Introduction to the Third Part
The third Part bears the title De origine et natura affectuum, “Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects.” It is the hinge of the Ethics. Parts I and II have established what God is and what the human mind is; Parts IV and V will treat human bondage and human freedom. Between them Spinoza needs an account of what moves us: why we love and hate, hope and fear, envy, pity and despise, and why we so often see the better and follow the worse. Part III supplies it. It is the longest Part of the book after Part IV, the richest in observation of ordinary life, and the one in which Spinoza’s naturalism is most consistently and most provocatively applied. A reader who has found the first two Parts remote from human concerns will find in the third the reason for them: the metaphysics of substance and the theory of ideas were built so that the passions could be understood as natural things.
A dominion within a dominion
The method is announced in the Preface, with deliberate provocation. “Most of those who have written about the affects and about men’s way of living seem to treat not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion” (Preface). They believe that man disturbs the order of nature rather than follows it, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined by nothing but himself. They attribute human weakness and inconstancy not to the common power of nature but to some vice of human nature, which they “weep over, laugh at, despise, or, as usually happens, detest,” and the one who can censure the weakness of the human mind most eloquently or most cleverly “is regarded as if he were divine.”
Against them Spinoza sets a single principle. “Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a vice of nature; for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form into another, are always and everywhere the same.” There must therefore be one way of understanding things of every kind, through the universal laws of nature. Hatred, anger and envy “follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other singular things,” and have causes through which they are understood and properties “as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing.” And so: “I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies.” The Political Treatise puts the same resolve more personally: “I have taken pains not to laugh at, nor weep over, nor detest human actions, but to understand them” (sedulo curavi, humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere; TP I.4).
The geometrical treatment of the passions is easily misunderstood. Spinoza does not mean that feelings are to be measured, or that human beings are machines. He means that the affects are effects of definite causes, related to one another by definite laws, and that a knowledge of these causes and laws is possible and is worth having for its own sake. The phrase “as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing by the mere contemplation of which we are delighted” is the key. A mathematician is not indignant at the properties of a triangle; a student of the affects should not be indignant at the properties of envy. The attitude is not indifference, and it is not cynicism. It is the condition of any remedy.
Descartes and the passions
One predecessor is named, and only to be dismissed. Descartes, “although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions,” had tried to explain the passions through their first causes and to show the way by which the mind can have absolute dominion over them; “but in my opinion he showed nothing but the acumen of his great ingenuity, as I shall demonstrate in its place” (Preface). The Passions of the Soul (1649) had in fact claimed this in the heading of one of its articles: there is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions (art. 50). The “place” in which Spinoza demonstrates the contrary turns out to be the Preface to Part V.
Part III owes Descartes more than the Preface admits. Its procedure, a small number of primary affects from which all the others are derived by combination and by the variety of their objects, is Descartes’ procedure, though the list is different. Descartes recognized six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness (Passions, art. 69). Spinoza recognizes three, desire, joy and sadness (Prop. 11, Schol.); love and hatred are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Prop. 13, Schol.), and wonder is not an affect at all, but a distraction of the mind that has no positive cause (Def. Aff. 4, Expl.).
The difference lies deeper than the list. For Descartes a passion is something the soul undergoes because of the body, an effect in the soul of motions in the body transmitted through the pineal gland, and the remedy is for the will, which is free, to take control of the passions by joining them to other thoughts and by forming “firm and determinate judgments concerning the knowledge of good and evil” (Passions, arts. 45, 48). Spinoza has already removed both terms of that remedy. The mind and the body are one thing conceived under two attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol.), so neither can act on the other (Prop. 2); and there is no free will, only volitions that are the affirmations involved in ideas (Part II, Prop. 49). If the passions are to be mastered, it cannot be by the will acting on the body; it must be in some other way.
Mind and body once more
The long scholium to Prop. 2 argues against mind-body interaction from experience as well as from reason, and it is one of the most vivid passages in the book. Spinoza doubts that his readers will weigh the matter with an equal mind unless he confirms it by experience, “so firmly are they persuaded that the body now moves, now is at rest, at the mind’s bidding alone.” But experience teaches nothing of the kind. “No one has so far known the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions,” not to mention that many things are observed in animals which far surpass human ingenuity, “and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep which they would not dare to do awake; which shows well enough that the body itself, from the laws of its own nature alone, can do many things at which its mind wonders.” No one knows how the mind could move the body, or how much motion it could give it. When men say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, “they do not know what they are saying, and do nothing but confess, in fine-sounding words, that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action.”
The objection from speech is answered in the same way. People think that it is in the mind’s power alone to speak or to keep silent. But if experience had not taught us that we do many things we afterwards regret, and that “when we are torn by contrary affects, we see the better and follow the worse,” nothing would prevent us from believing that we do everything freely. “So the infant believes that it freely wants milk, the angry boy that he wants vengeance, and the timid one flight. The drunk, again, believes that he says from a free decree of the mind what afterwards, when sober, he would wish he had kept silent about.” The conclusion returns to Part II: “the decree of the mind and the appetite and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a decree when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained through it, and a determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension.” And so those “who believe that they speak or are silent or do anything from a free decree of the mind dream with their eyes open” (Prop. 2, Schol.).
The phrase “no one has so far known the structure of the body” is sometimes quoted as a general remark about human ignorance, but in context it is an argument. If we do not know what the body can do by its own laws, we have no reason to suppose that anything the body does requires the intervention of the mind. The body’s achievements, from the instincts of animals to the acts of sleepwalkers, show how far mechanism can go without any mental command.
Action and passion
Since action and passion cannot be defined by the will, they have to be redefined, and the definitions at the head of the Part do this without mentioning the will at all. An adequate cause is one “whose effect can be perceived clearly and distinctly through it,” an inadequate or partial cause one “whose effect cannot be understood through it alone” (Def. 1). “I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause,” and that we are acted on when something happens in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause (Def. 2). An affect is defined as “affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections”; if we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, the affect is an action, otherwise a passion (Def. 3).
The first three propositions draw the consequences. “Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things” (Prop. 1), and “the actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone” (Prop. 3). Activity and passivity are therefore matters of knowledge. To be active is to be the complete explanation of what happens in one; to be passive is to be only part of the explanation, the rest lying in external causes. This is the foundation of everything Part V will say about the power of the intellect over the affects, and it is perhaps the most important single idea of the Part. Freedom will not consist in a will that escapes causes, but in being oneself the adequate cause of what one does, and that will be a matter of understanding.
The striving to persevere
The centre of the Part is the doctrine of striving, worked out in Props. 4–9. “No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause” (Prop. 4), since “the definition of any thing affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it” (Prop. 4, Dem.): attending only to the thing itself, we find nothing in it that could destroy it. Things are of contrary natures insofar as one can destroy the other (Prop. 5). Then comes the central proposition: “Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (Prop. 6). The demonstration ties the doctrine to Part I. Singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way, “that is ... things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God by which God is and acts”; nothing has in itself anything by which it could be destroyed; “and so, as far as it can and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being” (Prop. 6, Dem.). The striving is “nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself” (Prop. 7), and it involves no finite time, but an indefinite one (Prop. 8).
The Latin word is conatus, and its sense should be understood carefully. It is not a separate drive that a thing has in addition to its nature, nor a desire for some future state, but the thing’s own power of acting, considered as resisting whatever would destroy it. A stone at rest, a body in motion, a plant, an animal and a human being all strive in this sense. The phrase “as far as it is in itself” (quantum in se est) repeats the language in which Descartes had stated the principle of inertia (Principles II.37), and the physical digression of Part II had given the same principle for bodies (Part II, Lemma 3, Cor.). What Part III adds is the application of this principle to the mind, and so to the whole of human life.
In a human being the striving takes several names. “This striving, when it is related to the mind alone, is called will; but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called appetite, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation” (Prop. 9, Schol.). Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is appetite together with consciousness of it. And then comes a sentence that reverses the order assumed by most moral philosophy: “we strive for, will, want and desire nothing because we judge it to be good; but on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it.” Values are not perceived and then pursued. They are the shadows cast by our desires.
Jonathan Bennett remarks that Spinoza’s “substantive morality will be based on a strong individual egoism,” and that the argument for it, running through Props. 4–6, “deserves to be tracked patiently” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, § 54, p. 231). Whether the argument succeeds, and whether it shows that everything strives to persevere in its being or only that nothing destroys itself, has been much discussed. The reader should notice at least that the doctrine is meant to apply to everything, not only to living things, and that it is derived from the metaphysics of Part I, not from observation of human behaviour.
Joy, sadness and desire
From the doctrine of striving Spinoza derives the primary affects. “Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting of our body, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of thinking of our mind” (Prop. 11). The mind can pass to a greater or a lesser perfection, and these passages are the affects of joy and sadness: “By joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection. By sadness, however, the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection” (Prop. 11, Schol.). Joy related to mind and body together is called pleasure or cheerfulness, sadness pain or melancholy, according as one part of the body or the whole is affected. Desire has been defined in the scholium to Prop. 9, “and apart from these three I acknowledge no other primary affect; for I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three.”
Joy and sadness, so defined, are transitions, not states. A man who was born with a greater perfection would not feel joy at it; joy is the feeling of becoming more powerful. This dynamic conception explains much of what follows. Since the mind strives to persevere and to increase its power of acting, it “strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body’s power of acting” (Prop. 12), and when it imagines what diminishes the body’s power, it strives to recollect things that exclude their existence (Prop. 13). From this follow love and hatred: “love is nothing but joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred nothing but sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (Prop. 13, Schol.). A lover strives to have present and to preserve what he loves, a hater to remove and destroy what he hates.
The mechanics of the passions
The rest of the Part, Props. 14–57, derives the variety of the affects from these few principles, and it does so with a combination of rigour and observation that has no parallel in earlier philosophy. Three mechanisms do most of the work.
The first is association. If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is afterwards affected by one, it will also be affected by the other (Prop. 14), and so anything can be the accidental cause of joy, sadness or desire (Prop. 15). We love or hate a thing merely because it resembles something that usually affects us with joy or sadness, “even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects” (Prop. 16). When one thing affects us with both joy and sadness, we love and hate it at once, and this state is called “fluctuation of mind,” which “is therefore related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination” (Prop. 17, Schol.). Hope and fear arise from the image of a thing of whose outcome we are in doubt: “hope is nothing but an inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are in doubt; fear, on the other hand, an inconstant sadness, arising also from the image of a doubtful thing” (Prop. 18, Schol. 2).
The second mechanism is the transmission of affects through the objects of love and hatred. We rejoice when we imagine that what we love is preserved and are saddened when we imagine it destroyed; we love whatever affects what we love with joy, and hate whatever affects it with sadness; and the reverse holds for what we hate (Props. 19–26). The affects thus spread through a network of relations, and much of the misery Spinoza describes arises from the fact that the objects of our love can be possessed by others, lost, or changed.
The third and most original mechanism is the imitation of affects. “From the fact that we imagine a thing like us, towards which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect” (Prop. 27). The proposition is derived from the theory of Part II: the image of an external body like ours involves the nature of our body as well as its, and so an affection like the one we imagine in the other. From imitation Spinoza derives pity, which is the imitation of sadness, and emulation, the imitation of desire (Prop. 27, Schol.); the striving to please others, which is called ambition when it is pursued to our own harm or another’s, and otherwise courtesy (Prop. 29, Schol.); and, by a further step, the desire that everyone should love what we love and hate what we hate. “So we see that each by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament; and while all want this alike, they are alike an obstacle to one another, and while all want to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another” (Prop. 31, Schol.). From the same property of human nature that makes men compassionate, Spinoza adds, it follows that they are envious and ambitious; and experience confirms it, especially in children, who “laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry,” and desire whatever they see others delight in (Prop. 32, Schol.).
Several of the later propositions are among the most quoted in the book. “Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love” (Prop. 43), and hatred completely conquered by love passes into a love greater than if hatred had not preceded it (Prop. 44). “Good” and “evil” are defined, in the scholium to Prop. 39, by reference to joy and sadness: by good Spinoza understands here “every kind of joy, and whatever, further, leads to it,” and by evil every kind of sadness, so that “each judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better, what worse.” Different men can be affected differently by the same object, and the same man differently at different times (Prop. 51). There are as many species of each affect as there are species of objects by which we are affected (Prop. 56), and “each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other” (Prop. 57). The scholium to this last proposition notes that the affects of the animals differ from ours as their natures differ, since “we can by no means doubt that the brutes feel, now that we know the origin of the mind,” and that “there is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunkard, for example, is led, and the gladness which a philosopher possesses” (Prop. 57, Schol.).
The active affects
The last two propositions turn from the passions to the affects that are actions. “Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act” (Prop. 58), and among the affects related to the mind insofar as it acts there are none but those related to joy or desire (Prop. 59); sadness, which diminishes the mind’s power of acting, can never be an action. The actions that follow from the affects related to the mind insofar as it understands Spinoza relates to strength of character, fortitudo, which he divides into tenacity (animositas) and nobility (generositas): “by tenacity I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to preserve his being. By nobility, however, I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship” (Prop. 59, Schol.). Temperance, sobriety and presence of mind in dangers are species of tenacity; modesty and clemency are species of nobility. These two words will carry much of the ethics of Part IV.
The same scholium sums up the condition that the Part has described. From what has been shown, “it is evident that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds, we fluctuate, ignorant of our outcome and fate.” The image is the most memorable in the Part, and it states the problem to which Parts IV and V are the answer.
The definitions of the affects
The Part ends with a recapitulation: forty-eight definitions of the affects, with explanations, and a general definition of the affect that is a passion of the mind. The definitions follow a classification of their own, and several of them correct what the scholia had said; an essay before them introduces their plan.
Questions the reader will meet
Several features of Part III need care.
The first is the vocabulary. “Affect” (affectus) is not the same as emotion. It includes desire, which is not a feeling in the ordinary sense, and it is defined by a change in the body’s power of acting together with the idea of that change; so it is both bodily and mental. “Passion” is not intense feeling but being acted on, being only the partial cause of what happens in one. “Joy” (laetitia) and “sadness” (tristitia) are broader than their English names suggest; they cover every increase or decrease of power that the mind undergoes, from physical pleasure to intellectual delight, and from a toothache to grief.
The second concerns perfection. Joy is the passage to a greater perfection, and perfection is the same as reality (Part II, Def. 6). To be more perfect is to be more powerful, to be able to do and to undergo more, and not to be better in a moral sense. The doctrine that we judge things good because we desire them should be read in the same light. It does not say that whatever anyone desires is good. Part IV will define the good as what we certainly know to be useful to us, and will distinguish between what the passions lead us to desire and what reason does.
The third concerns egoism. If every thing strives to persevere in its being, and the human mind seeks only what increases its power, it may seem that Spinoza’s psychology leaves no room for concern for others. But the imitation of the affects, which makes us share the joys and sorrows of those we take to be like us, is derived from the same principles, and Part III already names nobility, the desire to aid others and join them to oneself in friendship, as one of the two species of strength of character. Part IV will argue that nothing is more useful to a human being than other human beings who live by reason. Whether this amounts to a genuine concern for others or an enlightened self-interest is a question that readers have answered in different ways.
The fourth concerns teleology. The Appendix to Part I attacked final causes, and Part III speaks constantly of what we strive for and desire. The striving of Prop. 6 is not a striving toward a goal in the sense the Appendix rejects; it is the actual essence of the thing, and the things it leads us to do follow from it as effects from a cause. Bennett describes the Part as an attempt to move from a Spinozist “appetite,” a push, to something that functions like genuine teleology, a pull (§ 54, p. 231). How far Spinoza succeeds, and how far he needs to, is a question for the reader to keep in mind.
The place of Part III in the whole
The account of the affects is what makes the rest of the Ethics possible. Part IV will ask how strong the affects are and why they so often overcome our knowledge, and it will rest its answer on the principle that “an affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained” (Part IV, Prop. 7). It will also ask which affects agree with reason and which are opposed to it, using the definitions at the end of this Part as its terms. Part V will propose remedies for the passions, and every one of them depends on the theory worked out here: that an affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it, that the mind can order and connect the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and that the intellectual love of God arises from the third kind of knowledge as other loves arise from their causes. The derivations of Part III were offered as explanations of human life as it is. They are also the material from which Spinoza will build an account of how it can be changed.
The text begins with the Preface, the declaration of method quoted above. The definitions and postulates that follow are few, and the first propositions are abstract; the scholia, from the second onwards, are where the Part’s observation of human life begins.
Praefatio
Preface
[G II 137] Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus, quae communes naturae leges sequuntur, sed de rebus, quae extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura, veluti imperium in imperio, concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi, ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, nec aliunde, quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanae deinde impotentiae et inconstantiae causam non communi naturae potentiae, sed nescio cui naturae humanae vitio tribuunt, quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur; et qui humanae mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur.
Most of those who have written about the
affects and about men’s
way of living seem to treat not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion.
1 For they believe that man disturbs the order of nature rather than follows it, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined by nothing other than himself. Next, they attribute the cause of human lack of power and inconstancy not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore weep over, laugh at, despise, or, as usually happens, detest; and he who knows how to censure the lack of power of the human mind more eloquently or more cleverly is regarded as if he were divine.
- 1 veluti imperium in imperio. The Political Treatise repeats the charge in the same words: ‘At plerique, ignaros naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi, credunt, et homines in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipiunt’ (‘But most believe that the ignorant disturb the order of nature rather than follow it, and conceive men in nature as a dominion within a dominion’, II.6), and goes on to name the reason: they hold that the human mind is not produced by natural causes but created immediately by God, and so independent of other things that it has absolute power to determine itself.
Non defuerunt tamen viri praestantissimi (quorum labori et industriae nos multum debere fatemur), qui de recta vivendi ratione praeclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiae consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires, et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo, quod sciam, determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum
Cartesium, licet
a etiam crediderit, mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare, simulque viam ostendere studuisse, qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium; sed mea quidem sententia nihil praeter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo, qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt, quam intelligere.
There have not been lacking, however, very eminent men (to whose labour and industry we confess that we owe much) who have written many excellent things about the right way of living and have given mortals counsels full of prudence; but no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and powers of the affects, and what, on the other hand, the mind can do in moderating them. I know, indeed, that the most celebrated Descartes, although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, nevertheless tried to explain human affects through their first causes, and at the same time to show the way by which the mind can have absolute dominion over the affects;
2 but in my opinion he showed nothing but the acumen of his great ingenuity, as I shall demonstrate in its place. For I want to return to those who prefer to detest or laugh at the affects and actions of men rather than to understand them.
3- a Cartesium, licet] transcr. Cartesium, licet. Italics: the transcription opens the emphasis at ‘Cartesium’ and closes it only after ‘affectuum’ in the last sentence. The 1677 edition (OP pp. 93–94) sets the Preface in italic with ‘Cartesium’ in roman, i.e. emphasized.
- 2 The Passions of the Soul (1649), art. 50: ‘Qu’il n’y a point d’ame si faible qu’elle ne puisse, étant bien conduite, acquérir un pouvoir absolu sur ses passions’ (‘That there is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions’). The demonstration promised here is in the Preface to Part V, which examines Descartes’ account of the pineal gland and concludes that it explains nothing.
- 3 Compare the Political Treatise, I.4: ‘sedulo curavi, humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere’ (‘I have taken pains not to laugh at, nor weep over, nor detest human actions, but to understand them’), so as to consider the affects ‘non ut humanae naturae vitia, sed ut proprietates’ (‘not as vices of human nature but as properties’) and to investigate them ‘eadem animi libertate, qua res mathematicas solemus’ (‘with the same freedom of mind with which we usually treat mathematical things’).
His sine dubio mirum videbitur, quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar, et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea, quae rationi repugnare, quaeque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea haec est ratio. Nihil in natura fit, quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque eius virtus et agendi potentia, hoc est, naturae leges et regulae, secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eaedem, atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcumque naturam intelligendi, nempe per leges et regulas naturae universales. Affectus itaque odii, irae, invidiae etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturae necessitate et virtute consequuntur, ac reliqua singularia; ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt, per quas intelliguntur, certasque proprietates habent, cognitione nostra aeque dignas ac proprietates cuiuscumque alterius rei cuius sola contemplatione delectamur. De
affectuum itaque
b natura et viribus ac
mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in praecedentibus de
Deo et
mente egi, et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde, ac si quaestio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.
To them it will doubtless seem strange that I undertake to treat men’s vices and follies in the geometrical manner, and that I wish to demonstrate by sure reasoning things which they proclaim to be contrary to reason, vain, absurd and horrible. But my reasoning is this. Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a vice of nature; for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting
4 are everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form into another, are always and everywhere the same; and so there must also be one and the same way of understanding the nature of things of any kind whatever, namely through the universal laws and rules of nature. The affects, therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other singular things; and accordingly they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing by the mere contemplation of which we are delighted. I shall treat, therefore, of
the nature and powers of the affects, and of
the power of the mind over them, by the same method by which I treated of
God and the
mind in the preceding Parts, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies.
- b De affectuum itaque] transcr. De affectuum* itaque. Italics (see the note on ‘Cartesium’).
- 4 virtus in its older sense of efficacy, as in Part I, Prop. 11, Schol., and in the next sentence (‘the same necessity and virtue of nature’). Part IV, Def. 8 will identify virtue with power.
Definitiones
Definitions
[G II 139] I. Causam adaequatam appello eam, cuius effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. Inadaequatam autem seu partialem illam voco, cuius effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit.
I. I call that an
adequate cause whose effect can be perceived clearly and distinctly through it.
1 But I call that
inadequate, or
partial, whose effect cannot be understood through it alone.
- 1 The definition joins Part I, Ax. 4 (knowledge of an effect depends on and involves knowledge of its cause) to the adequate idea of Part II, Def. 4. A cause is adequate when the effect can be understood through it alone; partial when the effect also requires other causes to be understood. Everything Part III says of action and passion rests on this distinction.
II. Nos tum agere dico cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cuius adaequata sumus causa hoc est (per defin. praeced.) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cuius nos non nisi partialis sumus causa.
II. I say that we
act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is (by the
preceding Def.), when something follows from our nature, in us or outside us, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are
acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.
1 - 1 Descartes begins the Passions of the Soul from the received view: ‘tout ce qui se fait, ou qui arrive de nouveau, est generalement appellé par les Philosophes une Passion au regard du sujet auquel il arrive, et une Action au regard de celuy qui fait qu’il arrive’ (‘whatever is done or happens anew is generally called by the philosophers a passion with respect to the subject to which it happens, and an action with respect to that which makes it happen’, art. 1). Spinoza defines both in terms of adequate causation. Acting does not require a will, and being acted on admits of degrees, as one is more or less completely the cause of what happens.
Cited in 3P1D, 4P2D, 4P5D, 4P15D, 4P23D, 4P33D, 4P35D, 4P35C1, 4P52D, 4P59D, 4P61D, 4P64D
III. Per
affectum intelligo
a corporis affectiones, quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur, et simul harum affectionum ideas.
III. By
affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections.
1 - a W. Meijer proposed reading Affectus (plural), and Appuhn adopts it. Gebhardt (G II 139; Textgestaltung II 368) keeps the singular: Spinoza puts the defined term in the singular in such definitions (compare Part I, Def. 5, Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones), the complex of affections being the affect; the Dutch version also has the singular (By Hartstocht).
- 1 An affect is not only a feeling: it is a change in the body’s power of acting together with the idea of that change, as the mind is the idea of the body (Part II, Prop. 13). Affectus is to be kept distinct from affectio (see the note on Part I, Def. 5): every affect is an affection, but not every affection changes the power of acting (Post. 1). The General Definition at the end of the Part (Gen. Def.) defines the affect that is a passion from the side of the mind alone.
Explicatio. Si itaque alicuius harum affectionum adaequata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo; alias passionem.
Explanation. If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then by the affect I understand an
action; otherwise a
passion.
1 - 1 So there are active affects as well as passions; they are the subject of Props. 58–59. This is the reason for ‘affect’ rather than ‘passion’ or ‘emotion’ as the general term.
Postulata
Postulates
[G II 139] I. Corpus humanum potest multis affici modis, quibus ipsius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, et etiam aliis qui eiusdem agendi potentiam nec maiorem nec minorem reddunt.
I. The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in others which render its power of acting neither greater nor less.
Hoc postulatum seu axioma nititur postul. 1.
a et lem. 5. et 7., quae vide post prop. 13. P. 2.
- a nititur postul. 1.] transcr. nitituraxiom. 1. The 1677 edition (OP p. 95) and Gebhardt (G II 139) read ‘nititur Postulato 1.’; the transcription has ‘axiom.’, run together with ‘nititur’.
II. Corpus humanum multas pati potest mutationes, et nihilominus retinere obiectorum impressiones seu vestigia (de quibus vide postul. 5. P. 2.), et consequenter easdem rerum imagines; quarum defin. vide schol. prop. 17.
a P. 2.
II. The human body can undergo many changes and nevertheless retain the impressions, or traces, of objects (on which see
Post. 5 of Part II), and consequently the same images of things; for the definition of which see the
Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II.
- a quarum defin. vide schol. prop. 17.] transcr. quarum defin. vide in schol. prop. 17. The 1677 edition (OP p. 96) and Gebhardt (G II 140) have no ‘in’.
Propositiones
Propositions
Propositio I
Proposition I
[G II 140] Mens nostra quaedam agit, quaedam vero patitur; nempe quatenus adaequatas habet ideas, eatenus quaedam necessario agit, et quatenus ideas habet inadaequatas, eatenus necessario quaedam patitur.
Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things.
Demonstratio. Cuiuscumque humanae mentis ideae aliae adaequatae sunt,
a aliae autem mutilatae et confusae (per schol. prop. 40. P. 2.).
bc Ideae autem, quae in alicuius mente sunt adaequatae, sunt in Deo adaequatae, quatenus eiusdem mentis essentiam constituit (per coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.), et quae deinde inadaequatae sunt in mente, sunt etiam in Deo (per idem coroll.) adaequatae, non quatenus eiusdem solummodo mentis essentiam, sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet. Deinde ex data quacumque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet (per prop. 36. P. 1.), cuius effectus Deus causa est adaequata (vide defin. 1. huius), non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus data illa idea affectus consideratur (vide prop. 9. P. 2.). At eius effectus, cuius Deus est causa, quatenus affectus est idea, quae in alicuius mente est adaequata, illa eadem mens est causa adaequata (per coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.). Ergo mens nostra (per defin. 2. huius) quatenus ideas habet adaequatas, quaedam necessario agit; quod erat primum. Deinde quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea, quae in Deo est adaequata, non quatenus mentem unius hominis tantum, sed quatenus aliarum rerum mentes simul cum eiusdem hominis mente in se habet, eius (per idem coroll. prop. 11 P. 2.) illius hominis mens non est causa adaequata, sed partialis. Ac proinde (per defin. 2. huius) mens quatenus ideas inadaequatas habet, quaedam necessario patitur; quod erat secundum. Ergo mens nostra etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Of each human mind some ideas are adequate, others mutilated and confused (by the
Schol. of Prop. 40 of Part II). But the ideas which are adequate in someone’s mind are adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of that mind (by
Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II); and those which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God (by the same Corollary), not insofar as he contains in himself the essence of that mind only, but also insofar as he contains in himself the minds of other things at the same time. Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by
Prop. 36 of Part I), of which effect God is the adequate cause (see
Def. 1 of this Part), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by that given idea (see
Prop. 9 of Part II). But of that effect of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in someone’s mind, that same mind is the adequate cause (by
Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II). Therefore our mind (by
Def. 2 of this Part), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts in some things; which was the first point. Next, whatever necessarily follows from an idea which is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but insofar as he has in himself the minds of other things together with the mind of that man, of that (by the same Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II) the man’s mind is not the adequate cause, but a partial cause. And therefore (by
Def. 2 of this Part) the mind, insofar as it has inadequate ideas, is necessarily acted on in some things; which was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q.E.D.
- a aliae adaequatae sunt] transcr. aliae adaequataesunt. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
- b (per schol. prop. 40. P. 2.)] transcr. (per schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 96) and Gebhardt (G II 140; Textgestaltung II 368) read ‘per Schol. Prop. 40.’ without a number; ‘2.’ is the correction of Leopold, Baensch, Meijer and Appuhn, which the transcription follows.
- c So the 1677 edition (OP p. 96) and Gebhardt (G II 140); Leopold, Baensch, W. Meijer and Appuhn read Schol. 2., as does the transcription. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 368) explains that Spinoza first wrote the two scholia of Part II, Prop. 40 as one and divided them later (Textgestaltung II 364, on G II 120); the reference was written to the undivided scholium and, in sense, means both.
[G II 141] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur mentem eo pluribus passionibus esse obnoxiam, quo plures ideas inadaequatas habet, et contra eo plura agere, quo plures habet adaequatas.
Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is subject to more passions the more inadequate ideas it has, and, on the other hand, acts more the more adequate ideas it has.
Propositio II
Proposition II
Nec corpus mentem ad cogitandum, nec mens corpus ad motum, neque ad quietem, nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.
The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion,
1 or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).
- 1 The denial of interaction between mind and body. It follows from the causal independence of the attributes (Part II, Prop. 6) and, as the Scholium says, is better understood from their identity: the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived under two attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol.). Descartes’ account of their interaction through the pineal gland is examined in the Preface to Part V.
Demonstratio. Omnes cogitandi modi Deum, quatenus res est cogitans et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur, pro causa habent (per prop. 6. P. 2.). Id ergo, quod mentem ad cogitandum determinat, modus cogitandi est, et non extensionis, hoc est (per defin. 1. P. 2.) non est corpus; quod erat primum. Corporis deinde motus et quies ab alio oriri debet corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et absolute quicquid in corpore oritur, id a Deo oriri debuit, quatenus aliquo extensionis modo et non quatenus aliquo cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (per eandem prop. 6. P. 2.), hoc est, a mente, quae (per prop. 11. P. 2.) modus cogitandi est, oriri non potest; quod erat secundum. Ergo nec corpus mentem etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. All modes of thinking have God for their cause insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by another attribute (by
Prop. 6 of Part II). What determines the mind to thinking, therefore, is a mode of thinking and not of extension, that is (by
Def. 1 of Part II), it is not a body; which was the first point. Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another; and absolutely, whatever arises in a body must have arisen from God insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension, and not insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of thinking (by the same Prop. 6 of Part II); that is, it cannot arise from the mind, which (by
Prop. 11 of Part II) is a mode of thinking; which was the second point. Therefore neither can the body determine the mind, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec clarius intelliguntur ex iis, quae in schol. prop. 7. P. 2. dicta sunt, quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit, quae iam sub cogitationis, iam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit, ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit, sive natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur, consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum mentis. Quod etiam patet ex modo, quo prop. 12. P. 2. demonstravimus.
Scholium. These things are understood more clearly from what was said in the
Scholium of Prop. 7 of Part II, namely that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. Hence it comes about that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or under that; and consequently that the order of actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the way in which we demonstrated
Prop. 12 of Part II.
At quamvis haec ita se habeant, ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo, nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad haec aequo animo perpendendum; adeo firmiter persuasi sunt, corpus ex solo mentis nutu iam moveri, iam quiescere, plurimaque agere, quae a sola mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent. Etenim quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem hucusque experientia docuit, quid corpus ex solis legibus naturae quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque corporis fabricam tam accurate novit, ut omnes eius functiones potuerit explicare, ut iam taceam quod in brutis plura observentur, quae humanam sagacitatem longe superant, et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant, quae vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit, ipsum corpus ex solis suae naturae legibus multa posse, quae ipsius mens admiratur. Deinde nemo scit, qua ratione quibusve mediis mens moveat corpus, neque quot motus gradus possit corpori tribuere, quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat. Unde sequitur, cum homines dicunt, hanc vel illam actionem corporis oriri a mente, quae imperium in corpus habet, eos nescire, quid dicant, nec aliud agere, quam speciosis verbis fateri, se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare.
But although these things are so, so that no reason for doubting remains, I hardly believe that men can be induced to weigh them with an equal mind unless I confirm the matter by experience; so firmly are they persuaded that the body now moves, now is at rest, at the mind’s bidding alone, and does a great many things which depend only on the will of the mind and its art of thinking things out. For what the body can do, no one has so far determined;
1 that is, experience has so far taught no one what the body can do from the laws of nature alone, insofar as nature is considered only as corporeal, and what it cannot do unless it is determined by the mind. For no one has so far known the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions, not to mention that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep which they would not dare to do awake; which shows well enough that the body itself, from the laws of its own nature alone, can do many things at which its mind wonders. Next, no one knows in what way, or by what means, the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give to the body, and with what speed it can move it. From this it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and do nothing but confess, in fine-sounding words, that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action, and do not wonder at it.
- 1 quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit. The argument from ignorance turns the usual one around: we do not know enough about the body to say that its actions need a mind to direct them. It agrees with Part II, Prop. 13, Schol.: the more a body is capable of doing many things at once, the more its mind is capable of perceiving many things at once; to know the excellence of a mind, one must know that of its body.
At dicent, sive sciant sive nesciant, quibus mediis mens moveat corpus, se tamen experiri, quod nisi mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, corpus iners esset; deinde se experiri, in sola mentis potestate esse, tam loqui quam tacere, et alia multa, quae proinde a mentis decreto pendere credunt. Sed quod ad primum attinet, ipsos rogo, num experientia non etiam doceat, quod si contra corpus iners sit, mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum corpus somno quiescit, mens simul cum ipso sopita manet, nec potestatem habet, veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi. Deinde omnes expertos esse credo, mentem non semper aeque aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem obiecto;
a sed prout corpus aptius est, ut in eo huius vel illius obiecti imago excitetur, ita mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud obiectum contemplandum. At dicent ex solis legibus naturae, quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse, ut causae aedificiorum, picturarum rerumque huiusmodi, quae sola humana arte fiunt, possint deduci, nec corpus humanum, nisi a mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod aedificandum. Verum ego iam ostendi, ipsos nescire, quid corpus possit, quidve ex sola ipsius naturae contemplatione possit deduci, ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis naturae legibus fieri, quae nunquam credidissent posse fieri, nisi ex mentis directione, ut sunt ea, quae somnambuli in somnis agunt, quaeque ipsi, dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam corporis humani fabricam, quae artificio longissime superat omnes, quae humana arte fabricatae sunt, ut iam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura sub quovis attributo considerata infinita sequi.
But they will say that, whether or not they know by what means the mind moves the body, they nevertheless experience that unless the human mind were fit for thinking things out, the body would be inactive; and next, that they experience that it is in the power of the mind alone both to speak and to be silent, and many other things, which they therefore believe depend on the mind’s decree. But as regards the first, I ask them whether experience does not also teach that if, on the other hand, the body is inactive, the mind is at the same time unfit for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind remains asleep together with it, and does not have the power of thinking things out, as it does when awake. Next, I believe everyone has experienced that the mind is not always equally fit for thinking about the same object, but that as the body is more fit for the image of this or that object to be aroused in it, so the mind is more fit to contemplate this or that object. But they will say that it cannot be that the causes of buildings, pictures and things of this kind, which are made by human art alone, could be deduced from the laws of nature alone, insofar as it is considered only as corporeal; nor would the human body, unless it were determined and guided by the mind, be able to build a temple. But I have already shown that they do not know what the body can do, or what can be deduced from the contemplation of its nature alone, and that they experience a great many things happening from the laws of nature alone which they would never have believed could happen except by the direction of the mind, such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, at which they themselves wonder when they are awake. I add here the very structure of the human body, which in artfulness far surpasses all the things constructed by human art; not to mention that I have shown above that infinitely many things follow from nature,
2 under whatever attribute it is considered.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 98) reads de eodem subjecto; the Dutch version has op een zelfde voorwerp, with Objectum in the margin. Gebhardt (G II 142; Textgestaltung II 368–369) corrects to objecto, as Baensch had conjectured, since no relation of inherence is meant; Appuhn and Halpern keep subjecto.
- 2 Part I, Prop. 16.
Quod porro ad secundum attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanae haberent, si aeque in hominis potestate esset tam tacere, quam loqui. At experientia satis superque docet, homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam, nec
b minus posse, quam appetitus moderari suos. Unde factum, ut plerique credant, nos ea tantum libere agere, quae leviter petimus, quia earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei, cuius frequenter recordamur; sed illa minime, quae magno cum affectu petimus et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit. Verumenimvero nisi experti essent, nos plura agere quorum postea poenitet, nosque saepe, quando scilicet contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil
c impediret, quominus crederent nos omnia libere agere. Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui, quae postea sobrius vellet tacuisse. Sic delirans, garrula, puer et huius farinae plurimi ex libero mentis decreto credunt loqui, cum tamen loquendi impetum, quem habent, continere nequeant, ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare, quam ratio doceat, quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant, quia suarum actionum sunt conscii et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari; et praeterea quod mentis decreta nihil sint praeter ipsos appetitus, quae propterea varia sunt pro varia corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur, et qui praeterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint, nesciunt; qui autem nullo, facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur.
As regards the second, human affairs would certainly go much more happily if it were equally in man’s power to be silent as to speak. But experience teaches more than enough that men have nothing less in their power than their tongue, and can do nothing less than moderate their appetites. That is why most believe that we do freely only those things which we seek lightly, because the appetite for these things can easily be reduced by the memory of another thing which we frequently recollect; but by no means those things which we seek with a great affect, one which cannot be calmed by the memory of another thing. But in truth, if they had not experienced that we do many things which we afterwards regret, and that often, namely when we are torn by contrary affects, we see the better and follow the worse,
3 nothing would prevent them from believing that we do all things freely. So the infant believes that it freely wants milk, the angry boy that he wants vengeance, and the timid one flight. The drunk, again, believes that he says from a free decree of the mind what afterwards, when sober, he would wish he had kept silent about. So the delirious man, the chattering woman, the child and very many of this stamp believe that they speak from a free decree of the mind, although they cannot contain the impulse to speak which they have; so that experience itself teaches no less clearly than reason that men believe themselves free for this reason only, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined;
4 and, moreover, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary according to the varying disposition of the body. For each moderates everything from his own affect, and those who, besides, are torn by contrary affects do not know what they want; while those who are torn by none are driven this way and that by the slightest impulse.
- b quam linguam, nec] transcr. quam linguam1), nec. The transcription keeps the marker ‘1)’ of a footnote of an earlier edition (the source of the phrase), without the note.
- c deteriora sequi, nihil] transcr. deteriora sequi2), nihil. The transcription keeps the marker ‘2)’ of a footnote of an earlier edition (Ovid, Met. VII.20–21), without the note.
- 3 Ovid, Metamorphoses VII.20–21, where Medea, in love with Jason, says: ‘video meliora proboque, / deteriora sequor’ (‘I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse’). Spinoza quotes the line again in the Preface to Part IV and in Part IV, Prop. 17, Schol..
- 4 The diagnosis of the Appendix to Part I and of Part II, Prop. 35, Schol.. Letter 58, to Schuller, gives the same examples in nearly the same words (‘Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle, et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui, quae postea sobrius tacuisse vellet’), with garrulus where the Ethics has the feminine garrula, and adds the stone which, set in motion and conscious of its effort, would believe itself free.
Quae omnia profecto clare ostendunt, mentis tam decretum, quam appetitum et corporis determinationem simul esse natura, vel potius unam eandemque rem, quam, quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, decretum appellamus, et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, determinationem vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex iam dicendis patebit. Nam aliud est, quod hic apprime notari vellem, nempe quod nos nihil ex mentis decreto agere possumus, nisi eius recordemur. Ex. gr. non possumus verbum loqui, nisi eiusdem recordemur. Deinde in libera mentis potestate non est, rei alicuius recordari vel eiusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in mentis potestate esse creditur, quod rem, cuius recordamur, vel tacere vel loqui ex solo mentis decreto possumus. Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero mentis decreto loqui, nec tamen loquimur, vel si loquimur, id ex corporis spontaneo motu fit. Somniamus deinde, nos quaedam homines celare, idque eodem mentis decreto, quo, dum vigilamus, ea quae scimus tacemus. Somniamus denique, nos ex mentis decreto quaedam agere, quae, dum vigilamus, non audemus; atque adeo pervelim scire, an in mente duo decretorum genera dentur, phantasticorum unum et liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est, hoc mentis decretum, quod liberum esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui, nec aliud esse praeter illam affirmationem, quam idea, quatenus idea est, necessario involvit. Vide prop. 49. P. 2. Atque adeo haec mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur, ac ideae rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt, se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.
All these things certainly show clearly that both the decree of the mind and the appetite and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a
decree when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained through it, and a
determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension
5 and deduced from the laws of motion and rest; which will be still more clearly evident from what is to be said now. For there is something else which I should like to be especially noted here, namely that we can do nothing from a decree of the mind unless we recollect it. For example, we cannot speak a word unless we recollect it. Next, it is not in the free power of the mind to recollect a thing or to forget it. That is why it is believed that only this is in the power of the mind: that we can, from the mind’s decree alone, either be silent about or speak of a thing which we recollect. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decree of the mind, and yet we do not speak, or, if we do speak, it happens from a spontaneous motion of the body. We dream, next, that we conceal certain things from men, and that by the same decree of the mind by which, while awake, we are silent about the things we know. We dream, finally, that we do from a decree of the mind certain things which we do not dare to do while awake; and so I should very much like to know whether there are in the mind two kinds of decrees, the fantastic and the free. But if one does not wish to go so far in madness, it must necessarily be granted that this decree of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguished from the imagination itself, or memory, and is nothing but that affirmation which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves. See
Prop. 49 of Part II. And so these decrees of the mind arise in the mind with the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing. Those, therefore, who believe that they speak or are silent or do anything from a free decree of the mind dream with their eyes open.
- 5 One thing under two attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol.): there is no causal relation between the decision and the bodily movement, because they are not two things. The decree, as an affirmation involved in an idea (Part II, Prop. 49), is as necessary as any other idea.
Propositio III
Proposition III
[G II 144] Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis oriuntur, passiones autem a solis inadaequatis pendent.
The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.
Cited in 3P9D, 3P56D, 3GDAEx, 4P15D, 4P24D, 4P28D, 4P35D, 4P35C2, 4P51D, 4P52D, 4P59D, 4P61D, 4P63D, 4P64D, 5P3D, 5P4S, 5P18D, 5P20S, 5P36D, 5P40D, 5P40C, 5P42D
[G II 145] Demonstratio. Primum, quod mentis essentiam constituit, nihil aliud est, quam idea corporis actu existentis (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.), quae (per prop. 15. P. 2.) ex multis aliis componitur, quarum quaedam (per coroll. prop. 38. P. 2.) sunt adaequatae, quaedam autem inadaequatae (per coroll. prop. 29. P. 2.). Quicquid ergo ex mentis natura sequitur et cuius mens causa est proxima, per quam id debet intelligi, necessario ex idea adaequata vel inadaequata sequi debet. At quatenus mens (per prop. 1. huius) ideas habet inadaequatas, eatenus necessario patitur. Ergo mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis sequuntur, et mens propterea tantum patitur quia ideas habet inadaequatas. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of a body actually existing (by
Props. 11 and
13 of Part II), which (by
Prop. 15 of Part II) is composed of many other ideas, of which some (by
Cor. of Prop. 38 of Part II) are adequate, others inadequate (by
Cor. of Prop. 29 of Part II). Whatever, therefore, follows from the nature of the mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate or an inadequate idea. But insofar as the mind (by
Prop. 1 of this Part) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on. Therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and the mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Videmus itaque passiones ad mentem non referri, nisi quatenus aliquid habet, quod negationem involvit, sive quatenus consideratur ut naturae pars,
a quae per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi; et hac ratione ostendere possem, passiones eodem modo ad res singulares, ac ad mentem referri, nec alia ratione posse percipi. Sed meum institutum est, de sola mente humana agere.
Scholium. We see, therefore, that passions are not related to the mind except insofar as it has something which involves negation, or insofar as it is considered as a part of nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself without others;
1 and in this way I could show that passions are related to singular things in the same way as to the mind, and cannot be perceived in any other way. But my purpose is to treat only of the human mind.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 101) has quatenus consideratur naturae pars; Halpern adds ut, as Spinoza’s usage requires, and Gebhardt (G II 145; Textgestaltung II 369) follows.
- 1 Part IV builds on this: ‘we are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others’ (Part IV, Prop. 2), and it cannot be that a man is not a part of nature, so that he is necessarily always subject to passions (Part IV, Prop. 4 and its Corollary).
Propositio IV
Proposition IV
Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui.
No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause.
1- 1 The argument of the Demonstration moves from what the definition of a thing contains to what the thing itself can do. Part IV draws the consequence for suicide: no one neglects to preserve his being, or kills himself, ‘from the necessity of his own nature’, but only ‘compelled by external causes’ (Part IV, Prop. 20, Schol.).
Demonstratio. Haec propositio per se patet. Definitio enim cuiuscumque rei ipsius rei essentiam affirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For the definition of any thing affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it; or it posits the essence of the thing, but does not take it away. So while we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it which could destroy it. Q.E.D.
Propositio V
Proposition V
Res eatenus contrariae sunt naturae, hoc est, eatenus in eodem subiecto esse nequeunt, quatenus una alteram potest destruere.
Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.
[G II 146] Demonstratio. Si enim inter se convenire vel in eodem subiecto simul esse possent, posset ergo in eodem subiecto aliquid dari, quod ipsum posset destruere, quod (per prop. praeced.) est absurdum. Ergo res etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For if they could agree with one another, or be in the same subject at the same time, then something could be in the same subject which could destroy it, which (by the
preceding Prop.) is absurd. Therefore things, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio VI
Proposition VI
Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.
Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.
1- 1 The doctrine of the conatus, the centre of Part III. Quantum in se est is the phrase of Descartes’ first law of nature, that each thing ‘quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseveret’ (‘as far as is in it, always perseveres in the same state’, Principles II.37, AT VIII-1 62), which Spinoza had stated for bodies in Part II, Lemma 3, Cor.. Here it is extended to every thing under every attribute, and it was anticipated in Part II, Prop. 45, Schol.: the force by which each thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature.
Demonstratio. Res enim singulares modi sunt, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.), hoc est (per prop. 34. P. 1.) res, quae Dei potentiam qua Deus est et agit, certo et determinato modo exprimunt. Neque ulla res aliquid in se habet, a quo possit destrui, sive quod eius existentiam tollat (per prop. 4. huius); sed contra ei omni, quod eiusdem existentiam potest tollere, opponitur (per prop. praeced.). Adeoque quantum potest et in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by
Cor. of Prop. 25 of Part I), that is (by
Prop. 34 of Part I), things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God by which God is and acts.
1 And no thing has in itself anything by which it could be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by
Prop. 4 of this Part); on the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by the
preceding Prop.). And so, as far as it can and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being. Q.E.D.
- 1 The first step grounds the striving of finite things in the power of God, which is his essence (Part I, Prop. 34): each thing is a certain and determinate portion of that power. The striving is thus not a tendency added to the thing but its share in the power by which God exists and acts.
Propositio VII
Proposition VII
Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.
The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.
Cited in 3P9D, 3P10D, 3P37D, 3P54D, 4D8, 4P4D, 4P5D, 4P8D, 4P15D, 4P18D, 4P18S, 4P20D, 4P21D, 4P22D, 4P25D, 4P26D, 4P32D, 4P33D, 4P53D, 4P60D, 4P64D, 5A2, 5P8D, 5P9D, 5P25D
Cited in Letters 64
Demonstratio. Ex data cuiuscumque rei essentia quaedam necessario sequuntur (per prop. 36. P. 1.), nec res aliud possunt, quam id quod ex determinata earum natura necessario sequitur (per prop. 29. P. 1.). Quare cuiuscumque rei potentia sive conatus, quo ipsa vel sola vel cum aliis quidquam agit, vel agere conatur, hoc est (per prop. 6. huius) potentia sive conatus, quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei datam sive actualem essentiam. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. From the given essence of any thing certain things necessarily follow (by
Prop. 36 of Part I), and things can do nothing but what necessarily follows from their determinate nature (by
Prop. 29 of Part I). Therefore the power of any thing, or the striving by which it, either alone or with others, does anything or strives to do anything, that is (by
Prop. 6 of this Part), the power, or striving, by which it strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself.
1 Q.E.D.
- 1 As God’s power is his essence (Part I, Prop. 34), so the power of each thing is its actual essence. What a thing is and what it does are not two things: its essence is a power of producing effects, and its striving to persevere is that same power considered as it meets the things that oppose it.
Propositio VIII
Proposition VIII
[G II 147] Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.
The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
Demonstratio. Si enim tempus limitatum involveret, quod rei durationem determinaret, tum ex sola ipsa potentia, qua res existit, sequeretur, quod res post limitatum illud tempus non posset existere, sed quod deberet destrui. Atqui hoc (per prop. 4. huius) est absurdum. Ergo conatus, quo res existit, nullum tempus definitum involvit, sed contra, quoniam (per eandem prop. 4. huius) si a nulla externa causa destruatur, eadem potentia, qua iam existit, existere perget semper, ergo hic conatus tempus indefinitum involvit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For if it involved a limited time, which would determine the duration of the thing, then it would follow from the very power alone by which the thing exists that the thing could not exist after that limited time, but would have to be destroyed. But this (by
Prop. 4 of this Part) is absurd. Therefore the striving by which a thing exists involves no definite time; on the contrary, since (by the same Prop. 4 of this Part) if it is destroyed by no external cause, it will always continue to exist by the same power by which it now exists, this striving involves an indefinite time.
1 Q.E.D.
- 1 Compare the definition of duration as ‘the indefinite continuation of existing’ (Part II, Def. 5). The limit of a thing’s duration comes from outside it.
Propositio IX
Proposition IX
Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione, et huius sui conatus est conscia.
The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this striving of its own.
Demonstratio. Mentis essentia ex ideis adaequatis et inadaequatis constituitur (ut in prop. 3. huius ostendimus), adeoque (per prop. 7. huius) tam quatenus has, quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur; idque (per prop. 8. huius) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem mens (per prop. 23. P. 2.) per ideas affectionum corporis necessario sui sit conscia, est ergo (per prop. 7. huius) mens sui conatus conscia. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in
Prop. 3 of this Part), and so (by
Prop. 7 of this Part) it strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has the former and insofar as it has the latter; and that (by
Prop. 8 of this Part) for an indefinite duration. But since the mind (by
Prop. 23 of Part II) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the affections of the body, the mind is therefore (by
Prop. 7 of this Part) conscious of its striving. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Hic conatus cum ad mentem solam refertur,
voluntas appellatur; sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur
appetitus, qui proinde
a nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia, ex cuius natura ea, quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur; atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla
b est differentia, nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur, quatenus sui appetitus sunt conscii; et propterea sic definiri potest, nempe,
cupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia.
c Constat itaque ex his omnibus, nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere, quia id bonum esse iudicamus; sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse iudicare, quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus.
Scholium. This striving, when it is related to the mind alone, is called
will;
1 but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called
appetite, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation; and so man is determined to do those things. Next, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite; and so it can be defined thus:
desire is appetite together with consciousness of it. From all these things, then, it is established that we strive for, will, want and desire nothing because we judge it to be good; but on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it.
2 - a appetitus, qui proinde] transcr. appetitus, qui proinde. Italics: the transcription closes the emphasis only after ‘cupiditatem’ in the next sentence; the 1677 edition (OP pp. 103–104) italicizes the defined terms.
- b inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla] transcr. inter appetitum et cupiditatem* nulla. Italics (see the previous note); ‘appetitum’ and ‘cupiditatem’ are in roman in the 1677 edition.
- c nempe, cupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia.] transcr. nempecupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia. Word division and italics as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 104), which sets the definition in italic.
- 1 Not the will of Part II, Prop. 48, Schol., the faculty of affirming and denying, which Spinoza there distinguished from desire. ‘Will’ here names the conatus considered under the attribute of thought alone; ‘appetite’ names the same striving considered as belonging to the whole man, mind and body.
- 2 The traditional order, in which the will is moved by the good the intellect apprehends, is reversed. Prop. 39, Schol. draws the consequence for the words: ‘by good I understand here every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies a longing’, and recalls this Scholium. Compare the account of how men form the notions of good and evil in the Appendix to Part I, and the definitions of good and evil at the beginning of Part IV (Part IV, Def. 1).
Cited in 3P11S, 3P27C3D, 3P28D, 3P37D, 3P39S, 3P55C2D, 3P56D, 3P57D, 3P58D, 3DA1Ex, 4P19D, 4P26D
Propositio X
Proposition X
[G II 148] Idea, quae corporis nostri existentiam secludit, in nostra mente dari nequit, sed eidem est contraria.
An idea which excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.
Demonstratio. Quicquid corpus nostrum potest destruere, in eodem dari nequit (per prop. 5. huius). Adeoque neque eius rei idea potest in Deo dari, quatenus nostri corporis ideam habet (per coroll. prop. 9. P. 2.), hoc est (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.) eius rei idea in nostra mente dari nequit; sed contra, quoniam (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.) primum, quod mentis essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et praecipuum nostrae mentis conatus est (per prop. 7. huius) corporis nostri existentiam affirmare. Atque adeo idea, quae corporis nostri existentiam negat, nostrae menti est contraria etc.
a Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Whatever can destroy our body cannot be in it (by
Prop. 5 of this Part). And so the idea of that thing cannot be in God insofar as he has the idea of our body (by
Cor. of Prop. 9 of Part II); that is (by
Props. 11 and
13 of Part II), the idea of that thing cannot be in our mind. On the contrary, since (by
Props. 11 and
13 of Part II) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of a body actually existing, the first and principal thing in the striving of our mind is (by
Prop. 7 of this Part) to affirm the existence of our body. And so an idea which denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind, etc. Q.E.D.
- a W. Meijer and Baensch, in their second editions, would delete etc., and Appuhn omits it without comment. Gebhardt (G II 148; Textgestaltung II 369) keeps it: the Dutch version confirms it, and the summary at the end of the Demonstration does not restate the whole Proposition.
Propositio XI
Proposition XI
Quicquid corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet, eiusdem rei idea mentis nostrae cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet.
Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting of our body, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of thinking of our mind.
Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex prop. 7. P. 2. vel etiam ex prop. 14. P. 2.
Scholium. Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes, et iam ad maiorem, iam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quae quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus laetitiae et tristitiae. Per laetitiam itaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem, qua mens ad maiorem perfectionem transit. Per tristitiam autem passionem, qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem.
Scholium. We see, then, that the mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection; and these passions explain to us the
affects of joy and
sadness. By
joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows
the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection.
1 By
sadness, however,
the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection.
- 1 Joy and sadness are transitions, not states: the Definitions of the Affects insist that joy is ‘the passage’ to greater perfection, not perfection itself, since a man born with that perfection would possess it without the affect of joy (‘Dico transitionem’, Def. Aff. 3, Expl.). ‘Pleasure’ and ‘pain’, the older English renderings, suggest sensations, which is too narrow; Spinoza keeps those words for joy and sadness related to one part of the body (titillatio, dolor). Joy is defined here as a passion; there is also an active joy (Prop. 58).
Porro affectum laetitiae ad mentem et corpus simul relatum
titillationem vel
hilaritatem voco; tristitiae autem
dolorem vel
melancholiam.
a Sed notandum, titillationem et dolorem ad hominem referri, quando una eius pars prae reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam, quando omnes pariter sunt affectae.
Further, the affect of joy related to the mind and body together I call
pleasure or
cheerfulness; that of sadness,
pain or
melancholy. But it should be noted that pleasure and pain are related to a man when one part of him is affected more than the rest; cheerfulness and melancholy, when all parts are equally affected.
2- a titillationem vel hilaritatem voco; tristitiae autem dolorem vel melancholiam.] transcr. titillationem vel hilaritatem voco; tristitiae autem dolorem velmelancholiam. Word division (‘velmelancholiam’) and italics as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 105).
- 2 Titillatio (literally ‘tickling’) and hilaritas. The distinction matters in Part IV: cheerfulness cannot be excessive and is always good, melancholy always bad (Part IV, Prop. 42); pleasure can be excessive and bad, and pain can be good insofar as pleasure is bad (Part IV, Prop. 43).
Quid deinde
cupiditas sit in schol. prop. 9. huius partis explicui et praeter hos tres
b nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium; nam
c reliquos ex his tribus oriri in seqq. ostendam. Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius prop. 10. huius explicare, ut clarius intelligatur, qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria.
dNext, what
desire is I have explained in the
Scholium of Prop. 9 of this Part, and apart from these three I acknowledge no other primary affect;
3 for I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three. But before I go further, I should like to explain
Prop. 10 of this Part more fully here, so that it may be understood more clearly in what way one idea is contrary to another.
- b explicui et praeter hos tres] transcr. explicui et *praeter hos tres. Italics: the transcription sets ‘praeter hos tres … contraria’ in italic, which neither the 1677 edition (OP p. 105) nor the sense supports.
- c The 1677 edition (OP p. 105) has no nam in the text but adds it in its list of errata (Sphalmata corrigenda, p. 105 l. 12); the Dutch version has want. Gebhardt (G II 149; Textgestaltung II 369) prints it; Van Vloten–Land had rejected the insertion.
- d qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria.] transcr. qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria. Italics (see the previous note).
- 3 Descartes had counted six primitive passions: ‘l’admiration, l’amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse’ (‘wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness’, Passions of the Soul, art. 69). For Spinoza love and hatred are joy and sadness with the idea of an external cause (Prop. 13, Schol.), and wonder is not an affect (Def. Aff. 4, Expl.).
[G II 149] In schol. prop. 17. P. 2. ostendimus, ideam quae mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere, quamdiu ipsum corpus existit. Deinde ex iis quae in coroll. prop. 8. P. 2. et in eiusdem schol. ostendimus, sequitur, praesentem nostrae mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere, quod sc. mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam, qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide prop. 17. et 18. P. 2. cum eius schol.), quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur, mentis praesentem existentiam eiusque imaginandi potentiam tolli, simulatque mens praesentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa, cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per prop. 4. huius), nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per prop. 6. P. 2.) causa, cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est, quia corpus existere incepit (quare, per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit); sed (per prop. 8. P. 2.)
a hoc ab alia idea oritur, quae nostri corporis, et consequenter nostrae mentis praesentem existentiam secludit; quaeque adeo ideae, quae nostrae mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.
In the
Scholium of Prop. 17 of Part II we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body for as long as the body itself exists. Next, from what we have shown in the
Cor. of Prop. 8 of Part II and in
its Scholium, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends only on this, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the mind by which it imagines things and recollects them also depends on this, that it involves the actual existence of the body (see
Props. 17 and
18 of Part II, with
its Scholium). From this it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are taken away
1 as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (by
Prop. 4 of this Part), nor also that the body ceases to be. For (by
Prop. 6 of Part II) the cause why the mind affirms the existence of the body is not that the body has begun to exist (so, by the same reasoning, it does not cease to affirm the existence of its body because the body ceases to be); but (by
Prop. 8 of Part II) this arises from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea which constitutes the essence of our mind.
- a Van Vloten–Land doubted the reference and proposed Prop. 17., and Appuhn and Halpern follow them; Baensch changed it to Prop. 6. in his second edition. Gebhardt (G II 149; Textgestaltung II 369) keeps Prop. 8., which the Dutch version also has: Prop. 17 concerns the mind’s relation to other bodies, not to its own, while only Prop. 8 teaches that the ideas of things that do not exist must be derived from the infinite idea of God, which has nothing in common with the temporal existence of our body and mind.
- 1 The duration of the mind is tied to that of the body, and with it the imagination and memory (Part V, Prop. 21). What of the mind is not so tied, Part V will argue, is the idea that expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity (Part V, Props. 22–23).
Cited in 3P15D, 3P15CD, 3P19D, 3P20D, 3P21D, 3P23D, 3P34D, 3P35D, 3P37D, 3P38D, 3P53D, 3P55D, 3P55C2D, 3P56D, 3P57D, 3P59D, 3DA3Ex, 3DA4Ex, 4P8D, 4P18D, 4P29D, 4P30D, 4P41D, 4P42D, 4P43D, 4P44D, 4P51D2
Propositio XII
Proposition XII
[G II 150] Mens quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur, quae corporis agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant.
The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body’s power of acting.
Demonstratio. Quamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam corporis alicuius externi involvit, tamdiu mens humana idem corpus ut praesens contemplabitur (per prop. 17. P. 2.); et consequenter (per prop. 7. P. 2.) quamdiu mens humana aliquod externum corpus
a ut praesens contemplatur, hoc est (per eiusdem prop. 17 schol.)
b imaginatur, tamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam eiusdem corporis externi involvit. Atque adeo quamdiu mens ea imaginatur, quae corporis nostri agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant, tamdiu corpus affectum est modis, qui eiusdem agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant (vide postul. 1. huius); et consequenter (per prop. 11. huius) tamdiu mentis cogitandi potentia augetur vel iuvatur. Ac proinde (per prop. 6. vel 9. huius) mens quantum potest, eadem imaginari conatur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. As long as the human body is affected in a way which involves the nature of some external body, so long will the human mind contemplate that body as present (by
Prop. 17 of Part II); and consequently (by
Prop. 7 of Part II), as long as the human mind contemplates some external body as present, that is (by the
Schol. of the same Prop. 17), imagines it, so long is the human body affected in a way which involves the nature of that external body. And so, as long as the mind imagines those things which increase or aid our body’s power of acting, so long is the body affected in ways which increase or aid its power of acting (see
Post. 1 of this Part); and consequently (by
Prop. 11 of this Part) so long is the mind’s power of thinking increased or aided. And therefore (by
Prop. 6 or
9 of this Part) the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things. Q.E.D.
- a quamdiu mens humana aliquod externum corpus] transcr. quamdiu mens aliquod externum corpus. The 1677 edition (OP p. 106) and Gebhardt (G II 150) read ‘Mens humana’; the transcription omits ‘humana’.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 106) has per ejusdem Prop. Schol., the Dutch version volgens het Byvoegsel van de zelfde Voorstelling. Van Vloten–Land insert 17., rightly, since the reference is to the Scholium of Prop. 17, not of Prop. 7; Gebhardt (G II 150; Textgestaltung II 369) follows.
Propositio XIII
Proposition XIII
Cum mens ea imaginatur, quae corporis agendi potentiam minuunt vel coercent, conatur, quantum potest, rerum recordari, quae horum existentiam secludunt.
When the mind imagines those things which diminish or restrain the body’s power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things which exclude their existence.
Demonstratio. Quamdiu mens quicquam tale imaginatur, tamdiu mentis et corporis potentia minuitur vel coercetur (ut in praeced. prop. demonstravimus), et nihilominus id tamdiu imaginabitur, donec mens aliud imaginetur, quod huius praesentem existentiam secludat (per prop. 17. P. 2.), hoc est (ut modo ostendimus) mentis et corporis potentia tamdiu minuitur vel coercetur, donec mens aliud imaginetur, quod huius existentiam secludit, quodque adeo mens (per prop. 9. huius) quantum potest, imaginari vel recordari conabitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. As long as the mind imagines anything of this kind, so long is the power of mind and body diminished or restrained (as we have demonstrated in the
preceding Prop.); and nevertheless it will go on imagining it until the mind imagines something else which excludes its present existence (by
Prop. 17 of Part II); that is (as we have just shown), the power of mind and body is diminished or restrained until the mind imagines something else which excludes the existence of this thing; and this, therefore, the mind (by
Prop. 9 of this Part) will strive, as far as it can, to imagine or recollect. Q.E.D.
[G II 151] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod mens ea imaginari aversatur, quae ipsius et corporis potentiam minuunt vel coercent.
Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is averse to imagining those things which diminish or restrain its power and the body’s.
Scholium. Ex his clare intelligimus quid amor quidque odium sit. Nempe amor nihil aliud est, quam laetitia concomitante idea causae externae et odium nihil aliud quam tristitia concomitante idea causae externae. Videmus deinde quod ille, qui amat, necessario conatur rem, quam amat, praesentem habere et conservare; et contra qui odit, rem, quam odio habet, amovere et destruere conatur. Sed de his omnibus in seqq. prolixius.
Scholium. From this we understand clearly what
love and
hatred are. Namely, love is nothing but joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause,
1 and hatred nothing but sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We see, next, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and to preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But of all these things more fully in what follows.
- 1 Descartes had defined love as an emotion of the soul, caused by the movement of the spirits, ‘qui l’incite à se joindre de volonté aux objets qui paraissent luy estre convenables’ (‘which incites it to join itself by will to objects which appear to be agreeable to it’, Passions of the Soul, art. 79). In the Definitions of the Affects Spinoza says that the definition of those who make love ‘the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved’ expresses a property of love, not its essence, and that by ‘will’ he does not mean a free decree. Love is a kind of joy; the striving to keep the beloved present (next sentence) follows from it.
Cited in 3P15CD, 3P17D, 3P19D, 3P20D, 3P22D, 3P28D, 3P29D, 3P30S, 3P33D, 3P34D, 3P35D, 3P38D, 3P39D, 3P40D, 3P44D, 3P45D, 3P48D, 3P49D, 3P55C2D, 3DA7Ex, 4P57D
Propositio XIV
Proposition XIV
Si mens duobus affectibus simul affecta semel fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero.
If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.
1- 1 The association of affects, built on the association of images and memory in Part II, Prop. 18 and its Scholium. With Props. 15–16 it explains why we love and hate things that are not in themselves causes of our joy or sadness.
Demonstratio. Si corpus humanum a duobus corporibus simul affectum semel fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginatur, statim et alterius recordabitur (per prop. 18. P. 2.). At mentis imaginationes magis nostri corporis affectus,
a quam corporum externorum naturam indicant (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.). Ergo si corpus et consequenter mens (vide defin. 3. huius) duobus affectibus semel affecta fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also (by
Prop. 18 of Part II). But the imaginations of the mind indicate the affects of our body more than the nature of external bodies (by
Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II). Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (see
Def. 3 of this Part), has once been affected by two affects, then when it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other. Q.E.D.
- a The Dutch version has de gesteltheit van onz lighaam (Constitutio), the wording of Part II, Prop. 16, Cor. 2. Gebhardt (G II 151; Textgestaltung II 370) takes affectus for Spinoza’s later change, made to fit what is to be proved, and rejects W. Meijer’s suggestion that it is a misprint for affectiones.
Propositio XV
Proposition XV
Res quaecumque potest esse per accidens causa laetitiae, tristitiae vel cupiditatis.
Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of joy, sadness or desire.
Demonstratio. Ponatur mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet, qui eius agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit et altero, qui eandem vel auget vel minuit (vide postul. 1. huius). Ex praeced. prop. patet, quod ubi mens postea illo a sua vera causa, quae (per hypothesin) per se eius cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero, qui ipsius cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) laetitia vel tristitia afficietur; atque adeo illa res non per se, sed per accidens causa erit laetitiae vel tristitiae. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest, rem illam posse per accidens causam esse cupiditatis. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Let the mind be supposed to be affected by two affects at the same time, one which neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, and the other which either increases or diminishes it (see
Post. 1 of this Part). From the
preceding Prop. it is evident that when the mind is afterwards affected by the former through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself neither increases nor diminishes its power of thinking, it will immediately be affected also by the latter, which increases or diminishes its power of thinking, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), it will be affected with joy or sadness; and so that thing will be the cause of joy or sadness not through itself but accidentally. And in this same way it can easily be shown that that thing can accidentally be the cause of desire. Q.E.D.
[G II 152] Corollarium. Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae, cuius ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus.
Corollary. From the mere fact that we have contemplated some thing with an affect of joy or sadness of which it is not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it.
Demonstratio. Nam ex hoc solo fit (per prop. 14. huius), ut mens hanc rem postea imaginando affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae afficiatur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) ut mentis et corporis potentia augeatur vel minuatur etc. Et consequenter (per prop. 12. huius) ut mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel (per coroll. prop. 13. huius) aversetur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ut eandem amet vel odio habeat. Q. E. D.
Scholium. Hinc intelligimus, qui fieri potest, ut quaedam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita; sed tantum ex sympathia (ut aiunt) et antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea obiecta, quae nos laetitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo, quod aliquid simile habent obiectis, quae nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent, ut in seq. prop. ostendam. Scio equidem auctores, qui primi haec nomina sympathiae et antipathiae introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates; sed nihilominus credo nobis licere, per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.
Scholium. From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate certain things without any cause known to us, but only from
sympathy (as they say) and
antipathy. And to this must be referred also those objects which affect us with joy or sadness from the mere fact that they have something similar to objects which usually affect us with the same affects, as I shall show in the
following Prop. I know, indeed, that the authors who first introduced these names of sympathy and antipathy wished to signify by them certain occult qualities of things;
1 but nevertheless I believe that we may also understand by them qualities which are known, or manifest.
- 1 Occult qualities were powers not manifest to the senses and admitted without further explanation, such as the attraction of the magnet. Descartes had claimed to explain all such effects mechanically: no one who considers his principles will think that there are ‘nulla sympathiae vel antipathiae miracula tam stupenda’ (‘any wonders of sympathy or antipathy so astonishing’) that their reason cannot be deduced from the figure, size, position and motion of the particles of matter (Principles IV.187, AT VIII-1 314–315). Spinoza keeps the words and gives them a known cause: the association of affects.
Propositio XVI
Proposition XVI
Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile obiecto, quod mentem laetitia vel tristitia afficere solet, quamvis id, in quo res obiecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus.
From the mere fact that we imagine some thing to have something similar to an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sadness, we shall love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.
[G II 153] Demonstratio. Id quod simile est obiecto, in ipso obiecto (per hypothesin) cum affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae contemplati sumus atque adeo (per prop. 14. huius) cum mens eius imagine afficietur, statim etiam hoc vel illo afficietur affectu, et consequenter res, quam hoc idem habere percipimus, erit (per prop. 15. huius) per accidens laetitiae vel tristitiae causa. Adeoque (per praeced. coroll.) quamvis id, in quo obiecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum causa efficiens, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. That which is similar to the object, we have contemplated (by hypothesis) in the object itself with an affect of joy or sadness; and so (by
Prop. 14 of this Part) when the mind is affected by its image, it will immediately be affected also with this or that affect; and consequently the thing which we perceive to have this same feature will (by
Prop. 15 of this Part) be accidentally the cause of joy or sadness. And so (by the
preceding Cor.), even though that in which it is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we shall nevertheless love it or hate it. Q.E.D.
Propositio XVII
Proposition XVII
Si rem,
a quae nos tristitiae affectu afficere solet, aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri, quae nos aeque magno laetitiae affectu solet afficere, eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus.
If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of sadness has something similar to another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 109) has Si res; the Dutch version has Indien wy ons inbeelden dat de zaak (‘If we imagine that the thing’). Van Vloten–Land, on Camerer’s suggestion, correct to rem, and Gebhardt (G II 153; Textgestaltung II 370) follows; Land had earlier thought the change not strictly necessary, given similar slips of construction elsewhere in Spinoza.
Demonstratio. Est enim (per hypothesin) haec res per se tristitiae causa, et (per schol. prop. 13. huius) quatenus eandem hoc affectu imaginamur, eandem odio habemus; et quatenus praeterea aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quae nos aeque magno laetitiae affectu afficere solet, aeque magno laetitiae conamine amabimus (per prop. praeced.). Atque adeo eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For (by hypothesis) this thing is through itself a cause of sadness, and (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part) insofar as we imagine it with this affect, we hate it; and insofar as we imagine, besides, that it has something similar to another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall love it with an equally great effort of joy (by the
preceding Prop.). And so we shall hate it and at the same time love it. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec mentis constitutio quae scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur, animi vocatur fluctuatio, quae proinde affectum respicit, ut dubitatio imaginationem (vide schol. prop. 44. P. 2.); nec animi fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt, nisi secundum maius et minus. Sed notandum, me in prop. praeced. has animi fluctuationes ex causis deduxisse, quae per se unius et per accidens alterius affectus sunt causa. Quod ideo feci, quia sic facilius ex praecedentibus deduci poterant; at non, quod negem, animi fluctuationes plerumque oriri ab obiecto, quod utriusque affectus sit efficiens causa. Nam corpus humanum (per postul. 1. P. 2.) ex plurimis diversae naturae individuis componitur, atque adeo (per axiom. 1. post lem. 3. quod vide post prop. 13. P. 2.) ab uno eodemque corpore plurimis diversisque modis potest affici; et contra, quia una eademque res multis modis potest affici, multis ergo etiam diversisque modis unam eandemque corporis partem afficere poterit. Ex quibus facile concipere possumus, unum idemque obiectum posse esse causam multorum contrariorumque affectuum.
Scholium. This constitution of the mind, which arises from two contrary affects, is called fluctuation of mind, which is therefore related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination
1 (see
Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II); and fluctuation of mind and doubt do not differ from one another except in respect of more and less. But it should be noted that in the
preceding Prop. I deduced these fluctuations of mind from causes which are through themselves the cause of one affect and accidentally the cause of the other. I did this because they could thus be deduced more easily from what preceded; not because I deny that fluctuations of mind usually arise from an object which is the efficient cause of both affects. For the human body (by
Post. 1 of Part II) is composed of very many individuals of different natures, and so (by
Ax. 1 after Lemma 3, which see after
Prop. 13 of Part II) it can be affected in very many different ways by one and the same body; and on the other hand, because one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many different ways. From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many contrary affects.
Propositio XVIII
Proposition XVIII
[G II 154] Homo ex imagine rei praeteritae aut futurae eodem laetitiae et tristitiae affectu afficitur, ac ex imagine rei praesentis.
A man is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy and sadness as by the image of a present thing.
Demonstratio. Quamdiu homo rei alicuius imagine affectus est, rem ut praesentem, tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (per prop. 17. P. 2. cum eiusdem coroll.), nec ipsam ut praeteritam aut futuram imaginatur, nisi quatenus eius imago iuncta est imagini temporis praeteriti aut futuri (vide schol. prop. 44. P. 2.). Quare rei imago in se sola considerata eadem est, sive ad tempus futurum vel praeteritum, sive ad praesens referatur, hoc est (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.) corporis constitutio seu affectus idem est, sive imago sit rei praeteritae vel futurae, sive praesentis. Atque adeo affectus laetitiae et tristitiae idem est, sive imago sit rei praeteritae aut futurae, sive praesentis. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. As long as a man is affected by the image of some thing, he will contemplate the thing as present, even though it does not exist (by
Prop. 17 of Part II with its
Cor.), and he does not imagine it as past or future except insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see
Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II). Therefore the image of the thing, considered in itself alone, is the same whether it is referred to future or past time or to the present; that is (by
Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II), the constitution, or affect, of the body is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. And so the affect of joy and sadness is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. Q.E.D.
Scholium I. Rem eatenus
a praeteritam aut
futuram hic voco, quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur. Ex. gr. quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos laesit aut laedet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur, eatenus eius existentiam affirmamus, hoc est, corpus nullo affectu afficitur, qui rei existentiam secludat; atque adeo (per prop. 17. P. 2.) corpus eiusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur, ac si res ipsa praesens adesset. Verumenimvero quia plerumque fit, ut ii qui plura sunt experti fluctuent, quamdiu rem ut futuram vel praeteritam contemplantur, deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (vide schol. prop. 44. P. 2.), hinc fit, ut affectus, qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes, sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur, donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.
Scholium I. I call a thing
past or
future here insofar as we have been affected by it or shall be affected by it. For example, insofar as we have seen it or shall see it, it has refreshed us or will refresh us, it has harmed us or will harm us, etc. For insofar as we imagine it in this way, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no affect which excludes the existence of the thing; and so (by
Prop. 17 of Part II) the body is affected by the image of this thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. But because it usually happens that those who have experienced more things fluctuate as long as they contemplate a thing as future or past, and are generally in doubt about its outcome (see
Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II), it comes about that the affects which arise from like images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until men become more certain of the thing’s outcome.
- a The 1677 edition heads this simply Scholium; the Dutch version has Eerste Byvoegsel (‘First Scholium’). Because the Scholium is cited elsewhere without a number, Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 370) thinks the two scholia to this Proposition were originally one and divided later, like the scholium to Part II, Prop. 40.
[G II 155] Scholium II. Ex modo dictis intelligimus, quid sit
spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et
conscientiae morsus. Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans laetitia orta ex imagine rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu dubitamus; metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubiae imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe fit securitas
a et ex metu desperatio; nempe laetitia vel tristitia orta ex imagine rei, quam metuimus vel speravimus. Gaudium deinde est laetitia orta ex imagine rei praeteritae, de cuius eventu dubitavimus.
b Conscientiae denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio.
Scholium II. From what has just been said we understand what
hope,
fear,
confidence,
despair,
gladness and
remorse are. For hope is nothing but an inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are in doubt;
1 fear, on the other hand, an inconstant sadness, arising also from the image of a doubtful thing. Further, if the doubt is removed from these affects, hope becomes confidence and fear despair; namely, a joy or sadness arising from the image of a thing which we feared or hoped for. Gladness, next, is joy arising from the image of a past thing of whose outcome we were in doubt. Remorse, finally, is the sadness opposed to gladness.
2 - a ex spe fit securitas] transcr. ex spe fitsecuritas. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) reads dubitamus; Gebhardt (G II 155) prints dubitavimus, the past tense the sense requires, without comment in his Textgestaltung.
- 1 Hope and fear always go together, since doubt is common to both (Def. Aff. 13, Expl.), and they cannot be good in themselves (Part IV, Prop. 47). The Definitions of the Affects restate this group as Defs. 12–17.
- 2 Conscientiae morsus, literally ‘bite of conscience’. It is not moral remorse but the sadness of a past outcome that went against our hope (Def. Aff. 17), close to what English calls disappointment.
Propositio XIX
Proposition XIX
Qui id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur; si autem conservari,
a laetabitur.
He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but if he imagines that it is preserved, he will rejoice.
- a si autem conservari] transcr. si contra autem conservari. The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) and Gebhardt (G II 155) have no ‘contra’.
Demonstratio. Mens quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur, quae corporis agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant (per prop. 12. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius)
a ea quae amat. At imaginatio ab iis iuvatur, quae rei existentiam ponunt, et contra coercetur iis quae rei existentiam secludunt (per prop. 17. P. 2.). Ergo rerum imagines, quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt,
b mentis conatum, quo rem amatam imaginari conatur, iuvant, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) laetitia mentem afficiunt; et quae contra rei amatae existentiam secludunt, eundem mentis conatum coercent, hoc est (per idem schol.) tristitia mentem afficiunt. Qui itaque id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur, etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body’s power of acting (by
Prop. 12 of this Part), that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), the things it loves. But the imagination is aided by those things which posit the existence of a thing, and on the other hand is restrained by those which exclude the existence of a thing (by
Prop. 17 of Part II). Therefore the images of things which posit the existence of the thing loved aid the striving of the mind by which it strives to imagine the thing loved, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), they affect the mind with joy; and those which, on the other hand, exclude the existence of the thing loved restrain that same striving of the mind, that is (by the same Scholium), they affect the mind with sadness. He, therefore, who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened, etc. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) has per Schol. ejusdem Prop., the Dutch version volgens het Byvoegsel van der zelfder Voorstelling. Only the Scholium of Prop. 13 can be meant; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct accordingly, and Gebhardt (G II 155; Textgestaltung II 370) follows.
- b imagines, quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt] transcr. imagines, quae rei existentiam ponunt. The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) and Gebhardt (G II 155) read ‘rei amatae’; the transcription omits ‘amatae’.
Propositio XX
Proposition XX
[G II 156] Qui id quod odio habet destrui imaginatur, laetabitur.
He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.
Demonstratio. Mens (per prop. 13. huius) ea imaginari conatur, quae rerum existentiam, quibus corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur, secludunt, hoc est (per schol. eiusdem prop.) ea imaginari conatur; quae rerum quas odio habet, existentiam secludunt. Atque adeo rei imago, quae existentiam eius quod mens odio habet secludit, hunc mentis conatum iuvat, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) mentem laetitia afficit. Qui itaque id quod odio habet destrui imaginatur, laetabitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind (by
Prop. 13 of this Part) strives to imagine those things which exclude the existence of things by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained, that is (by the
Schol. of the same Prop.), it strives to imagine those things which exclude the existence of things it hates. And so the image of a thing which excludes the existence of what the mind hates aids this striving of the mind, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), it affects the mind with joy. He, therefore, who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXI
Proposition XXI
Qui id quod amat laetitia vel tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetitia etiam vel tristitia afficietur; et uterque hic affectus maior aut minor erit in amante, prout uterque maior aut minor est in re amata.
He who imagines that what he loves is affected with joy or sadness will also be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or less in the lover as it is greater or less in the thing loved.
Demonstratio. Rerum imagines (ut in prop. 19. huius demonstravimus) quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum, quo ipsam rem amatam imaginari conatur, iuvant. Sed laetitia existentiam rei laetae ponit, et eo magis, quo laetitiae affectus maior est; est enim (per schol. prop. 11. huius) transitio ad maiorem perfectionem. Ergo imago laetitiae rei amatae in amante ipsius mentis conatum iuvat, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) amantem laetitia afficit, et eo maiore quo maior hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Quod erat primum. Deinde quatenus res aliqua tristitia afficitur, eatenus destruitur, et eo magis, quo maiore afficitur tristitia (per idem schol. prop. 11. huius); adeoque (per prop. 19. huius) qui id quod amat tristitia affici imaginatur, tristitia etiam afficietur, et eo maiore quo maior hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The images of things which posit the existence of the thing loved (as we have demonstrated in
Prop. 19 of this Part) aid the striving of the mind by which it strives to imagine the thing loved itself. But joy posits the existence of the thing that rejoices, and the more so, the greater the affect of joy is; for it is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part) a passage to a greater perfection. Therefore the image of the joy of the thing loved aids the striving of the lover’s mind, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), it affects the lover with joy, and the more so, the greater this affect was in the thing loved. This was the first point. Next, insofar as a thing is affected with sadness, it is to that extent destroyed, and the more so, the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by
the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part); and so (by
Prop. 19 of this Part) he who imagines that what he loves is affected with sadness will also be affected with sadness, and the more so, the greater this affect was in the thing loved. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXII
Proposition XXII
[G II 157] Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem, quam amamus, amore erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem afficere, econtra odio etiam contra ipsum afficiemur.
If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with sadness, we shall, on the contrary, also be affected with hatred towards him.
Demonstratio. Qui rem, quam amamus, laetitia vel tristitia afficit, ille nos laetitia vel tristitia etiam afficit, si nimirum rem amatam laetitia illa vel tristitia affectam imaginamur (per praeced. prop.). At haec laetitia vel tristitia in nobis supponitur dari concomitante idea causae externae. Ergo (per schol. prop. 13. huius) si aliquem imaginamur laetitia vel tristitia afficere rem, quam amamus, erga eundem amore vel odio afficiemur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who affects a thing we love with joy or sadness also affects us with joy or sadness, namely if we imagine the thing loved to be affected with that joy or sadness (by the
preceding Prop.). But this joy or sadness is supposed to be in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Therefore (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), if we imagine someone to affect with joy or sadness a thing we love, we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Prop. 21. nobis explicat quid sit commiseratio quam definire possumus quod sit tristitia orta ex alterius damno. Quo autem nomine appellanda sit laetitia, quae ex alterius bono oritur, nescio. Porro amorem erga illum, qui alteri benefecit, favorem, et contra odium erga
a illum, qui alteri malefecit, indignationem appellabimus. Denique notandum nos non tantum misereri rei, quam amavimus (ut in prop. 21. ostendimus), sed etiam eius, quam antea nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, modo eam nobis similem iudicemus (ut infra ostendam); atque adeo ei etiam favere, qui simili benefecit et contra in eum indignari, qui simili damnum intulit.
Scholium. Prop. 21 explains to us what
pity is, which we can define as sadness arising from another’s harm. But by what name we should call the joy which arises from another’s good, I do not know.
1 Further, love towards one who has done good to another we shall call
favour, and on the other hand hatred towards one who has done evil to another we shall call
indignation. Finally, it should be noted that we pity not only a thing we have loved (as we have shown in
Prop. 21), but also one towards which we have previously had no affect, provided that we judge it to be like us (as I shall show below); and so we also favour one who has done good to someone like us, and on the other hand are indignant with one who has done harm to someone like us.
- a et contra odium erga] transcr. et contraodium erga. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
- 1 Pity, favour and indignation return in the Definitions of the Affects (Defs. 18–20); the joy at another’s good remains without a name. ‘As I shall show below’: Prop. 27.
Propositio XXIII
Proposition XXIII
Qui id quod odio habet, tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetabitur; si contra idem laetitia affectum esse imaginetur, contristabitur; et uterque hic affectus maior aut minor erit, prout eius contrarius maior aut minor est in eo, quod odio habet.
He who imagines that what he hates is affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened; and each of these affects will be greater or less as its contrary is greater or less in what he hates.
[G II 158] Demonstratio. Quatenus res odiosa tristitia afficitur, eatenus destruitur, et eo magis quo maiore tristitia afficitur (per schol. prop. 11. huius). Qui igitur (per prop. 20. huius) rem, quam odio habet, tristitia affici imaginatur, laetitia contra afficietur; et eo maiore, quo maiore tristitia rem odiosam affectam esse imaginatur. Quod erat primum. Deinde laetitia existentiam rei laetae ponit (per idem schol. prop. 11. huius), et eo magis, quo maior laetitia concipitur. Si quis eum, quem odio habet, laetitia affectum imaginatur, haec imaginatio (per prop. 13. huius) eiusdem conatum coercebit, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) is, qui odio habet, tristitia afficietur etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Insofar as a hated thing is affected with sadness, it is to that extent destroyed, and the more so, the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part). He, therefore, who (by
Prop. 20 of this Part) imagines that the thing he hates is affected with sadness will, on the contrary, be affected with joy; and the more so, the greater the sadness with which he imagines the hated thing to be affected. This was the first point. Next, joy posits the existence of the thing that rejoices (by the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), and the more so, the greater the joy is conceived to be. If someone imagines the one he hates to be affected with joy, this imagination (by
Prop. 13 of this Part) will restrain his striving, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), he who hates will be affected with sadness, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec laetitia vix solida et absque ullo animi conflictu esse potest. Nam (ut statim in prop. 27. huius ostendam) quatenus rem sibi similem tristitiae affectu affici imaginatur, eatenus contristari debet; et contra, si eandem laetitia affici imaginetur. Sed hic ad solum odium attendimus.
Scholium. This joy can hardly be solid and without any conflict of mind. For (as I shall show presently in
Prop. 27 of this Part), insofar as he imagines a thing like himself to be affected with an affect of sadness, he must to that extent be saddened; and the contrary, if he imagines it to be affected with joy. But here we attend only to hatred.
Propositio XXIV
Proposition XXIV
Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem, quam odio habemus, odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem rem afficere, amore erga ipsum afficiemur.
If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with hatred towards him also. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect that same thing with sadness, we shall be affected with love towards him.
Demonstratio. Demonstratur eodem modo haec prop. ac prop. 22. huius, quam vide.
Scholium. Hi et similes odii affectus ad invidiam referuntur, quae propterea nihil aliud est, quam ipsum odium, quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere, ut malo alterius gaudeat, et contra ut eiusdem bono contristetur.
Scholium. These and similar affects of hatred are related to
envy, which is therefore nothing but hatred itself, insofar as it is considered to dispose a man so that he rejoices in another’s ill and, on the other hand, is saddened by his good.
1 - 1 Envy proper, among equals, arises from imitation: Prop. 32, Schol. shows that men pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well. See also Def. Aff. 23.
Propositio XXV
Proposition XXV
[G II 159] Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur, quod nos vel rem amatam laetitia afficere imaginamur; et contra id omne negare, quod nos vel rem amatam tristitia afficere imaginamur.
We strive to affirm of ourselves and of the thing loved whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy; and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with sadness.
Demonstratio. Quod rem amatam laetitia vel tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos laetitia vel tristitia afficit (per prop. 21. huius). At mens (per prop. 12. huius) ea quae nos laetitia afficiunt, quantum potest, conatur imaginari, hoc est (per prop. 17. P. 2. et eius coroll.) ut praesentia contemplari; et contra (per prop. 13. huius) quae nos tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere. Ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur, quod nos vel rem amatam laetitia afficere imaginamur, et contra. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. What we imagine to affect the thing loved with joy or sadness affects us with joy or sadness (by
Prop. 21 of this Part). But the mind (by
Prop. 12 of this Part) strives, as far as it can, to imagine the things which affect us with joy, that is (by
Prop. 17 of Part II and its
Cor.), to contemplate them as present; and, on the other hand (by
Prop. 13 of this Part), to exclude the existence of the things which affect us with sadness. Therefore we strive to affirm of ourselves and of the thing loved whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy, and the contrary. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXVI
Proposition XXVI
Id omne de re, quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur, quod ipsam tristitia afficere imaginamur, et id contra negare, quod ipsam laetitia afficere imaginamur.
We strive to affirm of a thing we hate whatever we imagine to affect it with sadness, and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect it with joy.
Demonstratio. Sequitur haec prop. ex prop. 23. ut praec. ex prop. 21. huius.
Scholium. His videmus, facile contingere, ut homo de se deque re amata plus iusto, et contra de re quam odit minus iusto sentiat; quae quidem imaginatio, quando ipsum hominem respicit, qui de se plus iusto sentit, superbia vocatur et species delirii est, quia homo oculis apertis somniat, se omnia illa posse, quae sola imaginatione assequitur, quaeque propterea veluti realia contemplatur, iisque exultat, quamdiu ea imaginari non potest, quae horum existentiam secludunt et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. Est igitur superbia laetitia ex eo orta, quod homo de se plus iusto sentit. Deinde laetitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo de alio plus iusto sentit, existimatio vocatur; et illa denique despectus,
ab quae ex eo oritur, quod de alio minus iusto sentit.
Scholium. From these things we see that it easily happens that a man thinks more highly of himself and of the thing loved than is just, and, on the other hand, less highly than is just of the thing he hates. When this imagination concerns the man himself who thinks more highly of himself than is just, it is called
pride, and it is a species of madness, because the man dreams with his eyes open
1 that he can do all those things which he attains by imagination alone, and which he therefore contemplates as real, and exults in them, as long as he cannot imagine those things which exclude their existence and determine his own power of acting. Pride, therefore, is joy arising from the fact that a man thinks more highly of himself than is just. Next, the joy which arises from a man’s thinking more highly of another than is just is called
overestimation; and finally that which arises from his thinking less highly of another than is just,
scorn.
- a et illa denique despectus] transcr. et illa deniquedespectus. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
- b Illa takes up laetitia: scorn, too, is a joy. W. Meijer proposed et despectus denique tristitia, quae, on the ground that scorn belongs to sadness, and Leopold and Halpern agree. Gebhardt (G II 160; Textgestaltung II 370) rejects the conjecture, with Baensch and Appuhn: scorn is an affect of hatred, but Prop. 20 teaches that joy can arise from hatred.
- 1 The phrase with which Prop. 2, Schol. ended, there of those who believe that they act from a free decree of the mind. Pride, overestimation and scorn return as Defs. Aff. 21, 22 and 28.
Propositio XXVII
Proposition XXVII
[G II 160] Ex eo, quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.
From the fact that we imagine a thing like us, towards which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.
1- 1 The imitation of the affects (affectuum imitatio, Schol.), from which Spinoza derives pity, emulation, ambition, the desire to please, envy, and much of social life. It is not a sentiment of fellow-feeling chosen by the mind but a consequence of the body’s nature: the Demonstration rests on the resemblance between our body and the body of the one we imagine. Part IV builds on it (Part IV, Props. 35–37), and limits it: pity, in one who lives by the guidance of reason, is bad and useless in itself (Part IV, Prop. 50).
Cited in 3P23S, 3P27C1D, 3P27C3D, 3P29D, 3P30D, 3P31D, 3P32D, 3P40D, 3P47D, 3P49S, 3P52S, 3P53C, 3DA33Ex, 3DA44Ex, 4P50S, 4P68S
Demonstratio. Rerum imagines sunt corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideae corpora externa veluti nobis praesentia repraesentant (per schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), hoc est (per prop. 16. P. 2.) quarum ideae naturam nostri corporis et simul praesentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturae nostri corporis, tum idea corporis externi, quod imaginamur, affectionem nostri corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi; et consequenter, si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, haec imaginatio affectionem nostri corporis
a huic affectui similem exprimet. Adeoque ex hoc, quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (per prop. 23. huius) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili.
b Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The images of things are affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies to us as present (by
Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II), that is (by
Prop. 16 of Part II), whose ideas involve the nature of our body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, the nature of the external body is like the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body we imagine will involve an affection of our body like the affection of the external body; and consequently, if we imagine someone like us to be affected with some affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body like this affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to be affected with some affect, we are affected with a like affect together with it. But if we hate a thing like us, to that extent (by
Prop. 23 of this Part) we shall be affected with a contrary affect together with it, not a like one. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 116) prints nostri Corpus, an evident slip, which Gebhardt (G II 160) and Bartuschat reproduce; the transcription reads corporis, as the construction requires.
- b W. Meijer observed that the last sentence (Quod si … simili) is no part of the demonstration, which ends with afficimur; he would put Q. E. D. there and move the sentence to a second scholium, and Leopold, Baensch and Halpern agree; Bartuschat puts Q. E. D. after afficimur. Gebhardt (G II 160; Textgestaltung II 370–371) keeps the order of the 1677 edition, which the Dutch version confirms: Spinoza added to the demonstration, as if in a note, something that does not strictly belong to it.
Scholium. Haec affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio (de qua vide schol. prop. 22. huius); sed ad cupiditatem relata aemulatio, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam alicuius rei cupiditas, quae in nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.
Scholium. This imitation of the affects, when it is related to sadness, is called
pity (on which see the
Schol. of Prop. 22 of this Part); but when related to desire it is called
emulation,
1 which is therefore nothing but the desire for some thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same desire.
Corollarium I. Si aliquem, quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur laetitia afficere rem nobis similem, amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem tristitia afficere, odio erga ipsum afficiemur.
a Corollary I. If we imagine that someone towards whom we have had no affect affects with joy a thing like us, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with sadness, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 116) has contra Odio erga ipsum afficiemur, repeating contra; Bartuschat keeps it. Halpern thought it could be deleted, and Gebhardt (G II 160; Textgestaltung II 371) deletes it, since the Dutch version has in tegendeel only once.
[G II 161] Demonstratio. Hoc eodem modo
a ex prop. praec. demonstratur ac prop. 22. huius ex prop. 21.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 116) has Haec, perhaps a feminine referring to the propositio Spinoza had in mind; the Dutch version has Dit word … betoogt. W. Meijer corrects to Hoc, followed by Baensch and Appuhn, and Gebhardt (G II 161; Textgestaltung II 371) accepts the correction.
Corollarium II. Rem cuius nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo, quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit.
Corollary II. We cannot hate a thing we pity from the fact that its misery affects us with sadness.
Demonstratio. Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (per prop. 23. huius) ex ipsius tristitia laetaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.
Demonstration. For if we could hate it from that fact, then (by
Prop. 23 of this Part) we would rejoice in its sadness, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollarium III. Rem, cuius nos miseret, a miseria, quantum possumus, liberare conabimur.
Corollary III. A thing we pity we shall strive, as far as we can, to free from its misery.
Demonstratio. Id quod rem, cuius nos miseret, tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam tristitia afficit (per prop. praeced.); adeoque omne id, quod eius rei existentiam tollit, sive quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (per prop. 13. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 9. huius) id destruere appetemus, sive ad id destruendum determinabimur; atque adeo rem, cuius miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. That which affects with sadness a thing we pity affects us also with a like sadness (by the
preceding Prop.); and so we shall strive to think up whatever takes away the existence of that thing, or destroys it (by
Prop. 13 of this Part), that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part), we shall want to destroy it, or shall be determined to destroy it; and so we shall strive to free the thing we pity from its misery. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur, quod rei, in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia
a vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. Ceterum de amore et odio erga illum, qui rei, quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide schol. prop. 22. huius.
Scholium. This will, or appetite, to do good, which arises from our pitying the thing on which we want to confer a benefit, is called
benevolence,
1 which is therefore nothing but a desire arising from pity. As for love and hatred towards one who has done good or evil to a thing we imagine to be like us, see the
Schol. of Prop. 22 of this Part.
- a nos miseret, benevolentia] transcr. nos miseret,benevolentia. Spacing (the transcription runs the words together).
- 1 Def. Aff. 35 refers back to this Scholium.
Propositio XXVIII
Proposition XXVIII
Id omne, quod ad laetitiam conducere imaginamur, conamur promovere, ut fiat; quod vero eidem repugnare sive ad tristitiam conducere imaginamur, amovere vel destruere conamur.
We strive to promote the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy; but whatever we imagine is opposed to it, or leads to sadness, we strive to remove or destroy.
Cited in 3P29D, 3P31C, 3P32D, 3P35D, 3P36D, 3P38D, 3P39D, 3P39S, 3P50S, 3P51S, 3P55S, 4P19D, 4P37S2, 5P19D
[G II 162] Demonstratio. Quod ad laetitiam conducere imaginamur, quantum possumus, imaginari conamur (per prop. 12. huius), hoc est (per prop. 17. P. 2.) id, quantum possumus, conabimur ut praesens sive ut actu existens contemplari. Sed mentis conatus seu potentia in cogitando aequalis, et simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu potentia in agendo (ut clare sequitur ex coroll. prop. 7. et coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.). Ergo ut id existat, absolute conamur, sive (quod per schol. prop. 9. huius idem est) appetimus et intendimus; quod erat primum. Deinde si id, quod tristitiae causam esse credimus, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) si id, quod odio habemus destrui imaginamur, laetabimur (per prop. 20. huius). Adeoque idem (per primam huius partem) conabimur destruere sive (per prop. 13. huius) a nobis amovere, ne ipsum ut praesens contemplemur; quod erat secundum. Ergo id omne, quod ad laetitiam etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. What we imagine leads to joy we strive, as far as we can, to imagine (by
Prop. 12 of this Part), that is (by
Prop. 17 of Part II), we shall strive, as far as we can, to contemplate it as present, or as actually existing. But the mind’s striving, or power in thinking, is equal to, and simultaneous in nature with, the body’s striving, or power in acting (as follows clearly from
Cor. of Prop. 7 and
Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II). Therefore we strive absolutely that it should exist, or (which by
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part is the same) we want it and aim at it; which was the first point. Next, if we imagine that what we believe to be the cause of sadness, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), what we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (by
Prop. 20 of this Part). And so (by the first part of this Demonstration) we shall strive to destroy it, or (by
Prop. 13 of this Part) to remove it from us, so that we do not contemplate it as present; which was the second point. Therefore whatever we imagine leads to joy, etc. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXIX
Proposition XXIX
Nos id omne etiam agere conabimur, quod homines
b cum laetitia
a aspicere imaginamur, et contra id agere aversabimur, quod homines aversari imaginamur.
We shall also strive to do whatever we imagine men to look on with joy,
1 and, on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men to be averse to.
- a quod homines cum laetitia] transcr. quod homines [NB. Intellige hic et in seqq. homines, quos nullo affectu prosecuti sumus] cum laetitia. The transcription runs Spinoza’s note on ‘homines’ into the text of the Proposition; in the 1677 edition (OP p. 118) it is a footnote, ‘N.B. Intellige hic, & in seqq. homines, quos nullo affectu prosequuti sumus’. It is given in a textual note.
- b Here the 1677 edition (OP p. 118) has a footnote: ‘N.B. Intellige hic, & in seqq. homines, quos nullo affectu prosequuti sumus’ (‘N.B. Understand here and in what follows men towards whom we have had no affect’). The Dutch version has, for nullo affectu, geen trek, noch afkeer (‘neither inclination nor aversion’; Textgestaltung II 371). The transcription prints the note in the text of the Proposition.
- 1 Spinoza’s own footnote to ‘men’ in the 1677 edition: ‘N.B. Understand here and in what follows men towards whom we have had no affect’ (see the textual note). The restriction is that of Prop. 27: the imitation of affects works independently of love and hatred, which can reverse it.
Demonstratio. Ex eo, quod imaginamur homines aliquid amare vel odio habere, nos idem amabimus vel odio habebimus (per prop. 27. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) eo ipso eius rei praesentia laetabimur vel contristabimur; adeoque (per praeced. prop.) id omne, quod homines amare sive cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur, conabimur agere etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. From the fact that we imagine men to love or hate something, we shall love or hate the same thing (by
Prop. 27 of this Part), that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), we shall thereby rejoice or be saddened at the presence of that thing; and so (by the
preceding Prop.) we shall strive to do whatever we imagine men to love, or to look on with joy, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Hic conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi, ea sola de causa, ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur
ambitio praesertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur, ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quaedam agamus vel omittamus; alias
humanitas appellari solet. Deinde laetitiam, qua alterius actionem, qua nos conatus est delectari, imaginamur,
laudem voco;
a tristitiam vero, qua contra eiusdem actionem aversamur,
vituperium voco.
Scholium. This striving to do something, and also to omit something, solely in order to please men, is called
ambition, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the multitude that we do or omit certain things to our own harm or another’s; otherwise it is usually called
courtesy.
1 Next, the joy with which we imagine an action of another by which he has striven to please us I call
praise; the sadness, on the other hand, with which we are averse to his action I call
blame.
- a imaginamur, laudem voco] transcr. imaginamur, l a u d e m voco. The transcription renders the emphasis by letter-spacing.
- 1 Humanitas, which the Definitions of the Affects identify with modestia, the desire to do what pleases men and to refrain from what displeases them (Def. Aff. 43); ambition is there the immoderate desire for glory (Def. Aff. 44).
Propositio XXX
Proposition XXX
[G II 163] Si quis aliquid egit, quod reliquos laetitia afficere imaginatur, is laetitia concomitante idea sui, tamquam causa, afficietur, sive se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit, quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur.
If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he imagines affects others with sadness, he will, on the contrary, contemplate himself with sadness.
Demonstratio. Qui se reliquos laetitia vel tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (per prop. 27. huius) laetitia vel tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (per prop. 19. et 23. P. 2.) sui sit conscius per affectiones, quibus ad agendum determinatur, ergo qui aliquid egit, quod ipse imaginatur, reliquos laetitia afficere, laetitia cum conscientia sui tamquam causa afficietur, sive se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur, et contra. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who imagines that he affects others with joy or sadness will thereby (by
Prop. 27 of this Part) be affected with joy or sadness. But since man (by
Props. 19 and
23 of Part II) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act, he who has done something which he imagines affects others with joy will be affected with joy together with the consciousness of himself as cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy; and the contrary. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Cum amor (per schol. prop. 13. huius) sit laetitia concomitante idea causae externae, et odium tristitia concomitante etiam idea causae externae, erit ergo haec laetitia et tristitia amoris et odii species. Sed quia amor et odium ad obiecta externa referuntur, ideo hos affectus aliis nominibus significabimus; nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae externae
gloriama et tristitiam huic contrariam
pudorem appellabimus; intellige, quando laetitia vel tristitia ex eo oritur, quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit. Alias laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae
c acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam
poenitentiamb vocabo. Deinde quia (per coroll. prop. 17. P. 2.) fieri potest, ut laetitia, qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit, et (per prop. 25. huius) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari, quod se laetitia afficere imaginatur, facile ergo fieri potest, ut gloriosus superbus sit, et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur, quando omnibus molestus est.
Scholium. Since love (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part) is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred sadness accompanied also by the idea of an external cause, this joy and sadness will be species of love and hatred. But because love and hatred are related to external objects, we shall signify these affects by other names: namely, joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause we shall call
glory, and the sadness contrary to it
shame, understand, when the joy or sadness arises from a man’s believing that he is praised or blamed. Otherwise, joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause I shall call
self-contentment,
1 and the sadness contrary to it
repentance. Next, because (by
Cor. of Prop. 17 of Part II) it can happen that the joy with which someone imagines that he affects others is only imaginary, and (by
Prop. 25 of this Part) each strives to imagine of himself whatever he imagines affects him with joy, it can easily happen that the vainglorious man is proud and imagines himself to be pleasing to all when he is a nuisance to all.
- a nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae externae gloriam] transcr. nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae gloriam. The 1677 edition (OP p. 119) and Gebhardt (G II 163; Textgestaltung II 371–372) read ‘causae externae’ here; Gebhardt corrects only the second ‘externae’ (of self-contentment) to ‘internae’. The transcription has ‘internae’ in both places.
- b acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam poenitentiam] transcr. acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam poenitentiam. Italics: only the names of the affects are emphasized.
- c The 1677 edition (OP p. 119) and the older editions and translations read causae externae here as well as in the preceding sentence; the Dutch version has van het denkbeelt van een innerlijke oorzaak verzelt. Gebhardt (G II 163; Textgestaltung II 371–372) corrects to internae, as Camerer had proposed, against Land, who kept externae and thought that if this were changed the preceding externae would have to be changed too; Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Leopold read internae, W. Meijer omits the word, and Lantzenberg keeps externae. The antithesis requires externae for glory and shame and internae for self-contentment and repentance.
- 1 Glory and shame are joy and sadness whose cause lies in the praise or blame of others, and so they are species of love and hatred. Self-contentment and repentance have their cause in oneself: the man contemplates himself and his own power of acting (Defs. Aff. 25–27). Gebhardt points to the later passage where Spinoza speaks of the affects ‘quos idea rei internae comitatur, tanquam causa’ (‘which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as cause’), before defining these affects (Def. Aff. 24, Expl.). Self-contentment that arises from reason is ‘the highest thing we can hope for’ (Part IV, Prop. 52, Schol.).
Propositio XXXI
Proposition XXXI
[G II 164] Si aliquem imaginamur amare vel cupere vel odio habere aliquid, quod ipsi amamus, cupimus vel odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id, quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur, vel contra,
a tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.
If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something which we ourselves love, desire or hate, we shall thereby love it, etc., more constantly. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the contrary, then we shall suffer fluctuation of mind.
- a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dat hy ’t geen bemint ’t welk wy haten’ (‘that he loves what we hate’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 164; Textgestaltung II 372).
Demonstratio. Ex eo solo, quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (per prop. 27. huius). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus.
a Accedit ergo amori nova causa, a qua fovetur; atque adeo id, quod amamus hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo, quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (per eandem prop.). At si supponamus, nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur sive (vide schol. prop. 17. huius) animi fluctuationem patiemur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone to love something, we shall thereby love the same thing (by
Prop. 27 of this Part). But we suppose that we love it without this. A new cause of love is therefore added, by which it is fostered; and so we shall thereby love what we love more constantly. Next, from the fact that we imagine someone to be averse to something, we shall be averse to it (by the same Proposition). But if we suppose that we love that very thing at the same time, we shall therefore at the same time love and be averse to it, or (see
Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part) we shall suffer fluctuation of mind. Q.E.D.
- a The list of errata of the 1677 edition (Sphalmata corrigenda, p. 120 l. 12) asks for supponimur (‘we are supposed to love it’); Bruder and Van Vloten–Land reject the correction, appealing to the Dutch wy onderstellen dat wy, and Baensch, Appuhn and Gebhardt (G II 164; Textgestaltung II 372) keep supponimus.
Corollarium. Hinc et ex prop. 28. huius sequitur, unumquemque, quantum potest, conari ut unusquisque id quod ipse amat amet, et quod ipse odit odio etiam habeat; unde illud poetae:
a Corollary. From this and from
Prop. 28 of this Part it follows that each strives, as far as he can, that everyone should love what he loves and hate what he hates; whence that line of the poet:
1 - a Ovidii amor. l. II. eleg. 19. v. 4., 5. [Bruder]
- 1 Ovid, Amores II.19.5 and 4, quoted in reverse order. The poet asks a careless husband to guard his wife, since what is permitted gives no pleasure: ‘Ferreus est, siquis, quod sinit alter, amat. / Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes’. Spinoza makes the lines illustrate the wish that others love what we love, though Ovid’s point is closer to that of Prop. 32.
Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
As lovers, let us hope alike and fear alike;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.
He is made of iron who loves what another allows.
Scholium. Hic conatus efficiendi, ut unusquisque probet id, quod ipse amat vel odio habet, revera est ambitio (vide schol. prop. 29. huius); atque adeo videmus, unumquemque ex natura appetere, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento, et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.
Scholium. This striving to bring it about that everyone should approve what one loves or hates is in truth
ambition (see
Schol. of Prop. 29 of this Part); and so we see that each by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament; and while all want this alike, they are alike an obstacle to one another, and while all want to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another.
Propositio XXXII
Proposition XXXII
[G II 165] Si aliquem re aliqua, qua unus solus potiri potest, gaudere imaginamur, conabimur efficere ne ille illa re potiatur.
If we imagine that someone enjoys some thing which only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it.
Demonstratio. Ex eo solo, quod aliquem re aliqua gaudere imaginamur, (per prop. 27. huius cum eiusdem coroll. 1.) rem illam amabimus, eaque gaudere cupiemus. At (per hypothesin) huic laetitiae obstare imaginamur, quod ille eadem hac re gaudeat. Ergo (per prop. 28. huius) ne ille eadem potiatur, conabimur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone to enjoy some thing (by
Prop. 27 of this Part with its
Cor. 1), we shall love that thing and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine that the fact that he enjoys this same thing stands in the way of this joy. Therefore (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) we shall strive that he should not possess it. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Videmus itaque cum hominum natura plerumque ita comparatum, esse ut eorum, quibus male est, misereantur, et quibus bene est, invideant, et (per prop. praeced.) eo maiore odio, quo rem, qua alium potiri imaginantur, magis amant. Videmus deinde, ex eadem naturae humanae proprietate, ex qua sequitur homines esse misericordes, sequi etiam eosdem esse invidos et ambitiosos. Denique si ipsam experientiam consulere velimus, ipsam haec omnia docere experiemur; praesertim si ad priores nostrae aetatis annos attenderimus. Nam pueros, quia eorum corpus continuo veluti in aequilibrio est, ex hoc solo ridere vel flere experimur, quod alios ridere vel flere vident; et quicquid praeterea vident alios facere, id imitari statim cupiunt, et omnia denique sibi cupiunt, quibus alios delectari imaginantur; nimirum quia rerum imagines, uti diximus, sunt ipsae humani corporis affectiones, sive modi, quibus corpus humanum a causis externis afficitur, disponiturque ad hoc vel illud agendum.
Scholium. We see, then, that the nature of men is generally so constituted that they pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well, and (by the
preceding Prop.) with a hatred the greater, the more they love the thing they imagine another to possess. We see, next, that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are compassionate, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious.
1 Finally, if we are willing to consult experience itself, we shall find that it teaches all these things, especially if we attend to the first years of our life. For we find that children, because their body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry; and whatever else they see others do, they immediately desire to imitate it; and finally they desire for themselves all the things in which they imagine others take delight; namely, because, as we have said, the images of things are the very affections of the human body, or modes by which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed to do this or that.
- 1 The same mechanism, the imitation of the affects (Prop. 27), produces pity and envy. Spinoza does not set a benevolent and a selfish part of human nature against each other; both follow from one property, which is why reason, not pity, must ground the help one gives others (Part IV, Prop. 50).
Propositio XXXIII
Proposition XXXIII
Cum rem nobis similem amamus, conamur, quantum possumus, efficere ut nos contra amet.
When we love a thing like us, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return.
Demonstratio. Rem, quam amamus, prae reliquis, quantum possumus, imaginari conamur (per prop. 12. huius). Si igitur res nobis sit similis, ipsam prae reliquis laetitia afficere conabimur (per prop. 29. huius), sive conabimur, quantum possumus, efficere, ut res amata laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ut nos contra amet. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We strive, as far as we can, to imagine a thing we love before others (by
Prop. 12 of this Part). If, therefore, the thing is like us, we shall strive to affect it with joy before others (by
Prop. 29 of this Part), or we shall strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that the thing loved is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), that it loves us in return. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXIV
Proposition XXXIV
[G II 166] Quo maiore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.
The greater the affect with which we imagine a thing we love to be affected towards us, the more we shall exult in glory.
Demonstratio. Nos (per prop. praeced.) conamur, quantum possumus, ut res amata nos contra amet hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ut res amata laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam maiore laetitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus iuvatur hoc est (per prop. 11. huius cum eius schol.) eo maiore laetitia afficimur. At cum ex eo laetemur, quod alium nobis similem laetitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum laetitia contemplamur (per prop. 30. huius). Ergo quo maiore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo maiore laetitia nosmet contemplabimur, sive (per schol. prop. 30. huius) eo magis gloriabimur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We strive (by the
preceding Prop.), as far as we can, that the thing loved should love us in return, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), that the thing loved should be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us. The greater, therefore, the joy with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the more this striving is aided, that is (by
Prop. 11 of this Part with its
Schol.), the greater the joy with which we are affected. But when we rejoice that we have affected with joy another like us, then we contemplate ourselves with joy (by
Prop. 30 of this Part). Therefore the greater the affect with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected towards us, the greater the joy with which we shall contemplate ourselves, or (by
Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part) the more we shall exult in glory. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXV
Proposition XXXV
Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo amicitiae, quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi iungere, odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur, et illi alteri invidebit.
If someone imagines that a thing he loves joins another to itself with the same bond of friendship, or a closer one, than that by which he alone possessed it, he will be affected with hatred towards the thing loved, and will envy that other.
Demonstratio. Quo quis maiore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (per praeced. prop.), hoc est (per schol. prop. 30. huius) laetabitur; adeoque (per prop. 28. huius) conabitur, quantum potest, imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam, qui quidem conatus sive appetitus fomentatur, si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (per prop. 31. huius). At hic conatus sive appetitus ab ipsius rei amatae imagine concomitante imagine illius, quem res amata sibi iungit, coerceri supponitur. Ergo (per schol. prop. 11. huius) eo ipso tristitia afficietur concomitante idea rei amatae, tamquam causa, et simul imagine alterius, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) odio erga rem amatam afficietur, et simul erga illum alterum (per coroll. prop. 15. huius), cui propterea (per prop. 23. huius) quod re amata delectatur, invidebit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The greater the love with which someone imagines the thing loved to be affected towards him, the more he will exult in glory (by the
preceding Prop.), that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part), the more he will rejoice; and so (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine the thing loved bound to him as closely as possible; and this striving, or appetite, is fostered if he imagines that another desires the same thing for himself (by
Prop. 31 of this Part). But this striving, or appetite, is supposed to be restrained by the image of the thing loved accompanied by the image of him whom the thing loved joins to itself. Therefore (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part) he will thereby be affected with sadness, accompanied by the idea of the thing loved as cause and at the same time by the image of the other, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), he will be affected with hatred towards the thing loved, and at the same time towards that other (by
Cor. of Prop. 15 of this Part), whom (by
Prop. 23 of this Part) he will envy because that other takes delight in the thing loved. Q.E.D.
[G II 167] Scholium. Hoc odium erga rem amatam invidiae iunctum zelotypia vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui invidetur. Praeterea hoc odium erga rem amatam maius erit pro ratione laetitiae, qua zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatae amore solebat affici, et etiam pro ratione affectus quo erga illum, quem sibi rem amatam iungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (per prop. 24. huius) odio habebit, quia ipsam id, quod ipse odio habet, laetitia afficere imaginatur; et etiam (per coroll. prop. 15. huius) ex eo, quod rei amatae imaginem imagini eius, quem odit, iungere cogitur, quae ratio plerumque locum habet in amore erga feminam. Qui enim imaginatur mulierem, quam amat, alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo, quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur, sed etiam quia rei amatae imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius iungere cogitur, eandem aversatur. Ad quod denique accedit, quod zelotypus non eodem vultu, quem res amata ei praebere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut iam ostendam.
Scholium. This hatred towards a thing loved, joined with envy, is called
jealousy,
1 which is therefore nothing but a fluctuation of mind arising from love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of another who is envied. Moreover, this hatred towards the thing loved will be greater in proportion to the joy with which the jealous man used to be affected by the reciprocal love of the thing loved, and also in proportion to the affect with which he was affected towards him whom he imagines the thing loved to join to itself. For if he hated him, he will thereby hate the thing loved (by
Prop. 24 of this Part), because he imagines that it affects with joy what he himself hates; and also (by
Cor. of Prop. 15 of this Part) from the fact that he is compelled to join the image of the thing loved to the image of him whom he hates; which reason generally has place in love towards a woman. For he who imagines that the woman he loves gives herself to another will not only be saddened because his own appetite is restrained, but will also be averse to her because he is compelled to join the image of the thing loved to the private parts and excretions of the other. To which, finally, is added that the jealous man is not received by the thing loved with the same countenance that it used to show him; for this reason also the lover is saddened, as I shall now show.
- 1 A fluctuation of mind (Prop. 17, Schol.). The Definitions of the Affects pass over jealousy and the other fluctuations, since they are compounds of affects already defined (Def. Aff. 48, Expl.).
Propositio XXXVI
Proposition XXXVI
Qui rei, qua semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est.
He who recollects a thing in which he once took delight desires to possess it with the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it.
Demonstratio. Quicquid homo simul cum re, quae ipsum delectavit, vidit, id omne (per prop. 15. huius) erit per accidens laetitiae causa; adeoque (per prop. 28. huius) omni eo simul cum re, quae ipsum delectavit, potiri cupiet, sive re cum omnibus iisdem circumstantiis potiri cupiet, ac cum primo eadem delectatus est. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Whatever a man has seen together with the thing that delighted him will (by
Prop. 15 of this Part) be accidentally a cause of joy; and so (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) he will desire to possess all of it together with the thing that delighted him, or he will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it. Q.E.D.
[G II 168] Corollarium. Si itaque unam ex iis circumstantiis deficere compererit, amans contristabitur.
Corollary. If, therefore, he finds that one of those circumstances is lacking, the lover will be saddened.
Demonstratio. Nam quatenus aliquam circumstantiam deficere comperit, eatenus aliquid imaginatur, quod eius rei existentiam secludit. Cum autem eius rei sive circumstantiae (per prop. praeced.) sit prae amore cupidus, ergo (per prop. 19. huius) quatenus eandem deficere imaginatur, contristabitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For insofar as he finds that some circumstance is lacking, he imagines something which excludes the existence of that thing. But since (by the
preceding Prop.) he desires that thing, or circumstance, from love, he will therefore (by
Prop. 19 of this Part) be saddened insofar as he imagines it to be lacking. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec tristitia, quatenus absentiam eius, quod amamus, respicit, desiderium vocatur.
Scholium. This sadness, insofar as it concerns the absence of what we love, is called
longing.
1 - 1 Desiderium. Def. Aff. 32 defines it as a desire, fostered by the memory of the thing and restrained by the memory of other things that exclude its existence; the Explanation adds that longing ‘is in truth a sadness’, but is classed with the desires because its name seems to refer to desire.
Propositio XXXVII
Proposition XXXVII
Cupiditas, quae prae tristitia vel laetitia praeque odio vel amore oritur, eo est maior, quo affectus maior est.
The desire which arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is the greater, the greater the affect is.
Demonstratio. Tristitia hominis agendi potentiam (per schol. prop. 11. huius) minuit vel coercet, hoc est (per prop. 7. huius) conatum quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, minuit vel coercet; adeoque (per prop. 5. huius) huic conatui est contraria; et quicquid homo tristitia affectus conatur, est tristitiam amovere. At (per tristitiae defin.) quo tristitia maior est, eo maiori parti hominis agendi potentiae necesse est opponi. Ergo quo maior tristitia est, eo maiore agendi potentia conabitur homo contra tristitiam amovere, hoc est (per schol. prop. 9. huius) eo maiore cupiditate sive appetitu conabitur tristitiam amovere. Deinde quoniam laetitia (per idem schol. prop. 11. huius) hominis agendi potentiam auget vel iuvat, facile eadem via demonstratur, quod homo laetitia affectus nihil aliud cupit, quam eandem conservare, idque eo maiore cupiditate quo laetitia maior erit. Denique quoniam odium et amor sunt ipsi tristitiae vel laetitiae affectus,
a sequitur eodem modo, quod conatus, appetitus sive cupiditas, quae prae odio vel amore oritur, maior erit pro ratione odii et amoris. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Sadness diminishes or restrains a man’s power of acting (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), that is (by
Prop. 7 of this Part), it diminishes or restrains the striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being; and so (by
Prop. 5 of this Part) it is contrary to this striving; and whatever a man affected with sadness strives for is to remove the sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater the sadness is, the greater the part of the man’s power of acting to which it is necessarily opposed. Therefore the greater the sadness is, the greater the power of acting with which the man will strive, on the other hand, to remove the sadness, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part), the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the sadness. Next, since joy (by the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part) increases or aids a man’s power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that a man affected with joy desires nothing but to preserve it, and that with a desire the greater, the greater the joy will be. Finally, since hatred and love are themselves affects of sadness or joy, it follows in the same way that the striving, appetite or desire which arises from hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the hatred and love. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 125) has Laetitiae, vel Tristitiae affectus; the Dutch version has hartstochten van droefheit en blijschap. Gebhardt (G II 169; Textgestaltung II 372) transposes to match odium et amor, as W. Meijer and Baensch had asked in their second editions and Appuhn does.
Propositio XXXVIII
Proposition XXXVIII
[G II 169] Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit, ita ut amor plane aboleatur, eandem maiore odio ex pari causa prosequetur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset, et eo maiore, quo amor antea maior fuerat.
If someone begins to hate a thing he loved, so that the love is completely destroyed, he will, from an equal cause, hate it with a greater hatred than if he had never loved it, and with a hatred the greater, the greater the love had been before.
Demonstratio. Nam si quis rem, quam amat, odio habere incipit, plures eius appetitus coercentur, quam si eandem non amavisset. Amor namque laetitia est (per schol. prop. 13. huius), quam homo, quantum potest (per prop. 28. huius) conservare conatur; idque (per idem schol.) rem amatam ut praesentem contemplando, eandemque (per prop. 21. huius) laetitia, quantum potest, afficiendo, qui quidem conatus (per prop. praeced.) eo est maior, quo amor maior est, ut et conatus efficiendi, ut res amata ipsum contra amet (vide prop. 33. huius). At hi conatus odio erga rem amatam coercentur (per coroll. prop. 13. et per prop. 23. huius). Ergo amans (per schol. prop. 11. huius) hac etiam de causa tristitia afficietur, et eo maiore quo amor maior fuerat, hoc est, praeter tristitiam, quae odii fuit causa, alia ex eo oritur quod rem amavit, et consequenter maiore tristitiae affectu rem amatam contemplabitur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) maiore odio prosequetur, quam si eandem non amavisset, et eo maiore, quo amor maior fuerat. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For if someone begins to hate a thing he loves, more of his appetites are restrained than if he had not loved it. For love is a joy (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), which a man strives to preserve as far as he can (by
Prop. 28 of this Part); and that (by the same Scholium) by contemplating the thing loved as present, and (by
Prop. 21 of this Part) by affecting it with joy as far as he can; and this striving (by the
preceding Prop.) is the greater, the greater the love is, as is also the striving to bring it about that the thing loved loves him in return (see
Prop. 33 of this Part). But these strivings are restrained by hatred towards the thing loved (by
Cor. of Prop. 13 and by
Prop. 23 of this Part). Therefore the lover (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part) will for this reason also be affected with sadness, and the more so, the greater the love had been; that is, besides the sadness which was the cause of the hatred, another arises from the fact that he loved the thing; and consequently he will contemplate the thing loved with a greater affect of sadness, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), he will hate it with a greater hatred than if he had not loved it, and with a hatred the greater, the greater the love had been. Q.E.D.
Propositio XXXIX
Proposition XXXIX
Qui aliquem odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur, nisi ex eo maius sibi malum oriri timeat; et contra, qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.
He who hates someone will strive to do him evil, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from it; and, on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive, by the same law, to do him good.
[G II 170] Demonstratio. Aliquem odio habere est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) aliquem ut tristitiae causam imaginari; adeoque (per prop. 28. huius) is, qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius sive (quod idem est) maius malum sibi timeat, idque se vitare posse credit non inferendo ei, quem odit, malum quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (per eandem prop. 28. huius) abstinere cupiet; idque (per prop. 37. huius) maiore conatu, quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea praevalebit, ut volebamus. Secundae partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit. Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. To hate someone is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part) to imagine someone as a cause of sadness; and so (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) he who hates someone will strive to remove or destroy him. But if he fears from this something sadder, or (which is the same) a greater evil to himself, and believes that he can avoid it by not inflicting on the one he hates the evil he was planning, he will desire (by the same Prop. 28 of this Part) to abstain from inflicting the evil; and that (by
Prop. 37 of this Part) with a greater striving than that by which he was held to inflict the evil, which will therefore prevail, as we maintained. The demonstration of the second part proceeds in the same way. Therefore he who hates someone, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Per bonum hic intelligo omne genus laetitiae et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit, et praecipue id, quod desiderio qualecumque illud sit, satisfacit; per malum autem omne tristitiae genus et praecipue id, quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in schol. prop. 9. huius) ostendimus, nos nihil cupere, quia id bonum esse iudicamus, sed contra id bonum vocamus, quod cupimus; et consequenter id, quod aversamur malum appellamus. Quare unusquisque ex suo affectu iudicat seu aestimat, quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid peius et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit. Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, eius autem inopiam pessimum iudicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil aeque ac gloriam cupit, et contra nihil aeque ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil iucundius, quam alterius infelicitas, et nihil molestius, quam aliena felicitas; ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse iudicat.
Scholium. By
good I understand here every kind of joy,
1 and whatever, further, leads to it, and especially what satisfies a longing, whatever it may be; by
evil, every kind of sadness, and especially what frustrates a longing. For we have shown above (in
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary call good what we desire; and consequently what we are averse to we call evil. So each judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better, what worse, and finally what best or what worst. So the greedy man judges an abundance of money best and its lack worst. The ambitious man, again, desires nothing so much as glory, and on the other hand fears nothing so much as shame. To the envious man, next, nothing is more pleasant than another’s unhappiness, and nothing more troublesome than another’s happiness; and so each, from his own affect, judges a thing good or evil, useful or useless.
- 1 The definition is relative to the affects, and so to each man’s temperament, as the examples show. Part IV will define good and evil from the standpoint of reason: good is ‘what we certainly know to be useful to us’ (Part IV, Def. 1), and the Preface to Part IV explains that good and evil indicate nothing positive in things but are modes of thinking, notions formed by comparing things with one another and with a model of human nature (Preface to Part IV).
Ceterum hic affectus, quo homo ita disponitur, ut id quod vult nolit, vel ut id quod non vult velit, timor vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum, quod futurum iudicat, minore vitandum. Vide prop. 28. huius. Sed si malum, quod timet, pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali, ita ut quid potius velit nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio praecipue si utrumque malum, quod timetur, ex maximis sit.
But this affect by which a man is so disposed that he does not will what he wills, or wills what he does not will, is called
timidity,
2 which is therefore nothing but fear insofar as a man is disposed by it to avoid an evil which he judges to be future by a lesser one. See
Prop. 28 of this Part. But if the evil he fears is shame, then the timidity is called shamefacedness. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is restrained by timidity regarding another evil, so that he does not know which he would rather will, then the fear is called
consternation, especially if both of the evils feared are among the greatest.
- 2 Timor, distinguished from metus (fear); see Def. Aff. 39. On shamefacedness (verecundia), the fear of shame, see Def. Aff. 31, Expl.; on consternation, which the Definitions derive differently, from wonder at the evil feared, Def. Aff. 42 and its Explanation.
Propositio XL
Proposition XL
[G II 171] Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit.
He who imagines that he is hated by someone, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate him in return.
Demonstratio. Qui aliquem odio affectum imaginatur, eo ipso etiam odio afficietur (per prop. 27. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) tristitia concomitante idea causae externae. At ipse (per hypothesin) nullam huius tristitiae causam imaginatur praeter illum, qui ipsum odio habet. Ergo ex hoc, quod se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, tristitia afficietur concomitante idea eius, qui ipsum odio habet, sive (per idem schol.) eundem odio habebit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who imagines someone to be affected with hatred will thereby also be affected with hatred (by
Prop. 27 of this Part), that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part), with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But he himself (by hypothesis) imagines no cause of this sadness except the one who hates him. Therefore from the fact that he imagines that he is hated by someone, he will be affected with sadness accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him, or (by the same Scholium) he will hate him. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Quod si se iustam odii causam praebuisse imaginatur, tum (per prop. 30. huius et eiusdem schol.) pudore afficietur. Sed hoc (per prop. 25. huius) raro contingit. Praeterea haec odii reciprocatio oriri etiam potest ex eo, quod odium sequatur conatus malum inferendi ei, qui odio habetur (per prop. 39. huius). Qui igitur se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, eundem alicuius mali sive tristitiae causam imaginabitur; atque adeo tristitia afficietur, seu metu concomitante idea eius, qui ipsum odio habet, tamquam causa, hoc est, odio contra afficietur, ut supra.
Scholium. But if he imagines that he has given just cause for the hatred, then (by
Prop. 30 of this Part and
its Scholium) he will be affected with shame. But this (by
Prop. 25 of this Part) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred is followed by a striving to inflict evil on the one who is hated (by
Prop. 39 of this Part). He, therefore, who imagines that he is hated by someone will imagine him as the cause of some evil, or sadness; and so he will be affected with sadness, or fear, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him as cause; that is, he will be affected with hatred in return, as above.
Corollarium I. Qui, quem amat, odio erga se affectum imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Nam quatenus imaginatur, ab eodem se odio haberi, determinatur (per prop. praeced.) ad eundem contra odio habendum. At (per hypothesin) ipsum nihilominus amat. Ergo odio et amore simul conflictabitur.
Corollary I. He who imagines that one he loves is affected with hatred towards him will be torn by hatred and love together. For insofar as he imagines that he is hated by him, he is determined (by the
preceding Prop.) to hate him in return. But (by hypothesis) he nevertheless loves him. Therefore he will be torn by hatred and love together.
[G II 172] Corollarium II. Si aliquis imaginatur, ab aliquo, quem antea nullo affectu prosecutus est, malum aliquod prae odio sibi illatum esse, statim idem malum eidem referre conabitur.
Corollary II. If someone imagines that some evil has been done to him from hatred by someone towards whom he previously had no affect, he will immediately strive to return the same evil to him.
Demonstratio. Qui aliquem odio erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eum contra (per praeced. prop.) odio habebit et (per prop. 26. huius) id omne comminisci conabitur, quod eundem possit tristitia afficere; atque id eidem (per prop. 39. huius) inferre studebit. At (per hypothesin) primum, quod huiusmodi imaginatur, est malum sibi illatum. Ergo idem statim eidem inferre conabitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who imagines someone to be affected with hatred towards him will hate him in return (by the
preceding Prop.), and (by
Prop. 26 of this Part) will strive to think up everything which can affect him with sadness, and will be eager (by
Prop. 39 of this Part) to inflict it on him. But (by hypothesis) the first thing of this kind that he imagines is the evil done to himself. Therefore he will immediately strive to inflict the same on him. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Conatus malum inferendi ei, quem odimus, ira vocatur; conatus autem malum nobis illatum referendi vindicta appellatur.
Scholium. The striving to inflict evil on one we hate is called anger; but the striving to return an evil done to us is called vengeance.
Propositio XLI
Proposition XLI
Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur, nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit (quod per coroll. prop. 15. et per prop. 16. huius fieri potest), eundem contra amabit.
If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe that he has given any cause for it (which can happen by
Cor. of Prop. 15 and by
Prop. 16 of this Part), he will love him in return.
Demonstratio. Haec propositio eadem via demonstratur ac praeced., cuius etiam schol. vide.
Scholium. Quod si se iustam amoris causam praebuisse crediderit, gloriabitur (per prop. 30. huius cum eiusdem schol.); quod quidem (per prop. 25. huius) frequentius contingit, et cuius contrarium evenire diximus, quando aliquis ab aliquo se odio haberi imaginatur (vide schol. prop. praeced.). Porro hic reciprocus amor, et consequenter (per prop. 39. huius) conatus benefaciendi ei, qui nos amat, quique (per eandem prop. 39. huius) nobis benefacere conatur, gratia seu gratitudo vocatur. Atque adeo apparet, homines longe paratiores esse ad vindictam, quam ad referendum beneficium.
Scholium. But if he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will exult in glory (by
Prop. 30 of this Part with
its Scholium); which indeed (by
Prop. 25 of this Part) happens more frequently, and the contrary of which, we said, happens when someone imagines that he is hated by someone (see the
Schol. of the preceding Prop.). Further, this reciprocal love, and consequently (by
Prop. 39 of this Part) the striving to do good to one who loves us, and who (by the same Prop. 39 of this Part) strives to do good to us, is called
thankfulness, or
gratitude. And so it is evident that men are far readier for vengeance than for returning a benefit.
[G II 173] Corollarium. Qui ab eo, quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Quod eadem via, qua primum propositionis praecedentis coroll.
b demonstratur.
a Corollary. He who imagines that he is loved by one he hates will be torn by hatred and love together. This is demonstrated in the same way as the first
Corollary of the preceding Proposition.
- a qua primum propositionis praecedentis coroll. demonstratur] transcr. qua coroll. 1. prop. praeced. demonstratur. Wording as in Gebhardt (G II 173), who adds ‘Propositionis’ to the 1677 edition’s ‘primum praecedentis Coroll.’ (OP p. 129); the transcription abbreviates and reorders.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 129) has primum praecedentis Coroll., the Dutch version d’eerste Toegift van de voorgaande Voorstelling. Gebhardt (G II 173; Textgestaltung II 372) adds Propositionis, as Baensch and W. Meijer had proposed.
Scholium. Quod si odium praevaluerit, ei, a quo amatur, malum inferre conabitur, qui quidem affectus crudelitas appellatur, praecipue si illum, qui amat, nullam odii communem causam praebuisse creditur.
Scholium. But if hatred prevails, he will strive to inflict evil on the one by whom he is loved; and this affect is called cruelty, especially if it is believed that the one who loves has given no common cause for hatred.
Propositio XLII
Proposition XLII
Qui in aliquem amore aut spe gloriae motus beneficium contulit, contristabitur, si viderit, beneficium ingrato animo accipi.
He who has conferred a benefit on someone, moved by love or by hope of glory, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with an ungrateful spirit.
Demonstratio. Qui rem aliquam sibi similem amat, conatur, quantum potest, efficere ut ab ipsa contra ametur (per prop. 33. huius). Qui igitur prae amore in aliquem beneficium contulit, id facit desiderio,
a quo tenetur, ut contra ametur, hoc est (per prop. 34. huius) spe gloriae sive (per schol. prop. 30. huius) laetitiae; adeoque (per prop. 12. huius) hanc gloriae causam, quantum potest, imaginari, sive ut actu existentem contemplari conabitur. At (per hypothesin) aliud imaginatur, quod eiusdem causae existentiam secludit. Ergo (per prop. 19. huius) eo ipso contristabitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who loves a thing like himself strives, as far as he can, to bring it about that he is loved by it in return (by
Prop. 33 of this Part). He, therefore, who has conferred a benefit on someone from love does it from the longing by which he is held, to be loved in return, that is (by
Prop. 34 of this Part), from hope of glory, or (by
Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part) of joy; and so (by
Prop. 12 of this Part) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine this cause of glory, or to contemplate it as actually existing. But (by hypothesis) he imagines something else which excludes the existence of this cause. Therefore (by
Prop. 19 of this Part) he will thereby be saddened. Q.E.D.
- a Baensch, and W. Meijer in his second edition, would correct facit to fecit for the sequence of tenses, and Appuhn writes fecit. Gebhardt (G II 173; Textgestaltung II 372–373) keeps facit: conferring the benefit is a single act, in the perfect, the longing a lasting motive; the Dutch has De geen, die … weldaat bewijst, doet zulks.
Propositio XLIII
Proposition XLIII
Odium reciproco odio augetur, et amore contra deleri potest.
Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love.
1- 1 The ground of the rule of life of Part IV, Prop. 46: one who lives by the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay another’s hatred, anger and contempt towards him with love, or nobility. Its Scholium adds that he who wishes to avenge injuries by reciprocal hatred lives miserably.
Demonstratio. Qui eum, quem odit, odio contra erga se
a affectum esse imaginatur, eo ipso (per prop. 40. huius) novum odium oritur durante (per hypothesin) adhuc primo. Sed si contra eundem amore erga se affectum esse imaginetur, quatenus hoc imaginatur, eatenus (per prop. 30. huius) se ipsum cum laetitia contemplatur, et eatenus (per prop. 29. huius) eidem placere conabitur, hoc est (per prop. 41. huius)
b eatenus conatur ipsum odio non habere nullaque tristitia afficere; qui quidem conatus (per prop. 37. huius) maior vel minor erit pro ratione affectus, ex quo oritur. Atque adeo si maior fuerit illo, qui ex odio oritur, et quo rem, quam odit (per prop. 26. huius) tristitia afficere conatur, ei praevalebit, et odium ex animo delebit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. He who imagines that the one he hates is affected with hatred towards him in return thereby (by
Prop. 40 of this Part) has a new hatred arise, while (by hypothesis) the first still lasts. But if, on the other hand, he imagines that the same person is affected with love towards him, then insofar as he imagines this, he contemplates himself with joy (by
Prop. 30 of this Part), and to that extent (by
Prop. 29 of this Part) he will strive to please him, that is (by
Prop. 41 of this Part), to that extent he strives not to hate him and to affect him with no sadness; and this striving (by
Prop. 37 of this Part) will be greater or less in proportion to the affect from which it arises. And so, if it is greater than that which arises from hatred, and by which he strives (by
Prop. 26 of this Part) to affect the thing he hates with sadness, it will prevail over it and destroy the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.
- a quem odit, odio contra erga se] transcr. quem odit, contra odio erga se. Word order as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 129) and Gebhardt (G II 173), ‘Odio contrà’.
- b The 1677 edition (OP p. 130) and the older editions have Prop. 40.; Valentin Schmidt and Auerbach correct to 41., followed by Van Vloten–Land, and Gebhardt (G II 174; Textgestaltung II 373) prints 41.
Propositio XLIV
Proposition XLIV
[G II 174] Odium, quod amore plane vincitur, in amorem transit; et amor propterea maior est, quam si odium non praecessisset.
Hatred which is completely conquered by love passes into love; and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it.
Demonstratio. Eodem modo procedit, ac prop. 38. huius. Nam qui rem, quam odit, sive quam cum tristitia contemplari solebat, amare incipit, eo ipso, quod amat, laetatur et huic laetitiae, quam amor involvit (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 13. huius), illa etiam accedit, quae ex eo oritur, quod conatus amovendi tristitiam, quam odium involvit
a (ut in prop. 37. huius ostendimus), prorsus iuvatur, concomitante idea eius, quem odio habuit, tamquam causa.
Demonstration. It proceeds in the same way as
Prop. 38 of this Part. For he who begins to love a thing he hates, or which he used to contemplate with sadness, rejoices from the very fact that he loves; and to this joy which love involves (see its definition in the
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part) there is also added the joy which arises from the fact that the striving to remove the sadness which hatred involves (as we have shown in
Prop. 37 of this Part) is entirely aided, accompanied by the idea of the one he hated as cause.
- a Baensch, followed by Appuhn, would read quem (the striving which hatred involves) for quam, since Prop. 37 does not show that hatred involves sadness. Gebhardt (G II 174; Textgestaltung II 373), with Halpern, keeps quam, which parallels laetitiae, quam amor involvit in the same sentence.
Scholium. Quamvis res ita se habeat, nemo tamen conabitur rem aliquam odio habere vel tristitia affici, ut maiore hac laetitia fruatur; hoc est, nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet, nec aegrotare desiderabit spe convalescendi. Nam unusquisque suum esse conservare et tristitiam, quantum potest, amovere semper conabitur. Quod si contra concipi posset, hominem posse cupere aliquem odio habere, ut eum postea maiore amore prosequatur, tum eundem odio habere semper desiderabit. Nam quo odium maius fuerit, eo amor erit maior, atque adeo desiderabit semper, ut odium magis magisque augeatur, et eadem de causa homo magis ac magis aegrotare conabitur, ut maiore laetitia ex restauranda valetudine postea fruatur; atque adeo semper aegrotare conabitur, quod (per prop. 6. huius) est absurdum.
Scholium. Although this is so, no one will strive to hate a thing, or to be affected with sadness, in order to enjoy this greater joy; that is, no one will desire to suffer harm in the hope of recovering from it, nor long to be ill in the hope of getting well. For each will always strive to preserve his being and to remove sadness as far as he can. But if, on the contrary, it could be conceived that a man could desire to hate someone in order to love him the more afterwards, then he would always desire to hate him. For the greater the hatred had been, the greater the love will be; and so he would always desire that the hatred should be increased more and more; and for the same reason a man would strive to be more and more ill, in order to enjoy a greater joy afterwards from the restoring of his health; and so he would always strive to be ill, which (by
Prop. 6 of this Part) is absurd.
Propositio XLV
Proposition XLV
[G II 175] Si quis aliquem sibi similem odio in rem sibi similem, quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.
If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred towards a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate him.
Demonstratio. Nam res amata eum, qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (per prop. 40. huius). Adeoque amans, qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam odio, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) tristitia affectam esse imaginatur, et consequenter (per prop. 21. huius) contristatur, idque concomitante idea eius, qui rem amatam odit, tamquam causa, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ipsum odio habebit. Q. E. D.
Propositio XLVI
Proposition XLVI
Si quis ab aliquo cuiusdam classis,
a sive nationis a sua diversae, laetitia vel tristitia affectus fuerit, concomitante eius idea sub nomine universali classis vel nationis tamquam causa, is non tantum illum, sed omnes eiusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.
If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, accompanied by the idea of him under the universal name of the class or nation as cause, he will love or hate not only him, but all of the same class or nation.
1- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 131) has cujusdem classis in the text; its list of errata, citing the word as cujusdam, asks for ejusdem, and the Dutch version has van een zelfde stant. Land rightly asks for cujusdam, since a sua diversae must also refer to classis; Gebhardt (G II 175; Textgestaltung II 373) prints it. Paulus, who overlooked the errata, had cujusdam; the other editions ejusdem.
- 1 An account of prejudice against groups, derived from the association of affects (Prop. 16) and from the universal notions the imagination forms when it can no longer keep individuals apart (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1). The Theological-Political Treatise describes the hatred between the Hebrews and other nations in these terms: the Jews ‘se ab omnibus nationibus ita separaverunt, ut omnium odium in se converterint’ (‘so separated themselves from all nations that they turned the hatred of all upon themselves’, ch. 3), and the Hebrews’ love of their country was joined with a hatred of other nations fostered by daily worship (ch. 17).
Demonstratio. Huius rei demonstratio patet ex prop. 16. huius partis.
Propositio XLVII
Proposition XLVII
Laetitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod scilicet rem, quam odimus, destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia.
The joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed or affected with some other evil does not arise without some sadness of mind.
Demonstratio. Patet ex prop. 27. huius. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem tristitia affici imaginamur, eatenus contristamur.
Demonstration. This is evident from
Prop. 27 of this Part. For insofar as we imagine a thing like us to be affected with sadness, we are saddened.
Scholium. Potest haec propositio etiam demonstrari ex coroll. prop. 17. P. 2. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut praesentem contemplamur,
a corpusque eodem modo afficitur. Quare quatenus rei memoria viget, eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quae determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine, coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum, quae huius existentiam secludunt, sed non tollitur. Atque adeo homo eatenus tantum laetatur, quatenus haec determinatio coercetur; et hinc fit, ut haec laetitia, quae ex rei, quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur, quoties eiusdem rei recordamur. Nam, uti diximus, quando eiusdem rei imago excitatur, quia haec ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum, qua eandem contemplari solebat, cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia eiusdem rei imagini alias iunxit, quae eiusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo haec ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur, et homo de novo laetatur, et hoc toties, quoties haec repetitio fit. Atque haec eadem est causa, cur homines laetantur, quoties alicuius iam praeteriti mali recordantur, et cur pericula, a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur, et ad id metuendum determinantur, quae determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis, quam huius periculi ideae iunxerunt, cum ab eodem liberati sunt, quaeque eos de novo securos reddit; atque adeo de novo laetantur.
Scholium. This Proposition can also be demonstrated from the
Cor. of Prop. 17 of Part II. For whenever we recollect a thing, even though it does not actually exist, we nevertheless contemplate it as present, and the body is affected in the same way. So insofar as the memory of the thing is vivid, the man is determined to contemplate it with sadness; and this determination, while the image of the thing still remains, is indeed restrained by the memory of those things which exclude its existence, but is not taken away. And so the man rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained; and hence it comes about that this joy which arises from the evil of the thing we hate is repeated as often as we recollect that thing. For, as we have said, when the image of that thing is aroused, because it involves the existence of the thing itself, it determines the man to contemplate the thing with the same sadness with which he used to contemplate it when it existed. But because he has joined to the image of the thing other images which exclude its existence, this determination to sadness is immediately restrained, and the man rejoices anew; and this as often as the repetition occurs. And this is the same cause why men rejoice whenever they recollect some evil already past, and why they enjoy telling of the dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine some danger, they contemplate it as if still future, and are determined to fear it; and this determination is restrained anew by the idea of freedom which they joined to the idea of this danger when they were freed from it, and which makes them confident anew; and so they rejoice anew.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 132) has eandem tantùm; the Dutch version has zo aanschouwen wy echter de zelfde als tegenwoordig. Gebhardt (G II 176; Textgestaltung II 373) reads tamen, as Leopold proposed, followed by Baensch, W. Meijer, Appuhn and Halpern.
Propositio XLVIII
Proposition XLVIII
[G II 176] Amor et odium ex. gr. erga Petrum destruitur, si tristitia, quam hoc, et laetitia, quam ille involvit, ideae alterius causae iungatur; et eatenus uterque diminuitur, quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam.
Love and hatred, for example towards Peter, are destroyed if the sadness which the latter involves, and the joy which the former involves, are joined to the idea of another cause; and each is diminished insofar as we imagine that Peter was not the only cause of either.
Demonstratio. Patet ex sola amoris et odii definitione, quam vide in schol. prop. 13. huius. Nam propter hoc solum laetitia vocatur amor, et tristitia odium erga Petrum, quia scilicet Petrus huius vel illius affectus causa
a esse consideratur. Hoc itaque prorsus vel ex parte sublato affectus quoque erga Petrum prorsus vel ex parte diminuitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred, which see in the
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part. For joy is called love, and sadness hatred, towards Peter only because Peter is considered to be the cause of this or that affect. So when this is taken away, entirely or in part, the affect towards Peter is also diminished, entirely or in part. Q.E.D.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 132) has effectûs; the Dutch version has d’oorzaak van deze, of die hartstocht (Affectus). Gebhardt (G II 176; Textgestaltung II 373) corrects to affectûs, as Stern had conjectured, followed by Leopold, Baensch, Lantzenberg and Appuhn.
Propositio XLIX
Proposition XLIX
[G II 177] Amor et odium erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, maior ex pari causa uterque debet esse, quam erga necessariam.
Love and hatred towards a thing we imagine to be free must both, from an equal cause, be greater than towards a necessary thing.
1- 1 The belief in freedom intensifies the affects; the knowledge of necessity moderates them. Part V makes this a remedy: the affect towards a thing we imagine simply, not as necessary, possible or contingent, is the greatest (Part V, Prop. 5), and insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects (Part V, Prop. 6).
Demonstratio. Res, quam liberam esse imaginamur, debet (per defin. 7. P. 1.) per se absque aliis percipi. Si igitur eandem laetitiae vel tristitiae causam esse imaginemur, eo ipso (per schol. prop. 13. huius) eandem amabimus vel odio habebimus, idque (per prop. praeced.) summo amore vel odio, qui ex dato affectu oriri potest. Sed si rem, quae eiusdem affectus est causa, ut necessariam imaginemur, tum (per eandem defin. 7. P. 1.) ipsam non solam, sed cum aliis eiusdem affectus causam esse imaginabimur; atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) amor et odium erga ipsam minor erit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A thing which we imagine to be free must (by
Def. 7 of Part I) be perceived through itself without others. If, therefore, we imagine it to be the cause of joy or sadness, we shall thereby (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part) love or hate it, and that (by the
preceding Prop.) with the greatest love or hatred which can arise from the given affect. But if we imagine the thing which is the cause of this affect as necessary, then (by the same Def. 7 of Part I) we shall imagine it to be the cause of this affect not alone but with others; and so (by the preceding Prop.) love and hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Hinc sequitur homines, quia se liberos esse existimant, maiore amore vel odio se invicem prosequi, quam alia; ad quod accedit affectuum imitatio, de qua vide prop. 27., 34., 40. et 43. huius.
Scholium. From this it follows that men, because they think themselves free, pursue one another with greater love or hatred than they do other things; to which is added the imitation of the affects, on which see
Props. 27,
34,
40 and
43 of this Part.
Propositio L
Proposition L
Res quaecumque potest esse per accidens spei aut metus causa.
Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of hope or fear.
Demonstratio. Haec propositio eadem via demonstratur, qua prop. 15. huius, quam vide una cum schol. prop. 18. huius.
ab - a quam vide una cum schol. prop. 18. huius] transcr. quam vide una cum schol. 2. prop. 18. huius. The 1677 edition (OP p. 133) has ‘Schol. Propositionis 18.’ without a number; ‘2.’ is Leopold’s correction, which Gebhardt’s Textgestaltung (II 373–374) rejects.
- b So the 1677 edition (OP p. 133). Leopold reads Schol. 2., followed by Baensch, W. Meijer, Appuhn and Halpern, and the transcription follows them. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 373–374) rejects the correction: the reference is to the two scholia of Prop. 18, originally one (see the note on Prop. 18, Schol. 1), since the mere definition of hope and fear in the second does not ground Prop. 50 without the account of wavering in the first; the abbreviation should be read as plural. (The scan of Gebhardt’s text used here reads Schol. 2. at G II 177.)
Scholium. Res, quae per accidens spei aut metus sunt causae, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus haec eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa, eatenus (per defin. spei et metus, quam vide in schol. 2. prop. 18. huius) laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt causa, et consequenter (per coroll. prop. 15. huius) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus, et (per prop. 28. huius) tamquam media ad ea, quae speramus, adhibere, vel tamquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. Praeterea ex prop. 25. huius sequitur, nos natura ita esse constitutos, ut ea quae speramus facile, quae autem timemus, difficile credamus, et ut de iis plus minusve iusto sentiamus. Atque ex his ortae sunt superstitiones, quibus homines ubique conflictantur.
Scholium. Things which are accidentally causes of hope or fear are called
good or
bad omens. Next, insofar as these same omens are causes of hope or fear, they are to that extent (by the definition of hope and fear, which see in the
Schol. 2 of Prop. 18 of this Part) causes of joy or sadness; and consequently (by
Cor. of Prop. 15 of this Part) we love or hate them to that extent, and (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) strive to use them as means to the things we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Moreover, it follows from
Prop. 25 of this Part that we are so constituted by nature that we easily believe the things we hope for, but with difficulty those we fear, and that we think more or less highly of them than is just. And from these have arisen the superstitions by which men are everywhere troubled.
1 - 1 The Preface to the Theological-Political Treatise begins from the same point: ‘Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur’ (‘If men could manage all their affairs by sure counsel, or if fortune were always favourable to them, they would be held by no superstition’); because they fluctuate miserably between hope and fear, they are ready to believe anything. Compare the Appendix to Part I.
Ceterum non puto operae esse pretium, animi hic ostendere fluctuationes, quae ex spe et metu oriuntur; quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur, non dari spem sine metu, neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus); et praeterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus, eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus. Atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.
But I do not think it worth the effort to show here the fluctuations of mind which arise from hope and fear; since it follows from the mere definition of these affects that there is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope (as we shall explain more fully in its place); and moreover, since insofar as we hope for or fear something, we love or hate it. And so whatever we have said of love and hatred, anyone can easily apply to hope and fear.
Propositio LI
Proposition LI
[G II 178] Diversi homines ab uno eodemque obiecto diversimode affici possunt, et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque obiecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.
Different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times.
Demonstratio. Corpus humanum (per postul. 3. P. 2.) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti; atque adeo (per axiom. 1. quod est post lem. 3. quod vide post prop. 13. P. 2.) ab uno eodemque obiecto possunt diversimode affici. Deinde (per idem postul.) corpus humanum potest iam hoc, iam alio modo esse affectum; et consequenter (per idem axiom.) ab uno eodemque obiecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The human body (by
Post. 3 of Part II) is affected by external bodies in very many ways. Two men, therefore, can be affected in different ways at the same time; and so (by
Ax. 1, which is after
Lemma 3, which see after
Prop. 13 of Part II) they can be affected in different ways by one and the same object. Next (by the same Postulate), the human body can be affected now in this way, now in another; and consequently (by the same Axiom) it can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Videmus itaque fieri posse, ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat; et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat; et ut unus idemque homo iam amet, quod antea oderit, et ut iam audeat, quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu iudicat, quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid peius sit (vide schol. prop. 39. huius), sequitur homines tam iudicio, quam affectu variare posse;
b et hinc
a fit, ut, cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur, et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Ex. gr. illum ego intrepidum vocabo, qui malum contemnit, quod ego timere soleo; et si praeterea ad hoc attendam, quod eius cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit, et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali, a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo. Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur, qui malum timet, quod ego contemnere soleo, et si insuper ad hoc attendam, quod eius cupiditas coercetur timore mali, quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam, et sic unusquisque iudicabit.
Scholium. We see, then, that it can happen that what one man loves another hates; that what one man fears another does not fear; and that one and the same man now loves what he previously hated, and now dares what he previously feared, etc. Next, because each judges from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better and what worse (see
Schol. of Prop. 39 of this Part), it follows that men can vary as much in judgment as in affect;
1 and hence it comes about that, when we compare some with others, they are distinguished by us only by the difference of their affects, and that we call some fearless, others timid, others by another name. For example, I shall call him fearless who despises an evil which I usually fear; and if, besides, I attend to the fact that his desire to inflict evil on one he hates and to do good to one he loves is not restrained by timidity regarding an evil by which I am usually held back, I shall call him daring. Next, he will seem timid to me who fears an evil which I usually despise; and if, moreover, I attend to the fact that his desire is restrained by timidity regarding an evil which cannot hold me back, I shall say that he is cowardly; and so each will judge.
- a variare posse; et hinc] transcr. variare posse; [NB. Posse hoc fieri, tametsi mens humana pars esset divini intellectus, ostendimus in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.] et hinc. The transcription runs Spinoza’s footnote into the text; in the 1677 edition (OP p. 135) and Gebhardt (G II 179) it is a footnote. It is given in a textual note.
- b Here the 1677 edition (OP p. 135) has a footnote: ‘N.B. Posse hoc fieri, tametsi Mens humana pars esset divini intellectus, ostendimus in Schol. p. 17. p. 2.’ (‘N.B. That this can happen, even though the human mind were part of the divine intellect, we have shown in the Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II’); the Dutch version also has the seventeenth Proposition. Van Vloten–Land, with reason, read Prop. 13., as do Stern, Baensch and Gebhardt (G II 179; Textgestaltung II 374); Van Vloten–Land also consider Coroll. Prop. 11., which Lantzenberg, Appuhn and Halpern read. The transcription prints the note in the text.
- 1 Spinoza’s footnote here (see the textual note): ‘N.B. That this can happen, even though the human mind is a part of the divine intellect, we have shown in the Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part II’ (the 1677 edition has Prop. 17). The mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God (Part II, Prop. 11, Cor.), yet its ideas can be inadequate, because God has them insofar as he has the ideas of other things as well.
Denique ex hac hominis natura et iudicii inconstantia, ut et quod homo saepe ex solo affectu de rebus iudicat, et quod res, quas ad laetitiam vel tristitiam facere credit, quasque propterea (per prop. 28. huius) ut fiant, promovere vel amovere conatur, saepe non nisi imaginariae sint, ut iam taceam alia, quae in P. 2. ostendimus, de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse saepe in causa esse, tam ut contristetur, quam ut laetetur, sive ut tam tristitia, quam laetitia, afficiatur, concomitante idea sui tamquam causa. Atque adeo facile intelligimus, quid poenitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit.
c Nempe poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui, et acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia concomitante idea sui tamquam causa, et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt, quia homines se liberos esse credunt. Vide prop. 49. huius.
Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of his judgment, and also from the fact that man often judges of things from his affect alone, and that the things which he believes make for joy or sadness, and which he therefore (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) strives to promote or remove, are often only imaginary, not to mention the other things we have shown in Part II about the uncertainty of things, we easily conceive that a man can often be the cause both of his being saddened and of his rejoicing, or of his being affected both with sadness and with joy, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. And so we easily understand what repentance and what self-contentment are. Namely, repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself, and self-contentment is joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause; and these affects are very violent, because men believe themselves free. See
Prop. 49 of this Part.
- c The 1677 edition (OP p. 135) has Acquiescentia in se ipsâ here and in the next sentence; the Dutch version gives as its Latin term only Acquiescentia in se. Van Vloten–Land restore ipso, the form found elsewhere, and Gebhardt (G II 179; Textgestaltung II 374) follows. (In the fourth sentence the 1677 edition misprints timidius for timidus.)
Propositio LII
Proposition LII
[G II 179] Obiectum, quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus, vel quod nihil habere imaginamur, nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur, ac illud, quod aliquid singulare habere imaginamur.
An object which we have previously seen together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, we shall not contemplate for as long as one which we imagine to have something singular.
[G II 180] Demonstratio. Simulatque obiectum, quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (per prop. 18. P. 2., cuius etiam schol. vide), et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio obiecti, quod nihil habere imaginamur, nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus, nos nihil in eo contemplari, quod antea cum aliis non viderimus. Verum cum supponimus, nos in obiecto aliquo aliquid singulare, quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod mens, dum illud obiectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat, in cuius contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest. Atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo obiectum etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen with others, we immediately recollect the others too (by
Prop. 18 of Part II, whose
Scholium see also), and so from the contemplation of one we immediately fall into the contemplation of another. And the reasoning is the same for an object which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many. For we thereby suppose that we contemplate nothing in it which we have not previously seen with others. But when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular which we have never seen before, we are saying nothing but that the mind, while it contemplates that object, has in itself no other into whose contemplation it can fall from the contemplation of that one. And so it is determined to contemplate only that object. Therefore an object, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio, quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur
admiratio, quae si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur,
consternatio dicitur,
a quia mali admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet, ut de aliis cogitare non valeat, quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id, quod admiramur, sit hominis alicuius prudentia, industria vel aliquid huiusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur
veneratio; alias
horror, si
b hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur. Deinde, si hominis, quem amamus, prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso (per prop. 12. huius) maior erit, et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi iunctum
devotionem vocamus. Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affectus admirationi iunctos; atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus, quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet, affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu, quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione.
Scholium. This affection of the mind, or imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it alone occupies the mind, is called
wonder;
1 which, if it is moved by an object we fear, is called
consternation, because wonder at an evil holds a man so suspended in the contemplation of it alone that he is not able to think of other things by which he could avoid that evil. But if what we wonder at is some man’s prudence, industry or something of this kind, then, because we thereby contemplate the man as far surpassing us, the wonder is called
veneration; otherwise
horror, if we wonder at a man’s anger, envy, etc. Next, if we wonder at the prudence, industry, etc., of a man we love, the love will thereby (by
Prop. 12 of this Part) be greater, and this love joined to wonder, or veneration, we call
devotion. And in this way we can also conceive hatred, hope, confidence and other affects joined to wonder; and so we shall be able to deduce more affects than are usually indicated by the accepted words. From this it is evident that the names of the affects have been invented more from their common use than from an accurate knowledge of them.
2 - a vocatur admiratio, quae si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur, consternatio dicitur] transcr. vocatur admiratio, quae si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur, consternatio dicitur. Italics: only the names of the affects are emphasized.
- b vocatur veneratio; alias horror, si] transcr. vocatur veneratio; alias horror si. Italics (see the previous note).
- 1 For Descartes wonder (admiration) is ‘la première de toutes les passions’ (‘the first of all the passions’), because it can arise before we know whether the object is agreeable to us or not (Passions of the Soul, art. 53). Spinoza does not count it among the affects at all: it is an imagination like any other, distinguished only by the absence of other images to connect it with, and so a distraction of the mind with no positive cause (Def. Aff. 4, Expl.). The affects joined to wonder and to its opposite, contempt, are named in Defs. Aff. 4–11.
- 2 The same remark closes the Definitions of the Affects, where many fluctuations of mind are passed over because they have no names (Def. Aff. 48, Expl.); on the origin of words in the imagination, see Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1.
Admirationi opponitur contemptus cuius tamen causa haec plerumque est, quod scilicet ex eo, quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere etc. videmus, vel ex eo, quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet similis rebus, quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus etc. (per prop. 15 cum eius coroll. et prop. 27. huius) determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei praesentia vel accuratiore contemplatione id omne de eadem negare cogamur, quod causa admirationis, amoris, metus etc. esse potest, tum mens ex ipsa rei praesentia magis ad ea cogitandum, quae in obiecto non sunt quam quae in ipso sunt, determinata manet; cum tamen contra ex obiecti praesentia id praecipue cogitare soleat, quod in obiecto est. Porro sicut devotio ex rei, quam amamus, admiratione; sic irrisio ex rei, quam odimus vel metuimus, contemptu oritur, et dedignatio ex stultitiae contemptu, sicuti veneratio ex admiratione prudentiae. Possumus denique amorem, spem, gloriam et alios affectus iunctos contemptui concipere, atque inde alios praeterea affectus deducere, quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.
To wonder is opposed
contempt,
1 whose cause, however, is generally this: from the fact that we see someone wonder at, love, fear, etc., some thing, or from the fact that some thing at first sight appears like things we wonder at, love, fear, etc., we are determined (by
Prop. 15 with its
Cor. and
Prop. 27 of this Part) to wonder at, love, fear, etc., that same thing. But if, from the presence of the thing itself or from a more accurate contemplation of it, we are compelled to deny of it everything which can be a cause of wonder, love, fear, etc., then the mind remains determined by the very presence of the thing to think more of what is not in the object than of what is in it; whereas, on the contrary, from the presence of an object it usually thinks chiefly of what is in the object. Further, as devotion arises from wonder at a thing we love, so
mockery arises from contempt of a thing we hate or fear, and
disdain from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Finally, we can conceive love, hope, glory and other affects joined to contempt, and from these deduce yet other affects, which we are also not accustomed to distinguish from the others by any particular word.
Propositio LIII
Proposition LIII
[G II 181] Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, laetatur; et eo magis, quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.
When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting, it rejoices;
1 and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.
- 1 The origin of self-contentment (acquiescentia in se ipso, Prop. 55, Schol.). When it arises from reason, Part IV calls it the highest thing we can hope for (Part IV, Prop. 52 and Schol.).
Demonstratio. Homo se ipsum non cognoscit, nisi per affectiones sui corporis earumque ideas (per prop. 19. et 23. P. 2.). Cum ergo fit, ut mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad maiorem perfectionem transire, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) laetitia affici supponitur, et eo maiore quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A man does not know himself except through the affections of his body and their ideas (by
Props. 19 and
23 of Part II). When, therefore, it happens that the mind can contemplate itself, it is thereby supposed to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), to be affected with joy, and the more so, the more distinctly it can imagine itself and its power of acting. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Haec laetitia magis magisque fovetur, quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur, eo maiore laetitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur, idque concomitante idea sui (per schol. prop. 29. huius). Atque adeo (per prop. 27 huius) ipse maiore laetitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. Q. E. D.
Corollary. This joy is fostered more and more, the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater the joy with which he imagines others to be affected by him, and that accompanied by the idea of himself (by
Schol. of Prop. 29 of this Part). And so (by
Prop. 27 of this Part) he himself is affected with a greater joy accompanied by the idea of himself. Q.E.D.
Propositio LIV
Proposition LIV
[G II 182] Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur, quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.
The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting.
Demonstratio. Mentis conatus sive potentia est ipsa ipsius mentis essentia (per prop. 7. huius). Mentis autem essentia (ut per se notum) id tantum, quod mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id, quod non est neque potest. Adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur, quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive ponit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The striving, or power, of the mind is the very essence of the mind (by
Prop. 7 of this Part). But the essence of the mind (as is self-evident) affirms only what the mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do. And so it strives to imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting. Q.E.D.
Propositio LV
Proposition LV
Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.
When the mind imagines its lack of power, it is thereby saddened.
Demonstratio. Mentis essentia id tantum, quod mens est et potest, affirmat, sive de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari, quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per prop. praeced.). Cum itaque dicimus, quod mens, dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod, dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur, quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic eius conatus coercetur, sive (per schol. prop. 11. huius) quod ipsa contristatur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The essence of the mind affirms only what the mind is and can do, or it is of the nature of the mind to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting (by the
preceding Prop.). When, therefore, we say that the mind, while it contemplates itself, imagines its lack of power, we are saying nothing but that, while the mind strives to imagine something which posits its power of acting, this striving of it is restrained, or (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part) that it is saddened. Q.E.D.
Corollarium I. Haec tristitia magis ac magis fovetur,
b si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac coroll. prop. 53.
a huius.
Corollary I. This sadness is fostered more and more if he imagines himself to be blamed by others; which is demonstrated in the same way as the
Cor. of Prop. 53 of this Part.
- a eodem modo demonstratur ac coroll. prop. 53.] transcr. eodem modo demonstratur accoroll. prop. 53. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
- b Land, following the Dutch translator Gorter, proposed to number this Corollary and the one after the Scholium as I and II, as the transcription does. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 374) observes that they are not two corollaries of one thing: this one belongs to the Proposition, the other to the Scholium.
Scholium. Haec tristitia concomitante idea nostrae imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; laetitia autem, quae ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam haec toties repetitur, quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit, ut unusquisque facta sua narrare, suique tam corporis, quam animi vires ostentare gestiat, et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur, homines natura esse invidos (vide schol. prop. 24. et schol. prop. 32. huius) sive ob suorum aequalium imbecillitatem gaudere, et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur, toties laetitia (per prop. 53. huius) afficitur, et eo maiore, quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur, hoc est (per illa quae in schol. 1. prop. 40. P. 2. dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest.
Scholium. This sadness, accompanied by the idea of our weakness, is called
humility;
1 but the joy which arises from the contemplation of ourselves is called
self-love or
self-contentment. And since this is repeated as often as a man contemplates his virtues, or his power of acting, it also comes about that everyone is eager to tell of his deeds and to show off his powers, both of body and of mind, and that men for this reason are troublesome to one another. From this it follows again that men are by nature envious (see
Schol. of Prop. 24 and
Schol. of Prop. 32 of this Part), or are glad of the weakness of their equals and, on the other hand, saddened by their virtue. For whenever someone imagines his own actions, he is affected with joy (by
Prop. 53 of this Part), and with a joy the greater, the more perfection he imagines his actions to express, and the more distinctly he imagines them, that is (by what was said in
Schol. 1 of Prop. 40 of Part II), the more he can distinguish them from others and contemplate them as singular things.
Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit, quando aliquid in se contemplatur, quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id, quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit; et contra contristabitur, si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per prop. 28. huius) amovere conabitur, idque suorum aequalium actiones perperam interpretando, vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam, ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiae stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet, quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.
Therefore each will rejoice most in the contemplation of himself when he contemplates something in himself which he denies of the others. But if he refers what he affirms of himself to the universal idea of man or of animal, he will not rejoice so much; and, on the other hand, he will be saddened if he imagines that his actions, compared with those of others, are weaker; and this sadness (by
Prop. 28 of this Part) he will strive to remove, either by misinterpreting the actions of his equals or by embellishing his own as much as he can. It is evident, therefore, that men are by nature inclined to hatred and envy, to which their very education contributes. For parents usually spur their children to virtue only by the goad of honour and envy.
2 But perhaps a doubt remains, because we not infrequently wonder at men’s virtues and venerate the men themselves. To remove it, then, I shall add the following corollary.
- 2 An education by honour and envy appeals to the passions. Part IV distinguishes the desire to please men that is determined by reason, which belongs to morality, from the one that arises from affect, which is ambition (Part IV, Appendix, ch. 25).
[G II 183] Corollarium II. Nemo virtutem alicui nisi aequali invidet.
Corollary II. No one envies anyone’s virtue unless he is his equal.
Demonstratio. Invidia est ipsum odium (vide schol. prop. 24. huius) sive (per schol. prop. 13. huius) tristitia hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) affectio, qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (per schol. prop. 9. huius) nihil agere conatur, neque cupit, nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest. Ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem praedicari cupiet, quae naturae alterius est propria et suae aliena. Adeoque eius cupiditas coerceri, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) ipse contristari nequit ex eo, quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur, et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit; at quidem suo aequali qui cum ipso eiusdem naturae supponitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Envy is hatred itself (see
Schol. of Prop. 24 of this Part), or (by
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part) sadness, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), an affection by which a man’s power of acting, or striving, is restrained. But a man (by
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part) strives to do and desires nothing but what can follow from his given nature. Therefore a man will desire no power of acting, or (which is the same) virtue, to be predicated of himself which is proper to another’s nature and foreign to his own. And so his desire cannot be restrained, that is (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), he cannot be saddened, by the fact that he contemplates some virtue in someone unlike himself, and consequently he will not be able to envy him either; but he can indeed envy his equal, who is supposed to be of the same nature as himself. Q.E.D.
[G II 184] Scholium. Cum igitur supra in schol. prop. 52. huius dixerimus, nos hominem venerari ex eo, quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa prop. patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse, et non ut nostrae naturae communes imaginamur; adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.
Scholium. Since, therefore, we said above, in the
Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part, that we venerate a man because we wonder at his prudence, strength of character, etc., this happens (as is evident from the
Proposition itself) because we imagine these virtues to be in him singularly, and not as common to our nature; and so we shall not envy him them any more than we envy trees their height or lions their strength, etc.
Propositio LVI
Proposition LVI
Laetitiae, tristitiae et cupiditatis, et consequenter uniuscuiusque affectus, qui ex his componitur, ut animi fluctuationis, vel qui ab his derivatur, nempe amoris, odii, spei, metus etc. tot species dantur, quot sunt species obiectorum, a quibus afficimur.
There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of each affect which is composed of these, like fluctuation of mind, or which is derived from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.
Demonstratio. Laetitia et tristitia, et consequenter affectus, qui ex his componuntur vel ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (per schol. prop. 11. huius); nos autem (per prop. 1. huius) necessario patimur, quatenus ideas habemus inadaequatas; et quatenus easdem habemus (per prop. 3. huius), eatenus tantum patimur, hoc est (vide schol. prop. 40. P. 2.)
a eatenus tantum necessario patimur, quatenus imaginamur, sive (vide prop. 17. P. 2. cum eius schol.) quatenus afficimur affectu, qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscuiusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari, ut obiecti a quo afficimur, natura exprimatur. Nempe laetitia, quae ex obiecto ex. gr. A oritur, naturam ipsius obiecti A, et laetitia, quae ex obiecto B oritur, ipsius obiecti B naturam involvit; atque adeo hi duo laetitiae affectus natura sunt diversi, quia ex causis diversae naturae oriuntur. Sic etiam tristitiae affectus, qui ex uno obiecto oritur, diversus natura est a tristitia, quae ab alia causa oritur; quod etiam de amore, odio, spe, metu, animi fluctuatione etc. intelligendum est, ac proinde laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris, odii etc. tot species necessario dantur, quot sunt species obiectorum, a quibus afficimur.
Demonstration. Joy and sadness, and consequently the affects which are composed of them or derived from them, are passions (by
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part); but we (by
Prop. 1 of this Part) are necessarily acted on insofar as we have inadequate ideas; and only insofar as we have them (by
Prop. 3 of this Part) are we acted on, that is (see the
Schol. of Prop. 40 of Part II), we are necessarily acted on only insofar as we imagine, or (see
Prop. 17 of Part II with its
Schol.) insofar as we are affected with an affect which involves the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. The nature of each passion, therefore, must necessarily be so explained that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. Namely, the joy which arises from object A, for example, involves the nature of object A itself, and the joy which arises from object B involves the nature of object B itself; and so these two affects of joy are different in nature, because they arise from causes of a different nature. So also the affect of sadness which arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness which arises from another cause; which is also to be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, fluctuation of mind, etc.; and therefore there are necessarily as many species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.
- a (vide schol. prop. 40. P. 2.)] transcr. (vide schol. 1. prop. 40. P. 2.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 140), Gebhardt (G II 184) and Bartuschat have ‘Schol. Prop. 40.’ without a number.
At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscuiusque essentia seu natura, quatenus ex data quacumque eius constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum. Vide schol. prop. 9. huius. Ergo, prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris, odii etc. specie afficitur, hoc est prout eius natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita eius cupiditas alia atque alia esse
b et natura unius a natura alterius cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est, quantum affectus, a quibus unaquaeque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species cupiditatis, quot sunt species laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris etc. et consequenter (per iam ostensa) quot sunt obiectorum species, a quibus afficimur. Q. E. D.
But desire is the very essence, or nature, of each man insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given constitution of it, to do something. See
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part. Therefore, as each is affected by external causes with this or that species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., that is, as his nature is constituted in this or that way, so his desire must be different and different, and the nature of one desire must differ from the nature of another as much as the affects from which each arises differ from one another. There are, therefore, as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love, etc., and consequently (by what has already been shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Q.E.D.
- b The construction (cupiditas … esse … necesse est) is a slip of Spinoza’s, which the 1677 edition prints and Gebhardt (G II 185; Textgestaltung II 374) keeps.
[G II 185] Scholium. Inter affectuum species, quae (per prop. praeced.) perplurimae esse debent, insignes sunt
luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et
ambitio, quae non nisi
a amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones, quae huius utriusque affectus naturam explicant per obiecta, ad quae referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus, quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriae immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. Praeterea hi affectus, quatenus eos per solum obiectum, ad quod referuntur, ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam temperantia, quam luxuriae, et sobrietas, quam ebrietati, et denique castitas, quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt; sed animi indicant potentiam, quae hos affectus moderatur.
Scholium. Among the species of affects, which (by the
preceding Prop.) must be very many, notable are
gluttony,
drunkenness,
lust,
greed and
ambition, which are only notions of love or desire that explain the nature of each of these two affects through the objects to which they are related. For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, greed and ambition we understand nothing but an immoderate love or desire of feasting, drinking, sexual union, riches and glory. Moreover, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from others only through the object to which they are related, have no contraries. For temperance, which we usually oppose to gluttony, sobriety, which we oppose to drunkenness, and finally chastity, which we oppose to lust, are not affects, or passions, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates these affects.
1 - a et ambitio, quae non nisi] transcr. et *ambitio, quae non nisi. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the Scholium.
- 1 The traditional virtues of moderation are not opposite passions but the mind’s power over passions, the subject of Part V. The last proposition of the Ethics turns this around: ‘we do not enjoy blessedness because we restrain our lusts; but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts’ (Part V, Prop. 42).
Ceterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot obiectorum species), nec, si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus, nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit, uniuscuiusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit, inquam, nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere, ut determinare possimus, qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum, ex. gr. inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem,
c nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare non est opus.
bBut I cannot explain the remaining species of affects here (because there are as many as there are species of objects), nor, if I could, is it necessary. For for our purpose, namely to determine the powers of the affects and the power of the mind over them, it is enough for us to have a general definition of each affect. It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can determine what kind of power, and how great, the mind has in moderating and restraining the affects. Although, therefore, there is a great difference between this and that affect of love, hatred or desire, for example between love towards children and love towards a wife, it is nevertheless not necessary for us to know these differences, and to investigate further the nature and origin of the affects.
- b ulterius indagare non est opus.] transcr. ulterius indagare non est opus. Italics (see the previous note).
- c inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem] transcr. inter amorem erga liberos et amorem erga uxorem. The 1677 edition (OP p. 142) and Gebhardt (G II 186) repeat ‘inter’.
Propositio LVII
Proposition LVII
[G II 186] Quilibet uniuscuiusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.
Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex axiom. 1., quod vide post lem. 3. schol. prop. 13. P. 2.
a At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus.
Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from
Ax. 1, which see after
Lemma 3, after the
Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part II. But nevertheless we shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primary affects.
- a quod vide post lem. 3. schol. prop. 13. P. 2.] transcr. quod vide post lem. 3. prop. 13. P. 2. The 1677 edition (OP p. 142) and Gebhardt (G II 186) read ‘post Lem. 3. Schol. Prop. 13.’; the transcription omits ‘Schol.’.
Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, laetitiam vel tristitiam referuntur, ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscuiusque natura seu essentia (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 9. huius); ergo uniuscuiusque individui cupiditas a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat, quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Laetitia deinde et tristitia passiones sunt, quibus uniuscuiusque potentia seu conatus in suo esse perseverandi augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur (per prop. 11 huius et eius schol.). At per conatum in suo esse perseverandi, quatenus ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, appetitum et cupiditatem intelligimus (vide schol. prop. 9. huius); ergo laetitia et tristitia est ipsa cupiditas sive appetitus quatenus a causis externis augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur, hoc est (per idem schol.) est ipsa cuiusque natura. Atque adeo uniuscuiusque laetitia vel tristitia a laetitia vel tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat, quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt; et consequenter quilibet uniuscuiusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q. E. D.
All the affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But desire is the very nature, or essence, of each (see its definition in the
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part); therefore the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other. Joy and sadness, next, are passions by which the power, or striving, of each to persevere in its being is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by
Prop. 11 of this Part and its
Schol.). But by the striving to persevere in its being, insofar as it is related to the mind and body together, we understand appetite and desire (see
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part); therefore joy and sadness are the very desire, or appetite, insofar as it is increased or diminished, aided or restrained by external causes, that is (by the same Scholium), they are the very nature of each. And so the joy or sadness of each also differs from the joy or sadness of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other; and consequently each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another, etc. Q.E.D.
[G II 187] Scholium. Hinc sequitur affectus animalium, quae irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus, postquam mentis novimus originem), ab affectibus hominum tantum differre, quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina, hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat; vita tamen illa, qua unumquodque est contentum, et gaudium nihil aliud est, quam idea seu anima eiusdem individui; atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.
Scholium. From this it follows that the affects of the animals which are called irrational (for we can by no means doubt that the brutes feel, now that we know the origin of the mind
1) differ from the affects of men as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both the horse and the man are indeed carried away by the lust to procreate; but the former by an equine lust, the latter by a human one. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fish and birds must be different and different. Although, therefore, each individual lives content with the nature of which it consists, and rejoices in it, yet that life with which each is content, and its gladness, are nothing but the idea, or soul, of that individual; and so the gladness of one differs in nature from the gladness of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
- 1 Since every individual is animate, though in different degrees (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol.), animals have minds and affects of their own. Descartes, in the Passions of the Soul, had said that the beasts have the same movements of the spirits and of the gland that excite the passions in us, ‘encore qu’elles n’aient point de raison, ni peut-estre aussi aucune pensée’ (‘although they have no reason, nor perhaps any thought either’, art. 50). Spinoza does not draw a humane conclusion from the difference of natures: we have the same right over animals as they have over us (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1).
Denique ex praec. prop. sequitur, non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium, quo ebrius ex. gr. ducitur, et inter gaudium, quo potitur philosophus,
a quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque haec de affectibus, qui ad hominem referuntur, quatenus patitur. Superest, ut pauca addam de iis, qui ad eundem referuntur, quatenus agit.
Finally, from the
preceding Proposition it follows that there is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunkard, for example, is led, and the gladness which a philosopher possesses, which I wanted to point out here in passing. So much for the affects which are related to man insofar as he is acted on. It remains for me to add a few things about those which are related to him insofar as he acts.
- a et inter gaudium, quo potitur philosophus] transcr. et gaudium, quo potitur philosophus. The 1677 edition (OP p. 143) and Gebhardt (G II 187) repeat ‘inter’.
Propositio LVIII
Proposition LVIII
Praeter laetitiam et cupiditatem quae passiones sunt, alii laetitiae et cupiditatis affectus dantur, qui ad nos, quatenus agimus, referuntur.
Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act.
1- 1 The active affects, which arise from adequate ideas (Prop. 1). They prepare Part IV’s thesis that to every action to which we are determined by an affect which is a passion we can be determined by reason without it (Part IV, Prop. 59). There is no active sadness (Prop. 59).
Demonstratio. Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, laetatur (per prop. 53. huius). Mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur, quando veram sive adaequatam ideam concipit (per prop. 43. P. 2.). At mens quasdam ideas adaequatas concipit (per schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.). Ergo eatenus etiam laetatur, quatenus ideas adaequatas concipit, hoc est (per prop. 1. huius) quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (per prop. 9. huius). At per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus (per eiusdem schol.). Ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus, sive (per prop. 1. huius) quatenus agimus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices (by
Prop. 53 of this Part). But the mind necessarily contemplates itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by
Prop. 43 of Part II). But the mind conceives some adequate ideas (by
Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II). Therefore it also rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by
Prop. 1 of this Part), insofar as it acts. Next, the mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being (by
Prop. 9 of this Part). But by striving we understand desire (by the
Schol. of the same Prop.). Therefore desire is related to us also insofar as we understand, or (by
Prop. 1 of this Part) insofar as we act. Q.E.D.
Propositio LIX
Proposition LIX
[G II 188] Inter omnes affectus, qui ad mentem, quatenus agit, referuntur, nulli sunt, quam
a qui ad laetitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur.
Among all the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none but those which are related to joy or desire.
- a referuntur, nulli sunt, quam] transcr. referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam. The 1677 edition (OP p. 144), Gebhardt (G II 188) and Bartuschat have no ‘alii’.
Demonstratio. Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, laetitiam vel tristitiam referuntur, ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus, quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur
a (per prop. 11. huius et eius schol.); adeoque mens quatenus contristatur, eatenus eius intelligendi, hoc est eius agendi potentia (per prop. 1. huius) minuitur vel coercetur. Adeoque nulli tristitiae affectus ad mentem referri possunt, quatenus agit, sed tantum affectus laetitiae et cupiditatis, qui (per prop. praeced.) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. All the affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But by sadness we understand that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or restrained (by
Prop. 11 of this Part and its
Schol.); and so, insofar as the mind is saddened, its power of understanding, that is, its power of acting (by
Prop. 1 of this Part), is diminished or restrained. And so no affects of sadness can be related to the mind insofar as it acts, but only affects of joy and desire, which (by the
preceding Prop.) are also related to the mind to that extent. Q.E.D.
- a So the 1677 edition (OP p. 144): ‘that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or restrained’, with quòd as a conjunction. The Dutch version has het geen, dat het vermogen van de ziel om te denken vermindert, of intoomt (‘that which diminishes or restrains the mind’s power of thinking’), and Gebhardt (G II 188; Textgestaltung II 374–375) corrects the verbs to minuit, vel coërcet, as in Prop. 11; Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn keep the 1677 text, Halpern follows Saisset’s id, quo. The text here follows the 1677 edition, since the scan of Gebhardt’s page does not show whether he also changed potentia; the sense is the same.
Scholium. Omnes actiones, quae sequuntur ex affectibus, qui ad mentem referuntur, quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem, qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo, qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines iuvare et sibi amicitia iungere. Eas itaque actiones, quae solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem, et quae alterius etiam utile intendunt, ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis praesentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt.
Scholium. All the actions which follow from the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it understands I relate to
strength of character, which I divide into
tenacity and
nobility.
1 For by tenacity I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to preserve his being. By nobility, however, I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which aim only at the agent’s advantage I relate to tenacity, and those which aim also at the advantage of another I relate to nobility. Temperance, therefore, sobriety, presence of mind in dangers, etc., are species of tenacity; but modesty, clemency, etc., are species of nobility.
- 1 Fortitudo, animositas, generositas. The active affects are the virtues of Part IV: the free man’s virtue ‘is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them’ (Part IV, Prop. 69), and he repays hatred with love, or nobility (Part IV, Prop. 46). Temperance and sobriety, which Prop. 56, Schol. denied were affects, reappear here as species of tenacity: powers of the mind, not passions.
Atque his puto me praecipuos affectus animique fluctuationes, quae ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum, nempe cupiditatis, laetitiae et tristitiae oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet, nos a causis externis multis modis agitari, nosque perinde ut maris undae a contrariis ventis agitatae, fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. At dixi, me praecipuos tantum,
a non omnes, qui dari possunt, animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via, qua supra, procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse iunctum poenitentiae, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex iam dictis clare constare credo, affectus tot modis, alii cum aliis, posse componi,
b indeque tot variationes oriri, ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum praecipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit; nam reliqui, quos omisi, plus curiositatis, quam utilitatis haberent.
And with this I think I have explained, and shown through their first causes, the principal affects and fluctuations of mind which arise from the composition of the three primary affects, namely desire, joy and sadness. From this it is evident that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds, we fluctuate,
2 ignorant of our outcome and fate. But I have said that I have shown only the principal conflicts of mind, not all that there can be. For by proceeding in the same way as above we can easily show that love is joined to repentance, disdain, shame, etc. Indeed, I believe it is clearly established for everyone from what has already been said that the affects can be compounded with one another in so many ways, and that so many variations arise from this, that they cannot be determined by any number. But for my purpose it is enough to have enumerated only the principal ones; for the rest, which I have omitted, would be more a matter of curiosity than of use.
- a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘hartstochten’ (‘affects’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 189).
- b affectus tot modis, alii cum aliis, posse componi] transcr. affectus tot modis, alios cum aliis, posse componi. The 1677 edition (OP p. 145), Gebhardt (G II 189) and Bartuschat read ‘alii cum aliis’, the fixed phrase, in the nominative.
- 2 fluctuari: the image gives the literal sense of the ‘fluctuation of mind’ defined in Prop. 17, Schol., and it is the picture of human bondage that Part IV will analyse (Preface to Part IV).
Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat, quod scilicet saepissime contingit, dum re, quam appetebamus, fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem, a qua aliter determinatur, et aliae rerum imagines in eo excitantur, et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Ex. gr. cum aliquid, quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui, nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore iam aliter disposito eiusdem cibi imago, quia ipse praesens adest, fomentetur, et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit, et consequenter cibi, quem appetebamus, praesentia odiosa erit, et hoc est quod fastidium et taedium vocamus. Ceterum corporis affectiones externas, quae in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quaedam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam, et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.
Yet this remains to be noted about love: it very often happens that, while we are enjoying the thing we wanted, the body acquires from that enjoyment a new constitution, by which it is determined differently, and other images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine something which usually delights us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy it, namely to eat it. But while we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is constituted differently. If, therefore, now that the body is differently disposed, the image of the same food is fostered, because the food itself is present, and consequently also the striving, or desire, to eat it, this new constitution will be opposed to this desire, or striving; and consequently the presence of the food we wanted will be hateful; and this is what we call
disgust and
weariness. As for the external affections of the body which are observed in the affects, such as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, etc.,
3 I have neglected them, because they are related to the body alone, without any relation to the mind. Finally, some things must be noted about the
definitions of the affects, which I shall therefore repeat here in order, inserting among them what is to be observed in each.
- 3 Descartes had devoted a series of articles of the Passions of the Soul to these ‘signes extérieurs’ of the passions: changes of colour, trembling, languor, fainting, laughter, tears, sighs (arts. 112–135).
The Definitions of the Affects
Part III ends by going over its ground a second time. The affects have been defined one by one in the scholia, as the demonstrations reached them: joy and sadness in the scholium to Prop. 11, love and hatred in that to Prop. 13, hope and fear in the second scholium to Prop. 18, and so on through envy, ambition, glory and jealousy. Spinoza now repeats the definitions “in order”, forty-eight of them, and adds to each what needs to be observed about it. A General Definition of the affect that is a passion of the mind closes the Part. Because the definitions follow a classification of their own, and because several of them correct what the scholia said, they are best read with their plan and their changes in view.
The decision to do so is announced at the end of the scholium to Prop. 59: “Finally, some things must be noted about the definitions of the affects, which I shall therefore repeat here in order, inserting among them what is to be observed in each.” Two motives seem to be at work. The first is practical. The affects were defined in the order in which the demonstrations reached them, scattered through fifty-nine propositions, and a reader who wants to know what Spinoza means by envy or by humility needs to find the definition quickly; Part IV, which judges the affects one by one, needs a list of terms to refer to. The second is theoretical. The propositions derived the affects from their causes; the definitions now classify them by their nature, and the classification shows that the derivation is complete, that every affect the language names can be placed by its relation to desire, joy and sadness.
The order of the definitions
The order is not that of the propositions but of a classification. The three primary affects come first: desire, joy and sadness (Defs. 1–3). Wonder and contempt follow (4–5); wonder, Spinoza explains, is not an affect at all, and is mentioned only because usage gives other names to affects derived from the primary ones when they are related to objects we wonder at. Then come the affects of joy and sadness with an external cause: love and hatred, and their species (6–11); those that concern a doubtful or a decided outcome, hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness and remorse (12–17); those that arise from the good or ill of others, pity, favour and indignation, overestimation and scorn, envy and compassion (18–24). Next are the joys and sadnesses whose idea is of an internal cause, oneself: self-contentment and humility, repentance, pride and self-abasement, glory and shame (25–31). The rest are kinds of desire, from longing and emulation to anger, vengeance and cruelty, timidity, daring and cowardice, and finally courtesy, ambition, gluttony, drunkenness, greed and lust (32–48). Each affect is placed by its relation to the three primary ones and by the kind of object or idea that accompanies it, as the scholium to Prop. 56 said it must be: the affects have as many species as there are species of objects, and a general definition of each is enough for the purpose of the work.
Earlier catalogues
A catalogue of the passions with short definitions was not a new genre. Descartes’ Passions of the Soul had derived a long list of particular passions from its six primitive ones, and Hobbes, in the sixth chapter of Leviathan (1651), had defined the passions one after another in a few words each: “For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.” Spinoza’s definitions resemble Hobbes’s in their brevity and in their reduction of the passions to a few elementary motions; they differ from both predecessors in what the elements are and in the use made of the list. For Descartes, the classification of the passions served a doctrine of how the free will can govern them. For Spinoza it serves a doctrine of how understanding transforms them.
The difference shows clearly in a single word. The virtue Descartes valued above all he called générosité, which “makes a man esteem himself as highly as he can legitimately esteem himself,” and consists partly in knowing that nothing truly belongs to him “but this free disposition of his volitions,” and partly in a firm and constant resolution to use it well (Passions, art. 153). Spinoza takes over the Latin form of the word, generositas, and gives it an entirely different sense: “the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship” (Prop. 59, Schol.). The Cartesian virtue is a relation of the self to its own free will; the Spinozist one is a desire, born of reason, directed at others. The translation renders Spinoza’s word as “nobility”, which keeps the two apart.
Corrections and sharpenings
The repetition is not mechanical. Several definitions are corrected or sharpened. The first is the most important. The scholium to Prop. 9 had defined desire as “appetite together with consciousness of it”. The new definition reads: “Desire is the very essence of man insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something.” The explanation gives two reasons for the change. Since there is no real difference between appetite and desire, whether or not a man is conscious of his appetite, defining one by the other would be a tautology; and a definition was wanted that would comprehend all the strivings of human nature, which are called appetite, will, desire or impulse. And the phrase “from any given affection of it” is added so that the definition contains the cause of the consciousness: a man is conscious of himself only through the affections of his body (Part II, Prop. 23). In the same way, joy is now said to be the passage to a greater perfection, not the perfection itself: if a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy. Love is defined again as joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and Spinoza takes the opportunity to reject the definition of love as the lover’s will to join himself to the thing loved, which states a property of love and not its essence (Def. 6, Expl.).
New distinctions
Other explanations add distinctions that the propositions passed over. Repentance is now defined as sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decree of the mind; its intensity comes from the belief in freedom. Pride is distinguished from overestimation, and the customary opposition of pride and humility is examined (Defs. 28–29). Pity (commiseratio) is said to differ from misericordia only in that one regards the single affect and the other the habit; misericordia is then redefined, ‘against the meaning of the word’, as the love that rejoices in another’s good, the opposite of envy (Defs. 18 and 24). Spinoza also admits where the Latin language fails him. Some affects have no names, others have names that are used loosely; and he warns, once for all, that his purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose ordinary meaning is not wholly at odds with the one he intends (Def. 20, Expl.).
What the explanations observe
The explanations are also where Spinoza allows himself remarks of a kind the propositions rarely contain, observations about how the affects behave and about how the words for them are used. Several are worth reading for their own sake.
Wonder is excluded from the affects because the imagination of a new thing, “considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others”; the mind is held in the contemplation of it only because it is not yet linked to other images, so that nothing leads the mind on to something else (Def. Aff. 4, Expl.). Wonder is thus a gap in the chain of association, not a positive feeling, and Spinoza keeps the word only because usage gives special names to the affects derived from the primary ones when their objects are things we wonder at, as devotion is “love towards one whom we wonder at” (Def. Aff. 10).
Hope and fear are shown to be inseparable. “There is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope.” He who hangs on hope and is in doubt about the outcome imagines something that excludes the thing he hopes for, and so to that extent is saddened and fears; he who fears imagines something that excludes the thing he hates, and so rejoices and hopes (Def. Aff. 13, Expl.). The point will matter in Part IV, where hope and fear are both judged to be signs of a mind lacking in knowledge.
Repentance and its opposite are traced, in part, to upbringing. It is not surprising, the explanation of Def. 27 says, that acts which custom calls wrong are followed by sadness and those it calls right by joy, since “this depends chiefly on education”: parents, by reproaching the one and praising the other, have joined sadness to the first and joy to the second (Def. Aff. 27, Expl.). The observation is brief, but it contains a whole account of moral feeling as learned association.
The explanation of ambition observes that it is “a desire by which all the affects ... are fostered and strengthened; and for this reason this affect can hardly be overcome,” and quotes Cicero: “Every best man … is led most by glory. Even the philosophers inscribe their names on the books which they write on despising glory” (Def. Aff. 44, Expl.). And the last explanation notes that the five affects of immoderate appetite, ambition, gluttony, drunkenness, greed and lust, have no contraries among the affects: temperance, sobriety and chastity “indicate a power of the mind, not a passion,” and a greedy or timid man who abstains from food or drink is not on that account moved by an affect contrary to gluttony (Def. Aff. 48, Expl.).
The General Definition
The General Definition gathers the account into a single formula: “An affect, which is called a passion of the mind, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, when it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than of that” (General Definition). The Latin for “passion of the mind” is animi pathema, a Greek word in Latin dress. Each phrase is explained. It is a confused idea, because the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate ideas (Prop. 3). It affirms of the body a greater or lesser force of existing, because the mind is the idea of the body and the affect expresses a change in the body’s power of acting. “Than before” does not mean that the mind compares its present state with its past one; it means that the idea which constitutes the affect affirms something of the body that involves more or less reality than before. And the last clause adds the desire that every affect brings with it.
The bridge to Part IV
The catalogue is the bridge to Part IV. There Spinoza will ask how strong the affects are, and which of them agree with reason and which are opposed to it: pity is bad in one who lives by reason (Part IV, Prop. 50), humility and repentance are not virtues (Props. 53–54), cheerfulness cannot be excessive (Prop. 42), hatred can never be good (Prop. 45). That inquiry presupposes what the definitions provide, a complete map of the affects reduced to three, each with its definite cause. The derivations of Part III were offered as explanations of human life as it is; the definitions fix the terms in which Part IV will judge it.
As the text continues, the definitions can be read straight through or kept at hand for reference. The explanations attached to them are where the corrections and the new distinctions are made, and they repay closer attention than the definitions themselves.
Affectuum Definitiones
Definitions of the Affects
[G II 190] I. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus ex data quacumque eius affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.
I. Desire is the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something.
Explicatio. Diximus supra in schol. prop. 9. huius partis, cupiditatem esse appetitum cum eiusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam, quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum, quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem schol. etiam monui, me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius, sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque; atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui, sed eandem ita definire studui, ut omnes humanae naturae conatus, quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere, cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam, quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum; sed ex hac definitione (per prop. 23. P. 2.) non sequeretur, quod mens possit suae cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut huius conscientiae causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem prop.) addere “quatenus ex data quacumque eius affectione determinata etc.”.
Explanation. We said above, in the
Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part, that
desire is appetite together with consciousness of it; and that appetite is the very essence of man, insofar as it is determined to do those things which serve his preservation. But in the same Scholium I also pointed out that in truth I acknowledge no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man is conscious of his appetite or not, the appetite remains one and the same; and so, lest I should seem to commit a tautology, I did not want to explain desire by appetite, but took care to define it so as to comprehend together all the strivings of human nature
1 which we signify by the name of appetite, will, desire or impulse. For I could have said that desire is the very essence of man insofar as it is conceived to be determined to do something; but from this definition (by
Prop. 23 of Part II) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire, or appetite. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same Proposition) to add ‘insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, etc.’.
- 1 The definition of Prop. 9, Schol. is revised for two reasons: to avoid defining desire by appetite, from which it does not really differ, and to include in the definition the cause of the consciousness of desire, namely the affections of the body through which alone the mind knows itself (Part II, Prop. 23).
Nam per affectionem humanae essentiae quamcumque eiusdem essentiae constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata,
a sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis, sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur, sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscumque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia eiusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt, ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.
For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it is innate, or whether it is conceived through the attribute of thought alone, or through the attribute of extension alone, or finally whether it is related to both at once. Here, therefore, by the name of desire I understand any strivings, impulses, appetites and volitions of a man, which vary according to the varying constitution of the same man, and are not seldom so opposed to one another that the man is pulled in different directions and does not know where to turn.
- a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of van buiten aangekomen’ (‘or come from outside’), which the Latin evidently dropped. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 190; Textgestaltung II 375); Leopold proposed the Latin sive adventicia.
[G II 191] II. Laetitia est hominis transitio a minore ad maiorem perfectionem.
II. Joy is a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.
III. Tristitia est hominis transitio a maiore ad minorem perfectionem.
III. Sadness is a man’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.
Explicatio. Dico transitionem. Nam laetitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione, ad quam transit, nasceretur, eiusdem absque laetitiae affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex tristitiae affectu, qui huic est contrarius. Nam quod tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest, quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit, quatenus alicuius perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus, quod tristitia in privatione maioris perfectionis consistat; nam privatio nihil est. Tristitiae autem affectus actus est, qui propterea nullus alius esse potest, quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem, hoc est, actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur. Vide schol. prop. 11. huius. Ceterum definitiones hilaritatis, titillationis, melancholiae et doloris omitto, quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species.
Explanation. I say ‘passage’. For joy is not perfection itself. For if a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy; which appears more clearly from the affect of sadness, which is contrary to it. For no one can deny that sadness consists in the passage to a lesser perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself, since a man cannot be saddened insofar as he participates in some perfection. Nor can we say that sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection; for privation is nothing.
1 But the affect of sadness is an act, which therefore can be no other than the act of passing to a lesser perfection, that is, the act by which a man’s power of acting is diminished or restrained. See the
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part. For the rest, I omit the definitions of
cheerfulness,
pleasure,
melancholy and
pain, because they are related chiefly to the body, and are only species of joy or sadness.
- 1 So sadness cannot be the mere lack of a perfection one does not have; it is a positive act of the mind, the passage itself. Compare the account of falsity as privation in Part II, Prop. 35.
IV. Admiratio est rei alicuius imaginatio, in qua mens defixa propterea manet, quia haec singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide prop. 52. cum eiusdem schol.
a IV. Wonder is an imagination of some thing in which the mind remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with the others. See
Prop. 52 with its
Scholium.
- a The reference is supplied by the 1677 edition’s list of errata in the references (Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda, p. 147 l. 24: connexionem → connexionē. Vide Prop. 52. cum ejusd. Schol.). Van Vloten–Land add hujus, evidently after the Dutch version (Textgestaltung II 375).
Explicatio. In schol. prop. 18. P. 2. ostendimus, quaenam sit causa, cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat, videlicet, quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatae et ita ordinatae sunt, ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit, quando rei imago nova est; sed mens in eiusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur, donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novae imaginatio in se considerata eiusdem naturae est, ac reliquae, et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero, nec causam video, cur id facerem, quandoquidem haec mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva, quae mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur, sed tantum ex eo, quod causa, cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit.
Tres igitur (ut in schol. prop. 11. huius monui) tantum
affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco, nempe
laetitiae, tristitiae et
cupiditatis, nec alia de causa
a verba de admiratione feci, quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus, qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad obiecta, quae admiramur, referuntur; quae quidem ratio me ex aequo movet, ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adiungam.
b Explanation. In the
Schol. of Prop. 18 of Part II we have shown what the cause is why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, immediately falls into the thought of another: namely, because the images of those things are linked together and so ordered that one follows another; which cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new; but the mind will be held in the contemplation of that thing until it is determined by other causes to think of other things. The imagination of a new thing, therefore, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others; and for this reason I do not number wonder among the affects,
1 nor do I see a cause why I should, since this distraction of the mind does not arise from any positive cause which distracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause is lacking by which the mind is determined, from the contemplation of one thing, to think of others. I acknowledge, therefore (as I pointed out in the
Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), only
three primitive, or primary,
affects, namely those of
joy,
sadness and
desire; nor have I spoken of wonder for any other reason than that it has become customary to indicate certain affects which are derived from the three primitive ones by other names when they are related to objects we wonder at; which reason equally moves me to add to these the definition of contempt as well.
- a et cupiditatis, nec alia de causa] transcr. et *cupiditatis nec alia de causa. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the Explanation.
- b ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adiungam.] transcr. ut etiam contemptus defininitionem his adiungam. Transcription slip (‘defininitionem’) and italics; the 1677 edition (OP p. 148) and Gebhardt (G II 192) read ‘definitionem’.
- 1 Against Descartes, for whom wonder is the first of the passions (see the note on Prop. 52, Schol.).
[G II 192] V. Contemptus est rei alicuius imaginatio, quae mentem adeo parum tangit, ut ipsa mens ex rei praesentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum, quae in ipsa re non sunt, quam quae in ipsa sunt. Vide schol. prop. 52. huius.
V. Contempt is an imagination of some thing which touches the mind so little that the mind itself is moved by the presence of the thing to imagine what is not in the thing rather than what is in it. See the
Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part.
Definitiones venerationis et dedignationis missas hic facio, quia nulli, quod sciam, affectus ex his nomen trahunt.
I pass over here the definitions of veneration and disdain, because no affects, so far as I know, take their name from them.
VI. Amor est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae.
VI. Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
Explicatio. Haec definitio satis clare amoris essentiam explicat. Illa vero auctorum, qui definiunt amorem esse voluntatem amantis se iungendi rei amatae, non amoris essentiam, sed eius proprietatem exprimit; et quia amoris essentia non satis ab auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque eius proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt, et hinc factum, ut eorum definitionem admodum obscuram esse omnes iudicaverint. Verum notandum, cum dico, proprietatem esse in amante, se voluntate iungere rei amatae, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus prop. 48. P. 2.), nec etiam cupiditatem sese iungendi rei amatae, quando abest, vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest; potest namque amor
a absque hac aut illa cupiditate concipi; sed per voluntatem me acquiescentiam intelligere, quae est in amante ob rei amatae praesentiam, a qua laetitia amantis corroboratur aut saltem fovetur.
Explanation. This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough. But that of the authors who define love as the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved
1 expresses not the essence of love but a property of it; and because the essence of love was not sufficiently perceived by these authors, they could not have any clear concept of its property either, and hence it has come about that everyone has judged their definition to be very obscure. But it should be noted that when I say that it is a property in the lover that he joins himself by will to the thing loved, I do not understand by will a consent, or deliberation of the mind, or free decree (for we have demonstrated in
Prop. 48 of Part II that this is a fiction), nor even a desire to join oneself to the thing loved when it is absent, or to persevere in its presence when it is present; for love can be conceived without the one or the other of these desires; but by will I understand the contentment which is in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by which the joy of the lover is strengthened, or at least fostered.
- a vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest; potest namque amor] transcr. vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest (potest namque amor. The transcription opens a parenthesis that it never closes; punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 193).
- 1 Descartes among them: love is an emotion of the soul ‘qui l’incite à se joindre de volonté aux objets qui paraissent luy estre convenables’ (Passions of the Soul, art. 79; see the note on Prop. 13, Schol.).
[G II 193] VII. Odium est tristitia concomitante idea causae externae.
VII. Hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
Explicatio. Quae hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in praecedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide praeterea schol. prop. 13. huius.
a Explanation. What is to be noted here is easily perceived from what was said in the Explanation of the preceding Definition. See, besides, the
Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 148) has Prop. 11., as does the Dutch version (d’elfde Voorstelling); Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to 13., and Gebhardt (G II 193; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.
VIII. Propensio est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est laetitiae.
VIII. Inclination is joy accompanied by the idea of some thing which is accidentally the cause of joy.
IX. Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est tristitiae. De his vide schol. prop. 15. huius.
IX. Aversion is sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing which is accidentally the cause of sadness. On these see the
Schol. of Prop. 15 of this Part.
X. Devotio est amor erga eum, quem admiramur.
X. Devotion is love towards one whom we wonder at.
Explicatio. Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate, ostendimus prop. 52. huius. Si igitur contingat, ut id quod admiramur saepe imaginemur,
a idem admirari desinemus; atque adeo videmus, devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare.
Explanation. We have shown in
Prop. 52 of this Part that wonder arises from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that we often imagine what we wonder at, we shall cease to wonder at it; and so we see that the affect of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 149) has imaginamur; Gfroerer, Bruder, Riedel, Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn correct to imaginemur, and Gebhardt (G II 193; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.
XI. Irrisio est laetitia orta ex eo, quod aliquid, quod contemnimus in re, quam odimus, inesse imaginamur.
a XI. Mockery is joy arising from our imagining that something we despise is in a thing we hate.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 149) has ei inesse imaginamur; the Dutch version has no equivalent of ei. Gebhardt (G II 193; Textgestaltung II 375) deletes it, as Leopold proposed, followed by W. Meijer and Appuhn: the punctuation of the manuscript was probably unclear, and the corrector inserted the misleading ei. Bartuschat keeps it.
Explicatio. Quatenus rem, quam odimus, contemnimus, eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide schol. prop. 52. huius), et eatenus (per prop. 20. huius) laetamur. Sed quoniam supponimus, hominem id quod irridet, odio tamen habere, sequitur, hanc laetitiam solidam non esse. Vide schol. prop. 47. huius.
[G II 194] XII. Spes est inconstans laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.
XII. Hope is an inconstant joy arising from the idea of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt.
XIII. Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his schol. 2. prop. 18. huius.
XIII. Fear is an inconstant sadness arising from the idea of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt. See on these the
Schol. 2 of Prop. 18 of this Part.
Explicatio. Ex his definitionibus sequitur, non dari spem sine metu, neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur, quod rei futurae existentiam secludit; atque adeo eatenus contristari (per prop. 19. huius) et consequenter, dum spe pendet, metuere, ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est, hoc est, de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur, quod eiusdem rei existentiam secludit; atque adeo (per prop. 20. huius) laetatur, et consequenter eatenus spem habet, ne eveniat.
Explanation. From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope. For he who hangs on hope and is in doubt about the outcome of a thing is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of the future thing; and so to that extent to be saddened (by
Prop. 19 of this Part), and consequently, while he hangs on hope, to fear that the thing will not happen.
1 But he who, on the other hand, is in fear, that is, is in doubt about the outcome of a thing he hates, also imagines something which excludes the existence of that thing; and so (by
Prop. 20 of this Part) he rejoices, and consequently to that extent has hope that it will not happen.
- 1 metuere, ut res eveniat: after verbs of fearing, ut means ‘that … not’; so also spem habet, ne eveniat, ‘has hope that it will not happen’.
XIV. Securitas est laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.
XIV. Confidence is joy arising from the idea of a future or past thing about which the cause of doubting has been removed.
XV. Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.
XV. Despair is sadness arising from the idea of a future or past thing about which the cause of doubting has been removed.
Explicatio. Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio, quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit, quia homo rem praeteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut praesentem contemplatur; vel quia alia imaginatur, quae existentiam earum rerum secludunt, quae ipsi dubium iniiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per coroll. prop. 31. P. 2.) nunquam possumus esse certi; fieri tamen potest, ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide schol. prop. 49. P. 2.) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere; atque adeo fieri potest, ut ex imagine rei praeteritae aut futurae eodem laetitiae vel tristitiae affectu afficiamur ac ex rei praesentis imagine, ut in prop. 18 huius demonstravimus, quam cum eiusdem scholiis vide.
a Explanation. Confidence, therefore, arises from hope, and despair from fear, when the cause of doubting about the outcome of a thing is removed; which happens because a man imagines that the past or future thing is there and contemplates it as present; or because he imagines other things which exclude the existence of those things which were causing him to doubt. For although we can never be certain about the outcome of singular things (by
Cor. of Prop. 31 of Part II), it can nevertheless happen that we do not doubt about their outcome. For we have shown (see the
Schol. of Prop. 49 of Part II) that it is one thing not to doubt about a thing, another to have certainty of it; and so it can happen that we are affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy or sadness as by the image of a present thing, as we have demonstrated in
Prop. 18 of this Part, which see together with its
Scholia.
- a quam cum eiusdem scholiis vide] transcr. quam cum eiusdem schol. 2. vide. The 1677 edition (OP p. 151) has ‘cum ejusdem Scholio’; Gebhardt (G II 195; Textgestaltung II 375) reads ‘Scholiis’, since both scholia to Prop. 18, originally one, are meant. The transcription has ‘schol. 2.’.
[G II 195] XVI. Gaudium est laetitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit.
a XVI. Gladness is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing which has turned out contrary to expectation.
- a So the 1677 edition (OP p. 151) and Gebhardt (G II 195), in the same words as the definition of remorse that follows. Bartuschat reads praeter metum (‘contrary to fear’), which fits gladness better; but praeter spem, ‘contrary to expectation’, can cover a good outcome as well as a bad one.
XVII. Conscientiae morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit.
XVII. Remorse is sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which has turned out contrary to expectation.
XVIII. Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali, quod alteri, quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide schol. prop. 22. et schol. prop. 27. huius.
Explicatio. Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia, nisi forte, quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem eius habitum.
Explanation. Between pity and compassion there seems to be no difference, except perhaps that pity regards the single affect, compassion the habit of it.
XIX. Favor est amor erga aliquem, qui alteri benefecit.
XIX. Favour is love towards someone who has done good to another.
XX. Indignatio est odium erga aliquem, qui alteri malefecit.
XX. Indignation is hatred towards someone who has done evil to another.
Explicatio. Haec nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est, verborum significationem, sed rerum naturam explicare, easque iis vocabulis indicare, quorum significatio, quam ex usu habent, a significatione, qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Ceterum horum affectuum causam vide in coroll. 1. prop. 27. et schol. prop. 22. huius.
a Explanation. I know that these names mean something else in common usage. But my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose meaning from usage is not wholly at odds with the meaning in which I wish to use them; which it is enough to have pointed out once. As for the cause of these affects, see
Cor. 1 of Prop. 27 and the
Schol. of Prop. 22 of this Part.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 151) has Scholiis; the Dutch version has het Byvoegsel (Scholium). Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to the singular, in keeping with the present form of the Scholium of Prop. 22, and Gebhardt (G II 195; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.
XXI. Existimatio est de aliquo prae amore plus iusto sentire.
XXI. Overestimation is thinking more highly of someone than is just, out of love.
XXII. Despectus est de aliquo prae odio minus iusto sentire.
XXII. Scorn is thinking less highly of someone than is just, out of hatred.
[G II 196] Explicatio. Est itaque existimatio, amoris et despectus odii effectus sive proprietas; atque adeo potest
existimatio etiam definiri, quod sit amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de re amata plus iusto sentiat, et contra
despectus, quod sit odium,
a quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de eo quem odio habet, minus iusto sentiat. Vide de his schol. prop. 26. huius.
b Explanation. Overestimation, therefore, is an effect, or property, of love, and scorn of hatred; and so
overestimation can also be defined as love insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly of the thing loved than is just; and, on the other hand,
scorn as hatred insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks less highly than is just of the one he hates. See on these the
Schol. of Prop. 26 of this Part.
- a et contra despectus, quod sit odium] transcr. et contra *despectus, quod sit odium. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the Explanation.
- b schol. prop. 26. huius.] transcr. schol. prop. 26. huius. Italics (see the previous note).
XXIII. Invidia est odium, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur, et contra ut ex alterius malo gaudeat.
XXIII. Envy is hatred insofar as it so affects a man that he is saddened by another’s happiness and, on the other hand, rejoices in another’s ill.
Explicatio. Invidiae opponitur communiter misericordia, quae proinde invita vocabuli significatione sic definiri potest:
Explanation. To envy is commonly opposed compassion, which can therefore, against the meaning of the word,
1 be defined thus:
- 1 Misericordia, which Def. 18, Expl. distinguished from pity (commiseratio) only as a habit from a single affect, is here redefined as the contrary of envy: love that rejoices in another’s good and is saddened by his ill. ‘Compassion’ keeps the link with pity; the joy at another’s good, for which Prop. 22, Schol. found no name, is now included in it.
XXIV. Misericordia est amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex bono alterius gaudeat, et contra ut ex alterius malo contristetur.
XXIV. Compassion is love insofar as it so affects a man that he rejoices in another’s good and, on the other hand, is saddened by another’s ill.
Explicatio. Ceterum de invidia vide schol. prop. 24. et schol. prop. 32. huius. Atque hi affectus laetitiae et tristitiae sunt, quos idea rei externae comitatur tamquam causa per se vel per accidens. Hinc ad alios transeo, quos idea rei internae comitatur tamquam causa.
Explanation. As for envy, see the
Schol. of Prop. 24 and the
Schol. of Prop. 32 of this Part. And these are the affects of joy and sadness which are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as cause, through itself or accidentally. From here I pass to the others, which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as cause.
XXV. Acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur.
XXV. Self-contentment is joy arising from a man’s contemplating himself and his power of acting.
XXVI. Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo, quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur.
XXVI. Humility is sadness arising from a man’s contemplating his lack of power, or weakness.
Explicatio. Acquiescentia in se ipso humilitati opponitur, quatenus per eandem intelligimus laetitiam, quae ex eo oritur, quod nostram agendi potentiam contemplamur. Sed quatenus per ipsam etiam intelligimus laetitiam concomitante idea alicuius facti, quod nos ex mentis libero decreto fecisse credimus, tum poenitentiae opponitur, quae a nobis sic definitur:
Explanation. Self-contentment is opposed to humility insofar as we understand by it the joy which arises from our contemplating our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it joy accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decree of the mind, it is opposed to repentance, which is defined by us thus:
[G II 197] XXVII. Poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius facti, quod nos ex libero mentis decreto fecisse credimus.
XXVII. Repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decree of the mind.
1 - 1 The belief in a free decree belongs to the definition: hence the violence of repentance and of self-contentment (Prop. 51, Schol.). Repentance is not a virtue; he who repents of a deed is twice wretched, or lacking in power (Part IV, Prop. 54).
Explicatio. Horum affectuum causas ostendimus in schol. prop. 51. huius et prop. 53., 54. et 55. huius eiusque schol. De libero autem mentis decreto vide schol. prop. 35. P. 2. Sed hic praeterea notandum venit, mirum non esse, quod omnes omnino actus, qui ex consuetudine pravi vocantur, sequatur tristitia, et illos, qui recti dicuntur, laetitia. Nam hoc ab educatione potissimum pendere, facile ex supra dictis intelligimus. Parentes nimirum illos exprobrando liberosque propter eosdem saepe obiurgando, hos contra suadendo et laudando effecerunt, ut tristitiae commotiones illis, laetitiae vero his iungerentur. Quod ipsa etiam experientia comprobatur. Nam consuetudo et religio non est omnibus eadem; sed contra, quae apud alios sacra, apud alios profana, et quae apud alios honesta, apud alios turpia sunt. Prout igitur unusquisque educatus est, ita facti alicuius poenitet vel eodem gloriatur.
Explanation. We have shown the causes of these affects in the
Schol. of Prop. 51 of this Part and in
Props. 53,
54 and
55 of this Part and its
Scholium. On the free decree of the mind, see the
Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part II. But here it should be noted besides that it is not surprising that all acts whatever which are by custom called
wrong are followed by sadness, and those which are called
right by joy. For we easily understand from what has been said above that this depends chiefly on education. Parents, namely, by reproaching the former and often scolding their children for them, and on the other hand by recommending and praising the latter, have brought it about that commotions of sadness were joined to the former and of joy to the latter. This is also confirmed by experience itself. For custom and religion are not the same for all; on the contrary, what is sacred among some is profane among others, and what is honourable among some is base among others. According, therefore, as each has been educated, so he repents of a deed or glories in it.
1 - 1 Moral feelings are formed by education through the association of affects (Prop. 14), which explains their variety from one people to another. This does not make good and evil arbitrary for Spinoza: Part IV defines them by what is truly useful, as known by reason (Part IV, Defs. 1–2).
XXVIII. Superbia est de se prae amore sui plus iusto sentire.
XXVIII. Pride is thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of self-love.
Explicatio. Differt igitur superbia ab existimatione, quod haec ad obiectum externum, superbia autem ad ipsum hominem de se plus iusto sentientem referatur. Ceterum ut existimatio amoris sic superbia philautiae effectus vel proprietas est, quae propterea etiam definiri potest, quod sit amor sui sive acquiescentia in se ipso, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de se plus iusto sentiat. Vide schol. prop. 26. huius. Huic affectui non datur contrarius. Nam nemo de se prae odio sui minus iusto sentit; imo nemo de se minus iusto sentit, quatenus imaginatur, se hoc vel illud non posse. Nam quicquid homo imaginatur se non posse, id necessario imaginatur, et hac imaginatione ita disponitur, ut id agere revera non possit, quod se non posse imaginatur. Quamdiu enim imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse, tamdiu ad agendum non est determinatus; et consequenter tamdiu impossibile ei est, ut id agat.
Explanation. Pride, therefore, differs from overestimation in that the latter is related to an external object, while pride is related to the man himself, who thinks more highly of himself than is just. For the rest, as overestimation is an effect or property of love, so
pride is an effect or property of self-love, and can therefore also be defined as love of oneself, or self-contentment, insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly of himself than is just. See the
Schol. of Prop. 26 of this Part. There is no contrary to this affect. For no one thinks less highly of himself than is just out of hatred of himself; indeed, no one thinks less highly of himself than is just insofar as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a man imagines he cannot do, he imagines necessarily, and by this imagination he is so disposed that he really cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For as long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, so long is he not determined to do it; and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it.
Verumenimvero si ad illa attendamus, quae a sola opinione pendent, concipere poterimus fieri posse, ut homo de se minus iusto sentiat. Fieri enim potest, ut aliquis, dum tristis imbecillitatem contemplatur suam, imaginetur, se ab omnibus contemni; idque, dum reliqui nihil minus cogitant, quam ipsum contemnere. Potest praeterea homo de se minus iusto sentire, si aliquid de se in praesenti neget cum relatione ad futurum tempus, cuius est incertus; ut quod neget, se nihil
a certi posse concipere nihilque nisi prava vel turpia posse cupere vel agere etc. Possumus deinde dicere, aliquem de se minus iusto sentire, cum videmus, ipsum ex nimio pudoris metu ea non audere, quae alii ipsi aequales audent. Hunc igitur affectum possumus superbiae opponere, quem
abiectionem vocabo. Nam ut ex acquiescentia in se ipso superbia, sic ex humilitate abiectio oritur; quae proinde a nobis sic definitur:
But if we attend to those things which depend on opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive that it can happen that a man thinks less highly of himself than is just. For it can happen that someone, while he sadly contemplates his weakness, imagines that he is despised by all, and that while the others think of nothing less than of despising him. Moreover, a man can think less highly of himself than is just if in the present he denies something of himself with relation to a future time of which he is uncertain; as if he denies that he can conceive anything certain, or that he can desire or do anything but what is wrong or base, etc. We can say, next, that someone thinks less highly of himself than is just when we see that, from an excessive fear of shame, he does not dare the things which others equal to him dare. This affect, then, we can oppose to pride; I shall call it self-abasement. For as pride arises from self-contentment, so self-abasement arises from humility; and it is therefore defined by us thus:
- a ut quod neget, se nihil] transcr. ut quod negetm, se nihil. Transcription slip; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 198) read ‘neget’.
[G II 198] XXIX. Abiectio est de se prae tristitia minus iusto sentire.
XXIX. Self-abasement is thinking less highly of oneself than is just, out of sadness.
Explicatio. Solemus tamen saepe superbiae humilitatem opponere; sed tum magis ad utriusque effectus, quam naturam attendimus. Solemus namque illum
superbum vocare, qui nimis gloriatur (vide schol. prop. 30. huius), qui non nisi virtutes suas et aliorum non nisi vitia narrat, qui omnibus praeferri vult, et qui denique ea gravitate et ornatu incedit, quo solent alii, qui longe supra ipsum sunt positi. Contra illum
humilem vocamus, qui saepius erubescit, qui sua vitia fatetur et aliorum virtutes narrat, qui omnibus cedit, et qui denique submisso capite ambulat et se ornare negligit. Ceterum hi affectus, nempe humilitas et abiectio, rarissimi sunt. Nam natura humana in se considerata contra eosdem, quantum potest nititur (vide prop. 13. et 54. huius);
a et ideo qui maxime creduntur abiecti et humiles esse, maxime plerumque ambitiosi et invidi sunt.
Explanation. We are nevertheless accustomed often to oppose humility to pride; but then we attend more to the effects of the two than to their nature. For we usually call him
proud who glories too much (see the
Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part), who tells of nothing but his own virtues and others’ vices, who wants to be preferred to all, and who, finally, goes about with the gravity and finery usual for others who are placed far above him. On the other hand, we call him
humble who blushes rather often, who confesses his own vices and tells of others’ virtues, who yields to all, and who, finally, walks with head bowed and neglects to adorn himself. For the rest, these affects, namely humility and self-abasement, are very rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see
Props. 13 and
54 of this Part); and so those who are most believed to be self-abased and humble are generally most ambitious and envious.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 155) has Prop. 15. & 34. in the text, and its list of errata asks for 15. and 54., as the Dutch version has; Gfroerer, Bruder and Saisset follow. Valentin Schmidt, Auerbach, Land and Van Vloten–Land rightly correct to 13. and 54., and Gebhardt (G II 199; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.
[G II 199] XXX. Gloria est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios laudare imaginamur.
XXX. Glory is joy accompanied by the idea of some action of ours which we imagine others to praise.
XXXI. Pudor est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius actionis, quam alios vituperare
a imaginamur.
XXXI. Shame is sadness accompanied by the idea of some action which we imagine others to blame.
- a idea alicuius actionis, quam alios vituperare] transcr. idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios vituperare. The 1677 edition (OP p. 155), Gebhardt (G II 199) and Bartuschat have no ‘nostrae’ in the definition of shame (unlike that of glory).
Explicatio. De his vide schol. prop. 30. huius. Sed hic notanda est differentia, quae est inter pudorem et verecundiam. Est enim
pudor tristitia, quae sequitur factum cuius pudet;
verecundia autem est metus seu timor pudoris,
a quo homo continetur, ne aliquid turpe committat. Verecundiae opponi solet
impudentia, quae revera
b affectus non est, ut suo loco ostendam; sed affectuum nomina (ut iam monui) magis eorum usum, quam naturam respiciunt. Atque his laetitiae et tristitiae affectus,
cd quos explicare proposueram, absolvi. Pergo itaque ad illos, quos ad cupiditatem refero.
e Explanation. On these see the
Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part. But here the difference between shame and shamefacedness should be noted. For
shame is the sadness which follows a deed of which one is ashamed;
shamefacedness, however, is the fear, or timidity, of shame, by which a man is held back from committing something base. To shamefacedness
shamelessness is usually opposed, which in truth is not an affect, as I shall show in its place;
1 but the names of the affects (as I have already pointed out) regard their usage more than their nature. And with these I have completed the affects of joy and sadness which I had proposed to explain. I proceed, therefore, to those which I relate to desire.
- a verecundia autem est metus seu timor pudoris] transcr. verecundia autem metus seu timor pudoris. The 1677 edition (OP p. 155), Gebhardt (G II 199) and Bartuschat read ‘est’.
- b opponi solet impudentia, quae revera] transcr. opponi solet *impudentia, quae revera. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis over the next sentences.
- c Atque his laetitiae et tristitiae affectus] transcr. Atque his laetitiae et tristitiae affectus. Italics (see the previous note).
- d The 1677 edition (OP p. 155) has hi, which Paulus already corrected to his; Gebhardt (G II 199; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.
- e quos ad cupiditatem refero.] transcr. quos ad cupiditatem* refero. Italics (see the previous note).
- 1 The promise is not explicitly kept. The nearest passage is Part IV, Prop. 58, Schol.: a man who is ashamed of a deed, though he is sad, is more perfect than the shameless man, who has no desire to live honourably.
XXXII. Desiderium est cupiditas sive appetitus re aliqua potiundi, quae eiusdem rei memoria fovetur, et simul aliarum rerum memoria, quae eiusdem rei appetendae existentiam secludunt, coercetur.
XXXII. Longing is the desire, or appetite, to possess some thing, which is fostered by the memory of that thing and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing wanted.
Explicatio. Cum alicuius rei recordamur, ut iam saepe diximus, eo ipso disponimur ad eandem eodem affectu contemplandum, ac si res praesens adesset; sed haec dispositio seu conatus, dum vigilamus, plerumque cohibetur ab imaginibus rerum, quae existentiam eius, cuius recordamur, secludunt. Quando itaque rei meminimus, quae nos aliquo laetitiae genere afficit, eo ipso conamur eandem cum eodem laetitiae affectu ut praesentem contemplari; qui quidem conatus statim cohibetur memoria rerum, quae illius existentiam secludunt. Quare desiderium revera tristitia est, quae laetitiae opponitur illi, quae ex absentia rei, quam odimus, oritur, de qua vide schol. prop. 47. huius. Sed quia nomen desiderium cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad cupiditatis affectus refero.
Explanation. When we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we are thereby disposed to contemplate it with the same affect as if the thing were present; but this disposition, or striving, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of what we recollect. When, therefore, we remember a thing which affects us with some kind of joy, we thereby strive to contemplate it as present with the same affect of joy; and this striving is immediately checked by the memory of things which exclude its existence. Longing, therefore, is in truth a sadness, which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of a thing we hate, on which see the
Schol. of Prop. 47 of this Part. But because the name
desiderium seems to refer to desire, I relate this affect to the affects of desire.
[G II 200] XXXIII. Aemulatio est alicuius rei cupiditas, quae nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.
XXXIII. Emulation is the desire for some thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others to have the same desire.
Explicatio. Qui fugit, quia alios fugere, vel qui timet, quia alios timere videt, vel etiam ille, qui ex eo, quod aliquem manum suam combussisse videt, manum ad se contrahit corpusque movet, quasi ipsius manus combureretur, eum imitari quidem alterius affectum, sed non eundem aemulari dicemus; non quia aliam aemulationis, aliam imitationis novimus causam, sed quia usu factum est, ut illum tantum vocemus aemulum, qui id, quod honestum, utile vel iucundum esse iudicamus, imitatur. Ceterum de aemulationis causa vide prop. 27. huius cum eius schol. Cur autem huic affectui plerumque iuncta sit invidia, de eo vide prop. 32. huius cum eiusdem schol.
Explanation. He who flees because he sees others flee, or who fears because he sees others fear, or even he who, because he sees that someone has burned his hand, draws back his own hand and moves his body as if his own hand were being burned, we shall say imitates the other’s affect, but not that he emulates it; not because we know one cause of emulation and another of imitation, but because it has become customary to call him only an emulator who imitates what we judge to be honourable, useful or pleasant. For the rest, on the cause of emulation see
Prop. 27 of this Part with its
Scholium. Why envy is generally joined to this affect, see
Prop. 32 of this Part with its
Scholium.
XXXIV. Gratia seu gratitudo est cupiditas seu amoris studium, quo ei benefacere conamur, qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit. Vide prop. 39. cum schol. prop. 41. huius.
XXXIV. Thankfulness, or
gratitude, is the desire, or eagerness of love, by which we strive to do good to one who has conferred a benefit on us from a like affect of love. See
Prop. 39 with the
Schol. of Prop. 41 of this Part.
XXXV. Benevolentia est cupiditas benefaciendi ei, cuius nos miseret. Vide schol. prop. 27. huius.
a - a Vide schol. prop. 27. huius.] transcr. Vide schol. ad coroll. 3. prop. 27. huius. The 1677 edition (OP p. 156), Gebhardt (G II 200) and Bartuschat read ‘Vide Schol. Prop. 27. hujus’; the transcription adds ‘ad coroll. 3.’, which identifies the Scholium meant (to Cor. 3).
XXXVI. Ira est cupiditas, qua ex odio incitamur ad illi quem odimus malum inferendum. Vide prop. 39. huius.
XXXVI. Anger is the desire by which we are spurred, from hatred, to inflict evil on one we hate. See
Prop. 39 of this Part.
[G II 201] XXXVII. Vindicta est cupiditas, qua ex reciproco odio concitamur ad malum inferendum ei, qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit. Vide coroll. 2. prop. 40. huius cum eiusdem schol.
XXXVII. Vengeance is the desire by which we are roused, from reciprocal hatred, to inflict evil on one who, from a like affect, has done us harm. See
Cor. 2 of Prop. 40 of this Part with its
Scholium.
XXXVIII. Crudelitas seu
saevitia est cupiditas, qua aliquis concitatur ad malum inferendum ei, quem amamus,
a vel cuius nos miseret.
XXXVIII. Cruelty, or savagery, is the desire by which someone is roused to inflict evil on one whom we love or whom we pity.
- a W. Meijer translated as if the text had ei, quem amat, vel cujus eum miseret, declared the definition false and proposed concitamur; Baensch adopts concitamur, to bring the definition into line with Prop. 41, Cor., Schol.. Gebhardt (G II 201; Textgestaltung II 376) keeps the text: the change of person is deliberate, since Spinoza calls the intention of someone to do harm cruel only where it meets our love or our pity (otherwise the jailer’s or the executioner’s action would also be cruel); Appuhn keeps the text.
Explicatio. Crudelitati opponitur
clementia, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.
a Explanation. To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a passion, but a power of the mind by which a man moderates anger and vengeance.
- a opponitur clementia, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.] transcr. opponitur clementia, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur. Italics: only the name of the affect is emphasized.
XXXIX. Timor est cupiditas maius quod metuimus malum minore vitandi. Vide schol. prop. 39. huius.
XL. Audacia est cupiditas, qua aliquis incitatur ad aliquid agendum cum periculo, quod eius aequales subire metuunt.
XL. Daring is the desire by which someone is spurred to do something with a danger which his equals fear to face.
XLI. Pusillanimitas dicitur de eo, cuius cupiditas coercetur timore periculi, quod eius aequales subire audent.
XLI. Cowardice is said of one whose desire is restrained by the timidity of a danger which his equals dare to face.
Explicatio. Est igitur pusillanimitas nihil aliud, quam metus alicuius mali quod plerique non solent metuere; quare ipsam ad cupiditatis affectus non refero. Eandem tamen hic explicare volui, quia quatenus ad cupiditatem attendimus, affectui audaciae revera opponitur.
Explanation. Cowardice, therefore, is nothing but the fear of some evil which most men are not accustomed to fear; that is why I do not relate it to the affects of desire. But I wanted to explain it here because, insofar as we attend to desire, it is really opposed to the affect of daring.
XLII. Consternatio dicitur de eo, cuius cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali, quod timet.
XLII. Consternation is said of one whose desire to avoid an evil is restrained by wonder at the evil he fears.
Explicatio. Est itaque consternatio pusillanimitatis species. Sed quia consternatio ex duplici timore oritur, ideo commodius definiri potest, quod sit metus, qui hominem stupefactum aut fluctuantem ita continet, ut is malum amovere non possit. Dico stupefactum, quatenus eius cupiditatem malum amovendi admiratione coerceri intelligimus. Fluctuantem autem dico, quatenus concipimus eandem cupiditatem coerceri timore alterius mali, quod ipsum aeque cruciat; unde fit ut quodnam ex duobus avertat, nesciat. De his vide schol. prop. 39. et schol. prop. 52. huius. Ceterum de pusillanimitate et audacia vide schol. prop. 51. huius.
Explanation. Consternation, therefore, is a species of cowardice. But because consternation arises from a twofold timidity, it can more conveniently be defined as a fear which holds a man stupefied or fluctuating so that he cannot remove the evil. I say
stupefied insofar as we understand his desire to remove the evil to be restrained by wonder. I say
fluctuating, however, insofar as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the timidity of another evil which torments him equally, so that he does not know which of the two to avert. On these see the
Schol. of Prop. 39 and the
Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part. For the rest, on cowardice and daring see the
Schol. of Prop. 51 of this Part.
[G II 202] XLIII. Humanitas seu modestia est cupiditas ea faciendi quae hominibus placent, et omittendi quae displicent.
XLIII. Courtesy, or modesty, is the desire to do what pleases men and to omit what displeases them.
XLIV. Ambitio est immodica gloriae cupiditas.
XLIV. Ambition is an immoderate desire for glory.
Explicatio. Ambitio est cupiditas, qua omnes affectus (per prop. 27. et 31. huius) foventur et corroborantur; et ideo hic affectus vix superari potest. Nam quamdiu homo aliqua cupiditate tenetur, hac simul necessario tenetur. “Optimus quisque, inquit Cicero,
a maxime gloria ducitur. Philosophi etiam libris, quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt” etc.
Explanation. Ambition is a desire by which all the affects (by
Props. 27 and
31 of this Part) are fostered and strengthened; and for this reason this affect can hardly be overcome. For as long as a man is held by any desire, he is necessarily held by this one at the same time. ‘Every best man’, says Cicero,
1 ‘is led most by glory. Even the philosophers inscribe their names on the books which they write on despising glory’, etc.
- a Vid. Cic. pro Archia cap. 11. Conf. Tuscul. disp. l. 1., cap. 15. [Bruder]
- 1 Cicero, Pro Archia 26: ‘trahimur omnes studio laudis, et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur. ipsi illi philosophi etiam in eis libellis quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt nomen suum inscribunt’ (‘we are all drawn by the desire for praise, and every best man is led most by glory. Those very philosophers inscribe their names even on the little books they write on despising glory’). The same remark is in the Tusculan Disputations I.34.
XLV. Luxuria est immoderata convivandi cupiditas vel etiam amor.
XLV. Gluttony is an immoderate desire, or also love, of feasting.
XLVI. Ebrietas est immoderata potandi cupiditas et amor.
XLVI. Drunkenness is an immoderate desire and love of drinking.
XLVII. Avaritia est immoderata divitiarum cupiditas et amor.
XLVII. Greed is an immoderate desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. Libido est etiam cupiditas et amor in commiscendis corporibus.
XLVIII. Lust is also a desire and love in the joining of bodies.
Explicatio. Sive haec coeundi cupiditas moderata sit sive non sit, libido appellari solet. Porro hi quinque affectus (ut in schol. prop. 56. huius monui) contrarios non habent. Nam modestia species est ambitionis, de qua vide schol. prop. 29. huius. Temperantiam deinde, sobrietatem et castitatem mentis potentiam, non autem passionem indicare, iam etiam monui. Et tametsi fieri potest ut homo avarus, ambitiosus vel timidus a nimio cibo, potu et coitu abstineat, avaritia tamen, ambitio et timor luxuriae, ebrietati vel libidini
a non sunt contrarii. Nam avarus in cibum et potum alienum se ingurgitare
b plerumque desiderat. Ambitiosus autem, modo speret fore clam, in nulla re sibi temperabit, et si inter ebrios vivat et libidinosos, ideo quia ambitiosus est, proclivior erit ad eadem vitia. Timidus denique id quod non vult, facit. Nam quamvis mortis vitandae causa divitias in mare proiiciat, manet tamen avarus; et si libidinosus tristis est, quod sibi morem gerere nequeat, non desinit propterea libidinosus esse. Et absolute hi affectus non tam ipsos actus convivandi, potandi etc. respiciunt, quam ipsum appetitum et amorem. Nihil igitur his affectibus opponi potest praeter generositatem et animositatem, de quibus in seqq.
Explanation. Whether this desire for sexual union is moderate or not, it is usually called lust. Further, these five affects (as I pointed out in the
Schol. of Prop. 56 of this Part) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition, on which see the
Schol. of Prop. 29 of this Part. Next, I have also already pointed out that temperance, sobriety and chastity indicate a power of the mind, not a passion. And although it can happen that a greedy, ambitious or timid man abstains from too much food, drink and sexual union, greed, ambition and timidity are nevertheless not contrary to gluttony, drunkenness or lust. For the greedy man generally longs to gorge himself on another’s food and drink. The ambitious man, again, provided he hopes it will be secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives among drunkards and the lustful, he will, precisely because he is ambitious, be more inclined to the same vices. The timid man, finally, does what he does not will. For although he throws his riches into the sea to avoid death, he remains greedy; and if the lustful man is sad that he cannot indulge himself, he does not on that account cease to be lustful. And absolutely, these affects regard not so much the acts themselves of feasting, drinking, etc., as the appetite and love itself. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these affects except nobility and tenacity, of which in what follows.
- a The 1677 edition (OP p. 158) and the editions before Van Vloten–Land read castitati, as does the Dutch version (kuisheit). Land and Van Vloten–Land, after Schmidt, Saisset, Auerbach and Pollock, correct to libidini, followed by W. Meijer, Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Leopold, and Gebhardt (G II 203; Textgestaltung II 376).
- b The 1677 edition has ingurgitare; Gebhardt (G II 203; Textgestaltung II 376) reads se ingurgitare, as Leopold proposed.
[G II 203] Definitiones
zelotypiae et reliquarum animi fluctuationum silentio praetermitto, tam quia ex compositione affectuum, quos iam definivimus, oriuntur, quam quia pleraeque nomina non habent, quod ostendit ad usum vitae sufficere, easdem in genere tantummodo noscere. Ceterum ex definitionibus affectuum, quos explicuimus, liquet eos
omnes a
cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia oriri,
a seu potius nihil praeter hos tres esse, quorum unusquisque variis nominibus appellari solet propter varias eorum relationes et denominationes extrinsecas. Si iam ad hos primitivos et ad eam, quae de natura mentis supra diximus, attendere velimus, affectus, quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, sic definire poterimus.
b I pass over in silence the definitions of
jealousy and the other fluctuations of mind, both because they arise from the composition of affects we have already defined and because most of them have no names, which shows that for the conduct of life it is enough to know them only in general. For the rest, it is clear from the definitions of the affects we have explained that they
all arise from
desire, joy or sadness, or rather are nothing but these three, each of which is usually called by various names on account of their various relations and extrinsic denominations.
1 If we now wish to attend to these primitive affects and to what we said above about the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define the affects, insofar as they are related to the mind alone, as follows.
- a a cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia oriri,] transcr. a *cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia oriri,. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the passage.
- b sic definire poterimus.] transcr. sic definire poterimus. Italics (see the previous note).
- 1 The names of the affects are taken from the objects and circumstances to which they are related, not from their nature, which is in every case desire, joy or sadness. On extrinsic denomination see the note on Part II, Prop. 43, Schol..
Affectuum Generalis Definitio
General Definition of the Affects
[G II 203] Affectus, qui animi pathema dicitur, est confusa idea, qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat, et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius, quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur.
An affect, which is called a
passion of the mind,
1 is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, when it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than of that.
- 1 animi pathema: from the Greek πάθημα (‘something undergone’). The General Definition defines only the affect that is a passion, from the side of the mind; the active affects (Props. 58–59) arise from adequate ideas. Its first part gives the nature of joy and sadness, the last clause that of desire (Explanation, last sentence).
[G II 204] Explicatio. Dico primo affectum seu passionem animi esse “confusam ideam”. Nam mentem eatenus tantum pati ostendimus (vide prop. 3 huius), quatenus ideas inadaequatas sive confusas habet. Dico deinde “qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat”. Omnes enim corporum ideae, quas habemus, magis nostri corporis actualem constitutionem (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.), quam corporis externi naturam indicant; at haec, quae affectus formam constituit, corporis vel alicuius eius partis constitutionem indicare vel exprimere debet, quam ipsum corpus vel aliqua eius pars habet, ex eo, quod ipsius agendi potentia sive existendi vis augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur.
Explanation. I say first that an affect, or passion of the mind, is ‘a confused idea’. For we have shown that the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or confused, ideas (see
Prop. 3 of this Part). I say next ‘by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before’. For all the ideas of bodies which we have indicate the actual constitution of our body (by
Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II) more than the nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form of the affect, must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or of some part of it, which the body itself, or some part of it, has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.
Sed notandum cum dico “maiorem vel minorem existendi vim, quam antea”, me non intelligere, quod mens praesentem corporis constitutionem cum praeterita comparat, sed quod idea, quae affectus formam constituit, aliquid de corpore affirmat, quod plus minusve realitatis revera involvit, quam antea. Et quia essentia mentis in hoc consistit (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.), quod sui corporis actualem existentiam affirmat, et nos per perfectionem ipsam rei essentiam intelligimus; sequitur ergo, quod mens ad maiorem minoremve perfectionem transit, quando ei aliquid de suo corpore vel aliqua eius parte affirmare contingit, quod plus minusve realitatis involvit, quam antea. Cum igitur supra dixerim mentis cogitandi potentiam augeri vel minui, nihil aliud intelligere volui, quam quod mens ideam sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis formaverit, quae plus minusve realitatis exprimit, quam de suo corpore affirmaverat. Nam idearum praestantia et actualis cogitandi potentia ex obiecti praestantia aestimatur. Addidi denique “et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad aliud cogitandum determinatur”,
a ut praeter laetitiae et tristitiae naturam, quam prima definitionis pars explicat, cupiditatis etiam naturam exprimerem.
But it should be noted that when I say ‘a greater or lesser force of existing than before’, I do not understand that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with a past one,
1 but that the idea which constitutes the form of the affect affirms something of the body which really involves more or less reality than before. And because the essence of the mind consists in this (by
Props. 11 and
13 of Part II), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something of its body, or of some part of it, which involves more or less reality than before. When, therefore, I said above that the mind’s power of thinking is increased or diminished, I wanted to understand nothing but that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or of some part of it, which expresses more or less reality than it had affirmed of its body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking are estimated from the excellence of the object.
2 I added, finally, ‘and by which, when it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than of anything else’, so as to express, besides the nature of joy and sadness, which the first part of the definition explains, the nature of desire as well.
- a ad hoc potius quam ad aliud cogitandum determinatur”] transcr. ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur”. The 1677 edition (OP p. 160) and Gebhardt (G II 204) read ‘aliud’ in this quotation of the definition (the definition itself has ‘illud’).
- 1 The comparison ‘than before’ is not made by the mind; the idea itself affirms more or less reality. Joy and sadness are therefore not judgments about one’s condition but the very passage of the mind, as the idea of the body, to more or less perfection (Def. 3, Expl.).
- 2 The principle of Part II, Prop. 13, Schol.: ideas differ among themselves as their objects do, and one is more excellent than another as its object is more excellent.