Ethices Pars Quinta
De Potentia Intellectus seu de Libertate Humana

Fifth Part of the Ethics
Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom

Introduction to the Fifth Part

The last Part is called De potentia intellectus, seu de libertate humana, “Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom.” Part IV ended by describing a free man and admitting that no one is born free; Part V asks how far the mind can make itself free, and in what that freedom consists. Its Preface states both questions: Spinoza will treat of the power of reason, “showing what reason itself can do against the affects, and then what freedom of mind, or blessedness, is; from which we shall see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant” (Preface). The answer to the first question occupies Props. 1–20; the answer to the second, Props. 21–42.

Part V is the shortest Part of the Ethics, less than half the length of Part IV, and it is the most disputed. Its first half is a practical psychology, sober and close to experience, and most readers find it among the most useful things in the book. Its second half, on the eternity of the mind and the intellectual love of God, is the culmination toward which Spinoza says everything has been leading, and it has been read as the summit of his philosophy, as a mystical appendage to it, and as a failure. This introduction describes both halves, the essay before Prop. 21 introduces the second more fully, and Appendix E describes how modern interpreters have read it.

The Preface: the Stoics and Descartes

The Preface begins by marking the limits of the Part. How the intellect is to be perfected belongs to logic, and how the body is to be cared for belongs to medicine; neither is treated here. Spinoza will treat only of the power of the mind, “and above all I shall show how great and of what kind its dominion over the affects is, for restraining and moderating them. For we have already demonstrated above that we do not have absolute dominion over them.”

Two answers are then set aside. The Stoics thought that the affects depend absolutely on our will and that we can command them absolutely, yet they were compelled “by the protests of experience and not by their own principles” to admit that no little practice is needed to restrain them; someone, Spinoza recalls, tried to show this with two dogs, a house dog trained to hunt and a hunting dog trained to leave hares alone. Descartes inclines to the same opinion. Spinoza summarizes the doctrine of the Passions of the Soul at length and with evident care: the mind is united chiefly to the pineal gland, which it can move by willing; each motion of the gland is joined by nature to a certain thought, but can be joined to others by habit; and so, by determining the will through firm judgments and joining to them the motions of the passions we want to have, “we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions.” From this Descartes concluded “that there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when it is well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions” (Preface).

Spinoza’s reply is one of the sharpest passages he wrote. He can hardly believe that so great a man should have put the doctrine forward, “if it had been less acute.” A philosopher who had resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles, and who had so often reproached the scholastics for explaining obscure things by occult qualities, assumed “a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality.” “What clear and distinct concept, I say, has he of a thought most closely united to a certain small portion of quantity?” How many degrees of motion can the mind give the gland, and with what force can it hold it? Might not the motions joined to firm judgments be disjoined again by corporeal causes, so that a man who had resolved to face danger would, at the sight of it, think only of flight? “And indeed, since there is no ratio of will to motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body.” The anatomy is wrong as well: the gland is not so placed that it can be moved so easily, and not all the nerves reach the cavities of the brain. “Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, we shall determine the remedies for the affects ... by the knowledge of the mind alone, and from that same knowledge we shall deduce all that concerns its blessedness.”

The Preface thus states the program of the whole Part. There is no will that can master the passions by moving the body; there is only understanding, and whatever power the mind has over the affects must come from it.

The axioms and the first propositions

The Part has two axioms. If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change must take place in both or in one until they cease to be contrary (Axiom 1); and the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause (Axiom 2). The first propositions lay the foundation for the remedies. “In just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected exactly in the body” (Prop. 1), which is Part II’s parallelism applied to the affects: if the mind orders its thoughts, the body’s affections are ordered correspondingly. “If we separate a commotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause ... will be destroyed” (Prop. 2), since love and hatred are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Then comes the central proposition of the first half: “An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (Prop. 3). The demonstration is short: a passion is a confused idea, and when we form a clear and distinct idea of it, it will be distinguished from the affect only by reason, and so will cease to be a passion. “An affect, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind is acted on by it the less, the better it is known to us” (Prop. 3, Cor.). And “there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept” (Prop. 4), since whatever is common to all things can only be conceived adequately. The scholium concludes that “no remedy for the affects which depends on our power can be thought of that is more excellent than this one, which consists in a true knowledge of them, since there is no other power of the mind than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas” (Prop. 4, Schol.).

The remedies

The next propositions describe the ways in which understanding changes the force of the affects. An affect toward a thing imagined simply, not as necessary, possible or contingent, is the greatest (Prop. 5); and “insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects” (Prop. 6). The scholium appeals to experience. The sadness over a good that has been lost is eased as soon as a man considers that it could not have been kept; and “no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk or reason,” but if most men were born adults and only a few infants, everyone would pity infants, regarding infancy as a fault of nature rather than as natural and necessary (Prop. 6, Schol.).

Affects that arise from reason are, over time, more powerful than those related to singular things contemplated as absent, since reason is concerned with the common properties of things, which are always present (Prop. 7). An affect is greater the more causes concur in arousing it (Prop. 8), and an affect related to many causes is less harmful than an equally great affect related to one (Prop. 9). “So long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect” (Prop. 10).

The scholium to Prop. 10 turns this into practical advice, and it is the passage of the Ethics that comes closest to a manual of conduct. “The best thing, therefore, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a right way of living, or sure principles of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life, so that in this way our imagination may be widely affected by them, and they may always be ready to hand for us.” The example is the precept of Part IV that hatred is to be conquered by love, or nobility, and not repaid with hatred: to have it ready when needed, we must often meditate on the common injuries of men and on how they are best warded off by nobility, so that the image of an injury is joined to the image of the precept (Prop. 10, Schol.). The same scholium applies the method to fear, by imagining the common dangers of life and how presence of mind and strength of character overcome them, and advises that in ordering our thoughts we attend to what is good in each thing, so as to be moved by joy: a man who pursues glory too much should think of its right use, and not of its abuse and emptiness and the inconstancy of men, “about which no one thinks except from sickness of mind.” The remedies of the Ethics are not acts of will; they are habits of thought, formed by understanding and maintained by practice.

The love of God

The first half of the Part ends with a new affect. “The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God” (Prop. 14), since there is no affection of the body of which it cannot form a clear and distinct concept. “He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects” (Prop. 15), since such understanding is accompanied by joy and by the idea of God as its cause. “This love towards God must occupy the mind most” (Prop. 16), because it is joined to all the affections of the body and encouraged by all of them.

The love Spinoza describes is not reciprocal. “God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness” (Prop. 17), and so, “strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one” (Prop. 17, Cor.). No one can hate God (Prop. 18). “He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return” (Prop. 19), since he would then desire that God, whom he loves, should not be God. And this love “cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or of jealousy; but it is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love” (Prop. 20). Unlike the loves analysed in Part III, which are troubled by rivals, loss and change, the love of God is shared without diminution and directed at an object that cannot be lost.

The scholium to Prop. 20 gathers the results into five remedies. The power of the mind over the affects consists “1. In the knowledge itself of the affects ... 2. In its separating the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly ... 3. In time, by which the affections related to things which we understand surpass those related to things which we conceive confusedly, or in a mutilated way ... 4. In the multitude of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are encouraged ... 5. Finally, in the order in which the mind can order its affects and connect them with one another” (Prop. 20, Schol.). The scholium ends with a sentence that divides the Part in two: “And with these I have completed everything which concerns this present life. ... It is time, therefore, to pass to those things which pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.”

The eternity of the mind

The second half begins with the denial of what most readers expect. “The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures” (Prop. 21). But there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity (Prop. 22), and so “the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (Prop. 23). The eternity in question is not endless duration but the eternity defined in Part I, and the essay before Prop. 21 explains the doctrine and its difficulties.

From it Spinoza derives an account of the third kind of knowledge and its fruits. “The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God” (Prop. 24). “The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge” (Prop. 25), and “from this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be” (Prop. 27). The desire to know things in this way cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second (Prop. 28): reason prepares the way for intuition, and imagination does not.

“Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause” (Prop. 32). From this “there necessarily arises the intellectual love of God,” the love of God not insofar as we imagine him as present, “but insofar as we understand God to be eternal” (Prop. 32, Cor.). This love is eternal (Prop. 33), though the scholium explains that Spinoza speaks of it as if it had come into being, for ease of exposition. “God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love” (Prop. 35), and “the intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love of God by which God loves himself ... that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself” (Prop. 36). Hence “God, insofar as he loves himself, loves men, and consequently ... the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same” (Prop. 36, Cor.).

The scholium to Prop. 36 draws the conclusion toward which the whole book has moved. “From these things we understand clearly in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists: namely, in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God towards men.” This love “is called glory in the sacred books, and not without reason.” And Spinoza adds a remark about the third kind of knowledge itself: he has shown generally in Part I that all things depend on God according to essence and existence, but that demonstration, though certain, does not affect the mind as much as when the same conclusion is drawn from the essence of a singular thing that we say depends on God (Prop. 36, Schol.). The difference between the second and third kinds of knowledge is the difference between knowing that everything follows from God and seeing how this thing, oneself, does.

Body, death and degrees of eternity

The last propositions draw consequences for the life of the body. “There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away” (Prop. 37). “The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death” (Prop. 38). “He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal” (Prop. 39), so that eternity is not given to every mind in the same measure, and the scholium returns to the infant and the corpse, the changes of life by which we are called happy or unhappy. “The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on” (Prop. 40), and the part of the mind that remains, however great it may be, is more perfect than the rest (Prop. 40, Cor.).

An ethics that does not depend on immortality

Then Spinoza does something surprising. Having argued that something of the mind is eternal, he insists that the ethics of Part IV does not depend on it. “Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility” (Prop. 41). The scholium attacks the common view that piety and religion are burdens to be laid down after death, borne only in hope of reward and fear of punishment, and calls it no less absurd than if someone, because he did not believe he could nourish his body with good food for eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons (Prop. 41, Schol.).

The last proposition answers that view directly. “Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts, but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts” (Prop. 42). The final scholium contrasts the ignorant man, driven about by external causes and never possessing true contentment of mind, who “as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he also ceases to be,” with the wise man, who, “being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true contentment of mind.” And it ends with the most famous sentences of the book: “If the way which I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, it can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is so rarely found must be hard. For how could it happen, if salvation were ready to hand and could be found without great labour, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare” (Prop. 42, Schol.).

Questions the reader will meet

The first concerns God’s love. Prop. 17, Cor. says that strictly speaking God loves no one; Prop. 36, Cor. says that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves men. The contradiction is apparent. The first denies that God has passions, joy or sadness that arise from external causes; the second describes an intellectual love that is not a passion and has no external object, the love by which God, conceived through the essence of the human mind, enjoys his own perfection. The phrase “strictly speaking” in the corollary to Prop. 17 is a warning that the word “love” will be used again in another sense.

The second concerns the relation between the two halves of the Part. The remedies of the first half concern “this present life”; the second half concerns the mind “without relation to the body.” Yet the second half speaks of what the mind can do now, and its account of the intellectual love of God continues the account of the love of God in Props. 14–20. Readers have asked whether the two halves describe two kinds of freedom, a practical one and a contemplative one, or two aspects of one.

The third concerns the value of the second half. Jonathan Bennett judged that “the final three doctrines” of the Ethics, the mind’s eternity, intuitive knowledge and the intellectual love of God, cannot be rescued, and that this part of the Ethics “has nothing to teach us” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, § 85, p. 372). Others, among them Stuart Hampshire, whom Bennett quotes, have read the doctrine sympathetically as an account of what it is to understand things completely and to know oneself, in such moments, as part of the eternal order of nature. The reader will have to decide; the essay before Prop. 21 tries to make clear what the doctrine claims and what it does not.

A last question concerns how hard the way is. Spinoza ends by saying that it is very hard and rarely found, and the remedies of Part V are modest: knowledge of the affects, separation of them from their external causes, time, the multitude of causes, and order. None of them promises a sudden liberation. The freedom of Part V is a matter of degree, and so is its blessedness, and the book’s last word is not a promise but an encouragement.

The place of Part V in the whole

Part V gathers the threads of the whole Ethics. Its God is the God of Part I, who acts from the necessity of his nature and loves himself with an intellectual love; its theory of knowledge is that of Part II, with the third kind of knowledge at last put to work; its remedies apply the theory of the affects of Part III; and its blessedness is the end toward which the free man of Part IV was striving. The Preface to Part II promised that the work would explain only what could lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness. Part V is where that promise is kept.

The text begins with the Preface, with its criticism of the Stoics and of Descartes, and then with the two axioms. The first propositions are short and depend closely on Parts II and III; the reader who has followed those Parts will find the opening of Part V easy going.

Praefatio

Preface

[G II 277] Transeo tandem ad alteram ethices partem, quae est de modo sive via, quae ad libertatem ducit. In hac ergo de potentia rationis agam ostendens, quid ipsa ratio in affectus possit, et deinde, quid mentis libertas seu beatitudo sit; ex quibus videbimus, quantum sapiens potior sit ignaro.
I pass, finally, to the other part of ethics, which concerns the manner, or way, which leads to freedom. In this Part, therefore, I shall treat of the power of reason, showing what reason itself can do against the affects, and then what freedom of mind, or blessedness, is; from which we shall see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.
Quomodo autem et qua via debeat intellectus perfici, et qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum, ut possit suo officioa recte fungi, huc non pertinet; hoc enim ad medicinam, illud autem ad logicam spectat.b Hic igitur, ut dixi, de sola mentis seu rationis potentia agam, et ante omnia, quantum et quale imperium in affectus habeat ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum, ostendam. Nam nos in ipsos imperium absolutum non habere, iam supra demonstravimus.
But how and by what way the intellect must be perfected, and then by what art the body must be cared for so that it can perform its function properly, does not belong here; for the latter pertains to medicine, the former to logic. Here, therefore, as I have said, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason, and above all I shall show how great and of what kind its dominion over the affects is, for restraining and moderating them. For we have already demonstrated above that we do not have absolute dominion over them.1
  1. a qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum, ut possit suo officio] transcr. qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum; ut possit suo officio. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 233) and Gebhardt (G II 277).
  2. b hoc enim ad medicinam, illud autem ad logicam spectat] transcr. hoc enim ad medicinam, illud autem ad logicam spectat. Italics confined to the two disciplines.
  1. 1 In Part IV: man is necessarily always subject to passions (Prop. 4, Cor.), and an affect can be restrained only by a contrary and stronger affect (Prop. 7), not by true knowledge insofar as it is true (Prop. 14).
Stoici tamen putarunt, eosdem a nostra voluntate absolute pendere, nosque iis absolute imperare posse. Attamen ab experientia reclamante, non vero ex suis principiis coacti sunt fateri, usum et studium non parvum requiri ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum. Quod quidam exemplo duorum canum (si recte memini), unius scilicet domestici, alterius venatici, conatus est ostendere; nempe quia usu efficere tandem potuit ut domesticus venari, venaticus contra a leporibus sectandis abstinere assuesceret.
The Stoics, however, thought that they depend absolutely on our will, and that we can command them absolutely. Yet they were compelled, by the protests of experience and not by their own principles, to admit that no little practice and effort are required to restrain and moderate them. Someone tried to show this by the example of two dogs (if I remember rightly), one a house dog, the other a hunting dog; namely, because by practice he was finally able to bring it about that the house dog grew accustomed to hunting, and the hunting dog, on the contrary, to refraining from chasing hares.2
  1. 2 Spinoza does not say who told the story. In the article of the Passions of the Soul he goes on to cite, Descartes gives a similar example of training: setters are taught to stop at the sight of a partridge and to run towards it at the sound of the gun, although by nature they do the opposite (art. 50, AT XI 370).
Huic opinioni non parum favet Cartesius. Nam statuit animam seu mentem unitam praecipue esse cuidam parti cerebri, glandulae scilicet pineali dictae, cuius ope mens motus omnes, qui in corpore excitantur, et obiecta externa sentit, quamque mens eo solo, quod vult, varie movere potest. Hanc glandulam in medio cerebri ita suspensam esse statuit, ut minimo spirituum animalium motu possit moveri.
Descartes inclines not a little to this opinion. For he maintained that the soul, or mind, is united chiefly to a certain part of the brain, namely the so-called pineal gland,3 by means of which the mind senses all the motions excited in the body, and external objects, and which the mind can move in various ways merely by willing. He maintained that this gland is so suspended in the middle of the brain that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits.
  1. 3 The account that follows summarizes the Passions of the Soul (1649), which Spinoza read in the Latin translation of 1650 (Passiones animae) and quotes from it almost word for word: the gland in the middle of the brain, through which the soul exercises its functions (arts. 31–32, AT XI 351–353), moved by the spirits and by the soul (art. 34), every volition joined by nature to some movement of the gland (art. 44), and the power of habit to join them otherwise (art. 50).
Deinde statuit, quod haec glans tot variis modis in medio cerebro suspendatur, quot variis modis spiritus animales in eandem impingunt, et quod praeterea tot varia vestigia in eadem imprimantur, quot varia obiecta externa ipsos spiritus animales versus eandem propellunt; unde fit, ut si glans postea ab animae voluntate illam diversimode movente hoc aut illo modo suspendatur, quo semel fuit suspensa a spiritibus hoc aut illo modo agitatis, tum ipsa glans ipsos spiritus animales eodem modo propellet et determinabit, ac antea a simili glandulae suspensione repulsi fuerant.
Next, he maintained that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many different ways as there are different ways in which the animal spirits strike against it, and that, besides, as many different traces are impressed on it as there are different external objects which drive the animal spirits towards it; from which it comes about that if the gland is afterwards suspended in this or that way by the will of the soul, which moves it in different ways, in the way in which it was once suspended by the spirits agitated in this or that way, then the gland itself will drive and determine the animal spirits in the same way as they had been repelled before by a similar suspension of the gland.
Praeterea statuit, unamquamque mentis voluntatem natura esse unitam certo cuidam glandis motui. Ex. gr. si quis voluntatem habet obiectum remotum intuendi, haec voluntas efficiet, ut pupilla dilatetur; sed si de sola dilatanda pupilla cogitet, nihil proderit eius rei habere voluntatem, quia natura non iunxit motum glandis, qui inservit impellendis spiritibus versus nervum opticum modo conveniente dilatandae vel contrahendae pupillae, cum voluntate eandem dilatandi vel contrahendi; sed demum cum voluntate intuendi obiecta remota vel proxima.
Besides, he maintained that each will of the mind is united by nature to a certain motion of the gland. For example, if someone has the will to look at a distant object, this will brings it about that the pupil is dilated; but if he thinks only of dilating the pupil, it will be of no use to have the will to do so,4 because nature has not joined the motion of the gland which serves to drive the spirits towards the optic nerve in the way suitable for dilating or contracting the pupil with the will to dilate or contract it, but only with the will to look at distant or near objects.
  1. 4 The example and its wording come from art. 44 (AT XI 361–362), in the Latin of 1650: ‘si solum cogitetur de pupilla dilatanda, nihil proderit ejus rei habere voluntatem’.
Denique statuit, quod, etsi unusquisque motus huius glandulae videatur connexus esse per naturam singulis ex nostris cogitationibus ab initio nostrae vitae, aliis tamen per habitum possunt iungi, quod probare conatur artic. 50. P. 1. de passionibus animae. Ex his concludit, nullam esse tam imbecillem animam quae non possit, cum bene dirigitur, acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas passiones.
Finally, he maintained that although each motion of this gland seems to have been connected by nature from the beginning of our life with each of our thoughts, they can nevertheless be joined to others by habit, which he tries to prove in art. 50 of Part I of The Passions of the Soul. From this he concludes that there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when it is well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions.5
  1. 5 The title of art. 50 (AT XI 368), in the Latin of 1650: ‘Nullam tam imbecillem esse animam, quae non possit cum bene dirigitur acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas passiones’. The preceding sentence follows the opening of the same article. Spinoza had promised this examination in the Preface to Part III. In this Part ‘power’ renders both of Spinoza’s words: potentia, the power by which the mind acts, and potestas, what is in someone’s power, at his disposal (see the note on Part I, Prop. 17, Schol.). The question of Part V is how far the affects are in our power in the second sense (Prop. 3, Cor.), and the answer is given in terms of the mind’s power in the first (Prop. 20, Schol.).
Nam hae, ut ab eo definiuntur, sunt perceptiones aut sensus aut commotiones animae, quae ad eam speciatim referuntur, quaeque NB. producuntur,cd conservantur et corroborantur per aliquem motum spirituum. Vide Cartes. artic. 27. P. 1. passionum animae.
For these, as he defines them, are perceptions, or feelings, or commotions of the soul, which are related to it in particular, and which (note well!) are produced, preserved and strengthened by some motion of the spirits. See Descartes, art. 27 of Part I of The Passions of the Soul.6
  1. c quaeque NB. producuntur] transcr. quaeque nota bene producuntur. Gebhardt (G II 279) prints ‘NB.’, the reading of the 1677 errata; the transcription expands it.
  2. d The 1677 edition prints quaeque producuntur in the text and adds in its Sphalmata corrigenda: ita Auctor scripserat, NB. produ[cuntur]; the Dutch has (merk). Gebhardt (G II 279; Textgestaltung II 389) prints NB., which has the force of a critical exclamation mark.
  1. 6 Art. 27 (AT XI 349), quoted from the Latin of 1650: ‘Perceptiones, aut sensus, aut commotiones animae, quae ad eam speciatim referuntur, quaeque producuntur, conservantur et corroborantur per aliquem motum spirituum’. Spinoza’s ‘NB.’ marks the word that undoes the claim: if the passions are produced by motions of the spirits, they cannot depend on the will alone.
At quandoquidem cuilibet voluntati possumus iungere motum quemcumque glandis, et consequenter spirituum, et determinatio voluntatis a sola nostra potestate pendet, si igitur nostram voluntatem certis et firmis iudiciis, secundum quae nostrae vitae actiones dirigere volumus, determinemus et motus passionum, quas habere volumus, hisce iudiciis iungamus, imperium acquiremus absolutum in nostras passiones.
But since we can join any motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, to any will, and the determination of the will depends on our power alone, if, therefore, we determine our will by sure and firm judgments according to which we want to direct the actions of our life, and join to these judgments the motions of the passions which we want to have, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions.
Haec est clarissimi huius viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis coniicio), quam ego vix credidissem a tanto viro prolatam esse, si minus acuta fuisset. Profecto mirari satis non possum, quod vir philosophus, qui firmiter statuerat, nihil deducere nisi ex principiis per se notis, et nihil affirmare nisi quod clare et distincte perciperet, et qui toties scholasticos reprehenderat, quod per occultas qualitates res obscuras voluerint explicare, hypothesin sumat omni occulta qualitate occultiorem.
This is the opinion of this most distinguished man (so far as I can conjecture from his words); and I would hardly have believed it to have been put forward by so great a man, if it had been less acute. Indeed, I cannot wonder enough that a philosopher who had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing except what he perceived clearly and distinctly, and who had so often reproached the scholastics for wanting to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should assume a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality.
Quid, quaeso, per mentis et corporis unionem intelligit? Quem, inquam, clarum et distinctum conceptum habet cogitationis arctissime unitae cuidam quantitatis portiunculae? Vellem sane, ut hanc unionem per proximam suam causam explicuisset. Sed ille mentem a corpore adeo distinctam conceperat, ut nec huius unionis, nec ipsius mentis ullam singularem causam assignare potuerit, sed necesse ipsi fuerit, ad causam totius universi, hoc est, ad Deum recurrere.
What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct concept, I say, has he of a thought most closely united to a certain small portion of quantity? I should indeed have liked him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind to be so distinct from the body that he could assign no singular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, but had to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God.7
  1. 7 Descartes explains the correspondence of particular movements of the gland with particular thoughts by ‘the institution of nature’ (arts. 36 and 50), and by nature, ‘generaliter spectatam’, he understands ‘vel Deum ipsum, vel rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institutam’ (‘either God himself, or the order of created things instituted by God’, Meditations VI, AT VII 80). For Spinoza mind and body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol.; Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.).
Deinde pervelim scire: quot motus gradus potest glandulae isti pineali mens tribuere, et quanta cum vi eandem suspensam tenere potest? Nam nescio an haec glans tardius vel celerius a mente circumagatur, quam a spiritibus animalibus, et an motus passionum, quos firmis iudiciis arcte iunximus, non possint ab iisdem iterum a causis corporeis disiungi; ex quo sequeretur, ut, quamvis mens firmiter proposuerit contra pericula ire, atque huic decreto motus audaciae iunxerit, viso tamen periculo glans ita suspendatur, ut mens non nisi de fuga possit cogitare.
Next, I should very much like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to this pineal gland, and with how much force it can hold it suspended. For I do not know whether this gland is driven about more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions which we have closely joined to firm judgments cannot be disjoined from them again by corporeal causes; from which it would follow that, although the mind had firmly resolved to go against dangers, and had joined the motions of daring to this decree, nevertheless, at the sight of the danger, the gland would be so suspended that the mind could think only of flight.
Et sane cum nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter mentis et corporis potentiam seu vires; et consequenter huius vires nequaquam viribus illius determinari possunt. His adde, quod nec haec glans ita in medio cerebro sita reperiatur, ut tam facile totque modis circumagi possit, et quod non omnes nervi ad cavitates usque cerebri protendantur. Denique omnia, quae de voluntate eiusque libertate asserit, omitto, quandoquidem haec falsa esse satis superque ostenderim. Igitur quia mentis potentia, ut supra ostendi, sola intelligentia definitur, affectuum remedia, quae omnes experiri quidem, sed non accurate observare, nec distincte videre credo, sola mentis cognitione determinabimus, et ex eadem illa omnia, quae ad ipsius beatitudinem spectant, deducemus.
And indeed, since there is no ratio of will to motion,8 there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body; and consequently the forces of the latter can by no means be determined by the forces of the former. Add to this that this gland is not found to be so situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend as far as the cavities of the brain. Finally, I pass over everything he asserts about the will and its freedom, since I have shown more than enough that it is false.9 Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, we shall determine the remedies for the affects, which I believe all experience but do not observe accurately or see distinctly, by the knowledge of the mind alone, and from that same knowledge we shall deduce all that concerns its blessedness.
  1. 8 ratio in its mathematical sense, a proportion between magnitudes of the same kind. Will and motion belong to different attributes and have no common measure, as Part III, Prop. 2 states: the body cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to motion.
  2. 9 In Part II, Props. 48–49 and the long Scholium to Prop. 49.

Cited in 2P47S, 2P49S

Axiomata

Axioms

[G II 281] I. Si in eodem subiecto duae contrariae actiones excitentur, debebit necessario vel in utraque, vel in una sola mutatio fieri, donec desinant contrariae esse.
I. If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will necessarily have to take place either in both or in one only, until they cease to be contrary.1
  1. 1 Used in Prop. 7, Dem..

Cited in 5P7D

II. Effectus potentia definitur potentia ipsius causae, quatenus eius essentia per ipsius causae essentiam explicatur vel definitur. Patet hoc axioma ex prop. 7. P. 3.
II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, insofar as its essence is explained or defined through the essence of its cause. This axiom is evident from Prop. 7 of Part III.

Cited in 5P8S

Propositiones

Propositions

Propositio I

Proposition I

Prout cogitationes rerumque ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente, ita corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines ad amussim ordinantur et concatenantur in corpore.
In just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected exactly in the body.1
  1. 1 The parallelism of Part II, Prop. 7 turned into a principle of practice: whatever order the mind gives its thoughts, the body’s affections receive the same order. The remedies of Part V work through this correspondence, not through any action of the mind on the body (Part III, Prop. 2).

Cited in 5P10D

Demonstratio. Ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per prop. 7. P. 2.) ac ordo et connexio rerum, et vice versa ordo et connexio rerum idem est (per coroll. prop. 6. et 7. P. 2.) ac ordo et connexio idearum. Quare sicuti ordo et connexio idearum in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis (per prop. 18. P. 2.), sic vice versa (per prop. 2. P. 3.) ordo et connexio affectionum corporis fit, prout cogitationes rerumque ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The order and connection of ideas is the same (by Prop. 7 of Part II) as the order and connection of things, and conversely the order and connection of things is the same (by Cors. of Props. 6 and 7 of Part II) as the order and connection of ideas. Hence, just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind happens according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by Prop. 18 of Part II), so conversely (by Prop. 2 of Part III) the order and connection of the affections of the body happens as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind. Q.E.D.

Propositio II

Proposition II

Si animi commotionem seu affectum a causae externae cogitatione amoveamus et aliis iungamus cogitationibus, tum amor seu odium erga causam externam, ut et animi fluctuationes, quae ex his affectibus oriuntur, destruentur.
If we separate a commotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as the fluctuations of mind which arise from these affects, will be destroyed.

Cited in 5P4S, 5P20S

[G II 282] Demonstratio. Id enim, quod formam amoris vel odii constituit, est laetitia vel tristitia concomitante idea causae externae (per aff. defin. 6. et 7.). Hac igitur sublata amoris vel odii forma simul tollitur; adeoque hi affectus, et qui ex his oriuntur, destruuntur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For what constitutes the form of love or hatred is joy or sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Defs. Aff. 6 and 7). When this is taken away, therefore, the form of love or hatred is taken away at the same time; and so these affects, and those which arise from them, are destroyed. Q.E.D.

Propositio III

Proposition III

Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque eius claram et distinctam formamus ideam.
An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.1
  1. 1 The idea of an affect is not a second thing beside it but the affect itself conceived as an idea (Part II, Prop. 21, Schol.). To know an affect clearly is therefore to have, in place of a confused idea, an adequate one, of which the mind is the adequate cause; and that is no longer a passion (Part III, Def. 2, Prop. 3). The Scholium to Prop. 20 adds the qualification: clear knowledge, if it does not take away the passions absolutely, at least makes them constitute the smallest part of the mind.

Cited in 5P18S, 5P20S

Demonstratio. Affectus, qui passio est, idea est confusa (per gener. aff. defin.). Si itaque ipsius affectus claram et distinctam formemus ideam, haec idea ab ipso affectu, quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, non nisi ratione distinguetur (per prop. 21. P. 2. cum eiusdem schol.a); adeoque (per prop. 3. P. 3.) affectus desinet esse passio. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An affect which is a passion is a confused idea (by the General Definition of the Affects). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea will be distinguished from the affect itself, insofar as it is related to the mind alone, only by reason (by Prop. 21 of Part II with its Schol.); and so (by Prop. 3 of Part III) the affect will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition and the Dutch have Prop. 22.; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder, Saisset and Van Vloten–Land correct to 21, and Gebhardt (G II 282; Textgestaltung II 389) follows.
Corollarium. Affectus igitur eo magis in nostra potestate est et mens ab eo minus patitur, quo nobis est notior.
Corollary. An affect, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind is acted on by it the less, the better it is known to us.

Cited in 5P42D

Propositio IV

Proposition IV

Nulla est corporis affectio, cuius aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum.
There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.

Cited in 5P4C, 5P14D

Demonstratio. Quae omnibus communia sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adaequate (per prop. 38. P. 2.). Adeoque (per prop. 12. et lemm. 2.a quod habetur post schol. prop. 13. P. 2.) nulla est corporis affectio, cuius aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Those things which are common to all can only be conceived adequately (by Prop. 38 of Part II). And so (by Prop. 12 and Lemma 2, which is found after the Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part II) there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.1 Q.E.D.
  1. a et lemm. 2.] transcr. etlemm. 2. Word division.
  1. 1 Every affection of the body involves what is common to all bodies (extension, motion and rest: Lemma 2), and the mind perceives whatever happens in its body (Part II, Prop. 12); so every affection contains something that is conceived adequately. The clear concept is ‘some’ (aliquem), not a complete one.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, nullum esse affectum, cuius non possumus aliquem clarum et distinctum formare conceptum. Est namque affectus corporis affectionis idea (per gener. aff. defin.), quae propterea (per prop. praeced.) aliquem clarum et distinctum involvere debet conceptum.
Corollary. Hence it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. For an affect is the idea of an affection of the body (by the General Definition of the Affects), which therefore (by the preceding Prop.) must involve some clear and distinct concept.
[G II 283] Scholium. Quandoquidem nihil datur, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur (per prop. 36. P. 1.), et quicquid ex idea, quae in nobis est adaequata, sequitur, id omne clare et distincte intelligimus (per prop. 40. P. 2.); hinc sequitur, unumquemque potestatem habere, se suosque affectus, si non absolute, ex parte saltem clare et distincte intelligendi, et consequenter efficiendi, ut ab iisdem minus patiatur. Huic igitur rei praecipue danda est opera, ut unumquemque affectum, quantum fieri potest, clare et distincte cognoscamus, ut sic mens ex affectu ad illa cogitandum determinetur, quae clare et distincte percipit, et in quibus plane acquiescit; atque adeo ut ipse affectus a cogitatione causae externae separetur et veris iungatur cogitationibus. Ex quo fiet, ut non tantum amor, odium etc. destruantur (per prop. 2. huius), sed ut etiam appetitus seu cupiditates, quae ex tali affectu oriri solent, excessum habere nequeant (per prop. 61. P. 4.).a
Scholium. Since there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by Prop. 36 of Part I), and whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (by Prop. 40 of Part II), it follows that each one has the power of understanding himself and his affects clearly and distinctly, if not absolutely, at least in part, and consequently of bringing it about that he is acted on less by them. To this, therefore, we must above all devote our effort, that we know each affect, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, so that the mind may be determined by the affect to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and in which it is fully content; and so that the affect itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts. From this it will come about not only that love, hatred, etc. are destroyed (by Prop. 2 of this Part), but also that the appetites, or desires, which usually arise from such an affect cannot be excessive (by Prop. 61 of Part IV).
  1. a The 1677 edition and the Dutch have Prop. 62.; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to 61, and Gebhardt (G II 283; Textgestaltung II 389) follows.
Nam apprime notandum est, unum eundemque esse appetitum, per quem homo tam agere quam pati dicitur. Ex. gr. cum natura humana ita comparatum esse ostendimus, ut unusquisque appetat, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant (vide schol. prop. 31. P. 3.c);b qui quidem appetitus in homine, qui ratione non ducitur, passio est, quae ambitio vocatur, nec multum a superbia discrepat; et contra in homine, qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, actio seu virtus est, quae pietas appellatur (vide schol. 1. prop. 37. P. 4. et 2. demonstr. eiusdem prop.).
For it should be noted above all that it is one and the same appetite through which a man is said both to act and to be acted on. For example, since we have shown that human nature is so constituted that each one wants the others to live according to his temperament (see Schol. of Prop. 31 of Part III), this appetite, in a man who is not led by reason, is a passion, which is called ambition and does not differ much from pride; and on the other hand in a man who lives from the dictate of reason it is an action, or virtue, which is called piety (see Schol. 1 of Prop. 37 of Part IV and the second demonstration of the same Prop.).
  1. b (vide schol. prop. 31. P. 3.)] transcr. (vide coroll. prop. 31. P. 3.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 239) and Bartuschat read ‘Schol.’; Gebhardt’s text (G II 283) prints ‘Coroll.’, but his Textgestaltung (II 389) rejects Schmidt’s and Auerbach’s ‘Coroll.’ and approves Van Vloten–Land’s keeping of the 1677 reading.
  2. c So the 1677 edition (OP p. 239) and Bartuschat. Gebhardt’s text (G II 283) prints Coroll., but his Textgestaltung (II 389) calls Schmidt’s and Auerbach’s Coroll. unjustified and approves Van Vloten–Land’s keeping of the 1677 reading; the passage meant is the Scholium.
Et hoc modo omnes appetitus seu cupiditates eatenus tantum passiones sunt, quatenus ex ideis inadaequatis oriuntur; atque eaedem virtuti accensentur, quando ab ideis adaequatis excitantur vel generantur. Nam omnes cupiditates, quibus ad aliquid agendum determinamur, tam oriri possunt ab adaequatis, quam ab inadaequatis ideis (vide prop. 59. P. 4.). Atque hoc (ut eo, unde digressus sum, revertar) affectuum remedio, quod scilicet in eorum vera cognitione consistit, nullum praestantius aliud, quod a nostra potestate pendeat, excogitari potest, quandoquidem nulla alia mentis potentia datur, quam cogitandi et adaequatas ideas formandi, ut supra (per prop. 3. P. 3.) ostendimus.
And in this way all appetites, or desires, are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and the same are counted as virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to do something can arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (see Prop. 59 of Part IV). And (to return to the point from which I digressed) no remedy for the affects which depends on our power can be thought of that is more excellent than this one, which consists in a true knowledge of them, since there is no other power of the mind than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (by Prop. 3 of Part III).

Cited in 5P20S

Propositio V

Proposition V

[G II 284] Affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter et non ut necessariam neque ut possibilem, neque ut contingentem imaginamur, ceteris paribus omnium est maximus.
An affect towards a thing which we imagine simply, and not as necessary, or as possible, or as contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.

Cited in 5P6D

Demonstratio. Affectus erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, maior est, quam erga necessariam (per prop. 49. P. 3.), et consequenter adhuc maior, quam erga illam, quam ut possibilem vel contingentem imaginamur (per prop. 11. P. 4.). At rem aliquam ut liberam imaginari nihil aliud esse potest, quam quod rem simpliciter imaginamur, dum causas, a quibus ipsa ad agendum determinata fuit, ignoramus (per illa quae in schol. prop. 35. P. 2. ostendimus). Ergo affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter imaginamur, ceteris paribus maior est, quam erga necessariam, possibilem vel contingentem, et consequenter maximus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An affect towards a thing which we imagine to be free is greater than towards a necessary thing (by Prop. 49 of Part III), and consequently still greater than towards one which we imagine as possible or contingent (by Prop. 11 of Part IV). But to imagine a thing as free can be nothing other than to imagine the thing simply, while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to act (by what we showed in Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part II). Therefore an affect towards a thing which we imagine simply is, other things being equal, greater than towards a necessary, possible or contingent thing, and consequently the greatest. Q.E.D.

Propositio VI

Proposition VI

Quatenus mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit, eatenus maiorem in affectus potentiam habet, seu minus ab iisdem patitur.
Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them.

Cited in 5P10S

Demonstratio. Mens res omnes necessarias esse intelligit (per prop. 29. P. 1.), et infinito causarum nexu determinari ad existendum et operandum (per prop. 28. P. 1.). Adeoque (per prop. praeced.) eatenus efficit, ut ab affectibus, qui ex iis oriuntur, minus patiatur et (per prop. 48. P. 3.) minus erga ipsas afficiatur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind understands all things to be necessary (by Prop. 29 of Part I) and to be determined to exist and to operate by an infinite connection of causes (by Prop. 28 of Part I). And so (by the preceding Prop.) to that extent it brings it about that it is acted on less by the affects which arise from them, and (by Prop. 48 of Part III) that it is less affected towards them. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Quo haec cognitio, quod scilicet res necessariae sint, magis circa res singulares, quas distinctius et magis vivide imaginamur, versatur, eo haec mentis in affectus potentia maior est, quod ipsa etiam experientia testatur. Videmus enim tristitiam boni alicuius, quod periit, mitigari simulac homo, qui id perdidit, considerat bonum illud servari nulla ratione potuisse. Sic etiam videmus, quod nemo miseretur infantis, propterea quod nescit loqui, ambulare, ratiocinari, et quod denique tot annos quasi sui inscius vivat. At si plerique adulti, et unus aut alter infans nascerentur, tum unumquemque misereret infantum, quia tum ipsam infantiam non ut rem naturalem et necessariam, sed ut naturae vitium seu peccatum consideraret. Et ad hunc modum plura alia notare possemus.
Scholium. The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, concerns singular things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects, as experience itself also testifies. For we see that the sadness over a good which has perished is eased as soon as the man who has lost it considers that the good could not have been kept in any way. So also we see that no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk or reason, and because, finally, it lives so many years as if unconscious of itself. But if most men were born adults, and only one or another an infant, then everyone would pity infants, because he would then consider infancy itself not as a natural and necessary thing, but as a vice or fault of nature. And we could note many other things of this kind.

Propositio VII

Proposition VII

[G II 285] Affectus, qui ex ratione oriuntur vel excitantur, si ratio temporis habeatur, potentiores sunt iis, qui ad res singulares referuntur, quas ut absentes contemplamur.
Affects which arise from or are aroused by reason are, if account is taken of time,1 more powerful than those which are related to singular things which we contemplate as absent.
  1. 1 This qualifies Part IV, Props. 14–17: in the moment, desires from knowledge of the good are easily overcome; over time, affects related to what is always present, the common properties of things, prevail over affects whose objects are imagined as absent.

Cited in 5P10S, 5P20S

Demonstratio. Rem aliquam ut absentem non contemplamur ex affectu, quo eandem imaginamur, sed ex eo, quod corpus alio afficitur affectu, qui eiusdem rei existentiam secludit (per prop. 17. P. 2.). Quare affectus, qui ad rem, quam ut absentem contemplamur, refertur, eius naturae non est, ut reliquas hominis actiones et potentiam superet (de quibus vide prop. 6. P. 4.), sed contra eius naturae est, ut ab iis affectionibus, quae existentiam externae eius causae secludunt, coerceri aliquo modo possit (per prop. 9. P. 4.).
Demonstration. We contemplate a thing as absent not from the affect by which we imagine it, but from the fact that the body is affected with another affect which excludes the existence of the thing (by Prop. 17 of Part II). Hence the affect which is related to a thing which we contemplate as absent is not of such a nature that it surpasses the other actions and power of a man (on which see Prop. 6 of Part IV), but on the contrary is of such a nature that it can be restrained in some way by those affections which exclude the existence of its external cause (by Prop. 9 of Part IV).
At affectus, qui ex ratione oritur, refertur necessario ad communes rerum proprietates (vide rationis definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), quas semper ut praesentes contemplamur (nam nihil dari potest, quod earum praesentem existentiam secludat), et quas semper eodem modo imaginamur (per prop. 38. P. 2.). Quare talis affectus idem semper manet, et consequenter (per axiom. 1. huius) affectus, qui eidem sunt contrarii, quique a suis causis externis non foventur, eidem magis magisque sese accommodare debebunt, donec non amplius sint contrarii, et eatenus affectus, qui ex ratione oritur, est potentior. Q. E. D.
But an affect which arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II), which we always contemplate as present (for there can be nothing which excludes their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same way (by Prop. 38 of Part II). Hence such an affect always remains the same, and consequently (by Axiom 1 of this Part) the affects which are contrary to it, and which are not encouraged by their external causes, will have to accommodate themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary; and to that extent an affect which arises from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

Propositio VIII

Proposition VIII

[G II 286] Quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul concurrentibus excitatur, eo maior est.
The more causes concurring at the same time by which some affect is aroused, the greater it is.

Cited in 5P10S, 5P11D

Demonstratio. Plures causae simul plus possunt, quam si pauciores essent (per prop. 7. P. 3.). Adeoque (per prop. 5. P. 4.) quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul excitatur, eo fortior est. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Many causes together can do more than if they were fewer (by Prop. 7 of Part III). And so (by Prop. 5 of Part IV) the more causes at the same time by which some affect is aroused, the stronger it is. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec propositio patet etiam ex axiom. 2. huius partis.
Scholium. This Proposition is also evident from Axiom 2 of this Part.

Propositio IX

Proposition IX

Affectus, qui ad plures et diversas causas refertur, quas mens cum ipso affectu simul contemplatur, minus noxius est, et minus per ipsum patimur, et erga unamquamque causam minus afficimur, quam alius aeque magnus affectus, qui ad unam solam vel pauciores causas refertur.
An affect which is related to many and different causes, which the mind contemplates together with the affect itself, is less harmful, and we are acted on less by it and are affected less towards each cause, than by another equally great affect which is related to one only or to fewer causes.

Cited in 5P20S

Demonstratio. Affectus eatenus tantum malus seu noxius est, quatenus mens ab eo impeditur, quominus possit cogitare (per propositiones 26. et 27. P. 4.). Adeoque ille affectus, a quo mens ad plura simul obiecta contemplandum determinatur, minus noxius est, quam alius aeque magnus affectus, qui mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum obiectorum contemplatione ita detinet,a ut de aliis cogitare nequeat; quod erat primum.
Demonstration. An affect is evil, or harmful, only insofar as the mind is prevented by it from being able to think (by Props. 26 and 27 of Part IV). And so that affect by which the mind is determined to contemplate many objects at once is less harmful than another equally great affect which so holds the mind in the contemplation of one or a few objects alone that it cannot think of others; which was the first point.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 242) has qui Mentem vi solâ unius, aut pauciorum objectorum contemplatione ita detinet; the Dutch has in d’enige aanschouwing, and Gebhardt (G II 286; Textgestaltung II 389) reads in solâ, as Van Vloten–Land had already printed.
Deinde quia mentis essentia, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) potentia, in sola cogitatione consistit (per prop. 11. P. 2.);b ergo mens per affectum, a quo ad plura simul contemplandum determinatur, minus patitur, quam per aeque magnum affectum, qui mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum obiectorum contemplatione occupatam tenet; quod erat secundum. Denique hic affectus (per prop. 48. P. 3.) quatenus ad plures causas externas refertur, est etiam erga unamquamque minor. Q. E. D.
Next, because the essence of the mind, that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III), its power, consists in thought alone (by Prop. 11 of Part II), the mind is acted on less by an affect by which it is determined to contemplate many things at once than by an equally great affect which keeps the mind occupied in the contemplation of one or a few objects alone; which was the second point. Finally, this affect (by Prop. 48 of Part III), insofar as it is related to many external causes, is also less towards each. Q.E.D.
  1. b The 1677 edition and the Dutch have p. 3.; Schmidt, Auerbach and Van Vloten–Land correct to p. 2., and Gebhardt (G II 286; Textgestaltung II 389) follows.

Propositio X

Proposition X

[G II 287] Quamdiu affectibus, qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, non conflictamur, tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum.
So long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting1 the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.
  1. 1 potestatem habemus: ‘power’ here renders potestas, what is at our disposal, rather than potentia; see the notes on Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. and on the Preface to this Part.

Cited in 5P39D

Demonstratio. Affectus, qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, hoc est (per prop. 30. P. 4.) qui mali sunt, eatenus mali sunt, quatenus impediunt, quominus mens intelligat (per prop. 27. P. 4.). Quamdiu igitur affectibus, qui nostrae naturae contrarii sunt, non conflictamur, tamdiu mentis potentia, qua res intelligere conatur (per prop. 26. P. 4.) non impeditur. Atque adeo tamdiu potestatem habet claras et distinctas ideas formandi et alias ex aliis deducendi (vide schol. 2. prop. 40. et schol. prop. 47. P. 2.); et consequenter (per prop. 1. huius) tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi affectiones corporis secundum ordinem ad intellectum. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Affects which are contrary to our nature, that is (by Prop. 30 of Part IV), which are evil, are evil insofar as they prevent the mind from understanding (by Prop. 27 of Part IV). So long, therefore, as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, the power of the mind by which it strives to understand things (by Prop. 26 of Part IV) is not hindered. And so for that long it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas and of deducing some from others (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 and Schol. of Prop. 47 of Part II); and consequently (by Prop. 1 of this Part) for that long we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Hac potestate recte ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones efficere possumus, ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur. Nam (per prop. 7. huius) maior vis requiritur ad affectus secundum ordinem ad intellectum ordinatos et concatenatos coercendum, quam incertos et vagos. Optimum igitur, quod efficere possumus, quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vitae dogmata concipere, eaque memoriae mandare, et rebus particularibus in vita frequenter obviis continuo applicare, ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur, et nobis in promptu sint semper.
Scholium. By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the body we can bring it about that we are not easily affected by evil affects. For (by Prop. 7 of this Part) a greater force is required to restrain affects ordered and connected according to the order of the intellect than to restrain uncertain and random ones. The best thing, therefore, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a right way of living, or sure principles of life, to commit them to memory,1 and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life, so that in this way our imagination may be widely affected by them, and they may always be ready to hand for us.
  1. 1 certa vitae dogmata. Short of perfect knowledge, the principles of reason are learnt and rehearsed so that they work through the imagination, by the association of images (Part II, Prop. 18), until they can be understood. The examples that follow are the precepts of Part IV: hatred conquered by love (Prop. 46), tenacity against fear (Prop. 69), attention to the good rather than to the evil in things (Prop. 63, Cor.).
Ex. gr. inter vitae dogmata posuimus (vide prop. 46. P. 4. cum eiusdem schol.), odium amore seu generositate vincendum, non autem reciproco odio compensandum. Ut autem hoc rationis praescriptum semper in promptu habeamus, ubi usus erit, cogitandae et saepe meditandae sunt communes hominum iniuriae, et quomodo et qua via generositate optime propulsentur. Sic enim imaginem iniuriae imaginationi huius dogmatis iungemus, et nobis (per prop. 18. P. 2.) in promptu semper erit, ubi nobis iniuria afferetur.
For example, we have laid down among the principles of life (see Prop. 46 of Part IV with its Schol.) that hatred is to be conquered by love, or nobility, and not repaid with reciprocal hatred. But in order that we may always have this prescription of reason ready to hand when it is needed, we must think about and often meditate on the common injuries of men, and on how and by what way they are best warded off by nobility. For in this way we shall join the image of an injury to the imagination of this principle, and it will always be ready to hand for us (by Prop. 18 of Part II) when an injury is done to us.
Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis ac etiam boni, quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur, et praeterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi acquiescentiaa oriatur (per prop. 52. P. 4.), et quod homines, ut reliqua, ex naturae necessitate agant; tum iniuria sive odium, quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit et facile superabitur; vel si ira, quae ex maximis iniuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen, quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione longe minore temporis spatio, quam si haec non ita praemeditata habuissemus, ut patet ex prop. 6., 7. et 8. huius partis.
If we also have ready to hand the principle of our true advantage, and also of the good which follows from mutual friendship and common society, and besides that the highest contentment of mind arises from the right way of living (by Prop. 52 of Part IV), and that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature, then the injury, or the hatred which usually arises from it, will occupy the least part of the imagination and will easily be overcome; or if the anger which usually arises from the greatest injuries is not so easily overcome, it will still be overcome, though not without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than if we had not thus meditated on these things beforehand, as is evident from Props. 6, 7 and 8 of this Part.
  1. a summa animi acquiescentia] transcr. summa animi cquiescentia. Misprint in the transcription.
De animositate ad metum deponendum eodem modo cogitandum est; enumeranda scilicet sunt et saepe imaginanda communia vitae pericula, et quomodo animi praesentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt. Sed notandum, quod nobis in ordinandis nostris cogitationibus et imaginibus semper attendendum est (per coroll. prop. 63. P. 4. et prop. 59. P. 3.) ad illa, quae in unaquaque re bona sunt, ut sic semper ex laetitiae affectu ad agendum determinemur.
Of tenacity, for laying aside fear, we must think in the same way: the common dangers of life must be enumerated and often imagined, and how they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character. But it should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images we must always attend (by Cor. of Prop. 63 of Part IV and Prop. 59 of Part III) to those things which are good in each thing, so that in this way we are always determined to act from an affect of joy.
Ex. gr. si quis videt, se nimis gloriam sectari, de eius recto usu cogitet, et in quem finem sectanda sit, et quibus mediis acquiri possit; sed non de ipsius abusu et vanitate et hominum inconstantia vel aliis huiusmodi, de quibus nemo nisi ex animi aegritudine cogitat. Talibus enim cogitationibus maxime ambitiosi se maxime afflictant,b quando de assequendo honore, quem ambiunt, desperant; et dum iram evomunt, sapientes videri volunt. Quare certum est, eos gloriae maxime esse cupidos, qui de ipsius abusu et mundi vanitate maxime clamant. Nec hoc ambitiosis proprium, sed omnibus commune est, quibus fortuna est adversa, et qui animo impotentes sunt.c
For example, if someone sees that he pursues glory too much, let him think of its right use, and for what end it is to be pursued, and by what means it can be acquired; but not of its abuse and emptiness, and of the inconstancy of men, or other things of this kind, about which no one thinks except from sickness of mind. For with such thoughts the most ambitious torment themselves most, when they despair of attaining the honour which they are seeking; and while they vomit up their anger, they want to seem wise. So it is certain that those are most desirous of glory who cry out most about its abuse and the emptiness of the world. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious, but it is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are lacking in power of mind.
  1. b Baensch, and W. Meijer in his second edition, would strike the first maxime. Gebhardt (G II 288; Textgestaltung II 389) keeps it, as the Dutch does (de genen, die meest roemzuchtig, pijnigen zich meest): the sentence is parallel to maxime … cupidos, qui … maxime clamant in the next.
  2. c The 1677 edition has et animo impotentes sunt; Gebhardt (G II 288; Textgestaltung II 389–390) supplies qui with Baensch (second edition).
Nam pauper etiam avarus de abusu pecuniae et divitum vitiis non cessat loqui; quo nihil aliud efficit, quam se afflictare et aliis ostendere, se non tantum paupertatem suam, sed etiam aliorum divitias iniquo animo ferre. Sic etiam qui male ab amasia excepti sunt, nihil cogitant,d quam de mulierum inconstantia et fallaci animo et reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis, quae omnia statim oblivioni tradunt, simulac ab amasia iterum recipiuntur.
For the poor man too, who is greedy, does not cease to speak of the abuse of money and the vices of the rich; by which he achieves nothing but to torment himself and to show others that he bears resentfully not only his own poverty but also the riches of others. So also those who have been badly received by a mistress think of nothing but the inconstancy of women, their deceitful hearts and their other much-sung vices, all of which they at once consign to oblivion as soon as they are received again by the mistress.
  1. d excepti sunt, nihil cogitant] transcr. excepti sunt, nihil aliud cogitant. The 1677 edition (OP p. 245), Gebhardt (G II 289) and Bartuschat have no ‘aliud’.
Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo libertatis amore moderari studet, is, quantum potest, nitetur, virtutes earumque causas noscere, et animum gaudio, quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere; at minime hominum vitia contemplari, hominesque obtrectare et falsa libertatis specie gaudere. Atque haec qui diligenter observabite (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, nae ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.
He, therefore, who strives to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of freedom alone will strive as far as he can to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge of them, but by no means to contemplate the vices of men, to disparage men, and to rejoice in a false appearance of freedom. And he who observes these things diligently (for they are not difficult) and practises them will certainly in a short space of time be able to direct his actions for the most part by the rule of reason.
  1. e The 1677 edition has observavit, beside exercebit; the Dutch has zal waarneemen … en oeffenen, and Gebhardt (G II 289; Textgestaltung II 390) reads observabit, as Van Vloten–Land, after Saisset, had already printed.

Cited in 5P20S

Propositio XI

Proposition XI

[G II 289] Quo imago aliqua ad plures res refertur, eo frequentior est seu saepius viget, et mentem magis occupat.
The more things an image is related to, the more frequent it is, or the more often it is vivid, and the more it occupies the mind.

Cited in 5P12D, 5P16D, 5P20S

Demonstratio. Quo enim imago seu affectus ad plures res refertur, eo plures dantur causae, a quibus excitari et foveri potest, quas omnes mens (per hypothesin) ex ipso affectu simul contemplatur. Atque adeo affectus eo frequentior est seu saepius viget, et (per prop. 8. huius) mentem magis occupat. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For the more things an image, or affect, is related to, the more causes there are by which it can be aroused and encouraged, all of which the mind (by hypothesis) contemplates at once from the affect itself. And so the affect is the more frequent, or the more often vivid, and (by Prop. 8 of this Part) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.

Propositio XII

Proposition XII

Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus, quae ad res referuntur, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, iunguntur, quam aliis.
The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others.

Cited in 5P20S

Demonstratio. Res, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, vel rerum communes proprietates sunt, vel quae ex iis deducuntur (vide rationis definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), et consequenter saepius (per prop. praeced.) in nobis excitantur. Adeoque facilius fieri potest, ut res alias simul cum his, quam cum aliis contemplemur, et consequenter (per prop. 18. P. 2.) ut facilius cum his, quam cum aliis iungantur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Things which we understand clearly and distinctly are either the common properties of things or what is deduced from them (see the definition of reason in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II), and consequently (by the preceding Prop.) they are aroused in us more often. And so it can more easily happen that we contemplate other things together with these than with others, and consequently (by Prop. 18 of Part II) that they are more easily joined with these than with others. Q.E.D.

Propositio XIII

Proposition XIII

[G II 290] Quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis iuncta est, eo saepius viget.a
The more other images an image is joined to, the more often it is vivid.
  1. a The 1677 edition and the older editions have saepius viget without eo; Gebhardt (G II 290; Textgestaltung II 390) supplies it, by analogy with Prop. 11.

Cited in 5P20S

Demonstratio. Nam quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis iuncta est, eo (per prop. 18. P. 2.) plures causae dantur, a quibus excitari potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For the more other images an image is joined to, the more causes there are (by Prop. 18 of Part II) by which it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

Propositio XIV

Proposition XIV

Mens efficere potest, ut omnes corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines ad Dei ideam referantur.
The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.1
  1. 1 Not by seeing God in things through the imagination, but because every affection of the body admits some clear concept (Prop. 4), and whatever is conceived is conceived through God (Part I, Prop. 15). The love of God of Props. 15–16 is the affect that accompanies this relating.

Cited in 5P15D, 5P16D, 5P20S, 5P39D

Demonstratio. Nulla est corporis affectio, cuius aliquem clarum et distinctum non possit mens formare conceptuma (per prop. 4. huius). Adeoque efficere potest (per prop. 15. P. 1.), ut omnes ad Dei ideam referuntur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by Prop. 4 of this Part). And so it can bring it about (by Prop. 15 of Part I) that they are all related to the idea of God. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition has aliquod; as Baensch pointed out, the wording of Prop. 4 requires aliquem, which the Dutch also implies (enige klare en onderscheide bevatting, glossed Conceptus). W. Meijer (second edition), Appuhn and Gebhardt (G II 290; Textgestaltung II 390) read aliquem.

Propositio XV

Proposition XV

Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amat, et eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit.
He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God,1 and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects.
  1. 1 This love is joy accompanied by the idea of God, and insofar as it is related to the body it lasts only as long as the body (Prop. 20, Schol.). The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge and is eternal, comes later (Props. 32–33).

Cited in 5P16D, 5P20S, 5P39D

Demonstratio. Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, laetatur (per prop. 53. P. 3.), idque concomitante idea Dei (per prop. praeced.). Atque adeo (per aff. defin. 6.) Deum amat, et (per eandem rationem) eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly rejoices (by Prop. 53 of Part III), and that accompanied by the idea of God (by the preceding Prop.). And so (by Def. Aff. 6) he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) the more so the more he understands himself and his affects. Q.E.D.

Propositio XVI

Proposition XVI

Hic erga Deum amor mentem maxime occupare debet.
This love towards God must occupy the mind most.

Cited in 5P20S, 5P39D

Demonstratio. Est enim hic amor iunctus omnibus corporis affectionibus (per prop. 14. huius), quibus omnibus fovetur (per prop. 15. huius). Atque adeo (per prop. 11. huius) mentem maxime occupare debet. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For this love is joined to all the affections of the body (by Prop. 14 of this Part), by all of which it is encouraged (by Prop. 15 of this Part). And so (by Prop. 11 of this Part) it must occupy the mind most. Q.E.D.

Propositio XVII

Proposition XVII

[G II 291] Deus expers est passionum, nec ullo laetitiae aut tristitiae affectu afficitur.
God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.1
  1. 1 Against every anthropomorphic picture of God (Part I, Appendix): God has no passions because all ideas, as they are in God, are adequate, and no joy or sadness because he cannot pass to a greater or lesser perfection. Yet Part V will say that God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love, and that insofar as he loves himself he loves men (Props. 35–36 and Prop. 36, Cor.); that love is not a passion and involves no transition.

Cited in 5P17C

Demonstratio. Ideae omnes, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt (per prop. 32. P. 2.), hoc est (per defin. 4. P. 2.) adaequatae; atque adeo (per gener. aff. defin.) Deus expers est passionum. Deinde Deus neque ad maiorem neque ad minorem perfectionem transire potest (per coroll. 2. prop. 20. P. 1.); adeoque (per aff. defin. 2. et 3.) nullo laetitiae neque tristitiae affectu afficitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by Prop. 32 of Part II), that is (by Def. 4 of Part II), adequate; and so (by the General Definition of the Affects) God is without passions. Next, God can pass neither to a greater nor to a lesser perfection (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 20 of Part I); and so (by Defs. Aff. 2 and 3) he is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat, neque odio habet. Nam Deus (per prop. praeced.) nullo laetitiae neque tristitiae affectu afficitur, et consequenter (per aff. defin. 6. et 7.) neminem etiam amat, neque odio habet.
Corollary. Strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one. For God (by the preceding Prop.) is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness, and consequently (by Defs. Aff. 6 and 7) he also loves no one and hates no one.

Cited in 5P19D

Propositio XVIII

Proposition XVIII

Nemo potest Deum odio habere.
No one can hate God.

Cited in 5P20D

Demonstratio. Idea Dei, quae in nobis est, est adaequata et perfecta (per prop. 46. et 47. P. 2.).a Adeoque quatenus Deum contemplamur, eatenus agimus (per prop. 3. P. 3.), et consequenter (per prop. 59. P. 3.) nulla potest dari tristitia concomitante idea Dei, hoc est (per aff. defin. 7.) nemo Deum odio habere potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (by Props. 46 and 47 of Part II). And so insofar as we contemplate God, to that extent we act (by Prop. 3 of Part III), and consequently (by Prop. 59 of Part III) there can be no sadness accompanied by the idea of God, that is (by Def. Aff. 7), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.
  1. a (per prop. 46. et 47. P. 2.)] transcr. (per prop. 46. et 47 P. 2.). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 291).
Corollarium. Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit.
Corollary. Love towards God cannot be turned into hatred.
Scholium. At obiici potest, quod dum Deum omnium rerum causam intelligimus, eo ipso Deum tristitiae causam consideramus. Sed ad hoc respondeo, quod quatenus tristitiae causas intelligimus, eatenus (per prop. 3. huius) ipsa desinit esse passio, hoc est (per prop. 59. P. 3.) eatenus desinit esse tristitia; atque adeo quatenus Deum tristitiae causam esse intelligimus, eatenus laetamur.
Scholium. But it can be objected that while we understand God as the cause of all things, by that very fact we consider God to be the cause of sadness. But to this I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of sadness, to that extent (by Prop. 3 of this Part) it ceases to be a passion, that is (by Prop. 59 of Part III), to that extent it ceases to be sadness; and so insofar as we understand God to be the cause of sadness, to that extent we rejoice.

Propositio XIX

Proposition XIX

[G II 292] Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet.
He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.1
  1. 1 To want God to love us back would be to want God to be affected with joy, that is, not to be God. The love that is returned is of another kind: God’s love of men and the mind’s intellectual love of God are one and the same (Prop. 36, Cor.).
Demonstratio. Si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo (per coroll. prop. 17. huius) ut Deus, quem amat, non esset Deus, et consequenter (per prop. 19. P. 3.) contristari cuperet; quod (per prop. 28. P. 3.) est absurdum. Ergo qui Deum amat etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If a man strove for this, he would therefore desire (by Cor. of Prop. 17 of this Part) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently (by Prop. 19 of Part III) he would desire to be saddened, which (by Prop. 28 of Part III) is absurd. Therefore he who loves God, etc. Q.E.D.

Propositio XX

Proposition XX

Hic erga Deum amor neque invidiae neque zelotypiae affectu inquinari potest; sed eo magis fovetur, quo plures homines eodem amoris vinculo cum Deo iunctos imaginamur.
This love towards God cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or of jealousy; but it is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love.
Demonstratio. Hic erga Deum amor summum bonum est, quod ex dictamine rationis appetere possumus (per prop. 28. P. 4.), et omnibus hominibus commune est (per prop. 36. P. 4.), et omnes ut eodem gaudeant, cupimus (per prop. 37. P. 4.). Atque adeo (per aff. defin. 23.) invidiae affectu maculari nequit, neque etiam (per prop. 18. huius et definitionem zelotypiae, quam vide in schol. prop. 35. P. 3.) zelotypiae affectu; sed contra (per prop. 31. P. 3.) eo magis foveri debet, quo plures homines eodem gaudere imaginamur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This love towards God is the highest good which we can want from the dictate of reason (by Prop. 28 of Part IV), and is common to all men (by Prop. 36 of Part IV), and we desire that all should enjoy it (by Prop. 37 of Part IV). And so (by Def. Aff. 23) it cannot be stained by the affect of envy, nor (by Prop. 18 of this Part and the definition of jealousy, which see in Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part III) by the affect of jealousy; but on the contrary (by Prop. 31 of Part III) it must be the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to enjoy it. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Possumus hoc eodem modo ostendere, nullum dari affectum, qui huic amori directe sit contrarius, a quo hic ipse amor possit destrui: atque adeo concludere possumus, hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum esse constantissimum,a nec quatenus ad corpus refertur, posse destrui, nisi cum ipso corpore. Cuius autem naturae sit, quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, postea videbimus. Atque his omnia affectuum remedia, sive id, omne quod mens in se sola considerata adversus affectus potest, comprehendi.
Scholium. We can show in the same way that there is no affect which is directly contrary to this love and by which this love itself could be destroyed; and so we can conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all the affects, and that, insofar as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed except with the body itself. What its nature is insofar as it is related to the mind alone, we shall see afterwards. And with these I have covered all the remedies for the affects, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects.
  1. a hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum esse constantissimum] transcr. hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum est constantissimum. The 1677 edition (OP p. 249), Gebhardt (G II 293) and Bartuschat read ‘esse’.
Ex quibus apparet, mentis in affectus potentiam consistere 1. in ipsab affectuum cognitione. Vide schol. prop. 4. huius. 2. In eo, quod affectus a cogitatione causae externae, quam confuse imaginamur, separat. Vide prop. 2. cum eodem schol.c prop. 4. huius.d 3. In tempore, quo affectiones, quae ad res quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant, quae ad res referuntur, quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus. Vide prop. 7. huius. 4. In multitudine causarum, a quibus affectiones, quae ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur. Vide prop. 9. et 11. huius. 5. Denique in ordine, quo mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest. Vide schol. prop. 10. et insuper prop. 12., 13. ete 14. huius.
From which it is evident that the power of the mind over the affects consists: 1. In the knowledge itself of the affects (see Schol. of Prop. 4 of this Part). 2. In its separating the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly (see Prop. 2 with the same Schol. of Prop. 4 of this Part). 3. In time, by which the affections related to things which we understand surpass those related to things which we conceive confusedly, or in a mutilated way (see Prop. 7 of this Part). 4. In the multitude of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are encouraged (see Props. 9 and 11 of this Part). 5. Finally, in the order in which the mind can order its affects and connect them with one another1 (see Schol. of Prop. 10, and besides Props. 12, 13 and 14 of this Part).
  1. b consistere 1. in ipsa] transcr. consistere *1. in ipsa. The transcription sets the rest of the Scholium in italics; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 293–294) do not.
  2. c cum eodem schol.] transcr. cumeodem schol. Word division.
  3. d The 1677 edition has vide Prop. 2. cum eodem Schol. & Prop. 4. hujus; the Dutch reads the second Proposition, with the same Scholium of the fourth Proposition, and Gebhardt (G II 293; Textgestaltung II 390) corrects accordingly, as Van Vloten–Land had done without reference to the Dutch.
  4. e 13. et] transcr. 13.et. Word division.
  1. 1 The five remedies sum up Props. 1–14. All are forms of knowledge, in keeping with the Preface: the mind’s power is defined by understanding alone, and it acts on the affects not by will but by forming clear ideas, separating, ordering and connecting.
Sed ut haec mentis in affectus potentia melius intelligatur, venit apprime notandum, quod affectus a nobis magni appellantur, quando unius hominis affectum cum affectu alterius comparamus, et unum magis, quam alium eodem affectu conflictari videmus; vel quando unius eiusdemque hominis affectus ad invicem comparamus, eundemque uno affectu magis, quam alio affici sive moveri comperimus. Nam (per prop. 5. P. 4.) vis cuiuscumque affectus definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata. At mentis potentia sola cognitione definitur; impotentia autem seu passio a sola cognitionis privatione, hoc est, ab eo, per quod ideae dicuntur inadaequatae, aestimatur.
But in order that this power of the mind over the affects may be better understood, it should above all be noted that we call affects great when we compare the affect of one man with that of another, and see that one is troubled more than another by the same affect; or when we compare the affects of one and the same man with one another, and find that he is affected, or moved, more by one affect than by another. For (by Prop. 5 of Part IV) the force of any affect is defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone, and its lack of power, or passion, is judged by the privation of knowledge alone, that is, by that through which ideas are called inadequate.
Ex quo sequitur, mentem illam maxime pati, cuius maximam partem ideae inadaequatae constituunt, ita ut magis per id, quod patitur, quam per id quod agit, dignoscatur; et illam contra maxime agere, cuius maximam partem ideae adaequatae constituunt, ita ut, quamvis huic tot inadaequatae ideae, quam illi insint, magis tamen per illas, quae humanae virtuti tribuuntur, quam per has, quae humanam impotentiam arguunt, dignoscatur.
From this it follows that that mind is acted on most whose greatest part is constituted by inadequate ideas, so that it is known more by what it undergoes than by what it does; and that that mind, on the contrary, acts most whose greatest part is constituted by adequate ideas, so that, although it may have as many inadequate ideas in it as the other, it is still known more by those which are attributed to human virtue than by those which show human lack of power.
Deinde notandum, animi aegritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio amore erga rem, quae multis variationibus est obnoxia, et cuius nunquam compotes esse possumus. Nam nemo de re ulla, nisi quam amat, sollicitus anxiusve est, neque iniuriae, suspiciones, inimicitiae etc. oriuntur, nisi ex amore erga res, quarum nemo potest revera esse compos.
Next, it should be noted that sicknesses of the mind and misfortunes take their origin chiefly from excessive love towards a thing which is subject to many variations, and which we can never possess. For no one is anxious or troubled about anything unless he loves it, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities, etc. arise except from love towards things which no one can really possess.
Ex his itaque facile concipimus, quid clara et distincta cognitio, et praecipue tertium illud cognitionis genus (de quo vide schol. prop. 47. P. 2.), cuius fundamentum est ipsa Dei cognitio, in affectus potest, quos nempe, quatenus passiones sunt, si non absolute tollit (vide prop. 3. cum schol. prop. 4.f huius), saltem efficit, ut minimam mentis partem constituant. Vide prop. 14. huius. Deinde amorem gignit erga rem immutabilem et aeternam (vide prop. 15. huius), et cuius revera sumus compotes (vide prop. 45. P. 2.), et qui propterea nullis vitiis,g quae in communi amore insunt, inquinari, sed semper maior ac maior esse potest (per prop. 15. huius), et mentis maximam partem occupare (per prop. 16. huius) lateque afficere.
From these things, therefore, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (on which see Schol. of Prop. 47 of Part II),2 whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself, can do against the affects: namely, that if it does not take them away absolutely insofar as they are passions (see Prop. 3 with Schol. of Prop. 4 of this Part), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the mind (see Prop. 14 of this Part). Next, it begets love towards an immutable and eternal thing (see Prop. 15 of this Part), which we really possess (see Prop. 45 of Part II); a love which therefore cannot be tainted by any of the vices which are in common love, but can always become greater and greater (by Prop. 15 of this Part), and occupy the greatest part of the mind (by Prop. 16 of this Part) and affect it widely.
  1. f cum schol. prop. 4.] transcr. cumschol. prop. 4. Word division.
  2. g The 1677 edition has & propterea nullis vitiis … inquinari; sed qui major, ac major esse potest; the Dutch implies a qui before propterea. Van Vloten–Land repunctuate, Leopold would strike the qui, W. Meijer (second edition) and Appuhn move it. Gebhardt (G II 294; Textgestaltung II 390) keeps et and corrects only what he takes to be a transposition of qui.
  1. 2 The third kind of knowledge, intuitive knowledge, is defined in Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2; the Scholium to Prop. 47 cited here shows that men have an adequate knowledge of God’s essence, which is its foundation.
Atque his omnia, quae praesentem hanc vitam spectant, absolvi. Nam quod in huius scholii principio dixi, me his paucis omnia affectuum remedia amplexum esse, facile poterit unusquisque videre qui ad haec quae in hoc scholio diximus, et simul ad mentis eiusque affectuum definitiones, et denique ad prop. 1. et 3. P. 3. attenderit. Tempus igitur iam est, ut ad illa transeam quae ad mentis durationem sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.ih
And with these I have completed everything which concerns this present life. For anyone will easily be able to see what I said at the beginning of this Scholium, that I have covered all the remedies for the affects in these few words, if he attends to what we have said in this Scholium, and at the same time to the definitions of the mind and its affects, and finally to Props. 1 and 3 of Part III. It is time, therefore, to pass to those things which pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.3
  1. h sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.] transcr. sine relatione ad corpus pertinent. See the preceding emendation.
  2. i W. Meijer (second edition), followed by Appuhn, would read sine relatione ad Corporis existentiam, after the parallel in the Scholium to Prop. 40. Gebhardt (G II 294; Textgestaltung II 390) keeps the manuscript’s inconcinnity, since the Dutch has zonder betrekking tot het lighaam here and zonder de betrekking tot de wezentlijkheit van ’t lighaam there.
  1. 3 The turning point of Part V. What follows concerns the mind not as the idea of the actually existing body, which endures, but as the idea of the body’s essence, which is in God from eternity (Props. 22–23); see the essay before Prop. 21.

The Eternity of the Mind

The Scholium to Prop. 20 closes the account of the remedies with the words: “with these I have completed everything which concerns this present life. ... It is time, therefore, to pass to those things which pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.” The phrase is paradoxical on purpose, since what follows denies that this part of the mind has any duration at all, and the Scholium to Prop. 40 closes the account with a more exact one: “the mind insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body.” The propositions between them are the most disputed in the Ethics. They come here because they keep earlier promises: Part II had deferred to Part V an account of the excellence and usefulness of the third kind of knowledge (Part II, Prop. 47, Schol.), Part IV the question how far the death of the body can harm the mind (Part IV, Prop. 39, Schol.), and the Scholium to Prop. 20 itself the nature of the love of God “insofar as it is related to the mind alone.” The reader should know in advance what they claim and how the argument is built.

What the doctrine denies

They begin by taking away what the reader might expect. “The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures” (Prop. 21). The demonstration rests entirely on Part II: the mind expresses the actual existence of its body only while the body endures (Part II, Prop. 8, Cor.), and imagination and memory are defined by the affections of the body (Part II, Prop. 17, Schol.; Prop. 18, Schol.). They belong to the mind as the idea of an actually existing body, and they end with it.

Whatever is eternal in the mind, therefore, remembers nothing, and Spinoza says so: “it cannot happen that we should remember that we existed before the body, since there can be no traces of this in the body, nor can eternity be defined by time or have any relation to time” (Prop. 23, Schol.). Men, he says, are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but “they confuse it with duration and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death” (Prop. 34, Schol.). The common opinion is the confused form of something true, but the life after death of popular religion, in which a person remembers his earthly life and is rewarded or punished for it, is precisely what the doctrine excludes. The eternal part will prove to be the idea of this body and of no other, but it has no memory, no imagination and no relation to time, and Spinoza does not try to show that it is a self in the sense in which we care about our own survival. Steven Nadler argues that on Spinoza’s principles it could not be (Spinoza’s Heresy, 2001, pp. 123–129), and Appendix E takes up the question.

The idea of the body’s essence

What remains? In God there is necessarily an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity (Prop. 22). The demonstration returns to Part I: God is the cause of the essence of things as well as of their existence (Part I, Prop. 25), so the essence of this or that human body must be conceived through the essence of God, by a certain eternal necessity, and this concept must be in God (Part II, Prop. 3). Part II had prepared the doctrine: the ideas of things which do not exist are comprehended in God’s infinite idea as their formal essences are contained in his attributes (Part II, Prop. 8). Its corollary distinguishes two ways in which the ideas of things are in God: as comprehended in God’s infinite idea, and, when the things endure, as involving the existence “through which they are said to endure” (Part II, Prop. 8, Cor.). The demonstrations of Props. 21 and 23 cite it for the second; Prop. 22 asserts of the human body what the first says of every thing.

The demonstration of Prop. 23 then takes the step on which everything turns. The idea in God which expresses the essence of the human body “is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind,” since the mind is the idea of the body (Part II, Prop. 13); duration belongs to the mind only insofar as it expresses the body’s actual existence; and since this idea is conceived by an eternal necessity through God’s essence, “this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal” (Prop. 23, Dem.). Hence “the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (Prop. 23).

The argument is asymmetrical. Its premise concerns the essence of the body, its conclusion the mind, and Spinoza never says that something of the body remains. Yet nothing in the demonstration of Prop. 22 is peculiar to human bodies, and Part II had said that what holds of the idea of the human body “must necessarily be said of the idea of any thing” (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol.). Whether the doctrine then reduces to the truism that every essence is eternal, as Jonathan Bennett thought Edwin Curley’s “symmetrical” reading made it (Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, pp. 358–359), is one of the questions Appendix E takes up. Nadler distinguishes two eternities of the mind: one that the idea of every body has as the idea of its essence, no more personal in a man than in a tree, and one acquired by rational minds alone, which consists in their adequate ideas (Nadler, pp. 111–122). On this reading, the rest of the argument is about the second, of which a mind can have more or less.

Eternity, not duration

The word “remains” is misleading if it is taken to mean “continues afterwards.” Eternity here has the sense of Part I, Def. 8: existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing, which “cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end” (Part I, Def. 8, Expl.). On the strict reading, which Appendix E sets beside more temporal ones, the eternal part of the mind does not exist at all times, or after the body’s death; it exists in a way that has no relation to time. So “our mind ... can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body,” and insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, its existence “cannot be defined by time or explained through duration” (Prop. 23, Schol.).

The claim is not only deduced but felt. “But nevertheless we feel and experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things which it conceives in understanding no less than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves” (Prop. 23, Schol.). The passage is often quoted, and it is easily misread as an appeal to mystical experience. Read with the sentence that follows it, it seems to point the other way. The experience of eternity is the experience of understanding something by demonstration, of seeing that it must be so; when we understand in this way, we are aware of a kind of knowing that is not tied to the moment at which it occurs, as “he who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea” (Part II, Prop. 43). The demonstrations are the eyes with which the mind sees, and what it sees, when it sees anything necessary, is the eternal.

The phrase “under a species of eternity” (sub specie aeternitatis) first appeared, as “under a certain species of eternity,” in Part II, Prop. 44, Cor. 2, where it is said to be of the nature of reason to perceive things in this way, because the necessity it perceives “is the very necessity of God’s eternal nature,” and because the common notions on which it rests “must therefore be conceived without any relation to time” (Part II, Prop. 44, Cor. 2, Dem.). Part V joins this strand to Props. 22–23. Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands “not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity” (Prop. 29). The demonstration shows how Spinoza builds: it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under a species of eternity, it pertains to the mind to conceive the essence of the body so, “and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind” (Prop. 29, Dem.). The power which Part II ascribed to reason belongs to the mind, then, only insofar as the mind is eternal. The scholium explains the phrase: “Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature” (Prop. 29, Schol.). To conceive the essence of one’s body under a species of eternity is not to imagine it lasting forever, but to understand it as following from the nature of God, and so to know that one “is in God and is conceived through God” (Prop. 30).

The third kind of knowledge

Props. 24–28 turn from what the mind is to what it strives for. “The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God” (Prop. 24), since singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed (Part I, Prop. 25, Cor.). The Dutch version of 1677 adds “or have more understanding of God”; the note to the proposition gives Gebhardt’s account of that reading. The demonstration of Prop. 25 joins this to earlier results: the third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2), and the highest virtue of the mind, that is, its power and its striving, is to know God (Part IV, Prop. 28). Hence “the highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge” (Prop. 25). The more capable of this the mind is, the more it desires it (Prop. 26); from it arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be (Prop. 27); and the desire for it “cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second” (Prop. 28). Don Garrett notes that human beings generally reach the third kind only after the second (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, 2018, p. 211).

What distinguishes the third kind from the second? Bennett observed that Part II gives little help, since it contrasts the first kind with the other two, never the second with the third (Bennett, p. 364). In the Scholium to Prop. 36 Spinoza says that he has noted how our mind follows from the divine nature in order to show “how much the knowledge of singular things which I have called intuitive, or of the third kind ..., can do”: the general demonstration of Part I that all things depend on God is certain, but it “does not affect our mind as much as when this same thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God” (Prop. 36, Schol.). On Garrett’s reading, the demonstration of Part I gives knowledge of the second kind because it rests on a property common to everything, not on the mind’s own essence (p. 208); the third kind is more powerful because it runs from essences to what follows from them, as from causes to effects, in the order in which God himself knows (pp. 212–213). Spinoza’s conclusion is that the third kind of knowledge “depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal” (Prop. 31): insofar as it is eternal, the mind has the adequate knowledge of God which every idea involves (Part II, Prop. 46), and can know whatever follows from it.

The intellectual love of God

From here on, Spinoza warns, he will speak of the mind, as he has done so far, “as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under a species of eternity,” although we are certain that it is eternal; this may be done “without any danger of error, provided we take care to conclude nothing except from clear premises” (Prop. 31, Schol.). The language of growth and acquisition that follows describes, in temporal terms, relations that are not temporal. Bennett saw in the device an attempt to hide a split in the doctrine: how much of my mind is eternal seems fixed by eternal truths, yet the same pages speak of self-improvement (p. 363).

Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, with the idea of God as its cause (Prop. 32); by the definition of love (Part III, Def. Aff. 6) this is a love of God, “not insofar as we imagine him as present ..., but insofar as we understand God to be eternal; and this is what I call the intellectual love of God” (Prop. 32, Cor.). It is not the love of God of Props. 15–16 as related to the body: that love arose as the mind related the affections of the body to the idea of God, and in that relation, the Scholium to Prop. 20 said, it cannot be destroyed except with the body. This love arises from the third kind of knowledge, and since that knowledge is eternal, so is the love (Prop. 33). The scholium corrects the corollary: this love has had no beginning, but “it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come into being” (Prop. 33, Schol.). It also resolves a difficulty left by Part III, which defined joy as a passage to a greater perfection and warned that “joy is not perfection itself” (Part III, Def. Aff. 3, Expl.). The scholium concludes: “if joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself” (Prop. 33, Schol.). H. A. Wolfson noted that the difficulty was old: Crescas had held that the delight of knowing lies in passing from potentiality to actuality, and found the answer in a pleasure of constant possession (The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934, II 307–308).

Only while the body endures is the mind subject to passions, and so “no love except intellectual love is eternal” (Prop. 34, Cor.). But “God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love” (Prop. 35), and the mind’s intellectual love of God “is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself” (Prop. 36). The demonstration, by way of Part II, Prop. 11, Cor., makes the mind’s contemplation of itself “an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself” (Prop. 36, Dem.). The essay before Part V explains why this does not contradict the denial that God loves anyone (Prop. 17, Cor.). The demonstration of Prop. 17 gives the reason: what is denied of God is joy as a passage, and what is affirmed here is perfection possessed, which the Scholium to Prop. 36 calls joy only “if we may still use this word” (Prop. 36, Schol.). Nothing in nature can take this love away (Prop. 37), for the axiom of Part IV, that every singular thing can be destroyed by a stronger one, “concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place” (Prop. 37, Schol.).

The measure of the eternal part

The argument returns to the body. “The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death” (Prop. 38), because the more it knows in these ways, “the greater the part of it that remains” (Prop. 38, Dem.). The scholium names the promise of Part IV which this keeps, “that death is the less harmful, the greater the mind’s clear and distinct knowledge” (Prop. 38, Schol.).

Then comes the most troubling proposition: “He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal” (Prop. 39). Its demonstration runs through the first half of the Part. Such a man is least troubled by evil affects, and so he can order the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect (Prop. 10), relate them all to the idea of God (Prop. 14), and love God (Prop. 15) with a love that occupies the greatest part of the mind (Prop. 16); “and accordingly (by Prop. 33 of this Part) he has a mind whose greatest part is eternal” (Prop. 39, Dem.). The scholium explains why the body matters. An infant, whose body is capable of very few things, has a mind which “is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things”; and so “in this life” we strive that the body of infancy may change into one capable of a great many things (Prop. 39, Schol.). The principle is Part II’s: the more a body can do and undergo, the more its mind can perceive (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol.).

The part that remains is the intellect, the part that perishes the imagination (Prop. 40, Cor.). The intellect, the corollary says, is that “through which alone we are said to act,” so that, as Bennett and Garrett both note, the mind’s eternity is tied to reason as well as to intuition (Bennett, p. 369; Garrett, p. 212). The vocabulary is old. Aristotle had said of the intellect that makes all things: Χωρισθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον (“when separated it is only what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal”); and he added, in a remark that invites comparison with Spinoza’s, that we do not remember: Οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός (“but we do not remember, because this is not acted on, while the passive intellect is perishable”; De anima III.5, 430a22–25). Appendix E describes the medieval doctrine of the acquired intellect, which, as Wolfson notes, is not found in Aristotle but grew out of medieval expositions of his account of the intellect (II 54). Spinoza’s last word is the Scholium to Prop. 40: our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking determined by another, and that by another, and so to infinity, “so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God” (Prop. 40, Schol.). Part II had called the human mind “part of the infinite intellect of God” (Part II, Prop. 11, Cor.); the end of Part V shows which part, and why it can be greater or smaller.

The remedies seen from eternity

Prop. 39 shows how closely the two halves of Part V are joined. On the reading offered here, the second adds no new remedy, but regards the remedies of the first from the side of eternity. The Scholium to Prop. 20 had already said that clear and distinct knowledge, “and especially that third kind of knowledge ..., whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself,” begets “love towards an immutable and eternal thing ..., which we really possess” (Prop. 20, Schol.). The second half explains how we possess that thing, and why the love of it is eternal, and its demonstrations draw on the first: Prop. 39 runs through Props. 10 and 14–16, and the last demonstration of the book cites the corollary of Prop. 3, that an affect is the more in our power the better it is known (Prop. 42, Dem.). What the first half describes as a process in time, in which adequate ideas come to make up more of the mind and the passions less, the second describes as a fact about those ideas: they are in God, they are eternal, and the more of the mind they constitute, the less of it can be destroyed. The essay before Part V asks whether the two halves describe two kinds of freedom or two aspects of one. The demonstrations suggest one freedom, conceived in the two ways the Scholium to Prop. 29 distinguished; Bennett, as noted above, saw instead a split that cannot be healed (p. 363).

An ethics that does not wait for it

Spinoza adds at once that the ethics of Part IV does not depend on any of this. “Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility” (Prop. 41). In determining what reason dictates, he recalls, “we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to know only in this fifth Part” (Prop. 41, Dem.). The doctrine is not offered as a reward for virtue, or as a motive for it, but as a further truth about what the mind is. The scholium, which attacks the belief that piety is a burden to be repaid after death, contains the only occurrence of the word “immortal” in the Ethics, in the absurd reasoning of someone who “sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal,” and so prefers to live without reason (Prop. 41, Schol.). Nadler notes how carefully the book avoids the traditional vocabulary (pp. 108–111). The early Short Treatise still had a chapter “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” Van des Ziels Onsterfelykheid, in which the soul’s fate depends on whether it is united with the body alone or with God (KV II.23; G I 102–103); the Ethics speaks of eternity instead. Whatever the reader concludes about the doctrine, the remedies of the first half of Part V and the ethics of Part IV stand on their own.

The text resumes with Prop. 21, whose demonstration rests on Part II, as that of Prop. 22 rests on Parts I and II; the main claim comes in Prop. 23 and its scholium. Props. 24–31 treat the third kind of knowledge, Props. 32–37 the intellectual love of God, and Props. 38–40 the measure of the eternal part. After Prop. 40 the last two propositions of the Ethics turn from the eternity of the mind back to the life of virtue, and conclude that “blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself” (Prop. 42).

Propositio XXI

Proposition XXI

[G II 294] Mens nihil imaginari potest, neque rerum praeteritarum recordari, nisi durante corpore.
The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures.

Cited in 5P29D, 5P31D, 5P34D, 5P38S, 5P40C

Demonstratio. Mens actualem sui corporis existentiam non exprimit, neque etiam corporis affectiones ut actuales concipit, nisi durante corpore (per coroll. prop. 8. P. 2.), et consequenter (per prop. 26. P. 2.) nullum corpus ut actu existens concipit, nisi durante suo corpore. Ac proinde nihil imaginari (vide imaginationis definitionem in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), neque rerum praeteritarum recordari potest, nisi durante corpore (vide definitionem memoriae in schol. prop. 18. P. 2.). Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it conceive the affections of the body as actual, except while the body endures (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of Part II), and consequently (by Prop. 26 of Part II) it conceives no body as actually existing except while its body endures. And so it can imagine nothing (see the definition of imagination in Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II), nor recollect past things, except while the body endures (see the definition of memory in Schol. of Prop. 18 of Part II). Q.E.D.

Propositio XXII

Proposition XXII

[G II 295] In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quae huius et illius corporis humani essentiam sub aeternitatis specie exprimit.
Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity.

Cited in 5P23D

Demonstratio. Deus non tantum est causa huius et illius corporis humani existentiae, sed etiam essentiae (per prop. 25. P. 1.), quae propterea per ipsam Dei essentiam necessario debet concipi (per axiom. 4. P. 1.), idque aeterna quadam necessitate (per prop. 16. P. 1.), qui quidem conceptus necessario in Deo dari debet (per prop. 3. P. 2.). Q. E. D.
Demonstration. God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (by Prop. 25 of Part I), which therefore must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (by Axiom 4 of Part I), and that by a certain eternal necessity (by Prop. 16 of Part I); and this concept must necessarily be in God (by Prop. 3 of Part II). Q.E.D.

Propositio XXIII

Proposition XXIII

Mens humana non potest cum corpore absolute destrui, sed eius aliquid remanet quod aeternum est.
The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.

Cited in 5P29D, 5P31D, 5P38D, 5P40C

Demonstratio. In Deo datur necessario conceptus seu idea, quae corporis humani essentiam exprimit (per prop. praeced.), quae propterea aliquid necessario est, quod ad essentiam mentis humanae pertinet (per prop. 13. P. 2.). Sed menti humanae nullam durationem, quae tempore definiri potest, tribuimus, nisi quatenus corporis actualem existentiam, quae per durationem explicatur et tempore definiri potest, exprimit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 8. P. 2.) ipsi durationem non tribuimus nisi durante corpore. Cum tamen aliquid nihilominus sit id, quod aeterna quadam necessitate per ipsam Dei essentiam concipitur (per prop. praeced.), erit necessario hoc aliquid, quod ad mentis essentiam pertinet, aeternum. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding Prop.), and which therefore is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind (by Prop. 13 of Part II). But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and can be defined by time; that is (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of Part II), we do not attribute duration to it except while the body endures. Since, however, there is nevertheless something which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (by the preceding Prop.), this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Est, uti diximus, haec idea, quae corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus, qui ad mentis essentiam pertinet, quique necessario aeternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla eius vestigia dari,a nec aeternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest.
Scholium. This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking which pertains to the essence of the mind and which is necessarily eternal. And yet it cannot happen that we should remember that we existed before the body, since there can be no traces of this in the body, nor can eternity be defined by time or have any relation to time.
  1. a From the following potest a possunt must be understood after dari; the Dutch seems to have the same inconcinnity. W. Meijer (second edition), followed by Appuhn, would put possunt into the text. Gebhardt (G II 296; Textgestaltung II 390–391) leaves the text, and rejects Halpern’s view that Spinoza meant only that there are no such traces (dantur), not that there can be none.
At nihilominus sentimus experimurque, nos aeternos esse. Nam mens non minus res illas sentit, quas intelligendo concipit, quam quas in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi, quibus res videt observatque, sunt ipsae demonstrationes.
But nevertheless we feel and experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things which it conceives in understanding no less than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves.
Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen mentem nostram, quatenus corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie involvit, aeternam esse, et hanc eius existentiam tempore definiri sive per durationem explicari non posse. Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare, eiusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest, quatenus actualem corporis existentiam involvit, et eatenus tantum potentiam habet rerum existentiam tempore determinandi, easque sub duratione concipiendi.
Although, therefore, we do not remember that we existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of it cannot be defined by time or explained through duration. Our mind, therefore, can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body, and only to that extent does it have the power of determining the existence of things by time and of conceiving them under duration.

Propositio XXIV

Proposition XXIV

[G II 296] Quo magis res singulares intelligimus, eo magis Deum intelligimus.a
The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.
  1. a The Dutch has hoe wy ook God meer verstaan, of meer verstant van God hebben (‘the more we also understand God, or have more understanding of God’), as if the Latin had been eo magis Deum intelligimus sive eo magis Dei intellectum habemus. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 391) takes the Dutch to give the key to this much-disputed proposition: the more we understand of things, the greater our share in the infinite intellect.

Cited in 5P25D, 5P27D

Demonstratio. Patet ex coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.
Demonstration. This is evident from Cor. of Prop. 25 of Part I.

Propositio XXV

Proposition XXV

Summus mentis conatus summaque virtus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere.
The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Cited in 5P27D

Demonstratio. Tertium cognitionis genus procedit ab adaequata idea quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum (vide huius definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), et quo magis hoc modo res intelligimus, eo magis (per prop. praeced.) Deum intelligimus. Ac proinde (per prop. 28. P. 4.) summa mentis virtus, hoc est (per defin. 8. P. 4.) mentis potentia seu natura, sive (per prop. 7. P. 3.) summus conatus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II); and the more we understand things in this way, the more (by the preceding Prop.) we understand God. And so (by Prop. 28 of Part IV) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (by Def. 8 of Part IV), the power, or nature, of the mind, or (by Prop. 7 of Part III) its highest striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXVI

Proposition XXVI

[G II 297] Quo mens aptior est ad res tertio cognitionis genere intelligendum, eo magis cupit res eodem hoc cognitionis genere intelligere.
The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.
Demonstratio. Patet. Nam quatenus concipimus mentem aptam esse ad res hoc cognitionis genere intelligendum, eatenus eandem determinatama concipimus ad res eodem cognitionis genere intelligendum, et consequenter (per aff. defin. 1.) quo mens ad hoc aptior est, eo magis hoc cupit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This is evident. For insofar as we conceive the mind to be capable of understanding things by this kind of knowledge, to that extent we conceive it to be determined to understand things by the same kind of knowledge; and consequently (by Def. Aff. 1), the more capable the mind is of this, the more it desires it. Q.E.D.
  1. a genere intelligendum, eatenus eandem determinatam] transcr. genere intelligendum eatenus, eandem determinatam. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 297).

Propositio XXVII

Proposition XXVII

Ex hoc tertio cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, mentis acquiescentia oritur.a
From this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be.1
  1. a mentis acquiescentia oritur] transcr. mentis acquiescentia, oritur. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 297).
  1. 1 What Part IV, Prop. 52 said of the self-contentment that arises from reason is here said of the third kind of knowledge, with the same words summa, quae dari potest.

Cited in 5P32D, 5P36S, 5P38S

Demonstratio. Summa mentis virtus est Deum cognoscere (per prop. 28. P. 4.), sive res tertio cognitionis genere intelligere (per prop. 25. huius); quae quidem virtus eo maior est, quo mens hoc cognitionis genere magis res cognoscit (per prop. 24. huius). Adeoque qui res hoc cognitionis genere cognoscit, is ad summam humanam perfectionem transit, et consequenter (per aff. defin. 2.) summa laetitia afficitur, idque (per prop. 43. P. 2.) concomitante idea sui suaeque virtutis; ac proinde (per aff. defin. 25.) ex hoc cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, oritur acquiescentia. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (by Prop. 28 of Part IV), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (by Prop. 25 of this Part); and this virtue is the greater, the more the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge (by Prop. 24 of this Part). And so he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection, and consequently (by Def. Aff. 2) is affected with the highest joy, and that (by Prop. 43 of Part II) accompanied by the idea of himself and of his virtue; and accordingly (by Def. Aff. 25) from this kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment there can be. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXVIII

Proposition XXVIII

Conatus seu cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere oriri non potest ex primo, at quidem ex secundo cognitionis genere.
The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second.
Demonstratio. Haec propositio per se patet. Nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel per se vel per aliud, quod per se concipitur, intelligimus; hoc est, ideae, quae in nobis clarae et distinctae sunt, sive quae ad tertium cognitionis genus referuntur (vide schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), non possunt sequi ex ideis mutilatis et confusis, quae (per idem schol.) ad primum cognitionis genus referuntur, sed ex ideis adaequatis, sive (per idem schol.) ex secundo et tertio cognitionis genere. Ac proinde (per aff. defin. 1.) cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere non potest oriri ex primo, at quidem ex secundo. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This proposition is evident through itself. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself or through something else which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to the third kind of knowledge (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II), cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas, which (by the same Schol.) are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, or (by the same Schol.) from the second and third kind of knowledge. And accordingly (by Def. Aff. 1) the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but it can from the second. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXIX

Proposition XXIX

[G II 298] Quicquid mens sub specie aeternitatis intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit, quod corporis praesentem actualem existentiam concipit; sed ex eo, quod corporis essentiam concipit sub specie aeternitatis.
Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity.

Cited in 5P31D, 5P32C, 5P37D, 5P38D, 5P40C

Demonstratio. Quatenus mens praesentem sui corporis existentiam concipit, eatenus durationem concipit, quae tempore determinari potest, et eatenus tantum potentiam habet concipiendi res cum relatione ad tempus (per prop. 21. huius et prop. 26. P. 2.). At aeternitas per durationem explicari nequit (per defin. 8. P. 1. et ipsius explic.).
Demonstration. Insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, to that extent it conceives duration, which can be determined by time, and to that extent only does it have the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by Prop. 21 of this Part and Prop. 26 of Part II). But eternity cannot be explained by duration (by Def. 8 of Part I and its Explanation).
Ergo mens eatenus potestatem non habet concipiendi res sub specie aeternitatis; sed quia de natura rationis est, res sub specie aeternitatis concipere (per coroll. 2. prop. 44. P. 2.), et ad mentis naturam etiam pertinet, corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipere (per prop. 23. huius), et praeter haec duo nihil aliud ad mentis essentiam pertinet (per prop. 13. P. 2.), ergoa haec potentia concipiendi res sub specie aeternitatis ad mentem non pertinet, nisi quatenus corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipit. Q. E. D.
Therefore to that extent the mind does not have the power of conceiving things under a species of eternity; but because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under a species of eternity (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 44 of Part II), and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under a species of eternity (by Prop. 23 of this Part), and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind (by Prop. 13 of Part II), therefore this power of conceiving things under a species of eternity does not pertain to the mind except insofar as it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition puts a full stop after pertinet and begins a new sentence with Ergo; the Dutch (behoort; … zo) shows that the sentence runs on, and Gebhardt (G II 298; Textgestaltung II 391) corrects the punctuation, as Leopold asked.
Scholium. Res duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur, vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere, vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri et ex naturae divinae necessitate consequi concipimus. Quae autem hoc secundo modo ut verae seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub aeternitatis specie concipimus, et earum ideae aeternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt, ut prop. 45. P. 2. ostendimus, cuius etiam schol. vide.
Scholium. Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature.1 But those which are conceived as true, or real, in this second way, we conceive under a species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Prop. 45 of Part II; see also its Schol..
  1. 1 The two ways correspond to existence as duration and existence as it follows from God’s nature. Part II, Prop. 45, Schol. had already drawn the line: ‘by existence I do not here understand duration, that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly and as a certain species of quantity’, but ‘the very nature of existence which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways from the eternal necessity of God’s nature’.

Propositio XXX

Proposition XXX

[G II 299] Mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub aeternitatis specie cognoscit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque se in Deo esse et per Deum concipi.
Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

Cited in 5P31D, 5P32D

Demonstratio. Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam (per defin. 8. P. 1.). Res igitur sub specie aeternitatis concipere est res concipere, quatenus per Dei essentiam ut entia realia concipiuntur, sive quatenus per Dei essentiam involvunt existentiam. Adeoque mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub specie aeternitatis concipit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves necessary existence (by Def. 8 of Part I). To conceive things under a species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things insofar as they are conceived as real beings through the essence of God, or insofar as through the essence of God they involve existence. And so our mind, insofar as it conceives itself and the body under a species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXI

Proposition XXXI

Tertium cognitionis genus pendet a mente, tamquam a formali causa, quatenus mens ipsa aeterna est.
The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.

Cited in 5P33D

Demonstratio. Mens nihil sub aeternitatis specie concipit, nisi quatenus sui corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie concipit (per prop. 29. huius), hoc est (per prop. 21. et 23. huius) nisi quatenus aeterna est. Adeoque (per prop. praeced.) quatenus aeterna est, Dei habet cognitionem, quae quidem cognitio est necessario adaequata (per prop. 46. P. 2.); ac proinde mens quatenus aeterna est, ad illa omnia cognoscendum est apta, quae ex data hac Dei cognitione consequi possunt (per prop. 40. P. 2.), hoc est, ad res tertio cognitionis genere cognoscendum (vide huius definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), cuius propterea mens (per defin. 1. P. 3.) quatenus aeterna est, causa est adaequata seu formalis. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind conceives nothing under a species of eternity except insofar as it conceives the essence of its body under a species of eternity (by Prop. 29 of this Part), that is (by Props. 21 and 23 of this Part), except insofar as it is eternal. And so (by the preceding Prop.) insofar as it is eternal it has knowledge of God, which is necessarily adequate (by Prop. 46 of Part II); and accordingly the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which can follow from this given knowledge of God (by Prop. 40 of Part II), that is, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see its definition in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II), of which the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is therefore (by Def. 1 of Part III) the adequate, or formal, cause.1 Q.E.D.
  1. 1 causa formalis is here equated with the adequate cause of Part III, Def. 1: a cause whose effect can be perceived clearly and distinctly through it. The third kind of knowledge follows from the mind’s own nature insofar as that nature is eternal.
[G II 300] Scholium. Quo igitur unusquisque hoc cognitionis genere plus pollet, eo melius sui et Dei conscius est, hoc est, eo est perfectior et beatior, quod adhuc clarius ex seqq. patebit. Sed hic notandum, quod, tametsi iam certi sumus, mentem aeternam esse, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit, nos tamen, ut ea, quae ostendere volumus, facilius explicentur et melius intelligantur, ipsam, tamquam iam inciperet esse, et res sub aeternitatis specie intelligere iam inciperet, considerabimus, ut hucusque fecimus; quod nobis absque ullo erroris periculo facere licet, modo nobis cautio sit nihil concludere, nisi ex perspicuis praemissis.
Scholium. The more, therefore, each one is capable in this kind of knowledge, the better he is conscious of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect and blessed he is, as will be evident still more clearly from what follows. But it should be noted here that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity, nevertheless, so that what we wish to show may be explained more easily and better understood, we shall consider it, as we have done so far, as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under a species of eternity; which we may do without any danger of error, provided we take care to conclude nothing except from clear premises.

Propositio XXXII

Proposition XXXII

Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur, et quidem concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa.
Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause.

Cited in 5P32C, 5P36D, 5P42D

Demonstratio. Ex hoc cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, mentis acquiescentia (per prop. 27. huius),a hoc est (per aff. defin. 25.) laetitia oritur, eaque concomitante idea sui, et consequenter (per prop. 30. huius) concomitante etiam idea Dei tamquam causa. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. From this kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be (by Prop. 27 of this Part), that is (by Def. Aff. 25), joy, and this accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (by Prop. 30 of this Part) accompanied also by the idea of God as its cause. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition and the Dutch put per Prop. 27. hujus after concomitante ideâ sui instead of after acquiescentia; W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) give the reference its right place, and Gebhardt (G II 300; Textgestaltung II 391) follows.
Corollarium. Ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur necessario amor Dei intellectualis. Nam ex hoc cognitionis genere oritur (per prop. praeced.) laetitia concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa, hoc est (per aff. defin. 6.) amor Dei, non quatenus ipsum ut praesentem imaginamur (per prop. 29. huius), sed quatenus Deum aeternum esse intelligimus, et hoc est, quod amorem Dei intellectualem voco.
Corollary. From the third kind of knowledge there necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge there arises (by the preceding Prop.) joy accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is (by Def. Aff. 6), the love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by Prop. 29 of this Part), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal; and this is what I call the intellectual love of God.1
  1. 1 The love of God of Props. 15–16 was joy accompanied by the idea of God as one relates the affections of the body to him, and lasted with the body. This love arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal (Prop. 33), and is an action of the mind, not a passion (Prop. 36, Dem.); the Scholium to Prop. 33 explains why it can still be called joy.

Cited in 5P33S, 5P35D, 5P36D, 5P42D

Propositio XXXIII

Proposition XXXIII

Amor Dei intellectualis, qui ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur, est aeternus.
The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Cited in 5P33S, 5P37D, 5P39D

[G II 301] Demonstratio. Tertium enim cognitionis genus (per prop. 31. huius et axiom. 3. P. 1.) est aeternum; adeoque (per idem axiom. P. 1.) amor, qui ex eodem oritur, est etiam necessario aeternus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For the third kind of knowledge (by Prop. 31 of this Part and Axiom 3 of Part I) is eternal; and so (by the same Axiom of Part I) the love which arises from it is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Quamvis hic erga Deum amor principium non habuerit (per prop. praeced.), habet tamen omnes amoris perfectiones, perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in coroll. prop. praeced. finximus. Nec ulla hic est differentia, nisi quod mens easdem has perfectiones, quas eidem iam accedere finximus, aeternas habuerit, idque concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa aeterna. Quod si laetitia in transitione ad maiorem perfectionem consistit, beatitudo sane in eo consistere debet, quod mens ipsa perfectione sit praedita.
Scholium. Although this love towards God has had no beginning (by the preceding Prop.), it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come into being, as we feigned in the Cor. of the preceding Prop.. Nor is there any difference here, except that the mind has had eternally these same perfections which we feigned to be now accruing to it, and that accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. But if joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.1
  1. 1 Joy was defined as a passage to a greater perfection, not perfection itself (Part III, Def. Aff. 3, Expl.). Blessedness is not a passage at all: it is the possession of the perfection to which joy is a passage.

Propositio XXXIV

Proposition XXXIV

Mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur.
Only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions.
Demonstratio. Imaginatio est idea, qua mens rem aliquam ut praesentem contemplatur (vide eius definitionem in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), quae tamen magis corporis humani praesentem constitutionem, quam rei externae naturam indicat (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.). Est igitur affectus (per gener. aff. defin.) imaginatio, quatenus corporis praesentem constitutionem indicat; atque adeo (per prop. 21. huius) mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates some thing as present (see its definition in Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II), but which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II). An affect, therefore (by the General Definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body; and so (by Prop. 21 of this Part) only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur nullum amorem praeter amorem intellectualem esse aeternum.
Corollary. Hence it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal.
Scholium. Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus, eos suae mentis aeternitatis esse quidem conscios, sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere, eamque imaginationi seu memoriae tribuere, quam post mortem remanere credunt.
Scholium. If we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse it with duration and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death.1
  1. 1 The common belief in survival is not simply rejected: men are aware of something true, the eternity of the mind, but imagine it as continued duration with memory, which Prop. 21 excludes.

Propositio XXXV

Proposition XXXV

[G II 302] Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat.
God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.1
  1. 1 This does not contradict Prop. 17, which denied that God has passions or any joy or sadness: intellectual love is defined by the idea of a perfection possessed, not by a passage to a greater one, and the Scholium to Prop. 36 calls it joy only with an apology (‘if we may still use this word’).

Cited in 5P36D, 5P36S

Demonstratio. Deus est absolute infinitus (per defin. 6. P. 1.), hoc est (per defin. 6. P. 2.) Dei natura gaudet infinita perfectione, idque (per prop. 3. P. 2.) concomitante idea sui, hoc est (per prop. 11. et defin. 1. P. 1.a) idea suae causae, et hoc est, quod in coroll. prop. 32. huius amorem intellectualem esse diximus.
Demonstration. God is absolutely infinite (by Def. 6 of Part I), that is (by Def. 6 of Part II), the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection, and that (by Prop. 3 of Part II) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (by Prop. 11 and Def. 1 of Part I), by the idea of his own cause; and this is what we said in the Cor. of Prop. 32 of this Part is intellectual love.
  1. a The 1677 edition and the Dutch have Axiom. 1.; Van Vloten–Land rightly correct to Defin. 1., and Gebhardt (G II 302; Textgestaltung II 391–392) follows. He keeps Prop. 11., which Halpern would change to 25: what matters here is God as necessarily existing, that is, as cause of himself, not as cause of things. W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) would add tanquam causa after concomitante ideâ sui, and Appuhn does; Gebhardt finds the addition unnecessary.

Propositio XXXVI

Proposition XXXVI

Mentis amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei amor, quo Deus se ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per essentiam humanae mentis sub specie aeternitatis consideratam explicari potest, hoc est, mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum amat.
The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered under a species of eternity; that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.

Cited in 5P42D

Demonstratio. Hic mentis amor ad mentis actiones referri debet (per coroll. prop. 32. huius et per prop. 3. P. 3.), qui proinde actio est, qua mens se ipsam contemplatur concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa (per prop. 32. huius et eius coroll.), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1. et coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.) actio, qua Deus, quatenus per mentem humanam explicari potest, seipsum contemplatur concomitante idea sui. Atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) hic mentis amor pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus seipsum amat. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This love of the mind must be related to the actions of the mind (by Cor. of Prop. 32 of this Part and by Prop. 3 of Part III); it is therefore an action by which the mind contemplates itself, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (by Prop. 32 of this Part and its Cor.), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 25 of Part I and Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II), an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself. And so (by the preceding Prop.) this love of the mind is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod Deus, quatenus seipsum amat, homines amat, et consequenter quod amor Dei erga homines et mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis unum et idem sit.
Corollary. Hence it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves men, and consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same.
[G II 303] Scholium. Ex his clare intelligimus, qua in re nostra salusa seu beatitudo seu libertas consistit, nempe in constanti et aeterno erga Deum amore, sive in amore Dei erga homines. Atque hic amor, seu beatitudo in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur;cb nec immerito.
Scholium. From these things we understand clearly in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists: namely, in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God towards men. And this love, or blessedness, is called glory in the sacred books, and not without reason.1
  1. a qua in re nostra salus] transcr. qua in re nostra salus. The transcription opens an italic span here that closes after ‘gloria’; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 303) have no italics.
  2. b Ies. 6. 3., Ps. 8. 6., 113. 4., Ioh. 11. 40., Rom. 3. 23., Eph. 1. 17.-18. [Bruder]
  3. c in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur] transcr. in sacris codicibus gloria* appellatur. See the preceding emendation.
  1. 1 Bruder’s note in the Latin lists the passages, beginning with Isaiah 6:3: ‘מְלֹא כָל־הָאָרֶץ כְּבוֹדוֹ’ (‘the whole earth is full of his glory’; Vulgate plena est omnis terra gloria ejus). The justification follows: blessedness is contentment of mind, and contentment of mind is not really distinguished from glory (Part III, Defs. Aff. 25 and 30).
Nam sive hic amor ad Deum referatur sive ad mentem, recte animi acquiescentia, quae revera a gloria (per aff. defin. 25. et 30.) non distinguitur, appellari potest. Nam quatenus ad Deum refertur, est (per prop. 35. huius) laetitia (liceat hoc adhuc vocabulo uti) concomitante idea sui, ut et quatenus ad mentem refertur (per prop. 27. huius).
For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called contentment of mind, which in reality is not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. 25 and 30). For insofar as it is related to God, it is (by Prop. 35 of this Part) joy (if we may still use this word), accompanied by the idea of himself, as it is also insofar as it is related to the mind (by Prop. 27 of this Part).
Deinde quia nostrae mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit, cuius principium et fundamentum Deus est (per prop. 15. P. 1. et schol. prop. 47. P. 2.), hinc perspicuum nobis fit, quomodo et qua ratione mens nostra secundum essentiam et existentiam ex natura divina sequatur et continuo a Deo pendeat; quod hic notare operae pretium duxi, ut hoc exemplo ostenderem, quantum rerum singularium cognitio, quam intuitivam sive tertii generis appellavi (vide schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), polleat, potiorque sit cognitione universali, quam secundi generis esse dixi.
Next, because the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, of which God is the principle and foundation (by Prop. 15 of Part I and Schol. of Prop. 47 of Part II), it becomes clear to us how and in what way our mind follows from the divine nature according to essence and existence, and continually depends on God, which I thought it worthwhile to note here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things which I have called intuitive, or of the third kind (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II), can do, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge which I have said is of the second kind.
Nam quamvis in prima parte generaliter ostenderim, omnia (et consequenter mentem etiam humanam) a Deo secundum essentiam et existentiam pendere, illa tamen demonstratio tametsi legitima sit et extra dubitationis aleam posita, non ita tamen mentem nostram afficit, quam quando id ipsum ex ipsa essentia rei cuiuscumque singularis, quam a Deo pendere dicimus, concluditur.
For although I have shown generally in Part I that all things (and consequently the human mind also) depend on God according to essence and existence, that demonstration, although it is legitimate and placed beyond the hazard of doubt, still does not affect our mind as much as when this same thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God.2
  1. 2 The difference between the second and the third kind of knowledge is not in certainty but in object and force: the same truth, known from universal premises, convinces; known in the essence of a singular thing, here our own mind, it affects us. Compare the example of the proportional numbers in Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

Cited in 5P42D

Propositio XXXVII

Proposition XXXVII

Nihil in natura datur, quod huic amori intellectuali sit contrarium, sive quod ipsum possit tollere.
There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Cited in 5P38D

Demonstratio. Hic intellectualis amor ex mentis natura necessario sequitur, quatenus ipsa ut aeterna veritas per Dei naturam consideratur (per prop. 33. et 29. huius). Si quid ergo daretur, quod huic amori esset contrarium, id contrarium esset vero, et consequenter id, quod hunc amorem posset tollere, efficeret, ut id, quod verum est, falsum esset; quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nihil in natura datur etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, insofar as the mind is considered as an eternal truth through the nature of God (by Props. 33 and 29 of this Part). If, therefore, there were anything which was contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the true; and consequently that which could take this love away would bring it about that what is true would be false, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in nature, etc. Q.E.D.
[G II 304] Scholium. Partis quartae axioma res singulares respicit, quatenus cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum considerantur, de quo neminem dubitare credo.
Scholium. The axiom of Part IV concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place,1 of which I believe no one has any doubt.
  1. 1 The axiom said that for every singular thing there is another more powerful by which it can be destroyed. It holds of things as they exist in duration, not of the mind insofar as it is an eternal truth.

Propositio XXXVIII

Proposition XXXVIII

Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur et mortem minus timet.a
The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death.
  1. a W. Meijer pointed out that this last clause is strictly proved only in the Scholium and may be a later addition; Leopold, Baensch and Appuhn agree. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 392) grants the inconcinnity but notes that the Dutch already had the text of the 1677 edition.

Cited in 5P42D

Demonstratio. Mentis essentia in cognitione consistita (per prop. 11. P. 2.); quo igitur mens plures res cognoscit secundo et tertio cognitionis genere, eo maior eius pars remanet (per prop. 23. et 29. huius),b et consequenter (per prop. praeced.) eo maior eius pars non tangitur ab affectibus, qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, hoc est (per prop. 30. P. 4.) qui mali sunt. Quo itaque mens plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere intelligit, eo maior eius pars illaesa manet, et consequenter minus ab affectibus patitur etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Prop. 11 of Part II); the more things, therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains (by Props. 23 and 29 of this Part), and consequently (by the preceding Prop.) the greater the part of it that is not touched by affects which are contrary to our nature, that is (by Prop. 30 of Part IV), which are evil. The more things, therefore, the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains unharmed, and consequently the less it is acted on by affects, etc. Q.E.D.
  1. a Mentis essentia in cognitione consistit] transcr. Mentis essentia in ognitione consistit. Misprint in the transcription; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 304) read ‘cognitione’.
  2. b W. Meijer (second edition) and Baensch read per Prop. 23., 29. et 33.; Gebhardt (G II 304; Textgestaltung II 392) keeps the transmitted reference, since in the same context the Corollary to Prop. 40 cites only Props. 23 and 29.
Scholium. Hinc intelligimus id quod in schol. prop. 39. P. 4. attigi et quod in hac parte explicare promisi; nempe quod mors eo minus est noxia, quo mentis clara et distincta cognitio maior est, et consequenter quo mens magis Deum amat. Deinde quia (per prop. 27. huius) ex tertio cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, oritur acquiescentia, hinc sequitur mentem humanam posse eius naturae esse, ut id, quod eius cum corpore perire ostendimus (vide prop. 21. huius), in respectu ad id, quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti. Sed de his mox prolixius.
Scholium. From this we understand what I touched on in Schol. of Prop. 39 of Part IV, and what I promised to explain in this Part: namely, that death is the less harmful, the greater the mind’s clear and distinct knowledge, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Next, because (by Prop. 27 of this Part) the greatest contentment there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows from this that the human mind can be of such a nature that what of it we have shown perishes with the body (see Prop. 21 of this Part) is of no importance in relation to what of it remains. But of these things more fully presently.

Cited in 5P39S

Propositio XXXIX

Proposition XXXIX

Qui corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is mentem habet, cuius maxima pars est aeterna.
He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.
[G II 305] Demonstratio. Qui corpus ad plurima agendum aptum habet, is minime affectibus, qui mali sunt, conflictatur (per prop. 38. P. 4.), hoc est (per prop. 30. P. 4.) affectibus qui naturae nostrae sunt contrarii. Atque adeo (per prop. 10. huius) potestatem habet ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum, et consequenter efficiendi (per prop. 14. huius) ut omnes corporis affectiones ad Dei ideam referantur, ex quo fiet (per prop. 15. huius) ut erga Deum afficiatur amore, qui (per prop. 16. huius) mentis maximam partem occupare sive constituere debet; ac proinde (per prop. 33. huius) mentem habet, cuius maxima pars est aeterna. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who has a body capable of doing a great many things is least troubled by affects which are evil (by Prop. 38 of Part IV), that is (by Prop. 30 of Part IV), by affects which are contrary to our nature. And so (by Prop. 10 of this Part) he has the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and consequently of bringing it about (by Prop. 14 of this Part) that all the affections of the body are related to the idea of God; from which it will come about (by Prop. 15 of this Part) that he is affected with a love towards God which (by Prop. 16 of this Part) must occupy, or constitute, the greatest part of the mind; and accordingly (by Prop. 33 of this Part) he has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Quia corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est, quin eius naturae possint esse, ut ad mentes referantur, quae magnam sui et Dei habeant cognitionem, et quarum maxima seu praecipua pars est aeterna, atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant. Sed ut haec clarius intelligantur, animadvertendum hic est, quod nos in continua vivimus variatione, et prout in melius sive in peius mutamur, eo felices aut infelices dicimur.
Scholium. Because human bodies are capable of a great many things, there is no doubt that they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose greatest, or principal, part is eternal, so that they hardly fear death. But in order that these things may be understood more clearly, it should be noted here that we live in continual change, and are called happy or unhappy according as we change for the better or for the worse.
Qui enim ex infante vel puero in cadaver transiit, infelix dicitur, et contra id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vitae spatium mente sana in corpore sano percurrere potuerimus. Et revera qui corpus habet, ut infans vel puer, ad paucissima aptum et maxime pendens a causis externis, mentem habet, quae in se sola considerata nihil fere sui, nec Dei, nec rerum sit conscia; et contra, qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet, quae in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia.
For he who has passed from being an infant or a child into a corpse is called unhappy, and on the other hand it is counted as happiness if we have been able to pass through the whole span of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And in truth, he who, like an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few things and very greatly dependent on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things;1 and on the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is very much conscious of itself and of God and of things.
  1. 1 The infant of Part IV, Prop. 39, Schol., whose nature the old man can hardly believe was ever his, returns here as the measure of what education and understanding change. The mind is the idea of the body (Part II, Prop. 13), so what the body is capable of sets the range of what the mind can know (Part II, Prop. 14; Part IV, Prop. 38).
In hac vita igitur apprime conamur, ut corpus infantiae in aliud, quantum eius natura patitur eique conducit, mutetur, quod ad plurima aptum sit, quodque ad mentem referatur, quae sui et Dei et rerum plurimum sit conscia; atque ita ut id omne, quod ad ipsius memoriam vel imaginationem refertur, in respectu ad intellectum vix alicuius sit momenti, ut in schol. prop. praeced. iam dixi.
In this life, therefore, we strive above all that the body of infancy may change, as far as its nature allows and is conducive to it, into another which is capable of a great many things, and which is related to a mind very much conscious of itself and of God and of things; and so that everything which is related to its memory or imagination may be of hardly any importance in relation to the intellect, as I have already said in the Schol. of the preceding Prop..

Propositio XL

Proposition XL

[G II 306] Quo unaquaeque res plus perfectionis habet, eo magis agit et minus patitur, et contra quo magis agit, eo perfectior est.
The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.

Cited in 5P40C

Demonstratio. Quo unaquaeque res perfectior est, eo plus habet realitatis (per defin. 6. P. 2.),a et consequenter (per prop. 3. P. 3. cum eius schol.) eo magis agit et minus patitur; quae quidem demonstratio inverso ordine eodem modo procedit; ex quo sequitur, ut res contra eo sit perfectior, quo magis agit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The more perfect each thing is, the more reality it has (by Def. 6 of Part II), and consequently (by Prop. 3 of Part III with its Schol.) the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and this demonstration proceeds in the same way in reverse order, from which it follows that, conversely, a thing is the more perfect the more it acts. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition and the Dutch have per Axiom. 6; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land rightly correct to Defin. 6., and Gebhardt (G II 305; Textgestaltung II 392) follows.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, partem mentis, quae remanet, quantacumque ea sit, perfectiorem esse reliqua. Nam pars mentis aeterna (per prop. 23. et 29. huius) est intellectus, per quem solum nos agere dicimur (per prop. 3. P. 3.); illa autem, quam perire ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio (per prop. 21. huius), per quam solam dicimur pati (per prop. 3. P. 3. et gener. aff. defin.). Atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) illa, quantacumque ea sit, hac est perfectior. Q. E. D.
Corollary. Hence it follows that the part of the mind which remains, however great it may be, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (by Props. 23 and 29 of this Part) is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act (by Prop. 3 of Part III); but the part which we have shown perishes is the imagination itself (by Prop. 21 of this Part), through which alone we are said to be acted on (by Prop. 3 of Part III and the General Definition of the Affects). And so (by the preceding Prop.) the former, however great it may be, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec sunt, quae de mente, quatenus sine relatione ad corporis existentiam consideratur, ostendere constitueram. Ex quibus et simul ex prop. 21. P. 1.a et aliis apparet, quod mens nostra, quatenus intelligit, aeternus cogitandi modus sit, qui alio aeterno cogitandi modo determinatur,b et hic iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum; ita ut omnes simul Dei aeternum et infinitum intellectum constituant.
Scholium. These are the things I had decided to show concerning the mind insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body. From these, and at the same time from Prop. 21 of Part I and other places, it is evident that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so to infinity; so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.1
  1. a ex prop. 21. P. 1.] transcr. ex prop. 21 P. 1. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 306).
  2. b qui alio aeterno cogitandi modo determinatur] transcr. qui alio cogitandi modo determinatur. The 1677 edition (OP p. 262), Gebhardt (G II 306) and Bartuschat read ‘alio aeterno cogitandi modo’; the transcription omits ‘aeterno’.
  1. 1 Part II had said that ‘the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God’ (Part II, Prop. 11, Cor.). Here the parts are seen together: the eternal part of each mind is one link in an infinite chain of eternal modes of thinking, and the chain as a whole is God’s infinite intellect, an infinite mode that follows from the absolute nature of the attribute of thought (Part I, Prop. 21).

Propositio XLI

Proposition XLI

Quamvis nesciremus, mentem nostram aeternam esse, pietatem tamen et religionem et absolute omnia, quae ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus in quarta parte, prima haberemus.
Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion,1 and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility.
  1. 1 The ethics of Part IV was derived from the striving to persevere in being alone (Part IV, Prop. 22, Cor.; Prop. 24), and needs no support from the eternity of the mind. Spinoza says so in order to separate his ethics from the common view, set out in the Scholium, that piety is a burden borne for a reward after death.
Demonstratio. Primum et unicum virtutis seu recte vivendi rationis fundamentum (per coroll. prop. 22. et per prop. 24. P. 4.) est suum utile quaerere. Ad illa autem determinandum, quae ratio utilia esse dictat, nullam rationem habuimus mentis aeternitatis, quam demum in hac quinta parte novimus. Quamvis igitur tum temporis ignoraverimus, mentem esse aeternam, illa tamen, quae ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus, prima habuimus. Atque adeo quamvis etiam nunc hoc ipsum ignoraremus, eadem tamen rationis praescripta prima haberemus.a Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The first and only foundation of virtue, or of the principle of living rightly (by Cor. of Prop. 22 and by Prop. 24 of Part IV), is to seek one’s own advantage. But in determining those things which reason dictates to be useful, we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to know only in this fifth Part. Although, therefore, we were at that time ignorant that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless regarded as of first importance those things which we showed to be related to tenacity and nobility. And so, even if we were still now ignorant of this, we would still regard the same prescriptions of reason as of first importance. Q.E.D.
  1. a eadem tamen rationis praescripta prima haberemus] transcr. eadem tamen praescripta prima haberemus. The 1677 edition (OP p. 263), Gebhardt (G II 307) and Bartuschat read ‘rationis praescripta’; the transcription omits ‘rationis’.
[G II 307] Scholium. Communis vulgi persuasio alia videtur esse. Nam plerique videntur credere, se eatenus liberos esse, quatenus libidini parere licet, et eatenus de suo iure cedere, quatenus ex legis divinae praescripto vivere tenentur. Pietatem igitur et religionema et absolute omnia, quae ad animi fortitudinem referuntur, onera esse credunt, quae post mortem deponere, et pretium servitutis, nempe pietatis et religionis, accipere sperant.
Scholium. The common persuasion of the multitude seems to be otherwise. For most seem to believe that they are free insofar as they are permitted to obey their lust, and that they give up their right insofar as they are bound to live according to the prescription of the divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion, and absolutely all the things which are related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to lay down after death, and to receive the reward of their servitude, namely of their piety and religion.
  1. a The 1677 edition prints Pietas et Religio … onera esse credunt, a slip of Spinoza’s which its Sphalmata corrigenda correct (Gebhardt, G II 307; Textgestaltung II 392).
Nec hac spe sola, sed etiam et praecipue metu, ne diris scilicet suppliciis post mortem puniantur, inducuntur, ut ex legis divinae praescripto, quantum eorum fert tenuitas et impotens animus, vivant; et nisi haec spes et metus hominibus inessent, at contra si crederent, mentes cum corpore interire, nec restare miseris pietatis onere confectis, vivere longius, ad ingenium redirent, et ex libidine omnia moderari et fortunae potius, quam sibi parere vellent.
And they are induced, not by this hope alone but also and chiefly by fear, namely the fear of being punished with dreadful punishments after death, to live according to the prescription of the divine law as far as their feebleness and lack of power of mind allow; and if this hope and fear were not in men, but if, on the contrary, they believed that minds perish with the body, and that no longer life remains for the wretched who are worn out by the burden of piety, they would return to their own temperament, and would want to govern everything according to their lust and to obey fortune rather than themselves.
Quae mihi non minus absurda videntur, quam si quis propterea, quod non credit se posse bonis alimentis corpus in aeternum nutrire, venenis potius et letiferis se exsaturare vellet; vel quia videt mentem non esse aeternam seu immortalem, ideo amens mavult esse et sine ratione vivere; quae adeo absurda sunt, ut vix recenseri mereantur.
These things seem to me no less absurd than if someone, because he does not believe that he can nourish his body with good food for eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons and deadly things; or because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, should prefer to be out of his mind and to live without reason; which are so absurd that they hardly deserve to be mentioned.

Propositio XLII

Proposition XLII

Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus; nec eadem gaudemus, quia libidines coercemus; sed contra quia eadem gaudemus, ideo libidines coercere possumus.
Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself;1 nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts, but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts.
  1. 1 The answer to the view described in the preceding Scholium, and the conclusion announced at the end of Part II, where the doctrine of the mind was said to teach that our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists in the knowledge of God alone, and that virtue and the service of God are happiness itself and the highest freedom (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol.).
Demonstratio. Beatitudo in amore erga Deum consistit (per prop. 36. huius et eius schol.), qui quidem amor ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur (per coroll. prop. 32. huius). Atque adeo hic amor (per prop. 59. et 3. P. 3.) ad mentem, quatenus agit, referri debet, ac proinde (per defin. 8. P. 4.) ipsa virtus est; quod erat primum.
Demonstration. Blessedness consists in love towards God (by Prop. 36 of this Part and its Schol.), which love arises from the third kind of knowledge (by Cor. of Prop. 32 of this Part). And so this love (by Props. 59 and 3 of Part III) must be related to the mind insofar as it acts; and accordingly (by Def. 8 of Part IV) it is virtue itself; which was the first point.
Deinde quo mens hoc amore divino seu beatitudine magis gaudet, eo plus intelligit (per prop. 32. huius), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 3. huius) eo maiorem in affectus habet potentiam, et (per prop. 38. huius) eo minus ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur. Atque adeo ex eo, quod mens hoc amore divino seu beatitudine gaudet, potestatem habet libidines coercendi; et quia humana potentia ad coercendos affectus in solo intellectu consistit, ergo nemo beatitudine gaudet, quia affectus coercuit, sed contra potestas libidines coercendi ex ipsa beatitudine oritur. Q. E. D.
Next, the more the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, the more it understands (by Prop. 32 of this Part), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 3 of this Part), the greater the power it has over the affects, and (by Prop. 38 of this Part) the less it is acted on by affects which are evil. And so, from the fact that the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts; and because human power to restrain the affects consists in the intellect alone, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained the affects, but on the contrary the power of restraining lusts arises from blessedness itself. Q.E.D.
[G II 308] Scholium. His omnia, quae de mentis in affectus potentia, quaeque de mentis libertate ostendere volueram, absolvi. Ex quibus apparet, quantum sapiens polleat, potiorque sit ignaro, qui sola libidine agitur. Ignarus enim, praeterquam quoda a causis externis multis modis agitatur, nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur, sed sui et Dei et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit, sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur.
Scholium. With these I have completed all that I wished to show concerning the power of the mind over the affects and concerning the freedom of the mind. From which it is evident how much the wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than the ignorant man, who is driven by lust alone. For the ignorant man, besides being driven about in many ways by external causes and never possessing true contentment of mind, lives as if unconscious of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he also ceases to be. The wise man, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly moved in mind, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true contentment of mind.
  1. a The 1677 edition has praeterquam alone; Gebhardt (G II 308; Textgestaltung II 392) reads praeterquam quod, as Leopold proposed.
Si iam via, quam ad haec ducere ostendi, perardua videatur, inveniri tamen potest. Et sane arduum debet esse, quod adeo raro reperitur. Qui enim posset fieri, si salus in promptu esset et sine magno labore reperiri posset, ut ab omnibus fere negligeretur? Sed omnia praeclara tam difficilia, quam rara sunt.
If the way which I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, it can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is so rarely found must be hard. For how could it happen, if salvation were ready to hand and could be found without great labour, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.