impatience of mind and a false zeal for religion, have preferred to live among the beasts rather than among men; like boys or young men who cannot bear their parents’ scolding with equanimity, run off to the army, choose the hardships of war and the rule of a tyrant over the comforts of home and paternal admonitions, and allow any burden whatever to be imposed on them, provided they can take revenge on their parents.
[G II 270] Caput XIV. Quamvis igitur homines omnia plerumque ex sua libidine moderentur, ex eorum tamen communi societate multo plura commoda, quam damna sequuntur. Quare satius est eorum iniurias aequo animo ferre et studium iis adhibere, quae concordiae et amicitiae conciliandae inserviunt.
Chapter XIV. Although, therefore, men generally govern everything by their own lust,
1 still far more advantages than harms follow from their
common society. So it is better to bear their injuries with equanimity, and to apply our zeal to those things which serve to bring about concord and friendship.
- 1 ex sua libidine: here in the wide sense of whim or caprice; the word is rendered ‘lust’ throughout (see Part III, Def. Aff. 48).
Caput XV. Quae concordiam gignunt sunt illa, quae ad iustitiam, aequitatem et honestatem referuntur. Nam homines praeter id, quod iniustum et iniquum est, etiam aegre ferunt, quod turpe habetur, sive quod aliquis receptos civitatis mores aspernatur. Amori autem conciliando illa apprime necessaria sunt, quae ad religionem et pietatem spectant. De quibus vide schol. 1. et 2. prop. 37. et schol. prop. 46. et schol. prop. 73. P. 4.
Chapter XV. The things which beget
concord are those which are related to
justice,
equity and
honourableness. For besides what is unjust and inequitable, men also take badly what is held to be base, or the fact that someone spurns the accepted customs of the state. But for winning love, those things are above all necessary which concern
religion and
piety. On these see
Schols. 1 and
2 of Prop. 37,
Schol. of Prop. 46, and
Schol. of Prop. 73 of Part IV.
Caput XVI. Solet praeterea concordia ex metu plerumque gigni; sed sine fide. Adde, quod metus ex animi impotentia oritur et propterea ad rationis usum non pertinet, ut nec commiseratio, quamvis pietatis speciem prae se ferre videatur.
Chapter XVI. Concord, moreover, is usually begotten from fear, but without good faith. Add that fear arises from lack of power of mind, and therefore does not pertain to the use of reason; nor does pity, although it seems to present a show of piety.
1
[G II 271] Caput XVII. Vincuntur praeterea homines etiam largitate, praecipue ii, qui non habent unde comparare possint illa, quae ad vitam sustentandam necessaria sunt. Attamen unicuique indigenti auxilium ferre, vires et utilitatem viri privati longe superat. Divitiae namque viri privati longe impares sunt ad id suppeditandum. Unius praeterea viri facultas limitatior est,
a quam ut omnes sibi possit amicitia iungere; quare
pauperum cura integrae societati incumbit et ad communem tantum utilitatem spectat.
Chapter XVII. Men are also conquered by largesse, especially those who do not have the means to procure what is necessary to sustain life. Yet to bring help to everyone in need far surpasses the powers and the advantage of a private man. For the riches of a private man are far from sufficient to supply it. Moreover, one man’s capacity is too limited for him to be able to join all men to himself in friendship; so care of the poor falls on the whole of society and concerns only the common advantage.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 227) prints facultas ingenii, and its Sphalmata corrigenda strike ingenii; the older editions follow, except Paulus. Land would restore ingenii, and Van Vloten–Land print it. Gebhardt (G II 271; Textgestaltung II 387–388) keeps the corrected text, with the Dutch (de bequaamheit van een enig man): he sees a veiled polemic against monarchy, and thinks Spinoza replaced an original ingenium by the more general facultas, since friendship is not won by intellectual means alone.
Caput XVIII. In beneficiis accipiendis et gratia referenda alia prorsus debet esse cura, de qua vide schol. prop. 70. et schol. prop. 71. P. 4.
Caput XIX. Amor praeterea meretricius, hoc est generandi libido, quae ex forma oritur, et absolute omnis amor, qui aliam causam praeter animi libertatem agnoscit, facile in odium transit, nisi, quod peius est, species delirii sit, atque tum magis discordia, quam concordia fovetur.
a Vide schol. prop. 31. P. 3.
b Chapter XIX. Further, meretricious love, that is, the lust to procreate which arises from bodily beauty, and absolutely every love which recognizes any cause other than freedom of mind, easily passes into hatred, unless, which is worse, it is a species of madness; and then discord rather than concord is fostered. See
Schol. of Prop. 31 of Part III.
- a The 1677 edition has discordiâ and concordiâ (ablative), with love as the subject. Van Vloten–Land would read the nominatives (‘discord rather than concord is fostered’); Gebhardt (G II 271; Textgestaltung II 388) keeps the ablatives, as the Dutch understands them (dan zal zy meer door twist, dan door enigheit gevoed worden).
- b The 1677 edition has Coroll. Prop. 31. p. 3.; Baensch rightly observes that hatred arising from love is spoken of only in the Scholium, and Appuhn, Halpern and Gebhardt (G II 271; Textgestaltung II 388) correct accordingly.
Caput XX. Ad matrimonium quod attinet, certum est, ipsum cum ratione convenire, si cupiditas miscendi corpora non ex sola forma, sed etiam ex amore liberos procreandi et sapienter educandi, ingeneretur; et praeterea, si utriusque, viri scilicet et feminae, amor non solam formam, sed animi praecipue libertatem pro causa habeat.
Chapter XX. As for marriage, it is certain that it agrees with reason if the desire for bodily union is generated not from beauty alone but also from love of begetting children and educating them wisely; and if, moreover, the love of each, namely of the man and of the woman, has as its cause not beauty alone but chiefly freedom of mind.
[G II 272] Caput XXI. Gignit praeterea adulatio concordiam, sed foedo servitutis crimine vel perfidia; nulli quippe magis adulatione capiuntur, quam superbi, qui primi esse volunt, nec sunt.
Chapter XXI. Flattery, too, begets concord, but by the foul crime of servitude, or by perfidy; for none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who want to be first and are not.
Caput XXII. Abiectioni falsa pietatis et religionis species inest. Et quamvis abiectio superbiae sit contraria, est tamen abiectus superbo proximus. Vide schol. prop. 57. P. 4.
Chapter XXII. Self-abasement has a false appearance of piety and religion. And although self-abasement is contrary to pride, the self-abased man is still very near to the proud. See
Schol. of Prop. 57 of Part IV.
Caput XXIII. Confert praeterea concordiae pudor in iis tantum, quae celari non possunt. Deinde, quia ipse pudor species est tristitiae, ad rationis usum non spectat.
Chapter XXIII. Shame, too, contributes to concord, but only in matters which cannot be concealed. Next, because shame itself is a species of sadness, it does not pertain to the use of reason.
Caput XXIV. Ceteri tristitiae erga homines affectus directe iustitiae, aequitati, honestati, pietati et religioni opponuntur, et quamvis indignatio aequitatis speciem prae se ferre videatur, ibi tamen sine lege vivitur ubi unicuique de factis alterius iudicium ferre, et suum vel alterius ius vindicare licet.
Chapter XXIV. The other affects of sadness towards men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honourableness, piety and religion; and although indignation seems to present an appearance of equity, yet men live without law where each one is permitted to pass judgment on the deeds of another and to vindicate his own or another’s right.
Caput XXV. Modestia, hoc est, cupiditas
a hominibus placendi, quae ex ratione determinatur, ad pietatem (ut in schol. 1. prop. 37. P. 4. diximus
b) refertur. Sed si ex affectu oriatur, ambitio est sive cupiditas, qua homines falsa pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant.
Chapter XXV. Modesty, that is, the desire to please men which is determined by reason, is related to piety (as we said in
Schol. 1 of Prop. 37 of Part IV). But if it arises from affect, it is ambition, or a desire by which men, under a false image of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions.
- a Modestia, hoc est, cupiditas] transcr. Modestia, hoc est, cupiditas. The transcription sets the whole chapter in italics; only the defined term is meant.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 229) has Schol. Prop. 37.; the Dutch has het eerste Byvoegsel (as Land pointed out), and Van Vloten–Land and Gebhardt (G II 273; Textgestaltung II 388) read Schol. 1.
Nam qui reliquos consilio aut re iuvare cupit, ut simul summo fruantur bono, is apprime studebit, eorum sibi amorem conciliare; non autem eos in admirationem traducere, ut disciplina ex ipso habeat vocabulum, nec ullas absolute invidiae causas dare. In communibus deinde colloquiis cavebit hominum vitia referre, et de humana impotentia non nisi parce loqui curabit; at largiter de humana virtute seu potentia, et qua via possit perfici, ut sic homines non ex metu aut aversione, sed solo laetitiae affectu, moti ex rationis praescripto, quantum in se est, conentur vivere.
cFor he who desires to help others by counsel or deed, so that they may enjoy the highest good together, will above all strive to win their love, not to lead them into wonder so that a school may take its name from him, nor absolutely to give any causes for envy. Then in common conversation he will take care not to report men’s vices, and to speak only sparingly of human lack of power, but abundantly of human virtue, or power, and of the way in which it can be perfected, so that men, moved not by fear or aversion but only by the affect of joy, may strive, as far as it is in them, to live according to the prescription of reason.
- c quantum in se est, conentur vivere.] transcr. quantum in se est, conentur vivere. See the preceding emendation.
[G II 273] Caput XXVI. Praeter homines nihil singulare in natura novimus, cuius mente gaudere et quod nobis amicitia aut aliquo consuetudinis genere iungere possumus; adeoque quicquid in rerum natura extra homines datur, id nostrae utilitatis ratio conservare non postulat, sed pro eius vario usu conservare, destruere, vel quocumque modo ad nostrum usum adaptare nos docet.
Chapter XXVI. Apart from men, we know no singular thing in nature whose mind we can enjoy, and which we can join to ourselves in friendship or in any kind of association; and so whatever there is in the nature of things apart from men, the principle of our advantage does not require us to preserve, but teaches us to preserve it, destroy it, or adapt it to our use in any way whatever, according to its various uses.
Caput XXVII. Utilitas, quam ex rebus, quae extra nos sunt, capimus, est praeter experientiam et cognitionem, quam acquirimus ex eo, quod easdem observamus et ex his formis in alias mutamus, praecipua corporis conservatio; et hac ratione res illae imprimis utiles sunt, quae corpus ita alere et nutrire possunt, ut eius omnes partes officio suo recte fungi queant. Nam quo corpus aptius est, ut pluribus modis possit affici et corpora externa pluribus modis afficere, eo mens ad cogitandum est aptior. Vide prop. 38. et 39. P. 4.
Chapter XXVII. The advantage which we take from things outside us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another, is chiefly the preservation of the body; and in this respect those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body that all its parts can perform their function properly. For the more capable the body is of being affected in many ways, and of affecting external bodies in many ways, the more capable the mind is of thinking. See
Props. 38 and
39 of Part IV.
At huius notae perpauca in natura esse videntur. Quare ad corpus, ut requiritur, nutriendum necesse est multis naturae diversae alimentis uti. Quippe humanum corpus ex plurimis diversae naturae partibus componitur, quae continuo alimento indigent et vario, ut totum corpus ad omnia, quae ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, aeque aptum sit, et consequenter ut mens etiam aeque apta sit ad plura concipiendum.
But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature. So to nourish the body as it requires, it is necessary to use many foods of different natures. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which need continual and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind also may be equally capable of conceiving many things.
[G II 274] Caput XXVIII. Ad haec autem comparandum vix uniuscuiusque vires sufficerent nisi homines operas mutuas traderent. Verum omnium rerum compendium
pecunia attulit.
a Unde factum, ut eius imago mentem vulgi maxime occupare soleat; quia vix ullam laetitiae speciem imaginari possunt, nisi concomitante nummorum idea tamquam causa.
Chapter XXVIII. But to procure these things the powers of each one would hardly suffice, if men did not give their labour to one another. But money has furnished a compendium of all things. Hence it has come about that its image usually occupies the mind of the multitude most, because they can hardly imagine any species of joy except one accompanied by the idea of coins as its cause.
- a The 1677 edition prints Verùm, taking it as the particle (‘But money has furnished …’), and the Dutch translates Doch. W. Meijer, followed by Baensch and Appuhn, finds a gap between the first and second sentences of this chapter. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 388) answers that the thought runs on: money is the true regulator of mutual help, harmful when it becomes an end in itself, good when it serves need; and a Verum at the beginning of a sentence can only be the adjective, as Kirchmann already took it. The translation follows Gebhardt.
Caput XXIX. Sed hoc vitium eorum tantum est, qui non ex indigentia, nec propter necessitates nummos quaerunt, sed quia lucri artes didicerunt, quibus se magnifice efferunt. Ceterum corpus ex consuetudine pascunt; sed parce, quia tantum de suis bonis se perdere credunt, quantum sui corporis conservationi impendunt. At qui verum nummorum usum norunt et divitiarum modum ex sola indigentia moderantur, paucis contenti vivunt.
Chapter XXIX. But this vice belongs only to those who seek coins not from need or for necessities, but because they have learned the arts of gain, on which they pride themselves greatly. For the rest, they feed the body according to habit, but sparingly, because they believe that they lose as much of their goods as they spend on the preservation of their body. But those who know the true use of coins, and set the measure of their wealth by need alone, live content with little.
[G II 275] Caput XXX. Cum igitur res illae sint bonae, quae corporis partes iuvant, ut suo officio fungantur, et laetitia in eo consistat, quod hominis potentia, quatenus mente et corpore constat, iuvatur vel augetur, sunt ergo illa omnia, quae laetitiam afferunt, bona. Attamen quoniam contra non eum in finem res agunt, ut nos laetitia afficiant, nec earum agendi potentia ex nostra utilitate temperatur, et denique quoniam laetitia plerumque ad unam corporis partem potissimum refertur, habent ergo plerumque laetitiae affectus (nisi ratio et vigilantia adsit), et consequenter cupiditates, etiam quae ex iisdem generantur, excessum.
Chapter XXX. Since, therefore, those things are good which help the parts of the body to perform their function, and joy consists in this, that man’s power, insofar as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all those things which bring joy are good. Yet since, on the other hand, things do not act with the aim of affecting us with joy, nor is their power of acting tempered to our advantage, and finally since joy is generally related chiefly to one part of the body, the affects of joy (unless reason and watchfulness are present), and consequently also the desires which are generated from them, are generally excessive.
Ad quod accedit, quod ex affectu id primum habeamus, quod in praesentia suave est,
a nec futura aequali animi affectu aestimare possumus. Vide schol. prop. 44. et schol. prop. 60. P. 4.
b- a The 1677 edition and the older editions have in praesenti; Leopold, recognizing the line of Terence, proposes in praesentia, which Gebhardt (G II 275; Textgestaltung II 388) prints, comparing in praesentia suaves at Part IV, Prop. 62, Schol.
- b The 1677 edition has p. 3; the Dutch has in ’t vierde deel, which certainly gives the reference as Spinoza wrote it. Van Vloten–Land, without reference to the Dutch, correct to p. 4., and Gebhardt (G II 275; Textgestaltung II 388–389) follows.
- 1 The words echo Terence, Heauton Timorumenos 962–963: ‘suavia in praesentia / Quae essent prima habere, neque consulere in longitudinem’ (‘to hold first what was pleasant in the present, and not to take thought for the long run’), as Leopold noticed.
Caput XXXI. At superstitio id contra videtur statuere bonum esse, quod tristitiam, et id contra malum, quod laetitiam affert. Sed, ut iam diximus
a (vide schol. 2. prop. 45. P. 4.), nemo, nisi invidus, mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur. Nam quo maiore laetitia afficimur, eo ad maiorem perfectionem transimus, et consequenter eo magis de natura divina participamus; nec laetitia unquam mala esse potest, quam nostrae utilitatis vera ratio moderatur. At qui contra metu ducitur et bonum, ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur. Vide prop. 63. P. 4.
Chapter XXXI. But superstition, on the contrary, seems to maintain that what brings sadness is good, and what brings joy evil. But, as we have already said (see
Schol. 2 of Prop. 45 of Part IV), no one but an envious man takes pleasure in my lack of power and misfortune. For the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently the more we participate in the divine nature; nor can joy ever be evil which the true principle of our advantage moderates. But he who, on the contrary, is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason. See
Prop. 63 of Part IV.
- a Sed, ut iam diximus] transcr. Sed, ut iamdiximus. Word division.
[G II 276] Caput XXXII. Sed humana potentia admodum limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur; atque adeo potestatem absolutam non habemus, res, quae extra nos sunt, ad nostrum usum aptandi. Attamen ea quae nobis eveniunt contra id, quod nostrae utilitatis ratio postulat, aequo animo feremus, si conscii simus nos functos nostro officio fuisse, et potentiam, quam habemus, non potuisse se eo usque extendere, ut eadem vitare possemus, nosque partem totius naturae esse, cuius ordinem sequimur.
Chapter XXXII. But human power is very limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; and so we do not have an absolute power of adapting things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear with equanimity whatever happens to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage requires, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the power we have could not have extended so far as to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow.
Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri, quae intelligentia definitur, hoc est, pars melior nostri, in eo plane acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur. Nam quatenus intelligimus, nihil appetere nisi id quod necessarium est, nec absolute, nisi in veris acquiescere possumus; adeoque quatenus haec recte intelligimus, eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine totius naturae convenit.
If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be entirely content with it, and will strive to persevere in that contentment. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing but what is necessary, nor be content absolutely with anything but what is true; and so, insofar as we understand these things rightly, to that extent the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.
1- 1 The Part closes where it began, with man as a part of nature (Prop. 4, Cor.), but now seen from the side of understanding. ‘The better part of us’ is the intellect; Part V calls it the eternal part of the mind (Part V, Prop. 40, Cor.).