Ethices Pars Secunda
De Natura et Origine Mentis

Second Part of the Ethics
Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Introduction to the Second Part

Part I deduced God and the necessity with which everything follows from him. Part II narrows the field at once. Spinoza will not explain everything that follows from God’s essence, for infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways (Part I, Prop. 16), “but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness” (Preface). The word beatitudo points to the end of the book; the promise is redeemed only in Part V (Part V, Prop. 42). Part II is the first step toward it: a theory of the mind, of knowledge and of error, built on the metaphysics of Part I.

It is also the Part in which the reader first sees what the metaphysics of Part I is for. Substance, attribute and mode were abstract terms; in Part II they become a theory of what a human being is. A human being is a mode of God, and so is the mind, and so is the body, and the relation between the mind and the body is the relation between a mode of thought and a mode of extension. Much of what Part II says about perception, memory, error and knowledge follows from this one thesis, that the mind is the idea of the body. The rest of this introduction explains the problem Spinoza inherited, the doctrine he put in its place, and the theory of knowledge that grows out of it, and points to the places where readers most often go astray.

The problem it inherits

The problem is Descartes’. For Descartes the mind and the body are two created substances, a thinking and an extended one, each with its own principal attribute (Principles I.53), really distinct and yet united, so that the mind moves the body and is affected by it through a small gland in the brain. Spinoza returns to this view in the Preface to Part V, where he expresses his astonishment that a philosopher who had resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles should have assumed a hypothesis “more occult than any occult quality.”

Part I has already removed the two substances: thought and extension are attributes of the one substance, God (Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2). Part II begins by stating this in form. Prop. 1 argues that “thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing,” from the existence of particular thoughts which must be conceived through some attribute, and adds in a scholium that we can conceive an infinite thinking being, since “the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality or perfection we conceive it to contain” (Prop. 1, Schol.). Prop. 2 does the same for extension. A reader who has followed Part I will not be surprised. What is new is the use to which these propositions are put. Mind and body are not two things that need to be joined; they are two modes, of two attributes, of one substance.

The definitions and axioms

The definitions and axioms bring in the vocabulary the rest of the Part needs, and several of them repay attention. A body is “a mode which expresses God’s essence, insofar as he is considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate way” (Def. 1): not a substance, and not a thing that could exist without God. The definition of essence (Def. 2) adds a reciprocal clause to the traditional one: the essence of a thing is that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, “and which in turn without the thing” can neither be nor be conceived. The addition matters, because without it God, without whom nothing can be or be conceived, would belong to the essence of everything; Spinoza explains the point later (Prop. 10, Cor., Schol.).

An idea is “a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing” (Def. 3), and the explanation adds: “I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind.” Spinoza will insist on this throughout. An idea is not “something mute, like a picture on a panel” (Prop. 43, Schol.), an image waiting to be judged, but an act of thinking that already affirms or denies something. An adequate idea is one “which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations, of a true idea” (Def. 4). The definition separates two things that ordinary usage runs together: truth, which is the agreement of an idea with its object (Part I, Ax. 6), and adequacy, which is a property the idea has in itself. Every adequate idea is true, but the converse is the burden of the second half of the Part.

Duration is “an indefinite continuation of existing” (Def. 5), indefinite because it cannot be determined by the nature of the existing thing itself. Reality and perfection are the same (Def. 6), which means that perfection is not a moral or aesthetic grade but a measure of being. And singular things are “things that are finite and have a determinate existence,” to which Spinoza adds that several individuals which so concur in one action that all are together the cause of one effect may be considered “as one singular thing” (Def. 7). The clause prepares the account of composite bodies in the physical digression, and with it the possibility that a human being, a society or the whole of nature may count as one individual.

The axioms include the only empirical premises of the Part. “Man thinks” (Ax. 2). “We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways” (Ax. 4). “We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking” (Ax. 5). Spinoza is sparing with appeals to experience, and these are the ones he allows himself. Another axiom will matter later: modes of thinking such as love and desire are not given unless there is in the same individual an idea of the thing loved or desired, though an idea can be given without any other mode of thinking (Ax. 3). The idea is the basic mode of thought; the affects of Part III will be ideas of a certain kind.

Ideas in God

Props. 3–6 work out the place of ideas in God. “In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from his essence” (Prop. 3), and this idea is unique (Prop. 4). Ideas, considered in their own being as modes of thinking, their “formal being,” are caused by God only insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not by the things they are ideas of (Prop. 5); and in general the modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under that attribute (Prop. 6). Causation does not cross from one attribute to another.

The corollary to Prop. 6 draws a consequence that cuts against a long tradition: “the formal being of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God first knew the things; rather, the things that are the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their own attributes in the same way and with the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought” (Prop. 6, Cor.). On the traditional picture, God creates the world according to the ideas in his intellect, as an architect builds according to a plan. Spinoza denies it. Bodies do not follow from God’s ideas of them; they follow from extension, as ideas follow from thought. Long before human minds appear, the ground has been taken away from any interaction between mind and body. Part III will say so outright: “The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)” (Part III, Prop. 2).

Parallelism and identity

Prop. 7 states the doctrine for which Part II is best known: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.” Commentators call it Spinoza’s “parallelism”; the word is not his (M. Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 1996, p. 19). The demonstration is a single line, an appeal to the axiom that the knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of its cause (Part I, Ax. 4). As Della Rocca points out, the axiom by itself does not guarantee that every thing has an idea; for that Spinoza needs Prop. 3 (pp. 22–23). The corollary puts the doctrine in terms of power: “God’s power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting; that is, whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature, all of it follows objectively in God, in the same order and with the same connection, from the idea of God” (Prop. 7, Cor.). The scholastic pair of “formal” and “objective” being, which Descartes had used in the third Meditation (AT VII 40–41), here names the two sides of one order: a thing as it is in itself, and the same thing as it is represented in an idea.

The scholium goes further than the proposition. It recalls that “the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that,” and concludes: “So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways” (Prop. 7, Schol.). The claim is no longer that two series correspond, but that each pair of corresponding items is one thing. Martial Gueroult describes the step as a passage from the identity of the chains to the identity of the things chained, and notes that Prop. 7 is proved by an axiom about knowledge, while the scholium explains by ontological truths why it holds (Spinoza II: L’âme, 1974, pp. 85–86). The second half of the scholium then guards the distinction of the attributes: although a circle existing in nature and the idea of that circle are one and the same thing, the idea is to be explained only through other modes of thinking, the circle only through other modes of extension. One thing, two explanations, and no explanation that passes from one attribute to the other.

Prop. 8 adds a doctrine that will be needed in Part V. The ideas of singular things that do not exist are comprehended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of those things are contained in God’s attributes. The scholium gives an illustration, which Spinoza admits cannot be adequate, since the case is unique: in a circle there are infinitely many rectangles formed from the segments of intersecting chords, all equal to one another, and none of them can be said to exist except insofar as the circle exists; but if two of them are actually drawn, their ideas now exist not only as comprehended in the idea of the circle but also as involving the existence of those rectangles (Prop. 8, Schol.). The distinction between a thing’s essence as contained in God’s attributes and its existence in duration is the distinction on which Part V’s account of the eternity of the mind will turn.

The mind as the idea of the body

Applied to the human being, all this becomes the thesis of Props. 11–13. “The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing” (Prop. 11). The mind is therefore “part of the infinite intellect of God,” and when we say that the human mind perceives something, “we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea” (Prop. 11, Cor.). Spinoza expects resistance at this point: readers “will come to a halt and think of many things that give them pause,” and he asks them “not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read through everything” (Prop. 11, Schol.). Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the mind must be perceived by the mind (Prop. 12), and that object is “a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else” (Prop. 13). The corollary draws the conclusion “that man consists of a mind and a body, and that the human body exists as we feel it” (Prop. 13, Cor.).

The scholium to Prop. 13 makes two remarks that every reader should keep in view. The first is that “the things we have shown so far are very general and pertain no more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate” (Prop. 13, Schol.). There is an idea in God of every body, and so, in the sense defined, a mind of every body. Jonathan Bennett calls the resulting position panpsychism, and argues that Spinoza is driven to it because, once mind and body are conceptually independent, no line drawn across nature between things that have minds and things that do not could be anything but arbitrary; he adds that this “is not to say that every physical thing has a mind properly so-called, or indeed that it has anything we would recognize as mental” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, § 33, pp. 137–138). The second remark is that minds differ as their bodies do: “the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once.” To know what is distinctive about the human mind, then, we must know what is distinctive about the human body, and Spinoza interrupts the propositions at this point to give a brief account of bodies, the physical digression introduced in the essay that follows the scholium.

Imagination, memory and inadequate knowledge

The propositions that follow the physical digression build an account of perception on this foundation. The idea of any way in which the human body is affected by external bodies “must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body” (Prop. 16), and so “the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies” (Prop. 16, Cor. 2). When the body is affected in a way that involves the nature of an external body, the mind will regard that body as present until the body is affected in a way that excludes its presence (Prop. 17), which explains how we can regard as present things that no longer exist. Spinoza calls the affections of the body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us “images of things,” “even though they do not reproduce the figures of things,” and when the mind regards bodies in this way he says that it “imagines” (Prop. 17, Schol.).

The word “imagination” therefore has a much wider sense in the Ethics than in English. It covers sense perception as well as fantasy, and it means every way of perceiving things through the affections of one’s own body. Spinoza adds at once that imagination is not in itself an error: “the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error,” and the mind errs only insofar as it lacks an idea that excludes the existence of the things it imagines as present. Memory, likewise, is “a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body,” which takes place “according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body,” and not according to the order of the intellect (Prop. 18, Schol.). The example is memorable. A soldier who sees the tracks of a horse in the sand passes at once from the thought of a horse to that of a horseman, and from there to the thought of war; a farmer passes from the thought of a horse to that of a plough and a field. Each follows the order in which the images were joined in his own body.

The consequences for self-knowledge are severe. The mind does not know the human body, nor that it exists, except through the ideas of the body’s affections (Prop. 19); it does not know itself except insofar as it perceives these ideas (Prop. 23); it has no adequate knowledge of the parts of its body (Prop. 24), of external bodies (Prop. 25), or of the duration of its body or of other things (Props. 30–31). The conclusion is drawn in the corollary to Prop. 29: whenever the mind “perceives things from the common order of nature,” it has “neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies an adequate knowledge, but only a confused and mutilated one” (Prop. 29, Cor.). The scholium adds the qualification on which the rest of the book depends. This holds whenever the mind is determined externally, “from the fortuitous encounter with things,” to regard this or that, and not whenever it is determined internally, “from the fact that it contemplates several things at once, to understanding their agreements, differences and oppositions” (Prop. 29, Schol.). There is another way of thinking, and the second half of Part II describes it.

Truth, error and the three kinds of knowledge

The account of truth and error begins with a surprising claim: “All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true” (Prop. 32), and “there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false” (Prop. 33). Falsity “consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve” (Prop. 35). The scholium gives two examples. Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of their causes. And when we look at the sun, “we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us; an error which does not consist in this imagining alone, but in the fact that while we imagine it so, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining” (Prop. 35, Schol.). Even when we learn its true distance, we still imagine it near, since the image expresses the way our body is affected by the sun. Error is not a positive thing added to an idea, such as an act of misjudgment; it is an idea that is true as far as it goes but incomplete, taken for complete.

The escape from inadequacy begins with what Spinoza calls common notions. Some things are common to all bodies and are equally in the part and in the whole, and these “can only be conceived adequately” (Prop. 38), since whatever idea we have of them, from whatever part of our body, is complete. From such notions, and from the adequate ideas of the properties of things that follow from them, reason proceeds. The second scholium to Prop. 40 then sets out the doctrine of the three kinds of knowledge. The first kind, “opinion, or imagination,” comprises knowledge “from random experience,” built up from singular things perceived through the senses “in a mutilated, confused way and without order for the intellect,” and knowledge from signs, as when we hear or read words and recollect the things they signify. The second kind, “reason,” proceeds from common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. The third, “intuitive knowledge,” “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.”

Spinoza illustrates the three with a single example. Given three numbers, one is to find a fourth that is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants multiply the second by the third and divide by the first, either because they remember what they were told without demonstration, or because they have often found it so with simple numbers, or because they know the demonstration in Euclid. “But in the simplest numbers none of this is needed. For example, given the numbers 1, 2, 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6,” and this more clearly, because from the ratio we see at a glance between the first and the second, we infer the fourth itself. The first kind of knowledge is the only cause of falsity; the second and third are necessarily true (Prop. 41), and they alone teach us to distinguish the true from the false (Prop. 42).

Two further theses complete the account. The first is that truth is its own standard. “He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing” (Prop. 43), for “just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false” (Prop. 43, Schol.). Spinoza is answering the sceptic’s demand for a criterion of truth outside the true idea, which would need a further criterion, and so to infinity. The second is that “it is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity” (Prop. 44, Cor. 2): reason regards things as necessary, not as contingent, and so as following from the eternal nature of God. Part II ends this line of argument with a claim that may seem breathtaking: “The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God” (Prop. 47). Why then do men not have so clear a knowledge of God as of the common notions? Because they cannot imagine God as they imagine bodies, and because “they have joined the name God to the images of things which they are accustomed to see.” “And indeed most errors consist in this alone, that we do not apply names to things correctly” (Prop. 47, Schol.).

Will and intellect

Part II ends with two propositions about the will and the longest scholium of the Part. They deny that there is in the mind any absolute or free will, identify each volition with the affirmation or negation that an idea involves, and conclude that “will and intellect are one and the same.” The polemical target is Descartes’ theory of judgment and error, and the uses Spinoza draws from the doctrine at the end of the scholium sketch the program of the rest of the book. An essay before Prop. 48 introduces them.

Questions the reader will meet

Several features of Part II regularly mislead readers, and it may help to name them in advance.

The first is the word “idea.” For Spinoza an idea is an act of thinking that involves affirmation, not a picture or a mental image, and it is not necessarily conscious. The idea that constitutes the human mind is the idea of the body, but we are not aware of most of what happens in our bodies; Spinoza’s claim that whatever happens in the body is “perceived” by the mind (Prop. 12) uses “perceive” in a sense in which having an idea of something does not mean noticing it. The theory of consciousness that would make this intelligible is one of the least developed parts of the Ethics, and the reader should not expect to find it worked out.

The second concerns the other attributes. If each thing is expressed in infinitely many attributes, and there is an idea of each expression, why does the human mind know only the body? Spinoza’s reply to Tschirnhaus, which refers back to the scholium to Prop. 7, is that those infinitely many ideas do not constitute one mind but infinitely many, having no connection with one another (Letter 66). The human mind is the idea of the body, and of nothing else (Prop. 13).

The third concerns the identity of mind and body. Part III states the outcome of Part II in the words of the scholium to Prop. 7: “the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension” (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.). But how can a mode of extension and a mode of thought be one thing, if neither can be conceived or explained through the other? Della Rocca has argued that the answer lies in the “referential opacity” of explanatory contexts in Spinoza, which lets one and the same thing be explained under one attribute and not under another (1996, ch. 7). Others take the identity less strictly, as a correspondence between two series of modes. The question is important because Spinoza’s whole account of the affects depends on it. Appendix C takes up both this question and that of the other attributes.

The fourth is the relation between adequacy and truth. Every idea is true insofar as it is related to God, since in God’s intellect it is part of a complete idea; it is inadequate in us because our mind has only a part of that idea. Inadequacy is a matter of what a mind contains, and the same idea can be adequate in God and inadequate in us. This is why Spinoza can say both that all ideas are true and that most of ours are confused.

A last difficulty is the scope of Part II’s claims about the human mind. The propositions about imagination and memory describe the mind insofar as it is determined from outside, and they paint a bleak picture. The propositions about common notions and the third kind of knowledge describe the mind insofar as it is determined from within, and they paint a hopeful one. Both are true of every human mind; the question the rest of the Ethics asks is how the proportion between them can be changed.

The place of Part II in the whole

The doctrines of Part II carry the rest of the book. Part III will define the affects as affections of the body together with the ideas of those affections, and its account of the passions will rest on the theory of inadequate ideas worked out here. The denial of mind-body interaction allows Spinoza to treat human emotions as natural things, to be understood by their causes like lines, planes and bodies. Part IV’s distinction between being led by reason and being led by the affects is the practical form of the distinction between the second kind of knowledge and the first. And Part V’s account of the mind’s freedom and eternity returns to three propositions of this Part: to Prop. 8 and its corollary on the ideas of things insofar as they are contained in God’s attributes, to the third kind of knowledge of Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and to the doctrine that reason perceives things under a species of eternity (Prop. 44, Cor. 2).

The text begins with the Preface, a single sentence that narrows the field from everything that follows from God to what concerns the human mind, and then with the definitions. As in Part I, they are short and worth reading twice; several of them, above all those of idea and of adequate idea, are not what the reader expects.

Praefatio

Preface

[G II 84] Transeo iam ad ea explicanda, quae ex Dei, sive entis aeterni et infiniti essentia necessario debuerunt sequi. Non quidem omnia (infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi P. 1. prop. 16. demonstravimus), sed ea solummodo, quae nos ad mentis humanae eiusque summae beatitudinis cognitionem quasi manu ducere possunt.
I pass now to explaining the things that must necessarily have followed from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being. Not all of them, indeed (for we have demonstrated, Part I, Prop. 16, that infinitely many things must follow from it in infinitely many ways), but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.1
  1. 1 summae beatitudinis. What blessedness is, and that it ‘is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself’, is the subject of the end of Part V (Part V, Prop. 42).

Definitiones

Definitions

I. Per corpus intelligo modum, qui Dei essentiam, quatenus ut res extensa consideratur, certo et determinato modo exprimit. Vide P. 1. prop. 25. coroll.
I. By body I understand a mode1 which expresses God’s essence, insofar as he is considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate way. See Part I, Cor. of Prop. 25.
  1. 1 A body is a mode, not a substance. For Descartes extension ‘constitutes the nature of corporeal substance’ (substantiae corporeae naturam constituit; Principles I.53, AT VIII-1 25); for Spinoza it is an attribute of God, and each body one of its modes (Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2).

Cited in 2L2D, 2L3D, 3P2D

II. Ad essentiam alicuius rei id pertinere dico, quo dato res necessario ponitur et quo sublato res necessario tollitur; vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.
II. I say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing, and which in turn without the thing,1 can neither be nor be conceived.
  1. 1 The reciprocal clause (et vice versa) is Spinoza’s addition to the usual definition, which said only that the essence of a thing is that without which it can neither be nor be conceived. He explains the addition in Prop. 10, Cor., Schol.: singular things can neither be nor be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence.

Cited in 2P10D, 2P37D, 2P49D

III. Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format, propterea quod res est cogitans.
III. By idea I understand a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.

Cited in 2P48S

Explicatio. Dico potius conceptum, quam perceptionem, quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur, mentem ab obiecto pati. At conceptus actionem mentis exprimere videtur.
Explanation. I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind.1
  1. 1 The point returns against those who take an idea to be ‘something mute, like a picture on a panel’ (Prop. 43, Schol.; compare Prop. 49, Schol.). In the definition of attribute (Part I, Def. 4) the intellect percipit (‘perceives’); there the Dutch version of 1677 has bevat, glossed Concipere (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 346).
[G II 85] IV. Per ideam adaequatam intelligo ideam, quae, quatenus in se sine relatione ad obiectum consideratur, omnes verae ideae proprietates sive denominationes intrinsecas habet.
IV. By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations,1 of a true idea.
  1. 1 A scholastic term: an intrinsic denomination is a predicate a thing has in itself, an extrinsic one a predicate it has only by relation to something else. The relation in question is named in the Explanation. To Tschirnhaus Spinoza wrote: ‘Inter ideam veram et adaequatam nullam aliam differentiam agnosco, quam quod nomen veri respiciat tantummodo convenientiam ideae cum suo ideato, nomen adaequati autem naturam ideae in se ipsa’ (‘I recognize no other difference between a true and an adequate idea than that the word true looks only to the agreement of the idea with its object, the word adequate to the nature of the idea in itself’; Letter 60, VVL³ III 199–200).

Cited in 4P62D, 5P17D

Explicatio. Dico intrinsecas, ut illam secludam, quae extrinseca est, nempe convenientiam ideae cum suo ideato.
Explanation. I say intrinsic, so as to exclude the one that is extrinsic, namely the agreement of the idea with its object.
V. Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio.
V. Duration is an indefinite continuation of existing.1
  1. 1 Contrast eternity (Part I, Def. 8), which cannot be explained by duration even if the duration is conceived without beginning or end. The Cogitata Metaphysica had defined duration as ‘attributum, sub quo rerum creatarum existentiam, prout in sua actualitate perseverant, concipimus’ (‘the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality’; I.4, G I 244).
Explicatio. Dico indefinitam, quia per ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest, neque etiam a causa efficiente, quae scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.
Explanation. I say indefinite, because it can by no means be determined through the very nature of the existing thing, nor even by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.
VI. Per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo.
VI. By reality and perfection I understand the same thing.1
  1. 1 The Preface to Part IV returns to this definition and explains it: we refer all individuals in nature to one most general genus, the notion of being, and compare them in reality or perfection under it (Part IV, Pref.).

Cited in 4Pref, 5P35D, 5P40D

VII. Per res singulares intelligo res, quae finitae sunt et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individuaa in una actione ita concurrant, ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.
VII. By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if several individuals so concur in one action that all are together the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.1
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of bezonderen’ (‘or particulars’), glossed Singularia in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 85; Textgestaltung II 357).
  1. 1 The composite individual is defined in the physics that follows Prop. 13 (Definition after Ax. 2).

Axiomata

Axioms

I. Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam, hoc est, ex naturae ordine tam fieri potest, ut hic et ille homo existat, quam ut non existat.
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man exists, or that he does not exist.

Cited in 2P10D, 2P11D, 2P30D

II. Homo cogitat.a
II. Man thinks.1
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of anders, wy weten dat wy denken’ (‘or otherwise, we know that we think’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 85; Textgestaltung II 357), where he also notes that the Dutch translator’s marginal Latin terms here are misplaced.
  1. 1 Put as an axiom, and in the third person, where Descartes reached his first certainty in the first person: ‘Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum’ (‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’; Meditations II, AT VII 25). Compare the earlier form preserved in Dutch (note to the Latin).

Cited in 2P11D

III. Modi cogitandi, ut amor, cupiditas, vel quicumque nomine affectus animi insigniuntur, non dantur nisi in eodem individuo detur idea rei amatae, desideratae, etc. At idea dari potest, quamvis nullus alius detur cogitandi modus.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the name of affects of the mind,1 are not given unless there is in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But an idea can be given though no other mode of thinking is given.
  1. 1 affectus animi. The affects are defined in Part III, Def. 3.

Cited in 2P11D, 2P49D

[G II 86] IV. Nos corpus quoddam multis modis affici sentimus.
IV. We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways.

Cited in 2P13D

V. Nullas res singularesa praeter corpora et cogitandi modos sentimus, nec percipimus.
V. We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of niets van de genatuurde natuur’ (‘or nothing of Natura naturata’), with Natura naturata in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 86; Textgestaltung II 357).
Postulata vide post prop. 13.
For the postulates, see after Prop. 13.

Cited in 2P13D

Propositiones

Propositions

Propositio I

Proposition I

Cogitatio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res cogitans.
Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Cited in 2P2D, 2P3D, 2P20D

Demonstratio. Singulares cogitationes sive haec et illa cogitatio modi sunt, qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimunt (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.). Competit ergo Deo (per defin. 5. P. 1.) attributum, cuius conceptum singulares omnes cogitationes involvunt, per quod etiam concipiuntur. Est igitur cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, quod Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit (vide defin. 6. P. 1.), sive Deus est res cogitans. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Singular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express God’s nature in a certain and determinate way (by Cor. of Prop. 25, Part I). There pertains to God, therefore (by Def. 5, Part I), an attribute whose concept all singular thoughts involve, and through which they are also conceived. Thought, therefore, is one of God’s infinite attributes, which expresses God’s eternal and infinite essence (see Def. 6, Part I), or God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Patet etiam haec propositio ex hoc, quod nos possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere. Nam quo plura ens cogitans potest cogitare, eo plus realitatis sive perfectionis idem continere concipimus. Ergo ens, quod infinita infinitis modis cogitare potest, est necessario virtute cogitandi infinitum. Cum itaque ad solam cogitationem attendendo ens infinitum concipiamus, est necessario (per defin. 4.et 6. P. 1.) cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, ut volebamus.
Scholium. This proposition is also evident from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality or perfection we conceive it to contain. Therefore a being that can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways is necessarily infinite in its power of thinking. Since, therefore, attending only to thought, we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (by Defs. 4 and 6, Part I) one of God’s infinite attributes, as we wished.

Propositio II

Proposition II

Extensio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res extensa.
Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.
[G II 87] Demonstratio. Huius eodem modo procedit, ac demonstratio praeced. prop.
Demonstration. The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding proposition.

Propositio III

Proposition III

In Deo datur necessario idea tam eius essentiae, quam omnium, quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.
In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from his essence.1
  1. 1 The idea of God was Spinoza’s example of an infinite mode of thought in Part I, Prop. 21, Dem.; Prop. 4 shows that it is unique.
Demonstratio. Deus enim (per prop. 1. huius) infinita infinitis modis cogitare, sive (quod idem est per prop. 16. P. 1.) ideam suae essentiae et omnium, quae necessario ex ea sequuntur, formare potest. Atqui omne id, quod in Dei potestate est, necessario est (per prop. 35. P. 1.). Ergo datur necessario talis idea, et (per prop. 15. P. 1.) non nisi in Deo. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For God (by Prop. 1 of this Part) can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways, or (what is the same, by Prop. 16, Part I) can form the idea of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from it. But all that is in God’s power1 necessarily is (by Prop. 35, Part I). Therefore there is necessarily such an idea, and (by Prop. 15, Part I) only in God. Q.E.D.
  1. 1 in Dei potestate: on potestas, see the note on Part I, Prop. 17, Schol..
Scholium. Vulgus per Dei potentiam intelligit Dei liberam voluntatem et ius in omnia quae sunt, quaeque propterea communiter ut contingentia considerantur. Deum enim potestatem omnia destruendi habere dicunt et in nihilum redigendi. Dei porro potentiam cum potentia regum saepissime comparant.
Scholium. By God’s power the common people understand God’s free will and his right over all things that are, which are therefore commonly considered as contingent. For they say that God has the power to destroy all things and reduce them to nothing. Further, they very often compare God’s power with the power of kings.
Sed hoc in coroll. 1. et 2. prop. 32. P. 1. refutavimus; et prop. 16. P. 1. ostendimus, Deum eadem necessitate agere, qua se ipsum intelligit; hoc est, sicuti ex necessitate divinae naturae sequitur (sicut omnes uno ore statuunt), ut Deus se ipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur, ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde prop. 34. P. 1. ostendimus, Dei potentiam nihil esse, praeterquam Dei actuosam essentiam; adeoque tam nobis impossibile est concipere, Deum non agere, quam Deum non esse.
But we have refuted this in Cors. 1 and 2 of Prop. 32, Part I; and in Prop. 16, Part I we have shown that God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself; that is, just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all maintain with one voice) that God understands himself, with the same necessity it also follows that God does infinitely many things in infinitely many ways. Next, in Prop. 34, Part I we have shown that God’s power is nothing but God’s active essence;1 and so it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that God does not exist.
  1. 1 actuosam essentiam: actuosus, ‘full of activity’, a rare word, chosen to say that God’s essence is itself activity, not a capacity that may or may not be exercised.
Porro si haec ulterius persequi liberet, possem hic etiam ostendere,a potentiam illam, quam vulgus Deo affingit, non tantum humanam esse (quod ostendit Deum hominem, vel instar hominis a vulgo concipi), sed etiam impotentiam involvere. Sed nolo de eadem re toties sermonem instituere.
Further, if it pleased me to pursue this matter further, I could also show here that the power which the common people ascribe to God is not only human (which shows that God is conceived by the common people as a man, or like a man), but also involves lack of power. But I do not wish to speak about the same thing so often.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 43) and Bartuschat repeat ulterius here. Gebhardt (G II 87; Textgestaltung II 357) corrects the second ulterius to etiam, from the Dutch version (ik zou hier ook konnen tonen); Meijer, Baensch and Appuhn delete it, which the Dutch ook (‘also’) forbids.
Lectorem solummodo iterum atque iterum rogo, ut quae in P. 1. ex prop. 16. usque ad finem de hac re dicta sunt, semel atque iterum perpendat. Nam nemo ea quae volo percipere recte poterit, nisi magnopere caveat, ne Dei potentiam cum humana regum potentia vel iure confundat.
I only ask the reader again and again to weigh, once and again, what has been said on this matter in Part I from Prop. 16 to the end. For no one will be able to perceive rightly the things I intend unless he takes great care not to confuse God’s power with the human power or right of kings.

Propositio IV

Proposition IV

[G II 88] Idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest.
The idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be unique.
Demonstratio. Intellectus infinitus nihil praeter Dei attributa eiusque affectiones comprehendit (per prop. 30. P. 1.). Atqui Deus est unicus (per coroll. 1. prop. 14. P. 1.). Ergo idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God’s attributes and his affections (by Prop. 30, Part I). But God is unique (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14, Part I). Therefore the idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be unique. Q.E.D.

Propositio V

Proposition V

Esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, pro causa agnoscit et non, quatenus alio attributo explicatur; hoc est, tam Dei attributorum, quam rerum singularium ideae non ipsa ideata sive res perceptas pro causa efficiente agnoscunt, sed ipsum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans.a
The formal being of ideas1 admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of God’s attributes and of singular things admit as their efficient cause not the objects themselves, or the things perceived, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 gives the proposition in an earlier form: ‘God, voor zo veel hy alleenlijk als een denkende zaak aangemerkt word, is oorzaak van ’t vormelijk wezen der denkbeelden; maar niet voor zo veel hy door een andere toeëigening uitgedrukt en verklaart word: dat is, God alleen, voor zo veel hy een denkende zaak is, en niet de voorwerpen der denkbeelden, zijn de werkende oorzaak van alle denkbeelden, zo wel die Gods toeëigeningen, als die de bezondere dingen uitdrukken’ (‘God, insofar as he is considered only as a thinking thing, is the cause of the formal being of ideas, but not insofar as he is expressed and explained by another attribute; that is, God alone, insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not the objects of the ideas, is the efficient cause of all ideas, both those that express God’s attributes and those that express singular things’). Gebhardt gives it in his Textgestaltung (II 357–358), not in his text.
  1. 1 esse formale idearum: the being an idea has in its own right, as a mode of thinking, as distinct from its objective being, the being of what it represents (see the note on formaliter and obiective at Part I, Prop. 17, Schol.). The proposition denies that the object of an idea is its cause.
Demonstratio. Patet quidem ex prop. 3. huius. Ibi enim concludebamus, Deum ideam suae essentiae et omnium, quae ex ea necessario sequuntur, formare posse ex hoc solo, nempe quod Deus est res cogitans, et non ex eo, quod sit suae ideae obiectum. Quare esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans, pro causa agnoscit.
Demonstration. This is evident from Prop. 3 of this Part. For there we concluded that God can form the idea of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from it from this alone, namely that God is a thinking thing, and not from his being the object of his idea. So the formal being of ideas admits God as a cause insofar as he is a thinking thing.
Sed aliter hoc modo demonstratur. Esse formale idearum modus est cogitandi (ut per se notum), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.) modus, qui Dei naturam, quatenus est res cogitans, certo modo exprimit, adeoque (per prop. 10. P. 1.) nullius alterius attributi Dei conceptum involvit, et consequenter (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) nullius alterius attributi, nisi cogitationis, est effectus. Adeoque esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur etc. Q. E. D.
But it is demonstrated otherwise in this way. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 25, Part I), a mode which expresses God’s nature, insofar as he is a thinking thing, in a certain way, and so (by Prop. 10, Part I) involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by Ax. 4, Part I) is the effect of no other attribute except thought. And so the formal being of ideas admits God as a cause insofar as he is considered only as a thinking thing, etc. Q.E.D.

Propositio VI

Proposition VI

[G II 89] Cuiuscumque attributi modi Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cuius modi sunt, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent.
The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other.

Cited in 2P9D, 2L3D, 2P45D, 3P2D, 3P11S, 4P7D, 4P29D

Cited in Letters 64

Demonstratio. Unumquodque enim attributum per se absque alio concipitur (per prop. 10. P. 1.). Quare uniuscuiusque attributi modi conceptum sui attributi, non autem alterius involvunt; adeoque (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cuius modi sunt, et non, quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For each attribute is conceived through itself without any other (by Prop. 10, Part I). So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not of another; and so (by Ax. 4, Part I) they have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod esse formale rerum, quae modi non sunt cogitandi, non sequitur ideo ex divina natura, quia res prius cognovit; sed eodem modo eademque necessitate res ideatae ex suis attributis consequuntur et concluduntur, ac ideas ex attributo cogitationis consequi ostendimus.
Corollary. From this it follows that the formal being of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God first knew the things;1 rather, the things that are the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their own attributes in the same way and with the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.
  1. 1 The order of explanation in which things are what they are because they exist first, objectively, in God’s intellect is the one Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. described on the hypothesis that intellect belongs to God’s nature. Here it is set aside: bodies follow from extension as ideas follow from thought.

Cited in 2P36D, 5P1D

Propositio VII

Proposition VII

Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum.
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.1
  1. 1 The doctrine is usually called Spinoza’s ‘parallelism’; the word is the commentators’, not his. M. Della Rocca warns that it should not be taken to exclude what the Scholium asserts, that a mode of extension and its idea are one and the same thing (Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 1996, p. 19).
Demonstratio. Patet ex axiom. 4. P. 1. Nam cuiuscumque causati idea a cognitione causae, cuius est effectus, dependet.
Demonstration. This is evident from Ax. 4, Part I. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.1
  1. 1 As Della Rocca observes, the axiom gives only that wherever there is an idea of an effect there is an idea of its cause on which it depends; that there is an idea of every thing at all needs Prop. 3 (1996, pp. 22–23).
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod Dei cogitandi potentia aequalis est ipsius actuali agendi potentiae; hoc est, quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo obiective.
Corollary. From this it follows that God’s power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting; that is, whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature, all of it follows objectively in God, in the same order and with the same connection, from the idea of God.
[G II 90] Scholium. Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus; nempe, quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiae essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet; et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae iam sub hoc, iam sub illo attributo comprehenditur.
Scholium. Before we proceed further, we must recall here what we have shown above:1 namely, that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently that the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that.
  1. 1 In Part I, Prop. 10, Schol. and Prop. 14, Cor. 2. The phrase ‘as constituting an essence of substance’ repeats the definition of attribute (Part I, Def. 4).
Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa; quod quidam Hebraeorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt, Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Ex. gr. circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis, quae etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res, quae per diversa attributa explicatur.
So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways;2 which some of the Hebrews seem to have seen as if through a cloud, those, namely, who maintain that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same.3 For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes.
  1. 2 duobus modis. The word could be read technically, ‘in two modes’; Della Rocca argues that on that reading the ‘one and the same thing’ would have no place in Spinoza’s ontology, being neither a mode of extension nor a mode of thought, and reads ‘ways’ (1996, pp. 119–120).
  2. 3 Maimonides: ‘כבר ידעת פרסום זה המאמר אשר אמרוהו הפילוסופים באלוה ית׳, והוא אמרם שהוא השכל והמשכיל והמושכל, ושאלו השלשה ענינים בו ית׳ הם ענין אחד, אין רבוי בו’ (‘You already know how well known is the saying of the philosophers about God, may he be exalted, that he is the intellect, the one who understands, and what is understood, and that these three are in him one thing, with no multiplicity in it’; מורה נבוכים (Guide of the Perplexed) I.68). So both H. A. Wolfson (The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934, II 24–27) and M. Gueroult (Spinoza II: L’âme, 1974, p. 85 n. 74). Gueroult explains the reserve of ‘as if through a cloud’: for those philosophers the identity is that of the intellect with its inner objects, founded on the identity of God’s essence and his intellect, which Spinoza rejects; for Spinoza it is that of an idea with a thing of another attribute.
Et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis, sive sub attributo cogitationis, sive sub alio quocumque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem, hoc est, easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus.
And therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, that is, that the same things follow one another.
Nec ulla alia de causaa dixi, quod Deus sit causa ideae ex. gr. circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans, et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa, nisi quia esse formale ideae circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum, tanquam causam proximam, et ille iterum per alium, et sic in infinitum, potest percipi, ita ut, quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturae sive causarum connexionem, per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus; et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturae per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet, et idem de aliis attributis intelligo.
Nor did I say for any other reason that God is the cause of the idea of, for example, a circle insofar only as he is a thinking thing, and of the circle insofar only as he is an extended thing, than this: that the formal being of the idea of the circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that one again through another, and so on to infinity; so that as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of thought alone; and insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone; and I understand the same of the other attributes.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘te voren’ (‘before’): ‘nor did I say before for any other reason’. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 90; Textgestaltung II 358).
Quare rerum, ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa, quatenus infinitis constat attributis; nec impraesentiarum haec clarius possum explicare.
So God is really the cause of things as they are in themselves4 insofar as he consists of infinite attributes; and for the present I cannot explain these matters more clearly.
  1. 4 Tschirnhaus asked why, if each thing is expressed in infinitely many attributes, the human mind perceives only extension and thought. Spinoza’s reply refers back to this scholium: ‘quamvis unaquaeque res infinitis modis expressa sit in infinito Dei intellectu, illae tamen infinitae ideae, quibus exprimitur, unam eandemque rei singularis mentem constituere nequeunt; sed infinitas’ (‘although each thing is expressed in infinitely many ways in God’s infinite intellect, the infinitely many ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinitely many’; Letter 66, G IV 280; VVL³ III 207–208).

Cited in 2P8D, 2P12S, 2P21S, 3P2S

Cited in Letters 64, 65, 66

Propositio VIII

Proposition VIII

Ideae rerum singularium sive modorum non existentium ita debent comprehendi in Dei infinita idea, ac rerum singularium sive modorum essentiae formales in Dei attributis continentur.
The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes.1
  1. 1 The essences of things that do not now exist are contained in the attributes, and their ideas in the idea of God. The doctrine returns in Part V, where there is in God ‘an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity’ (Part V, Prop. 22).

Cited in 3P11S

[G II 91] Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex praeced., sed intelligitur clarius ex praeced. schol.
Demonstration. This proposition is evident from the preceding one, but it is understood more clearly from the preceding scholium.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod, quamdiu res singulares non existunt, nisi quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, earum esse obiectivum sive ideae non existunt, nisi quatenus infinita Dei idea existit; et ubi res singulares dicuntur existere, non tantum quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, sed quatenus etiam durare dicuntur, earum ideae etiam existentiam, per quam durare dicuntur, involvent.
Corollary. From this it follows that, as long as singular things do not exist except insofar as they are comprehended in God’s attributes, their objective being, or ideas, do not exist except insofar as God’s infinite idea exists; and when singular things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are comprehended in God’s attributes, but insofar also as they are said to endure, their ideas also will involve existence, through which they are said to endure.
Scholium. Si quis ad uberiorem huius rei explicationem exemplum desideret, nullum sane dare potero, quod rem, de qua hic loquor, utpote unicam adaequate explicet; conabor tamen rem, ut fieri potest,a illustrare.
Scholium. If anyone desires an example for a fuller explanation of this matter, I shall certainly not be able to give one that adequately explains the thing I am speaking of here, since it is unique. I shall nevertheless try to illustrate the matter as far as possible.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘met een voorbeelt’ (‘by an example’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 91; Textgestaltung II 358).
Nempe circulus talis est naturae, ut omnium linearum rectarum in eodem sese invicem secantium rectangula sub segmentis sint inter se aequalia. Quare in circulo infinita inter se aequalia rectangula continentur.
Namely, the circle is of such a nature that the rectangles formed from the segments of all the straight lines intersecting one another in it are equal to one another.1 So in a circle there are contained infinitely many rectangles equal to one another.
  1. 1 Euclid III.35: ἐὰν ἐν κύκλῳ δύο εὐθεῖαι τέμνωσιν ἀλλήλας, τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς μιᾶς τμημάτων περιεχόμενον ὀρθογώνιον ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας τμημάτων περιεχομένῳ ὀρθογωνίῳ (‘if in a circle two straight lines cut one another, the rectangle contained by the segments of the one is equal to the rectangle contained by the segments of the other’; Elements III.35, Heiberg). Spinoza’s rectangula sub segmentis has troubled editors: Meijer, Baensch and Appuhn emend to facta ex (or a) segmentis; Gebhardt keeps the text and reconstructs a fuller first wording from the Dutch (Textgestaltung II 358).
Attamen nullum eorum potest dici existere, nisi quatenus circulus existit, nec etiam alicuius horum rectangulorum idea potest dici existere, nisi quatenus in circuli idea comprehenditur. Concipiantur iam ex infinitis illis duo tantum, nempe E et D existere. Sane eorum etiam ideae iam non tantum existunt, quatenus solummodo in circuli idea comprehenduntur; sed etiam quatenus illorum rectangulorum existentiam involvunt, quo fit, ut a reliquis reliquorum rectangulorum ideis distinguantur.
Yet none of them can be said to exist except insofar as the circle exists, nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist except insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Now conceive that of those infinitely many only two exist, namely E and D. Certainly their ideas also now exist not only insofar as they are merely comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles, which brings it about that they are distinguished from the other ideas of the other rectangles.

Cited in 2P9D, 3P11S

Propositio IX

Proposition IX

Idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur, cuius etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alia tertia affectus est, et sic in infinitum.
The idea of a singular thing actually existing has God for its cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing actually existing, of which God is also the cause insofar as he is affected by another, third idea, and so on to infinity.
[G II 92] Demonstratio. Idea rei singularis actu existentis modus singularis cogitandi est et a reliquis distinctus (per coroll. et schol. prop. 8. huius); adeoque (per prop. 6. huius) Deum, quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (per prop. 28. P. 1.) quatenus est res absolute cogitans, sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur,a et huius etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alio affectus est, et sic in infinitum.
Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing actually existing is a singular mode of thinking, distinct from the others (by Cor. and Schol. of Prop. 8 of this Part); and so (by Prop. 6 of this Part) it has God for its cause insofar as he is only a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. 28, Part I) insofar as he is a thing thinking absolutely, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another mode of thinking; and of this too God is the cause insofar as he is affected by another, and so on to infinity.
  1. a Gebhardt (G II 92; Textgestaltung II 359) inserts definito here and definito cogitandi modo after the second alio, from the Dutch version (met een andere bepaalde wijze van denken, glossed Modus definitus cogitandi); the 1677 edition (OP p. 48) and Bartuschat lack them. The Dutch version also has, in its first redaction, ‘van ’t welk God ook oorzaak is’, whence et huius etiam Deus est causa, which Van Vloten–Land supplied for the bare et hujus etiam of the 1677 edition and which Gebhardt and Bartuschat print.
Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (per prop. 7. huius) idem est, ac ordo et connexio causarum. Ergo unius singularis ideae alia idea sive Deus, quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa, et huius etiam, quatenus alia affectus est, et sic in infinitum. Q. E. D.
But the order and connection of ideas (by Prop. 7 of this Part) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore the cause of one singular idea is another idea, or God insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea, and of this too, insofar as he is affected by another, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Quicquid in singulari cuiuscumque ideae obiecto contingit, eius datur in Deo cognitio, quatenus tantum eiusdem obiecti ideam habet.
Corollary. Whatever happens in the singular object of any idea, there is knowledge of it in God only insofar as he has the idea of that object.

Cited in 2P12D, 2P13D, 2P30D, 3P10D

Demonstratio. Quicquid in obiecto cuiuscumque ideae contingit, eius datur in Deo idea (per prop. 3. huius), non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (per prop. praeced.), sed (per prop. 7. huius) ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum. Erit ergo cognitio eius, quod in singulari aliquo obiecto contingit, in Deo, quatenus tantum eiusdem obiecti habet ideam. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Whatever happens in the object of any idea, there is an idea of it in God (by Prop. 3 of this Part), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing (by the preceding Prop.); but (by Prop. 7 of this Part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore knowledge of what happens in some singular object will be in God only insofar as he has the idea of that object. Q.E.D.

Propositio X

Proposition X

Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiae, sive substantia formam hominis non constituit.
The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.1
  1. 1 forma, in the scholastic sense, that which makes a thing what it is. Against Descartes, for whom the human mind is a thinking substance; for Spinoza the human being is constituted by modes of God’s attributes (Cor.).

Cited in 2P10C

Demonstratio. Esse enim substantiae involvit necessariam existentiam (per prop. 7. P. 1.). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertinereta esse substantiae, data ergo substantia daretur necessario homo (per defin. 2. huius), et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (per axiom. 1. huius) est absurdum. Ergo etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by Prop. 7, Part I). So if the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, then, substance being given, man would necessarily be given (by Def. 2 of this Part), and consequently man would exist necessarily, which (by Ax. 1 of this Part) is absurd. Therefore etc. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 48) reads pertinet, and the Dutch version behoort. Gebhardt (G II 92; Textgestaltung II 359), with Meijer and Baensch, corrects to pertineret, to match daretur; so also Bartuschat.
[G II 93] Scholium. Demonstratur etiam haec propositio ex prop. 5. P. 1. nempe quod duae eiusdem naturae substantiae non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id, quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substantiae. Patet praeterea haec propositio ex reliquis substantiae proprietatibus, videlicet, quod substantia sit sua natura infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc., ut facile unusquisque videre potest.
Scholium. This proposition is also demonstrated from Prop. 5, Part I, namely that there are not two substances of the same nature. Now since several men can exist, that which constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. This proposition is evident, moreover, from the other properties of substance, namely that substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as anyone can easily see.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus. Nam esse substantiaea (per prop. praeced.) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (per prop. 15. P. 1.) aliquid quod in Deo est, et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest, sive (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.) affectio sive modus, qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.
Corollary. From this it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of God’s attributes. For the being of substance (by the preceding Prop.) does not pertain to the essence of man. It is therefore (by Prop. 15, Part I) something which is in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God, or (by Cor. of Prop. 25, Part I) an affection or mode which expresses God’s nature in a certain and determinate way.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 49) runs the demonstration on without a heading; Gebhardt (G II 93; Textgestaltung II 359) inserts Demonstratio here, after the Dutch version’s Betoging.

Cited in 2P11D, 4P29D

Scholium. Omnes sane concedere debent, nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est, quod Deus omnium rerum, tam earum essentiae, quam earum existentiae, unica est causa, hoc est, Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri (ut aiunt), sed etiam secundum esse.
Scholium. Everyone, surely, must grant that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For it is acknowledged by all that God is the only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is the cause of things not only according to their coming to be (as they say), but also according to their being.1
  1. 1 secundum fieri … secundum esse: the scholastic distinction between a cause of a thing’s coming to be and a cause of its being; compare causa essendi in Part I, Prop. 24, Cor..
At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicuius rei pertinere dicunt, sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere, vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt, vel, quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cuius rei causam fuisse credo, quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam, quam ante omnia contemplari debebant, quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam,a et res, quae sensuum obiecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt. Unde factum est, ut, dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint, quam de divina natura, et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint, quam de primis suis figmentis, quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant, utpote quae ad cognitionem divinae naturae nihil iuvare poterant; adeoque nihil mirum, si sibi passim contradixerint.
But meanwhile most people say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived; and so they believe either that the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or be conceived without God, or, what is more certain, they are not sufficiently consistent with themselves. The cause of this, I believe, was that they did not keep to the order of philosophizing.2 For the divine nature, which they ought to have contemplated before all things, since it is prior both in knowledge and in nature, they believed to be last in the order of knowledge, and the things that are called objects of the senses to be prior to all. Hence it came about that, while they contemplated natural things, there was nothing they thought about less than the divine nature, and when afterwards they applied their minds to contemplating the divine nature, there was nothing they could think about less than their first fictions, on which they had built the knowledge of natural things, since these could be of no help to the knowledge of the divine nature; and so it is no wonder if they have contradicted themselves everywhere.
  1. a quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam] transcr. quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est ordine cognitionis, ultimam. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 93; Textgestaltung II 359), Van Vloten–Land and Bartuschat, and as the Dutch version confirms (‘om dat zy zo wel in ordening van kennis, als in ordening van natuur de voorgang heeft, in ordening van kennis de leste’); the 1677 edition, which the transcription follows, has the comma after ‘cognitionis’.
  1. 2 The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect asks that ‘our mind, in order to reproduce the pattern of nature completely, should produce all its ideas from the idea that represents the origin and source of the whole of nature’ (debeat omnes suas ideas producere ab ea, quae refert originem et fontem totius naturae; §42, G II 17). Descartes had reached God only in the Third Meditation, after the senses had been doubted and the thinking self found.
Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit,b causam reddere, cur non dixerim, id ad essentiam alicuius rei pertinere, sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest, nimirum, quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi; et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet; sed id necessario essentiam alicuius rei constituere dixi, quo dato res ponitur et quo sublato res tollitur, vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa id, quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.
But I let this go. For my intention here was only to give the reason why I did not say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived: namely, because singular things cannot be or be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence. Rather, I said that that necessarily constitutes the essence of a thing which, being given, the thing is posited, and which, being taken away, the thing is taken away; or that without which the thing, and in turn which without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘niet zo zeer hen tegen te spreken, als wel’ (‘not so much to contradict them as’): ‘my intention was not so much to contradict them as to give the reason’. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 94; Textgestaltung II 359).

Propositio XI

Proposition XI

[G II 94] Primum, quod actuale mentis humanae esse constituit, nihil aliud est, quam idea rei alicuius singularis actu existentis.
The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing.
Demonstratio. Essentia hominis (per coroll. prop. praeced.) a certis Dei attributorum modis constituitur; nempe (per axiom. 2 huius) a modis cogitandi, quorum omnium (per axiom. 3. huius) idea natura prior est, et ea data reliqui modi (quibus scilicet idea natura prior est) in eodem debent esse individuo (per axiom. 3. huius).a Atque adeo idea primum est, quod humanae mentis esse constituit.
Demonstration. The essence of man (by the Cor. of the preceding Prop.) is constituted by certain modes of God’s attributes, namely (by Ax. 2 of this Part) by modes of thinking, of all of which (by Ax. 3 of this Part) the idea is prior in nature, and, the idea being given, the other modes (to which, that is, the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by Ax. 3 of this Part). And so an idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of a human mind.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 50) and the Dutch version cite Axiom. 4.; Van Vloten–Land correct to per idem Axioma, and Gebhardt (G II 94; Textgestaltung II 359–360) and Bartuschat print Axiom. 3., the axiom that fits. W. Meijer rejected the correction.
At non idea rei non existentis; nam tum (per coroll. prop. 8. huius) ipsa idea non posset dici existere. Erit ergo idea rei actu existentis. At non rei infinitae. Res namque infinita (per prop. 21. et 22. P. 1.)b debet semper necessario existere. Atqui hoc (per axiom. 1. huius) est absurdum. Ergo primum, quod esse humanae mentis actuale constituit, est idea rei singularis actu existentis. Q. E. D.
But not the idea of a thing that does not exist; for then (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of this Part) the idea itself could not be said to exist. It will therefore be the idea of a thing actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by Props. 21 and 22, Part I) must always exist necessarily. But this (by Ax. 1 of this Part) is absurd. Therefore the first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is the idea of a singular thing actually existing. Q.E.D.
  1. b The 1677 edition (OP p. 50) and the Dutch version cite Prop. 21. & 23.; Van Vloten–Land, Gebhardt (G II 94; Textgestaltung II 360) and Bartuschat read 22.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei. Ac proinde cum dicimus, mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Deus, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam humanae mentis explicatur, sive quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam; et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere, non tantum, quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit, sed quatenus simul cum mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus mentem humanam rem ex parte sive inadaequate percipere.
Corollary. From this it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God.1 And therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has, together with the human mind, the idea of another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially, or inadequately.2
  1. 1 Compare the end of Part V: our mind, insofar as it understands, ‘is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on to infinity; so that all together constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect’ (Part V, Prop. 40, Schol.).
  2. 2 The first account of inadequate knowledge: an idea in the human mind is inadequate when God has it not only insofar as he constitutes this mind but insofar as he also has the idea of something else, which this mind does not contain. The account is applied in Props. 24–31.
[G II 95] Scholium. Hic sine dubio lectores haerebunt, multaque comminiscentur, quae moram iniiciant; et hac de causa ipsos rogo, ut lento gradu mecum pergant, nec de his iudicium ferant, donec omnia perlegerint.
Scholium. Here, no doubt, readers will come to a halt and think of many things that give them pause; and for this reason I ask them to proceed slowly with me, and not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read through everything.

Propositio XII

Proposition XII

Quicquid in obiecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, id ab humana mente debet percipi, sive eius rei dabitur in mente necessario idea: hoc est, si obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere, quod a mente non percipiatur.a
Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body that is not perceived by the mind.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of zonder dat daar af een denkbeelt in de ziel is’ (‘or without there being an idea of it in the mind’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 95; Textgestaltung II 360).
Demonstratio. Quicquid enim in obiecto cuiuscumque ideae contingit, eius rei datur necessario in Deo cognitio (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), quatenus eiusdem obiecti idea affectus consideratur, hoc est (per prop. 11. huius), quatenus mentem alicuius rei constituit. Quicquid igitur in obiecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, eius datur necessario in Deo cognitio, quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) eius rei cognitio erit necessario in mente, sive mens id percipit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For whatever happens in the object of any idea, there is necessarily knowledge of it in God (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part) insofar as he is considered to be affected by the idea of that object, that is (by Prop. 11 of this Part), insofar as he constitutes the mind of some thing. Whatever happens, therefore, in the object of the idea constituting the human mind, there is necessarily knowledge of it in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), knowledge of the thing will necessarily be in the mind, or the mind perceives it. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec propositio patet etiam et clarius intelligitur ex schol. prop. 7. huius, quod vide.
Scholium. This proposition is also evident, and is understood more clearly, from Schol. of Prop. 7 of this Part, which see.

Propositio XIII

Proposition XIII

[G II 96] Obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, sive certus extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud.
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else.
Demonstratio. Si enim corpus non esset humanae mentis obiectum, ideae affectionum corporis non essent in Deo (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), quatenus mentem nostram, sed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11 huius), ideae affectionum corporis non essent in nostra mente. Atqui (per axiom. 4. huius) ideas affectionum corporis habemus. Ergo obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, idque (per prop. 11. huius) actu existens.
Demonstration. For if a body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part) insofar as he constitutes our mind, but insofar as he constitutes the mind of another thing; that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in our mind. But (by Ax. 4 of this Part) we have ideas of the affections of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, and it (by Prop. 11 of this Part) actually existing.
Deinde, si praeter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis obiectum, cum nihil (per prop. 36. P. 1.) existat, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (per prop. 12 huius)a necessario alicuius eius effectus idea in mente nostra dari. Atqui (per axiom. 5. huius) nulla eius idea datur. Ergo obiectum nostrae mentis est corpus existens, et nihil aliud. Q. E. D.
Next, if besides a body there were also something else that was the object of the mind, then, since nothing exists (by Prop. 36, Part I) from which some effect does not follow, there would necessarily (by Prop. 12 of this Part) have to be in our mind an idea of some effect of it. But (by Ax. 5 of this Part) there is no idea of it. Therefore the object of our mind is an existing body, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 52) and the earlier editions, including Van Vloten–Land, read Prop. 11.; the Dutch version has de twaalfde, and Gebhardt (G II 96; Textgestaltung II 360) and Bartuschat read 12.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare, et corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere.
Corollary. From this it follows that man consists of a mind and a body, and that the human body exists as we feel it.

Cited in 2P17S

Scholium. Ex his non tantum intelligimus, mentem humanam unitam esse corpori, sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adaequate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit, nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adaequate cognoscat.
Scholium. From these things we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body.1 But no one will be able to understand it adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of our body.
  1. 1 For Descartes the union of two substances, taught by nature: ‘me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum et quasi permixtum’ (‘I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it’; Meditations VI, AT VII 81). For Spinoza the union is that of an idea with its object; the Preface to Part V attacks Descartes’ account of it through the pineal gland (Part V, Pref.).
Nam ea, quae hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt, nec magis ad homines, quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quae omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt. Nam cuiuscumque rei datur necessario in Deo idea, cuius Deus est causa, eodem modo, ac humani corporis ideae:a atque adeo, quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cuiuscumque rei idea necessario dicendum est.
For the things we have shown so far are very general and pertain no more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate.2 For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body; and so whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must necessarily be said of the idea of any thing.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 52) reads idea; Gebhardt (G II 96; Textgestaltung II 360), with the Dutch version (als van het denkbeelt), Meijer, Baensch and Appuhn, corrects to ideae; so also Bartuschat.
  1. 2 animata, ‘ensouled’. The claim follows from the generality of the preceding propositions: since there is an idea in God of every thing, every thing has, in Spinoza’s terms, a mind, though minds differ as their bodies differ in excellence (next sentences).
Attamen nec etiam negare possumus, ideas inter se ut ipsa obiecta differre, unamque alia praestantiorem esse, plusque realitatis continere, prout obiectum unius obiecto alterius praestantius est, plusque realitatis continet; ac propterea ad determinandum, quid mens humana reliquis intersit, quidque reliquis praestet, necesse nobis est, eius obiecti, ut diximus, hoc est, corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum, nec id ad ea quae demonstrare volo necesse est.
But still, we cannot deny either that ideas differ among themselves as the objects themselves do, and that one is more excellent than another and contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the object of the other and contains more reality; and therefore, to determine how the human mind differs from the others and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. I can neither explain this here, nor is it necessary for the things I wish to demonstrate.
Hoc tamen in genere dico, quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo eius mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum; et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent, et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo eius mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his praestantiam unius mentis prae aliis cognoscere possumus; deinde causam etiam videre, cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem, et alia plura, quae in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operae pretium esse duxi, haec ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est, pauca de natura corporum praemittere.
I say this, however, in general: that the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once; and the more the actions of one body depend on itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in acting, the more its mind is capable of understanding distinctly.3 And from these things we can know the excellence of one mind over others, and also see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things which I shall deduce from these in what follows. For this reason I have thought it worth while to explain and demonstrate these very things more accurately, for which it is necessary to premise a few things concerning the nature of bodies.
  1. 3 M. Della Rocca notes an asymmetry here: to know the degree of reality of a mind we must know that of its body, but not conversely, although parallelism by itself is symmetrical (Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 1996, pp. 21–22).

Cited in 3P57D

The Physical Digression

At this point the numbered propositions of Part II stop, and a short treatise on bodies takes their place: axioms, lemmas and postulates about motion and rest, about composite bodies, and about the human body. A reader may well wonder why a Part on the mind should turn to physics. The answer lies in the scholium to Prop. 13, which has just drawn the consequence of the preceding propositions: the human mind is the idea of the human body, and what has been shown of it holds of the idea of any thing, for all individuals are “animate,” though in different degrees. What distinguishes one mind from another can therefore be learned only from what distinguishes its body: “the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once.” To make use of this, Spinoza needs some account of bodies, and he gives one, briefly and, as he says, not as a treatise on body for its own sake (Lemma 7, Schol.). The pages that follow are compressed and unadorned, and their purpose is easy to lose sight of; it may help to see in advance what they contain and what the rest of the Ethics takes from them.

The plan of the digression

The section has two axioms, three lemmas with a corollary, three more axioms and a definition, four more lemmas with a scholium, and six postulates about the human body. It has no propositions of its own and is often called the “physical digression,” though it is not a digression in the argument; the propositions that follow it depend on it throughout. It falls into three parts. The first concerns the simplest bodies, which differ from one another only in motion and rest; the second, composite bodies, or individuals, and the conditions under which they keep their nature; the third, the human body in particular. The order is the order of the Ethics as a whole, which proceeds from what is general to what concerns human beings, and from simple things to complex ones.

The simplest bodies

“All bodies are either in motion or at rest,” and “each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly” (Axioms 1–2). On these two axioms Spinoza builds three lemmas. “Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance” (Lemma 1): there is only one substance, and extension is indivisible, so whatever makes one body this body and not another must be a difference in its modes. “All bodies agree in certain things” (Lemma 2), namely that they involve the concept of one attribute and that they can move more slowly or more quickly, or be at rest. And a body in motion or at rest “must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity” (Lemma 3), the physical counterpart of Part I, Prop. 28.

The corollary to Lemma 3 states a principle of persistence: “a body in motion moves until it is determined to rest by another body, and ... a body at rest also remains at rest until it is determined to motion by another” (Lemma 3, Cor.). Descartes had made the same principle his first law of nature: each thing, “quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseveret” (“as far as is in it, always perseveres in the same state,” Principles II.37). The phrase quantum in se est will return, applied to all things, in the proposition of Part III that states the striving of each thing to persevere in its being (Part III, Prop. 6). The principle of inertia, in other words, is the physical form of the doctrine on which Spinoza’s whole psychology rests.

A second group of axioms follows. The first states that “all the ways in which a body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body,” so that the same body is moved differently by different bodies, and different bodies are moved differently by the same body (Axiom 1). This axiom will be cited more often than anything else in the digression, since it is the ground of the doctrine that our ideas of external bodies involve the nature of our own body as well as theirs (Prop. 16). The second is the law of reflection, with a diagram in the first edition: a body in motion that strikes another at rest which it cannot move is reflected, and the angle of reflection equals the angle of incidence (Axiom 2).

Spinoza took a serious interest in the physics of his day. In a letter to Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, he corrected a misunderstanding: he had not said that almost all of Descartes’ rules of motion were false; it was Christiaan Huygens who thought so, and he himself held only the sixth of Descartes’ rules to be false, adding that he thought Huygens mistaken about it too (Letter 32; VVL³ III 122). The digression does not enter into such questions. It takes from physics only what the theory of the mind will need.

Composite bodies

The second part concerns composite bodies, and its central notion is the definition placed after the second group of axioms. “When a number of bodies, of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or, if they move with the same or with different degrees of speed, so that they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another, and that all together compose one body, or individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies” (Definition). The form of an individual is thus not a substantial form, as in the scholastic philosophy, nor a mere aggregate of parts, but a pattern: a fixed ratio of motion and rest among the parts. An axiom adds that parts which lie upon one another over large surfaces are harder to displace, and on this Spinoza bases the distinction between hard, soft and fluid bodies (Axiom 3).

Lemmas 4–7 draw the consequences for identity through change. If some of the bodies composing an individual are separated from it, and as many others of the same nature take their place, the individual “will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form” (Lemma 4). It keeps its nature if its parts grow or shrink in proportion, so that they keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another (Lemma 5); if they turn their motions in another direction while continuing to communicate them in the same ratio (Lemma 6); and whether the whole moves or is at rest, “provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before” (Lemma 7). What makes a body the same body over time is not the persistence of its matter, which is continually replaced, but the persistence of the ratio by which its parts are united.

The doctrine has a famous application in Part IV. There Spinoza defines the good and the bad for the human body by the same ratio: “Those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved are good; and on the contrary, those are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different ratio of motion and rest to one another” (Part IV, Prop. 39). The scholium draws a startling consequence. A body dies when its parts take on a different ratio of motion and rest, and this can happen while the blood still circulates. “For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse.” Spinoza tells of a Spanish poet who, after an illness, so forgot his past life that he did not believe the plays he had written were his own, and asks what we should say of infants, whose nature an old man can hardly believe was ever his (Part IV, Prop. 39, Schol.). The identity of a human being is the identity of a pattern, and patterns can be lost before matter falls apart.

The whole of nature as one individual

The scholium to Lemma 7 builds a hierarchy on these foundations. An individual composed of the simplest bodies can be affected in many ways and keep its nature. An individual composed of individuals of different natures can be affected in many more ways, since each of its parts can move more slowly or more quickly without change of its nature. A third kind of individual, composed of these, can be affected in still more ways; “and if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinitely many ways, without any change of the whole individual” (Lemma 7, Schol.).

The same picture appears in a letter to Oldenburg of 1665 (Letter 32). A worm living in the blood would take each particle of blood for a whole and could not know how all the parts are governed by the nature of the blood as a whole; we are in the same position with respect to the universe, and “every body, insofar as it exists modified in a certain way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe” (VVL³ III 120–121). Letter 64 names, as the mediate infinite mode of extension, “the face of the whole universe, which, although it varies in infinite ways, nevertheless remains always the same” (VVL³ III 206), and refers the reader to this very scholium. The end of the scholium to Lemma 7 thus connects the physics of Part II with the metaphysics of Part I: the whole of nature, considered under the attribute of extension, is one individual whose form is preserved through all the changes of its parts, and this individual is the mediate infinite mode of extension.

The human body

The postulates bring the account down to the human body. “The human body is composed of very many individuals (of different natures), each of which is highly composite” (Postulate 1). Some of these are fluid, some soft and some hard (Postulate 2). The human body is affected by external bodies in very many ways (Postulate 3); it “needs, in order to be preserved, very many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated” (Postulate 4); and it “can move external bodies in very many ways, and arrange them in very many ways” (Postulate 6).

Each of these postulates has work to do. The complexity of the human body explains why its mind is capable of perceiving many things at once, and why it can form ideas of what many bodies have in common. The need for other bodies is the physical root of the doctrine of Part IV that nothing is more useful to a human being than other human beings. And the fifth postulate prepares the theory of memory and imagination: “When a fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body so that it frequently strikes another, soft part, it changes the surface of that part and impresses on it, as it were, certain traces of the external body that drives it” (Postulate 5). These traces explain how the mind can imagine as present things that are absent (Prop. 17), and how one image recalls another with which it was once joined (Prop. 18). Spinoza’s physiology was that of his time, and the details do not matter. What matters is the principle: memory and imagination are the mind’s awareness of changes in its body, and they follow the order of those changes, not the order of the intellect.

What the digression makes possible

On these few premises Props. 14–31 build an account of sense perception, imagination, memory and the association of ideas, and of why the human mind’s knowledge of its own body, of external bodies and of itself is, in the common order of nature, inadequate. But the digression also contains the seed of the remedy. Lemma 2 says that all bodies agree in certain things, and these common properties, which are “equally in the part and in the whole,” can only be conceived adequately (Prop. 38). The same holds of what is common and proper to the human body and to the external bodies by which it is usually affected (Prop. 39). These are the common notions on which reason is built. The physics of the digression thus supplies both the explanation of our confusion and the foundation of our knowledge.

Later Parts return to the digression more than once. Part III restates two of its postulates in its own: the human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, a postulate which, Spinoza says, “rests on Post. 1 and Lemmas 5 and 7” (Part III, Post. 1); and it can undergo many changes and still retain the traces of objects (Part III, Post. 2). Part IV defines good and evil for the body by the ratio of motion and rest, as we have seen. Part V’s account of the eternity of the mind ends with the thesis that “he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal” (Part V, Prop. 39), which returns to the principle stated in the scholium to Prop. 13: minds differ as their bodies differ in what they can do and suffer.

How to read it

The digression should be read as a sketch. Spinoza says so himself: if it had been his intention to treat of body expressly, he would have had to explain and demonstrate these matters more fully, but he brings them forward only because he can easily deduce from them what he has decided to demonstrate (Lemma 7, Schol.). The reader need not decide whether the physics is correct, and should not expect from it the precision of Descartes’ or Huygens’ laws of collision. Its function is to supply a notion of the individual that does not depend on substance, a principle of persistence, and a theory of bodily traces, and these the later Parts use.

The Dutch version of 1677 preserves a slightly fuller form of these pages. In the scholium to Lemma 7 Spinoza says that he would have had to explain and demonstrate these matters more fully had it been his intention to treat expressly “of matter, or” of body, “and in particular”; the Latin drops the words. In the demonstration of Lemma 6 the Dutch adds a cross-reference to the definition before Lemma 4, which the Latin gives instead in the demonstration of Lemma 7, where the Dutch has “this also is evident.” Gebhardt takes these to be the traces of Spinoza’s later revision.

When the text resumes, the axioms, lemmas and postulates follow one another with little comment, and a first reading need not master them all. The propositions that follow draw above all on the postulates about the human body and on the first axiom after Lemma 3: all the ways in which a body is affected by another follow from the nature of the affected body and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body. The account of composite individuals returns later. Part III restates two of the postulates in its own (Part III, Post. 1), and in Part IV the preservation of the ratio of motion and rest among the parts of the human body becomes the measure of what is good or evil for it (Part IV, Prop. 39).

[G II 97] Axioma I. Omnia corpora vel moventur, vel quiescunt.
Axiom I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

Cited in 2L3D

Axioma II. Unumquodque corpus iam tardius, iam celerius movetur.
Axiom II. Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly.
Lemma I. Corpora ratione motus et quietis, celeritatis et tarditatis, et non ratione substantiae ab invicem distinguuntur.
Lemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.

Cited in 2L3D, 2L4D

Demonstratio. Primam partem huius per se notam suppono. At, quod ratione substantiae non distinguantur corpora, patet tam ex prop. 5. quam 8. P. 1.; sed clarius ex iis, quae in schol. prop. 15. P. 1. dicta sunt.
Demonstration. The first part of this I suppose to be self-evident. But that bodies are not distinguished by reason of substance is evident both from Prop. 5 and from Prop. 8 of Part I; but more clearly from what was said in Schol. of Prop. 15, Part I.
[G II 98] Lemma II. Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt.
Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain things.

Cited in 2P37, 2P38C, 5P4D

Demonstratio. In his enim omnia corpora conveniunt, quod unius eiusdemque attributi conceptum involvunt (per defin. 1. huius); deinde, quod iam tardius, iam celerius, et absolute iam moveri, iam quiescere possunt.
Demonstration. For all bodies agree in this, that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by Def. 1 of this Part); and next, that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and absolutely, now move, now be at rest.1
  1. 1 What all bodies have in common will be the ground of the ‘common notions’, which are adequately known (Props. 37–38, which cite this lemma).
Lemma III. Corpus motum vel quiescens ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum.
Lemma III. A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity.

Cited in 3P51D, 3P57D

Demonstratio. Corpora (per defin. 1. huius) res singulares sunt, quae (per lem. 1.) ratione motus et quietis ab invicem distinguuntur; adeoque (per prop. 28. P. 1.) unumquodque ad motum vel quietem necessario determinari debuit ab alia re singulari, nempe (per prop. 6. huius) ab alio corpore, quod (per axiom. 1.) etiam vel movetur, vel quiescit. At hoc etiam (per eandem rationem) moveri, vel quiescere non potuit, nisi ab alio ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuisset, et hoc iterum (per eandem rationem) ab alio, et sic in infinitum. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Bodies (by Def. 1 of this Part) are singular things, which (by Lemma 1) are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest; and so (by Prop. 28, Part I) each must necessarily have been determined to motion or rest by another singular thing, namely (by Prop. 6 of this Part) by another body, which (by Ax. 1) is also either in motion or at rest. But this too (by the same reasoning) could not have been in motion or at rest unless it had been determined to motion or rest by another, and this again (by the same reasoning) by another, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur corpus motum tamdiu moveri, donec ab alio corpore ad quiescendum determinetur; et corpus quiescens tamdiu etiam quiescere, donec ab alio ad motum determinetur. Quod etiam per se notum est.
Corollary. From this it follows that a body in motion moves until it is determined to rest by another body, and that a body at rest also remains at rest until it is determined to motion by another.1 This is also self-evident.
  1. 1 Descartes’ first law of nature: ‘unamquamque rem, quatenus est simplex et indivisa, manere, quantum in se est, in eodem semper statu, nec unquam mutari nisi a causis externis’ (‘each thing, insofar as it is simple and undivided, remains, as far as is in it, always in the same state, and is never changed except by external causes’; Principles II.37, AT VIII-1 62). The phrase quantum in se est returns in Spinoza’s conatus (Part III, Prop. 6).
Nam cum suppono, corpus ex. gr. A quiescere, nec ad alia corpora mota attendo, nihil de corpore A dicere potero, nisi quod quiescat. Quod si postea contingat, ut corpus A moveatur, id sane evenire non potuit ex eo, quod quiescebat; ex eo enim nil aliud sequi poterat, quam ut corpus A quiesceret. Si contra supponatur A moveri, quotiescumque ad A tantum attendimus, nihil de eodem affirmare poterimus, nisi quod moveatur. Quod si postea contingat, ut A quiescat, id sane evenire etiam non potuit ex motu, quem habebat; ex motu enim nihil aliud sequi poterat, quam ut A moveretur. Contingit itaque a re, quae non erat in A, nempe a causa externa, a qua ad quiescendum determinatum fuit.a
For when I suppose that a body, for example A, is at rest, and do not attend to other bodies in motion, I shall be able to say nothing about body A except that it is at rest. If afterwards it happens that body A moves, that certainly could not come about from the fact that it was at rest; for from that nothing else could follow than that body A should be at rest. If, on the contrary, A is supposed to move, then as often as we attend only to A, we shall be able to affirm nothing of it except that it moves. If afterwards it happens that A is at rest, that certainly could not come about from the motion it had either; for from the motion nothing else could follow than that A should move. It happens therefore from a thing which was not in A, namely from an external cause, by which it was determined to rest.
  1. a Gebhardt (G II 99; Textgestaltung II 360) inserts Corpus motum A before ad quiescendum, from the Dutch version (van de welke het bewoge lighaam A tot te rusten is bepaalt, with the marginal glosses Corpus motum, Ad quiescendum, Determinatum); the 1677 edition (OP p. 55) lacks it.
[G II 99] Axioma I. Omnes modi, quibus corpus aliquod ab alio afficitur corpore, ex natura corporis affecti et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur; ita ut unum idemque corpus diversimode moveatur pro diversitate naturae corporum moventium, et contra ut diversa corpora ab uno eodemque corpore diversimode moveantur.
Axiom I. All the ways in which a body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected1 and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body; so that one and the same body is moved in different ways according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it, and, conversely, different bodies are moved in different ways by one and the same body.
  1. 1 The axiom is used in Prop. 16: the idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the external body as well as that of our own.

Cited in 2P16D, 2P24D, 3P17S, 3P51D, 3P57D

Axioma II. Cum corpus motum alteri quiescenti, quod dimovere nequit, impingit, reflectitur, ut moveri pergat, et angulus lineae motus reflectionis cum plano corporis quiescentis, cui impegit, aequalis erit angulo, quem linea motus incidentiae cum eodem plano efficit.a
Axiom II. When a body in motion strikes another at rest which it cannot move, it is reflected so as to continue moving, and the angle of the line of the motion of reflection with the plane of the body at rest which it struck will be equal to the angle which the line of the motion of incidence makes with the same plane.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 55) prints a diagram beside this axiom: a line striking a plane and reflected at the same angle.
Atque haec de corporibus simplicissimis, quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur, iam ad composita ascendamus.a
So much, then, for the simplest bodies, which are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness; let us now ascend to composite bodies.
  1. a simplicissimis, quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur, iam ad composita ascendamus] transcr. simplicissimis, quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur, iam ad composita ascendamus. Italics overrun removed; the 1677 edition (OP p. 55) sets the sentence in roman.

Cited in 2P17CD

Definitio. Cum corpora aliquot eiusdem aut diversae magnitudinis a reliquis ita coercentur, ut invicem incumbant, vel si eodem aut diversis celeritatis gradibus moventur, ut motus suos invicem certa quadam ratione communicent, illa corpora invicem unita dicemus, et omnia simul unum corpus, sive individuum componere, quod a reliquis per hanc corporum unionem distinguitur.
Definition. When a number of bodies, of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or, if they move with the same or with different degrees of speed, so that they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio,1 we shall say that those bodies are united with one another, and that all together compose one body, or individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies.
  1. 1 certa quadam ratione. The form of a composite individual is a pattern of communicated motion, not a substantial form; Lemmas 4–7 show that it can persist through the replacement, growth and movement of its parts. The 1677 edition prints the definition in italic.

Cited in 2L4D, 2P24D, 4P39D

[G II 100] Axioma III. Quo partes individui vel corporis compositi secundum maiores vel minores superficies sibi invicem incumbunt, eo difficilius vel facilius cogi possunt, ut situm suum mutent, et consequenter eo difficilius vel facilius effici potest,a ut ipsum individuum aliam figuram induat. Atque hinc corpora, quorum partes secundum magnas superficies invicem incumbunt, dura, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, mollia, et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, fluidab vocabo.
Axiom III. The greater or smaller the surfaces by which the parts of an individual, or composite body, lie upon one another, the more difficult or the easier it is to compel them to change their position, and consequently the more difficult or the easier it is to bring it about that the individual itself takes on another shape. And from this I shall call bodies whose parts lie upon one another over large surfaces hard, those whose parts lie upon one another over small surfaces soft, and those whose parts move among themselves fluid.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 56) has the second pair in the reverse order, eò facilius, vel difficilius. Gebhardt (G II 100; Textgestaltung II 360) inverts it from the Dutch version (zwarelijker of lichtelijker) to match the first, as Meijer and Baensch had proposed without the Dutch.
  2. b dura, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, mollia, et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, fluida] transcr. dura, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, mollia, et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, fluida. Italics restricted to the three terms, as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 56).
Lemma IV. Si corporis sive individui, quod ex pluribus corporibus componitur, quaedam corpora segregentur, et simul totidem alia eiusdem naturae eorum loco succedant, retinebit individuum suam naturam, uti antea, absque ulla eius formae mutatione.
Lemma IV. If from a body, or individual, which is composed of several bodies, certain bodies are separated, and at the same time as many other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form.

Cited in 2L5D, 2L7D, 2P24D, 4P39D

Demonstratio. Corpora enim (per lem. 1.) ratione substantiae non distinguuntur; id autem, quod formam individui constituit, in corporum unione (per defin. praeced.) consistit.a Atqui haec (per hypothesin), tametsi corporum continua fiat mutatio, retinetur. Retinebit ergo individuum tam ratione substantiae, quam modi, suam naturam, uti ante. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For bodies (by Lemma 1) are not distinguished by reason of substance; and that which constitutes the form of an individual consists in a union of bodies (by the preceding Def.). But this (by hypothesis), although a continual change of bodies takes place, is retained. The individual will therefore retain its nature, both in respect of substance and in respect of mode, as before. Q.E.D.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘alleenlijk’ (‘only’): ‘consists only in a union of bodies’. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 100; Textgestaltung II 360).
Lemma V. Si partes individuum componentes, maiores minoresve evadant, ea tamen proportione, ut omnes eandem, ut antea, ad invicem motus et quietis rationem servent, retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam, ut antea, absque ulla formae mutatione.
Lemma V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or smaller, but in such proportion that all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, as before, without any change of form.

Cited in 3Post1

[G II 101] Demonstratio. Huius eadem est, ac praeced. lem.
Demonstration. The demonstration of this is the same as that of the preceding lemma.
Lemma VI. Si corpora quaedam individuum componentia motum, quem versus unam partem habent, aliam versus flectere cogantur, at ita, ut motus suos continuare possint, atque invicem eadem, qua antea,a ratione communicare; retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam absque ulla formae mutatione.
Lemma VI. If certain bodies composing an individual are compelled to turn aside the motion they have towards one part towards another, but in such a way that they can continue their motions and communicate them to one another in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature without any change of form.
  1. a invicem eadem, qua antea] transcr. invicem eadam, qua antea. Gebhardt (G II 101) prints ‘eadam’, a misprint not in his corrigenda, which Bartuschat and the transcription reproduce; the 1677 edition (OP p. 57) reads ‘eâdem’.
Demonstratio. Per se patet. Id enim omne retinere supponitur, quod in eiusdem definitione formam ipsius constituere diximus.a
Demonstration. This is self-evident. For it is supposed to retain all that which, in its definition, we said constitutes its form.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘Bezie de Bepaling voor ’t vierde Voorbewijs’ (‘See the Definition before the fourth Lemma’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 101; Textgestaltung II 360); he takes the omission in the Latin to be deliberate, since the Latin gives the cross-reference in the demonstration of Lemma 7 instead.
Lemma VII. Retinet praeterea individuum sic compositum suam naturam, sive id secundum totum moveatur, sive quiescat, sive versus hanc, sive versus illam partem moveatur, dummodo unaquaeque pars motum suum retineat, eumque, uti antea, reliquis communicet.
Lemma VII. Further, an individual so composed retains its nature whether it moves as a whole or is at rest, or moves towards this part or towards that, provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before.

Cited in 2L7S, 3Post1

Demonstratio. Patet ex ipsius definitione,a quam vide ante lem. 4.
Demonstration. This is evident from its definition, which see before Lemma 4.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘ook’ (‘also’): ‘This is also evident’. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 101; Textgestaltung II 360–361).
Scholium. His itaque videmus, qua ratione individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, eius nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque individuum concepimus, quod non, nisi ex corporibus, quae solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur, hoc est, quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur.
Scholium. By this, therefore, we see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways and yet keep its nature. And up to now we have conceived an individual composed only of bodies that are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is, composed of the simplest bodies.
Quod si iam aliud concipiamus ex pluribus diversae naturae individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. Nam quandoquidem eius unaquaeque pars ex pluribus corporibus est composita, poterit ergo (per lem. praeced.) unaquaeque pars, absque ulla ipsius naturae mutatione iam tardius, iam celerius moveri, et consequenter motus suos citius vel tardius reliquis communicare.
But if we now conceive another, composed of several individuals of different natures, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, and yet keep its nature. For since each part of it is composed of several bodies, each part will therefore be able (by the preceding lemma), without any change of its nature, to move now more slowly, now more quickly, and consequently to communicate its motions to the others now more quickly, now more slowly.
Quod si praeterea tertium individuorum genus ex his secundis compositum, concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse reperiemus absque ulla eius formae mutatione. Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse individuum, cuius partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant absque ulla totius individui mutatione.
And if we conceive further a third kind of individuals, composed of these second ones, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways without any change of its form. And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinitely many ways, without any change of the whole individual.1
  1. 1 Compare Letter 64, where the mediate infinite mode of extension is ‘facies totius Universi, quae quamvis infinitis modis variet, manet tamen semper eadem’ (‘the face of the whole universe, which, although it varies in infinitely many ways, nevertheless remains always the same’; VVL³ III 206), and Letter 32, where each body, ‘quatenus certo modo modificatum existit’, is to be considered ‘ut partem totius universi’ (‘insofar as it exists modified in a certain way … as a part of the whole universe’; VVL³ III 121).
Atque haec si animus fuisset, de corpore ex professo agere,a prolixius explicare et demonstrare debuissem. Sed iam dixi me aliud velle, nec alia de causa haec adferre, quam quia ex ipsis ea, quae demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.
And if it had been my intention to treat of body expressly, I should have had to explain and demonstrate these things more fully. But I have already said that I intend something else, and that I bring these things forward for no other reason than that I can easily deduce from them the things I have decided to demonstrate.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds ‘van de stoffe of’ (‘of matter, or’) before de corpore and ‘en bezonderlijk’ (‘and in particular’) after ex professo: ‘had it been my intention to treat expressly and in particular of matter, or of body’. Gebhardt prints both in his text (G II 102; Textgestaltung II 361).

Cited in Letters 64

Postulata

Postulates

[G II 102] I. Corpus humanum componitur ex plurimis (diversae naturae) individuis, quorum unumquodque valde compositum est.
I. The human body is composed of very many individuals (of different natures), each of which is highly composite.

Cited in 2P15D, 2P24D, 3Post1, 3P17S

II. Individuorum, ex quibus corpus humanum componitur, quaedam fluida, quaedam mollia et quaedam denique dura sunt.
II. Of the individuals of which the human body is composed, some are fluid, some soft, and some, finally, hard.
III. Individua corpus humanum componentia, et consequenter ipsum humanum corpus a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur.
III. The individuals composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in very many ways.

Cited in 2P14D, 2P28D, 3P51D, 4P39D

IV. Corpus humanum indiget, ut conservetur, plurimis aliis corporibus, a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur.
IV. The human body needs, in order to be preserved, very many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated.

Cited in 2P19D, 4P18S, 4P39D

V. Cum corporis humani pars fluida a corpore externo determinatur, ut in aliam mollem saepe impingat, eius planum mutat et veluti quaedam corporis externi impellentis vestigia eidem imprimit.
V. When a fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body so that it frequently strikes another, soft part, it changes the surface of that part and impresses on it, as it were, certain traces of the external body that drives it.1
  1. 1 vestigia. The traces are the bodily basis of imagination and memory: see Prop. 17, Cor. and Prop. 18.

Cited in 2P17CD, 3Post2

[G II 103] VI. Corpus humanum potest corpora externa plurimis modis movere plurimisque modis disponere.
VI. The human body can move external bodies in very many ways, and arrange them in very many ways.

Cited in 2P14D, 4P39D

Propositio XIV

Proposition XIV

Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, quo eius corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.
The human mind is capable of perceiving very many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in more ways.

Cited in 3P11D, 4P38D

Demonstratio. Corpus enim humanum (per postul. 3. et 6.) plurimis modis a corporibus externis afficitur, disponiturque ad corpora externa plurimis modis afficiendum. At omnia, quae in corpore humano contingunt (per prop. 12. huius), mens humana percipere debet. Est ergo mens humana apta ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior.a Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For the human body (by Posts. 3 and 6) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in very many ways. But all things that happen in the human body (by Prop. 12 of this Part) the human mind must perceive. The human mind is therefore capable of perceiving very many things, and is the more capable. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 59) ends the sentence et eò aptior, &c.; the Dutch version completes it: ‘als het menschelijk lighaam bequamer is’ (‘as the human body is more capable’). Gebhardt prints the Dutch in his text in place of &c. (G II 103; Textgestaltung II 361), and the transcription, which leaves out his Dutch, has neither.

Propositio XV

Proposition XV

Idea, quae esse formale humanae mentis constituit, non est simplex, sed ex plurimis ideis composita.
The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas.

Cited in 3P3D

Demonstratio. Idea, quae esse formale humanae mentis constituit, est idea corporis (per prop. 13. huius), quod (per postul. 1.) ex plurimis valde compositis individuis componitur. At cuiuscumque individui corpus componentis datur necessario (per coroll. prop. 8. huius) in Deo idea. Ergo (per prop. 7. huius) idea corporis humani ex plurimis hisce partium componentium ideis est composita. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of a body (by Prop. 13 of this Part), which (by Post. 1) is composed of very many highly composite individuals. But of each individual composing the body there is necessarily (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of this Part) an idea in God. Therefore (by Prop. 7 of this Part) the idea of the human body is composed of these very many ideas of the component parts. Q.E.D.

Propositio XVI

Proposition XVI

Idea cuiuscumque modi, quo corpus humanum a corporibus externis afficitur, involvere debet naturam corporis humani et simul naturam corporis externi.
The idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body.
[G II 104] Demonstratio. Omnes enim modi, quibus corpus aliquod afficitur, ex natura corporis affecti, et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur (per axiom. 1. post coroll. lem. 3.). Quare eorum idea (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) utriusque corporis naturam necessario involvet. Adeoque idea cuiuscumque modi, quo corpus humanum a corpore externo afficitur, corporis humani, et corporis externi naturam involvit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For all the modes in which a body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. 1 after the Cor. of Lemma 3). So the idea of them (by Ax. 4, Part I) will necessarily involve the nature of each body. And so the idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.
Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur primo, mentem humanam plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura percipere.
Corollary I. From this it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies together with the nature of its own body.

Cited in 2P17D, 2P26D, 2P47D

Corollarium II. Sequitur secundo, quod ideae, quas corporum externorum habemus, magis nostri corporis constitutionem, quam corporum externorum naturam indicant; quod in appendice partis primae multis exemplis explicui.
Corollary II. It follows, second, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies; which I have explained by many examples in the Appendix of Part I.1
  1. 1 In the third part of the Appendix: good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and confusion are judged ‘according to the disposition of the brain’.

Propositio XVII

Proposition XVII

Si humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam corporis alicuius externi involvit, mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut sibi praesens contemplabitur, donec corpus afficiatur affectu, qui eiusdem corporis existentiam vel praesentiam secludat.
If the human body is affected in a mode that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body.
Demonstratio. Patet. Nam quamdiu corpus humanum sic affectum est, tamdiu mens humana (per prop. 12. huius) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur, hoc est (per prop. praeced.), ideam habebit modi actu existentis, quae naturam corporis externi involvit, hoc est, ideam, quae existentiam, vel praesentiam naturae corporis externi non secludit, sed ponit. Adeoque mens (per coroll. 1. praeced.) corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut praesens contemplabitur, donec afficiatur etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. This is evident. For as long as the human body is so affected, the human mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part) will contemplate this affection of the body, that is (by the preceding Prop.), it will have the idea of a mode actually existing, an idea which involves the nature of the external body, that is, an idea which does not exclude but posits the existence or presence of the nature of the external body. And so the mind (by Cor. 1 of the preceding Prop.) will contemplate the external body as actually existing, or as present, until it is affected, etc. Q.E.D.
[G II 105] Corollarium. Mens corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec praesentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit, velut praesentia essent.
Corollary. The mind will be able to contemplate external bodies by which the human body has once been affected, even though they do not exist and are not present, as if they were present.
Demonstratio. Dum corpora externa corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant, ut in molliores saepe impingant, earum plana (per postul. 5.) mutant. Unde fit (vide axiom. 2. post coroll. lem. 3.) ut inde alio modo reflectantur, quam antea solebant, et ut etiam postea iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo, eodem modo reflectantur, ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsae sunt, et consequenter, ut corpus humanum, dum sic reflexae moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo mens (per prop. 12. huius) iterum cogitabit, hoc est (per prop. 17. huius) mens iterum corpus externum ut praesens contemplabitur; et hoc toties, quoties corporis humani partes fluidae spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent.
Demonstration. While external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that these often strike the softer parts, they change the surfaces of those parts (by Post. 5). From this it comes about (see Ax. 2 after the Cor. of Lemma 3) that the fluid parts are reflected from them in another way than they used to be before, and that also afterwards, meeting the same new surfaces by their own spontaneous motion, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven towards those surfaces by the external bodies; and consequently that, while they continue to move, so reflected, they affect the human body in the same way, which the mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part) will think of again; that is (by Prop. 17 of this Part), the mind will again contemplate the external body as present; and this as often as the fluid parts of the human body meet the same surfaces by their own spontaneous motion.
Quare quamvis corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, mens tamen eadem toties ut praesentia contemplabitur, quoties haec corporis actio repetetur. Q. E. D.
So although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected do not exist, the mind will nevertheless contemplate them as present as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Videmus itaque, qui fieri potest, ut ea, quae non sunt veluti praesentia contemplemur, ut saepe fit. Et fieri potest, ut hoc aliis de causis contingat. Sed mihi hic sufficit ostendisse unam, per quam rem sic possim explicare,a ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem; nec tamen credo, me a vera longe aberrare, quandoquidem omnia illa quae sumpsi postulata vix quicquam continent, quod non constet experientia, de qua nobis non licet dubitare, postquam ostendimus corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere (vide coroll. post prop. 13. huius).
Scholium. We see, then, how it can come about that we contemplate things that are not as if they were present, as often happens. And it can come about that this happens from other causes. But it is enough for me here to have shown one by which I can explain the thing as if I had shown it through its true cause; and yet I do not believe that I am far from the true one, since all the postulates I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established by experience, which we may not doubt after we have shown that the human body exists as we feel it (see the Cor. after Prop. 13 of this Part).
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 61) and the older editions read possem; Van Vloten–Land correct to possim for the sequence of tenses, and Gebhardt (G II 105; Textgestaltung II 361) follows them.
Praeterea (ex coroll. praeced. et coroll. 2. prop. 16. huius) clare intelligimus, quaenam sit differentia inter ideam ex. gr. Petri, quae essentiam mentis ipsius Petri constituit, et inter ideam ipsius Petri, quae in alio homine, puta in Paulo, est. Illa enim essentiam corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat, nec existentiam involvit nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; haec autem magis constitutionem corporis Pauli, quam Petri naturam indicat,b et ideo durante illa corporis Pauli constitutione mens Pauli, quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi praesentem contemplabitur.
Further (from the preceding Cor. and Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of this Part) we understand clearly what the difference is between the idea of, for example, Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter’s own mind, and the idea of Peter himself which is in another man, say in Paul. For the former directly explains the essence of Peter’s own body, and does not involve existence except as long as Peter exists; but the latter indicates the constitution of Paul’s body more than the nature of Peter, and so, while that constitution of Paul’s body lasts, Paul’s mind will contemplate Peter as present to it, even though Peter does not exist.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘bezie de tweede Toegift van de zestiende Voorstelling in dat deel’ (‘see the second Corollary of the sixteenth Proposition in that Part’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 106; Textgestaltung II 361). Here and below the Dutch calls Paul ‘Jan’.
Porro, ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant, rerum imagines vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus.
Further, to retain the customary words, we shall call the affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us images of things, even though they do not reproduce the figures of things.1 And when the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.
  1. 1 An image, for Spinoza, is a bodily affection, not a picture: ‘images of things’ keeps the customary phrase while denying that images resemble what they represent. To imagine is to contemplate bodies by means of such affections. Ideas, in turn, are not pictures either: see Prop. 49, Schol..
Atque hic, ut, quid sit error, indicare incipiam, notetis velim,d mentis imaginationesc in se spectatas nihil erroris continere, sive mentem ex eo, quod imaginatur, non errare; sed tantum quatenus consideratur, carere idea, quae existentiam illarum rerum, quas sibi praesentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens, dum res non existentes ut sibi praesentes imaginatur, simul sciret, res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suae naturae, non vitio tribueret; praesertim si haec imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet, hoc est (per defin. 7. P. 1.) si haec mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.
And here, to begin to indicate what error is, I would have you note that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error,2 or that the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as present to it. For if the mind, while it imagined non-existent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things did not really exist, it would surely attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice; especially if this faculty of imagining depended on its nature alone, that is (by Def. 7, Part I), if this faculty of the mind of imagining were free.
  1. c error, indicare incipiam, notetis velim, mentis imaginationes] transcr. error, indicare incipiam, notetis velim, mentis imaginationes. Italics overrun restricted to the two terms; the 1677 edition (OP p. 62) has no italics here.
  2. d The 1677 edition (OP p. 62) reads noteris velim, in the singular; Bruder, Van Vloten–Land, Gebhardt (G II 106) and Bartuschat print notetis, without comment in Gebhardt’s Textgestaltung.
  1. 2 The account of error begun here is completed in Props. 33–35: falsity consists in a privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve, and there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.

Propositio XVIII

Proposition XVIII

[G II 106] Si corpus humanum a duobus, vel pluribus corporibus simul affectum fuerit semel, ubi mens postea eorum aliquod imaginabitur, statim et aliorum recordabitur.
If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.
Demonstratio. Mens (per coroll. praeced.) corpus aliquod ea de causa imaginatur, quia scilicet humanum corpus a corporis externi vestigiis eodem modo afficitur disponiturque, ac affectum est, cum quaedam eius partes ab ipso corpore externo fuerunt impulsae. Sed (per hypothesin) corpus tum ita fuit dispositum, ut mens duo simul corpora imaginaretur. Ergo iam etiam duo simul imaginabitur, atque mens ubi alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind (by the preceding Cor.) imagines some body for this reason, that the human body is affected and disposed by the traces of an external body in the same way as it was affected when certain of its parts were driven by the external body itself. But (by hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once. Therefore it will now also imagine two at once, and when the mind imagines either of them, it will immediately recollect the other too. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Hinc clare intelligimus, quid sit memoria. Est enim nihil aliud, quam quaedam concatenatio idearum, naturam rerum, quae extra corpus humanum sunt, involventium, quae in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani.
Scholium. From this we understand clearly what memory is. For it is nothing other than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body, a concatenation which takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body.
Dico primo concatenationem esse illarum tantum idearum, quae naturam rerum, quae extra corpus humanum sunt, involvunt; non autem idearum, quae earundem rerum naturam explicant. Sunt enim revera (per prop. 16. huius) ideae affectionum corporis humani, quae tam huius, quam corporum externorum naturam involvunt. Dico secundo hanc concatenationem fieri secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani, ut ipsam distinguerem a concatenatione idearum, quae fit secundum ordinem intellectus, quo res per primas suas causas mens percipit, et qui in omnibus hominibus idem est.
I say, first, that it is a concatenation only of those ideas which involve the nature of things which are outside the human body, not of ideas which explain the nature of those same things. For they are in fact (by Prop. 16 of this Part) ideas of affections of the human body, which involve the nature both of this body and of the external bodies. I say, second, that this concatenation takes place according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body, in order to distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which takes place according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men.1
  1. 1 The contrast between the order of the affections of the body and the order of the intellect returns in the remedies of Part V: as long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, ‘we have the power of ordering and concatenating the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect’ (Part V, Prop. 10).
Atque hinc porro clare intelligimus, cur mens ex cogitatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat, quae nullam cum priore habet similitudinem; ut, ex. gr. ex cogitatione vocis pomi homo Romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet,a qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem, nec aliquid commune, nisi quod eiusdem hominis corpus ab his duobus affectum saepe fuit, hoc est, quod ipse homo saepe vocem pomum audivit, dum ipsum fructum videret; et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet, prout rerum imagines uniuscuiusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit.
And from this, further, we understand clearly why the mind passes immediately from the thought of one thing into the thought of another which has no likeness to the first; as, for example, a Roman will pass immediately from the thought of the word pomum into the thought of the fruit, which has no likeness to that articulate sound, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the same man has often been affected by these two, that is, that the man himself often heard the word pomum while he saw the fruit;2 and so each one will pass from one thought into another according as habit has ordered the images of things in his body.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 63) reads incidit; Gebhardt (G II 107; Textgestaltung II 361), with Leopold and Appuhn, corrects to incidet, after the Dutch version’s zal vallen and the futures that follow.
  1. 2 Association by contiguity, as in Hobbes’ ‘Trayne of Imaginations’: ‘as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses’ (Leviathan, 1651, ch. 3).
Nam miles ex. gr. visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis, et inde in cogitationem belli, etc. incidet. At rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri, etc. incidet; et sic unusquisque, prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc vel alio modo iungere et concatenare, ex una in hanc vel in aliam incidet cogitationem.
For a soldier, for example, having seen the traces of a horse in the sand, will pass immediately from the thought of the horse into the thought of a horseman, and from there into the thought of war, etc. But a farmer will pass from the thought of the horse into the thought of a plough, of a field, etc.; and so each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and concatenate the images of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought into this or that other.

Propositio XIX

Proposition XIX

[G II 107] Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus corpus afficitur.
The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through the ideas of affections by which the body is affected.
[G II 108] Demonstratio. Mens enim humana est ipsa idea sive cognitio corporis humani (per prop. 13. huius), quae (per prop. 9. huius) in Deo quidem est, quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur; vel quia (per postul. 4.) corpus humanum plurimis corporibus indiget, a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur, et ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per prop. 7. huius) ac ordo et connexio causarum, erit haec idea in Deo, quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus consideratur. Deus itaque ideam corporis humani habet, sive corpus humanum cognoscit, quatenus plurimis aliis ideis affectus est, et non quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) mens humana corpus humanum non cognoscit.
Demonstration. For the human mind is the very idea, or knowledge, of the human body (by Prop. 13 of this Part), which (by Prop. 9 of this Part) is indeed in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing; or, since (by Post. 4) the human body needs very many bodies by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated, and the order and connection of ideas is the same (by Prop. 7 of this Part) as the order and connection of causes, this idea will be in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by the ideas of very many singular things. God, therefore, has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, insofar as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), the human mind does not know the human body.
At ideae affectionum corporis in Deo sunt, quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit, sive mens humana easdem affectiones percipit (per prop. 12. huius), et consequenter (per prop. 16. huius) ipsum corpus humanum, idque (per prop. 17. huius) ut actu existens. Percipit ergo eatenus tantum mens humana ipsum humanum corpus. Q. E. D.
But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those affections (by Prop. 12 of this Part), and consequently (by Prop. 16 of this Part) the human body itself, and (by Prop. 17 of this Part) as actually existing. Only to that extent, therefore, does the human mind perceive the human body itself. Q.E.D.

Propositio XX

Proposition XX

Mentis humanae datur etiam in Deo idea, sive cognitio, quae in Deo eodem modo sequitur et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea sive cognitio corporis humani.
There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body.

Cited in 2P22D, 2P23D, 2P43D

Demonstratio. Cogitatio attributum Dei est (per prop. 1. huius); adeoque (per prop. 3. huius) tam eius, quam omnium eius affectionum, et consequenter (per prop. 11. huius) mentis etiam humanae debet necessario in Deo dari idea. Deinde haec mentis idea sive cognitio non sequitur in Deo dari, quatenus infinitus; sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus est (per prop. 9. huius). Sed ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio causarum (per prop. 7. huius). Sequitur ergo haec mentis idea, sive cognitio in Deo, et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea sive cognitio corporis. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Thought is an attribute of God (by Prop. 1 of this Part); and so (by Prop. 3 of this Part) there must necessarily be in God an idea both of thought and of all its affections, and consequently (by Prop. 11 of this Part) of the human mind too. Next, this idea, or knowledge, of the mind does not follow to be in God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by Prop. 9 of this Part). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (by Prop. 7 of this Part). This idea, or knowledge, of the mind therefore follows in God, and is related to God, in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXI

Proposition XXI

[G II 109] Haec mentis idea eodem modo unita est menti, ac ipsa mens unita est corpori.
This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.

Cited in 2P22D, 4P8D, 5P3D

Demonstratio. Mentem unitam esse corpori ex eo ostendimus, quod scilicet corpus mentis sit obiectum (vide prop. 12. et 13. huius); adeoque per eandem illam rationem idea mentis cum suo obiecto, hoc est, cum ipsa mente eodem modo unita esse debet, ac ipsa mens unita est corpori. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (see Props. 12 and 13 of this Part); and so, by that same reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind itself, in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Haec prop. longe clarius intelligitur ex dictis in schol. prop. 7. huius. Ibi enim ostendimus corporis ideam, et corpus, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) mentem et corpus unum et idem esse individuum, quod iam sub cogitationis, iam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Quare mentis idea et ipsa mens una eademque est res, quae sub uno eodemque attributo, nempe cogitationis, concipitur. Mentis, inquam, idea et ipsa mens in Deo eadem necessitate ex eadem cogitandi potentia sequuntur dari.
Scholium. This proposition is understood far more clearly from what was said in Schol. of Prop. 7 of this Part. For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part), the mind and the body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely thought. The idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself follow to be in God from the same power of thinking by the same necessity.
Nam revera idea mentis, hoc est, idea ideae nihil aliud est, quam forma ideae, quatenus haec ut modus cogitandi absque relatione ad obiectum consideratur. Simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit se id scire, et simul scit se scire quod scit, et sic in infinitum. Sed de his postea.
For in fact the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of the idea, is nothing other than the form of the idea1 insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its object. For as soon as someone knows something, by that very fact he knows that he knows it, and at the same time he knows that he knows that he knows, and so on to infinity. But of these matters later.
  1. 1 The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect had used the same notions: to understand Peter’s essence it is not necessary to understand the idea of Peter, ‘et multo minus ideam ideae Petri; quod idem est, ac si dicerem, non esse opus, ut sciam, quod sciam me scire’ (‘and much less the idea of the idea of Peter; which is the same as if I said that it is not necessary, in order to know, that I know that I know’; §34). The matter is taken up again in Prop. 43, Schol., on truth as its own standard.

Cited in 2P43S, 4P8D, 5P3D

Propositio XXII

Proposition XXII

Mens humana non tantum corporis affectiones, sed etiam harum affectionum ideas percipit.
The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections.

Cited in 2P23D, 2P47D, 4P8D

Demonstratio. Affectionum idearum ideae in Deo eodem modo sequuntur et ad Deum eodem modo referuntur, ac ipsae affectionum ideae; quod eodem modo demonstratur, ac prop. 20. huius. At ideae affectionum corporis in mente humana sunt (per prop. 12. huius), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) in Deo, quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit. Ergo harum idearum ideae in Deo erunt, quatenus humanae mentis cognitionem, sive ideam habet, hoc est (per prop. 21. huius) in ipsa mente humana, quae propterea non tantum corporis affectiones, sed earum etiam ideas percipit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The ideas of the ideas of the affections follow in God in the same way, and are related to God in the same way, as the ideas of the affections themselves; which is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. 20 of this Part. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in the human mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God insofar as he has the knowledge, or idea, of the human mind, that is (by Prop. 21 of this Part), in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the affections of the body, but also their ideas. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXIII

Proposition XXIII

[G II 110] Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.
The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.1
  1. 1 A reversal of Descartes, whose Second Meditation is titled ‘De natura mentis humanae: quod ipsa sit notior quam corpus’ (‘Of the nature of the human mind: that it is better known than the body’; AT VII 23). For Spinoza the mind knows itself only through the ideas of its body’s affections, and so no better than it knows the body (Prop. 19).
Demonstratio. Mentis idea sive cognitio (per prop. 20. huius) in Deo eodem modo sequitur et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac corporis idea sive cognitio. At quoniam (per prop. 19. huius) mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) quoniam cognitio corporis humani ad Deum non refertur, quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit; ergo nec cognitio mentis ad Deum refertur, quatenus essentiam mentis humanae constituit; atque adeo (per idem coroll. prop. 11. huius.) mens humana eatenus se ipsam non cognoscit.
Demonstration. The idea, or knowledge, of the mind (by Prop. 20 of this Part) follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. But since (by Prop. 19 of this Part) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), since the knowledge of the human body is not related to God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, neither is the knowledge of the mind related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and so (by the same Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part) the human mind to that extent does not know itself.
Deinde affectionum, quibus corpus afficitur, ideae naturam ipsius corporis humani involvunt (per prop. 16. huius), hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) cum natura mentis conveniunt. Quare harum idearum cognitio cognitionem mentis necessario involvet. At (per prop. praeced.) harum idearum cognitio in ipsa humana mente est. Ergo mens humana eatenus tantum se ipsam novit. Q. E. D.
Next, the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected involve the nature of the human body itself (by Prop. 16 of this Part), that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part), they agree with the nature of the mind. So the knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve the knowledge of the mind. But (by the preceding Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore the human mind knows itself only to that extent. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXIV

Proposition XXIV

Mens humana partium corpus humanum componentium adaequatam cognitionem non involvit.
The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Cited in 2P28D, 2P36D

Demonstratio. Partes corpus humanum componentes ad essentiam ipsius corporis non pertinent, nisi quatenus motus suos certa quadam ratione invicem communicant (vide defin. post coroll. lem. 3.), et non quatenus ut individua absque relatione ad humanum corpus considerari possunt. Sunt enim partes humani corporis (per postul. 1.) valde composita individua, quorum partes (per lem. 4.) a corpore humano servata omnino eiusdem natura et forma segregari possunt, motusque suos (vide axiom. 1. post lem. 3.) aliis corporibus alia ratione communicare.
Demonstration. The parts composing the human body do not pertain to the essence of the body itself except insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio (see the Def. after the Cor. of Lemma 3), and not insofar as they can be considered as individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body (by Post. 1) are highly composite individuals, whose parts (by Lemma 4) can be separated from the human body while it entirely keeps its nature and form, and can communicate their motions (see Ax. 1 after Lemma 3) to other bodies in another ratio.
Adeoque (per prop. 3. huius) cuiuscumque partis idea sive cognitio in Deo erit, et quidem (per prop. 9. huius) quatenus affectus consideratur alia idea rei singularis, quae res singularis ipsa parte ordine naturae prior est (per prop. 7. huius). Quod idem praeterea etiam de quacumque parte ipsius individui corpus humanum componentis est dicendum.
And so (by Prop. 3 of this Part) the idea, or knowledge, of each part will be in God, and indeed (by Prop. 9 of this Part) insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing, which singular thing is prior in the order of nature to the part itself (by Prop. 7 of this Part). The same, moreover, is to be said of any part of the individual itself composing the human body.
Adeoque cuiuscumque partis corpus humanum componentis cognitio in Deo est, quatenus plurimis rerum ideis affectus est, et non quatenus corporis humani tantum habet ideam, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) ideam, quae humanae mentis naturam constituit. Atque adeo (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) humana mens partium corpus humanum componentium adaequatam cognitionem non involvit. Q. E. D.
And so the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God insofar as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part), the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind. And therefore (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part) the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXV

Proposition XXV

[G II 111] Idea cuiuscumque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.
The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body.
Demonstratio. Ideam affectionis corporis humani eatenus corporis externi naturam involvere ostendimus (vide prop.16. huius), quatenus externum ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo determinat. At quatenus externum corpus individuum est, quod ad corpus humanum non refertur, eius idea sive cognitio in Deo est (per prop. 9. huius), quatenus Deus affectus consideratur alterius rei idea, quae (per prop. 7. huius) ipso corpore externo prior est natura. Quare corporis externi adaequata cognitio in Deo non est, quatenus ideam affectionis humani corporis habet, sive idea affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We have shown that the idea of an affection of the human body involves the nature of an external body insofar as the external body determines the human body itself in a certain way (see Prop. 16 of this Part). But insofar as the external body is an individual that is not related to the human body, its idea, or knowledge, is in God (by Prop. 9 of this Part) insofar as God is considered to be affected by the idea of another thing, which (by Prop. 7 of this Part) is prior in nature to the external body itself. So adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God insofar as he has the idea of the affection of the human body; or, the idea of an affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXVI

Proposition XXVI

[G II 112] Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit, nisi per ideas affectionum sui corporis.
The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.

Cited in 2P26CD, 2P29C, 5P21D, 5P29D

Demonstratio. Si a corpore aliquo externo corpus humanum nullo modo affectum est, ergo (per prop. 7. huius) nec idea corporis humani, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) nec mens humana idea existentiae illius corporis ullo etiam modo affecta est, sive existentiam illius corporis externi ullo modo percipit. At quatenus corpus humanum a corpore aliquo externo aliquo modo afficitur, eatenus (per prop. 16. huius cum coroll. 1. eiusdem) corpus externum percipit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If the human body is in no way affected by some external body, then (by Prop. 7 of this Part) neither is the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part), neither is the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of that body; or, it does not perceive the existence of that external body in any way. But insofar as the human body is affected in some way by some external body, to that extent (by Prop. 16 of this Part with its Cor. 1) the mind perceives the external body. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Quatenus mens humana corpus externum imaginatur, eatenus adaequatam eius cognitionem non habet.
Corollary. Insofar as the human mind imagines an external body, it does not have adequate knowledge of it.
Demonstratio. Cum mens humana per ideas affectionum sui corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus (vide schol. prop. 17. huius); nec mens alia ratione (per prop. praeced.) corpora externa ut actu existentia imaginari potest. Atque adeo (per prop. 25. huius) quatenus mens corpora externa imaginatur, eorum adaequatam cognitionem non habet. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. When the human mind contemplates external bodies through the ideas of the affections of its own body, we then say that it imagines (see Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part); nor can the mind (by the preceding Prop.) imagine external bodies as actually existing in any other way. And so (by Prop. 25 of this Part), insofar as the mind imagines external bodies, it does not have adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXVII

Proposition XXVII

Idea cuiuscumque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam ipsius humani corporis cognitionem non involvit.
The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Cited in 2P29D, 2P29C, 2P38D

Demonstratio. Quaelibet idea cuiuscumque affectionis humani corporis eatenus naturam corporis humani involvit, quatenus ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo affici consideratur (vide prop. 16. huius). At quatenus corpus humanum individuum est, quod multis aliis modis affici potest, eius idea etc. Vide demonstr. prop. 25. huius.
Demonstration. Any idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the human body to the extent that the human body itself is considered to be affected in a certain way (see Prop. 16 of this Part). But insofar as the human body is an individual that can be affected in many other ways, its idea etc. See the demonstration of Prop. 25 of this Part.

Propositio XXVIII

Proposition XXVIII

[G II 113] Ideae affectionum corporis humani, quatenus ad humanam mentem tantum referuntur, non sunt clarae et distinctae, sed confusae.
The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Cited in 2P29C, 2P36D

Demonstratio. Ideae enim affectionum corporis humani, tam corporum externorum, quam ipsius humani corporis naturam involvunt (per prop. 16. huius); nec tantum corporis humani, sed eius etiam partium naturam involvere debent. Affectiones namque modi sunt (per postul. 3.), quibus partes corporis humani, et consequenter totum corpus afficitur.
Demonstration. For the ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body itself (by Prop. 16 of this Part); and they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts. For the affections are modes (by Post. 3) in which the parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body, are affected.
At (per prop. 24. et 25. huius) corporum externorum adaequata cognitio, ut et partium corpus humanum componentium in Deo non est, quatenus humana mente, sed quatenus aliis ideis affectus consideratur.a Sunt ergo hae affectionum ideae, quatenus ad solam humanam mentem referuntur, veluti consequentiae absque praemissis, hoc est (ut per se notum) ideae confusae. Q. E. D.
But (by Props. 24 and 25 of this Part) adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by the human mind, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by other ideas. These ideas of affections, therefore, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are like consequences without premises,1 that is (as is self-evident), confused ideas. Q.E.D.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dat is (volgens de dartiende Voorstelling van dit deel), deeze Kennis is niet in God, voor zo veel hy de natuur van de menschelijke ziel stelt’ (‘that is (by the thirteenth Proposition of this Part), this knowledge is not in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 113; Textgestaltung II 362).
  1. 1 An inadequate idea is one whose causes are not in the mind that has it: it is had as a conclusion is had without the premises from which it follows. Adequate knowledge, by contrast, is knowledge through causes (Part I, Ax. 4).
Scholium. Idea, quae naturam mentis humanae constituit, demonstratur eodem modo non esse in se sola considerata clara et distincta; ut etiam idea mentis humanae, et ideae idearum affectionum corporis humani,a quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, quod unusquisque facile videre potest.
Scholium. That the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind, considered in itself alone, is not clear and distinct is demonstrated in the same way; as also that the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the mind, are not clear and distinct; which anyone can easily see.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘te weten dat zy verwart zijn’ (‘namely, that they are confused’), glossed Confusae in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 113; Textgestaltung II 363), and defends the scholium, which Saisset left out and Meijer, Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern thought a marginal gloss, as present in both redactions.

Cited in 2P29C

Propositio XXIX

Proposition XXIX

Idea ideae cuiuscumque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam humanae mentis cognitionem non involvit.
The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Cited in 2P29C, 4P64D

Demonstratio. Idea enim affectionis corporis humani (per prop. 27. huius) adaequatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit, sive eius naturam adaequate non exprimit, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) cum natura mentis non convenit adaequate. Adeoque (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) huius ideae idea adaequate humanae mentis naturam non exprimit, sive adaequatam eius cognitionem non involvit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For the idea of an affection of the human body (by Prop. 27 of this Part) does not involve adequate knowledge of the body itself, or does not express its nature adequately, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part), does not agree adequately with the nature of the mind. And so (by Ax. 6, Part I) the idea of this idea does not express the nature of the human mind adequately, or does not involve adequate knowledge of it. Q.E.D.
[G II 114] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, mentem humanam, quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius, nec sui corporis, nec corporum externorum adaequatam, sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem.
Corollary. From this it follows that the human mind, whenever it perceives things from the common order of nature, has neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies an adequate knowledge, but only a confused and mutilated one.
Nam mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus ideas affectionum corporis percipit (per prop. 23. huius). Corpus autem suum (per prop. 19. huius) non percipit, nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas, per quas etiam tantum (per prop. 26. huius) corpora externa percipit. Atque adeo, quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (per prop. 29. huius), nec sui corporis (per prop. 27. huius), nec corporum externorum (per prop. 25. huius) habet adaequatam cognitionem, sed tantum (per prop. 28. huius cum eius schol.) mutilatam, et confusam. Q. E. D.
For the mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body (by Prop. 23 of this Part). And it does not perceive its own body (by Prop. 19 of this Part) except through these very ideas of affections, through which alone also (by Prop. 26 of this Part) it perceives external bodies. And so, insofar as it has these ideas, it has an adequate knowledge neither of itself (by Prop. 29 of this Part), nor of its own body (by Prop. 27 of this Part), nor of external bodies (by Prop. 25 of this Part), but only (by Prop. 28 of this Part with its Schol.) a mutilated and confused one. Q.E.D.

Cited in 2P40S2, 3P3D

Scholium. Dico expresse, quod mens nec sui ipsius, nec sui corporis, nec corporum externorum adaequatam, sed confusam tantum, cognitionema habeat, quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit, hoc est, quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum, et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet, quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum. Quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.
Scholium. I say expressly that the mind has an adequate knowledge neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused one, whenever it perceives things from the common order of nature, that is, whenever it is determined externally, namely from the fortuitous encounter with things, to contemplate this or that, and not whenever it is determined internally, namely from the fact that it contemplates several things at once, to understanding their agreements, differences and oppositions. For whenever it is disposed internally, in this or another way, then it contemplates things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show below.1
  1. a Gebhardt (G II 114; Textgestaltung II 363) inserts et mutilatam after confusam tantum, from the Dutch version (een verwarde en verminkte kennis, glossed Confusa ac mutilata cognitio) and as in the Corollary; the 1677 edition and Bartuschat lack it.
  1. 1 The contrast between external and internal determination prepares the theory of the common notions, which are adequate because they concern what is common to all things, or to the human body and the external bodies that affect it (Props. 37–39), and the three kinds of knowledge of Prop. 40, Schol. 2.

Propositio XXX

Proposition XXX

Nos de duratione nostri corporis nullam nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus.
We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

Cited in 2P31D

Demonstratio. Nostri corporis duratio ab eius essentia non dependet (per axiom. 1. huius), nec etiam ab absoluta Dei natura (per prop. 21. P. 1.). Sed (per prop. 28. P. 1.) ad existendum et operandum determinatur a talibus causis,a quae etiam ab aliis determinatae sunt ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione, et hae iterum ab aliis, et sic in infinitum. Nostri igitur corporis duratio a communi naturae ordine et rerum constitutione pendet.
Demonstration. The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (by Ax. 1 of this Part), nor on the absolute nature of God either (by Prop. 21, Part I). But (by Prop. 28, Part I) it is determined to exist and to operate by such causes as are also determined by others to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner, and these again by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature and on the constitution of things.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 has ‘van zodanige andere oorzaken’ (‘by such other causes’); Gebhardt prints andere in his text (G II 115; Textgestaltung II 363).
Qua autem ratione constitutae sint, eius rei adaequata cognitio datur in Deo, quatenus earum omnium ideas, et non quatenus tantum humani corporis ideam habet (per coroll. prop. 9. huius). Quare cognitio durationis nostri corporis est in Deo admodum inadaequata, quatenus tantum naturam mentis humanae constituere consideratur, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) haec cognitio est in nostra mente admodum inadaequata. Q. E. D.
But adequate knowledge of the manner in which things are constituted is in God insofar as he has the ideas of them all, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part). So the knowledge of the duration of our body is very inadequate in God insofar as he is considered only to constitute the nature of the human mind, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXI

Proposition XXXI

[G II 115] Nos de duratione rerum singularium, quae extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus.
We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things that are outside us.

Cited in 2P31C, 4P62S

Demonstratio. Unaquaeque enim res singularis, sicuti humanum corpus, ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione; et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum (per prop. 28. P. 1.). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in praeced. prop. demonstraverimus, nos de duratione nostri corporis non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere; ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum, quod scilicet eius non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For each singular thing, like the human body, must be determined by another singular thing to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner, and this again by another, and so on to infinity (by Prop. 28, Part I). But since from this common property of singular things we have demonstrated in the preceding Prop. that we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body, the same will have to be concluded about the duration of singular things, namely that we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of it. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adaequatam cognitionem habere possumus (per prop. praeced.), et hoc est id, quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum. Vide schol. 1. prop. 33. P. 1. Nam (per prop. 29. P. 1.) praeter hoc nullum datur contingens.
Corollary. From this it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration (by the preceding Prop.), and that is what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption. See Schol. 1 of Prop. 33, Part I. For (by Prop. 29, Part I) apart from this there is nothing contingent.1
  1. 1 Contingency is relative to our knowledge, as in Part I, Prop. 33, Schol. 1; Part IV defines the contingent and the possible accordingly (Part IV, Defs. 3 and 4).

Cited in 3DA15Ex

Propositio XXXII

Proposition XXXII

[G II 116] Omnes ideae, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt.
All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.

Cited in 2P33D, 2P34D, 2P36D, 4P1D, 5P17D

Demonstratio. Omnes enim ideae, quae in Deo sunt, cum suis ideatis omnino conveniunta (per coroll. prop. 7. huius); adeoque (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) omnes verae sunt. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For all ideas that are in God agree entirely with their objects (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part); and so (by Ax. 6, Part I) they are all true. Q.E.D.
  1. a Gebhardt (G II 116; Textgestaltung II 363) inserts Objectis et before ideatis, from the Dutch version (met hun Voorwerpen en gedachte zaken, glossed Objecta, Ideatum); the 1677 edition and Bartuschat lack it.

Propositio XXXIII

Proposition XXXIII

Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur.
There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.

Cited in 2P35D, 4P1D

Demonstratio. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, modum positivum cogitandi, qui formam erroris, sive falsitatis constituat. Hic cogitandi modus non potest esse in Deo (per prop. praeced.); extra Deum autem etiam nec esse, nec concipi potest (per prop. 15. P. 1.). Atque adeo nihil potest dari positivum in ideis, propter quod falsae dicuntur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, a positive mode of thinking which constitutes the form of error, or of falsity.1 This mode of thinking cannot be in God (by the preceding Prop.); and outside God it can neither be nor be conceived (by Prop. 15, Part I). And so there can be nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false. Q.E.D.
  1. 1 formam erroris, Descartes’ phrase: for him the privation ‘quae formam erroris constituit’ lies in the misuse of free choice, ‘in ipsa operatione, quatenus a me procedit’ (‘in the operation itself, insofar as it proceeds from me’; Meditations IV, AT VII 60). See Prop. 35 and Prop. 49, Schol..

Propositio XXXIV

Proposition XXXIV

Omnis idea, quae in nobis est absoluta sive adaequata et perfecta, vera est.
Every idea which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

Cited in 2P41D, 2P43D

Demonstratio. Cum dicimus, dari in nobis ideam adaequatam et perfectam, nihil aliud dicimus (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) quam quod in Deo, quatenus nostrae mentis essentiam constituit, detur idea adaequata et perfecta, et consequenter (per prop. 32. huius) nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod talis idea sit vera. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we are saying nothing else (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part) than that there is an adequate and perfect idea in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our mind, and consequently (by Prop. 32 of this Part) we are saying nothing else than that such an idea is true. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXV

Proposition XXXV

Falsitas consistit in cognitionis privatione, quam ideae inadaequatae sive mutilatae et confusae involvunt.
Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge1 which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.
  1. 1 Descartes too calls error ‘non … pura negatio, sed privatio, sive carentia cujusdam cognitionis’ (‘not a pure negation, but a privation, or lack, of some knowledge’; Meditations IV, AT VII 55), but places it in the will’s judging beyond what the intellect perceives. Spinoza keeps the privation and, having denied a will distinct from ideas (Prop. 49), locates it in inadequate ideas themselves.

Cited in 2P41D, 2P43S, 2P49S, 4P1D

[G II 117] Demonstratio. Nihil in ideis positivum datur, quod falsitatis formam constituat (per prop. 33. huius). At falsitas in absoluta privatione consistere nequita (mentes enim, non corpora errare nec falli dicuntur), neque etiam in absoluta ignorantia; diversa enim sunt ignorare et errare; quare in cognitionis privatione, quam rerum inadaequata cognitio sive ideae inadaequatae et confusae involvunt, consistit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. There is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity (by Prop. 33 of this Part). But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for it is minds, not bodies, that are said to err and be deceived), nor yet in absolute ignorance; for to be ignorant and to err are different. So it consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate knowledge of things, or inadequate and confused ideas, involve. Q.E.D.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘van kennis’ (‘of knowledge’): ‘in an absolute privation of knowledge’. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 117; Textgestaltung II 363).
Scholium. In schol. prop. 17. huius explicui, qua ratione error in cognitionis privatione consistit. Sed ad uberiorem huius rei explicationem exemplum dabo.
Scholium. In Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge. But for a fuller explanation of this matter I shall give an example.
Nempe falluntur homines, quod se liberos esse putant;a quae opinio in hoc solo consistit, quod suarum actionum sint conscii et ignari causarum a quibus determinantur. Haec ergo est eorum libertatis idea, quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam. Nam quod aiunt, humanas actiones a voluntate pendere, verba sunt, quorum nullam habent ideam. Quid enim voluntas sit et quomodo moveat corpus, ignorant omnes; qui aliud iactant, et animae sedes et habitacula fingunt,b vel risum vel nauseam movere solent.
Namely, men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.1 This, therefore, is their idea of freedom: that they know no cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend on the will, these are words of which they have no idea. For what the will is, and how it moves the body, they are all ignorant; those who boast otherwise, and feign seats and dwelling places of the soul,2 usually provoke either laughter or disgust.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘dat is, zy achten dat zy vrywilliglijk iets konnen doen, of laten’ (‘that is, they think that they can voluntarily do or omit something’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 117; Textgestaltung II 363).
  2. b The 1677 edition (OP p. 73) has animae sedes, & habitacula, without the first et; Gebhardt (G II 117; Textgestaltung II 363), with Leopold and after the Dutch version (en zetels en woningen), supplies it.
  1. 1 As in the Appendix to Part I, and again in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol..
  2. 2 Aimed at Descartes’ pineal gland, discussed at length in the Preface to Part V.
Sic cum solem intuemur, eum ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur; qui error in hac sola imaginatione non consistit, sed in eo, quod dum ipsum sic imaginamur, veram eius distantiam et huius imaginationis causam ignoramus. Nam tametsi postea cognoscamus, eundem ultra sescentos terrae diametros a nobis distare, ipsum nihilominus prope adesse imaginabimur; non enim solem adeo propinquum imaginamur, propterea quod veram eius distantiam ignoramus, sed propterea, quod affectio nostri corporis essentiam solis involvit, quatenus ipsum corpus ab eodem afficitur.
So when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us;3 an error which does not consist in this imagining alone, but in the fact that while we imagine it so, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining. For even if we afterwards come to know that it is more than six hundred diameters of the earth away from us, we shall nonetheless imagine it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our body is affected by it.
  1. 3 An old example. Aristotle: φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ’ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης (‘the sun appears a foot across, though it is believed to be larger than the inhabited world’; De anima III.3, 428b3–4). Descartes finds in himself ‘duas diversas solis ideas’ (‘two different ideas of the sun’), one from the senses, ‘per quam mihi valde parvus apparet’ (‘by which it appears very small to me’), the other from astronomy, by which it is shown to be several times larger than the earth (Meditations III, AT VII 39). Spinoza adds that the first appearance persists after the second is known.

Cited in 2P43S, 2P49S, 3DA27Ex, 4P1S, 5P5D

Propositio XXXVI

Proposition XXXVI

Ideae inadaequatae et confusae eadem necessitate consequuntur, ac adaequatae sive clarae ac distinctae ideae.
Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.
[G II 118] Demonstratio. Ideae omnes in Deo sunt (per prop. 15. P. 1.) et quatenus ad Deum referuntur, sunt verae (per prop. 32. huius) et (per coroll. prop. 7. huius) adaequatae; adeoque nullae inadaequatae nec confusae sunt, nisi quatenus ad singularem alicuius mentem referuntur. Qua de re vide prop. 24. et 28. huius). Adeoque omnes tam adaequatae, quam inadaequatae eadem necessitate (per coroll. prop. 6. huius) consequuntur. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. All ideas are in God (by Prop. 15, Part I), and insofar as they are related to God they are true (by Prop. 32 of this Part) and (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part) adequate; and so there are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of someone. (On this see Props. 24 and 28 of this Part.) And so all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow with the same necessity (by Cor. of Prop. 6 of this Part). Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXVII

Proposition XXXVII

Id quod omnibus commune (de his vide supra lem. 2.), quodque aeque in parte ac in toto est, nullius rei singularis essentiam constituit.
That which is common to all things (on which see Lemma 2 above), and which is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.

Cited in 2P44C2D

Demonstratio. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, id essentiam alicuius rei singularis constituere, nempe essentiam B. Ergo (per defin. 2 huius) id sine B non poterit esse, neque concipi. Atqui hoc est contra hypothesin. Ergo id ad essentiam B non pertinet, nec alterius rei singularis essentiam constituit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, that it constitutes the essence of some singular thing, namely the essence of B. Then (by Def. 2 of this Part) it will not be able to be or be conceived without B. But this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not pertain to the essence of B, nor does it constitute the essence of any other singular thing. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXVIII

Proposition XXXVIII

Illa quae omnibus communia, quaeque aeque in parte ac in toto sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adaequate.
Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.1
  1. 1 The theory of the ‘common notions’ (named in Cor. and Prop. 40, Schol. 1). Spinoza had used the term for axioms in the old sense (see the note on Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2); here they become ideas of what is common to all bodies, or to the human body and those that affect it (Prop. 39), and are adequate in every mind because nothing in them depends on what the mind lacks.

Cited in 2P38C, 2P44C2D, 2P46D, 5P4D, 5P7D

Demonstratio. Sit A aliquid, quod omnibus corporibus commune, quodque aeque in parte cuiuscumque corporis ac in toto est. Dico A non posse concipi, nisi adaequate. Nam eius idea (per coroll. prop. 7. huius) erit necessario in Deo adaequata, tam quatenus ideam corporis humani, quam quatenus ideas habet eiusdem affectionum, quae (per prop. 16., 25. et 27. huius) tam corporis humani, quam corporum externorum naturam ex parte involvunt, hoc est (per prop. 12. et 13. huius) haec idea erit necessario in Deo adaequata, quatenus mentem humanam constituit, sive quatenus ideas habet, quae in mente humana sunt. Mens igitur (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) A necessario adaequate percipit, idque tam quatenus se, quam quatenus suum vel quodcumque externum corpus percipit; nec A alio modo potest concipi. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and that is equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part) will necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of its affections, which (by Props. 16, 25 and 27 of this Part) involve in part the nature both of the human body and of external bodies; that is (by Props. 12 and 13 of this Part), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human mind, or insofar as he has the ideas which are in the human mind. The mind therefore (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part) necessarily perceives A adequately, and that both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own or any external body; nor can A be conceived in any other way. Q.E.D.
[G II 119] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, dari quasdam ideas sive notiones omnibus hominibus communes. Nam (per lem. 2.) omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quae (per prop. praeced.) ab omnibus debent adaequate sive clare et distincte percipi.
Corollary. From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men. For (by Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by the preceding Prop.) must be perceived by all adequately, or clearly and distinctly.

Cited in 2P40S2, 3P3D

Propositio XXXIX

Proposition XXXIX

Id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis, a quibus corpus humanum affici solet, commune est, et proprium, quodque in cuiuscumque horum partea aeque ac in toto est, eius etiam idea erit in mente adaequata.
Of that which is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and which is equally in the part of each of these and in the whole, there will also be an adequate idea in the mind.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 75) has the words in a confused order: Id, quod Corpori humano, & quibusdam corporibus externis, a quibus Corpus humanum affici solet, quodque in cujuscunque horum parte aeque, ac in toto commune est, & proprium, ejus etiam idea erit in Mente adaequata. Gebhardt (G II 119; Textgestaltung II 363), after the Dutch version and the order of the demonstration, transposes commune est, et proprium, as do Baensch, Meijer, Appuhn and Halpern.

Cited in 2P40S2

Demonstratio. Sit A id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis commune est et proprium, quodque aeque in humano corpore ac in iisdem corporibus externis, et quod denique aeque in cuiuscumque corporis externi parte ac in toto est. Ipsius A dabitur in Deo idea adaequata (per coroll. prop. 7. huius) tam quatenus ideam corporis humani, quam quatenus positorum corporum externorum ideas habet.
Demonstration. Let A be that which is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies, and which is equally in the human body and in those external bodies, and which, finally, is equally in the part of each external body and in the whole. There will be in God an adequate idea of A (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part) both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of the external bodies supposed.
Ponatur iam humanum corpus a corpore externo affici per id quod cum eo habet commune, hoc est, ab A. Huius affectionis idea proprietatem A involvet (per prop. 16. huius); atque adeo (per idem coroll. prop. 7. huius) idea huius affectionis, quatenus proprietatem A involvit, erit in Deo adaequata, quatenus idea corporis humani affectus est, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) quatenus mentis humanae naturam constituit. Adeoque (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) haec idea est etiam in mente humana adaequata. Q. E. D.
Suppose now that the human body is affected by an external body through what it has in common with it, that is, by A. The idea of this affection will involve the property A (by Prop. 16 of this Part); and so (by the same Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part) the idea of this affection, insofar as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God insofar as he is affected by the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part), insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. And so (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.
Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod mens eo aptior est ad plura adaequate percipiendum, quo eius corpus plura habet cum aliis corporibus communia.
Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately, the more its body has in common with other bodies.

Cited in 2P40S2

Propositio XL

Proposition XL

[G II 120] Quaecumque ideae in mente sequuntur ex ideis, quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, sunt etiam adaequatae.
Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it are also adequate.

Cited in 2P40S2, 4P26D, 4P52D, 5P4S, 5P31D

Demonstratio. Patet. Nam cum dicimus, in mente humana ideam sequi ex ideis, quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, nihil aliud dicimus (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) quam quod in ipso divino intellectu detur idea, cuius Deus est causa, non quatenus infinitus est, nec quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus est; sed quatenus tantum humanae mentis essentiam constituit.a
Demonstration. This is evident. For when we say that an idea follows in the human mind from ideas which are adequate in it, we are saying nothing else (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part) than that there is in the divine intellect itself an idea of which God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected by the ideas of very many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human mind.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘en dieshalven moet het evenmatig wezen’ (‘and therefore it must be adequate’), glossed Adaequata in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 120; Textgestaltung II 363).
Scholium I. His causam notionum,a quae communes vocantur quaeque ratiocinii nostri fundamenta sunt, explicui. Sed aliae quorundam axiomatum sive notionum causae dantur, quas hac nostra methodo explicare e re foret. Ex iis namque constaret, quaenam notiones prae reliquis utiliores, quaenam vero vix ullius usus essent; deinde quaenam communes,b et quaenam iis tantum, qui praeiudiciis non laborant, clarae et distinctae; et quaenam denique male fundatae sint.
Scholium I. With these things I have explained the cause of the notions which are called common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning. But there are other causes of certain axioms, or notions, which it would be to the purpose to explain by this method of ours. For from them it would be established which notions are more useful than the rest, and which are of hardly any use; next, which are common, and which are clear and distinct only to those who do not labour under prejudices; and which, finally, are ill founded.
  1. a The 1677 edition and the Dutch version head this scholium simply Scholium (Dutch Byvoegsel), and the next Scholium II. Since Spinoza later cites both together as ‘Schol. Prop. 40.’ (G II 140, 228), Gebhardt concludes that he divided one scholium in two (Textgestaltung II 364).
  2. b deinde quaenam communes] transcr. deinde quaeriam communes. The transcription reads ‘quaeriam’; the 1677 edition (OP p. 76) and Gebhardt (G II 120) read ‘quaenam’.
Praeterea constaret, unde notiones illae, quas secundas vocant, et consequenter axiomata, quae in iisdem fundantur, suam duxerunt originem, et alia, quae circa haec aliquando meditatus sum. Sed quoniam haec alii dicavi tractatui, et etiam, ne propter nimiam huius rei prolixitatem fastidium crearem, hac re hic supersedere decrevi.
Further, it would be established from what source those notions which they call second notions,1 and consequently the axioms that are founded on them, have taken their origin, and other things which I have at some time thought about in this connection. But since I have devoted these matters to another treatise,2 and also so as not to create tedium by too great a prolixity on this subject, I have decided to pass over this matter here.
  1. 1 notiones secundas: in scholastic logic, ‘second intentions’, concepts of concepts, such as genus, species, predicate, as distinct from first intentions, concepts of things.
  2. 2 Which treatise is not known. M. Gueroult suggests perhaps an improved and completed version of the unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (Spinoza II: L’âme, 1974, p. 364).
Attamen ne quid horum omittam, quod scitu necessarium sit, causas breviter addam, ex quibus termini transcendentales dicti suam duxerunt originem, ut ens, res, aliquid. Hi termini ex hoc oriuntur, quod scilicet humanum corpus, quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri (quid imago sit explicui in schol. prop. 17. huius) in se distincte simul formandi; qui si excedatur, hae imagines confundi incipient, et si hic imaginum numerus, quarum corpus est capax, ut eas in se simul distincte formet, longe excedatur, omnes inter se plane confundentur. Cum hoc ita se habeat, patet ex coroll. prop. 17. et prop. 18. huius, quod mens humana tot corpora distincte simul imaginari poterit, quot in ipsius corpore imagines possunt simul formari. At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet, nempe sub attributo entis, rei, etc.
Nevertheless, so as to omit nothing of these matters that is necessary to know, I shall add briefly the causes from which the terms called transcendental, such as being, thing, something,3 have taken their origin. These terms arise from this, that the human body, since it is limited, is capable of forming in itself distinctly at the same time only a certain number of images (what an image is I have explained in Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part); and if this number is exceeded, these images will begin to be confused; and if this number of images which the body is capable of forming in itself distinctly at the same time is far exceeded, they will all be completely confused with one another. Since this is so, it is evident from Cor. of Prop. 17 and Prop. 18 of this Part that the human mind will be able to imagine distinctly at the same time as many bodies as there are images that can be formed at the same time in its body. But when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind too will imagine all bodies confusedly, without any distinction, and will comprehend them as it were under one attribute, namely under the attribute of being, thing, etc.
  1. 3 The scholastic transcendentals, predicates that apply to every being and cut across the categories. Suárez: ‘Solent communiter sex transcendentia numerari, ens, res, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum’ (‘six transcendentals are commonly counted: being, thing, something, one, true, good’; Disputationes metaphysicae III.2). Spinoza had treated the ‘termini vulgo transcendentales dicti’ in the Cogitata Metaphysica (I.6, G I 245) as modes of thinking; here he gives them a physiological genealogy.
Potest hoc etiam ex eo deduci, quod imagines non semper aeque vigeant, et ex aliis causis his analogis, quas hic explicare non est opus; nam ad nostrum, ad quem collimamus, scopum unam tantum sufficit considerare. Nam omnes huc redeunt, quod hi termini ideas significent summo gradu confusas.
This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other causes analogous to these, which there is no need to explain here; for to our purpose, at which we aim, it is enough to consider only one. For they all come back to this, that these terms signify ideas confused in the highest degree.
Ex similibus deinde causis ortae sunt notiones illae, quas universales vocant, ut homo, equus, canis etc., videlicet, quiac in corpore humano tot imagines, ex gr. hominum formantur simul, ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus, sed eo usque tamen superent, ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscuiusque colorem, magnitudinem etc.) eorumque determinatum numerum mens imaginari nequeat, et id tantum, in quo omnes, quatenus corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur; nam ab eo corpus maxime, scilicet ab unoquoque singulari,d affectum fuit; atque hoc nomine hominis exprimit, hocque de infinitis singularibus praedicat. Nam singularium determinatum numerum, ut diximus, imaginari nequit.
From similar causes, next, have arisen those notions which they call universal, such as man, horse, dog, etc., namely because so many images, for example of men, are formed at the same time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining, not indeed completely, but still to the point that the mind cannot imagine the small differences of the individuals (namely the colour, size, etc. of each) and their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only that in which all agree, insofar as the body is affected by them; for by that the body has been affected most, namely by each individual; and this it expresses by the name man, and predicates it of infinitely many individuals. For, as we have said, it cannot imagine the determinate number of the individuals.
  1. c ut homo, equus, canis etc., videlicet, quia] transcr. ut homo, equus, canis etc. Videlicet quia. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 121; Textgestaltung II 364), after the Dutch version (‘paert, hont enz. te weten’) and Leopold; the 1677 edition (OP p. 77), which the transcription follows, ends the sentence after ‘etc.’.
  2. d nam ab eo corpus maxime, scilicet ab unoquoque singulari] transcr. nam ab eo corpus, maxime scilicet ab unoquoque singulari. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 121; Textgestaltung II 364), after the Dutch version and Leopold; the 1677 edition, which the transcription follows, has ‘corpus, maxime scilicet’.
Sed notandum, has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari, sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei, a qua corpus affectum saepius fuit, quamque facilius mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Ex. gr. qui saepius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine hominis intelligente animal erectae staturae; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt, nempe, hominem esse animal risibile, animal bipes, sine plumis, animal rationale; et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit. Quare non mirum est, quod inter philosophos, qui res naturales per solas rerum imagines explicare voluerunt, tot sint ortae controversiae.
But it is to be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same way, but vary in each according to the thing by which the body has more often been affected, and which the mind imagines or recollects more easily. For example, those who have more often contemplated the stature of men with wonder will understand by the name man an animal of erect stature; but those who are accustomed to contemplate something else will form another common image of men, namely that man is an animal capable of laughter, a featherless biped, a rational animal;4 and so of the rest, each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his body. So it is no wonder that so many controversies have arisen among the philosophers who wished to explain natural things through mere images of things.
  1. e The 1677 edition (OP p. 77) reads intelliget; Gebhardt (G II 121; Textgestaltung II 364) prints intelligent, which the plural subject requires.
  1. 4 Traditional definitions of man: animal rationale, the standard definition by genus and difference; risibile, the stock example of a property (proprium) in the logic of the predicables; ‘featherless biped’, the definition ascribed to Plato, which Diogenes the Cynic is said to have answered with a plucked cock: Πλάτωνος ὁρισαμένου, Ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον δίπουν ἄπτερον (‘when Plato had defined: Man is a two-footed, featherless animal’; Diogenes Laertius VI.40).

Cited in 3P55S

[G II 122] Scholium II. Ex omnibus supra dictis clare apparet, nos multa percipere, et notiones universales formare 1. ex singularibus nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum repraesentatis (vide coroll. prop. 29. huius); et ideo tales perceptiones cognitionem ab experientia vaga vocare consuevi. 2. Ex signis, ex. gr. ex eo, quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur, et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis, per quas res imaginamur. Vide schol. prop. 18. huius. Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum cognitionem primi generis, opinionem, vel imaginationem in posterum vocabo.
Scholium II. From all that has been said above it is clearly evident that we perceive many things and form universal notions 1. from singulars represented to us through the senses in a mutilated, confused way and without order for the intellect (see Cor. of Prop. 29 of this Part); and for that reason I have been accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from random experience.1 2. From signs, for example from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine the things (see Schol. of Prop. 18 of this Part). Both these ways of contemplating things I shall henceforth call knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
  1. 1 experientia vaga, the phrase of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, which counted four modes of perception: from hearsay or signs, from random experience (‘ab experientia vaga, hoc est, ab experientia, quae non determinatur ab intellectu’), from an inadequate inference of a thing’s essence from another, and from a thing’s essence alone or its proximate cause (§19). The Short Treatise has three, and the same example of the rule of three (II.1, G I 54). Here the first two of the Treatise’s modes are combined into one kind.
3. Denique ex eo, quod notiones communes rerumque proprietatum ideas adaequatas habemus. Vide coroll. prop. 38. et 39. cum eius coroll. et prop. 40. huius. Atque hunc rationem, et secundi generis cognitionem vocabo. Praeter haec duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium quod scientiam intuitivam vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum.
3. Finally, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see Cor. of Prop. 38, and Prop. 39 with its Cor., and Prop. 40 of this Part). And this I shall call reason, and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall show in what follows, another, third kind, which we shall call intuitive knowledge.2 And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.
  1. 2 scientia intuitiva. Its power over the affects and its relation to the intellectual love of God are the subject of Part V, Props. 25–36.
Haec omnia unius rei exemplo explicabo. Dantur ex. gr. tres numeri ad quartum obtinendum, qui sit ad tertium, ut secundus ad primum. Non dubitant mercatores secundum in tertium ducere et productum per primum dividere; quia scilicet ea, quae a magistro absque ulla demonstratione audiverunt, nondum tradiderunt oblivioni, vel quia id saepe in numeris simplicissimis experti sunt, vel ex vi demonstr. prop. 19. libr. 7. Euclid.,a nempe ex communi proprietate proportionalium. At in numeris simplicissimis nihil horum opus est. Ex. gr. datis numeris 1, 2, 3 nemo non videt, quartum numerum proportionalem esse 6, atque hoc multo clarius, quia ex ipsa ratione, quam primum ad secundum habere uno intuitu videmus, ipsum quartum concludimus.
I shall explain all these by the example of one thing. Suppose, for example, three numbers are given in order to obtain a fourth which is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first, either because they have not yet forgotten what they heard from their teacher without any demonstration, or because they have often found it so in the simplest numbers, or from the force of the demonstration of Prop. 19, Book VII of Euclid,3 namely from the common property of proportionals. But in the simplest numbers none of this is needed. For example, given the numbers 1, 2, 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6, and this much more clearly, because from the very ratio which we see at a glance the first to have to the second, we infer the fourth itself.
  1. a prop. 19. libr. 7. Euclid.] transcr. prop. 19. libr. 7. element. Euclid. ‘element.’ is not in the 1677 edition (OP p. 78) or Gebhardt (G II 122: ‘Prop. 19. lib. 7. Euclid.’).
  1. 3 ἐὰν τέσσαρες ἀριθμοὶ ἀνάλογον ὦσιν, ὁ ἐκ πρώτου καὶ τετάρτου γενόμενος ἀριθμὸς ἴσος ἔσται τῷ ἐκ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου γενομένῳ ἀριθμῷ (‘if four numbers are proportional, the number produced from the first and fourth will be equal to the number produced from the second and third’; Elements VII.19, Heiberg). The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect uses the same example and the same reference (§23; G II 12).

Propositio XLI

Proposition XLI

Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera.
Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, but knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.
[G II 123] Demonstratio. Ad primi generis cognitionem illas omnes ideas diximus in praeced. schol. pertinere, quae sunt inadaequatae, et confusae; atque adeo (per prop. 35. huius) haec cognitio unica est falsitatis causa. Deinde ad cognitionem secundi et tertii illas pertinere diximus, quae sunt adaequatae; adeoque (per prop. 34. huius) est necessario vera. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. We have said in the preceding Scholium that to knowledge of the first kind belong all those ideas which are inadequate and confused; and therefore (by Prop. 35 of this Part) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. Next, we have said that to knowledge of the second and third kinds belong those which are adequate; and therefore (by Prop. 34 of this Part) it is necessarily true. Q.E.D.

Propositio XLII

Proposition XLII

Secundi et tertii, et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.
Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.
Demonstratio. Haec prop. per se patet. Qui enim inter verum, et falsum scit distinguere, debet adaequatam veri, et falsi habere ideam, hoc est (per schol. 2. prop. 40. huius) verum, et falsum secundo, aut tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.
Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For he who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and the false, that is (by Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of this Part), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

Propositio XLIII

Proposition XLIII

Qui veram habet ideam, simul scit se veram habere ideam, nec de rei veritate potest dubitare.
He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea,1 and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.
  1. 1 Spinoza’s answer to the demand for a criterion of truth. The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect had put it so: ‘ad certitudinem veritatis nullo alio signo sit opus, quam veram habere ideam’ (‘for the certainty of truth no other sign is needed than to have a true idea’, §35), and ‘veritas nullo egeat signo’ (‘truth needs no sign’, §36). The Demonstration gives the ground: the certainty is the idea of the idea, which is not a second thing added to the idea but the same idea considered as a mode of thinking (Prop. 21, Schol.).
Demonstratio. Idea vera in nobis est illa, quae in Deo, quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur, est adaequata (per coroll. prop. 11. huius). Ponamus itaque, dari in Deo, quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur, ideam adaequatam A. Huius ideae debet necessario dari etiam in Deo idea, quae ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea A (per prop. 20. huius, cuius demonstratio universalis esta). At idea A ad Deum referri supponitur, quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur; ergo etiam idea ideae A ad Deum eodem modo debet referri, hoc est (per idem coroll. prop. 11. huius) haec adaequata idea ideae A erit in ipsa mente, quae ideam adaequatam A habet; adeoque qui adaequatam habet ideam, sive (per prop. 34. huius) qui vere rem cognoscit, debet simul suae cognitionis adaequatam habere ideam, sive veram cognitionem, hoc est (ut per se manifestum) debet simul esse certus. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. A true idea in us is one which is adequate in God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part). Let us suppose, then, that there is in God, insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea A. Of this idea there must necessarily also be in God an idea which is related to God in the same way as idea A (by Prop. 20 of this Part, whose demonstration is universal). But idea A is supposed to be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind; therefore the idea of idea A must also be related to God in the same way; that is (by the same Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part), this adequate idea of idea A will be in the mind itself which has the adequate idea A. And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by Prop. 34 of this Part) who knows a thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge; that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be certain. Q.E.D.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘en tot alle denkbeelden toegepast kan worden’ (‘and can be applied to all ideas’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 123; Textgestaltung II 364).
[G II 124] Scholium. In schol. prop. 21. huius explicui, quid sit idea ideae. Sed notandum, praeced. prop. per se satis esse manifestam. Nam nemo, qui veram habet ideam, ignorat veram ideam summam certitudinem involvere. Veram namque habere ideam, nihil aliud significat, quam perfecte, sive optime rem cognoscere; nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest, nisi putet, ideam quid mutum instar picturae in tabula, et non modum cogitandi esse, nempe ipsum intelligere. Et quaeso, quis scire potest, se rem aliquam intelligere, nisi prius rem intelligat? hoc est, quis potest scire, se de aliqua re certum esse, nisi prius de ea re certus sit?
Scholium. In the Scholium of Prop. 21 of this Part I have explained what the idea of an idea is. But it should be noted that the preceding Proposition is manifest enough through itself. For no one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea signifies nothing other than to know a thing perfectly, or in the best way; and indeed no one can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a panel,1 and not a mode of thinking, namely understanding itself. And, I ask, who can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands the thing? That is, who can know that he is certain about some thing unless he is first certain about that thing?
  1. 1 The image returns in the Scholium of Prop. 49, against those who regard ideas ‘like mute pictures on a panel’ and so do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Compare the explanation of Def. 3, where conceptus is preferred to perceptio because it expresses an action of the mind.
Deinde quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest, quod norma sit veritatis? Sane sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est.
Next, what can there be clearer and more certain than a true idea, to be the standard of truth? Indeed, just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false.2
  1. 2 veritas norma sui et falsi est. Spinoza gives the same answer, in nearly the same words, to Albert Burgh, who had asked how he knew his philosophy to be the best: ‘Nam ego non praesumo, me optimam invenisse philosophiam, sed veram me intelligere scio. Quomodo autem id sciam, si roges, respondebo, eodem modo ac tu scis, tres angulos trianguli aequales esse duobus rectis … est enim verum index sui et falsi’ (‘For I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, but I know that I understand the true one. If you ask how I know this, I shall answer: in the same way as you know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles … for the true is the index of itself and of the false’; Letter 76). There is no criterion outside true ideas by which they could be tested; the false is known as false only by the true.
Atque his me ad has quaestiones respondisse puto; nempe, si idea vera,a quatenus tantum dicitur cum suo ideato convenire, a falsa distinguitur, nihil ergo realitatis, aut perfectionis idea vera habet prae falsa (quandoquidem per solam denominationem extrinsecamb distinguuntur), et consequenter neque etiam homo,c qui veras, prae illo, qui falsas tantum ideas habet?d Deinde unde fit, ut homines falsas habeant ideas? Et denique, unde aliquis certo scire potest,e se ideas habere, quae cum suisf ideatis conveniant? Ad has, inquam, quaestiones me iam respondisse puto.
And with this I think I have answered these questions. Namely: if a true idea is distinguished from a false one only insofar as it is said to agree with its object, does a true idea then have no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished only by an extrinsic denomination3), and consequently does a man who has true ideas have none over one who has only false ones? Next, how does it happen that men have false ideas? And finally, whence can someone know for certain that he has ideas which agree with their objects? To these questions, I say, I think I have already answered.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘niet voor zo veel ’t een wijze van denken, maar’ (‘not insofar as it is a mode of thinking, but’), glossed Modus cogitandi in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 364).
  2. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘en niet door d’innerlijke afnoeming’ (‘and not by the intrinsic denomination’), glossed Interna denominatio. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365).
  3. c The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of menschelijke ziel’ (‘or human mind’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365).
  4. d The 1677 edition (OP p. 80) and the Dutch version close the sentence with a period. Gebhardt (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365) prints a question mark, as Leopold proposed and as Appuhn reads; the sentence states the first of the three questions.
  5. e certo scire potest] transcr. certo seire potest. Transcription slip; the 1677 edition (OP p. 80) and Gebhardt (G II 124) read ‘scire’.
  6. f The Dutch version of 1677 has ‘met hun voorwerpen, of gedachte zaken’ (‘with their objects, or thought things’), glossed Objecta, Ideata. Gebhardt prints ‘voorwerpen Objecta of’ before ideatis (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365); compare Prop. 32, Dem., where he puts the same Dutch into Latin.
  1. 3 A denomination is extrinsic when it is taken from something outside the thing, as agreement with the object is taken from the object. The explanation of Def. 4 excludes it from the adequate idea, which has all the ‘intrinsic denominations’ of a true idea; the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect says that a true thought is distinguished from a false one ‘non tantum per denominationem extrinsecam, sed maxime per intrinsecam’ (‘not only by an extrinsic denomination, but chiefly by an intrinsic one’, §69; G II 26). The objection supposes that truth is nothing but agreement; Spinoza’s reply (Prop. 35) is that the true idea has positive being which the false one lacks.
Nam quod ad differentiam inter ideam veram et falsam attinet, constat ex prop. 35. huius illam ad hanc sese habere, ut ens ad non-ens; falsitatis autem causas a prop. 19. usque ad 35. cum eius schol. clarissime ostendi. Ex quibus etiam apparet, quid homo, qui veras habet ideas, homini, qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit.g
For as regards the difference between a true and a false idea, it is established from Prop. 35 of this Part that the former is related to the latter as being to not-being. And the causes of falsity I have shown most clearly from Prop. 19 up to 35, with its Scholium. From which it is also apparent what difference there is between a man who has true ideas and a man who has only false ones.
  1. g quid homo, qui veras habet ideas, homini, qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit] transcr. quid inter hominem qui veras habet ideas et hominem qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit. As in the 1677 edition (OP p. 80) and Gebhardt (G II 124); the transcription has the normalized ‘quid inter hominem … et hominem … intersit’.
Quod denique ultimum attinet, nempe, undenam homo scire potest se habere ideam, quaeh cum suo ideato conveniat, id modo satis superque ostendi ex hoc solo oriri, quod ideam habet, quae cum suo ideato convenit, sive quod veritas sui sit norma. His adde, quod mens nostra, quatenus res vere percipit, pars est infiniti Dei intellectus (per coroll. prop. 11 huius); adeoque tam necesse est, ut mentis clarae et distinctae ideae verae sint, ac Dei ideae.
As regards, finally, the last question, namely, whence a man can know that he has an idea which agrees with its object, I have just shown more than enough that this arises solely from the fact that he has an idea which agrees with its object, or that truth is its own standard. Add to this that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part); and so it is as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true as that God’s ideas are.
  1. h The Dutch version of 1677 has ‘met zijn voorwerp, of met de gedachte zaak’ (‘with its object, or with the thought thing’), glossed Objectum, Ideatum; and again, a line below (after quod ideam habet, quae), ‘met zijn voorwerp, of’. Gebhardt prints ‘met zijn voorwerp Objectum, of’ and ‘met zijn voorwerp, of’ before cum suo ideato in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365).

Cited in 2P49S, 4P27D, 4P62D

Propositio XLIV

Proposition XLIV

[G II 125] De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias contemplari.
It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary.

Cited in 2P44C2D

Demonstratio. De natura rationis est res vere percipere (per prop. 41. huius), nempe (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) ut in se sunt, hoc est (per prop. 29. P. 1.) non ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by Prop. 41 of this Part), namely (by Ax. 6 of Part I) as they are in themselves, that is (by Prop. 29 of Part I), not as contingent but as necessary. Q.E.D.
Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur, a sola imaginatione pendere, quod res tam respectu praeteriti, quam futuri, ut contingentes contemplemur.
Corollary I. From this it follows that it depends on the imagination alone that we contemplate things as contingent, with respect to the past as well as the future.
Scholium. Qua autem ratione hoc fiat, paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (prop. 17. huius cum eius coroll.) mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi praesentes imaginari, nisi causae occurrant, quae earum praesentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (prop. 18. huius) ostendimus, quod, si corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur, hoc est, ambo ut sibi praesentia contemplabitur, nisi causae occurrant, quae eorum praesentem existentiam secludant. Praeterea nemo dubitat, quin etiam tempus imaginemur, nempe ex eo, quod corpora alia aliis tardius vel celerius, vel aeque celeritera moveri imaginemur.
Scholium. How this comes about I shall explain in a few words. We have shown above (Prop. 17 of this Part with its Cor.) that the mind, even though things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines them as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Next (Prop. 18 of this Part) we have shown that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also, that is, it will contemplate both as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Moreover, no one doubts that we also imagine time,1 namely from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or equally quickly.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 81) prints vel aeque celerius and corrects it to aeque celeriter in its list of errata (Sphalmata corrigenda, p. 81 l. 26). Gebhardt (G II 125; Textgestaltung II 365) and Bartuschat read celeriter.
  1. 1 Time belongs to the imagination: it arises from comparing motions. Letter 12 calls time, measure and number ‘aids of the imagination’ (see the note on Prop. 45, Schol.).
Ponamus itaque puerum, qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum et vespertina Simeonem, atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum. Ex prop. 18. huius patet, quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem caeli, quam die praecedenti viderit, partem percurrentem sive diem integrum, et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur, hoc est, Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur; et contra, si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus praeteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore praeterito imaginando; atque haec eo constantius, quo saepius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit.
Let us suppose, then, a boy who yesterday, for the first time, saw Peter in the morning, Paul at noon and Simeon in the evening, and today again saw Peter in the morning. From Prop. 18 of this Part it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will immediately imagine the sun traversing the same part of the sky as he saw it traverse on the preceding day, or the whole day, and Peter together with the morning time, Paul with noon and Simeon with the evening; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simeon with relation to future time. And on the other hand, if he sees Simeon in the evening, he will refer Paul and Peter to past time, namely by imagining them together with past time; and he will do this the more constantly, the more often he has seen them in this same order.
Quod si aliquando contingat, ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Iacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino iam Simeonem, iam Iacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur. Fluctuabitur itaque eius imaginatio, et cum futuro tempore vespertino iam hunc, iam illum imaginabitur, hoc est, neutrum certo; sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque haec imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit, si imaginatio rerum sit, quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus praeteritum vel praesens contemplamur, et consequenter res tam ad tempus praesens, quam ad praeteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.
But if it should ever happen that on some other evening he sees James instead of Simeon, then on the following morning he will imagine with the evening time now Simeon, now James, but not both together. For he is supposed to have seen only one of them in the evening, not both together. His imagination will therefore fluctuate,2 and with the future evening time he will imagine now this one, now that one, that is, neither of them with certainty; but he will contemplate each as contingently future. And this fluctuation of the imagination will be the same if the imagination is of things which we contemplate in the same way with relation to past or present time; and consequently we shall imagine things related to present time, as well as to past or future time, as contingent.
  1. 2 fluctuabitur. Part III builds on this: the ‘fluctuation of mind’ (animi fluctuatio) that arises from two contrary affects ‘is related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination (see Schol. Prop. 44, Part II)’ (Part III, Prop. 17, Schol.). Contingency, on this account, is not in things but in the imagination’s fluctuating between images.
[G II 126] Corollarium II. De natura rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere.
Corollary II. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity.1
  1. 1 sub quadam aeternitatis specie: the first occurrence of the formula that governs the second half of Part V (Prop. 22, Prop. 23, Schol., Props. 29–31, Prop. 36). Species is ‘look, aspect, form’ as well as ‘kind’; ‘species’ is kept so as not to choose between them. Spinoza qualifies it here with quadam (‘a certain’), and again at the end of the Demonstration; Part V drops the qualifier (sub aeternitatis specie, sub specie aeternitatis). The Demonstration gives two grounds: reason perceives things as necessary, and that necessity is the necessity of God’s eternal nature; and the common notions on which reason rests contain no reference to time.

Cited in 4P62D, 5P29D

Demonstratio. De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut contingentes contemplari (per prop. praeced.). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (per prop. 41. huius)a vere, hoc est (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per prop. 16. P. 1.) haec rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei aeternae naturae necessitas. Ergo de natura rationis est res sub hac aeternitatis specie contemplari. Adde, quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per prop. 38. huius) quae illa explicant, quae omnibus communia sunt, quaeque (per prop. 37. huius) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant; quaeque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione, sed sub quadam aeternitatis specie debent concipi. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. For it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary and not as contingent (by the preceding Prop.). And it perceives this necessity of things truly (by Prop. 41 of this Part), that is (by Ax. 6 of Part I), as it is in itself. But (by Prop. 16 of Part I) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God’s eternal nature. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things under this species of eternity. Add that the foundations of reason are notions (by Prop. 38 of this Part) which explain those things that are common to all, and which (by Prop. 37 of this Part) explain the essence of no singular thing; and which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity. Q.E.D.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 82) prints per Prop. 4. hujus and corrects it to per Prop. 41. hujus in its list of errata in the references (Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda, p. 82 l. 21). Gebhardt (G II 126) and Bartuschat read 41.

Propositio XLV

Proposition XLV

[G II 127] Unaquaeque cuiuscumque corporis, vel rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.
Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Cited in 2P46D, 2P47D, 5P20S, 5P29S

Demonstratio. Idea rei singularis actu existentis ipsius rei tam essentiam, quam existentiam necessario involvit (per coroll. prop. 8. huius). At res singulares (per prop. 15. P. 1.) non possunt sine Deo concipi; sed quia (per prop. 6. huius) Deum pro causa habent, quatenus sub attributo consideratur, cuius res ipsae modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideae (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) ipsarum attributi conceptum, hoc est (per defin. 6. P. 1.) Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the essence and the existence of the thing itself (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of this Part). But singular things (by Prop. 15 of Part I) cannot be conceived without God; but because (by Prop. 6 of this Part) they have God for a cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the things themselves are modes, their ideas must necessarily (by Ax. 4 of Part I) involve the concept of their attribute, that is (by Def. 6 of Part I), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem, hoc est, existentiam, quatenus abstracte concipitur et tanquam quaedam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existentiae, quae rebus singularibus tribuitur, propterea quod ex aeterna necessitate Dei naturae infinita infinitis modis sequuntur. Vide prop. 16. P. 1. Loquor, inquam, de ipsa existentia rerum singularium, quatenus in Deo sunt.
Scholium. By existence I do not understand here duration, that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity.1 For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. See Prop. 16 of Part I. I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God.
  1. 1 Duration measured, as by time. Letter 12, to Lodewijk Meyer: ‘ex eo, quod durationem et quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur tempus et mensura’ (‘from the fact that we can determine duration and quantity as we please, namely when we conceive the latter abstracted from substance and separate the former from the way in which it flows from eternal things, there arise time and measure’); time, measure and number are therefore ‘nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining’. On duration see Def. 5.
Nam etsi unaquaeque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum; vis tamen, qua unaquaeque in existendo perseverat, ex aeterna necessitate naturae Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide coroll. prop. 24. P. 1.
For even though each is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each perseveres in existing2 follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. On this see Cor. of Prop. 24 of Part I.
  1. 2 vis, qua unaquaeque in existendo perseverat: an anticipation of the conatus of Part III, the striving by which each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being (Part III, Prop. 6), and which is nothing but its actual essence (Part III, Prop. 7). The cited Corollary had said that God is the cause not only of things’ beginning to exist but also of their persevering in existing. The two orders of determination are distinguished here: each thing is determined to exist by another finite thing (Part I, Prop. 28), but the force of its existing is God’s.

Cited in 5P29S

Propositio XLVI

Proposition XLVI

Cognitio aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei, quam unaquaeque idea involvit, est adaequata et perfecta.
The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.

Cited in 2P47D, 5P18D, 5P31D

Demonstratio. Demonstratio praeced. prop. universalis est, et sive res ut pars, sive ut totum consideretur, eius idea sive totius sit sive partis (per prop. praeced.), Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id quod cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei dat, omnibus commune et aeque in parte, ac in toto est, adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) erit haec cognitio adaequata. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The demonstration of the preceding Proposition is universal, and whether a thing is considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or of a part, will (by the preceding Prop.) involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. Therefore that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; and so (by Prop. 38 of this Part) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.

Propositio XLVII

Proposition XLVII

[G II 128] Mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.
The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Cited in 4P36D, 4P36S, 4P37D, 5P18D

Demonstratio. Mens humana ideas habeta (per prop. 22. huius) ex quibus (per prop. 23. huius) se suumque corpus (per prop. 19. huius) et (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.b et per prop. 17. huius) corpora externa ut actu existentia percipit; adeoque (per prop. 45. et 46. huius) cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei habet adaequatam. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The human mind has ideas (by Prop. 22 of this Part) from which (by Prop. 23 of this Part) it perceives itself, and its own body (by Prop. 19 of this Part), and (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 16 and by Prop. 17 of this Part) external bodies as actually existing; and so (by Props. 45 and 46 of this Part) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
  1. a Mens humana ideas habet] transcr. mens humana ideas habet. Capital as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 84) and Gebhardt (G II 128).
  2. b The 1677 edition (OP p. 84) cites per Coroll. Prop. 16.; Proposition 16 has two corollaries. Van Vloten–Land make the reference precise, and Gebhardt (G II 128; Textgestaltung II 365) follows them; Bartuschat keeps the 1677 reading.
Scholium. Hinc videmus, Dei infinitam essentiam eiusque aeternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur, nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere, quae adaequate cognoscamus, atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare, de quo diximus in schol. 2. prop. 40. huius, et de cuius praestantia et utilitate in P. 5. erit nobis dicendi locus.
Scholium. From this we see that God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge very many things which we know adequately, and so form that third kind of knowledge1 of which we spoke in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of this Part, and of whose excellence and usefulness there will be occasion to speak in Part V.
  1. 1 Intuitive knowledge proceeds ‘from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ (Prop. 40, Schol. 2); Props. 45–47 have shown that every mind has that starting point. Its ‘excellence and usefulness’ are the subject of Part V, Props. 25–36.
Quod autem homines non aeque claram Dei, ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit, quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora, et quod nomen Deus iunxerunt imaginibus rerum, quas videre solent;a quod homines vix vitare possunt, quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt, quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait, lineas, quae ex centro circuli ad eiusdem circumferentiam ducuntur, esse inaequales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit, quam mathematici.
That men do not have as clear a knowledge of God as they have of the common notions comes from this: that they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and that they have joined the name God to the images of things2 which they are accustomed to see; which men can hardly avoid, because they are continually affected by external bodies. And indeed most errors consist in this alone, that we do not apply names to things correctly. For when someone says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he certainly understands by a circle, at least at that moment, something other than mathematicians do.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 84) has a comma here; the Dutch version begins a new clause (’t welk de menschen…). Gebhardt (G II 128; Textgestaltung II 365) prints a semicolon, as Leopold proposed, so that quod is relative (‘which’), not causal.
  1. 2 On the images men form of God see the Appendix to Part I and Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.; on words joined to images, Prop. 18, Schol. and Prop. 40, Schol. 1. The distinction between words and ideas is drawn in the Scholium of Prop. 49.
Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare, quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros, qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare,b quem nuper audivi clamantem, suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini, quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur.
So when men err in calculating, they have some numbers in their mind and others on the paper. And so if you look to their mind, they certainly do not err; they seem to err, however, because we think that they have in their mind the numbers which are on the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe that they err at all; just as I did not believe that a man was in error whom I recently heard shouting that his courtyard had flown into his neighbour’s hen,3 because what he had in mind seemed to me plain enough.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘hoewel zijn woorden ongerijmt waren’ (‘although his words were absurd’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 128; Textgestaltung II 365); Leopold proposed the Latin quamquam eius verba absurda essent.
  1. 3 He meant that the neighbour’s hen had flown into his yard. Mens here, as in the sentences before and after, is what someone has in mind: his meaning. The words were absurd (as the Dutch version adds), but there was no error, since the error would have to be in the mind.
Atque hinc pleraeque oriuntur controversiae, nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant, vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant,c ita ut, quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.
And from this arise most controversies: namely, because men do not explain their mind correctly, or because they interpret another’s mind badly. For in truth, while they contradict one another most, they think either the same things or different things, so that what they think are errors and absurdities in the other are not.
  1. c So the 1677 edition (OP p. 85) and Gebhardt (G II 129). The Dutch version has ‘hebben zy of de zelfde gedachten, of zy denken op verscheide dingen’ (‘either they have the same thoughts, or they are thinking about different things’), whence Leopold’s vel de diversis rebus cogitant, which Appuhn and Bartuschat print; Gebhardt gives it only in the Textgestaltung (II 365). The sense is the same: either the disputants mean the same thing in different words, or they are not talking about the same thing.

Cited in 2P49S, 4P36D, 5P10D, 5P20S, 5P36S

Will and Intellect

Part II ends with two propositions about the will and the longest scholium of the Part. They draw the consequence of everything said about ideas. They are also polemical, directed at a doctrine of the will which Spinoza expects his reader to know and does not set out, and they are easier to follow with that doctrine in view. Prop. 48 denies that there is in the mind any absolute or free will: the mind is a determinate mode of thinking, and so (Part I, Prop. 17, Cor. 2; Prop. 28) each volition is determined by a cause, which is determined by another, and so to infinity. Prop. 49 says what a volition is: nothing but the affirmation or negation that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. Its corollary is the thesis the whole scholium defends: “will and intellect are one and the same.”

Descartes’ theory of judgment

The opponent is Descartes, though Spinoza does not name him here. In the fourth Meditation Descartes explains error by the relation of two faculties. The intellect is finite; the will is not. “Sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius maioris ideam apprehendam” (“It is only the will, or freedom of choice, that I experience in myself as so great that I apprehend the idea of none greater”), and it is chiefly by the will that I bear the image and likeness of God (AT VII 57). Error comes from this disproportion: “cum latius pateat voluntas quam intellectus, illam non intra eosdem limites contineo, sed etiam ad illa quae non intelligo extendo” (“since the will extends more widely than the intellect, I do not keep it within the same limits, but extend it also to things I do not understand”, AT VII 58). The Principles make the doctrine systematic. There are only two modes of thinking, the perception of the intellect and the operation of the will, and affirming and denying belong to the second (I.32); judgment needs the will as well as the intellect, for the intellect only presents and the will assents (I.34); the will “can be called in a certain way infinite” (I.35); and its freedom is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions innate in us, as we found when, even supposing an all-powerful deceiver, we could still refrain from believing what was not certain (I.39; AT VIII-1 17–20). The remedy for error follows: withhold assent wherever perception is not clear and distinct.

The theory did more than explain error. It allowed Descartes to hold that God, who gave us both faculties, is not the cause of our mistakes. The intellect is finite but contains no falsity; the will is as perfect as a will can be; error arises only from our use of the will, when we affirm or deny what we do not clearly perceive, and then “libertate arbitrii non recte utor” (“I do not use my freedom of choice rightly”), and am at fault even if I happen to hit on the truth (AT VII 59–60). The responsibility for error, and with it the possibility of avoiding error, rests on the freedom of the will. Spinoza’s denial of that freedom therefore had to supply another account both of what error is and of how it is overcome.

Spinoza’s reply

Spinoza’s reply has two parts. The first is that there is no faculty of willing over and above singular volitions. Faculties of understanding, desiring, loving and willing are either wholly fictitious or “metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are accustomed to form from particulars”, so that the will is related to this or that volition as stoneness to this or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul (Prop. 48, Schol.). He had put it the same way to Oldenburg years before: “voluntas differt ab hac et illa volitione, eodem modo ac albedo ab hoc et illo albo, sive humanitas ab hoc et illo homine” (“the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as whiteness from this or that white thing, or humanity from this or that man”), and it is as impossible to conceive the will as the cause of a volition as humanity as the cause of Peter and Paul (Letter 2; VVL³ III 6). The second part is that a singular volition is not something added to an idea. The demonstration of Prop. 49 takes the affirmation that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. It cannot be or be conceived without the idea of the triangle, and the idea of the triangle cannot be or be conceived without it; by the definition of essence (Def. 2) the affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea and is nothing besides it. The idea is not “something mute, like a picture on a panel” (Prop. 43, Schol.) waiting for the will to say yes to it. It is itself an act of affirming. The Cartesian division of judgment between a presenting intellect and an assenting will disappears.

Images, words and ideas

Before answering objections, the scholium to Prop. 49 asks the reader to make two distinctions, which Spinoza thinks most people neglect: between an idea and the images of things that we imagine, and between ideas and the words by which we signify things. “Because these three, namely images, words and ideas, are by many either altogether confused, or not distinguished accurately enough, or finally not cautiously enough, they have been altogether ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which it is absolutely necessary to know, both for speculation and for arranging life wisely” (Prop. 49, Schol.).

Each confusion produces a characteristic mistake. Those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us by the encounter of bodies conclude that where we can form no image there is no idea, only a fiction made by the free choice of the will; “they look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel,” and do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Those who confuse words with ideas think they can will contrary to what they perceive, because by words alone they can affirm or deny the contrary. But to affirm something in words is not to affirm it in thought. Words and images are bodily motions, and “do not at all involve the concept of thought”; an idea, which is a mode of thinking, “consists neither in the image of some thing nor in words.” The appearance of a will that can assent or refuse at pleasure comes, on this account, from treating the verbal expression of a judgment, or the image that accompanies it, as if it were the judgment itself.

Two senses of “will”

“Will” in this sense means the faculty of affirming and denying, “not desire”, as the scholium to Prop. 48 is careful to say. In Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. the word returns with another sense: the striving by which each thing perseveres in its being is called will “when it is related to the mind alone”, and appetite when it is related to mind and body together. The two uses do not conflict, but the reader should keep them apart.

The four objections

The scholium to Prop. 49 then answers four objections. That the will extends further than the intellect is true, Spinoza replies, if “intellect” means only clear and distinct ideas; it does not extend further than our perceptions, and the “infinity” of the will is only the universality of an abstract idea, which is said equally of one, of many and of infinitely many individuals. That we can suspend judgment is denied: to suspend judgment is to perceive that one does not perceive the thing adequately, so that suspension is itself a perception. A boy who imagined a winged horse and perceived nothing else would contemplate the horse as present and could not doubt its existence; to perceive a winged horse is to affirm wings of a horse. That all affirmations seem equal in reality, while ideas differ in perfection, confuses the affirmation abstractly conceived, which is the same in all ideas as a universal is the same in its instances, with singular affirmations, which differ as their ideas differ; and a true and a false affirmation are related as being to not-being. The third reply ends with the warning that we are easily deceived “when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real beings.”

Buridan’s ass

The fourth objection is the ass of Buridan. If man does not act from freedom of the will, what will happen when he is in equilibrium, like Buridan’s ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? The dilemma is older than the name attached to it. Aristotle, discussing why the earth stays at the centre, mentions the argument about “τοῦ πεινῶντος καὶ διψῶντος σφόδρα μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐδωδίμων καὶ ποτῶν ἴσον ἀπέχοντος (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον ἠρεμεῖν ἀναγκαῖον)” (“the man who is very hungry and thirsty, and equally so, and is equally distant from food and drink, for he too must stay where he is”, De caelo II.13, 295b31–34). Spinoza’s answer is to grant the conclusion: such a man, perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst and food and drink equally distant, will die of hunger and thirst; and whether he should be counted a man or an ass, he does not know, any more than he knows how to count a man who hangs himself, or children, fools and madmen. The answer is the reverse of the one given under Spinoza’s name in 1663, in the Metaphysical Thoughts appended to his exposition of Descartes’ Principles: “si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus in tali aequilibrio positum, homo non pro re cogitante, sed pro turpissimo asino erit habendus, si fame et siti pereat” (“for if we put a man in place of the ass, placed in such an equilibrium, the man would be considered not a thinking thing but the most shameful ass, if he perished of hunger and thirst”, II.12; VVL² III 230). But that book expounded Descartes, and Lodewijk Meyer’s preface had warned the reader that its author did not share the Cartesian view of the will: he thought he could demonstrate “voluntatem ab intellectu non distingui, multo minus ea, quam illi Cartesius adscribit, pollere libertate; quin imo ipsam affirmandi et negandi facultatem prorsus fictitiam” (“that the will is not distinct from the intellect, much less endowed with the freedom Descartes ascribes to it; indeed, that the faculty of affirming and denying is wholly fictitious”, VVL² III 112). Prop. 49 and its scholium are that demonstration.

Error and responsibility without free will

What replaces Descartes’ remedy for error? If we cannot suspend judgment at will, we cannot avoid error by restraining the will; and Spinoza does not think we can. To suspend judgment is itself to perceive that we do not perceive the thing adequately. What we can do is have better ideas. A false idea is not corrected by an act of refusal but by an idea that excludes it, as the boy’s image of a winged horse is undone only when he perceives something that excludes its existence. The improvement of the intellect, which Spinoza had made the subject of an early work, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, takes the place of the discipline of the will, and the Ethics itself is meant to be such an improvement. The same structure returns in Part V, where “the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone” (Part V, Prop. 20, Schol.).

A natural objection is that without free will there can be neither praise nor blame, neither merit nor sin, and Spinoza’s correspondents pressed it on him. His answer, in a late letter to Oldenburg, is that men can be excusable and still lack blessedness and suffer in many ways. “A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but nonetheless it must be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of a dog is indeed to be excused, and yet he is rightly strangled. And he, finally, who cannot govern his desires and restrain them by fear of the laws, although he too is to be excused on account of his weakness, cannot enjoy peace of mind and the knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes” (Letter 78; VVL³ III 237). The denial of free will does not abolish the difference between the wise and the foolish, or between what is good for us and what is bad; it changes the way we regard it. That change of regard is the subject of the last section of the scholium.

The uses of the doctrine

The last section of the scholium turns to the uses of the doctrine. It teaches that we act by God’s decree alone and share in the divine nature, the more so the more perfect our actions and the more we understand God, and that our highest happiness consists in the knowledge of God alone; so that those who expect to be rewarded for virtue, as if for the utmost servitude, are far from a true estimate of it, since virtue and the service of God are themselves happiness and the highest freedom. It teaches us to bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind, since everything follows from God’s eternal decree as necessarily as the properties of a triangle from its essence. It teaches us to hate, despise, mock and envy no one, and to help others from the guidance of reason alone, not from womanish compassion, partiality or superstition. And it teaches how citizens are to be governed: not so that they may be slaves, but so that they may freely do what is best. Each of these is the program of a later Part: the ethics of reason in Part IV, the freedom and blessedness of the mind in Part V, the state in Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 and, at length, in the unfinished Political Treatise. The cross-reference for the third read “in the third Part” in the 1677 edition; Gebhardt corrects it to the fourth, taking it for a survival from the time when the work was divided into three parts.

The text resumes with Prop. 48 and its scholium on faculties. The scholium to Prop. 49 announces its own plan: first, some points needed for a fuller explanation of the proposition, chiefly the distinction between ideas on the one hand and images and words on the other; then the replies to the objections, taken in order and numbered; and last the advantages of the doctrine, also numbered. With it Part II ends, and Part III begins its account of the affects.

Propositio XLVIII

Proposition XLVIII

[G II 129] In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas, sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum.
In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will; but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.

Cited in 2P49D, 2P49CD, 3DA6Ex

Demonstratio. Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per prop. 11. huius), adeoque (per coroll. 2. prop. 17. P. 1.) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera, sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest; sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per prop. 28. P. 1.) determinari debet a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum ab alia, etc. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by Prop. 11 of this Part), and so (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 17 of Part I) it cannot be the free cause of its own actions, or cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing; but it must be determined to will this or that (by Prop. 28 of Part I) by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, etc. Q.E.D.
Scholium. Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi, etc. Unde sequitur, has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias, vel nihil esse praeter entia metaphysica sive universalia, quae ex particularibus formare solemus; adeo ut intellectus, et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam, vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant, ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem, vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem, cur homines se liberos esse putent, explicuimus in app. P. 1.
Scholium. In this same way it is demonstrated that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. From this it follows that these and similar faculties are either altogether fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are accustomed to form from particulars; so that intellect and will are related to this or that idea, or to this or that volition, in the same way as stoneness is related to this or that stone,1 or man to Peter and Paul. The cause why men think themselves free, however, we have explained in the Appendix of Part I.
  1. 1 Universals formed from particulars were explained in Prop. 40, Schol. 1. Spinoza had made the same point to Oldenburg: ‘voluntas differt ab hac et illa volitione, eodem modo ac albedo ab hoc et illo albo, sive humanitas ab hoc et illo homine’ (‘the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as whiteness from this or that white thing, or humanity from this or that man’), so that it is as impossible to conceive the will as the cause of this or that volition as to conceive humanity as the cause of Peter and Paul (Letter 2). The faculties of the scholastic and Cartesian psychology are, on this account, beings of reason.
Verum, antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum, me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem, inquam, intelligo, qua mens, quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat, et non cupiditatem, qua mens res appetit vel aversatur.
But before I go further, it should be noted here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, and not desire;2 I understand, I say, the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or what is false, and not the desire by which the mind wants things or is averse to them.
  1. 2 Descartes counted affirming and denying, together with desiring and being averse, among the ‘modes of willing’ (Principles I.32). Spinoza separates them: the will of Props. 48–49 is the faculty of judgment. In Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. the word has another use, for the striving of each thing to persevere in its being ‘when it is related to the mind alone’, and desire is there defined as appetite together with consciousness of it. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 365–366) records W. Meijer’s proposal to emend this sentence and Baensch’s view that it preserves the distinction of will and desire from the Short Treatise; he rejects both, observing that the Dutch version has the same text and that Part III itself distinguishes voluntas from cupiditas.
At postquam demonstravimus, has facultates notiones esse universales, quae a singularibus, ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum iam est, an ipsae volitiones aliquid sint praeter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum, inquam, est, an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur praeter illam, quam idea, quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide seq. prop., ut et defin. 3. huius, ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines, quales in fundo oculi, et, si placet, in medio cerebro formantur, sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.a
But now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions, which are not distinguished from the singulars from which we form them, we must inquire whether the volitions themselves are anything besides the very ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any other affirmation and negation besides that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves (on which see the following Proposition, and also Def. 3 of this Part, so that thought does not fall into pictures3). For by ideas I do not understand images such as are formed at the back of the eye and, if you like, in the middle of the brain,4 but concepts of thought.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘of het voorwerpelijk wezen van een zaak, voor zo veel ’t alleenlijk in denking bestaat’ (‘or the objective being of a thing, insofar as it exists only in thinking’), glossed Esse objectivum. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 130; Textgestaltung II 366); Leopold proposed the Latin sive esse obiectivum rei, quatenus tantum in cogitatione existit.
  1. 3 Compare Prop. 43, Schol.: no one can doubt that a true idea involves certainty ‘unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a panel’. The explanation of Def. 3 had preferred conceptus to perceptio because a concept expresses an action of the mind.
  2. 4 The images are Descartes’. In the Passions of the Soul light reflected from an animal ‘en peint deux images, une en chacun de nos yeux’ (‘paints two images of it, one in each of our eyes’), which are joined, by way of the optic nerves and the animal spirits, in the small gland ‘qui est au milieu du cerveau’ (‘which is in the middle of the brain’), where the soul exercises its functions (arts. 31, 35). Si placet (‘if you like’) marks Spinoza’s distance from the doctrine, which he criticizes in the Preface to Part V.

Cited in 2P49CD

Propositio XLIX

Proposition XLIX

[G II 130] In mente nulla datur volitio sive affirmatio et negatio praeter illam, quam idea, quatenus idea est, involvit.
There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, besides that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves.

Cited in 2P48S, 2P49CD, 2P49S, 3P2S

Demonstratio. In mente (per prop. praeced.) nulla datur absoluta facultas volendi et nolendi, sed tantum singulares volitiones, nempe haec et illa affirmatio, et haec et illa negatio. Concipiamus itaque singularem aliquam volitionem, nempe modum cogitandi, quo mens affirmat, tres angulos trianguli aequales esse duobus rectis. Haec affirmatio conceptum, sive ideam trianguli involvit, hoc est, sine idea trianguli non potest concipi. Idem enim est, si dicam, quod A conceptum B debeat involvere, ac quod A sine B non possit concipi. Deinde haec affirmatio (per axiom. 3. huius) non potest etiam sine idea trianguli esse. Haec ergo affirmatio sine idea trianguli nec esse, nec concipi potest. Porro haec trianguli idea hanc eandem affirmationem involvere debet, nempe, quod tres eius anguli aequentur duobus rectis. Quare et vice versa haec trianguli idea sine hac affirmatione nec esse nec concipi potest; adeoque (per defin. 2. huius) haec affirmatio ad essentiam ideae trianguli pertinet, nec aliud praeter ipsam est. Et quod de hac volitione diximus (quandoquidem eam ad libitum sumpsimus), dicendum etiam est de quacumque volitione, nempe, quod praeter ideam nihil sit. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. There is in the mind (by the preceding Prop.) no absolute faculty of willing and not willing, but only singular volitions, namely this and that affirmation, and this and that negation. Let us conceive, then, some singular volition, namely the mode of thinking by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the concept, or idea, of the triangle, that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. For it is the same whether I say that A must involve the concept of B, or that A cannot be conceived without B. Next, this affirmation (by Ax. 3 of this Part) also cannot be without the idea of the triangle. This affirmation, therefore, can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of the triangle. Further, this idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Therefore, conversely, this idea of the triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation; and so (by Def. 2 of this Part) this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle,1 and is nothing besides it. And what we have said of this volition (since we took it at random) must also be said of any volition, namely that it is nothing besides the idea. Q.E.D.
  1. 1 The demonstration establishes both halves of the reciprocal definition of essence in Def. 2: the affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea, and the idea can neither be nor be conceived without the affirmation. The fourth sentence states the equivalence, used throughout, between involving a concept and not being conceivable without it (compare Part I, Ax. 4).
[G II 131] Corollarium. Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.
Corollary. Will and intellect are one and the same.1
  1. 1 Against the Cartesian division of judgment between the intellect, which perceives, and the will, which assents (Principles I.32–35; Meditations IV, AT VII 56–58). See the essay before Prop. 48. Part I had already referred will and intellect, even infinite, to natura naturata (Part I, Prop. 31) and denied that the will is a free cause (Prop. 32).
Demonstratio. Voluntas et intellectus nihil praeter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt (per prop. 48. huius et eiusdem schol.). At singularis volitio et idea (per prop. praeced.) unum et idem sunt. Ergo voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt. Q. E. D.
Demonstration. Will and intellect are nothing besides the singular volitions and ideas themselves (by Prop. 48 of this Part and its Scholium). But a singular volition and idea (by the preceding Prop.) are one and the same. Therefore will and intellect are one and the same. Q.E.D.
Scholium. His causam, quae communiter erroris esse statuitur, sustulimus. Supra autem ostendimus, falsitatem in sola privatione, quam ideae mutilatae, et confusae involvunt, consistere. Quare idea falsa, quatenus falsa est, certitudinem non involvit. Cum itaque dicimus, hominem in falsis acquiescere, nec de iis dubitare, non ideo ipsum certum esse, sed tantum non dubitare dicimus, vel quod in falsis acquiescit, quia nullae causae dantur, quae efficiant, ut ipsius imaginatio fluctuetur.a Qua de re vide schol. prop. 44. huius. Quantumvis igitur homo falsis adhaerere supponatur,b nunquam tamen ipsum certum esse dicemus. Nam per certitudinem quid positivum intelligimus (vide prop. 43. huius cum eiusdem schol.), non vero dubitationis privationem. At per certitudinis privationem falsitatem intelligimus.
Scholium. With this we have removed what is commonly held to be the cause of error.1 We have shown above, moreover, that falsity consists only in the privation which mutilated and confused ideas involve.2 Therefore a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. So when we say that a man acquiesces in what is false and does not doubt it, we do not on that account say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there are no causes which bring it about that his imagination fluctuates. On this see the Scholium of Prop. 44 of this Part. However much, therefore, a man may be supposed to adhere to what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive (see Prop. 43 of this Part with its Scholium), not the privation of doubt. But by the privation of certainty we understand falsity.
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 87) prints fluctuatur, for which the Dutch version notes Fluctuat in the margin; Paulus and the later editions correct to fluctuetur, and Gebhardt (G II 131; Textgestaltung II 366) follows. The Dutch version then adds: ‘of die hem daar af doen twijffelen’ (‘or which make him doubt of it’). Gebhardt prints it in his text.
  2. b The Dutch version of 1677 has ‘Onderstel dan dat een mensch by iets, dat valsch is, zo hardnekkiglijk blijft, dat men hem geensins daar an kan doen twijffelen’ (‘Suppose, then, that a man holds so obstinately to something false that he can in no way be made to doubt it’). Gebhardt prints the last clause, ‘dat men hem geensins daar aan kan doen twijffelen’, in his text (G II 131; Textgestaltung II 366); Leopold proposed the Latin tam pertinaciter and ut nullo modo ad dubitandum de his adigi possit.
  1. 1 Descartes’ explanation in the fourth Meditation: error arises because ‘latius pateat voluntas quam intellectus’ (‘the will extends more widely than the intellect’) and I extend it to things I do not understand (AT VII 58). If will and intellect are one, there is no such disproportion; error is explained instead by the privation in inadequate ideas (Prop. 35).
  2. 2 Supra ostendimus: in Prop. 35.
Sed ad uberiorem explicationem praeced. prop. quaedam monenda supersunt. Superest deinde, ut ad obiectiones, quae in nostram hanc doctrinam obiici possunt, respondeam; et denique, ut omnem amoveam scrupulum, operae pretium esse duxi, huius doctrinae quasdam utilitates indicare. Quasdam, inquam; nam praecipuae ex iis, quae in P. 5. dicemus, melius intelligentur.
But for a fuller explanation of the preceding Proposition some things remain to be pointed out. It remains, next, for me to reply to the objections which can be raised against this doctrine of ours; and finally, to remove every scruple, I have thought it worthwhile to indicate certain advantages of this doctrine. Certain advantages, I say; for the chief ones will be better understood from what we shall say in Part V.
Incipio igitur a primo, lectoresque moneo, ut accurate distinguant inter ideam sive mentis conceptum, et inter imagines rerum, quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est, ut distinguant inter ideas, et verba, quibus res significamus. Nam quia haec tria, imagines scilicet, verba et ideae a multis vel plane confunduntur, vel non satis accurate, vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam, scitu prorsus necessariam, tam ad speculationem,a quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam, plane ignorarunt.
I begin, then, with the first, and I warn my readers to distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. Next, it is necessary that they distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because these three, namely images, words and ideas, are by many either altogether confused, or not distinguished accurately enough, or finally not cautiously enough, they have been altogether ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which it is absolutely necessary to know, both for speculation and for arranging life wisely.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘en van de wetenschappen’ (‘and for the sciences’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 132; Textgestaltung II 366).
Quippe qui putant ideas consistere in imaginibus, quae in nobis ex corporum occursu formantur, sibi persuadent, ideas illas rerum,b quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas, sed tantum figmenta, quae ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas, aspiciunt, et hoc praeiudicio praeoccupati non vident, ideam, quatenus idea est, affirmationem aut negationem involvere. Deinde qui verba confundunt cum idea, vel cum ipsa affirmatione, quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id, quod sentiunt, velle; quando aliquid solis verbis contra id, quod sentiunt, affirmant aut negant. Haec autem praeiudicia exuere facile is poterit, qui ad naturam cogitationis attendit, quae extensionis conceptum minime involvit; atque adeo clare intelliget, ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicuius imagine, neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt.
Indeed, those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us from the encounter of bodies persuade themselves that those ideas of things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas, but only fictions which we feign from the free choice of the will; they look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel, and, preoccupied by this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Next, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation which the idea involves, think that they can will contrary to what they feel, when by words alone they affirm or deny something contrary to what they feel. But anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of extension, will easily be able to put off these prejudices; and so he will understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of some thing nor in words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted by bodily motions alone,1 which do not at all involve the concept of thought.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘die geen speur in onze harssenen konnen maken, of’ (‘which can make no trace in our brain, or’); it lacks similem in the following clause. Gebhardt prints the addition in his text (G II 132; Textgestaltung II 366); Leopold proposed the Latin quae nullum vestigium in cerebro nostro facere possunt sive.
  1. 1 Images are affections of the body (Prop. 17, Schol.), and words are joined to them by the association of bodily affections (Prop. 18, Schol.). Since no mode of extension involves the concept of thought (Prop. 6), neither images nor words can constitute an idea; this is the ground for distinguishing the three.
[G II 132] Atque haec pauca de his monuisse sufficiat, quare ad praedictas obiectiones transeo. Harum prima est, quod constare putant, voluntatem latius se extendere, quam intellectum; atque adeo ab eodem diversam esse. Ratio autem, cur putant, voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum, est, quia se experiri aiunt, se non maiore assentiendi sive affirmandi et negandi facultate indigere ad infinitis aliis rebus, quas non percipimus, assentiendum, quam iam habemus; at quidem maiore facultate intelligendi. Distinguitur ergo voluntas ab intellectu, quod finitus hic sit, illa autem infinita.
Let it suffice to have pointed out these few things about these matters; so I pass to the objections mentioned above. The first of them is that they think it established that the will extends more widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from it. And the reason why they think that the will extends more widely than the intellect is that they say they experience that they do not need a greater faculty of assenting, or of affirming and denying, than we already have, in order to assent to infinitely many other things which we do not perceive; but that we do need a greater faculty of understanding. The will is therefore distinguished from the intellect in that the latter is finite and the former infinite.1
  1. 1 Descartes, Principles I.35: the perception of the intellect extends only to the few things presented to it and is always very finite, but ‘voluntas vero infinita quodammodo dici potest’ (‘the will can be called in a certain way infinite’), since we notice nothing that could be the object of another will, even God’s, to which ours does not also extend (AT VIII-1 18). In the fourth Meditation the will is the faculty in which Descartes finds the image of God in himself: ‘sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius maioris ideam apprehendam’ (‘it is only the will, or freedom of choice, that I experience in myself as so great that I apprehend the idea of none greater’, AT VII 57).
Secundo nobis obiici potest, quod experientia nihil clarius videatur docere, quam quod nostrum iudicium possumus suspendere, ne rebus, quas percipimus, assentiamur; quod hinc etiam confirmatur, quod nemo dicitur decipi, quatenus aliquid percipit, sed tantum, quatenus assentitur aut dissentitur. Ex. gr. qui equum alatum fingit, non ideo concedit dari equum alatum, hoc est, non ideo decipitur, nisi simul concedat, dari equum alatum. Nihil igitur clarius videtur docere experientia, quam quod voluntas sive facultas assentiendi libera sit et a facultate intelligendi diversa.
Second, it can be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend our judgment2 so as not to assent to things which we perceive; and this is confirmed also by the fact that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. For example, he who feigns a winged horse does not on that account grant that there is a winged horse, that is, he is not on that account deceived, unless at the same time he grants that there is a winged horse. Experience seems, therefore, to teach nothing more clearly than that the will, or faculty of assenting, is free, and different from the faculty of understanding.
  1. 2 Descartes, Principles I.39: the freedom of the will is so manifest that it must be counted among the first and most common innate notions; it showed itself when, supposing a most powerful deceiver, ‘hanc in nobis libertatem esse experiebamur, ut possemus ab iis credendis abstinere, quae non plane certa erant et explorata’ (‘we experienced that there was in us this freedom, that we could refrain from believing those things which were not plainly certain and examined’, AT VIII-1 19–20).
Tertio obiici potest, quod una affirmatio non plus realitatis videtur continere, quam alia, hoc est, non maiore potentia indigere videmur ad affirmandum, verum esse id quod verum est, quam ad aliquid quod falsum est verum esse affirmandum. Ata unam ideam plus realitatis sive perfectionis, quam aliam habere percipimus; quantum enim obiecta alia aliis praestantiora, tantum etiam eorum ideae aliae aliis perfectiores sunt; ex quibus etiam constare videtur differentia inter voluntatem et intellectum.
Third, it can be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, that is, we do not seem to need greater power to affirm that what is true is true than to affirm that something which is false is true. But we perceive that one idea has more reality, or perfection, than another; for in proportion as some objects are more excellent than others, so also some of their ideas are more perfect than others; and from this also the difference between will and intellect seems to be established.
  1. a The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘met de denkbeelden is ’t anders gestelt: want’ (‘with ideas it is otherwise, for’), glossed Ideae. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 133; Textgestaltung II 366).
Quarto obiici potest: si homo non operatur ex libertate voluntatis, quid ergo fiet, si in aequilibrio sit, ut Buridani asina? Famene, et siti peribit? Quod si concedam, viderer asinam vel hominis statuam, non hominem concipere; si autem negem, ergo se ipsum determinabit, et consequenter eundi facultatem et faciendi quicquid velit, habet. Praeter haec alia forsan possunt obiici; sed quia inculcare non teneor, quid unusquisque somniare potest, ad has obiectiones tantum respondere curabo, idque quam potero breviter.
Fourth, it can be objected: if man does not operate from freedom of the will, what then will happen if he is in equilibrium, like Buridan’s ass?3 Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I grant this, I would seem to conceive an ass, or a statue of a man, not a man; but if I deny it, then he will determine himself, and consequently has the faculty of going, and of doing whatever he wills. Besides these, other things can perhaps be objected; but since I am not bound to go over whatever anyone can dream up, I shall take care to reply only to these objections, and that as briefly as I can.
  1. 3 ut Buridani asina: a she-ass, as in the Metaphysical Thoughts, where Spinoza, expounding the Cartesian view, had drawn the opposite conclusion: ‘si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus in tali aequilibrio positum, homo non pro re cogitante, sed pro turpissimo asino erit habendus, si fame et siti pereat’ (‘if we put a man in place of the ass, placed in such an equilibrium, the man would be considered not a thinking thing but the most shameful ass, if he perished of hunger and thirst’, II.12). Meyer’s preface to that book had warned that its author did not hold the Cartesian doctrine of the will. On the older form of the dilemma see the note on the reply below.
Et quidem ad primam dico, me concedere, voluntatem latius se extendere, quam intellectum, si per intellectum claras tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant; sed nego voluntatem latius se extendere, quam perceptiones sive concipiendi facultatem. Nec sane video, cur facultas volendi potius dicenda est infinita, quam sentiendi facultas; sicut enim infinita (unum tamen post aliud; nam infinita simul affirmare non possumus) eadem volendi facultate possumus affirmare, sic etiam infinita corpora (unum nempe post aliudb) eadem sentiendi facultate possumus sentire sive percipere. Quod si dicant, infinita dari, quae percipere non possumus? regero, nos ea ipsa nulla cogitatione, et consequenter nulla volendi facultate posse assequi. At dicunt, si Deus vellet efficere, ut ea etiam perciperemus, maiorem quidem facultatem percipiendi deberet nobis dare, sed non maiorem, quam dedit, volendi facultatem; quod idem est, ac si dicerent, quod si Deus velit efficere, ut infinita alia entia intelligeremus, necesse quidem esset, ut nobis daret maiorem intellectum; sed non universaliorem entis ideam, quam dedit, ad eadem infinita entia amplectendum. Ostendimus enim voluntatem ens esse universale sive ideam, qua omnes singulares volitiones, hoc est, id quod iis omnibus commune est, explicamus. Cum itaque hanc omnium volitionum communem sive universalem ideam facultatemc esse credant, minime mirum, si hanc facultatem ultra limites intellectus in infinitum se extendere dicant. Universale enim aeque de uno, ac de pluribus ac de infinitis individuis dicitur.
And indeed to the first I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving. Nor indeed do I see why the faculty of willing should be called infinite rather than the faculty of sensing; for just as we can affirm infinitely many things by the same faculty of willing (one after another, however, for we cannot affirm infinitely many things at once), so also we can sense, or perceive, infinitely many bodies (one after another, that is) by the same faculty of sensing. If they say that there are infinitely many things which we cannot perceive, I reply that we can reach them by no thought, and consequently by no faculty of willing. But, they say, if God willed to bring it about that we perceived these too, he would indeed have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has given. This is the same as if they said that if God willed to bring it about that we understood infinitely many other beings, it would indeed be necessary that he give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being than he has given, in order to embrace those same infinitely many beings. For we have shown that the will is a universal being, or idea, by which we explain all singular volitions, that is, that which is common to them all. Since, therefore, they believe that this common, or universal, idea of all volitions is a faculty, it is not at all surprising if they say that this faculty extends itself beyond the limits of the intellect to infinity. For a universal is said equally of one, of many and of infinitely many individuals.
  1. b The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘en niet te gelijk, ’t welk onmogelijk is’ (‘and not at the same time, which is impossible’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 133; Textgestaltung II 366).
  2. c The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘van onze ziel’ (‘of our mind’). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 134; Textgestaltung II 366–367). The Dutch sentence differs further (‘deze algemene willing van alles, of dit algemeen denkbeelt van wil’, ‘this universal volition of all things, or this universal idea of will’), from which Gebhardt infers an earlier form of the Latin.
Ad secundam obiectionem respondeo negando, nos liberam habere potestatem iudicium suspendendi. Nam cum dicimus, aliquem iudicium suspendere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod videt, se rem non adaequate percipere. Est igitur iudicii suspensio revera perceptio, et non libera voluntas. Quod ut clare intelligatur, concipiamus puerum equum alatum imaginantem,d nec aliud quicquam percipientem. Quandoquidem haec imaginatio equi existentiam involvit (per coroll. prop. 17. huius) nec puer quicquam percipit, quod equi existentiam tollat (ille necessario equum ut praesentem contemplabitur), nec de eius existentia poterit dubitare, quamvis de eadem non sit certus. Atque hoc quotidie in somnis experimur, nec credo aliquem esse, qui putet, se, dum somniat, liberam habere potestatem suspendendi de iis, quae somniat, iudicium, efficiendique ut ea, quae se videre somniat, non somniet; et nihilominus contingit, ut etiam in somnis iudicium suspendamus, nempe cum somniamus, nos somniare.
To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we say nothing other than that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension of judgment, therefore, is in truth a perception, and not free will. That this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a boy imagining a winged horse and perceiving nothing else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by Cor. of Prop. 17 of this Part), and the boy perceives nothing which excludes the existence of the horse, he will necessarily contemplate the horse as present, nor will he be able to doubt its existence, although he is not certain of it.4 And this we experience daily in dreams; nor do I believe that there is anyone who thinks that, while he is dreaming, he has a free power of suspending judgment about what he dreams, and of bringing it about that he does not dream what he dreams that he sees; and nevertheless it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, namely when we dream that we are dreaming.
  1. d The 1677 edition (OP p. 90) reads puerum, equum imaginantem, and the Dutch version likewise has only een paert. Gebhardt (G II 134; Textgestaltung II 367) inserts alatum, as W. Meijer, Leopold, Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern had proposed: the passage answers the second objection, which used the winged horse, and the reply below returns to it; and only of a winged horse does it matter that the imaginer is a boy, who does not know, as an adult does, what excludes its existence. Gebhardt grants that the 1677 text reproduces Spinoza’s manuscript.
  1. 4 Not doubting is not certainty: the distinction just drawn at the beginning of the Scholium. The boy’s imagination is not in error in itself (Prop. 17, Schol.); what would make him doubt is another idea that excludes the horse’s existence, as in Prop. 44, Schol..
Porro concedo neminem decipi, quatenus percipit, hoc est, mentis imaginationes in se consideratas nihil erroris involvere concedo (vide schol. prop. 17. huius); sed nego, hominem nihil affirmare, quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere, quam alas de equo affirmare? Si enim mens praeter equum alatum nihil aliud perciperet, eundem sibi praesentem contemplaretur, nec causam haberet ullam dubitandi de eiusdem existentia, nec ullam dissentiendi facultatem, nisi imaginatio equi alati iuncta sit ideae, quae existentiam eiusdem equi tollit, vel quod percipit, ideam equi alati, quam habet, esse inadaequatam, atque tum vel eiusdem equi existentiam necessario negabit, vel de eadem necessario dubitabit.
Further, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives, that is, I grant that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error (see Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part); but I deny that a man affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what else is perceiving a winged horse than affirming wings of a horse? For if the mind perceived nothing else besides the winged horse, it would contemplate it as present to itself, and would have no cause to doubt its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting, unless the imagination of the winged horse is joined to an idea which excludes the existence of the same horse, or it perceives that the idea of the winged horse which it has is inadequate; and then it will either necessarily deny the existence of the horse, or necessarily doubt it.
Atque his puto me ad tertiam etiam obiectionem respondisse, nempe quod voluntas universale quid sit, quod de omnibus ideis praedicatur, quodque id tantum significat, quod omnibus ideis commune est, nempe affirmationem, cuius propterea adaequata essentia,f quatenus sic abstracte concipitur, debet esse in unaquaque idea, et hac ratione tantum in omnibus eadem;e sed non quatenus consideratur essentiam ideae constituere; nam eatenus singulares affirmationes aeque inter se differunt, ac ipsae ideae. Ex. gr. affirmatio, quam idea circuli ab illa, quam idea trianguli involvit, aeque differt, ac idea circuli ab idea trianguli. Deinde absolute nego, nos aequali cogitandi potentia indigere ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod verum est, quam ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod falsum est. Nam hae duae affirmationes, si mentem spectes,g se habent ad invicem, ut ens ad non-ens; nihil enim in ideis positivum est, quod falsitatis formam constituit. Vide prop. 35. huius cum eius schol. et schol. prop. 47. huius. Quare hic apprime venit notandum, quam facile decipimur, quando universalia cum singularibus et entia rationis et abstracta cum realibus confundimus.
And with this I think I have also replied to the third objection: namely, that the will is something universal, which is predicated of all ideas, and which signifies only what is common to all ideas, namely affirmation, whose adequate essence, therefore, insofar as it is thus conceived abstractly, must be in each idea, and only in this respect the same in all; but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the essence of the idea, for in that respect singular affirmations differ from one another as much as the ideas themselves do. For example, the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle. Next, I absolutely deny that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that what is true is true as to affirm that what is false is true. For these two affirmations, if you look to the mind,5 are related to one another as being to not-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity. See Prop. 35 of this Part with its Scholium, and the Scholium of Prop. 47 of this Part. Therefore it is especially to be noted here how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real beings.
  1. e The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ‘gelijk de bepaling van de mensch geheel en gelijkelijk aan yder bezonder mensch toegepast moet worden. Op deze wijze dan konnen wy bevatten dat de wil altijt in alle denkbeelden de zelfde is’ (‘just as the definition of man must be applied wholly and equally to each particular man. In this way, then, we can grasp that the will is always the same in all ideas’), glossed Definitio, Voluntas, Ideae. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 135; Textgestaltung II 367); in the Dutch the subject of what follows is therefore the will, not the essence.
  2. f Gebhardt (G II 135; Textgestaltung II 367) begins a new sentence at Cuius, after the Dutch version, which also read the clause differently: ‘En dieshalven moet des zelfs wezentheit … in yder denkbeelt evenmatig zijn’ (‘and therefore its essence must be adequate in each idea’), that is, cuius propterea essentia … debet esse adaequata in unaquaque idea. The punctuation here follows the 1677 edition (OP p. 91).
  3. g The Dutch version of 1677 has ‘alleenlijk’ (‘only’) before mentem and adds after it ‘en niet op de worden’ (‘and not to the words’). Gebhardt prints both in his text (G II 135; Textgestaltung II 367).
  1. 5 si mentem spectes: as in Prop. 47, Schol., the mind is what the person has in mind, as distinct from the words used. Whoever ‘affirms’ a falsehood in words may have in mind something true, or nothing.
Quod denique ad quartam obiectionem attinet, dico, me omnino concedere, quod homo in tali aequilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit, quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum, qui aeque ab eo distant), fame et siti peribit. Si me rogant, an talis homo non potius asinus, quam homo sit aestimandus? dico me nescire, ut etiam nescio, quanti aestimandus sit ille, qui se pensilem facit, et quanti aestimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani etc.
Finally, as regards the fourth objection, I say that I entirely grant that a man placed in such an equilibrium (namely, one who perceives nothing else but thirst and hunger, and such food and such drink, which are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst.6 If they ask me whether such a man is not to be reckoned an ass rather than a man, I say that I do not know; just as I also do not know at what to reckon one who hangs himself, or at what to reckon children, fools, madmen, etc.
  1. 6 The case is Aristotle’s, who mentions, among arguments from equilibrium, that of ‘τοῦ πεινῶντος καὶ διψῶντος σφόδρα μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐδωδίμων καὶ ποτῶν ἴσον ἀπέχοντος (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον ἠρεμεῖν ἀναγκαῖον)’ (‘the man who is very hungry and thirsty, and equally so, and equally distant from food and drink: for he too must stay where he is’, De caelo II.13, 295b31–34). Spinoza’s description of the man follows it closely. He accepts the conclusion: a man who perceived nothing else would not move, since nothing would determine him to one side; the objection has force only for one who supposes that a will undetermined by causes could break the tie.
[G II 135] Superest tandem indicare, quantum huius doctrinae cognitio ad usum vitae conferat, quod facile ex his animadvertemus. Nempe I. Quatenus docet nos ex solo Dei nutu agere, divinaeque naturae esse participes, et eo magis quo perfectiores actiones agimus et quo magis magisque Deum intelligimus. Haec ergo doctrina, praeterquam quod animum omnimode quietum reddit, hoc etiam habet, quod nos docet, in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitudo consistit, nempe in sola Dei cognitione, ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur, quae amor et pietas suadent. Unde clare intelligimus, quantum illi a vera virtutis aestimatione aberrant, qui pro virtute et optimis actionibus, tanquam pro summa servitute, summis praemiis a Deo decorari exspectant, quasi ipsa virtus Deique servitusa non esset ipsa felicitas et summa libertas.
It remains, finally, to indicate how much the knowledge of this doctrine contributes to the conduct of life, which we shall easily see from the following. Namely: I. Insofar as it teaches that we act by God’s bidding alone, and are sharers in the divine nature, and the more so, the more perfect the actions we do and the more and more we understand God. This doctrine, then, besides making the mind entirely at peace, has this also, that it teaches us in what our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists: namely in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love and piety urge.1 From this we understand clearly how far they stray from the true estimate of virtue who, for virtue and the best actions, as if for the utmost servitude, expect to be honoured by God with the highest rewards, as if virtue itself and servitude to God were not happiness itself and the highest freedom.2
  1. a The 1677 edition (OP p. 92) prints Deoque servitus; Van Vloten–Land correct it, and Gebhardt (G II 136; Textgestaltung II 367) and Bartuschat read Deique.
  1. 1 pietas: defined in Part IV as ‘the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason’ (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1). The word is the traditional one, but the sense is Spinoza’s own: not religious observance, but the desire to do good that arises from reason. On blessedness as the constant and eternal love of God see Part V, Prop. 36, Schol..
  2. 2 The closing proposition of the Ethics says the same: ‘beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus’ (‘blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself’, Part V, Prop. 42).
II. Quatenus docet, quomodo circa res fortunae, sive quae in nostra potestate non sunt, hoc est, circa res, quae ex nostra natura non sequuntur, nos gerere debeamus; nempe utramque fortunae faciem aequo animo exspectare et ferre; nimirum quia omnia ab aeterno Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur, ac ex essentia trianguli sequitur, quod tres eius anguli sunt aequales duobus rectis.
II. Insofar as it teaches how we must conduct ourselves with respect to matters of fortune, or things which are not in our power, that is, things which do not follow from our nature: namely, to expect and to bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind; because all things follow from God’s eternal decree with the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.
III. Confert haec doctrina ad vitam socialem, quatenus docet neminem odio habere, contemnere, irridere, nemini irasci, invidere. Praeterea quatenus docet, ut unusquisque suis sit contentus et proximo auxilio;b non ex muliebri misericordia, partialitate, neque superstitione, sed ex solo rationis ductu, prout scilicet tempus et res postulat, ut in quarta parte ostendam.c
III. This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no one, to envy no one. Further, insofar as it teaches that each should be content with his own and a help to his neighbour, not from womanish compassion,3 partiality or superstition, but from the guidance of reason alone, namely as the time and the matter require, as I shall show in Part IV.
  1. b et proximo auxilio;] transcr. et proximo in auxilium;. The 1677 edition (OP p. 92) and Gebhardt (G II 136) read ‘proximo auxilio’ (‘a help to his neighbour’); the transcription has the normalized ‘in auxilium’.
  2. c The 1677 edition (OP p. 92), the Dutch version, and the editions and translations before Gebhardt read in Tertia Parte. The discussion is in Part IV (G II 232 ff., 247 ff.: Props. 35–37 and 50), as Baensch pointed out; Gebhardt (G II 136; Textgestaltung II 367) takes the reference for a survival from the time when the work was divided into three Parts and corrects it to Quarta, and so Bartuschat.
  1. 3 The phrase muliebris misericordia recurs in Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1. Pity (commiseratio), which differs from compassion only as the single affect from the habit (Def. Aff. 18, Exp.), is in one who lives by the guidance of reason bad and useless in itself (Part IV, Prop. 50); its Scholium repeats this list: one who knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature will find nothing worthy of hatred, mockery or contempt, and will pity no one.
IV. Denique confert etiam haec doctrina non parum ad communem societatem, quatenus docet, qua ratione cives gubernandi sint et ducendi, nempe non ut serviant, sed ut libere ea quae optima sunt, agant. Atque his, quae in hoc schol. agere constitueram, absolvi et eo finem huic nostrae secundae parti impono, in qua puto me naturam mentis humanae eiusque proprietates satis prolixe, et quantum rei difficultas fert, clare explicuisse, atque talia tradidisse, ex quibus multa praeclara, maxime utilia et cognitu necessaria concludi possunt, ut partim ex sequentibusd constabit.
IV. Finally, this doctrine also contributes not a little to the common society, insofar as it teaches in what way citizens are to be governed and led: namely, not so that they may be slaves, but so that they may freely do the things which are best.4 And with this I have completed what I had resolved to treat in this Scholium, and with it I put an end to this our Second Part, in which I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties at sufficient length and, as far as the difficulty of the matter allows, clearly; and have set out things from which many excellent things, highly useful and necessary to know, can be concluded, as will be established partly from what follows.
  1. d ut partim ex sequentibus] transcr. ut panim ex sequentibus. Transcription slip; the 1677 edition (OP p. 92) and Gebhardt (G II 136) read ‘partim’.
  1. 4 Compare the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 20: the end of the state is not to turn men from rational beings into beasts or automata, but that they may use their reason freely; ‘finis ergo reipublicae revera libertas est’ (‘the end of the state, therefore, is in truth freedom’).

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