Ethices Pars Prima
De Deo

First Part of the Ethics
Of God

Introduction to the First Part

The Ethics does not begin with ethics. Its first Part is entitled De Deo, “Of God,” and only in its last two Parts does the work reach the subjects its title promises: the power of the affects over us, and the freedom that the intellect can win from them. A reader who opens the book hoping for advice on how to live finds instead eight definitions, seven axioms and thirty-six propositions about substance, attributes, modes, causes and necessity, and is entitled to ask why. Spinoza’s answer is given at the start of Part II. He will not explain everything that follows from the nature of God, since infinitely many things follow from it, “but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness” (Part II, Preface). The road to blessedness runs through the knowledge of God, and it does so for a reason the whole work tries to make good: human beings are parts of nature, subject to the same necessity as everything else, and we can neither understand our bondage nor gain our freedom except by understanding the whole of which we are parts. Part IV will say that “the highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God” (Part IV, Prop. 28), and Part V that the mind’s highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (Part V, Prop. 25), which proceeds from an adequate idea of God’s attributes. Part I is where that idea is first worked out.

What it works out can be put in a few sentences, though nearly every word of them needs the propositions that follow to give it its sense. There is exactly one substance, which Spinoza calls God. This substance has infinitely many attributes, each of which expresses its essence, and we know two of them, thought and extension. Everything else that exists is a mode of this substance, something that is in God and is conceived through God (Prop. 15). Everything follows from the nature of God with the same necessity with which it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles (Prop. 17, Scholium). Nothing is contingent (Prop. 29), and nothing could have been produced in any other way or order than it has been (Prop. 33). God does not act for ends, and the belief that he does, together with the belief that we ourselves are free in the sense of being uncaused, is diagnosed in the Appendix as the source of superstition.

Stated so baldly, these theses can sound like a set of dogmas. The point of the geometrical order is that they are not meant to be accepted on authority or for their edifying effect, but derived, one at a time, from definitions and axioms that a careful reader is asked to grant. The rest of this introduction tries to make that derivation easier to follow: first by saying something about the form of the work, then about the vocabulary Spinoza inherited and the use he made of it, then about the course of the argument and the places where readers most often lose their way.

Reading the geometrical order

Like the whole of the Ethics, Part I is set out “in geometrical order.” Definitions and axioms come first, followed by numbered propositions, each with its demonstration; corollaries state immediate consequences, and scholia (from the Greek for a comment or note) explain, illustrate and argue. Within a demonstration every step is justified by a reference to a definition, an axiom or an earlier proposition, given in Spinoza’s abbreviated form (“by Prop. 7,” “by Def. 3 and Ax. 6”). These references are the skeleton of the book, and following a few of them back to their source is the best way to learn how it works. The edition links each of them to the passage it cites.

The model is Euclid, whose Elements was the standard of rigour for the learned of the seventeenth century, but the immediate precedent was Cartesian. At the end of his Replies to the Second Objections to the Meditations, Descartes had set out some of his principal arguments “in geometrical fashion,” with definitions, postulates, axioms and propositions (AT VII 160 ff.). Spinoza’s first published book, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I et II (1663), recast the first two parts of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy in the same form, with a preface by his friend Lodewijk Meyer explaining the method and warning that the author did not share all the views he expounded. The Ethics is the work in which Spinoza used the method for his own philosophy, and it shows the marks of long revision. By February 1663 a group of his friends in Amsterdam was meeting to read a draft of its opening in order, one of them reading, explaining and demonstrating each proposition while the others raised their difficulties, which they sent to him by letter (Letter 8); the book was not printed until after his death in 1677.

For Spinoza the form is not merely a vehicle of persuasion. He holds that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Part II, Prop. 7), and a demonstration that derives each truth from those prior to it is meant to reproduce, in thought, the way in which things themselves follow from their causes. When the order is right, to understand a thing is to see it follow from what it depends on. This is why the Ethics begins with God: God is first in the order of being, and so must be first in the order of knowing, if our knowledge is to be adequate. It is also why Spinoza is impatient with those who begin elsewhere. Men who “do not know the true causes of things confuse everything,” he says, and “without any repugnance of mind feign that trees, no less than men, speak” (Prop. 8, Schol. 2); their mistake is not a want of cleverness but a wrong order of thinking, in which the things that come first in experience are taken for the things that come first in nature.

The reader should not expect the definitions to be neutral stipulations. In a letter to Simon de Vries (Letter 9), Spinoza distinguished definitions that only explain how we use a word, which need only be consistent, from definitions that explain a thing as it is outside the intellect, which must be true. The definitions of the Ethics are meant to be of the second kind, and a good deal of philosophy is packed into them. Some of them are definitions of a familiar term with an unfamiliar content: “free” (Def. 7) does not mean what the reader expects. Others contain, in a subordinate clause, a thesis that will turn out to carry great weight: the definition of substance ends with the words “that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed” (Def. 3), and it is this conceptual condition, more than anything else, that sets Spinoza’s metaphysics apart from Descartes’.

Nor should the reader take the scholia for idle asides. They are where Spinoza speaks most directly. He uses them to explain the point of a demonstration, to give an easier proof alongside a strict one, to answer objections, and to attack the views of others, sometimes at length. The scholium to Prop. 15 is a small treatise on the infinite divisibility of matter, the scholium to Prop. 17 an attack on the God of the theologians, the two scholia to Prop. 33 a discussion of contingency and of the divine will. The Appendix with which Part I ends is a polemical essay in continuous prose, with no numbered propositions at all. A useful way to read the Part for the first time is to read each enunciation, then its scholium if it has one, and only then the demonstration, returning to the demonstrations once the shape of the whole is clear.

The inherited vocabulary

The central terms of Part I are substance, attribute and mode, and none of them was new. They come from the scholastic metaphysics of substance and accident, which went back to Aristotle and was still taught in the universities of the Dutch Republic, as reformed by Descartes. In the Principles of Philosophy (I.51), Descartes defines substance as “a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist” (rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum), and adds at once that a substance which needs nothing at all “can be understood to be unique, namely God” (unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus; AT VIII-1 24). All other things, he says, can exist only with God’s concurrence, and so the word “substance” does not apply to God and to them in the same sense. He then admits, in a weaker sense, created substances, things that need nothing except God’s concurrence in order to exist: minds and bodies. Each created substance has one principal attribute that constitutes its nature and essence, thought in the case of minds and extension in length, breadth and depth in the case of bodies, and everything else we find in it is a mode of that attribute, a way of being thinking or of being extended (I.53). Shape and motion are modes of extension; imagination, sensation and will are modes of thought.

Spinoza keeps the terms and changes what they mean. His definition of substance (Def. 3) has two clauses: a substance is “what is in itself and is conceived through itself.” The first clause corresponds to Descartes’ independence in existence; the second adds an independence in conception. A substance is something we can understand without understanding anything else, and a mode, correspondingly, is “that which is in another, through which it is also conceived” (Def. 5). The two definitions together divide everything there is, for “whatever is, is either in itself or in another” (Ax. 1). With these definitions in hand Spinoza refuses Descartes’ concession. If only God strictly satisfies the definition of substance, then only God is a substance, and minds and bodies must be modes: “the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of God, or ... affections of the attributes of God” (Prop. 14, Cor. 2). Thought and extension, which for Descartes were the natures of two kinds of created substance, become two attributes of one substance.

The definition of attribute is the shortest in the book and the most disputed: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Def. 4). An attribute is a substance’s essence as an intellect grasps it. Because each attribute is conceived through itself (Prop. 10), the attributes of one substance are really distinct, in the sense that none can be understood through another; thought cannot be explained by extension, nor extension by thought. But, Spinoza argues, their real distinction does not make them distinct substances. “It is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance,” he writes; “indeed nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has” (Prop. 10, Schol.). This step, by which a plurality of attributes is combined with a single substance, is what allows the God of Part I to be both thinking and extended without being a composite of a mind and a body.

The definition of God gathers these terms together: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (Def. 6). The explanation that follows distinguishes two kinds of infinity. A thing infinite “in its own kind,” such as extension, is limited by nothing of its kind, but other attributes can be denied of it: extension is not thought. A thing absolutely infinite admits no such denial, for “to the essence of what is absolutely infinite there pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.” God is infinite in this second sense. Most readers take “infinite attributes” to mean infinitely many attributes. Spinoza never names any attribute besides thought and extension, and he explained to a correspondent why: the human mind is the idea of a body, and the idea of a body involves no attribute of God except extension and thought (Letter 64).

Three further definitions should be read with care, because each gives a familiar word a sense of its own. A thing is “free,” according to Def. 7, if it “exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone,” and “necessary, or rather compelled,” if it is determined by another. Freedom here is opposed not to necessity but to external compulsion, and the definition prepares the conclusion that God, who acts from the necessity of his own nature, is the only free cause (Prop. 17, Cor. 2). “Eternity” (Def. 8) is not endless duration but “existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing,” and the explanation adds that such existence “cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end.” The distinction between eternity and everlastingness will matter a great deal in Part V. And “cause of itself” (Def. 1), the first term defined in the book, is “that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.” The phrase was scholastic and Cartesian, but in Spinoza it carries the whole weight of his conception of God, who exists not because something else brings him about but because existing belongs to what he is.

Two principles do much of the work in the argument, and it helps to have them in view from the start. The first is that being and being conceived go together. To be in itself is to be conceived through itself, and to be in another is to be conceived through that other (Defs. 3 and 5; Axs. 1–2). The second is that causation and explanation go together. “Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause” (Ax. 4); things that have nothing in common cannot be understood through one another (Ax. 5); and “for each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for why it exists as for why it does not exist” (Prop. 11, second Dem.). The equation of cause with reason (causa seu ratio) is the deepest commitment of Spinoza’s rationalism. It is why he can say that God is the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is the cause of himself (Prop. 25, Schol.), why the necessity with which things follow from God can be compared to the necessity with which properties follow from a definition, and why nothing, for Spinoza, simply happens.

The argument for one substance

Part I divides into two halves and an appendix. The first half, Props. 1–15, establishes what God is. It begins, perhaps surprisingly, without mentioning God at all. Props. 1–8 prove general theorems about substance as such, any substance there might be. Substance is prior in nature to its affections (Prop. 1). Two substances with different attributes have nothing in common (Prop. 2), and of two things with nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other (Prop. 3). Things are distinguished from one another either by their attributes or by their affections (Prop. 4), and from this Spinoza infers that “in the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute” (Prop. 5). The reasoning is that two substances with the same attribute could not be told apart by their attribute, and could not be told apart by their affections either, since a substance considered truly is considered in itself, apart from its affections.

This is the first place where many readers stop. Leibniz, in notes he made on the Ethics, objected that the demonstration contains a paralogism: two substances could differ in some attributes and share others, and so be distinguished by their attributes while having one in common (Gerhardt, Philosophische Schriften I 142). The objection supposes that a substance might have one attribute among several that it shares with another. Spinoza’s reply, on most readings, lies in the doctrine that each attribute is conceived through itself and expresses the whole essence of its substance (Prop. 10): if two substances shared an attribute, each could be conceived completely through that attribute alone, and nothing in that conception could tell them apart. Whether the reply works is still debated, and the note to the demonstration of Prop. 5 sets out the issue.

From Prop. 5 the rest of the first group follows quickly. One substance cannot be produced by another, since two substances share no attribute and so have nothing in common (Prop. 6); a substance therefore cannot be produced by anything at all (Prop. 6, Cor.), and so must be the cause of itself: “It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist” (Prop. 7). Every substance is infinite (Prop. 8), for a finite substance would be limited by another of the same nature, which Prop. 5 excludes. The first scholium to Prop. 8 states the principle behind this in a form that will recur: “being finite is in truth partly a negation, and being infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature” (Prop. 8, Schol. 1). Determination, for Spinoza, is limitation; what is finite is so because something else bounds it.

At this point nothing yet excludes a world of many substances, each infinite in its own kind and each with a single attribute: one thinking substance, one extended substance, and so on. Props. 9–10 begin to close that possibility by turning from substances to attributes. The more reality a thing has, the more attributes belong to it (Prop. 9), and each attribute of one substance is conceived through itself (Prop. 10), so that the real distinction of attributes does not show that they belong to different substances (Prop. 10, Schol.). Then comes the proof of God’s existence. Prop. 11 states that God, “or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists,” and gives three demonstrations of it. The first is a brief version of the ontological argument: if God did not exist, his essence would not involve existence, which contradicts Prop. 7. The second rests on the principle that everything must have a cause or reason for its existence or non-existence, and argues that nothing could prevent God’s existence, since a reason for his non-existence would have to lie either in his own nature, which would then be contradictory, or in another substance, which, being of another nature, would have nothing in common with God and so could neither give him existence nor take it away. The third argues a posteriori: “To be able not to exist is lack of power, and conversely, to be able to exist is power” (Prop. 11, third Dem.); if only finite things existed, finite things would be more powerful than a being absolutely infinite; but we exist; therefore a being absolutely infinite exists too. The scholium explains that the third proof was given because it is easier to see, not because God’s existence does not follow a priori from the same foundation (Prop. 11, Schol.).

The first half ends with the conclusion that has made the book famous. Props. 12–13 argue that substance, and especially absolutely infinite substance, is indivisible. Then Prop. 14: “Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.” The demonstration is short. God has every attribute, since he is absolutely infinite; two substances cannot share an attribute; so any other substance would have to share an attribute with God, which is impossible. Hence God is unique, and thought and extension are either attributes of God or affections of his attributes (Prop. 14, Cors. 1–2). Prop. 15 draws the consequence for everything that is not substance: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”

Extension in God

The scholium to Prop. 15 defends the most scandalous consequence of this conclusion, that extension belongs to God, and it is worth reading slowly, because it also shows how Spinoza thinks about the relation between substance and its modes. His opponents, he says, deny that God is corporeal on the ground that body is a finite quantity bounded by a figure, and that nothing could be more absurd to say of a being absolutely infinite. With this he agrees. But they go on to remove extended substance itself from the divine nature, saying that God created it, and on this point he holds that they do not understand what they say, since no substance can be created (Prop. 15, Schol.).

Their arguments, he continues, come down to two. The first is that an infinite extended substance would be composed of parts, and that dividing it leads to absurdities: an infinite made of two finite halves, or an infinite twice as great as another, or a number of feet that is twelve times smaller than an equally infinite number of inches. The second is that extended substance is divisible and therefore can be acted on, which is unworthy of a supremely perfect being. Spinoza’s reply is that both arguments assume what he has shown to be absurd, that extended substance is composed of parts. The absurdities show only that infinite quantity is not measurable and not composed of finite parts, which is what he has already demonstrated; the weapon his opponents aim at him “they in fact turn against themselves.” Matter, considered as substance, is indivisible. We divide it only in the imagination, by attending to quantity “as it is in the imagination,” abstractly and superficially, and not as it is in the intellect, where it is conceived as substance. “Matter is everywhere the same, and parts are not distinguished in it except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really. For example, we conceive that water, insofar as it is water, is divided, and that its parts are separated from one another; but not insofar as it is corporeal substance” (Prop. 15, Schol.).

The water example deserves attention because it contains, in miniature, the relation between substance and mode that the whole Ethics depends on. Water comes into being and passes away, is divided and poured out; extended substance does none of these things. The same reality is described in both statements, but under different concepts. As water, it is a mode, a determinate way in which extension is affected; as corporeal substance, it is extension itself, infinite and indivisible. The distinction is not between two things but between two ways of conceiving one thing, and the same structure will return in Part II, where a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are said to be “one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways” (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol.). The scholium ends by restating the thesis it has defended: “All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen happen only through the laws of God’s infinite nature, and follow (as I shall soon show) from the necessity of his essence.”

What follows from God

With that sentence the second half of Part I is announced. Props. 16–36 turn from what God is to what follows from God. Their governing proposition is Prop. 16: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).” God is therefore the efficient cause of all things, a cause through himself and not by accident, and absolutely the first cause (Prop. 16, Cors.). He acts from the laws of his nature alone and is compelled by no one, so that he alone is a free cause (Prop. 17 and Cor. 2). He is the immanent and not the transitive cause of all things (Prop. 18), which means that his effects remain in him. His existence and his essence are one and the same (Prop. 20). From the absolute nature of his attributes follow infinite modes, eternal and infinite like the attributes themselves (Props. 21–23); and each finite thing is determined to exist and to act by another finite thing, and that by another, to infinity (Prop. 28). “In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way” (Prop. 29). Intellect and will, even infinite intellect, belong to what follows from God, Natura naturata, not to God as cause, Natura naturans (Props. 29, Schol., 31), and the will is a necessary, not a free, cause (Prop. 32). So “things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced” (Prop. 33). The Part closes with three short propositions on God’s power: it is his very essence (Prop. 34); whatever we conceive to be in his power necessarily exists (Prop. 35); and nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow (Prop. 36). An essay at the point where the second half begins introduces these propositions more fully, and another, before the Appendix, introduces Spinoza’s attack on final causes.

What Spinoza means by “God”

No word in Part I is more likely to mislead than its first, and it is worth saying plainly what Spinoza’s God is not. It is not a person who deliberates, chooses among possibilities, issues commands, rewards and punishes, or acts for the sake of ends. Spinoza denies that intellect and will pertain to God’s essence in anything like the human sense. If they did, he says, they “would have to differ by all the breadth of heaven from our intellect and will, and could agree with them in nothing except the name; no more, that is, than the Dog, a heavenly constellation, and the dog, a barking animal, agree with one another” (Prop. 17, Schol.). God’s power is not a reserve of possibilities among which he selects, but the very essence from which everything follows (Prop. 34). The Appendix traces the belief that God directs all things toward an end, and made them for man, to the prejudices of the imagination.

At the same time Spinoza does not simply rename the physical world. Extension is only one of God’s infinitely many attributes, and thought is as fully divine as extension. The formula most often associated with him, “God, or Nature” (Deus seu Natura), occurs only in Part IV, where Spinoza writes that “that eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists” (Part IV, Preface). Nature there means the whole of what is, considered as active and productive, Natura naturans together with Natura naturata, and not merely the totality of bodies. Spinoza could also write, in the second half of this Part, that God is the cause of the essence of things as well as of their existence (Prop. 25), and that “particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” (Prop. 25, Cor.). The language is theological; the content is a theory of what it is for anything to exist and to be intelligible. Appendix F considers how far that theory rests on a principle of sufficient reason.

Whether this is a philosophical theology or an atheism in theological dress was disputed from the moment the book appeared, and the dispute has never quite ended. Pierre Bayle, in the long article on Spinoza in his Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697), called Spinoza’s system the most monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined. Novalis, a century later, called Spinoza “a God-intoxicated man.” Both judgments respond to something real in the text: the first to the identification of God with a substance of which we and everything around us are modes, the second to the fact that Spinoza speaks of God on nearly every page and makes the knowledge and love of God the end of human life. The translation does not take sides, but the notes point out where the text has been read in conflicting ways.

Questions the reader will meet

Several questions in Part I remain open among interpreters, and a reader will meet them whether or not he goes looking for them. It may help to know in advance what they are.

The first concerns the attributes. The definition says that an attribute is what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence. If the emphasis falls on “what the intellect perceives,” the attributes may seem to be ways in which an intellect apprehends a substance whose essence is in itself undivided; if it falls on “constituting its essence,” they are real features of the substance, discovered rather than invented by the intellect. H. A. Wolfson, in his study of 1934, defended the first, “subjective,” reading and connected it with the medieval Jewish debate about the divine attributes (The Philosophy of Spinoza I 146–147). Martial Gueroult, in the first volume of his commentary (1968), rejected it, arguing among other things that the demonstration of Prop. 4 speaks of “substances, or what is the same (by Def. 4), their attributes,” and so identifies attributes with substance itself (Spinoza I 117). Most recent readers incline to the objective reading, but the question of how one substance can have many really distinct essences remains one of the hardest in the book. Appendix B sets out the two readings and the arguments for each.

The second concerns the relation between God and his modes. Spinoza says that modes are “in” God and are conceived through him. The traditional reading, which goes back to Bayle, takes this as the relation of a property to its subject, so that a stone, a man and a thought are states of God as a shape is a state of a body. Bayle drew from it the consequence that God would be not only the cause but the subject of every crime and every misery in the world, so that the sentence “the Germans have killed ten thousand Turks” would mean that God modified into Germans had killed God modified into ten thousand Turks (Dictionnaire, “Spinoza,” remark N). Edwin Curley, in Spinoza’s Metaphysics (1969), argued instead that “the relation of mode to substance is a relation of causal dependence which is unlike the relation of predicate to subject” (p. 40): for things to be in God is for them to depend on God as effects depend on their cause. Yitzhak Melamed has since defended the older view in a revised form, arguing that modes both inhere in God and are predicated of him, and that Bayle’s objections rest on misunderstandings (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 2013, ch. 1). The dispute bears directly on Props. 15, 18 and 25, Cor., and the notes return to it there. Appendix A follows the dispute from Bayle to Melamed.

The third concerns necessity. Spinoza says that nothing is contingent and that nothing could have been otherwise, and he means it. But he also says that each finite thing is determined by another finite thing, to infinity (Prop. 28), and not by God’s absolute nature alone. Readers have asked how the two claims fit together, whether everything really follows from the divine nature or only the infinite modes, and whether Spinoza leaves any room for things that might not have existed. The essay before Prop. 16 discusses these questions, and Appendix D follows the modern debate.

A last group of difficulties is verbal. Spinoza uses “in,” “through,” “involve,” “express” and “follow” in senses he never fully defines, and the reader does well to watch how each is used. “Power” (potentia) is not a capacity that might go unused but activity itself, and God’s power is identical with his essence (Prop. 34). “Reality” and “perfection” are the same (Part II, Def. 6), and a thing has more of them the more it is and does, not the more it pleases us. “Infinite” means unlimited, either in a kind or absolutely, and “eternal” means necessary existence, not endless time. None of these senses is arbitrary, but none of them is the sense the words have in ordinary speech.

The place of Part I in the whole

The doctrines of Part I are not left behind when the Ethics turns to human beings; they are applied. The human mind will be defined in Part II as the idea of an actually existing body, a mode of thought corresponding to a mode of extension, and the parallel of the two attributes will explain why mind and body neither act on each other nor need to. The denial of free will in Part II rests on Prop. 17, Cor. 2 and Prop. 28 of this Part. The striving by which each thing perseveres in its being, the foundation of the theory of the affects in Part III, is derived from the doctrine that each thing expresses God’s power in a certain and determinate way. The ethics of Part IV begins from the claim, already implicit in the Appendix, that good and evil are not features of things in themselves. And Part V’s account of the eternity of the mind returns to the propositions of this Part about essence and existence, citing Prop. 25 and Prop. 16 in its demonstration that there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of each human body under a species of eternity (Part V, Prop. 22). A reader who finds the First Part forbidding may take some comfort in knowing that nothing in it is idle.

On the translation

Spinoza’s technical vocabulary is rendered consistently, so that the reader can follow a word from one proposition to the next. “Involve” (involvere), “express” (exprimere), “be in itself” (in se esse), “be conceived through itself” (per se concipi) and “insofar as” (quatenus) are terms of art, and the English does not vary them for elegance. Where the Latin is ambiguous, the English tries to be ambiguous in the same way, and a note explains what is at stake. The glossary at the end of the volume records the renderings adopted.

The text begins with the definitions. They are short, and the reader will be tempted to pass over them quickly; it is better to read them twice, and to return to them whenever a demonstration cites one, since the argument of the whole Part is contained in them more fully than their brevity suggests.

Definitiones

Definitions

[G II 45] I. Per causam sui intelligo id, cuius essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens.
I. By cause of itself1 I understand that whose essence involves2 existence, or3 that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.
  1. 1 causa sui. The scholastics called God a se (‘from himself’) but generally refused to call him the cause of himself, since a cause must be prior to its effect and nothing can be prior to itself. Descartes defended the expression in a qualified sense (Replies to the First and Fourth Objections, AT VII 106–111, 236 ff.): the immensity of God’s power is the reason why he needs no cause, so that he stands to himself in a way analogous to an efficient cause. Spinoza defines the notion without any appeal to efficient causation, purely in terms of the relation between essence and existence.
  2. 2 involvit. A term of art throughout the Ethics: A involves B when B is contained in the concept of A, so that A cannot be conceived without B. It is always rendered ‘involve’, never ‘imply’.
  3. 3 sive. Spinoza’s sive and seu regularly introduce an equivalent description of the same thing rather than an alternative to it. They are rendered ‘or’ throughout, leaving the reader to judge, as the Latin reader had to, how strong the equivalence is.

Cited in 1P7D, 1P24D, 5P35D

II. Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita,a quae alia eiusdem naturae terminari potest. Ex. gr. corpus dicitur finitum, quia aliud semper maius concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione, nec cogitatio corpore.
II. That thing is said to be finite in its own kind1 which can be limited by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. So a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.2
  1. a in suo genere finita] transcr. in suo genere inita. The transcription reads ‘inita’, an evident slip; the 1677 edition (OP p. 1) and Gebhardt (G II 45) read ‘finita’.
  1. 1 The transcription italicizes res (‘thing’). These italics are editorial (the 1677 edition has none in the definitions), so they are placed here on the term being defined. ‘In its own kind’ (in suo genere) prepares the contrast, in Def. 6 and its Explanation, between what is infinite in its own kind and what is absolutely infinite.
  2. 2 The two examples anticipate the doctrine that thought and extension are attributes each conceived through itself (Prop. 10), between which there is no limitation and, by Prop. 3, no causal interaction.

Cited in 1P8D, 1P21D

III. Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id cuius conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.
III. By substance I understand what is in itself1 and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.
  1. 1 in se est. ‘Being in’ is the scholastic relation of inherence: accidents are in a subject, which is not itself in anything. Descartes (Principles I.51, AT VIII-1 24) defined substance as ‘a thing which exists in such a way that it needs no other thing in order to exist’, conceded that strictly only God satisfies this, and then admitted created substances (minds and bodies) that need only God’s concurrence. Spinoza’s definition joins the ontological condition to a conceptual one (‘conceived through itself’), and it is the conceptual condition that drives the argument of Props. 2–6.
IV. Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tamquam eiusdem essentiam constituens.
IV. By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence.1
  1. 1 tamquam eiusdem essentiam constituens. A famous crux. On a ‘subjectivist’ reading (classically H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934), tamquam means ‘as if’: attributes are the ways an intellect apprehends a substance whose essence is in itself undifferentiated. Wolfson translates ‘as if constituting its essence’ and judges that ‘the abundance of both literary and material evidence is in favor of the subjective interpretation’ (I 146). On an ‘objectivist’ reading (M. Gueroult, Spinoza I: Dieu, 1968, ch. 1 §XV and Appendix 3), the intellect perceives what really does constitute the essence: otherwise, Gueroult argues, the nature of substance would be unknowable and God, remaining incomprehensible, would become again the ‘sanctuary of ignorance’ (ignorantiae asylum) of the Appendix (p. 50); and the identification of substances with their attributes in Prop. 4, Dem., made by appeal to this definition, ‘ruine irrémédiablement, d’avance’ (ruins irreparably, in advance) the subjectivist reading (p. 117; the 1677 edition there cites Axiom 4, see the note to the Latin). ‘As constituting’ is chosen because it preserves the ambiguity of the Latin. The intellect in question includes God’s infinite intellect (cf. Part II, Prop. 7, Scholium).
V. Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur.
V. By mode I understand the affections1 of a substance, or that which is in another, through which it is also conceived.
  1. 1 affectiones: states, properties or modifications of a thing. The word must be kept apart from affectus (‘affect’), the subject of Part III, although Spinoza will define affects as certain affections of the body together with their ideas (Part III, Def. 3).
VI. Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.
VI. By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes,1 each of which expresses2 an eternal and infinite essence.
  1. 1 infinitis attributis. The Latin can mean ‘infinitely many attributes’ or ‘attributes that are (each) infinite’; the English keeps the same ambiguity. Most readers take Spinoza to assert infinitely many attributes, of which we know only two, thought and extension (Part II, Ax. 5); J. Bennett argued that Spinoza ‘often takes infinity to imply totality’, so that the definition says only that God has every possible attribute; this gives ‘a case for interpreting the Ethics as not containing the doctrine that there are more than two attributes’, though Bennett does ‘not say that Spinoza thought there were only two’ (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, §19, pp. 75–76). The question was put to Spinoza himself: in Letter 63 Schuller passes on Tschirnhaus’s request for a demonstration that we cannot know any attributes of God besides thought and extension (VVL³ III 203); Spinoza answers in Letter 64, and the exchange continues in Letters 65–66.
  2. 2 exprimit. ‘Expression’ is Spinoza’s preferred term for the relation between attributes and the essence of substance, and later between modes and attributes (Prop. 25, Cor.).
[G II 46] Explicatio. Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere. Quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus;a quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad eius essentiam pertinet, quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.
Explanation. I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind. For of whatever is infinite only in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite there pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.1
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dat is, men kan oneindige toeëigeningen bevatten, die tot des zelfs natuur niet behoren’ (‘that is, one can conceive infinite attributes which do not belong to its nature’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 46; Textgestaltung II 346). In the Dutch version the parenthesis is in italics.
  1. 1 The idea that limitation is negation, and perfection pure affirmation, is developed in Prop. 8, Schol. 1; compare Letter 36 to Hudde on what is ‘infinite in its own kind’.
VII. Ea res libera dicetur, quae ex solab suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur: necessaria autem, vel potius coacta, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.a
VII. That thing will be called free1 which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. That thing, however, will be called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to operate2 in a certain and determinate manner.3
  1. a coacta, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.] transcr. coacta, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione. Editorial italics restricted to the defined term, as with libera and necessaria; the 1677 edition italicizes none of them (OP p. 2).
  2. b So the 1677 edition (OP p. 2). Gebhardt (G II 46; Textgestaltung II 346) corrects to dicitur from the Dutch version (word gezegt), and Bartuschat follows him; our transcription keeps the 1677 reading, and the translation follows it.
  1. 1 Freedom is opposed here not to necessity but to compulsion by something external. Compare Letter 58, to G. H. Schuller (1674): ‘You see, then, that I place freedom not in a free decree but in a free necessity’ (me libertatem non in libero decreto, sed in libera necessitate ponere; VVL³ III 195). The same letter describes created things as determined by external causes ‘to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner’, the formula of this definition.
  2. 2 Spinoza says that the free thing is determined ad agendum (‘to act’), but the compelled thing ad operandum (‘to operate’, i.e. to produce effects). The shift anticipates Part III, where acting (agere) is reserved for being the adequate cause of an effect (Part III, Def. 2); the two verbs are kept distinct throughout.
  3. 3 certa ac determinata ratione, a formula that recurs with variations in Part I: certo et determinato modo (Prop. 25, Cor.), ad certo modo existendum et operandum (Prop. 29, Dem.), and being determined ‘to exist and to operate’ in Props. 26–28. Ratio here means ‘manner’ or ‘way’, and certus has its older sense, ‘definite’.
VIII. Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur.
VIII. By eternity1 I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.
  1. 1 Eternity is not endless duration (what the scholastics called sempiternity) but a kind of existence that has no relation to time at all, the existence of what exists by the necessity of its own definition. Spinoza had discussed the distinction in his Cogitata Metaphysica (I.4, ‘Of eternity, duration and time’, and II.1, ‘Of God’s eternity’). The doctrine returns, with decisive consequences, in Part V (Part V, Prop. 23, Scholium; Part V, Prop. 34, Scholium).

Cited in 1P19D, 1P20D, 1P23D, 5P29D, 5P30D

Explicatio. Talis enim existentia, ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur, proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.
Explanation. For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth,1 like the essence of the thing, and therefore cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end.
  1. 1 The comparison is with truths such as those of geometry, which hold without reference to any time. Descartes had held that the eternal truths were freely created by God (letters to Mersenne of 15 April, 6 May and 27 May 1630, AT I 145, 149, 152); Spinoza will deny that God creates anything by free will (Prop. 17, Scholium; Prop. 33, Scholium 2).

Cited in 5P29D

Axiomata

Axioms

I. Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.
I. Whatever is, is either in itself or in another.
II. Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet.
II. What cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.
III. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus, et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur.
III. From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible for an effect to follow.

Cited in 1P27D, 5P33D

IV. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit.
IV. Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause.1
  1. 1 This axiom ties causal dependence to conceptual dependence: what is caused by another is also conceived through it. Much of the argument of Part I (Prop. 3, Prop. 6, Cor., Prop. 25) and the parallelism of Part II, Prop. 7 rest on it; the demonstration of the latter consists of little more than a reference to this axiom.
V. Quae nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt, sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.
V. Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

Cited in 1P3D

[G II 47] VI. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.
VI. A true idea must agree with its object.1
  1. 1 suo ideato: literally ‘its ideated’, that of which the idea is an idea. The axiom states a correspondence condition on truth; Spinoza will add an intrinsic characterization of truth, the adequate idea, in Part II, Def. 4.

Cited in 1P5D, 1P30D, 2P29D, 2P32D, 2P44D, 2P44C2D

Cited in Letters 64

VII. Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, eius essentia non involvit existentiam.
VII. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.

Cited in 1P11D

Propositiones

Propositions

Propositio I

Proposition I

Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.
Substance is prior in nature1 to its affections.
  1. 1 Priority ‘in nature’ is not priority in time. In the scholastic sense, A is naturally prior to B when B depends on A, in being and in being conceived, but not conversely.

Cited in 1P5D

Demonstratio. Patet ex defin. 3. et 5.
Demonstration. This is evident from Defs. 3 and 5.

Propositio II

Proposition II

Duae substantiae diversa attributa habentes nihil inter se commune habent.
Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.

Cited in 1P6D, 1P11D2, 1P12D

Demonstratio. Patet etiam ex defin. 3. Unaquaeque enim in se debet esse et per se debet concipi, sive conceptus unius conceptum alterius non involvit.
Demonstration. This too is evident from Def. 3. For each must be in itself and must be conceived through itself, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

Propositio III

Proposition III

Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.
Of things that have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other.1
  1. 1 Applied to thought and extension, this rules out the causal interaction of mind and body that Descartes had defended; see Part II, Prop. 6, Part III, Prop. 2 and the Preface to Part V.

Cited in 1P6D

Cited in Letters 63

Demonstratio. Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per axiom. 5.) nec per se invicem possunt intelligi, adeoque (per axiom. 4.) una alterius causa esse non potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If they have nothing in common with one another, then (by Ax. 5) they cannot be understood through one another, and so (by Ax. 4) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.E.D.

Propositio IV

Proposition IV

Duae aut plures res distinctae vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum, vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum.
Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by a diversity of the attributes of the substances or by a diversity of their affections.

Cited in 1P5D

Demonstratio. Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt (per axiom. 1.), hoc est (per defin. 3. et 5.) extra intellectum nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones.a Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur, per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt praeter substantias, sive quod idem est (per defin. 4.)b earum attributa earumque affectiones. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by Ax. 1), that is (by Defs. 3 and 5), outside the intellect1 there is nothing except substances and their affections. Therefore there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by Def. 4), their attributes,2 and their affections. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 3) reads eiusque affectiones; the Dutch version has the plural (der zelfder aandoeningen), and Gebhardt (G II 47; Textgestaltung II 346), like Van Vloten–Land, corrects to earumque.
  2. b The 1677 edition (OP p. 4) reads per Axiom. 4., and the Dutch version agrees. Gebhardt (G II 48; Textgestaltung II 346), following Schmidt, Auerbach, Sigwart and Camerer, and Van Vloten–Land, reads per Defin. 4., the definition of attribute, which the sense requires. The translation follows the correction.
  1. 1 extra intellectum: in reality, as opposed to merely in thought.
  2. 2 The identification of substances with their attributes is one of the most debated moves in Part I. It is hard to square with a purely subjectivist reading of Def. 4, and Spinoza repeats it elsewhere (cf. Prop. 19, Prop. 20, Cor. 2).

Propositio V

Proposition V

[G II 48] In rerum natura non possunt dari duae aut plures substantiae eiusdem naturae sive attributi.
In the nature of things1 there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.
  1. 1 in rerum natura, idiomatic Latin for ‘in reality’. The phrase is rendered literally throughout, so that ‘Nature’ with a capital is reserved for Nature as a whole.
Demonstratio. Si darentur plures distinctae, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum, vel ex diversitate affectionum (per prop. praeced.). Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo, non dari nisi unam eiusdem attributi.
Demonstration. If there were several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a diversity of attributes or by a diversity of affections (by the preceding Prop.). If only by a diversity of attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute.
At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substantia sit prior natura suis affectionibus (per prop. 1.), depositis ergo affectionibus et in se considerata, hoc est (per defin. 3. et axiom. 6.)a vere considerata, non poterit concipi ab alia distingui, hoc est (per prop. praeced.) non poterunt dari plures, sed tantum una. Q. E. D.
But if by a diversity of affections, then, since substance is prior in nature to its affections (by Prop. 1), if the affections are put to one side and it is considered in itself, that is (by Def. 3 and Ax. 6), considered truly, it cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, that is (by the preceding Prop.), there cannot be several substances, but only one. Q.E.D.1
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 4) reads per Defin. 3. & 6., and the Dutch version agrees. Saisset proposed Defin. 3. & 4.; Gebhardt (G II 48; Textgestaltung II 346) adopts Van Vloten–Land’s per Defin. 3. & Axiom. 6.: Ax. 6 (on the true idea) fits ‘considered truly’, whereas Def. 6 defines God. The translation follows the correction.
  1. 1 Leibniz objected, in notes he made on the Ethics, that the argument contains a paralogism: ‘two substances can be distinguished by their attributes and yet have some attribute in common, provided they also have others of their own’ (duae substantiae possunt distingui attributis, et tamen habere aliquod attributum commune, modo etiam aliqua praeterea habeant propria; Gerhardt, Philosophische Schriften I 142). A common line of reply on Spinoza’s behalf: since each attribute is conceived through itself (Prop. 10) and expresses the whole essence of its substance, a shared attribute would let us conceive each substance through it alone, with nothing in that conception to tell the two apart.

Propositio VI

Proposition VI

Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.
One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Cited in 1P6C, 1P11S, 1P12D

Demonstratio. In rerum natura non possunt dari duae substantiae eiusdem attributi (per prop. praeced.), hoc est (per prop. 2.) quae aliquid inter se commune habent; adeoque (per prop. 3.) una alterius causa esse nequit, sive una ab aliaa non potest produci. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. In the nature of things there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by the preceding Prop.), that is (by Prop. 2), which have something in common with one another;1 and so (by Prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other, or one cannot be produced by the other. Q.E.D.
  1. a So the 1677 edition (OP p. 4); Gebhardt (G II 48) and Bartuschat omit una.
  1. 1 The step is compressed. Prop. 2 says that substances with different attributes have nothing in common; Spinoza takes it that two substances could have something in common only by sharing an attribute, which Prop. 5 excludes.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur substantiam ab alio produci non posse. Nam in rerum natura nihil datur praeter substantias, earumque affectiones, ut patet ex axiom. 1. et defin. 3. et 5. Atqui a substantia produci non potest (per prop. praeced.). Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci non potest. Q. E. D.
Corollary. From this it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything else.1 For in the nature of things there is nothing except substances and their affections, as is evident from Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5. But it cannot be produced by a substance (by the preceding Prop.).2 Therefore a substance absolutely cannot be produced by anything else. Q.E.D.
  1. 1 For Descartes, minds and bodies are created substances (Principles I.51–52, AT VIII-1 24–25). Spinoza denies that any substance can be created; see Prop. 8, Schol. 2 and Prop. 15, Scholium.
  2. 2 In a corollary or scholium, ‘the preceding Proposition’ is the one to which it is attached, here Prop. 6 itself.

Cited in 1P7D, 1P15S

Aliter. Demonstratur hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, eius cognitio a cognitione suae causae deberet pendere (per axiom. 4.); adeoque (per defin. 3.) non esset substantia.
Alternatively. This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of its contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by Ax. 4); and so (by Def. 3) it would not be a substance.

Propositio VII

Proposition VII

[G II 49] Ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere.
It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.
Demonstratio. Substantia non potest produci ab alio (per coroll. prop. praeced.); erit itaque causa sui, id est (per defin. 1.) ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam, sive ad eius naturam pertinet existere. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by the Cor. of the preceding Prop.); it will therefore be the cause of itself,1 that is (by Def. 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist. Q.E.D.
  1. 1 The inference from ‘not produced by anything else’ to ‘cause of itself’ assumes that everything has a cause, either in itself or in another (cf. Ax. 3, the ‘third note’ of Prop. 8, Schol. 2, and the second demonstration of Prop. 11). It is the first appearance in the Ethics of a principle of sufficient reason.

Propositio VIII

Proposition VIII

Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.
Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Cited in 1P12D, 1P13S, 1P15S, 2L1D

Demonstratio. Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit (per prop. 5.) et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere (per prop. 7.). Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam (per defin. 2.) deberet terminari ab alia eiusdem naturae, quae etiam necessario deberet existere (per prop. 7.); adeoque darentur duae substantiae eiusdem attributi, quod est absurdum (per prop. 5.). Existit ergo infinita. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A substance of one attribute1 exists only as unique (by Prop. 5), and it pertains to its nature to exist (by Prop. 7). It will therefore be of its nature to exist either as finite or as infinite. But not as finite. For (by Def. 2) it would have to be limited by another of the same nature, which would also have to exist necessarily (by Prop. 7); and so there would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by Prop. 5). It exists, therefore, as infinite. Q.E.D.
  1. 1 Up to this point the argument has spoken of substance in general, and has not excluded substances of a single attribute. Only with God, the substance of infinite attributes (Props. 9–11), and the uniqueness of God (Prop. 14), does it emerge that there is just one substance, with all the attributes.
Scholium I. Cum finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio, et infinitum absoluta affirmatio existentiae alicuius naturae, sequitur ergo ex sola prop. 7. omnem substantiam debere esse infinitam.a
Scholium I. Since being finite is in truth partly a negation,1 and being infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from Prop. 7 alone that every substance must be infinite.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘Want indien men de zelfstandigheit eindig stelde, zo zou men in haar natuur ten deel het wezentlijk te zijn ontkennen; ’t welk (volgens de gezeide Voorstelling) ongerijmt is’ (‘For if one supposed substance to be finite, one would in part deny existence in its nature, which (by the said proposition) is absurd’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 49; Textgestaltung II 346). The Latin terms Existere and Negare stand in the margin.
  1. 1 Compare Letter 50, to Jelles: since figure is nothing but determination, ‘and determination is negation’ (determinatio negatio est; VVL³ III 173), figure cannot be anything positive. Hegel quoted the principle as Spinoza’s (Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812, Book I, pp. 75–76: ‘Determinatio est negatio, sagte Spinoza’); it is often cited in the form omnis determinatio est negatio, which is not Spinoza’s wording.
Scholium II. Non dubito, quin omnibus, qui de rebus confuse iudicant, nec res per primas suas causas noscere consueverunt, difficile sit, demonstrationem prop. 7. concipere; nimirum quia non distinguunt inter modificationes substantiarum et ipsas substantias, neque sciunt, quomodo res producuntur.
Scholium II. I do not doubt that for all who judge of things confusedly, and are not accustomed to know things through their first causes, it is difficult to conceive the demonstration of Prop. 7; namely, because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced.
Unde fit, ut principium, quod res naturales habere vident, substantiis affingant. Qui enim veras rerum causas ignorant, omnia confundunt et sine ulla mentis repugnantia tam arbores, quam homines, loquentes fingunt et homines tam ex lapidibus quam ex semine formari et quascumque formas in alias quascumque mutari imaginantur. Sic etiam, qui naturam divinam cum humana confundunt, facile Deo affectus humanos tribuunt, praesertim quamdiu etiam ignorant, quomodo affectus in mente producuntur.
Hence it comes about that they fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning which they see natural things have. For those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything, and without any repugnance of mind feign1 that trees, no less than men, speak, and imagine that men are formed from stones as well as from seed,2 and that any forms whatever are changed into any others whatever. So also those who confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe human affects3 to God, especially so long as they are also ignorant of how affects are produced in the mind.
  1. 1 fingunt; compare affingant just before (‘fictitiously ascribe’). Fingere (‘to feign’, ‘to fashion’) and fictio are technical terms, developed in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: to frame an idea that does not arise from knowledge of the thing’s causes. They are rendered ‘feign’ and ‘fiction’ throughout.
  2. 2 The examples recall the poets’ fables: speaking trees (as with Polydorus’ myrtle in Virgil, Aeneid III), and men born from stones (Deucalion and Pyrrha, Ovid, Metamorphoses I), together with the transformations of the Metamorphoses generally.
  3. 3 The first occurrence of affectus (‘affect’), the subject of Part III. Spinoza’s polemic against anthropomorphic conceptions of God returns at length in Prop. 15, Scholium, Prop. 17, Scholium and the Appendix.
Si autem homines ad naturam substantiae attenderent, minime de veritate prop. 7. dubitarent; imo haec prop. omnibus axioma esset et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per substantiam intelligerent id quod in se est et per se concipitur, hoc est, id cuius cognitio non indiget cognitione alterius rei. Per modificationes autem id quod in alio est et quarum conceptus a conceptu rei, in qua sunt, formatur.
But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of the truth of Prop. 7; indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for all, and would be numbered among the common notions.4 For by substance they would understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of another thing; but by modifications, what is in another, and whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are.
  1. 4 notiones communes. The axioms of Euclid’s Elements I stand under the heading Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι (‘common notions’; Heiberg I 10), which Latin versions rendered variously (Heiberg’s own Latin has communes animi conceptiones, I 11). In Spinoza’s circle the term meant the axioms of a geometrical exposition: Lodewijk Meyer’s preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy speaks of ‘Postulata, & Axiomata, seu communes animi Notiones’ (G I 127); Descartes used it for self-evident truths (Principles I.13, I.49; AT VIII-1 9, 23). Spinoza gives the term a theory of its own in Part II, Props. 37–40.
Quocirca modificationum non existentium veras ideas possumus habere; quandoquidem, quamvis non existant actu extra intellectum, earum tamen essentia ita in alio comprehenditur, ut per idem concipi possint. Verum substantiarum veritas extra intellectum non est, nisi in se ipsis, quia per se concipiuntur.
This is why we can have true ideas of modifications that do not exist;5 for although they do not actually exist outside the intellect, their essence is nevertheless comprehended in another in such a way that they can be conceived through it. But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect except in themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.
  1. 5 Spinoza returns to the ideas of non-existent modes in Part II, Prop. 8 and its Corollary and Scholium.
Si quis ergo diceret, se claram et distinctam, hoc est, veram ideam substantiae habere et nihilominus dubitare, num talis substantia existat, idem hercle esset, ac si diceret, se veram habere ideam et nihilominus dubitare, num falsa sit (ut satis attendenti fit manifestum); vel, si quis statuat, substantiam creari, simul statuit, ideam falsam factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest. Adeoque fatendum necessario est, substantiae existentiam, sicut eius essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem.
If someone, therefore, were to say that he had a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of a substance, and nevertheless doubted whether such a substance existed, that would really be6 the same as if he were to say that he had a true idea and nevertheless doubted whether it was false (as is manifest to anyone who attends sufficiently); or if someone maintains that a substance is created,7 he maintains at the same time that a false idea has become true, than which surely nothing more absurd can be conceived. So it must necessarily be admitted that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth.
  1. 6 hercle, a colloquial oath (‘by Hercules’) that Spinoza uses for emphasis; it recurs in Prop. 15, Scholium.
  2. 7 Against the Cartesian doctrine of created substances. If the idea of a substance includes its existence, then before its supposed creation the true idea would have represented as existing something that did not exist, and so would have been false.
Atque hinc alio modo concludere possumus, non dari nisi unicam eiusdem naturae; quod hic ostendere, operae pretium esse duxi. Ut autem hoc ordine faciam, notandum est, 1. veram uniuscuiusque rei definitionem nihil involvere, neque exprimere praeter rei definitae naturam. Ex quo sequitur hoc 2. nempe nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuoruma involvere, neque exprimere, quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit, quam naturam rei definitae. Ex. gr. definitio trianguli nihil aliud exprimit, quam simplicem naturam trianguli; at non certum aliquem triangulorum numerum.
And from this we can conclude in another way8 that there is only one substance of the same nature, which I have thought it worthwhile to show here. But to do this in order, it must be noted, 1. that the true definition of each thing involves and expresses nothing except the nature of the thing defined. From which there follows this, 2. namely, that no definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of the triangle expresses nothing other than the simple nature of the triangle, but not any certain number of triangles.
  1. a The Dutch version has a marginal note on this word (ondeeligen, ‘individuals’): ‘By ondeeligen worden de bezonderen verstaan, die onder een geslacht behoren’ (‘By individuals are understood the particulars that belong under a genus’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 50; Textgestaltung II 347). Gebhardt prints it as a footnote.
  1. 8 What follows is an independent proof of Prop. 5, resting on four ‘notes’ about definition and causation. The third note is a version of the principle of sufficient reason (see the note on Prop. 7, Dem.).
3. Notandum, dari necessario uniuscuiusque rei existentis certam aliquam causam, propter quam existit. 4. Denique notandum, hanc causam, propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et definitione rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere), vel debere extra ipsam dari.
3. It must be noted that for each existing thing there is necessarily some certain cause on account of which it exists. 4. Finally, it must be noted that this cause, on account of which some thing exists, either must be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (namely, because it pertains to its nature to exist), or must be given outside it.
His positis sequitur, quod, si in natura certus aliquis numerus individuorum existat, debeat necessario dari causa, cur illa individua et cur non plura nec pauciora existunt. Si ex. gr. in rerum natura viginti homines existant (quos maioris perspicuitatis causa suppono simul existere, nec alios antea in natura exstitisse), non satis erit (ut scilicet rationem reddamus, cur viginti homines existant) causam naturae humanae in genere ostendere; sed insuper necesse erit, causam ostendere, cur non plures, nec pauciores, quam viginti existant; quandoquidem (per notam 3.) uniuscuiusque debet necessario dari causa, cur existat.
With these points established, it follows that if some certain number of individuals exists in nature, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals exist, and why neither more nor fewer. If, for example, twenty men exist in the nature of things (whom, for the sake of greater clarity, I suppose to exist at the same time, and that no others existed in nature before), it will not be enough (in order, that is, to give a reason why twenty men exist) to show the cause of human nature in general; but it will be necessary in addition to show the cause why not more and not fewer than twenty exist, since (by note 3) there must necessarily be a cause for each, why it exists.
At haec causa (per notam 2. et 3.) non potest in ipsa natura humana contineri, quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit. Adeoque (per notam. 4.) causa, cur hi viginti homines existunt et consequenter cur unusquisque existit, debet necessario extra unumquemque dari et propterea absolute concludendum, omne id, cuius naturae plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario, ut existant, causam externam habere.
But this cause (by notes 2 and 3) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. And so (by note 4) the cause why these twenty men exist, and consequently why each of them exists, must necessarily be given outside each of them; and therefore it must be concluded absolutely that whatever is of such a nature that several individuals of it can exist must necessarily, in order that they may exist, have an external cause.
Iam quoniam ad naturam substantiae (per iam ostensa in hoc schol.) pertinet existere, debet eius definitio necessariam existentiam involvere et consequenter ex sola eius definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. At ex ipsius definitione (ut iam ex nota 2. et 3. ostendimus) non potest sequi plurium substantiarum existentia. Sequitur ergo ex ea necessario, unicam tantum eiusdem naturae existere, ut proponebatur.
Now since it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (by what has already been shown in this Scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently its existence must be inferred from its definition alone. But from its definition (as we have already shown from notes 2 and 3) the existence of several substances cannot follow. It follows necessarily from it, therefore, that there exists only one substance of the same nature, as was proposed.

Cited in 1P15S

Propositio IX

Proposition IX

[G II 51] Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquaeque res habet, eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.
The more reality or being1 each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.
  1. 1 Degrees of reality are Cartesian (Meditations III, AT VII 40: substance has more ‘objective reality’ than a mode, infinite substance more than finite). Spinoza connects them with the number of attributes. The one-line demonstration has puzzled readers; the thought seems to be that attributes are what express the reality of a substance (see Prop. 10, Scholium).
Demonstratio. Patet ex defin. 4.
Demonstration. This is evident from Def. 4.

Propositio X

Proposition X

Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet.
Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself.

Cited in 1P12D, 2P5D, 2P6D

Cited in Letters 64, 66

Demonstratio. Attributum enim est id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tamquam eius essentiam constituens (per defin. 4.); adeoque (per defin. 3.) per se concipi debet. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For an attribute is what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (by Def. 4); and so (by Def. 3) it must be conceived through itself. Q.E.D.
[G II 52] Scholium. Ex his apparet, quod, quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur, hoc est, unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere, ipsa duo entia, sive duas diversas substantias constituere. Id enim est de natura substantiae, ut unumquodque eius attributorum per se concipiatur; quandoquidem omnia quae habet attributa simul in ipsa semper fuerunt, nec unum ab alio produci potuit; sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiae exprimit.
Scholium. From these things it is apparent that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct,1 that is, one without the aid of the other, we still cannot infer from this that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another; but each expresses the reality, or being, of substance.
  1. 1 realiter distincta. In Descartes, a ‘real distinction’ holds between substances, and is established when each can be clearly and distinctly conceived without the other (Principles I.60, AT VIII-1 28); this is how the Sixth Meditation concludes that mind and body are distinct substances (AT VII 78). Spinoza accepts the conceptual test for attributes but denies that it establishes distinct substances, a direct reply to Descartes.
Longe ergo abest, ut absurdum sit, uni substantiae plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi, et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat, eo plura attributa, quae et necessitatem sive aeternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat; et consequenter nihil etiam clarius, quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut defin. 6. tradidimus) ens, quod constat infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit.
So it is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance; indeed nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity; and consequently nothing is clearer, either, than that a being absolutely infinite must necessarily be defined (as we taught in Def. 6) as a being which consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
Si quis autem iam quaerit, ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quae ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere, eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quaereretur.
But if someone now asks by what sign, then, we shall be able to recognize a diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in the nature of things there exists only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite; so that such a sign would be sought in vain.

Cited in 1P14C1

Cited in Letters 63, 64

Propositio XI

Proposition XI

Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.
God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.1
  1. 1 Three demonstrations follow. The first is a version of the ontological argument (cf. Descartes, Meditations V, AT VII 65–66), but it runs through Prop. 7, the claim that existence pertains to the nature of every substance, rather than through the idea of a supremely perfect being. The second rests on a principle of sufficient reason; the third, by Spinoza’s own account in the Scholium, is a posteriori.
Demonstratio. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, Deum non existere. Ergo (per axiom. 7.) eius essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per prop. 7.) est absurdum. Ergo Deus necessario existit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, that God does not exist. Then (by Ax. 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.
Aliter. Cuiuscumque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio, tam cur existit, quam cur non existit. Ex. gr. si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet, cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet, quae impedit quominus existat, sive quae eius existentiam tollat. Haec vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet, vel extra ipsam.
Alternatively. For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason,1 as much for why it exists as for why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it does not exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing, or which takes its existence away. This reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.
  1. 1 causa seu ratio. The equation of cause and reason is basic to Spinoza’s rationalism: to have a cause is to have an explanation, and conversely. Here the principle of sufficient reason is stated in its strongest form, requiring a reason for non-existence as well as for existence.
Ex. gr. rationem, cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa eius natura indicat; nimirum, quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam eius natura sequitur, quia scilicet existentiam involvita (vide prop. 7.).
For example, the reason why a square circle does not exist is indicated by its very nature, namely, because it involves a contradiction. Why, on the other hand, a substance exists also follows from its nature alone, namely, because it involves existence (see Prop. 7).
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 9) prints quae scilicet existentiam involvit (‘its nature, which involves existence’) but corrects it to quia in its list of errata (Sphalmata corrigenda); the Dutch version has om dat (‘because’). Gebhardt (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347) and Bartuschat read quia; Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn kept quae. The sense is the same.
At ratio, cur circulus vel triangulus existit,b vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur, sed ex ordine universae naturae corporeae. Ex eo enim sequi debet, vel iam triangulum necessario existere, vel impossibile esse ut iam existat. Atque haec per se manifesta sunt.
But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from their nature, but from the order of the whole of corporeal nature. For from this it must follow either that the triangle now necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should now exist. And these things are self-evident.2
  1. b The 1677 edition (OP p. 9) and Bartuschat read triangulum; Gebhardt (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347) reads triangulus, with the Dutch version’s marginal gloss and with triangulus a few lines earlier (G II 52), as Van Vloten–Land had corrected.
  1. 2 per se manifesta, literally ‘manifest through themselves’; similarly per se notum is rendered ‘self-evident’.
Ex quibus sequitur, id necessario existere, cuius nulla ratio nec causa datur, quae impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit, quae impedit quominus Deus existat, vel quae eius existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est, eundem necessario existere.
From which it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause which prevents it from existing. Therefore, if there can be no reason or cause which prevents God from existing, or which takes his existence away, it must certainly be concluded that he necessarily exists.
At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura, vel extra ipsam dari deberet, hoc est, in alia substantia alterius naturae. Nam si eiusdem naturae esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum. At substantia, quae alterius esset naturae,c nihil cum Deo commune habere (per prop. 2.), adeoque neque eius existentiam ponere neque tollere posset.
But if there were such a reason, or cause, it would have to be either in the very nature of God or outside it, that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, by that very fact it would be granted that God exists. But a substance that was of another nature would have nothing in common with God (by Prop. 2), and so could neither posit nor take away his existence.
  1. c The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dan de goddelijke’ (‘than the divine’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347).
Cum igitur ratio seu causa, quae divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa eius natura, quae propteread contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de ente absolute infinitoe et summe perfecto affirmare, absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo, nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur, quae eius existentiam tollat, ac proinde Deus necessario existit. Q. E. D.
Since, therefore, a reason or cause which would take away the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, it will necessarily have to be, if indeed God does not exist, in his very nature, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to affirm this of a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in God nor outside God is there any cause or reason which takes his existence away, and hence God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.
  1. d The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘volgens onz tweede Voorbeelt’ (‘by our second example’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347). The second example is the square circle, whose nature involves a contradiction.
  2. e The 1677 edition (OP p. 9) reads Atque (‘And’), followed by Bruder, Van Vloten–Land and Bartuschat. Atqui (‘But’), which introduces the minor premise of the reductio, is Gebhardt’s correction (G II 53 l. 25; Textgestaltung II 348) from the Dutch version: ‘Doch dit … te zeggen, zou ongerijmt wezen’ (NS p. 10); Baensch had proposed it without knowledge of the Dutch. Gueroult defends Atqui (Spinoza I: Dieu, p. 187 n. 25, where the passage is cited as G II 52 l. 28).
[G II 53] Aliter. Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id, quod iam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora ente absolute infinito: atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est. Ergo vel nihil existit, vel ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit.
Alternatively. To be able not to exist is lack of power,1 and conversely, to be able to exist is power (as is self-evident). So, if what now necessarily exists is only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite: and this (as is self-evident) is absurd. So either nothing exists, or a being absolutely infinite also necessarily exists.
  1. 1 impotentia, the privative of potentia (‘power’); not ‘impotence’ in the modern sense.
Atqui nos, vel in nobis, vel in alio, quod necessario existit, existimus (vid.axiom. 1. et prop. 7.). Ergo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est (per defin. 6.), Deus necessario existit. Q. E. D.
But we exist, either in ourselves or in something else which necessarily exists (see Ax. 1 and Prop. 7). Therefore a being absolutely infinite, that is (by Def. 6), God, necessarily exists. Q.E.D.
[G II 54] Scholium. In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui, ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea, quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur, quo plus realitatis alicuius rei naturae competit, eo plus virium a se habere, ut existat; adeoque ens absolute infinitum, sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit.
Scholium. In this last demonstration I wanted to show God’s existence a posteriori,1 so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily; but not because God’s existence does not follow a priori from this same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist; and so a being absolutely infinite, or God, has of himself an absolutely infinite power of existing, and therefore he exists absolutely.
  1. 1 In the seventeenth-century sense, a demonstration a posteriori proceeds from effects to causes (here, from the fact that we exist), and one a priori from causes, or from the essence of a thing, to what follows from it.
Multi tamen forsan non facile huius demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt, quia assueti sunt, eas solummodo res contemplari, quae a causis externis fluunt; et ex his, quae cito fiunt, hoc est, quae facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contra eas res factu difficiliores iudicant, hoc est, ad existendum non adeo faciles, ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt. Verum ut ab his praeiudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere, qua ratione hoc enunciatum: quod cito fit, cito perit, verum sit, nec etiam, an respectu totius naturae omnia aeque facilia sint, an secus.
Still, perhaps many will not easily be able to see the evidentness of this demonstration, because they have been accustomed to contemplate only those things that flow from external causes; and of these they see that those which quickly come to be, that is, which easily exist, also easily perish, and conversely they judge those things more difficult to bring about, that is, not so easy to exist, to which they conceive more things to pertain. But to free them from these prejudices, I have no need to show here in what way this saying, what quickly comes to be quickly perishes,2 is true, nor even whether, in respect of the whole of nature, all things are equally easy, or not.
  1. 2 quod cito fit, cito perit. Spinoza calls it an enunciatum, a ‘saying’, and treats it as something his readers take for granted.
Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit, me hic non loqui de rebus, quae a causis externis fiunt, sed de solis substantiis, quae (per prop. 6.) a nulla causa externa produci possunt. Res enim, quae a causis externis fiunt, sive eae multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtuti causae externae debetur, adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causae externae, non autem suae oritur. Contra, quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causae externae debetur; quare eius etiam existentia ex sola eius natura sequi debet, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam eius essentia.
But it suffices to note only this, that I am not speaking here of things that come to be from external causes, but only of substances, which (by Prop. 6) can be produced by no external cause. For things that come to be from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, owe all the perfection, or reality, they have to the power of the external cause;3 and so their existence arises only from the perfection of the external cause, and not from their own. On the other hand, whatever perfection a substance has is owed to no external cause; so its existence too must follow from its nature alone, and is therefore nothing other than its essence.4
  1. 3 virtuti. Virtus here has its scholastic sense of causal power or efficacy; it is rendered ‘power’ rather than the glossary’s ‘virtue’, which is reserved for the ethical sense that Part IV, Def. 8 will in turn identify with power.
  2. 4 The grammar leaves open whether ‘which’ (quae) refers to the existence or to the nature of the substance; either way the claim anticipates Prop. 20, that God’s existence and his essence are one and the same.
Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit, sed contra ponit; imperfectio autem contra eandem tollit, adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus, quam de existentia entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti, hoc est, Dei. Nam quandoquidem eius essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit, summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.
Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary posits it; imperfection, on the other hand, takes it away; and so there is no existence of which we can be more certain than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite, or perfect, that is, God. For since his essence excludes all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it takes away every cause of doubting his existence and gives the greatest certainty concerning it, which I believe will be clear to anyone who attends even moderately.

Propositio XII

Proposition XII

[G II 55] Nullum substantiae attributum potest vere concipi, ex quo sequatur, substantiam posse dividi.
No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that the substance can be divided.

Cited in 1P15S

Demonstratio. Partes enim, in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel naturam substantiae retinebunt, vel non. Si primum,b tum (per prop. 8.) unaquaeque pars debebit esse infinita et (per prop. 6.) causa suia et (per prop. 5.) constare debebit ex diverso attributo, adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (per prop. 6.) est absurdum.
Demonstration. For the parts into which a substance so conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance or will not. If the first, then (by Prop. 8) each part will have to be infinite, and (by Prop. 6) cause of itself,1 and (by Prop. 5) will have to consist of a different attribute; and so many substances could be constituted from one, which (by Prop. 6) is absurd.
  1. a So the 1677 edition (OP p. 11) and the Dutch version. W. Meijer proposed prop. 7., which Bartuschat adopts; Gebhardt (G II 55; Textgestaltung II 348) keeps prop. 6. as the proposition that corresponds.
  2. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘namelijk dat zy de natuur van de zelfstandigheit behouden’ (‘namely, that they retain the nature of substance’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 55; Textgestaltung II 348).
  1. 1 Strictly, that a substance is cause of itself was shown in Prop. 7, Dem., on the basis of Prop. 6 and its Corollary; W. Meijer accordingly proposed to read Prop. 7, and Bartuschat does. The 1677 edition and the Dutch version read ‘Prop. 6’, which Gebhardt defends: a substance that cannot be produced by another must be its own cause, as Prop. 6 teaches (G II 348). The translation keeps it.
Adde, quod partes (per prop. 2.) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent, et totum (per defin. 4. et prop. 10.) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse, nemo dubitare poterit. Si autem secundum ponatur, quod scilicet partes naturam substantiae non retinebunt; ergo, cum tota substantia in aequales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiae amitteret et esse desineret, quod (per prop. 7.) est absurdum.
Add that the parts (by Prop. 2) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. 4 and Prop. 10) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which no one will be able to doubt is absurd. But if the second is asserted, namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance, then, when the whole substance had been divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and would cease to be, which (by Prop. 7) is absurd.

Propositio XIII

Proposition XIII

Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.
A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible.
Demonstratio. Si enim divisibilis esset, partes, in quas divideretur, vel naturam substantiae absolute infinitae retinebunt, vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiae eiusdem naturae, quod (per prop. 5.) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (ut supra) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (per prop. 11.) est etiam absurdum.
Demonstration. For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided either will retain the nature of an absolutely infinite substance or will not. If the first, there will be several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. 5) is absurd. If the second is asserted, then (as above) a substance absolutely infinite could cease to be, which (by Prop. 11) is also absurd.
Corollarium. Ex his sequitur, nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.
Corollary. From these it follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance,1 is divisible.
  1. 1 quatenus, ‘insofar as’, one of the most important words in the Ethics: the same thing considered in different respects has different properties. Matter considered as substance is indivisible; considered as affected in various ways, it has parts (Prop. 15, Scholium).

Cited in 1P15S

Scholium. Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc solo intelligitur, quod natura substantiae non potest concipi nisi infinita et quod per partem substantiae nihil aliud intelligi potest, quam substantia finita, quod (per prop. 8.) manifestam contradictionem implicat.
Scholium. That substance is indivisible is understood more simply from this alone, that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of a substance nothing can be understood except a finite substance, which (by Prop. 8) implies a manifest contradiction.

Propositio XIV

Proposition XIV

[G II 56] Praeter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.
Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.1
  1. 1 dari, literally ‘be given’, Spinoza’s usual verb for being or existing; it is rendered idiomatically throughout (see the glossary).

Cited in 1P15D, 1P15S, 1P18D

Demonstratio. Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum, de quo nullum attributum, quod essentiam substantiae exprimit, negari potest (per defin. 6.), isque necessario existat (per prop. 11.), si aliqua substantia praeter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei, sicque duae substantiae eiusdem attributi existerent, quod (per prop. 5.) est absurdum; adeoque nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest et consequenter non etiam concipi.
Demonstration. Since God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute which expresses an essence of substance can be denied1 (by Def. 6), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. 11), if there were any substance except God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. 5) is absurd; and so no substance outside God can be, and consequently none can be conceived either.
  1. 1 This reading of Def. 6 and its Explanation, on which God has every attribute there is, is what forces the conclusion: any other substance would have to share an attribute with God.
Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi, ut existens; atqui hoc (per primam partem huius demonst.) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest substantia. Q. E. D.
For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore, outside God no substance can be or be conceived. Q.E.D.
Corollarium I. Hinc clarissime sequitur 1. Deum esse unicum, hoc est (per defin. 6.) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari, eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in scholio prop. 10. iam innuimus.
Corollary I. From this it follows most clearly, 1. that God is unique, that is (by Def. 6), that in the nature of things there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated in the Scholium to Prop. 10.
Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. rem extensam et rem cogitantem, vel Dei attributa esse, vel (per axiom. 1.) affectiones attributorum Dei.
Corollary II. It follows, 2. that the extended thing and the thinking thing1 are either attributes of God, or (by Ax. 1) affections of the attributes of God.
  1. 1 rem extensam et rem cogitantem, Descartes’ two kinds of created substance, body and mind. Spinoza demotes both: they are either attributes or affections of God. That thought and extension are attributes is shown in Part II, Props. 1–2.

Propositio XV

Proposition XV

Quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.
Whatever is, is in God,1 and nothing can be or be conceived without God.
  1. 1 In the sense of Defs. 3 and 5, ‘being in’ is inherence: finite things are modes of God. Pierre Bayle (Dictionnaire historique et critique, article ‘Spinoza’, remark N) objected that God would then be the subject of every change and of contrary predicates: when the Germans kill ten thousand Turks, one would have to say that ‘God modified into Germans has killed God modified into ten thousand Turks’. E. Curley proposed that modes depend on substance as effects on a cause rather than inhering in it as properties in a subject: ‘the relation of mode to substance is a relation of causal dependence which is unlike the relation of predicate to subject’ (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 1969, p. 40). Y. Melamed defends the traditional reading, that modes ‘both inhere in and are predicated of the substance’, and argues that Bayle’s critique rests on misunderstandings (Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought, 2013, ch. 1).
Demonstratio. Praeter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (per prop. 14.), hoc est (per defin. 3.) res, quae in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (per defin. 5.) sine substantia nec esse, nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse et per ipsam solam concipi possunt. Atqui praeter substantias et modos nil datur (per axiom. 1.). Ergo nihil sine Deo esse, neque concipi potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Except God there is no substance, nor can any be conceived (by Prop. 14), that is (by Def. 3), a thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. 5) can neither be nor be conceived without substance; so they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But except substances and modes there is nothing (by Ax. 1). Therefore nothing can be or be conceived without God. Q.E.D.
[G II 57] Scholium. Sunt qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt. Sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex iam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto. Nam omnes, qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum, negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo, quod per corpus intelligimus quamcumque quantitatem, longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest.
Scholium. There are those who feign a God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and subject to passions.1 But how far they wander from the true knowledge of God is sufficiently established by what has already been demonstrated. But these I dismiss. For all who have in any way contemplated the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. They also prove this very well from the fact that by body we understand any quantity, with length, breadth and depth, bounded by some certain figure; and nothing more absurd than this can be said of God, a being, that is, absolutely infinite.
  1. 1 Spinoza names no one. The literal reading of the Bible’s corporeal language about God is the target of the opening chapters of Maimonides’ מוֹרֵה נְבוּכִים (Guide of the Perplexed), which begin with צֶלֶם (‘image’) and דְּמוּת (‘likeness’) in נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ (‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’, Gen. 1:26): כבר חשבו בני אדם כי ׳צלם׳ בלשון העברי יורה על תמונת הדבר ותארו; והביא זה אל הגשמה גמורה (‘People have thought that “image” in the Hebrew language denotes the shape and outline of a thing, and this led them to a complete corporealization [of God]’; Guide I.1, Ibn Tibbon).
Attamen interim aliis rationibus, quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt, se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere, atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant; quod clare ostendit, illos id quod ipsimet dicunt, non intelligere. Ego saltem satis clare, meo quidem iudicio, demonstravi (vide coroll. prop. 6. et schol. 2. prop. 8.) nullam substantiam ab alio posse produci vel creari.
But meanwhile, by other arguments by which they try to demonstrate this same point, they clearly show that they entirely remove corporeal, or extended, substance itself from the divine nature, and they maintain that it is created by God. But by what divine power it could have been created they are utterly ignorant; which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves say. I, at least, have demonstrated clearly enough, in my judgment at any rate, that no substance can be produced or created by anything else (see Cor. Prop. 6 and Schol. 2 Prop. 8).
Porro prop. 14. ostendimus, praeter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam. Atque hinca conclusimus, substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Verum, ad pleniorem explicationem adversariorum argumenta refutabo, quae omnia huc redeunt.
Further, we have shown in Prop. 14 that except God no substance can be or be conceived. And from this we have concluded that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.2 But for a fuller explanation I shall refute my adversaries’ arguments, which all come down to these.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘in de tweede Toegift van de zelfde Voorstelling in dit deel’ (‘in the second Corollary of the same proposition in this Part’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 57; Textgestaltung II 349). The reference is to Prop. 14, Cor. 2.
  1. 2 ‘Extended substance’ is here identified with an attribute; compare the identification of substances with their attributes in Prop. 4, Dem..
Primo, quod substantia corporea, quatenus substantia, constat, ut putant, partibus; et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse, et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant, ex quibus unum, aut alterum afferam.
First, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, consists, as they think, of parts; and therefore they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. And they explain this by many examples, of which I shall bring forward one or two.
Si substantia corporea, aiunt, est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquaeque pars, vel finita, vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum. Si hoc,b datur ergo infinitum duplo maius alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum.
If corporeal substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then there is an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is also absurd.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘te weten dat yder deel onëindig is’ (‘namely, that each part is infinite’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 57; Textgestaltung II 350). The Dutch has ‘But if one says the second’ for Si hoc.
Porro, si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes aequantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit, ut et si partibus mensuretur digitos aequantibus; ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies maior alio infinito.c
Further, if an infinite quantity is measured by parts each equal to a foot, it will have to consist of infinitely many such parts, as it will also if it is measured by parts each equal to an inch;3 and therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite number.
  1. c The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘’t welk niet minder ongerijmt is’ (‘which is no less absurd’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 57; Textgestaltung II 350).
  1. 3 digitos, literally ‘fingers’ (finger-breadths). Spinoza’s ‘twelve times’ shows that he means the inch, a twelfth of a foot.
Denique, si ex uno puncto infinitae cuiusdam quantitatis concipiatur, duas lineas, ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi; certum est, distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore.
Finally, if from one point of some infinite quantity two lines, such as AB and AC, are conceived to be extended to infinity, at a certain and determinate distance from one another at the beginning, it is certain that the distance between B and C is continually increased, and at length, from being determinate, will become indeterminable.4
  1. 4 Arguments of this shape against an actually infinite magnitude go back to Aristotle, who argued from lines diverging from a centre that an infinite body could not rotate (De caelo I.5).
[G II 58] Cum igitur haec absurda sequantur, ut putant, ex eo, quod quantitas infinita supponitur: inde concludunt, substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam, et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione. Deus enim, inquiunt, cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest; atqui substantia corporea, quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest; sequitur ergo, ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere.
Since, therefore, these absurdities follow, as they think, from the supposition of an infinite quantity, they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently does not pertain to God’s essence. The second argument is also drawn from God’s supreme perfection. For God, they say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be acted on;1 but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can be acted on; it follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God’s essence.
  1. 1 pati, ‘to be acted on’, ‘to undergo’, the root of passio. The traditional doctrine of divine impassibility held that God, being perfect, cannot be affected by anything.
Haec sunt, quae apud scriptores invenio argumenta, quibus ostendere conantur, substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse, nec ad eandem posse pertinere. Verumenimvero si quis recte attendat, me ad haec iam respondisse comperiet; quandoquidem haec argumenta in eo tantum fundantur, quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi supponunt, quod iam (prop. 12. cum coroll. prop. 13.) absurdum esse ostendi.
These are the arguments I find in the writers by which they try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature and cannot pertain to it. But in truth, if someone attends rightly, he will find that I have already replied to these, since these arguments are founded only on their supposing that corporeal substance is composed of parts, which I have already shown to be absurd (Prop. 12 with Cor. Prop. 13).
Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit, omnia illa absurda (siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo iam non disputo), ex quibus concludere volunt, substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi, quod quantitas infinita supponatur, sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflaria supponunt; quare ex absurdis, quae inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt, quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est, quod nos supra (prop. 12. etc.) iam demonstravimus. Quare telum, quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera coniiciunt.
Next, if someone wishes to consider the matter rightly, he will see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, which I am not now disputing), from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the supposition of an infinite quantity, but from their supposing that infinite quantity is measurable and composed of finite parts; so from the absurdities which follow from this they can conclude nothing but that infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be composed of finite parts. And this is the same thing we have already demonstrated above (Prop. 12 etc.). So the weapon they aim at us, they in fact turn against themselves.
  1. a ex partibus finitis conflari] transcr. ex partibus finits conflari. The transcription reads ‘finits’; Gebhardt (G II 58) reads ‘finitis’.
Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt, substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt, quam si quis ex eo, quod finxit, circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit, circulum non habere centrum, ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam ductae lineae sunt aequales. Nam substantiam corpoream, quae non nisi infinita, non nisi unica et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (vid. prop. 8. 5. et 12.), eam ipsi ad concludendum, eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflarib et multiplicem esse et divisibilem, concipiunt.
If, therefore, from this absurdity of theirs they nevertheless wish to conclude that extended substance must be finite, they are really doing nothing other than if someone, from having feigned that a circle has the properties of a square, concluded that a circle does not have a centre from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which can be conceived only as infinite, only as unique, and only as indivisible (see Props. 8, 5 and 12), they conceive, in order to conclude that it is finite, as composed of finite parts, and as multiple and divisible.
  1. b ex partibus finitis conflari] transcr. ex partibus finits conflari. The transcription reads ‘finits’; Gebhardt (G II 58) reads ‘finitis’.
Sic etiam alii, postquam fingunt, lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta, quibus ostendant, lineam non posse in infinitum dividi. Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere, quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur, quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineae denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes, qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent, et imprimis ii, qui negant, dari vacuum.
So also others, after they have feigned that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments by which they may show that a line cannot be divided to infinity. And indeed it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of bodies, or parts, than that a body is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines, finally, of points. And all who know clear reason to be infallible must admit this, and especially those who deny that there is a vacuum.2
  1. 2 Above all Descartes, for whom extension is the essence of matter, so that empty space is a contradiction (Principles II.16–18, AT VIII-1 49–50). Spinoza turns the Cartesian denial of the vacuum against the real divisibility of matter. He had himself expounded the Cartesian argument in his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (Part II, Prop. 3).
Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi, ut eius partes realiter distinctae essent, cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari manentibus reliquis, ut ante, inter se connexis? et cur omnes ita aptari debent, ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum, quae realiter ab invicem distinctae sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest. Cum igitur vacuum in natura non detur (de quo alias), sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent, ne detur vacuum, sequitur hinc etiam, easdem non posse realiter distingui, hoc est, substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi.
For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before? And why must they all fit together so that there is no vacuum? Surely, of things that are really distinct from one another, one can be without the other and remain in its own state. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature (of which elsewhere), but all the parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows from this also that they cannot be really distinguished, that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be divided.
Si quis tamen iam quaerat, cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? ei respondeo, quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet sive superficialiter, prout nempe ipsamc imaginamur, vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectud fit. Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus, prout in imaginatione est, quod saepe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis et ex partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam, prout in intellectu est, attendimus et eam, quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum, ut iam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica et indivisibilis reperietur.
But if someone should now ask why we are by nature so inclined to divide quantity, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: abstractly, or superficially, namely, as we imagine it,3 or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is substance, which happens with great difficulty, then, as we have already sufficiently demonstrated, it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible.
  1. c The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘gemenelijk’ (‘commonly’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 59; Textgestaltung II 350). That is, ‘as we commonly imagine it’.
  2. d The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘zonder behulp van d’ inbeelding’ (‘without the help of the imagination’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 59; Textgestaltung II 350).
  1. 3 The first appearance of the distinction between imagination and intellect that organizes Spinoza’s theory of knowledge (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2). The same distinction, applied to quantity, is the subject of Letter 12, to Lodewijk Meyer, ‘on the nature of the infinite’.
Quod omnibus, qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit; praecipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur, quod materia ubique eadem est, nec partes in eadem distinguuntur, nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde eius partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Ex. gr. aquam, quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus eiusque partes ab invicem separari; at non, quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur. Porro aqua, quatenus aqua, generatur et corrumpitur; at, quatenus substantia, nec generatur, nec corrumpitur.
This will be sufficiently manifest to all who have known how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect, especially if attention is also paid to this, that matter is everywhere the same, and parts are not distinguished in it except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really.4 For example, we conceive that water, insofar as it is water, is divided, and that its parts are separated from one another; but not insofar as it is corporeal substance; for in that respect it is neither separated nor divided. Further, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted; but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.
  1. 4 Descartes distinguished real distinction (between substances), modal distinction (between a mode and its substance, or between modes of one substance) and distinction of reason (Principles I.60–62, AT VIII-1 28–30). On Spinoza’s view the parts of matter are modes of one substance.
Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto; quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur, quod materia, quatenus substantia, divisibilis sit et ex partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio, cur divina natura indigna esset, quandoquidem (per prop. 14.) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest, a qua ipsa pateretur.
And with this I think I have also replied to the second argument, since it too is founded on this, that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if this were not so, I do not know why it would be unworthy of the divine nature, since (by Prop. 14) there can be no substance outside God by which it would be acted on.
Omnia, inquam, in Deo sunt et omnia, quae fiunt, per solas leges infinitae Dei naturae fiunt et ex necessitate eius essentiae (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur. Quare nulla ratione dici potest, Deum ab alio pati, aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse; tametsi divisibilis supponatur, dummodo aeterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impraesentiarum satis.
All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen happen only through the laws of God’s infinite nature, and follow (as I shall soon show)5 from the necessity of his essence. So it cannot be said in any way that God is acted on by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, so long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But enough of these matters for the present.
  1. 5 In Prop. 16 and the propositions that follow it.

Cited in 2L1D

From the Nature of God to What Follows from It

With Prop. 15 and its long scholium the first half of Part I is complete, and the argument turns. So far Spinoza has asked what God is; from Prop. 16 on he asks what follows from God’s nature, and his answer, that everything follows from it necessarily and nothing could have been otherwise, is the most disputed doctrine of the Part. Since that answer draws at every step on results the first half reached one at a time, it is worth having them in view together, and worth knowing in advance where the second half is going and where its readers have found it hardest to follow.

What the first half has established

The results of the first fifteen propositions can be gathered in a few sentences. There is one substance, God, which exists necessarily, is infinite and indivisible, and has infinitely many attributes, among them extension and thought. There is nothing outside this substance, and everything that is not substance is a mode, something that is in God and cannot be or be conceived without God. Descartes’ world of created minds and bodies has been reinterpreted: what Descartes called substances are, for Spinoza, either attributes of God or affections of those attributes (Prop. 14, Cor. 2). The scholium to Prop. 15 has defended the claim that extension, as well as thought, belongs to God, by distinguishing quantity as it is in the imagination, finite and divisible, from quantity as it is in the intellect, infinite, unique and indivisible.

So far, however, Spinoza has said almost nothing about how modes are related to God beyond the bare fact of their dependence. We know that they are in God and are conceived through him; we do not yet know in what way they come from him, whether they could have been different, or how the finite things of ordinary experience, which come into being and pass away, are related to an eternal and infinite substance. These are the questions of the second half.

The model of geometrical consequence

Its governing thought is announced in the last sentences of the scholium to Prop. 15: “all things that happen happen only through the laws of God’s infinite nature, and follow ... from the necessity of his essence.” Prop. 16 states it formally: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).” Its demonstration is three sentences long. It begins from a principle about definitions: from the definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties which really follow from it, and the more reality the definition expresses, the more properties it infers. It then applies the principle to God, whose nature has absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6): from such a nature infinitely many things must follow.

The model is mathematical, and Spinoza makes it explicit in the scholium to Prop. 17. Some think, he says, that God is a free cause because he can bring it about that the things which follow from his nature should not come about. “But this is the same as if they were to say that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.” The comparison is the key to the whole second half. A triangle does not choose to have its properties, and the properties do not come into being at some moment after the triangle; they belong to it necessarily and eternally, as consequences of what it is. In the same way, all things “have necessarily flowed, or always follow with the same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles.” God’s causality is not the act of a will that might have chosen otherwise. It is the necessity of a nature unfolding its consequences.

The comparison has a limit that Spinoza himself points out. The properties of a triangle follow from it as from a formal cause; God is called the efficient cause of all things (Prop. 16, Cor. 1), the term that philosophy reserved for the cause that brings something about. Spinoza does not keep the two kinds of cause apart, and the refusal is deliberate. For him to bring something about is to be that from which it follows, and the order of real causes is the same as the order of logical consequence; the demonstration of Prop. 16 passes from “the intellect infers” to “there must follow” without pause. Readers who find this identification of causation with logical consequence implausible have found the deepest assumption of the Part, and many of the second half’s most surprising theses follow from it.

Freedom without choice

The second half keeps the word “free” and changes its sense. According to Def. 7, a thing is free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. God acts “from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one” (Prop. 17), and so “God alone is a free cause” (Prop. 17, Cor. 2). Freedom, so understood, is not a power of choosing between alternatives. It is the absence of external determination, and it is entirely compatible with necessity; indeed it is a kind of necessity, the necessity of acting from one’s own nature.

The scholium to Prop. 17 turns this definition against the theologians. They think that God would lose his omnipotence if he created everything that is in his intellect, since he would then have nothing left to create, and so they maintain that God understands infinitely many things that he could create but does not, and “creates nothing except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will.” Spinoza replies that this denies God’s omnipotence rather than defending it: “they are compelled to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create,” and so “they are reduced to having to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends.” On his own view, “God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity.” Nothing is held in reserve. Everything God can do, he does, and the distinction between what God can do and what he does disappears.

The same scholium adds a second argument, against attributing intellect and will to God at all. If intellect and will pertained to God’s essence, they would have to be the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence, and a cause of both essence and existence must differ from its effect in both. God’s intellect would therefore differ from ours entirely, “and could agree with them in nothing except the name; no more, that is, than the Dog, a heavenly constellation, and the dog, a barking animal, agree with one another” (Prop. 17, Schol.). Props. 31–32 later draw the formal conclusion. Actual intellect, finite or infinite, and will, desire and love belong to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans (Prop. 31); the will is not a free cause but a necessary one (Prop. 32); and so “God does not operate from freedom of the will” (Prop. 32, Cor. 1). Will and intellect are related to God’s nature as motion and rest are, as things that follow from it, not as its principle (Prop. 32, Cor. 2).

The voluntarist position Spinoza opposes had its most radical defender in Descartes. In letters to Mersenne of 1630 Descartes had maintained that the mathematical truths “which you call eternal” were “established by God and depend on him entirely, as do all the rest of the creatures” (AT I 145), and that God “was as free to make it not true that all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal as not to create the world” (AT I 152). The second scholium to Prop. 33 takes up the view that everything depends on God’s indifferent will and argues, granting it for the sake of argument, that even on its own terms things could not have been otherwise. All God’s decrees were established from eternity; “since in eternity there is no when, before, or after,” God can never decree anything else, and never could have. Elsewhere in the same scholium Spinoza adds a striking judgment: the view that subjects all things to an indifferent divine will is nearer the truth than the view that God does everything for the sake of the good, since those who hold the latter “seem to posit something outside God which does not depend on God, to which God attends as to a model in operating” (Prop. 33, Schol. 2), and that is “to subject God to fate.” Both views are false; but the first at least does not make God depend on something other than himself.

The immanent cause

Prop. 18 states that “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.” A transitive cause produces an effect outside itself, as a builder produces a house; an immanent cause produces an effect that remains in it. The demonstration is brief: all things are in God and conceived through him, and God is their cause; and there is nothing outside God. So God’s effects are in him. The distinction belonged to the school logic of the period. In the Short Treatise Spinoza had classified God’s causality under eight headings, a scheme H. A. Wolfson traced to the Leiden logician Franco Burgersdijk (The Philosophy of Spinoza I 304), and in the first dialogue of the same work the model of an immanent cause is the intellect, which is the cause of its ideas and does not produce them outside itself (KV I, first dialogue; G I 30). The model is apt. Ideas do not leave the mind that has them, and they are not separate things standing over against it; they are the mind’s own activity. So too the modes are not things God makes and then releases, but ways in which God’s own being is determined.

The proposition is easily read as a restatement of Prop. 15, and in a sense it is. Its importance lies in what it excludes. A transitive creator stands outside his creation and could have refrained from it; an immanent cause cannot be separated from its effects, since they are its own states. This is the point at which Spinoza’s God differs most sharply from the God of the creation narratives, and also the point at which the question of how modes are in God, whether as properties in a subject or as effects in a cause, becomes most pressing. The Introduction to this Part describes the two main answers.

Infinite modes

Props. 21–23 introduce a class of modes that has puzzled readers ever since. “All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have had to exist always and as infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite” (Prop. 21). Whatever follows from an attribute modified by such an infinite mode is likewise infinite and necessary (Prop. 22), and every infinite and necessary mode follows either directly from an attribute or through another infinite mode (Prop. 23). Between God and the finite things of experience there is thus a layer of modes that are neither substance nor finite: the immediate infinite modes, which follow directly from the attributes, and the mediate ones, which follow from the attributes through the immediate ones.

The Ethics gives no examples. When a correspondent, G. H. Schuller, asked for some, Spinoza replied that in thought the immediate infinite mode is “absolutely infinite intellect,” and in extension “motion and rest,” and that the mediate infinite mode of extension is “the face of the whole universe” (facies totius universi), “which, although it varies in infinite ways, nevertheless remains always the same” (Letter 64; VVL³ III 206). He referred Schuller for the last to the scholium to Lemma 7 in Part II, where the whole of nature is described as one individual whose parts vary in infinitely many ways without any change of the whole individual. No example of a mediate infinite mode of thought is given anywhere.

What these entities are has been much discussed. On one influential reading, proposed by Edwin Curley, the infinite modes are best understood as the laws of nature, or as the general facts that the laws describe. The thesis of Prop. 23, that every infinite mode of extension follows either directly from the attribute or through other infinite modes, then “amounts to the thesis that every scientific law relating to extended objects can be derived either directly from the fundamental laws governing extended objects or from a finite series of nomological propositions which terminates ultimately in the fundamental laws” (Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 59). The reading fits Spinoza’s example of motion and rest, which the physical digression of Part II makes the principle by which bodies are distinguished and individuated. But it is not the only one. Spinoza’s own description of the face of the whole universe as a single individual, whose parts vary while it remains the same, has led other readers to take the infinite modes as infinite individuals, the totality of bodies or of ideas, rather than as laws. The notes return to the question at Prop. 21.

Finite things and the infinite series

The finite things of ordinary experience are taken up next. Their essence does not involve existence (Prop. 24), so they cannot be the cause of themselves. God is the cause of their essence as well as of their existence (Prop. 25), and “particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” (Prop. 25, Cor.). A thing that has been determined to act has been so determined by God, and cannot make itself undetermined (Props. 26–27). Then comes Prop. 28, the longest enunciation in the Part: every singular thing, or thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, “can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence,” and that cause by another, “and so on to infinity.”

Prop. 28 raises one of the hardest problems in the Ethics. If finite things are determined by other finite things, to infinity, how do they come from God? An infinite cause cannot produce them directly, since what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute is itself infinite (Prop. 21); and if each is produced by another finite thing, the series never reaches God. Leibniz put the difficulty sharply in his notes on a book by Johann Georg Wachter which presented Spinoza as a follower of the ancient philosophy of the Hebrews: Spinoza holds that finite and temporal things are not produced immediately by an infinite cause, but by other singular and finite things. “But how then do they finally arise from God? For they do not arise from him mediately in this way either, since one would never arrive at things which are not likewise produced by another finite thing” (Animadversiones in Wachterum, ed. Foucher de Careil, 70). Curley quotes the passage and states the problem as a double requirement: Spinoza seems to need “both an infinite series of finite causes and a finite series of infinite causes terminating in God” (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 64).

Spinoza’s own answer is given in the demonstration and scholium of Prop. 28. A finite thing is determined by God, not insofar as God is infinite, but insofar as God is modified by a finite modification; God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things that follow immediately from his absolute nature, and cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, since “by a remote cause we understand one which is in no way conjoined with its effect,” and “all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither be nor be conceived” (Prop. 28, Schol.). On the reading of the infinite modes as laws, the answer can be put in modern terms: each finite thing follows from the laws of nature together with prior finite things, and neither the laws alone nor the prior things alone are sufficient. Whether that is what Spinoza meant, and whether it leaves the finite world as strictly necessary as Prop. 29 and Prop. 33 declare it to be, are questions the reader will meet again.

Necessity

“In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way” (Prop. 29). “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced” (Prop. 33). These propositions are the core of Spinoza’s necessitarianism. The demonstration of Prop. 33 is short: all things have followed necessarily from God’s nature, so if they could have been of another nature or determined to act in another way, God’s nature too could have been other than it is, and that other nature would also exist, so that there would be two Gods, which is absurd.

The first scholium to Prop. 33 explains what remains of the ordinary vocabulary of modality. A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause, and impossible either because its essence involves a contradiction or because there is no external cause determined to produce it. “But a thing is called contingent for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge” (Prop. 33, Schol. 1). We call a thing contingent or possible when we do not know that its essence involves a contradiction, and yet cannot affirm anything certain about its existence “because the order of causes is hidden from us.” Contingency is an artefact of ignorance, not a feature of things. Part IV will reintroduce the words “contingent” and “possible,” explicitly defined in these terms, because a mind that does not know the whole order of causes must still think and act in a world it cannot fully foresee.

Readers have divided over how strictly to take these claims. On the strongest reading, nothing whatever could have been otherwise: not the laws of nature, not the existence of any particular thing, not the order of events. Others have thought that Spinoza needs, or at least leaves room for, a weaker position, in which the infinite modes follow necessarily from God’s nature but the particular finite things depend in part on the infinite series of other finite things, so that their existence is necessary only given that series. Jonathan Bennett, who discusses the question at length, finds Spinoza pulled both ways. His explanatory rationalism commits him to denying that there are any contingent truths, and the second scholium to Prop. 33 seems to defend the absolute necessity of all truths; yet much of what he says, on Bennett’s reading including the demonstration of Prop. 33 itself, asserts no more than that the laws of nature could not have been different and that every event is determined by prior events. Bennett concludes that, forced to choose, he would say that Spinoza held this to be the only possible world, “though it is not really right,” since Spinoza “did not think his situation through” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, § 29, pp. 119–124). The second scholium to Prop. 33 is the strongest evidence for the strong reading, and Prop. 28 the strongest for the weaker one. Appendix D sets out the arguments on both sides.

Nature naturing and nature natured

The scholium to Prop. 29 introduces a pair of terms from the scholastic tradition, Natura naturans and Natura naturata, “Nature naturing” and “Nature natured.” By the first Spinoza understands “what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is ... God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause”; by the second, “everything that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or of each of God’s attributes, that is, all the modes of God’s attributes, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God.” The distinction is not between two things. It is between God considered as the active source of everything and the totality of what follows from him, the same reality viewed as producing and as produced. The terms show how far Spinoza is willing to use the language of theology for a doctrine that is not theological in the ordinary sense, and they explain how he can say, in Part IV, “God, or nature,” without meaning by “nature” only the world of bodies.

God’s power

The Part closes with three short propositions. “God’s power is his very essence” (Prop. 34): God’s power is not a faculty that might be exercised or not, but the activity by which he exists and acts, and it is identical with what he is. “Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power necessarily is” (Prop. 35): there is no gap between the possible and the actual in God. “Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (Prop. 36): since every thing expresses God’s power in a certain and determinate way, every thing is active, and produces effects. This last proposition is easily overlooked, but Part III depends on it. There the striving of each thing to persevere in its being is derived from the doctrine that each thing expresses God’s power in a certain and determinate way (Part III, Prop. 6), and Prop. 36 is cited in the demonstration that this striving is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself (Part III, Prop. 7). The Appendix then turns from demonstration to diagnosis, asking why human beings resist these conclusions, and finding the answer in the prejudice that nature, and God, act for ends.

Two cautions

Two cautions may help the reader. First, Spinoza’s claims about necessity are strong, and he means them: he denies not only that anything happens by chance but that anything could have happened otherwise. Second, his language of God’s “freedom,” “power” and “causality” is continuous with the theology he rejects, and the words are defined anew as he goes. The free cause is the one that acts from the necessity of its own nature (Def. 7); God’s power is identical with his essence; and to say that God is the cause of all things is to say that they follow from his nature, not that he made them by a decree.

The text resumes with Prop. 16. Its demonstration, three sentences long, joins a principle about definitions (the more reality the definition of a thing expresses, the more properties the intellect infers from it) to the definition of God as a being of absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6). Much of what follows rests on it: Prop. 16 or one of its corollaries is cited in the demonstrations of Props. 17, 18, 26, 29, 33, 34 and 36, and twice in the Appendix.

Propositio XVI

Proposition XVI

[G II 60] Ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes1 (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).
  1. 1 infinita infinitis modis. As with the ‘infinite attributes’ of Def. 6, ‘infinite’ can mean ‘infinitely many’. Spinoza’s own gloss in the parenthesis, ‘everything that can fall under an infinite intellect’, is one of the passages from which J. Bennett concludes that Spinoza ‘often takes infinity to imply totality’ (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, §19, p. 75). Modis may also be taken non-technically: ‘in infinitely many ways’.

Cited in 1P17D, 1P17S, 1P25S, 1P26D, 1P29D, 1P33D, 1P34D, 1P36D, 1App, 2Pref, 2P3D, 2P3S, 2P44C2D, 2P45S, 4Pref, 4P4D, 5P22D

Cited in Letters 82

Demonstratio. Haec propositio unicuique manifesta esse debet, si modo ad hoc attendat, quod ex data cuiuscumque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quae revera ex eadem (hoc est, ipsa rei essentia) necessario sequuntur et eo plures, quo plus realitatis rei definitio exprimit, hoc est, quo plus realitatis rei definitae essentia involvit.
Demonstration. This proposition must be plain to everyone, provided he attends to this: that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties which really do follow necessarily from it (that is, from the very essence of the thing), and the more properties, the more reality the definition of the thing expresses, that is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined involves.
Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat (per defin. 6.), quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex eiusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent. Q. E. D.
But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. 6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity, therefore, there must necessarily follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect). Q.E.D.
Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur, Deum omnium rerum, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.
Corollary I. From this it follows that God is the efficient cause1 of all things that can fall under an infinite intellect.
  1. 1 causam efficientem: the cause that produces an effect, as distinct from the material, formal and final causes of the Aristotelian scheme. The Appendix to this Part rejects final causes outright.

Cited in 1P17S, 1P18D, 1P34D

[G II 61] Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.
Corollary II. It follows, 2. that God is a cause through himself, and not by accident.1
  1. 1 per se, non vero per accidens. A cause per se produces its effect by its own nature; a cause per accidens is called a cause only because of something incidentally joined to it. Aristotle’s example: Polyclitus is the cause of a statue only because the sculptor happens to be Polyclitus (Physics II.3, 195a–b).
Corollarium III. Sequitur 3. Deum esse absolute causam primam.
Corollary III. It follows, 3. that God is absolutely the first cause.

Propositio XVII

Proposition XVII

Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus agit.
God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.

Cited in 1P17C2

Demonstratio. Ex sola divinae naturae necessitate, vel (quod idem est) ex solis eiusdem naturae legibus, infinita absolute sequi, modo prop. 16.a ostendimus; et prop. 15. demonstravimus, nihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse, sed omnia in Deo esse. Quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest, a quo ad agendum determinetur vel cogatur; atque adeo Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus agit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We have just shown in Prop. 16 that from the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (what is the same) from the laws of that nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow; and we have demonstrated in Prop. 15 that nothing can be or be conceived without God, but that all things are in God. So there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act; and therefore God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one. Q.E.D.
  1. a modo prop. 16.] transcr. modoprop. 16. Word division restored (Gebhardt, G II 61: ‘modò Prop. 16.’).
Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur 1. nullam dari causam, quae Deum extrinsece vel intrinsece praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem incitet ad agendum.a
Corollary I. From this it follows, 1. that there is no cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, except the perfection of his own nature, which moves God to act.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘maar dat hy uit kracht van zijn volmaaktheit alleen een werkende oorzaak is’ (‘but that he is an efficient cause by the force of his perfection alone’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 61; Textgestaltung II 350). The Dutch version lacks praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem and has this clause instead; the margin glosses werkende oorzaak as Causa efficiens.
Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit (per prop. 11. et coroll. 1. prop. 14.), et ex sola suae naturae necessitate agit (per prop. praeced.). Adeoque (per defin. 7.) solus est causa libera. Q. E. D.
Corollary II. It follows, 2. that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his nature alone (by Prop. 11 and Cor. 1 of Prop. 14), and acts from the necessity of his nature alone (by the preceding Prop.). And so (by Def. 7) he alone is a free cause. Q.E.D.

Cited in 1P29S, 2P48D

Scholium. Alii putant, Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut putant, efficere, ut ea, quae ex eius natura sequi diximus, hoc est, quae in eius potestate sunt, non fiant, sive ut ab ipso non producantur. Sed hoc idem est, ac si dicerent, quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, eius tres angulos aequales esse duobus rectis; sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est absurdum.
Scholium. Others think that God is a free cause because he can, as they think, bring it about that the things we have said follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power,1 should not come about, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they were to say that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles,2 or that from a given cause the effect should not follow, which is absurd.
  1. 1 quae in eius potestate sunt. Spinoza has two words for power: potentia, the power by which God and all things are and act, which Prop. 34 identifies with God’s essence, and potestas, what is ‘in’ someone’s power, at his disposal (Prop. 35). Both are rendered ‘power’ in this Part; a note marks potestas.
  2. 2 Descartes uses the same example: existence can no more be separated from God’s essence than the equality of its three angles to two right angles from the essence of a triangle (Meditations V, AT VII 66).
Porro infra absque ope huius propositionis ostendam, ad Dei naturam neque intellectum, neque voluntatem pertinere. Scio equidem plures esse qui putant, se posse demonstrare, ad Dei naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere; nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese aiunt, quod Deo tribuere possunt, quam id quod in nobis summa est perfectio. Porro, tametsi Deum actu summe intelligentem concipiant, non tamen credunt, eum posse omnia, quae actu intelligit, efficere ut existant; nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant.
Further, I shall show below, without the help of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertains to the nature of God. I know, of course, that there are many who think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect and a free will pertain to God’s nature; for they say they know nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than what is the highest perfection in us. Further, although they conceive God to understand, actually, in the highest degree, they do not believe that he can bring it about that everything he actually understands should exist; for they think that in that way they would destroy God’s power.
Si omnia, inquiunt, quae in eius intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil tum amplius creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotentiae repugnare; ideoque maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere, nec aliud creantem praeter id quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit creare. Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto (vid. prop. 16.), a summa Dei potentia, sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis, hoc est, omnia necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo, ac ex natura trianguli ab aeterno et in aeternum sequitur, eius tres angulos aequari duobus rectis. Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab aeterno fuit et in aeternum in eadem actualitate manebit.
If, they say, he had created everything that is in his intellect, he would then have been unable to create anything more, which they believe to be inconsistent with God’s omnipotence; and so they have preferred to maintain that God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will. But I think I have shown clearly enough (see Prop. 16) that from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature, infinite things in infinite modes, that is, all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow with the same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity.
Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe, meo quidem iudicio, perfectior statuitur. Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri, Deum infinita creabilia intelligere, quae tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias, si scilicet omnia quae intelligit crearet, suam iuxta ipsos exhauriret omnipotentiam et se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant, ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quae eius potentia se extendit; quo absurdius aut Dei omnipotentiae magis repugnans non video, quid fingi possit.
And in this way God’s omnipotence is maintained, in my judgment at least, far more perfectly. Indeed, my adversaries seem (if I may speak openly) to deny God’s omnipotence. For they are compelled to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create. For otherwise, if, that is, he created everything he understands, he would, according to them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. So in order to maintain that God is perfect, they are reduced to having to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends; and I do not see what could be feigned that is more absurd than this, or more inconsistent with God’s omnipotence.
Porro (ut de intellectu et voluntate, quos Deo communiter tribuimus, hic etiam aliquid dicam) si ad aeternam Dei essentiam intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est, quam quod vulgo solent homines. Nam intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto coelo differre deberent, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis signum coeleste, et canis animal latrans. Quod sic demonstrabo.
Further (to say something here also about the intellect and will that we commonly attribute to God), if intellect and will pertain to the eternal essence of God, something different must surely be understood by each of these attributes from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and will that would constitute God’s essence would have to differ by all the breadth of heaven3 from our intellect and will, and could agree with them in nothing except the name; no more, that is, than the Dog, a heavenly constellation, and the dog, a barking animal,4 agree with one another. This I shall demonstrate as follows.
  1. 3 toto coelo, a proverbial phrase (‘by the whole sky’), here given a pointed echo by the constellation that follows.
  2. 4 The constellation of the Dog contains Sirius, the Dog-star. The thought, that intellect and will said of God and of us would share only the name, recalls Maimonides’ teaching that such attributes are said of God and of creatures homonymously: הותרו החכמה והיכולת והרצון והחיים עליו ית׳ ועל כל בעל חכמה ויכולת ורצון וחיים – בהשתתפות גמור, אשר אין דמיון ענין ביניהם כלל (‘wisdom, power, will and life are applied to Him, may He be exalted, and to every possessor of wisdom, power, will and life, by complete homonymy, with no likeness of meaning between them at all’; Guide I.56, Ibn Tibbon).
Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque placet), vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis, quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.); sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei intellectu existit obiective. Quare Dei intellectus, quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum tam earum essentiae, quam earum existentiae; quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse animadversum, qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt.
If intellect pertains to the divine nature, it will not be able, like our intellect, to be by nature posterior to (as most hold), or simultaneous with, the things understood, since God is prior in causality to all things (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 16); on the contrary, the truth and formal essence5 of things is what it is because it exists objectively in that way in God’s intellect. So God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is really the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence; which seems to have been noticed also by those who have asserted that God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same.6
  1. 5 formalis ... obiective. Scholastic and Cartesian terms: a thing exists ‘formally’ when it exists in its own right, and ‘objectively’ when it exists as the object of an idea, that is, as represented in an intellect. ‘Objectively’ thus has almost the reverse of its modern sense. Descartes uses the pair in Meditations III (AT VII 41). The terms recur in Prop. 30, Dem. and throughout Part II.
  2. 6 Spinoza names no one. That God’s attributes are not something added to his essence was common ground in medieval theology; Maimonides concludes from the homonymy of the attributes that אין ראוי שתאמין ענינים מוספים על העצם (‘one ought not to believe in notions superadded to the essence’; Guide I.56, Ibn Tibbon).
Cum itaque Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa, videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentiae, quam earum existentiae, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre tam ratione essentiae, quam ratione existentiae. Nam causatum differt a sua causa praecise in eo, quod a causa habet.a Ex. gr. homo est causa existentiae, non vero essentiae alterius hominis (est enim haec aeterna veritas); et ideo secundum essentiam prorsus convenire possunt, in existendo autem differre debent; et propterea, si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit; sed, si unius essentia destrui posset et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam alterius essentia.
Since, therefore, God’s intellect is the only cause of things, namely (as we have shown), both of their essence and of their existence, it must necessarily differ from them both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. For what is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from the cause. For example, a man is the cause of the existence, but not of the essence, of another man (for the latter is an eternal truth); and so they can agree entirely in essence, but must differ in existing; and for that reason, if the existence of one perishes, the existence of the other will not perish on that account; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would also be destroyed.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘daaröm het een gewrocht van zulk een oorzaak gezegt word’ (‘on account of which it is called the effect of such a cause’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 63; Textgestaltung II 351).
Quapropter res, quae et essentiae et existentiae alicuius effectus est causa, a tali effectu differre debet tam ratione essentiae, quam ratione existentiae. Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiae et existentiae nostri intellectus causa; ergo Dei intellectus, quatenus divinam essentiam constituere concipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentiae, quam ratione existentiae differt, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in nomine, cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.
So a thing that is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of some effect must differ from such an effect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect; therefore God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence, and can agree with it in nothing except the name, as we wished to show. The procedure is the same concerning the will, as anyone can easily see.

Cited in 1P33S2

Propositio XVIII

Proposition XVIII

[G II 63] Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.
God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause1 of all things.
  1. 1 causa immanens, non vero transiens. An immanent cause produces its effect within itself; a transitive (or transient) cause produces it outside itself. Spinoza had used the pair in the Short Treatise, whose first dialogue speaks of ‘de inblyvende oorzaak, de welke geenzins iets buyten zig zelve voortbrengt’ (‘the immanent cause, which produces nothing outside itself’; KV I, first dialogue, G I 30).
[G II 64] Demonstratio. Omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et per Deum concipi debent (per prop. 15.), adeoque (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.) Deus rerum, quae in ipso sunt, est causa; quod est primum.a Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia (per prop. 14.), hoc est (per defin. 3.) res, quae extra Deum in se sit; quod erat secundum. Deus ergo est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. All things that are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. 15), and so (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 16) God is the cause of the things that are in him; which is the first point. Next, outside God there can be no substance (by Prop. 14), that is (by Def. 3), a thing which is in itself outside God; which was the second point. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 20) omits the clause ‘adeoque (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.) Deus rerum, quae in ipso sunt, est causa’ in its text and supplies it in its list of errata, with the misprint Prop. 6. for Prop. 16. (the Dutch version has de zestiende); Schmidt and Bruder corrected the number. Gebhardt (G II 64; Textgestaltung II 351) prints per Coroll. 1. Prop. 16. hujus. The first point of the demonstration requires the clause.

Propositio XIX

Proposition XIX

Deus sive omnia Dei attributa sunt aeterna.
God, or all of God’s attributes, are eternal.1
  1. 1 The sive again marks an identification: God is nothing over and above his attributes (compare the note on Prop. 4, Dem.). The plural verb (sunt) follows the attributes.

Cited in 1P20D, 1P23D

Demonstratio. Deus enim (per defin. 6.) est substantia, quae (per prop. 11.) necessario existit, hoc est (per prop. 7.) ad cuius naturam pertinet existere, sive (quod idem est) ex cuius definitione sequitur ipsum existere, adeoque (per defin. 8.) est aeternus.
Demonstration. For God (by Def. 6) is a substance which (by Prop. 11) necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. 7), to whose nature it pertains to exist, or (what is the same) from whose definition it follows that he exists; and so (by Def. 8) he is eternal.
Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id quod (per defin. 4.) divinae substantiae essentiam exprimit, hoc est, id quod ad substantiam pertinet; id ipsum, inquam, ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiae (ut iam ex prop. 7. demonstravi) pertinet aeternitas; ergo unumquodque attributorum aeternitatem involvere debet, adeoque omnia sunt aeterna. Q. E. D.
Next, by God’s attributes must be understood that which (by Def. 4) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is, that which pertains to substance: that very thing, I say, the attributes themselves must involve. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance (as I have already demonstrated from Prop. 7); therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and so all are eternal. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec propositio quam clarissime etiam patet ex modo, quo (prop. 11.) Dei existentiam demonstravi. Ex ea, inquam, demonstratione constat, Dei existentiam, sicut eius essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem. Deinde (prop. 19. Principiorum Cartesii) alioa etiam modo Dei aeternitatem demonstravi, nec opus est eum hic repetere.
Scholium. This proposition is also evident, as clearly as possible, from the way in which I demonstrated God’s existence (Prop. 11). From that demonstration, I say, it is established that God’s existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further, I have also demonstrated God’s eternity in another way (Prop. 19 of the Principles of Descartes1), and there is no need to repeat it here.
  1. a Deinde (prop. 19. Principiorum Cartesii) alio] transcr. Deinde princip. philos. Cartesii P. 1. prop. 19. alio. The 1677 edition (OP p. 20), Gebhardt (G II 64) and Bartuschat read ‘(Prop. 19. Principiorum Cartesii)’; the transcription regularizes the citation.
  1. 1 Spinoza’s Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I et II, more geometrico demonstratae (1663), Part I, Prop. 19: ‘Deus est aeternus’ (G I 178).

Propositio XX

Proposition XX

Dei existentia eiusque essentia unum et idem sunt.
God’s existence and his essence are one and the same.

Cited in 1P20C2

Demonstratio. Deus (per anteced. prop.) eiusque omnia attributa sunt aeterna, hoc est (per defin. 8.) unumquodque eius attributorum existentiam exprimit. Eadem ergo Dei attributa, quae (per defin. 4.) Dei aeternam essentiam explicant, eius simul aeternam existentiam explicant, hoc est, illud ipsum, quod essentiam Dei constituit, constituit simul ipsius existentiam; adeoque haec et ipsius essentia unum et idem sunt. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. God (by the preceding Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def. 8), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which (by Def. 4) explain his eternal essence, at the same time explain his eternal existence, that is, that very thing which constitutes God’s essence constitutes at the same time his existence; and so his existence and his essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.
[G II 65] Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur 1. Dei existentiam, sicut eius essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem.
Corollary I. From this it follows, 1. that God’s existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.
Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. Deum, sive omnia Dei attributa esse immutabilia. Nam, si ratione existentiae mutarentur, deberent etiam (per prop. praeced.) ratione essentiae mutari, hoc est (ut per se notum) ex veris falsa fieri; quod est absurdum.
Corollary II. It follows, 2. that God, or all of God’s attributes, are immutable. For if they changed in respect of existence, they would also (by the preceding Prop.) have to change in respect of essence, that is (as is self-evident), from being true become false; which is absurd.

Cited in 1P21D, 5P17D

Propositio XXI

Proposition XXI

Omnia, quae ex absoluta natura alicuius attributi Dei sequuntur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt, sive per idem attributum aeterna et infinita sunt.
All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have had to exist always and as infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.1
  1. 1 The first of three propositions on the ‘infinite modes’. The Ethics gives no examples, but Letter 64 does: ‘in Cogitatione intellectus absolute infinitus, in Extensione autem motus et quies; secundi autem, facies totius Universi’ (‘in thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in extension, motion and rest; and of the second kind, the face of the whole universe’; VVL³ III 206). E. Curley proposed reading the infinite modes as the most general facts of nature: the immediate infinite mode of extension ‘will consist of that set of general facts which are described by the laws of motion’ (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 1969, p. 60).
Demonstratio. Concipe, si fieri potest (siquidem neges), aliquid in aliquo Dei attributo ex ipsius absoluta natura sequi, quod finitum sit et determinatam habeat existentiam sive durationem, ex. gr. ideam Dei in cogitatione. At cogitatio, quandoquidem Dei attributum supponitur, est necessario (per prop. 11.) sua natura infinita. Verum quatenus ipsa ideam Dei habet, finita supponitur.
Demonstration. Conceive, if it can be done (if indeed you deny this), that something which is finite and has a determinate existence or duration follows in some attribute of God from its absolute nature, for example, the idea of God in thought.1 But thought, since it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. 11) infinite by its nature. But insofar as it has the idea of God, it is supposed to be finite.
  1. 1 Spinoza’s example of an infinite mode of thought; the idea of God, by which God understands his own essence and all that follows from it, is introduced formally in Part II, Prop. 3.
At (per defin. 2.) finita concipi non potest, nisi per ipsam cogitationem determinetur; sed non per ipsam cogitationem, quatenus ideam Dei constituit (eatenus enim finita supponitur esse); ergo per cogitationem, quatenus ideam Dei non constituit, quae tamen (per prop. 11.) necessario existere debet. Datur igitur cogitatio non constituens ideam Dei, ac propterea ex eius natura, quatenus est absoluta cogitatio, non sequitur necessario idea Dei (concipitur enim ideam Dei constituens et non constituens); quod est contra hypothesin.
But (by Def. 2) it cannot be conceived as finite unless it is determined by thought itself; but not by thought itself insofar as it constitutes the idea of God (for to that extent it is supposed to be finite); therefore by thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. 11) must necessarily exist. There is, therefore, thought which does not constitute the idea of God, and on that account the idea of God does not follow necessarily from its nature insofar as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived both as constituting and as not constituting the idea of God); which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Quare si idea Dei in cogitatione, aut aliquid (perinde est, quicquid sumatur, quandoquidem demonstratio universalis est) in aliquo Dei attributo ex necessitate absolutae naturae ipsius attributi sequatur, id debet necessario esse infinitum; quod erat primum.
So if the idea of God in thought, or anything else (it makes no difference what is taken, since the demonstration is universal), follows in some attribute of God from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite; which was the first point.
Deinde id, quod ex necessitate naturae alicuius attributi ita sequitur, non potest determinatam habere existentiam sive durationem.a Nam si neges, supponatur res, quae ex necessitate naturae alicuius attributi sequitur, dari in aliquo Dei attributo, ex. gr. idea Dei in cogitatione, eaque supponatur aliquando non exstitisse, vel non exstitura. Cum autem cogitatio Dei attributum supponatur, debet et necessario et immutabilis existere (per prop. 11. et coroll. 2. prop. 20.).
Next, what follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of some attribute cannot have a determinate existence, or duration. For if you deny this, suppose that a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute is in some attribute of God, for example, the idea of God in thought, and suppose that it at some time did not exist, or will not exist. But since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must exist both necessarily and as immutable (by Prop. 11 and Cor. 2 of Prop. 20).
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 22) and Bartuschat read determinatam habere durationem. Gebhardt (G II 66; Textgestaltung II 351) supplies existentiam sive from the Dutch version (bepaalde wezentlijkheit, of during, with the marginal gloss ‘Existentia sive duratio determinata’) and in agreement with the first part of the demonstration.
Quare ultra limites durationis ideae Dei (supponitur enim aliquando non exstitisse, aut non exstitura) cogitatio sine idea Dei existere debebit; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin; supponitur enim, ex data cogitatione necessario sequi ideam Dei. Ergo idea Dei in cogitatione, aut aliquid quod necessario ex absoluta natura alicuius attributi Dei sequitur, non potest determinatam habere durationem, sed per idem attributum aeternum est; quod erat secundum.b Nota, hoc idem esse affirmandum de quacumque re, quae in aliquo Dei attributo ex Dei absoluta natura necessario sequitur.
So beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it is supposed at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist) thought will have to exist without the idea of God; but this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that, given thought, the idea of God follows necessarily. Therefore the idea of God in thought, or anything that follows necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, but is, through the same attribute, eternal; which was the second point. Note that the same is to be affirmed of any thing that follows necessarily, in some attribute of God, from God’s absolute nature.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dat te betogen stond’ (‘which was to be demonstrated’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 66; Textgestaltung II 351).

Propositio XXII

Proposition XXII

[G II 66] Quicquid ex aliquo Dei attributo, quatenus modificatum est tali modificatione, quae et necessario et infinita per idem existit, sequitur, debet quoque et necessario et infinitum existere.
Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which, through the same attribute, exists both necessarily and as infinite, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite.

Cited in 1P23D, 1P28D, 1App, 2P11D

Demonstratio. Huius propositionis demonstratio procedit eodem modo, ac demonstratio praecedentis.
Demonstration. The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding one.

Propositio XXIII

Proposition XXIII

Omnis modus, qui et necessario et infinitus existit, necessario sequi debuit vel ex absoluta natura alicuius attributi Dei, vel ex aliquo attributo modificato modificatione, quae et necessario et infinita existit.
Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists both necessarily and as infinite.

Cited in 1P32D, 1App

Demonstratio. Modus enim in alio est, per quod concipi debet (per defin. 5.), hoc est (per prop. 15.) in solo Deo est et per solum Deum concipi potest. Si ergo modus concipitur necessario existere et infinitus esse, utrumque hoc debet necessario concludi sive percipi per aliquod Dei attributum, quatenus idem concipitur infinitatem et necessitatem existentiae, sive (quod per defin. 8. idem est) aeternitatem exprimere, hoc est (per defin. 6. et prop. 19.) quatenus absolute consideratur.
Demonstration. For a mode is in another, through which it must be conceived (by Def. 5), that is (by Prop. 15), it is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone. If, therefore, a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, both of these must necessarily be inferred, or perceived, through some attribute of God, insofar as that attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (what is the same, by Def. 8) eternity, that is (by Def. 6 and Prop. 19), insofar as it is considered absolutely.
Modus ergo, qui et necessario et infinitus existit, ex absoluta natura alicuius Dei attributi sequi debuit; hocque vel immediate (de quo prop. 21.) vel mediante aliqua modificatione, quae ex eius absoluta natura sequitur, hoc est (per prop. praeced.) quae et necessario et infinita existit. Q. E. D.
A mode, therefore, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God; and this either immediately (concerning which see Prop. 21), or by the mediation of some modification which follows from its absolute nature, that is (by the preceding Prop.), which exists both necessarily and as infinite. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXIV

Proposition XXIV

[G II 67] Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam.
The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
Demonstratio. Patet ex defin. 1. Id enim, cuius natura (in se scilicet considerata) involvit existentiam, causa est sui et ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit.
Demonstration. This is evident from Def. 1. For that whose nature (considered, that is, in itself) involves existence is the cause of itself, and exists from the necessity of its own nature alone.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, Deum non tantum esse causam, ut res incipiant existere; sed etiam, ut in existendo perseverent, sive (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. Nam sive res existant, sive non existant, quotiescumque ad earum essentiam attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere comperimus; adeoque earum essentia neque suae existentiae, neque suae durationis potest esse causa, sed tantum Deus, ad cuius solam naturam pertinet existere (per coroll. 1. prop. 14.).
Corollary. From this it follows that God is not only the cause of things’ beginning to exist, but also of their persevering in existing, or (to use a scholastic term) that God is the cause of the being of things.1 For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we attend to their essence we find that it involves neither existence nor duration; and so their essence can be the cause neither of their existence nor of their duration, but only God, to whose nature alone it pertains to exist (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14).
  1. 1 causam essendi rerum. As the sentence itself explains, a cause of being sustains a thing in existence, as opposed to a cause merely of its coming to be. On this view God’s causality does not end when a thing begins to exist.

Cited in 1P28D, 1P28S, 1P29D, 2P45S, 4P4D

Propositio XXV

Proposition XXV

Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiae, sed etiam essentiae.
God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

Cited in 1P26D, 5P22D

Demonstratio. Si negas, ergo rerum essentiae Deus non est causa; adeoque (per axiom. 4.) potest rerum essentia sine Deo concipi. Atqui hoc (per prop. 15.) est absurdum. Ergo rerum etiam essentiae Deus est causa. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by Ax. 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this (by Prop. 15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause also of the essence of things. Q.E.D.
[G II 68] Scholium. Haec propositio clarius sequitur ex prop. 16. Ex ea enim sequitur, quod ex data natura divina tam rerum essentia quam existentia debeat necessario concludi; et, ut verbo dicam, eo sensu, quo Deus dicitur causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti corollario constabit.
Scholium. This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. 16. For from it it follows that, from the given divine nature, both the essence and the existence of things must necessarily be inferred; and, in a word, God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself, which will be established still more clearly from the following corollary.

Cited in Letters 64

Corollarium. Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demonstratio patet ex prop. 15. et defin. 5.
Corollary. Particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.1 The demonstration is evident from Prop. 15 and Def. 5.
  1. 1 modi, quibus ... certo et determinato modo exprimuntur: the technical ‘modes’ and the ordinary ‘way’ (modo) stand side by side. Compare the formula of Def. 7.

Cited in 1P28D, 1P36D, 2D1, 2P1D, 2P5D, 2P10C, 3P6D, 5P24D, 5P36D

Cited in Letters 64

Propositio XXVI

Proposition XXVI

Res, quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata; et quae a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare.
A thing which has been determined to produce some effect1 has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to operate.
  1. 1 ad aliquid operandum, literally ‘to operate something’; operari is rendered ‘operate’ where it stands alone (see the note on Def. 7), and ‘produce an effect’ where it takes an object, as here.

Cited in 1P28D, 1P29D

Demonstratio. Id, per quod res determinatae ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque, tam eius essentiae, quam existentiae, Deus ex necessitate suae naturae est causa efficiens (per prop. 25. et 16.); quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam, quod secundo proponitur, clarissime sequitur. Nam si res, quae a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars huius falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.
Demonstration. That through which things are said to be determined to produce some effect is necessarily something positive (as is self-evident). And so God, from the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (by Props. 25 and 16); which was the first point. From this the second point proposed also follows very clearly. For if a thing which has not been determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this proposition would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.

Propositio XXVII

Proposition XXVII

Res, quae a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest.
A thing which has been determined by God to produce some effect cannot render itself undetermined.

Cited in 1P29D

Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex axiom. 3.
Demonstration. This proposition is evident from Ax. 3.

Propositio XXVIII

Proposition XXVIII

[G II 69] Quodcumque singulare, sive quaevis res quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam; et rursus haec causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum, et sic in infinitum.
Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on to infinity.1
  1. 1 Alongside the dependence of all things on God’s nature (Prop. 16), this proposition sets an infinite series of finite causes, each determined by another. How the two relate is one of the central questions of Part I: the finite thing does not follow from the absolute nature of an attribute (Prop. 21), but from God insofar as he is modified by another finite mode, as the demonstration argues.
Demonstratio. Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per prop. 26. et coroll. prop. 24.). At id, quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicuius Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicuius Dei attributi sequitur, id infinitum et aeternum est (per prop. 21.).
Demonstration. Whatever has been determined to exist and to operate has been so determined by God (by Prop. 26 and Cor. of Prop. 24). But what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. 21).
Debuit ergo ex Deo, vel aliquo eius attributo sequi, quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; praeter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axiom. 1. et defin. 3. et 5.) et modi (per coroll. prop. 25.) nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel aliquo eius attributo, quatenus affectum est modificatione, quae aeterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per prop. 22.).
It must, therefore, have followed from God, or some attribute of God, insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode; for except substance and modes there is nothing (by Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5), and modes (by Cor. of Prop. 25) are nothing but affections of God’s attributes. But it also could not have followed from God, or some attribute of God, insofar as it is affected by a modification which is eternal and infinite (by Prop. 22).
Debuit ergo sequi, vel ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, vel aliquo eius attributo, quatenus modificatum est modificatione, quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum.
It must, therefore, have followed from, or have been determined to exist and to operate by, God or some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence. Which was the first point.
Deinde haec rursus causa, sive hic modus (per eandem rationem, qua primam partem huius iam iam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia, et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q. E. D.
Next, this cause in turn, or this mode (by the same reasoning by which we have just now demonstrated the first part of this proposition), must also have been determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and again this last (by the same reasoning) by another, and so always (by the same reasoning) to infinity. Q.E.D.
[G II 70] Scholium. Cum quaedam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt, videlicet ea quae ex absoluta eius natura necessario sequuntur, et alia mediantibus his primis,a quae tamen sine Deo nec esse, nec concipi possunt; hinc sequitur 1. quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima;b non vero in suo genere, ut aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per prop. 15. et coroll. prop. 24.).
Scholium. Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, and others by the mediation of these first ones, which nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God, it follows, 1. that God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him; but not proximate in his own kind, as they say. For God’s effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by Prop. 15 and Cor. of Prop. 24).
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 26) has only ‘mediantibus his primis’, where something has evidently fallen out. Gebhardt (G II 70; Textgestaltung II 352–353) supplies ‘et alia’ from the Dutch version (‘en anderen door middel van deze eersten’, ‘and others by means of these first’); Boehmer had conjectured ‘quaedam’, which Bartuschat adopts.
  2. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘Ik zeg volstrektelijk de naaste oorzaak, en’ (‘I say the absolutely proximate cause, and’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 70; Textgestaltung II 353). That is, proximate absolutely, and not in its own kind.
Sequitur 2. quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium, nisi forte ea de causa, ut scilicet has ab iis, quas immediate produxit, vel potius, quae ex absoluta eius natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus, quae cum effectu nullo modo coniuncta est. At omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent, ut sine ipso nec esse, nec concipi possint.
It follows, 2. that God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, unless perhaps for this reason, namely, that we may distinguish them from those which he has produced immediately, or rather, which follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is in no way conjoined with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

Propositio XXIX

Proposition XXIX

In rerum natura nullum datur contingens, sed omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.
In the nature of things there is nothing contingent,1 but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way.
  1. 1 What ‘contingent’ means, and why things nonetheless seem contingent to us, is explained in Prop. 33, Schol. 1.
Demonstratio. Quicquid est, in Deo est (per prop. 15.). Deus autem non potest dici res contingens. Nam (per prop. 11.) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinae naturae ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (per prop. 16.); idque vel quatenus divina natura absolute (per prop. 21.), vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (per prop. 27.).a
Demonstration. Whatever is, is in God (by Prop. 15). But God cannot be called a contingent thing. For (by Prop. 11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily, not contingently (by Prop. 16); and that either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by Prop. 21) or insofar as it is considered to be determined to act in a certain way (by Prop. 27).
  1. a So the 1677 edition (OP p. 26) and the Dutch version (zevenëntwintigste). W. Meijer proposed prop. 22.; Gebhardt (G II 70; Textgestaltung II 353) defends prop. 27.: the contrast is between the infinite modes, which follow from God’s nature considered absolutely (Prop. 21), and the finite modes, which follow from it as determined to act in a certain way (Prop. 27). Bartuschat reads prop. 28.
Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa, quatenus simpliciter existunt (per coroll. prop. 24.), sed etiam (per prop. 26.), quatenus ad aliquid operandum determinati considerantur. Quod si a Deo (per eand. prop.) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est, ut se ipsos determinent; et contra (per prop. 27.) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est, ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant.
Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (by Cor. of Prop. 24), but also (by Prop. 26) insofar as they are considered to be determined to produce some effect. If they have not been determined by God (by the same proposition), it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; and conversely (by Prop. 27), if they have been determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves undetermined.
Quare omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandum, nullumque datur contingens. Q. E. D.
So all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and to operate in a certain way, and there is nothing contingent. Q.E.D.
[G II 71] Scholium. Antequam ulterius pergam, hic quid nobis per naturam naturantem et quid per naturam naturatam intelligendum sit, explicare volo, vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus iam constare existimo, nempe, quod per naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se concipitur, sive talia substantiae attributa, quae aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt, hoc est (per coroll. 1. prop. 14. et coroll. 2. prop. 17.) Deus, quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturae sive uniuscuiusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est, omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur ut res, quae in Deo sunt et quae sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt.
Scholium. Before I proceed further, I wish to explain here, or rather to advise the reader, what we must understand by Natura naturans and what by Natura naturata.1 For from the preceding I think it is already established that by Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14 and Cor. 2 of Prop. 17), God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. But by naturata I understand everything that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or of each of God’s attributes, that is, all the modes of God’s attributes, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God.
  1. 1 Literally ‘Nature naturing’ and ‘Nature natured’: the active participle for Nature as cause, the passive for Nature as effect. The terms are scholastic, and Spinoza says he means only to ‘advise’ (monere) the reader, as of something familiar. He had used them already in the Short Treatise: ‘te weten in Natura naturans, en Natura naturata’ (‘namely into Natura naturans and Natura naturata’; KV I.8, G I 47). They are left in Latin in this translation.

Cited in 1P31D

Propositio XXX

Proposition XXX

Intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.
An intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend1 the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else.
  1. 1 comprehendere: both ‘grasp’ and ‘contain’. The demonstration uses the second sense: what an intellect grasps, it contains objectively.

Cited in 2P4D

Demonstratio. Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axiom. 6.), hoc est (ut per se notum) id, quod in intellectu obiective continetur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per coroll. 1. prop. 14.) non nisi una substantia datur, nempe Deus, nec ullae aliae affectiones (per prop. 15.) quam quae in Deo sunt et quae (per eandem prop.) sine Deo nec esse, nec concipi possunt.
Demonstration. A true idea must agree with its object (by Ax. 6), that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively1 in the intellect must necessarily be in nature.2 But in nature (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14) there is only one substance, namely God, and there are no other affections (by Prop. 15) than those which are in God and which (by the same proposition) can neither be nor be conceived without God.
  1. 1 On obiective, ‘as the content of an idea’, see the note on Prop. 17, Schol..
  2. 2 The step from the axiom takes it that what an intellect comprehends, it comprehends truly. For Spinoza the intellect is not the seat of error: falsity arises only from knowledge of the first kind, the imagination, while knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true (Part II, Prop. 41).
Ergo intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q. E. D.
Therefore an intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXI

Proposition XXXI

Intellectus actu, sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent.
The actual intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.1
  1. 1 Intellect and will, which the tradition placed in God’s essence, are here counted among his effects. Prop. 17, Schol. has argued that an intellect and will belonging to God’s essence would agree with ours in nothing but the name; Prop. 32, Cor. 2 puts will and intellect on the same footing as motion and rest.
[G II 72] Demonstratio. Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem, sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis, scilicet cupiditate, amore etc. differt, adeoque (per defin. 5.) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet; nempe (per prop. 15. et defin. 6.) per aliquod Dei attributum, quod aeternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit.
Demonstration. For by intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from others, namely desire, love, etc., and so (by Def. 5) must be conceived through absolute thought; namely (by Prop. 15 and Def. 6) it must be so conceived through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, that without it it can neither be nor be conceived.
Ac propterea (per schol. prop. 29.) ad naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet, ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q. E. D.
And therefore (by Schol. of Prop. 29) it must be referred to Natura naturata, not to naturans, as must the other modes of thinking also. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Ratio, cur hic loquar de intellectu actu, non est, quia concedo, ullum dari intellectum potentia; sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione, qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus, quod ad perfectiorem intellectionis cognitionem non conducat.
Scholium. The reason why I speak here of actual intellect is not that I grant that there is any potential intellect;1 but because I wish to avoid all confusion, I have been unwilling to speak of anything except what is perceived by us as clearly as possible, namely of intellection itself,2 than which nothing is perceived more clearly by us. For we can understand nothing that does not lead to a more perfect knowledge of intellection.
  1. 1 The scholastic distinction of potential and actual intellect goes back to Aristotle, for whom the intellect is actually nothing until it thinks: ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς … οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν (‘so the part of the soul called intellect … is actually none of the things that are, before it thinks’; De anima III.4, 429a22–24). A potential intellect would be a faculty prior to and distinct from its acts. Spinoza admits no such thing; in Part II faculties such as intellect and will are ‘either entirely fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals’, formed from particular ideas and volitions (Part II, Prop. 48, Schol.).
  2. 2 intellectio, the act of understanding, as distinct from the faculty (intellectus).

Propositio XXXII

Proposition XXXII

Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera, sed tantum necessaria.
The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.1
  1. 1 In the terms of Def. 7, ‘necessary, or rather compelled’. Part II draws the consequence for the human mind, in which there is ‘no absolute, or free, will’ (Part II, Prop. 48).
Demonstratio. Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est, sicuti intellectus; adeoque (per prop. 28.) unaquaeque volitio non potest existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, et haec rursus ab alia, et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est, sed quatenus attributum habet, quod infinitam et aeternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per prop. 23.).
Demonstration. The will is only a certain mode of thinking, like the intellect; and so (by Prop. 28) each volition can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on to infinity. But if the will is supposed to be infinite, it too must be determined to exist and to operate by God, not insofar as he is absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as he has an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. 23).
Quocumque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit, a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur; adeoque (per defin. 7.) non potest dici causa libera, sed tantum necessaria vel coacta. Q. E. D.
So in whatever way it is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to operate; and so (by Def. 7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one. Q.E.D.
[G II 73] Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur 1. Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.
Corollary I. From this it follows, 1. that God does not operate from freedom of the will.

Cited in 1App, 2P3S

Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere, ut motus et quies, et absolute, ut omnia naturalia, quae (per prop. 29.) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget, a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur.
Corollary II. It follows, 2. that will and intellect are related to God’s nature as motion and rest are,1 and absolutely, as are all natural things, which (by Prop. 29) must be determined by God to exist and to operate in a certain way. For the will, like all other things, requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to operate in a certain way.
  1. 1 Motion and rest are Spinoza’s example of the infinite mode that follows immediately from the attribute of extension, as absolutely infinite intellect is of the one that follows from thought (Letter 64; see the note on Prop. 21).
Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere, quam propter ea, quae ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur), dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet, quam reliqua naturalia, sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet, ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua, quae ostendimus ex necessitate divinae naturae sequi, et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.
And although infinitely many things follow from a given will or intellect, God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will any more than, on account of the things that follow from motion and rest (for infinitely many things follow from these also), he can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest. So will does not pertain to God’s nature any more than other natural things do, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and to operate in a certain way.

Cited in 1App, 2P3S

Propositio XXXIII

Proposition XXXIII

Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productae sunt.
Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced.1
  1. 1 How strict a necessity this asserts is disputed. J. Bennett finds two commitments in the Ethics: ‘In certain ways Spinoza commits himself to the remarkable conclusion that there are no contingent truths, i.e., that this is the only possible world. In other ways he commits himself to the opposite’ (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, p. 111). E. Curley argues that ‘all truths are necessary, but not all truths are necessary in the same sense’: some are ‘absolutely necessary’, their denial being self-contradictory, while others, such as truths about finite things grounded in an infinite series of prior finite causes (Prop. 28), are only ‘relatively necessary’ (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 1969, pp. 83, 89–90). The two grounds of necessity are those named in Schol. 1.
Demonstratio. Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario secutae sunt (per prop. 16.), et ex necessitate naturae Dei determinatae sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per prop. 29.). Si itaque res alterius naturae potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari, ut naturae ordo alius esset, ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse, quam iam est; ac proinde (per prop. 11.) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo, vel plures possent dari dii; quod (per coroll. 1. prop. 14.) est absurdum.
Demonstration. For all things have followed necessarily from the given nature of God (by Prop. 16), and have been determined from the necessity of God’s nature to exist and to operate in a certain way (by Prop. 29). So if things could have been of another nature, or have been determined to operate in another way, so that the order of nature would be different, then God’s nature also could be other than it now is; and therefore (by Prop. 11) that nature too would have to exist, and consequently there could be two or more Gods; which (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14) is absurd.
Quapropter res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine etc. Q. E. D.
Therefore things could have been produced in no other way and in no other order, etc. Q.E.D.
[G II 74] Scholium I. Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi, nihil absolute in rebus dari, propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare iam paucis volo, quid nobis per contingens erit intelligendum; sed prius, quid per necessarium et impossibile.
Scholium I. Since by the foregoing I have shown more clearly than the noonday light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they may be called contingent, I wish now to explain briefly what we must understand by contingent; but first, what by necessary and impossible.
Res aliqua necessaria dicitur vel ratione suae essentiae vel ratione causae. Rei enim alicuius existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione, vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit, vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata.
A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For the existence of any thing follows necessarily either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. Next, a thing is also called impossible for these same reasons: namely, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause determined to produce such a thing.
At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur, nisi respectu defectus nostrae cognitionis. Res enim, cuius essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus, vel de qua probe scimus, eandem nullam contradictionem involvere, et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus, propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest; ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.
But a thing is called contingent for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge. For a thing whose essence we do not know to involve a contradiction, or of which we know well that it involves no contradiction, and yet about whose existence we can affirm nothing with certainty, because the order of causes is hidden from us, can never seem to us either necessary or impossible; and so we call it either contingent or possible.1
  1. 1 So also, at greater length, the Cogitata Metaphysica (I.3), which makes the possible and the contingent ‘non nisi defectus nostrae perceptionis, nec aliquid reale esse’ (‘nothing but defects of our perception, and nothing real’) and declines to fix the terms: ‘neque enim de nominibus disputare soleo’ (‘for I am not in the habit of disputing about names’; G I 242). Part IV, Defs. 3 and 4 distinguish them: singular things are called contingent insofar as their essence alone neither posits nor excludes their existence, possible insofar as we do not know whether the causes from which they must be produced are determined to produce them.

Cited in 2P31C, 4D4, 4P11D

Scholium II. Ex praecedentibus clare sequitur, res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas, quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutae sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex huius contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi), Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia, si res alio modo fuissent productae, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda diversa ab ea, quam ex consideratione entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere.
Scholium II. From the foregoing it follows clearly that things have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection; for it is his perfection that has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from the contrary it would clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God is not supremely perfect; namely because, if things had been produced in another way, another nature would have to be attributed to God, different from the one we have been compelled to attribute to him from the consideration of the most perfect being.
Verum non dubito, quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant, nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint; idque nulla alia de causa, quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa, quae a nobis (defin. 7.)a tradita est, videlicet absolutam voluntatem. Verum neque etiam dubito, si rem meditari vellent, nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem, qualem iam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam, sed ut magnum scientiae obstaculum plane reiiciant. Nec opus est ut ea, quae in schol. prop. 17. dicta sunt, hic repetam.
But I do not doubt that many will dismiss this view as absurd and will not be willing to apply their minds to weighing it; and for no other reason than that they have been accustomed to attribute to God another freedom, far different from the one laid down by us (Def. 7), namely an absolute will. But neither do I doubt that, if they were willing to meditate on the matter and to weigh the sequence of our demonstrations rightly for themselves, they would in the end entirely reject such a freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as trifling but as a great obstacle to science. Nor is there any need for me to repeat here what was said in the Scholium to Prop. 17.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 30) reads Defin. 6.; Gebhardt (G II 74; Textgestaltung II 354), following Sigwart and Van Vloten–Land, corrects to defin. 7., the definition of freedom, and Bartuschat follows him. The translation follows the correction.
Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam, quod, quamvis concedatur, voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex eius perfectione nihilominus sequatur, res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere, si prius consideremus id quod ipsimet concedunt, videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere, ut unaquaeque res id quod est sit; nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset.
Nevertheless, for their sake I shall show further that, even if it is granted that will pertains to God’s essence, it still follows from his perfection that things could have been created by God in no other way or order, which will be easy to show if we first consider what they themselves grant, namely that it depends on God’s decree and will alone that each thing is what it is; for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things.
Deinde quod omnia Dei decreta ab aeterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt. Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstantiae argueretur. At cum in aeterno non detur quando, ante, nec post,b hinc, ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione, sequitur, Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse nec unquam potuisse; sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse, nec sine ipsis esse posse.
Next, that all God’s decrees have been established by God himself from eternity. For otherwise he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since in eternity there is no when, before, or after,1 it follows from this, namely from God’s perfection alone, that God can never decree anything else, and never could have; or that God was not prior to his decrees, and cannot be without them.
  1. b non detur quando, ante, nec post,] transcr. non detur quando, ante, nec post,. Italics restored from the 1677 edition (OP p. 31).
  1. 1 The argument is already in the Cogitata Metaphysica (I.3), nearly word for word: ‘cum in aeternitate non detur quando, nec ante, nec post, neque ulla affectio temporis, sequitur, Deum nunquam ante illa decreta extitisse, ut aliud decernere posset’ (‘since in eternity there is no when, before, or after, nor any affection of time, it follows that God never existed before those decrees so as to be able to decree something else’; G I 243). On eternity as excluding time, see Def. 8, Exp..
At dicent, quod,c quamvis supponeretur, quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset, vel quod ab aeterno aliud de natura eiusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio. Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul, Deum posse sua mutare decreta.
But they will say that, even if it were supposed that God had made another nature of things, or that from eternity he had decreed something else concerning nature and its order, no imperfection in God would follow from this. But if they say this, they will grant at the same time that God can change his decrees.
  1. c The 1677 edition (OP p. 31) reads At dicunt (‘But they say’). Gebhardt (G II 75; Textgestaltung II 354) corrects to dicent from the Dutch version (Maar (zullen zy zeggen)) and in view of concedent and of At dicent at the head of the next paragraph; Bartuschat follows him.
Nam si Deus de natura eiusque ordine aliud, quam decrevit, decrevisset, hoc est, ut aliud de natura voluisset et concepisset, alium necessario quam iam habet intellectum, et aliam quam iam habet voluntatem habuisset.
For if God had decreed something concerning nature and its order other than he has decreed, that is, if he had willed and conceived something else concerning nature, he would necessarily have had another intellect than the one he now has, and another will than the one he now has.
Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet absque ulla eius essentiae eiusque perfectionis mutatione; quid causae est, cur iam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare et nihilominus aeque perfectus manere? Eius enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem in respectu suae essentiae et perfectionis perinde est quomodocumque concipiatur.
And if it is permissible to attribute to God another intellect and another will without any change of his essence and of his perfection, what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees concerning created things and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For with respect to his essence and perfection, it makes no difference how his intellect and will concerning created things and their order are conceived.
Deinde omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt, nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia, sed tantum actu. Cum autem et eius intellectus et eius voluntas ab eiusdem essentia non distinguantur, ut etiam omnes concedunt; sequitur ergo hinc etiam, quod, si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset et aliam voluntatem, eius etiam essentia alia necessario esset; ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi) si aliter res, quam iam sunt, a Deo productae essent, Dei intellectus eiusque voluntas, hoc est (ut conceditur) eius essentia alia esse deberet; quod est absurdum.
Further, all the philosophers I have seen grant that there is no potential intellect in God, but only actual intellect.2 But since his intellect and his will are not distinguished from his essence, as they all grant as well, it follows from this too that if God had had another actual intellect and another will, his essence would also necessarily be other; and therefore (as I concluded at the beginning), if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, God’s intellect and his will, that is (as is granted), his essence, would have to be other; which is absurd.
  1. 2 So, for example, Maimonides: ‘וכאשר בא המופת שהאלוה ית׳ הוא שכל בפועל ואין כח בו כלל … אבל הוא שכל בפועל תמיד’ (‘since it has been demonstrated that God, may he be exalted, is intellect in actuality and that there is no potentiality in him at all … but he is always intellect in actuality’; מורה נבוכים (Guide of the Perplexed) I.68); and Descartes, for whom the idea of God contains nothing potential: ‘in qua nempe nihil omnino est potentiale’ (Meditations III, AT VII 47). On the identity of God’s intellect and will with his essence, see the notes on Prop. 17, Schol..
[G II 76] Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint,a et hoc verum esse ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur; nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest, ut credamus, quod Deus noluerit omnia, quae in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione, qua ipsa intelligit, creare.
Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other way or order, and since the truth of this follows from God’s supreme perfection, there is surely no sound reason that can persuade us to believe that God did not wish to create all the things that are in his intellect with the same perfection with which he understands them.
  1. a a Deo produci potuerint] transcr. a Deo produci potuerit. Gebhardt prints ‘potuerit’, a misprint corrected in his own corrigenda (G II 76 l. 5), which the transcription reproduces; the 1677 edition (OP p. 32) and Bartuschat read ‘potuerint’.
At dicent, in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem, sed id quod in ipsis est, propter quod perfectae sunt aut imperfectae, et bonae aut malae dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere; atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere, ut id quod iam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio, et contra.b Verum quid hoc aliud esset, quam aperte affirmare, quod Deus, qui id quod vult necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest, ut res alio modo, quam intelligit, intelligat? Quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum.
But they will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things, but that what is in them, on account of which they are perfect or imperfect, and are called good or evil, depends on God’s will alone; and so, if God had willed, he could have brought it about that what is now perfection would be the greatest imperfection, and conversely. But what else would this be than to affirm openly that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, can by his will bring it about that he understands things in another way than he understands them? Which (as I have just shown) is a great absurdity.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dat het geen, ’t welk nu in de dingen een onvolmaaktheit is, het volmaaktste geweest zou zijn’ (‘that what is now an imperfection in things would have been the most perfect’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 76; Textgestaltung II 354). The Dutch version has this in place of et contra.
Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum, hoc modo: „Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntasc aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus); ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt.”
So I can turn the argument against them, in this way: ‘All things depend on God’s power.1 For things to be able to be otherwise, therefore, God’s will would necessarily also have to be otherwise; but God’s will cannot be otherwise (as we have just shown most evidently from God’s perfection); therefore neither can things be otherwise.’
  1. c possint, Dei necessario voluntas] transcr. possint, necessario Dei voluntas. The 1677 edition (OP p. 32), Gebhardt (G II 76) and Bartuschat read ‘Dei necessario voluntas’.
  1. 1 potestate: on this word, distinct from potentia, see the note on Prop. 17, Schol..
Fateor, hanc opinionem, quae omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subiicit et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare, quam illorum, qui statuunt, Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere.
I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God and maintains that all things depend on his good pleasure,2 is less far from the truth than the opinion of those who maintain that God does all things under the aspect of the good.3
  1. 2 The first opinion is Descartes’s: ‘Repugnat enim Dei voluntatem non fuisse ab aeterno indifferentem ad omnia quae facta sunt aut unquam fient’ (‘for it is contradictory that God’s will should not have been indifferent from eternity to all things that have been made or ever will be’). So God did not will the three angles of a triangle to equal two right angles because he knew it could not be otherwise, but ‘quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario aequales esse duobus rectis, idcirco iam hoc verum est’ (‘because he willed the three angles of a triangle to be necessarily equal to two right angles, therefore this is now true’; Sixth Replies, AT VII 431–432).
  2. 3 sub ratione boni, the scholastic formula for willing an object as good. Suárez, discussing God’s freedom, says that the use of freedom has no place ‘nisi ubi sub ratione boni repraesentatur’ (‘except where something is represented under the aspect of the good’; Disputationes metaphysicae XXX.9).
Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere, quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus tamquam ad exemplar in operando attendit, vel ad quod tamquam ad certum scopum collimat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est, quam Deum fato subiicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiae, quam earum existentiae primam et unicam liberam causam esse. Quare non est, ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.
For these seem to posit something outside God which does not depend on God, to which God attends as to a model in operating, or at which he aims as at a definite goal. This is surely nothing else than to subject God to fate, than which nothing more absurd can be maintained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause both of the essence of all things and of their existence. So there is no reason for me to waste time refuting this absurdity.

Propositio XXXIV

Proposition XXXIV

Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia.
God’s power is his very essence.

Cited in 1P35D, 1P36D, 2P3S, 3P6D, 4P4D

[G II 77] Demonstratio. Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiae sequitur, Deum esse causam sui (per prop. 11.) et (per prop. 16. eiusque coroll.)a omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei, qua ipse et omnia sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For from the necessity of God’s essence alone it follows that God is the cause of himself (by Prop. 11) and (by Prop. 16 and its Cor.) of all things. Therefore God’s power, by which he and all things are and act, is his very essence. Q.E.D.
  1. a eiusque coroll.)] transcr. eiusque coroll. 1.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 33), Gebhardt (G II 77) and Bartuschat read ‘ejusque Coroll.’, without a number.

Propositio XXXV

Proposition XXXV

Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.
Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power1 necessarily is.
  1. 1 in Dei potestate: on potestas see the note on Prop. 17, Schol.. The proposition answers those who, as described there, hold that God can bring it about that things which are in his power should not come about.

Cited in 2P3D

Demonstratio. Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (per prop. praeced.) in eius essentia ita debet comprehendi, ut ex ea necessario sequatur, adeoque necessario est. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For whatever is in God’s power must (by the preceding Prop.) be so comprehended in his essence that it follows necessarily from it, and so it necessarily is. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXVI

Proposition XXXVI

Nihil existit, ex cuius natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.
Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.1
  1. 1 The proposition is the first premise of Part III, Prop. 7, Dem., which identifies each thing’s power, or striving to persevere in its being, with its actual essence: what Prop. 34 says of God is there said of every thing.

Cited in 2P13D, 3P1D, 3P7D, 5P4S

Demonstratio. Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (per coroll. prop. 25.),a hoc est (per prop. 34.) quicquid existit, Dei potentiam, quae omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit, adeoque (per prop. 16.) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Whatever exists expresses God’s nature, or essence, in a certain and determinate way (by Cor. of Prop. 25), that is (by Prop. 34), whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way God’s power, which is the cause of all things; and so (by Prop. 16) some effect must follow from it. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 33) prints per Prop. 25. and corrects it to per Coroll. Prop. 25. in its list of errata in the references (Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda). The Corollary has the formula ‘certo et determinato modo exprimuntur’.

The Appendix to Part I

With Prop. 36 the demonstrations of Part I end, and Spinoza changes register. The Appendix has no definitions, axioms or propositions; it is continuous prose, often sarcastic, and it addresses the reader directly (“See, I ask you, what the matter has come to in the end!”). The geometrical order proves; the Appendix diagnoses why the proofs will not be believed. A reader coming to it straight from the demonstrations meets a different kind of writing with a different target, not a thesis to be proved but a habit of mind to be exposed, and the Appendix is easier to follow with its plan, and the earlier writers whose views it answers, in view.

The plan and the tone

Its first sentence summarizes the Part. Spinoza has explained “the nature of God and its properties”: that he exists necessarily, that he is unique, that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature alone, that he is the free cause of all things, that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived, “and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will, or absolute good pleasure, but from God’s absolute nature, or infinite power” (Appendix). He has tried, wherever the occasion arose, to remove the prejudices that might prevent his demonstrations from being understood. But many remain, and they could prevent men, “indeed most of all,” from “embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it.” The phrase is worth noticing. What the Appendix defends is not one doctrine among others but the whole picture of a nature in which everything follows from everything else by necessity, and its claim is that this picture meets an obstacle in the mind of the reader before it meets any argument.

All the prejudices in question, Spinoza says, depend on one: “that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end, and indeed hold it as certain that God himself directs all things to some definite end (for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship him).” He announces three tasks. He will ask why most men acquiesce in this prejudice and why all are by nature inclined to it; he will show that it is false; and he will show how the prejudices about good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness arose from it. The Appendix follows that plan closely. The divisions of the present text (E1App, E1App.2, E1App.3, E1App.4) are paragraphs of the transcription, but they correspond roughly to its stages.

The tone deserves a word. The Appendix is the first place in the Ethics where Spinoza allows himself open mockery, and it is directed less at the common people, whose errors he explains, than at those who exploit them: the “interpreters of nature and of the gods” who brand as heretics anyone who seeks the true causes of things, “for they know that if ignorance is taken away, astonishment, that is, the only means they have of arguing and of defending their authority, is taken away too” (E1App.2). The author of the Theological-Political Treatise, which he had published anonymously in 1670 and in which, as Bayle later reported, all its refuters had found “the seeds of atheism,” knew what he was describing.

Two facts about human nature

The explanation rests on two facts that “must be acknowledged by all”: “that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek their own advantage, of which they are conscious.” Spinoza does not derive these facts here from the nature of the mind, which is the task of Parts II and III; he takes them as common ground. From them two consequences follow at once.

The first is the belief in free will. Men “think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them.” The feeling of freedom is not evidence of an undetermined will; it is the form ignorance of causes takes in a being that is conscious of its own desires. Spinoza returns to the analysis in Part II, where men’s “idea of freedom” is said to consist only in their being conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined (Part II, Prop. 35, Schol.), and in Part III (Prop. 2, Schol.). He gave it its most memorable form in a letter to G. H. Schuller (Letter 58), where he asks his correspondent to conceive a stone, set in motion by an external cause, which while it continues to move could think and know that it is striving, as far as it can, to keep moving. Such a stone, conscious only of its striving and not indifferent to it, “would believe itself to be most free, and to persevere in motion for no other reason than that it wills to. And this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists only in this, that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined” (VVL³ III 196).

The second consequence is the habit of explaining everything by ends. Since men act for the sake of the advantage they want, “they always want to know only the final causes of things done, and when they have heard them, they are at rest.” When no one can tell them the end for which something happened, they reflect on the ends by which they themselves are usually moved, and so “necessarily judge the temperament of another from their own.” Finding in nature many things useful to them which they had not made, “eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish,” they came to regard all natural things as means to their advantage, and since they knew that they had found these means and not provided them, they concluded that someone else had provided them: “some ruler, or some rulers, of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have taken care of all things for them and made all things for their use.”

From prejudice to superstition

The rest of the first stage is a natural history of religion in a few sentences. Having no information about the temperament of these rulers, men judged it from their own, and concluded that the gods direct all things for the use of men in order to bind men to them and be held in the highest honour. Each then devised, from his own temperament, a way of worshipping God so that God might love him above the rest and direct the whole of nature to serve his “blind desire and insatiable greed.” So the prejudice “was turned into superstition and struck deep roots in their minds.” But nature also contains storms, earthquakes and diseases, and men explained these as the anger of the gods at wrongs done to them; and when experience showed “by infinitely many examples that benefits and harms befall the pious and the impious alike,” they did not give up the prejudice, but declared that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding.

That last move, Spinoza says, “would surely have been the only cause why the truth should have been hidden from the human race to eternity, had not mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown men another standard of truth” (E1App). The remark explains, in passing, why the Ethics is written as it is. The geometrical order is not only a method of proof; it is a training in a way of thinking about things that asks what they are and what follows from them, never what they are for. A triangle has no purpose, and its properties are not explained by any.

Earlier critics of final causes

The rejection of final causes was not new. Descartes had excluded them from physics: “totum illud causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus Physicis nullum usum habere existimo” (“I consider that the whole class of causes customarily sought from the end has no use in physical matters”; Meditations IV, AT VII 55; compare Principles I.28). But his reason was modesty: we cannot, without rashness, investigate the ends of God. Spinoza’s reason is that there are none. Final causes are “nothing but human fictions” (humana figmenta), and a God who acted for an end would lack something he wanted, which contradicts his perfection.

Nor was it new to deny that the universe exists for human beings. Maimonides reports the opinion “שתכלית המציאות כולו – מציאות מין האדם לבד לעבוד את האלוה ושכל מה שנעשה אמנם נעשה בגללו” (“that the end of all existence is solely the existence of the human species, to worship God, and that everything that has been made was made for its sake”; מורה נבוכים (Guide of the Perplexed) III.13), nearly in Spinoza’s words, and rejects it. But Maimonides concludes that everything exists because God willed it, and that no further cause or end should be sought (III.13). That is precisely the answer the Appendix ridicules: those who explain events by their purposes “will not cease to ask for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance” (E1App.2). The voluntarist God of Prop. 33, Schol. 2, whose will is the only reason for things, is “less far from the truth” than the God who aims at the good; but neither is Spinoza’s.

The arguments

The second stage gives the arguments against final causes, and Spinoza says there is no need for many words, since the falsity of the doctrine is already established by the account of its origin, by Prop. 16, by the corollaries of Prop. 32, and by all the propositions that show that everything in nature proceeds “by a certain eternal necessity and with the highest perfection” (E1App.2). He adds three considerations.

First, the doctrine “entirely overturns nature.” It takes the cause for the effect and the effect for the cause; it makes what is prior posterior; and it makes what is most perfect least perfect. The last point draws on the propositions about infinite modes: the effect produced by God immediately is the most perfect, and the more intermediate causes something needs, the more imperfect it is (Props. 21–23). If the first things had been made for the sake of the last, the last would be the most excellent of all. Second, the doctrine takes away God’s perfection, “for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something that he lacks.” The theologians’ distinction between an end of need and an end of assimilation does not help, since they confess that God did all things for his own sake, and so must confess that he lacked the things for whose sake he provided the means. Third, its defenders have invented a new way of arguing, “reduction not to the impossible, but to ignorance.” A stone falls from a roof and kills a man; it must have fallen for that purpose, they argue, since so many circumstances could not have come together by chance. Tell them that the wind was blowing and the man was passing, and they ask why the wind was blowing at that moment and why the man was passing at that hour; tell them about the sea that was rough the day before and the friend who had invited the man, and they ask again, “since there is no end to asking,” until you take refuge in the will of God. The same habit makes men look at the structure of the human body and conclude, because they do not know the causes of so much art, that it was made by a supernatural and not by a mechanical art.

The stone from the roof is the most famous image in the Appendix, and it repays attention. Spinoza does not deny that the man’s death has a complete explanation; he insists on it. Every circumstance has its cause, and the causes have their causes, to infinity, as Prop. 28 has shown. What the believer in final causes cannot bear is that the explanation never comes to an end in a reason that satisfies him, a purpose that makes the event intelligible as meant. Spinoza’s answer is that the demand is misplaced. The infinite series of finite causes is not a failure of explanation but its form, and the order of the whole follows from the nature of God.

Notions of the imagination

The third stage turns to the notions that arose from the prejudice. Once men had persuaded themselves that everything happens for their sake, they had to regard as most important in each thing what is most useful to them, and so they formed the notions “good, evil, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty and ugliness,” and, because they think themselves free, “praise and blame, sin and merit” (E1App.3). Whatever conduces to health and to the worship of God they called good, and its contrary evil. Things easy to imagine and remember they called well ordered, and the rest confused; and since they prefer what they can easily imagine, they suppose that order is something in nature beyond its relation to our imagination, and say that God created all things in order, “and in this way, without knowing it, attribute imagination to God.” Beauty and ugliness, fragrance and stench, sweetness and bitterness, harmony and noise are named after the way objects move the nerves; harmony “has driven men so mad that they have believed that God too delights in harmony,” and there are philosophers who think that the heavenly motions compose one.

All this shows, Spinoza concludes, that each has judged things according to the disposition of his brain, “or rather has taken the affections of the imagination for things.” Since human bodies differ in many respects, what seems good to one seems evil to another, and from these differences come controversy and, finally, scepticism. Everyone repeats the proverbs “So many heads, so many opinions,” “everyone abounds in his own sense,” “there are no fewer differences of brains than of palates.” Such notions “indicate the nature of nothing, but only the constitution of the imagination”; and because they have names, as if they named things existing outside the imagination, Spinoza calls them “beings not of reason but of imagination” (E1App.4). The scholastics had distinguished real beings from beings of reason (entia rationis), such as genera and species, which exist only in the intellect; Spinoza adds a third class, lower than the second, of notions that do not even belong to the intellect.

The analysis is not Spinoza’s last word on these notions, and the reader should not take it for a simple relativism. Part II gives an account of the imagination that explains why such notions arise and how they differ from adequate ideas. The Preface to Part IV keeps “good” and “evil” as modes of thinking that compare things with one another, and gives them a use: they are to be defined by reference to a “model of human nature” that we set before ourselves, and Part IV defines them accordingly (Part IV, Defs. 1–2). Praise and blame are defined in Part III (Prop. 29, Schol.), and merit and sin in Part IV (Prop. 37, Schol. 2), which recalls the promise made here. What the Appendix denies is that these notions describe things as they are in themselves, apart from their relation to us.

The problem of imperfection

The Appendix ends with the objection from imperfection. If all things have followed from the necessity of God’s most perfect nature, where have so many imperfections come from: corruption to the point of stench, ugliness that moves nausea, confusion, evil, sin? The reply follows from what has just been said. “The perfection of things is to be judged from their nature and power alone; nor are things more or less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to human nature or are repugnant to it.” To those who ask why God did not create all men to be governed by reason alone, Spinoza answers only that God did not lack material to create all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest, “or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed for producing all things that can be conceived by some infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in Prop. 16” (E1App.4). It is an answer to the problem of evil that declines to be a theodicy: nothing is justified, because nothing was intended.

Does Spinoza reject all purposes?

One question about the Appendix has divided its readers. Spinoza plainly denies that God acts for ends and that natural things exist for ours. But does he also deny that human beings act for ends? The Appendix itself seems to say that they do: “men do all things for the sake of an end, namely for the sake of the advantage they want.” Yet two of its arguments, if they are sound, tell against every kind of purposive explanation. If final causes are excluded because everything proceeds by eternal necessity from efficient causes, then a man who raises his hand to shade his eyes is no more acting for an end than an elbow is shaped for the sake of raising the hand; and if teleology inverts the order of nature by explaining a cause through its effect, it does so in the human case as much as in the divine. Jonathan Bennett takes this “radical attack on teleology” seriously and argues that Spinoza needs it, since if human beings were allowed to act purposively Spinoza would have as much reason to ascribe purposes to God as he has to ascribe thought to him; on Bennett’s reading, much of Part III is an attempt to give a non-teleological theory of human motivation (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, § 51, pp. 215–216).

Other readers point to the way Spinoza himself redescribes human ends. The Preface to Part IV says that “what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing.” When we say that habitation was the final cause of a house, we mean only that a man, imagining the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build one; and this appetite “is really an efficient cause, which is considered as first because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites” (Part IV, Preface). Part IV then defines “the end for the sake of which we do something” as appetite (Part IV, Def. 7). On this reading Spinoza does not eliminate human purposes but explains them: a purpose is an appetite, and appetite is “nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation” (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.), an efficient cause like any other. What is excluded is the idea that the future state aimed at does the explaining, and the projection of such purposes onto God and nature. The question is not merely verbal, since it decides how the ethics of Parts IV and V, which speaks constantly of what we should seek and of the end of life, is to be read. Appendix D describes how interpreters have answered it.

The Appendix follows. It cites only a handful of propositions (Prop. 16, Props. 21–23 and the corollaries of Prop. 32) and can be read on its own; but it is meant to be read after the demonstrations, as an account of why their conclusions meet resistance. With it Part I ends, and Part II turns from God to the nature and origin of the human mind.

Appendix. His Dei naturam, eiusque proprietates explicui, ut quod necessario existit;a quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suae naturae necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint praedeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis, sive absoluto beneplacito, sed ex absoluta Dei natura, sive infinita potentia.
Appendix. In the foregoing I have explained the nature of God and its properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature alone; that he is the free cause of all things, and how; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will, or absolute good pleasure, but from God’s absolute nature, or infinite power.
  1. a necessario existit;] transcr. necessario existat;. The 1677 edition (OP p. 33), Gebhardt (G II 77) and Bartuschat read ‘existit’.
Porro ubicumque data fuit occasio, praeiudicia, quae impedire poterant, quominus meae demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi. Sed quia non pauca adhuc restant praeiudicia, quae etiam, imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt, quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operae pretium duxi.
Further, wherever the occasion arose, I have taken care to remove prejudices that could prevent my demonstrations from being perceived. But because not a few prejudices still remain which could also prevent, and still can prevent, indeed most of all, men from embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it, I have thought it worth while to summon them here before the judgment of reason.
Et quoniam omnia, quae hic indicare suscipio, praeiudicia pendent ab hoc uno, quod scilicet communiter supponant homines, omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere; imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere, pro certo statuant (dicunt enim, Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem, ut ipsum coleret): hoc igitur unum prius considerabo, quaerendo scilicet, primo causam, cur plerique hoc in praeiudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum, deinde eiusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem, quomodo ex hoc orta sint praeiudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitateb et de aliis huius generis.
And since all the prejudices that I undertake to point out here depend on this one, namely that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end, and indeed hold it as certain that God himself directs all things to some definite end (for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship him1), I shall therefore consider this one first. I shall ask, first, why most men acquiesce in this prejudice, and why all are by nature so inclined to embrace it; next I shall show its falsity; and finally, how from it have arisen the prejudices about good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and others of this kind.
  1. b praeiudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate] transcr. praeiudicia de bono etmalo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate. Word division (‘etmalo’) corrected; italics as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 34).
  1. 1 Maimonides reports the same opinion in nearly these terms and rejects it: ‘יחשבו שתכלית המציאות כולו – מציאות מין האדם לבד לעבוד את האלוה’ (‘they think that the end of all existence is solely the existence of the human species, to worship God’; מורה נבוכים (Guide of the Perplexed) III.13). See the essay before the Appendix.
Verum, haec ab humanae mentis natura deducere, non est huius loci. Satis hic erit, si pro fundamento id capiam, quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso; nempe hoc, quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur, et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quaerendi, cuius rei sunt conscii.
To deduce these things from the nature of the human mind, however, is not the business of this place. It will be enough here if I take as a foundation what must be acknowledged by all: namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek their own advantage, of which they are conscious.
Ex his enim sequitur primo, quod homines se liberos esse opinentur, quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii, et de causis, a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari, nec per somnium cogitant.
For from these it follows, first, that men think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them.2
  1. 2 The same analysis of the belief in freedom in Letter 58, to Schuller: ‘haec humana illa libertas est, quam omnes habere iactant, et quae in hoc solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitus sint conscii, et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari’ (‘this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists in this alone, that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined’; VVL³ III 196). Compare Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. and Part III, Prop. 2, Schol..
Sequitur secundo, homines omnia propter finem agere, videlicet propter utile, quod appetunt. Unde fit, ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant, et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum, quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat, nisi ut ad semet se convertant, et ad fines, a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant; et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario iudicant.
It follows, second, that men do all things for the sake of an end, namely for the sake of the advantage they want. Hence it comes about that they always want to know only the final causes of things done, and when they have heard them, they are at rest; namely, because they have no further cause for doubt. But if they cannot hear them from another, nothing remains for them but to turn to themselves and reflect on the ends by which they themselves are usually determined to similar things; and so they necessarily judge the temperament of another from their own.
Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media, quae ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant, ut ex. gr. oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum piscesc etc., hinc factum, ut omnia naturalia tamquam ad suum utile media considerent; et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt, aliquem alium esse, qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt, easdem se ipsas fecisse; sed ex mediis, quae sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt, dari aliquem vel aliquos naturae rectores humana praeditos libertate, qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint.
Further, since they find in themselves and outside themselves not a few means that are of no little help in attaining their own advantage, as, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish, etc., it has come about that they consider all natural things as means to their own advantage. And because they know that they found these means, and did not provide them, they had cause to believe that there is someone else who provided these means for their use. For after they had considered things as means, they could not believe that these things had made themselves; but from the means that they are accustomed to provide for themselves, they had to conclude that there is some ruler, or some rulers, of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have taken care of all things for them and made all things for their use.
  1. c The Dutch version has, in place of etc.: ‘en dus byna met alle andere dingen, van welker naturelijke oorzaaken zy geen oorzaak om te twijffelen hebben’ (‘and so with almost all other things, about whose natural causes they have no cause to doubt’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 78; Textgestaltung II 354).
Atque horum etiam ingenium, quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo iudicare debuerunt; atque hinc statuerunt, deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere, ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur. Unde factum, ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit, ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum caecae illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiae dirigeret.
And they had to judge the temperament of these rulers too from their own, since they had never heard anything about it; and hence they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of men, in order to bind men to themselves and to be held by them in the highest honour. Hence it has come about that each has devised, from his own temperament, different ways of worshiping God, so that God might love him above the rest and direct the whole of nature to serve his blind desire and insatiable greed.
Atque ita hoc praeiudicium in superstitionem versum et altasd in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit, ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere, easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quaesiverunt ostendere, naturam nihil frustra (hoc est, quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse, quam naturam deosque aeque ac homines delirare.
And so this prejudice was turned into superstition and struck deep roots in their minds; which was the reason why each strove with the greatest effort to understand and explain the final causes of all things. But while they sought to show that nature does nothing in vain3 (that is, nothing that is not for the use of men), they seem to have shown only that nature and the gods are as mad as men.
  1. d in superstitionem versum et altas] transcr. in superstitionem versum est et altas. The 1677 edition (OP p. 35), Gebhardt (G II 79) and Bartuschat have no ‘est’.
  1. 3 Aristotle’s maxim: μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις (‘nature does nothing in vain’; De anima III.12, 434a31; cf. III.9, 432b21).
Vide quaeso, quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturae commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terrae motus, morbos etc., atque haec statuerunt propterea evenire, quod diif irati essent ob iniurias sibi ab hominibus factas, sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa; et quamvis experientia in dies reclamaret ac infinitise exemplis ostenderet, commoda atque incommoda piis aeque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato praeiudicio destiterunt.
See, I ask you, what the matter has come to in the end! Among so many benefits of nature they had to find not a few harms: storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc.; and they maintained that these happen because the gods are angry on account of wrongs done to them by men, or on account of sins committed in their worship. And although experience protested daily, and showed by infinitely many examples that benefits and harms befall the pious and the impious alike, indiscriminately, they did not on that account give up their inveterate prejudice.
  1. e reclamaret ac infinitis] transcr. reclamaret et infinitis. The 1677 edition (OP p. 35), Gebhardt (G II 79) and Bartuschat read ‘ac’.
  2. f The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘die zy van een zelfde aart als de hunne oordeelen’ (‘whom they judge to be of the same nature as their own’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 79; Textgestaltung II 354). Gebhardt takes the passage to have been struck from the Latin out of caution.
Facilius enim iis fuit, hoc inter alia incognita, quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic praesentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiae retinere, quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt, deorum iudicia humanum captum longissime superare: quae sane unica fuisset causa, ut veritas humanum genus in aeternum lateret, nisi mathesis, quae non circa fines, sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset.
For it was easier for them to put this among other unknown things whose use they did not know, and so to keep their present and innate state of ignorance, than to destroy that whole fabric and devise a new one. Hence they held it as certain that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding: which would surely have been the only cause why the truth should have been hidden from the human race to eternity, had not mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown men another standard of truth.4
  1. 4 aliam veritatis normam. Part II supplies it: ‘as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false’ (Part II, Prop. 43, Schol.).
Et praeter mathesin aliae etiam adsignari possunt causae (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est), a quibus fieri potuit, ut homines communiag haec praeiudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur.
And besides mathematics other causes can also be assigned (which it is superfluous to enumerate here) by which it could happen that men noticed these common prejudices and were led to the true knowledge of things.
  1. g The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘doch zeer weinig, ten opzicht van ’t geheel menschelijk geslacht’ (‘though very few, in comparison with the whole human race’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 79; Textgestaltung II 355). The parenthesis was struck in the Latin.
[G II 80] His satis explicui id, quod primo loco promisi. Ut iam autem ostendam, naturam finem nullum sibi praefixum habere, et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id iam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis, unde hoc praeiudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi, quam ex prop. 16. et coroll. 1. et 2. prop. 32.,a et praeterea ex iis omnibus, quibus ostendi, omnia naturae aeterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere.
With this I have sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place. Now to show that nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions, there is no need of many words. For I believe that this is already sufficiently established, both from the foundations and causes from which I have shown that this prejudice took its origin, and from Prop. 16 and Cors. 1 and 2 of Prop. 32, and further from all those propositions by which I have shown that all things in nature proceed by a certain eternal necessity and with the highest perfection.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 36) reads Corollario Propositionis 32, in the singular, and so does the Dutch version (de Toegift). Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to Corollariis, as do Gebhardt (G II 80; Textgestaltung II 355), who suggests that the two corollaries were originally one, and Bartuschat. Our transcription spells the reference out as coroll. 1. et 2.
Hoc tamen adhuc addam, nempe, hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat, et contra;b deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius; et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum.
This, however, I shall add, namely that this doctrine about the end entirely overturns nature. For what is in reality a cause it considers as an effect, and conversely; next, it makes what is by nature prior, posterior; and finally, it renders what is supreme and most perfect, most imperfect.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘het geen als een oorzaak, ’t welk een gewrocht is’ (‘what is an effect, as a cause’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 80; Textgestaltung II 355).
Nam (duobus prioribus omissis, quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex prop. 21.c 22. et 23. constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est, qui a Deo immediate producitur, et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res, quae immediate a Deo productae sunt, ea de causa factae essent, ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimae, quarum de causa priores factae sunt, omnium praestantissimae essent.
For (passing over the first two, because they are self-evident) as is established from Props. 21, 22 and 23, that effect is most perfect which is produced by God immediately, and the more intermediate causes something needs in order to be produced, the more imperfect it is. But if the things produced immediately by God had been made so that God might attain his end, then the last things, for the sake of which the earlier were made, would necessarily be the most excellent of all.
  1. c ut ex prop. 21.] transcr. ut exprop. 21. Word division restored (OP p. 36: ‘ex Propositionibus 21. 22. & 23.’).
Deinde haec doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit; nam, si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit, quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysicid distinguant inter finem indigentiae et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse; quia nihil ante creationem praeter Deum assignare possunt, propter quod Deus ageret; adeoque necessario fateri coguntur, Deum iis, propter quae media parare voluit, caruisse, eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum.
Next, this doctrine takes away God’s perfection; for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something that he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation,1 they nevertheless confess that God did all things for his own sake, not for the sake of the things to be created; because before creation they can assign nothing except God for whose sake God would act; and so they are necessarily compelled to confess that God lacked the things for whose sake he willed to provide means, and that he desired them, as is self-evident.
  1. d theologi et metaphysici] transcr. theologi et methapysici. Gebhardt prints ‘Methapysici’, a misprint corrected in his own corrigenda (G II 80 l. 24), which the transcription reproduces; the 1677 edition (OP p. 36) reads ‘Metaphysici’.
  1. 1 finis indigentiae, finis assimilationis. Adriaan Heereboord gives the formula of the scholastics: ‘Deus omnia fecit propter finem, non indigentiae, sed assimilationis’ (‘God made all things for an end, not of need but of assimilation’), that is, to make other things like himself by benefiting them (Meletemata philosophica, Amsterdam, 1665, Disputationes ex philosophia selectae II, disp. 24, p. 269; quoted by H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934, I 432).
Nec hic praetereundum est, quod huius doctrinae sectatores, qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi, reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile, sed ad ignorantiam; quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinae argumentandi medium. Nam si ex. gr. ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicuius caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt, lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse; ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiae (saepe enim multae simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt?
Nor should it be passed over here that the followers of this doctrine, who have wished to show off their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, have introduced a new way of arguing to prove this doctrine of theirs: namely, reduction not to the impossible, but to ignorance; which shows that this doctrine had no other means of argument. For if, for example, a stone has fallen from a roof onto someone’s head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this way that the stone fell in order to kill the man: for if it did not fall for that end, by the will of God, how could so many circumstances (for often many concur at once) have concurred by chance?
Respondebis fortasse, id ex eo, quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt: cur ventus illo tempore flavit? cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas, ventum tum ortum, quia mare praecedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat, et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat; instabunt iterum, quia nullus rogandi finis: cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit?
You will perhaps answer that it happened because the wind was blowing and the man was going that way. But they will insist: why was the wind blowing at that time? Why was the man going that way at that very time? If you answer again that the wind arose then because on the preceding day, while the weather was still calm, the sea had begun to be agitated, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will insist again, since there is no end to asking: but why was the sea agitated? Why was the man invited at that time?
Et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt, donec ad Dei voluntatem, hoc est, ignorantiae asylum confugeris. Sic etiam, ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo, quod tantae artis causas ignorant, concludunt, eandeme non mechanica, sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari, talique modo constitui, ut una pars alteram non laedat.
And so they will not cease to ask for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance. So too, when they see the structure of the human body, they are astonished, and because they do not know the causes of so much art, they conclude that it is fashioned not by mechanical but by divine or supernatural art, and constituted in such a way that one part does not injure another.
  1. e The 1677 edition (OP p. 37) and Bartuschat read concludent. Gebhardt (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355) corrects to concludunt, matching stupescunt, from the Dutch version (zo besluiten zij daaruit), as Leopold and Appuhn had done.
Atque hinc fit, ut qui miraculorum causas veras quaerit, quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro haeretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis, quos vulgus tamquam naturae deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt, quod sublata ignorantiaf stupor, hoc est, unicum argumentandi, tuendaeque suae auctoritatis medium, quod habent, tollitur.g Sed haec relinquo et ad id, quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo.
And hence it comes about that one who seeks the true causes of miracles,2 and strives to understand natural things as a learned man, and not to wonder at them as a fool, is everywhere held and proclaimed a heretic and impious by those whom the common people worship as interpreters of nature and of the gods. For they know that if ignorance is taken away, astonishment, that is, the only means they have of arguing and of defending their authority, is taken away too. But I leave these things and pass on to what I decided to treat here in the third place.
  1. f The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of liever botheit’ (‘or rather stupidity’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355). Gebhardt takes the words to have been struck in the Latin to soften the passage.
  2. g The Dutch version has, in place of Sed haec relinquo: ‘Doch ik geef aan hen zelven t’ oordeelen wat kracht in zodanig redeneren is’ (‘But I leave it to them to judge what force there is in such reasoning’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355). The margin glosses redeneren as Argumentari.
  1. 2 Miracles are treated at length in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, ch. 6 (‘De miraculis’).
[G II 81] Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt, omnia quae fiunt propter ipsos fieri; id in unaquaque re praecipuum iudicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum, et illa omnia praestantissima aestimare, a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones, quibus rerum naturas explicarent, scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem;a et quia se liberos existimant, inde hae notiones ortae sunt, scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum.b
After men persuaded themselves that everything that happens happens for their sake, they had to judge that the principal thing in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by which they were most agreeably affected. Hence they had to form these notions, by which to explain the natures of things: good, evil, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty and ugliness; and because they think themselves free, these notions have arisen: praise and blame, sin and merit.
  1. a scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem;] transcr. scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem;. Italics restored from the 1677 edition (OP p. 37), which marks the notions under discussion.
  2. b scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum] transcr. scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum. Italics restored from the 1677 edition (OP p. 37).
Sed has infra, postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne, quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum; quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt.
But the latter I shall explain below, after I have treated human nature;1 the former I shall explain briefly here. Namely, whatever conduces to health and to the worship of God they have called good; what is contrary to these, evil.2
  1. 1 Praise and blame are defined in Part III, Prop. 29, Schol.; merit and sin in Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2, which begins by recalling this promise.
  2. 2 Part IV keeps the words: good and evil are ‘modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from comparing things with one another’, and are defined by reference to a model of human nature (Part IV, Pref.; Def. 1).
Et quia ii, qui rerum naturam non intelligunt, nihil de rebus affirmant, sed res tantummodo imaginanturc et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suaeque naturae ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositae, ut, cum nobis per sensus repraesentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas,d si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas, sive confusas esse dicimus.
And because those who do not understand the nature of things affirm nothing about things, but only imagine them and take the imagination for the intellect, they firmly believe, ignorant of things and of their own nature, that there is order in things. For when things are so disposed that, when they are presented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them and consequently easily remember them, we say that they are well ordered; but if the contrary, that they are badly ordered, or confused.
  1. c non intelligunt, nihil de rebus affirmant, sed res tantummodo imaginantur] transcr. non intelligunt, sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant sed res tantummodo imaginantur. The transcription has ‘sed res tantummodo imaginantur’ twice, conflating two orders. The 1677 edition (OP p. 37) and Bartuschat have it once, after ‘affirmant’, as printed here; Gebhardt (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355–356) moves it before ‘nihil de rebus affirmant’, to repair a disorder he traces to Spinoza’s revision of the wording preserved in the Dutch version.
  2. d The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘in goede ordening, of’ (‘in good order, or’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 82; Textgestaltung II 356). That is, ‘we say that they are in good order, or well ordered’.
Et quoniam ea nobis prae ceteris grata sunt, quae facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni praeferunt; quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse, et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt; nisi velint forte, Deum humanae imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo, quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis iniiciet, quod infinita reperiantur, quae nostram imaginationem longe superant, et plurima, quae ipsam propter eius imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis.
And since those things are more pleasing to us than others which we can easily imagine, men prefer order to confusion, as if order were something in nature beyond its relation to our imagination; and they say that God has created all things in order, and in this way, without knowing it, attribute imagination to God; unless perhaps they mean that God, providing for human imagination, has disposed all things in the way in which they could most easily imagine them. Nor perhaps will it give them pause that infinitely many things are found which far surpass our imagination, and very many which confuse it on account of its weakness. But enough of this.
Ceterae deinde notiones etiam praeter imaginandi modos, quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt, et tamen ab ignaris tamquam praecipua rerum attributa considerantur; quia, ut iam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt, et rei alicuius naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt, prout ab eadem afficiuntur.
Next, the other notions too are nothing but modes of imagining, by which the imagination is affected in various ways; and yet the ignorant consider them the principal attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe that all things have been made for their sake, and they call the nature of a thing good or evil, healthy or rotten and corrupt, according as they are affected by it.
Ex. gr. si motus, quem nervi ab obiectis per oculos repraesentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, obiecta, a quibus causatur, pulchra dicuntur, quae autem contrarium motum cient, deformia. Quae deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel faetida vocant, quae per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc.; quae autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut laevia, etc.
For example, if the motion which the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes conduces to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful, and those which cause the contrary motion, ugly. Those, next, which move the sense through the nostrils they call fragrant or fetid; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless, etc.; and through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.
Et quae denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur, quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit, ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi, qui sibi persuaserint, motus coelestes harmoniam componere.
And finally, those which move the ears are said to produce noise, sound or harmony, the last of which has driven men so mad that they have believed that God too delights in harmony. Nor are there lacking philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions compose a harmony.3
  1. 3 The Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle, who reports and rejects the doctrine that the moving stars produce a harmony (ἁρμονία) which we do not notice because we have heard it from birth (De caelo II.9, 290b12–291a8).
Quae omnia satis ostendunt, unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus iudicasse, vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus), quod inter homines tot, quot experimur, controversiae ortae sint, ex quibus tandem scepticismus.
All of which shows sufficiently that each has judged things according to the disposition of his brain, or rather has taken the affections of the imagination for things. So it is no wonder (to note this too in passing) that as many controversies as we experience have arisen among men, and from them, finally, scepticism.
Nam, quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant, et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est; et sic de ceteris, quibus hic supersedeo, cum quia huius loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt.
For although human bodies agree in many things, they differ in very many, and so what seems good to one seems evil to another; what seems ordered to one, confused to another; what is pleasing to one is displeasing to another; and so of the rest, which I pass over here, both because this is not the place to treat them expressly, and because everyone has experienced this sufficiently.
Omnibus enim in ore est: quot capita, tot sensus,e suo quemque sensu abundare, non minora cerebrorum, quam palatorum esse discrimina; quae sententiae satis ostendunt, homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus iudicare, resque potius imaginari, quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illae omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.
For everyone has these sayings on his lips: ‘So many heads, so many opinions’, ‘everyone abounds in his own sense’,4 ‘there are no fewer differences of brains than of palates’: which sayings show sufficiently that men judge things according to the disposition of the brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they had understood things, these would all, as mathematics testifies, if not attract them, at least convince them.
  1. e Terentius, Phormio 454 [Meijer]
  1. 4 The first saying recalls Terence, Phormio 454: ‘Quot homines, tot sententiae’ (‘So many men, so many opinions’), the identification given in the note to the Latin; the second, the Vulgate of Romans 14:5: ‘unusquisque in suo sensu abundet’ (‘let each abound in his own sense’).
[G II 83] Videmus itaque omnes notiones,a quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi, nec ullius rei naturam, sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare; et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium, extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis, sed imaginationis voco; atque adeo omnia argumenta, quae contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt.
We see, therefore, that all the notions by which the common people are accustomed to explain nature are only modes of imagining, and indicate the nature of nothing, but only the constitution of the imagination; and because they have names, as if they were notions of beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings not of reason but of imagination;1 and so all the arguments that are drawn against us from such notions can easily be repelled.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 39) reads omnes rationes. Gebhardt (G II 83; Textgestaltung II 356) corrects to notiones from the Dutch version (de kundigheden, with the marginal gloss ‘Notiones’), as Stern had conjectured; Bartuschat follows him.
  1. 1 entia non rationis, sed imaginationis. The Cogitata Metaphysica (I.1) had already said of certain modes of thinking that men ‘nomina ipsis imposuerunt, tanquam ad significandum entia extra mentem nostram existentia, quae Entia, sive potius Non-entia Entia rationis vocaverunt’ (‘gave them names, as if to signify beings existing outside our mind, and called these beings, or rather non-beings, beings of reason’; G I 234–235). Here Spinoza traces such notions to the imagination rather than to reason.
Solent enim multi sic argumentari: si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimae Dei naturae sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortae?b Videlicet rerum corruptio ad faetorem usque, rerum deformitas, quae nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc.
For many are accustomed to argue thus: if all things have followed from the necessity of God’s most perfect nature, where then have so many imperfections in nature come from? For instance, the corruption of things to the point of stench, the ugliness of things that moves nausea, confusion, evil, sin, etc.
  1. b The 1677 edition (OP p. 39) prints unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura? without a verb, but supplies ortae in its list of errata; the Dutch version has gesproten. Van Vloten–Land left it out; Gebhardt (G II 83; Textgestaltung II 356) and Bartuschat print it.
Sed, ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est aestimanda; nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectae sunt, propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanae naturae conducunt, vel quod eidem repugnant.
But, as I have just said, these are easily refuted. For the perfection of things is to be judged from their nature and power alone; nor are things more or less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to human nature or are repugnant to it.
Iis autem, qui quaerunt: cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo, quam: quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo: quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut prop. 16. demonstravi.
But to those who ask why God did not create all men so that they would be governed by the guidance of reason alone, I answer nothing but this: because he did not lack material for creating all things, namely from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed for producing all things that can be conceived by some infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in Prop. 16.
Haec sunt, quae hic notare suscepi praeiudicia. Si quaedam huius farinae adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.c
These are the prejudices I undertook to note here. If some of this sort still remain,2 anyone can correct them with a little meditation.
  1. c The Dutch version ends the Appendix with a further clause: ‘en dieshalven vind ik geen reden om op deze dingen langer te blijven, enz.’ (‘and therefore I find no reason to dwell on these things any longer, etc.’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 83; Textgestaltung II 356). Leopold rendered it itaque nullam invenio causam, ut his rebus diutius insistam etc.; Gebhardt holds that Spinoza meant the Appendix to end without it.
  1. 2 huius farinae, literally ‘of this flour’, a colloquial idiom.

Cited in 2P16C2, 2P48S, 4Pref, 4P37S2