Epilogue: The Ethics after Spinoza

The Ethics was published in a volume that bore only its author’s initials, and within a few months it was banned. Its later history is a history of readers who found in it something they feared or something they needed, and often both. This epilogue follows a few of them, from the first generation, which saw in the book a system of atheism, through the German writers who made it a philosophy of the divine, to the scholars of the last century, who have tried to read it on its own terms. It makes no attempt to be complete. The influence of the Ethics has been diffuse, and many claims about it are hard to document; what follows is confined to what can be documented from the sources used in preparing this edition.

Publication and prohibition

The publication of the Opera Posthuma was itself a clandestine undertaking. After Spinoza’s death his landlord sent the chest containing his manuscripts to Amsterdam, where his publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz, and a group of friends who are thought to have included Jelles, Lodewijk Meyer, Glazemaker, Bouwmeester, Schuller and Van Gent decided to publish everything at once, in Latin and in Dutch. The Catholic Vicar Apostolic in the Netherlands, instructed from Rome to prevent the publication of an atheistic work said to exist in manuscript, was told by Rieuwertsz that there was no such work; in January 1678 copies of both versions, bearing only the initials B. D. S., began to appear in the bookshops (Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment, pp. 287–291). The reaction was immediate. The Reformed consistory of Leiden, meeting in February 1678, called the volume “a book which, perhaps since the beginning of the world until the present day … surpasses all others in godlessness and endeavours to do away with all religion and set impiety on the throne” (p. 291). The edict of the States of Holland of June 1678, which the Introduction quotes, banned not only the book but every reprint, summary or extract of it; and Israel notes that its wording dwells on Spinoza’s denial of miracles more than on any other feature of his thought (p. 292). The ban was not watertight. Three months after it, the Vicar Apostolic complained to Rome that it had produced “scarcely any other fruit … than to increase the renown and prices of Spinoza’s books” (p. 293).

Israel has argued that the notoriety of the Ethics in these decades has been underestimated. “Spinoza, then, emerged as the supreme philosophical bogeyman of Early Enlightenment Europe,” and “no one else during the century 1650–1750 remotely rivalled Spinoza’s notoriety as the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion, received ideas, tradition, morality, and what was everywhere regarded … as divinely constituted political authority” (p. 159). His larger thesis, that “Spinoza and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European Radical Enlightenment everywhere” (p. vi), remains disputed, but his account of the publication and suppression of the book rests on the church and state records of the time.

The first readers

Among the first readers of the Ethics was Leibniz, who had met its author. He had visited Spinoza in The Hague in November 1676, a few months before Spinoza’s death, and wrote to a correspondent the next year: “Spinoza died this winter. I saw him while passing through Holland, and I spoke with him several times and at great length. He has a strange metaphysics, full of paradoxes. Among other things he believes that the world and God are only one thing in substance, that God is the substance of all things, and that creatures are only modes or accidents. But I noticed that some of the purported demonstrations he showed me are not exact” (letter to Gallois, quoted by Gerhardt, Philosophische Schriften I 118). Early in 1678 he received a copy of the Opera Posthuma and annotated the Ethics closely, especially Part I (I 119). He summed up his judgment in a letter to Tschirnhaus the same year: in the Ethics Spinoza “does not everywhere explain his views sufficiently,” and “sometimes he commits paralogisms, which comes from his having departed from the rigour of demonstration” (I 119).

Leibniz returned to Spinoza’s doctrines many times. In his notes on Part I he insisted that the world might have been otherwise, and that God chooses the best freely (Appendix D describes these comments). Some thirty years later, in his remarks on a book by Johann Georg Wachter about Spinoza and the Kabbalah, he returned to the subject. Of the doctrine that the human mind is the idea of the body he wrote that “it is altogether foreign to every appearance of reason that the soul should be an idea,” since ideas are something merely abstract, like numbers and figures, and cannot act (p. 44). He also rejected the intellectual love of God of Part V. In a God who produces all things, good and evil alike, by necessity, he wrote, “there is nothing lovable; the true love of God is founded not on necessity but on goodness,” and Spinoza’s doctrine of that love is “only trappings for the people” (Animadversiones in Wachterum, ed. Foucher de Careil, p. 68).

Pierre Bayle, whom Israel calls “probably the single most widely read and influential thinker of the Early Enlightenment” (p. 331), devoted to Spinoza an article of his Historical and Critical Dictionary that runs, with its remarks, to more than fifty pages in the edition of 1820. The article opens by calling him “an atheist of system, and of an entirely new method,” though “the substance of his doctrine was common to him with several other philosophers, ancient and modern, European and oriental” (1820 ed., XIII 416). His system, Bayle wrote, is “the most monstrous hypothesis that can be imagined, the most absurd, and the most diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our mind” (XIII 418), and he set out his reasons in a remark of many pages, whose central argument is described in Appendix A. Bayle also recorded what those who had known Spinoza said of him: that he was “a man of good company, affable, honest, obliging, and very regular in his morals.” “That is strange,” Bayle added, “but at bottom one should be no more astonished at it than at seeing people who live very badly although they are fully persuaded of the Gospel” (XIII 417). The two judgments, of a system of unparalleled impiety and of a man of blameless life, stand side by side in Bayle’s article, and both were to have a long future.

The German revival

A century after its publication the Ethics became the subject of public controversy in Germany, and the controversy began with a conversation. In July 1780 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi visited Gotthold Ephraim Lessing at Wolfenbüttel, and he later published an account of what they said. Jacobi showed Lessing a poem called “Prometheus,” a defiant address to the gods, with the remark that Lessing, who had given offence so often, might for once take some. Lessing replied that he had taken no offence; the point of view of the poem was his own. “The orthodox concepts of the Deity are no longer for me; I cannot enjoy them. Ἓν καὶ Πᾶν [One and All]! I know nothing else.” When Jacobi observed that he would then be fairly well in agreement with Spinoza, Lessing answered: “If I am to name myself after anyone, I know no one else” (Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, 1789 ed., p. 22). The next morning Lessing came to Jacobi’s room to talk about his “One and All.” Jacobi said that he had come in large part to get help from Lessing against Spinoza. “Then there is no help for you,” Lessing replied. “Become his friend altogether instead. There is no other philosophy than the philosophy of Spinoza” (pp. 23–24).

Jacobi himself was no Spinozist. His reply to Lessing gives the reason he took Spinoza so seriously: “That may be true. For the determinist, if he wants to be consistent, must become a fatalist; the rest then follows of itself” (p. 24). For Jacobi the Ethics showed what a philosophy of demonstration must end in if it is consistent, and so gave a reason to rely instead on what Hegel, reporting Jacobi’s position, called “immediate knowledge” (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, tr. Haldane and Simson, III 283). Jacobi made the conversation public in 1785, in a book of letters to Moses Mendelssohn, which appeared in an enlarged edition in 1789. The dispute had begun privately between the two men in the summer of 1783; when it became public it drew in, as Frederick Beiser has written, “almost all the best minds of late eighteenth-century Germany,” among them Kant, Herder, Goethe and Hamann (The Fate of Reason, p. 44). Mendelssohn, who had defended Spinoza in his first published work, became “the bitter opponent of Spinozism” in his Morgenstunden of 1785 (p. 52). Jacobi’s charge was that reason, consistently pursued, leads to atheism and fatalism, and finally to what he called “nihilism,” from which the only escape is a leap of faith, a salto mortale (p. 46). Goethe spoke of the book’s effect as “an explosion,” and Hegel as “a thunderbolt out of the blue” (p. 46).

The first and most visible effect, in Beiser’s account, was a revolution in Spinoza’s reputation. “Nearly all the major figures of the classical Goethezeit—Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin, Herder, F. Schlegel, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Schelling—became Spinoza enthusiasts in the wake of the controversy. Apparently overnight, Spinoza’s reputation changed from a devil into a saint” (p. 44); pantheism became, as Heine later put it, “the unofficial religion of Germany” (p. 45). These writers read the Ethics in a new spirit, and found in it, not the atheism Bayle had seen there, but a philosophy of God.

Novalis wrote, in one of his fragments, that “Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man” and that “Spinozism is a surfeit of divinity,” where unbelief is a lack of it (Fragmente, ed. Kamnitzer, p. 551). Friedrich Schleiermacher, in his speeches On Religion to its cultured despisers, called on his readers to “offer reverently with me a lock of hair to the shade of the holy, rejected Spinoza! The high world-spirit pervaded him, the infinite was his beginning and end, the universe his only and eternal love; in holy innocence and deep humility he mirrored himself in the eternal world, and saw how he too was its most lovable mirror; he was full of religion and full of the holy spirit; and so he stands there alone and unequalled, master in his art, but raised above the profane guild, without disciples and without citizenship” (Über die Religion, 1806 ed., p. 68). The man Bayle had called an atheist of system had become, in a book written in defence of religion, a model of religious feeling.

Hegel gave the revival its philosophical form. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, he described Spinoza’s idea of absolute substance as “in the main true and well-grounded,” though “not the whole truth,” since substance must also be thought of as active and living, and so as mind; and he declared that “to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all Philosophy,” since the soul must begin “by bathing in this ether of the One Substance, in which all that man has held as true has disappeared” (III 257). He rejected the charge of atheism. If Spinoza is called an atheist because he does not distinguish God from the world, “it is a misuse of the term”; “Spinozism might really just as well or even better have been termed Acosmism,” since for Spinoza it is not the world but God alone that is truly real (III 281). And against Jacobi he insisted that Spinoza is “a testing-point in modern philosophy, so that it may really be said: You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all” (III 283). Hegel’s reading, on which the attributes are “not independent, but only the forms in which the understanding grasps substance in its differences” (III 269–270), is the source to which Martial Gueroult traced the subjectivist interpretation he was still refuting in 1968 (see Appendix B).

Nietzsche

The most surprising testimony comes from Friedrich Nietzsche, who came to Spinoza only in 1881. In a postcard to his friend Franz Overbeck, postmarked Sils, 30 July 1881, he wrote: “I am utterly astonished, utterly delighted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now was inspired by ’instinct.’ Not only is his whole tendency like mine—to make knowledge the most powerful affect—but in five main points of his doctrine I find myself again; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these things: he denies the freedom of the will; purposes; the moral order of the world; the unegoistic; evil.” He granted that the differences between them were enormous, but thought they lay rather in differences of time, culture and science. “In sum: my solitude, which, as on very high mountains, often, often left me short of breath and made the blood rush out, is now at least a solitude for two” (Briefwechsel mit Franz Overbeck, 1916, pp. 149–150). The list is a fair summary of the negative doctrines of Parts I, II and IV, and the phrase “to make knowledge the most powerful affect” recalls the teaching of Part IV that the true knowledge of good and evil can restrain an affect only “insofar as it is considered as an affect” (Part IV, Prop. 14).

The Ethics in English

Two English translations of the Ethics appeared within a year of each other: by William Hale White in 1883, and by R. H. M. Elwes in 1884, in the second volume of his translation of Spinoza’s chief works. Both were kept in the repository of this edition for comparison. In the preface to a later edition, White confessed that he did not “pretend to understand the whole of it, and, so far as he can make out, nobody has fully understood it,” but argued that the speculative doctrine was not the source of the book’s power: “if Spinoza were merely a professional metaphysician, he would not have been what he was to Goethe, to Shelley, to George Eliot, and to the world at large” (White, Ethic, 1910 ed., pp. lxi–lxii). His own preface set out “the teaching of the Ethic in so far as it has been a power amongst men outside the schools.”

Scholarship

The modern study of the Ethics rests on a few great works of scholarship. Jacob Freudenthal collected the sources, records and reports of Spinoza’s life in 1899. Carl Gebhardt’s critical edition of 1925 established the text that this edition translates, with a full account of its sources in the first edition, the Dutch translation and the earlier editions. H. A. Wolfson’s The Philosophy of Spinoza (1934) distinguished the explicit Spinoza of the definitions and propositions, whom he called Benedictus, from the implicit Spinoza, Baruch, whose “mind is crammed with traditional philosophic lore”: “Benedictus is the first of the moderns; Baruch is the last of the mediaevals,” and “we cannot get the full meaning of what Benedictus says unless we know what has passed through the mind of Baruch” (I vii). His book traced the propositions of the Ethics to their sources in medieval Jewish and scholastic philosophy. Martial Gueroult’s commentary on Parts I and II (1968, 1974) followed the text “Book by Book and Proposition by Proposition,” on the conviction that each of Spinoza’s theses, and their close connection, “is the object of a rigorous demonstration” (I 13–14).

Two books in English, to which much later work responds, are cited often in this edition. Edwin Curley’s Spinoza’s Metaphysics (1969) proposed to read Spinoza’s terms in the vocabulary of modern philosophy of science, with substance and its attributes as the most general facts and laws of nature; Jonathan Bennett’s A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984) treated the Ethics as a set of arguments to be tested and, where possible, repaired, and was unsparing where it found them wanting. Among the studies that have answered them are Michael Della Rocca’s Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (1996), which argued against Bennett that the identity of mind and body is consistent with the barrier between the attributes, and Yitzhak Melamed’s Spinoza’s Metaphysics (2013), which defended against Curley the view that the modes inhere in God as their subject. The appendices of this edition describe these debates.

What remains

The history sketched here shows the Ethics read as atheism and as religion, as the completion of rationalism and as the refutation of it, as a system of metaphysics and as a guide to life. None of these readings is simply wrong, and each found something that is in the text. The book itself does not claim to be easy. It ends with the observation that the way it has shown “seems very hard,” but “can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is so rarely found must be hard.” “But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare” (Part V, Prop. 42, Schol.).

Appendix A. Substance and Mode

Every reader of Part I must decide what Spinoza means when he says that things are “in” God. The definitions say that a substance is “what is in itself and is conceived through itself,” and a mode “that which is in another, through which it is also conceived” (Part I, Defs. 3 and 5); the first axiom says that “whatever is, is either in itself or in another” (Ax. 1); and Prop. 15 concludes that “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.” Particular things, the corollary to Prop. 25 adds, “are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.” But the little word “in” can be read in more than one way, and the choice determines what kind of philosophy the Ethics contains. This appendix describes the main readings and the arguments for and against them.

The traditional reading and Bayle’s objection

In the philosophy Spinoza inherited, to be “in” something was the mark of an accident or quality: whiteness is in a wall, shape is in a body, a thought is in a mind. A substance is that in which qualities inhere and which does not itself inhere in anything. Descartes kept this structure. Shape and motion are modes of extended substance, ways of being extended, and imagination, sensation and will are modes of thinking substance (Principles I.53). Read in this light, Spinoza’s doctrine says that stones, trees, human beings and their thoughts are qualities or states of God, as a shape is a state of a body. This is the oldest reading of the Ethics, and for a long time the only one.

Pierre Bayle drew from it the consequences that made Spinoza notorious. If all things are modes of one substance, then that substance is the subject of all their properties, including contrary ones. It would be not only the efficient cause of all the follies and crimes of human beings but their passive subject, the subjectum inhaesionis, joined to them by an identity, since the mode is not really distinct from the substance it modifies. Wars and battles between men, which are intelligible when men are distinct beings with conflicting interests, become absurd when men are only modifications of the same being: “the same God, numerically one, who modifies himself into a Turk, modifying himself into a Hungarian.” Since, Bayle adds, modes do nothing and only substances act and suffer, the sentence “the Germans have killed ten thousand Turks” would have to mean that “God modified into Germans has killed God modified into ten thousand Turks,” and every sentence about what men do to each other would come to this: God hates himself, persecutes himself, kills himself, eats himself (Dictionnaire, “Spinoza,” remark N; 1820 ed. XIII 443–444).

Bayle’s argument is a reductio. Assume that modes inhere in substance as qualities in a subject; then God has contradictory properties and acts against himself; so the assumption, or the system, must be absurd. Bayle chose to reject the system. Later readers have tried to reject the assumption.

Curley: causal dependence

The most influential alternative was proposed by Edwin Curley in Spinoza’s Metaphysics (1969). Curley called the traditional reading the “Bayle–Joachim interpretation,” after Bayle and H. H. Joachim, whose Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (1901) had followed it, and argued that it misunderstands Spinoza’s terms. “Spinoza’s modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be related to substance in the same way Descartes’ modes are related to substance, for they are particular things (E Ip25c), not qualities. And it is difficult to know what it would mean to say that particular things inhere in substance” (p. 18). A quality can be predicated of a subject; it is not clear what it would mean to predicate a stone or a man of God.

Curley proposed instead that the relation of mode to substance is “a relation of causal dependence which is unlike the relation of predicate to subject and unlike the relation of species to genus” (p. 40). “Modes exist in substance in the sense that they are causally dependent on substance; substance exists in itself in the sense that it is not causally dependent on anything else” (p. 74). On this reading, Spinoza’s God is the cause of all things and the things depend on him entirely, but they are not his properties, and the doctrine that everything is “in” God is a doctrine of universal dependence, not of universal inherence. Bayle’s objection lapses, since God is not the subject of the properties of the things he causes.

Curley went further. He proposed that substance and its attributes are best understood as the most general facts about the world, described by the fundamental laws of nature, and that the infinite modes are the derivative laws, so that the relation between God and things is the relation between laws and what they explain (pp. 56–59). This “nomological” reading made Spinoza’s metaphysics intelligible to readers trained in the philosophy of science, and it has been very widely discussed.

Bennett: modes as properties

Jonathan Bennett, in A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), defended something closer to the traditional reading, on different grounds. Spinoza’s word modus, he pointed out, means “a way that something can be,” and Spinoza “really is saying that ordinary particular things are ways that reality is”; “Spinozistic ’modes’ belong on the property side of the line between things and properties” (p. 92). Bennett regarded Curley’s thesis as “radical and improbable,” since it credits Spinoza with silently depriving “mode” of half the meaning it had for Descartes and in Latin generally (p. 93).

To make the traditional reading plausible, Bennett attributed to Spinoza what he called a “field metaphysic.” The one extended substance is space itself, and a body is not a thing in space but a region of space that has certain qualities, or rather a continuous series of regions at successive times, each qualitatively unlike its neighbours. “When a thaw moves across a countryside, as we say, nothing really moves; there are just progressive changes in which bits of the countryside are frozen and which are melted” (p. 89). In the same way, the motion of a body is the progressive change of qualities in the regions of the one substance. On this picture a body really is a state of the extended substance, as the traditional reading says, and yet the oddity Curley found in predicating a stone of God disappears, since the stone is not a thing to be predicated but a way the substance is in a certain place.

Melamed: inherence and predication

More recently Yitzhak Melamed has defended the traditional reading directly. In the first chapter of Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought (2013), he argues that Spinozist modes “both inhere in and are predicated of the substance,” that Bayle’s famous critique “is based on crucial misunderstandings,” that the claim involves no category mistake, and that Curley’s appeal to the principle of interpretive charity does not justify his reading. He also points out the similarity between Spinoza’s modes and the “tropes,” or particular properties, of some contemporary metaphysics. A trope is a particular, as Curley insisted Spinoza’s modes are, but a particular property, such as the redness of this rose as opposed to redness in general, and such particulars can inhere in a subject. On this reading the doctrine that all things are in God is just what it seems, a doctrine of inherence, and the reader must face its consequences rather than explain them away.

What is at stake

The disagreement is not merely about a word. If modes inhere in God, the Ethics is a form of pantheism in the strict sense: God is not only the cause of all things but the subject of which all things are states, and the world is God in a certain modification. If modes merely depend causally on God, the Ethics is closer to a radical version of traditional theism, in which a single necessary being is the cause of everything else and everything else is distinct from it, though wholly dependent on it. The choice affects the reading of Prop. 18, where God is called the immanent and not the transitive cause of all things; of Part II, Prop. 11, Cor., where the human mind is called a part of God’s infinite intellect; and of the doctrine of Part V that the mind’s love of God is part of the love with which God loves himself.

The texts give each side something. On the side of inherence are Spinoza’s language, which is the language of substance and affection, and his insistence, in the scholium to Prop. 15, that matter is everywhere the same and that its parts are distinguished only modally, not really. On the side of causation are his equation of being in something with being conceived through it, and of being conceived through something with being caused by it (Part I, Ax. 4), which suggests that inherence and causation may be, for Spinoza, two names for one relation. Michael Della Rocca has drawn this conclusion, arguing that for Spinoza “causation and explanation and the inherence of a property in a subject all amount to the same phenomenon” (Spinoza, 2008, p. 7; see Appendix F); if he is right, the choice between the causal and the inherence readings is less sharp than it first appears. Defenders of the inherence reading have also answered Bayle in Spinoza’s own terms. The properties of the modes, they point out, are not properties of God considered as infinite, but of God insofar as he is affected by this or that mode, the qualification Spinoza uses again and again (as in Part II, Prop. 11, Cor.); and so God is not the subject of contradictory properties in the same respect, any more than a body is both moving and at rest because one part moves and another does not.

Further reading

The works cited here are the best entry into the debate: Bayle’s article “Spinoza” in his Historical and Critical Dictionary, especially remark N; Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (1969), chapters 1–2; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 20–25; and Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought (2013), chapter 1. Martial Gueroult’s commentary on Part I, Spinoza I: Dieu (1968), works through the propositions one by one and is indispensable for the detail of the argument.

Appendix B. The Attributes

The definition of attribute is among the shortest in the Ethics and among the most debated: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Part I, Def. 4). It raises three questions. Are the attributes really in the substance, or are they ways in which an intellect perceives a substance that is in itself without distinction? How many attributes are there? And how can one substance have several attributes, each of which constitutes its essence and is conceived through itself, without ceasing to be one? This appendix describes the main answers.

Subjective and objective readings

Jonathan Bennett called the definition “one of the most puzzling passages in the Ethics.” It seems to define one of Spinoza’s basic metaphysical concepts in terms of thought, and so gives one of the attributes a special place in the definition of all of them (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 62). If the emphasis falls on “what the intellect perceives,” the attributes may seem to exist only for the intellect that perceives them; if it falls on “as constituting its essence,” they are real features of the substance, which an intellect discovers. The Latin word rendered “as,” tanquam, can also mean “as if,” and the choice of English has sometimes followed the choice of interpretation.

H. A. Wolfson, in The Philosophy of Spinoza (1934), translated the phrase “as if constituting its essence” and defended the first view. He set out the alternatives with great clarity. On the first reading, “attributes are only in intellectu,” “a subjective mode of thinking, expressing a relation to a perceiving subject and having no real existence in the essence”; on the second, they are “extra intellectum, real elements out of which the essence of the substance is composed.” On both readings the mind perceives the attributes, but on the first “to be perceived by the mind means to be invented by the mind,” and on the second it means “only to be discovered by the mind.” Wolfson judged that “the abundance of both literary and material evidence is in favor of the subjective interpretation” (I 146).

His main argument was historical. He held that the dispute between the two readings reproduces a controversy among the medieval Jewish philosophers over the “essential attributes” of God, the terms that would stand to God’s essence as genus and species stand to the thing defined. Maimonides rejected such attributes, because he held that genus and species have a kind of reality and would introduce composition into God’s simple essence. Others admitted them, on the ground that they are purely subjective terms, distinct only in the mind and identical in reality with God’s essence: Wolfson names Averroes, Moses ha-Levi, Gersonides, Crescas and Albo, whom he quotes as calling the attributes “nothing but intellectual conceptions” of perfections that “in reality are nothing but Thy essence.” Spinoza, Wolfson argued, “consciously and advisedly aligned himself” with this second group (I 147–151). Hence, on his reading, the language of perception in the definition, and Spinoza’s statement to Simon de Vries that by attribute he understands the same as by substance, “except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such a definite nature to substance” (Letter 9; Wolfson I 152).

Martial Gueroult, in the first volume of his commentary (1968), rejected what he called the “idealist, subjectivist or formalist” interpretation, which he traced to Hegel’s reading of Spinoza, and devoted an appendix to refuting it (Spinoza I 428). One of his arguments is drawn from the demonstration of Part I, Prop. 4, which says that there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished except “substances, or what is the same (by Def. 4), their attributes, and their affections.” By identifying substances with their attributes, and by appeal to the very definition on which the subjectivists rely, the demonstration “ruins irremediably, in advance” the claim that the definition supports their reading (I 117). For Gueroult the attributes are real and really distinct. The first eight propositions of Part I deduce the “constitutive elements of the divine essence, namely the substances of one attribute, which will later turn out to be the very attributes of God” (I 109); and once Prop. 9 has shown that the more reality a being has, the more attributes belong to it, these beings, rightly considered at first as substances of one attribute, prove to be “not different substances, but the attributes of one and the same substance” (I 162).

Bennett proposed a third approach, which keeps the attributes real while explaining the language of the intellect. He read the remark in Letter 9 as saying that “substance differs from attribute only by the difference between a substantival and an adjectival presentation of the very same content.” “We use the concept of substance to think of what has the attribute, and we use the concept of attribute to think of what the substance has; but it is the same conceptual content in each case” (pp. 62–63). The phrase “with respect to the intellect” does not make the attribute unreal; it marks a difference in the logical form of our thinking about one and the same reality. Bennett admitted that this does not yet explain why Def. 4 says that an attribute is perceived as constituting an essence, and proposed, as most commentators do, to proceed on the assumption that an attribute actually is a basic property of its substance (p. 63).

How many attributes?

Spinoza defines God as “a substance consisting of infinite attributes” (Part I, Def. 6), and most readers take this to mean infinitely many. He names only two, thought and extension, and when Tschirnhaus asked why we know no others, he answered that the human mind is the idea of a body, and that the idea of a body involves no attributes of God except extension and thought (Letter 64). The answer seems to take for granted that there are others.

Bennett argued that the text does not require infinitely many attributes. Spinoza “used ’infinite’ as a virtual synonym for ’all’”: to say that God has infinite attributes is to say that God “exists in every possible basic way,” which “does not entail that God exists other than as extended and as thinking” (p. 76). He was careful not to claim that Spinoza believed there were only two. The scholium to Part II, Prop. 7 says that “whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other,” we shall find one and the same order of causes, and the correspondence with Tschirnhaus takes seriously the question why we know nothing of the other attributes. So Bennett does “not say that Spinoza thought there were only two attributes” (p. 77). But the doctrine that there are infinitely many is not, on his reading, something the definitions of the Ethics assert.

One substance, many attributes

The third difficulty is the deepest. Each attribute of one substance “must be conceived through itself” (Part I, Prop. 10), so that no attribute can be explained through another. Michael Della Rocca has called this “the conceptual or explanatory barrier that Spinoza erects between thought and extension,” from which it follows that “no mental fact can be explained by any physical fact and vice versa” (Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 10). Yet the attributes belong to one substance, and the scholium to Prop. 10 insists that “it is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance.” How can one thing have several essences, each complete and each unintelligible through the others?

On the subjective reading the problem disappears, since the attributes are only ways of perceiving a single essence. Wolfson presented this as one of its advantages: on the objective reading, he quoted James Martineau as saying, “how that essence can be one and self-identical, while its constituents are many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is a question which is hopeless of solution” (I 153). The price is to make the distinction between thought and extension something the intellect adds; and since the intellect is itself a mode of thought, this seems to give thought a priority over the other attributes that the system denies. Della Rocca pressed a further objection. In the scholium to Prop. 10 Spinoza says that the attributes are conceived as really distinct, and in the scholium to Part II, Prop. 7 he speaks of what can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance. The ideas of an infinite intellect are all true; so if it conceives the attributes as distinct, they are distinct, and Wolfson’s view “must therefore be mistaken” (p. 157).

Della Rocca’s own solution rests on the idea that certain contexts in Spinoza are what logicians call referentially opaque: whether a sentence of the form “x is conceived through extension” is true depends on how x is described, and not only on which thing x is. The thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance; yet extension constitutes the essence of the substance described as extended, and not of the substance described as thinking, since to say that extension constitutes the essence of the thinking substance would be to say that the thinking substance is conceived through extension, which breaks the barrier between the attributes. The phrase “what the intellect perceives … as” in Def. 4, on this reading, does not make the attributes unreal; it marks the fact that what constitutes the essence of a substance depends on the attribute under which the substance is conceived (pp. 164–165). The same feature of Spinoza’s system, Della Rocca argued, makes it possible for a mode of thought and a mode of extension to be one and the same thing, although neither can be explained through the other: given this opacity, “Spinoza can affirm an identity of modes of thought and modes of extension even while maintaining that there is no causal interaction across attributes” (p. 124). Appendix C takes up this argument.

Why it matters

The question about the attributes is the hinge between Parts I and II. If the attributes are real and really distinct, Spinoza’s account of mind and body is a duality of attributes within a single substance: thought and extension are both fully real, and neither can be reduced to the other. If they are subjective, Spinoza is closer to a monism in which the distinction between mind and body belongs to our way of knowing rather than to things. The doctrine of Part II, which Part III restates in the words “the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension” (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.), reads differently on each view.

Further reading

Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (1934), vol. I, chapter 5; Gueroult, Spinoza I: Dieu (1968), chapters 3–4, on Props. 1–10, and Appendix 3, “La controverse sur l’attribut”; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 16–19; Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (1996), chapters 1 and 9.

Appendix C. Mind and Body

Part II states the relation between mind and body in a series of propositions that readers have found both bold and obscure. “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (Part II, Prop. 7). The scholium adds that “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways” (E2P7S). “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else” (Prop. 13). And Part III draws the consequence that neither can act on the other: “The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else” (Part III, Prop. 2). The doctrine is usually called “parallelism,” a word that does not occur in the Ethics. This appendix describes the main questions it has raised and the main answers.

Two claims: correspondence and identity

The propositions make two claims that are not obviously the same. One is a claim of correspondence: for every mode of extension there is an idea of it, and the causal order among ideas mirrors the causal order among bodies. Jonathan Bennett stated it in these terms: “there is a one-one relation correlating mental items with physical ones, mapping similarities onto similarities and causal chains onto causal chains” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 127). The other is a claim of identity: the mind and the body are “one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension” (Part II, Prop. 21, Schol.). Correspondence relates two series; identity says that there is only one.

Spinoza plainly holds both, and the question is how they are related. Martial Gueroult argued that the identity is the ground of the correspondence. Just as the substances of one attribute deduced at the beginning of Part I prove to be one and the same substance constituted by different attributes, so “any mode of one attribute and the corresponding modes in the infinity of other attributes make one and the same thing” in different attributes. “From the identity of the connections between things in the various attributes one has passed here to the identity of the things connected; and this latter identity grounds the former ontologically: since the things connected are the same, their connections are only one” (Spinoza II 85–86). On this reading, Prop. 7 establishes the correspondence through an axiom about knowledge, and the scholium explains through the unity of substance why the correspondence must hold.

Gueroult insisted at the same time that the identity does not abolish the distinction. The modes of the different attributes, “despite their identity with respect to substance,” are caused by God only insofar as he is this or that attribute, and so “remain really distinct from one another,” just as the attributes themselves remain really distinct in God (II 86). He also distinguished the relation between ideas and the things outside thought from a second relation within thought itself, between ideas and the ideas of those ideas, which he called “intra-cogitative” parallelism, warning that the expression is his and not Spinoza’s (II 15–16). The second relation matters for Spinoza’s account of self-knowledge and consciousness (Part II, Props. 20–23).

The argument for Prop. 7

The demonstration of Prop. 7 is two short sentences: “This is evident from Ax. 4, Part I. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.” The axiom says that “knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause” (Part I, Ax. 4). Bennett called this an “offhand ’demonstration’” and argued that it works only if the axiom is read as a claim about mental items, whereas Spinoza’s other uses of the axiom read it as a claim about conceptual connection, the word rendered “knowledge,” cognitio, serving him for “concept” as well as for knowing. He conjectured that Spinoza had better reasons for the doctrine, drawn from the explanatory ambitions of the new science, which “could not easily have been shaped up into the sort of demonstration Spinoza liked to give,” and that this is why the text offers instead “the weak, cryptic argument that we find in the text” (p. 127).

Edwin Curley proposed a reading on which the demonstration is less weak. Spinoza says that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, “involves affirmation or negation” (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol.); so “it would be appropriate in most contexts in Spinoza to substitute the term ’proposition’ or ’assertion’ for the term ’idea’” (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, p. 122). If ideas are propositions and their objects are facts, the relation between thought and extension can be thought of “as an identity of true proposition and fact” (p. 123), and the correspondence between the order of ideas and the order of things is the correspondence between a complete true description of the world and the world it describes. Bennett granted that ideas are propositionally structured, but objected that the reading “gets Spinoza out of any conceivable trouble with his parallelism, but only by making it so empty as to lack all metaphysical significance.” He preferred to credit Spinoza with a real psycho-physical parallelism, adopted “to solve a real problem,” rather than “the tame parallelism doctrine to which Curley confines him” (p. 128).

What kind of identity?

The hardest question is what it means to say that a mind and a body are “one and the same thing.” The attributes are conceived through themselves, and no mode of one attribute can be explained through a mode of another (Part I, Prop. 10; Part II, Prop. 6). If my mind and my body are strictly identical, whatever is true of one is true of the other; but my body is conceived through extension and my mind is not. It seems to follow that they cannot be identical after all.

Bennett concluded that Spinoza cannot mean a strict identity of the mental and the physical item. “He cannot be saying that physical P1 = mental M1; that is impossible because they belong to different attributes.” He proposed instead that modes, being properties, have a common element: my body is extension combined with a certain “differentia” F, and my mind is thought combined with the same F. “What it takes for an extended world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a thinking world to contain my mind; just as what it takes for a two-dimensional figure to be a circle is exactly what it takes for a three-dimensional figure to be a sphere—namely being bounded by a set of points equidistant from one point” (p. 141). On this reading the identity is the identity of the “trans-attribute” differentia, and the mind and the body are the same in the way a circle and a sphere are the same.

Michael Della Rocca rejected this solution. On Bennett’s own account, he pointed out, my body is extension-and-F and my mind is thought-and-F, and neither is identical with F; and “the fact that each of these complex modes contains a constituent in common, namely F, does not, of course, show that my mind and my body are the same mode” (Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 160). Della Rocca defended a strict numerical identity, and answered the objection from the attributes by arguing that the contexts in question are referentially opaque. Whether “x is conceived through extension” is true depends on how x is described, not only on which thing it is; so the same mode, described as a mode of extension, is conceived through extension, and described as a mode of thought, is not. The barrier between the attributes is a barrier between ways of conceiving, and it does not prevent one thing from being conceived in both ways. “Given this opacity, Spinoza can affirm an identity of modes of thought and modes of extension even while maintaining that there is no causal interaction across attributes” (p. 124). Appendix B describes how Della Rocca extended the same idea to the definition of attribute.

Ideas of everything

Prop. 7 and its scholium imply that there is an idea in God not only of every human body but of every body whatever, and Spinoza draws the consequence in the scholium to Prop. 13. The things shown so far “are very general and pertain no more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body” (E2P13S). Readers have disagreed about how much this commits Spinoza to.

Bennett took it as a form of panpsychism, and offered Spinoza an argument for it. If some physical systems have minds and others do not, there must be a line somewhere on the scale of physical complexity below which mentality does not occur; but if no physical fact can explain a mental fact, there can be no explanation of why the line falls where it does, and such “unexplainability must be deeply offensive to Spinoza.” So he has reason to conclude that the mental realm “never stops,” that “there is a mental counterpart to every physical item, however simple and dead,” and that the human mind is a complex of simpler mental items related to the parts of the body, especially the brain (pp. 136–137). Bennett added that this does not mean that every physical thing has anything we would recognize as mental. As to what the mental counterparts of simple bodies are like, Spinoza “must admit that he does not know, and this ought to embarrass him”; but Bennett judged that “the problem is not fatal” (p. 138). He noted that Leibniz, who also denied any logical overlap between the mental and the physical, reached a similar conclusion.

Curley read the same passage more deflationarily. If ideas are propositions, then the idea of my watch is the true proposition about it; the scholium “does not imply that my watch has thoughts and sensations, any more than Aristotle’s doctrine that plants have souls implies that flowers feel pain.” Consciousness, on his reading, requires not only an idea of a body but an idea of that idea (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, p. 126). Spinoza himself says that “ideas differ among themselves as the objects themselves do,” and that “the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once” (E2P13S). On either reading, the human mind is not set apart from nature by a difference of kind.

The other attributes

A further puzzle was raised in Spinoza’s lifetime. If the same mode is expressed under infinitely many attributes, and the order and connection of its expressions is the same in all of them, why does my mind perceive only my body, its expression under extension, and not its expressions under the other attributes? Tschirnhaus put this question in a letter of 12 August 1675, arguing that the scholium to Part II, Prop. 7 seemed to imply the contrary of Spinoza’s claim that the mind can perceive no attributes of God except extension and thought (Letter 65). Spinoza replied that although each thing is expressed in infinitely many ways in the infinite intellect of God, “those infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinite minds,” since none of these infinite ideas has any connection with the others, as the same scholium and Part I, Prop. 10 show (Letter 66). There is thus a distinct idea, and so a distinct mind, of each of the thing’s expressions, and the mind that is the idea of my body is only one of them. The answer leaves a question that Spinoza did not take up: if the attribute of thought contains an idea of every mode of every attribute, thought seems to have a wider reach than any other attribute, although each attribute is supposed to express the essence of God equally.

What is at stake

Spinoza’s doctrine was meant to solve the problem Descartes had left: how an unextended mind and an extended body, really distinct substances, could act on each other, which Spinoza judged that Descartes had explained only through “a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality” (Part V, Preface). Spinoza’s solution denies the interaction and explains the correlation, and its interest for modern readers lies in the attempt to hold together three claims that are hard to combine: that the mental is not reducible to the physical, that there is nevertheless only one world, and that the mental and the physical are equally subject to explanation by causes. The disagreements described here concern the price of holding all three.

Further reading

Gueroult, Spinoza II: L’âme (1974), chapters 3–5, on Props. 1–13; Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics (1969), chapter 4; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 31–36; Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (1996), chapters 7–9.

Appendix D. Necessity and Purpose

Part I ends with two denials that together have done more than anything else to shape the reputation of the Ethics. The first is a denial of contingency: “In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way” (Part I, Prop. 29), and “things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced” (Prop. 33). The second, in the Appendix, is a denial of purpose: “nature has no end set before it, and … all final causes are nothing but human fictions” (Part I, Appendix). Each raises a question of interpretation. How strong is the necessity Spinoza asserts? And does the denial of final causes extend to human action, or only to the purposes popularly ascribed to God and nature? This appendix takes the questions in turn.

How strong is the necessity?

Spinoza explains his terms in the first scholium to Prop. 33. “A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause,” and it is called contingent “for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge”: we call a thing contingent when we do not know that its essence involves a contradiction, and yet “can affirm nothing with certainty” about its existence, “because the order of causes is hidden from us” (E1P33S1). Contingency, on this account, is only apparent. But two views are consistent with these words, and readers have been divided between them.

On the first view, Spinoza is a determinist. Every event is necessitated by its causes, and they by theirs, and the chain of finite causes runs back without end, as Prop. 28 says: every finite thing is determined to exist and operate by another finite thing, “and so on to infinity.” But the chain as a whole might have been different; the necessity of each link is conferred on it by the links before it, and it is necessary only “by reason of its cause.” On the second view, Spinoza is a necessitarian in the strict sense: the world, in every detail, could not have been otherwise, and the actual world is the only possible world. Prop. 16, which says that “from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect),” and Prop. 33 itself seem to say this, since everything follows from a nature that is itself necessary.

Edwin Curley argued for something close to the first view. On his reading, the attributes and infinite modes of Part I correspond to the laws of nature, which are absolutely necessary, while particular facts are only relatively necessary: each follows from the laws together with other particular facts, which follow in turn from others, without end. He then showed that, on this reading, other complete histories of the world are consistent with the same laws, since one could deny any particular fact provided one also denied, all the way back, the facts that necessitate it: “If every truth is necessary, but some are only relatively necessary, then the actual world is not the only possible world.” Whether Spinoza would have accepted the result Curley thought “not so easy to decide” (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, p. 104). If he wished to hold that the actual world is the only possible one in the stronger sense, he would have to answer the question why this series of particular facts rather than another, and to refuse it would be to “accept a limitation on the principle of sufficient reason,” a qualification Spinoza “never explicitly makes” (pp. 105–106). Even without strict necessitarianism, Curley concluded, Spinoza’s determinism “is quite strong enough to be philosophically interesting” (p. 106).

Jonathan Bennett read the evidence differently. He agreed that many of Spinoza’s statements express only determinism, but found others “harder to explain away,” above all the second scholium to Prop. 33, “the marvellous scholium” in which Spinoza argues that if God had decreed anything else concerning nature he would have had another intellect and another will, and asks: “what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees concerning created things and nevertheless remain equally perfect?” “It is hard not to conclude,” Bennett wrote, “that in this scholium Spinoza is defending the absolute necessity of all truths.” His verdict was divided. Forced to choose, he would say that Spinoza “consciously, explicitly held that this is the only possible world,” “though it is not really right”; but the opposite is not right either, for “it seems that Spinoza did not think his situation through” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, pp. 122–123). Bennett suggested that Spinoza was helped to avoid the question by a confusion about “necessary by reason of its cause,” supposing that a necessity conferred by something else could be as absolute as a necessity inherent in a thing’s own nature (pp. 123–124).

Later readers have pressed the case for the second view. Don Garrett, in an essay first published in 1991, started from a letter of 1675. Oldenburg had warned Spinoza that readers of the Theological-Political Treatise thought he asserted “the fatal necessity of all things and actions,” and Spinoza answered that “this very thing is the chief foundation of everything in the treatise which I had intended to publish”: “I in no way subject God to fate, but I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God” (Letters 74–75). Garrett defended three theses: that nothing Spinoza says commits him to denying necessitarianism; that Props. 16, 29 and 33, and independently the doctrine of the attributes in Part II, commit him to it; and that his monism and his account of adequate ideas make better sense if he is a necessitarian (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, pp. 98–100, 119). The argument from Prop. 16 is short. Everything that falls under an infinite intellect follows from the necessity of the divine nature; that nature is itself necessary; whatever follows from what is necessary is necessary; and everything actual falls under an infinite intellect (p. 111). Curley, in a later essay written with Gregory Walski, replied that Spinoza held only a “moderate necessitarianism,” on which there could have been, from eternity, other complete series of finite modes equally compatible with the divine nature. Garrett answered that such a view requires “that a crucial fact about the universe—namely, that there is this complete infinite system of finite modes rather than others that were equally possible—has no explanation at all,” and so sits uncomfortably with Spinoza’s commitment to the principle of sufficient reason (p. 125). Michael Della Rocca reached the same conclusion by the same route. He called necessitarianism “an extremely implausible thesis,” but added that this “would not deter Spinoza—bold philosopher that he is—from accepting it if he sees good reasons for doing so” (Spinoza, 2008, p. 76); and he found those reasons in Spinoza’s refusal to admit any fact without an explanation, the subject of Appendix F.

The dispute is older than modern scholarship. Leibniz, who received a copy of the Opera Posthuma early in 1678 (Gerhardt I 119), wrote beside Prop. 33 that the proposition is “true or false, according as it is explained”: on the hypothesis of a divine will that chooses the best, nothing but these things could have been produced, but “according to the very nature of things considered in themselves, things could have been produced otherwise” (Ad Ethicam, Gerhardt I 149). Years later, in his remarks on Wachter’s book about Spinoza, he put his alternative more sharply: “There is a middle between the necessary and the fortuitous, namely the free.” The world is a voluntary effect of God, produced for reasons that incline without necessitating; “God could have created either not at all or otherwise, but he was not going to.” And the claim that things follow from God as properties follow from a triangle, he added, “is proved by no argument” (Animadversiones in Wachterum, ed. Foucher de Careil, pp. 48–50).

Why the necessity matters

The question is not only metaphysical, for Spinoza draws ethical consequences from the necessity of things. “It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary” (Part II, Prop. 44), and Part V makes this one of the remedies for the passions: “Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them” (Part V, Prop. 6). The scholium gives an example from experience: “the sadness over a good which has perished is eased as soon as the man who has lost it considers that the good could not have been kept in any way” (E5P6S). For this remedy determinism seems enough, since what eases sadness is the knowledge that the loss followed inevitably from its causes, not the knowledge that no other world was possible.

Leibniz objected to the remedy itself. Spinoza thinks the mind is greatly strengthened if it understands that what happens, happens necessarily; but this constraint “does not make the mind of the sufferer content, nor does he therefore feel his evil any less. He is happy if he understands that good follows from evil, and that what happens is best for us, if we are wise” (Animadversiones, pp. 66–68). The objection marks the difference between Spinoza’s ethics and a Christian theodicy: Spinoza offers understanding, not the assurance that all is for the best, and the reader must judge whether understanding alone can bear the weight he puts on it.

The denial of purpose

The Appendix to Part I attacks the common supposition that “all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end,” and that God directs all things to some definite end. Spinoza offers a diagnosis and several arguments. The diagnosis starts from what he says “must be acknowledged by all: namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek their own advantage, of which they are conscious.” Finding in nature many things useful to them, and accustomed to providing means for their own ends, men conclude “that there is some ruler, or some rulers, of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have taken care of all things for them and made all things for their use.” The arguments are that the doctrine of ends “entirely overturns nature,” since “what is in reality a cause it considers as an effect, and conversely”; that it takes away God’s perfection, “for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something that he lacks”; and that it ends in an appeal to “the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance” (Part I, Appendix). The Preface to Part IV adds an account of what a final cause is: “what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing.” When we say that habitation was the final cause of a house, we mean only that a man, imagining the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build one; and this appetite “is really an efficient cause, which is considered as first because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites” (Part IV, Preface).

Most of the Appendix is aimed at cosmic purposes, at the belief that rain falls so that crops may grow. But Bennett argued that two of its arguments, if they work at all, tell against every kind of purposive explanation, including “He raised his hand so as to shade his eyes.” One is that whatever has an efficient cause cannot also be explained by a final cause; the other is that a purposive explanation explains an event by its effect, and so makes the cause posterior. Bennett regarded the denial of all purpose as the more important and more instructive part of Spinoza’s attack, and as the key to Part III: “many aspects of Part 3 cannot be understood unless one grasps that Spinoza is trying to develop a nonteleological theory of human motivation. Miss that and you miss most of what is interesting in Part 3” (p. 215). He criticized Schopenhauer, who had numbered Spinoza among those who rejected teleology only because they thought it inseparable from theology, for overlooking the wider attack (p. 213).

On Bennett’s reading, Spinoza replaces purpose with appetite. “By the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite” (Part IV, Def. 7), and appetite “is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation” (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.). An appetite is an intrinsic state of the person which drives him toward something, and it explains his action without any reference to a future state of affairs: “In Spinozist appetite there is the person’s intrinsic state, which is explanatory but not about the future; and there is where he is being driven by his state, which is about the future but does not explain his behaviour” (pp. 222–223). Bennett thought Spinoza mistaken to suppose that purposive explanation requires a freedom from efficient causes, since an action done with an end in view can be fully caused (p. 216); and he went on to sketch a theory of teleology that would meet Spinoza’s challenge.

Don Garrett has argued against Bennett that Spinoza, while keeping “a certain rhetorical distance from the Aristotelian vocabulary of final causes,” nonetheless “fully and consistently accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations,” explanations of a state of affairs by a likely consequence of it that is implicated in its origin (Nature and Necessity, pp. 321–323). The Appendix itself says, as part of its own account, that “men do all things for the sake of an end, namely for the sake of the advantage they want.” The doctrine that “each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (Part III, Prop. 6) extends something like purposive explanation to every finite thing, since the behaviour of each can be explained by its tendency to preserve itself. What the Appendix denies, on this reading, is that nature as a whole acts for an end, which is consistent with holding that each finite thing strives for its own preservation; and the definition of an end as appetite, together with the identification of appetite with the striving of Part III, suggests “that the underlying phenomenon of action for ends is itself nevertheless pervasive throughout nature” (pp. 324–325). Garrett answered in turn the five reasons Bennett had given for the opposite view, and concluded, against the usual picture, that of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz “it is not Leibniz but Spinoza who holds the position on teleology and teleological explanation nearest to that of Aristotle” (p. 323). Bennett, for his part, had suggested that the passages conceding human purposes may reflect Spinoza’s acceptance of a harmless reading of purposive talk, or may have been written before he arrived at his more radical view (p. 215). The question bears directly on how Part III should be read: as a psychology that explains action by striving and desire, or as one that replaces the language of ends with the language of causes.

Further reading

Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics (1969), chapter 3; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 27–29 on necessity and §§ 50–53 on purpose; Garrett, Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (2018), chapter 4 with its postscript, and chapter 12; Della Rocca, Spinoza (2008), chapter 2, sections 5–6; Gueroult, Spinoza I: Dieu (1968), chapters 12–14, on Props. 24–36; Leibniz’s notes on the Ethics in Gerhardt’s edition of his philosophical writings, vol. I, and his Animadversiones on Wachter, ed. Foucher de Careil (1854).

Appendix E. The Eternity of the Mind

No part of the Ethics has divided its readers more sharply than the propositions of Part V on the eternity of the mind. The essay that precedes Prop. 21 describes what they say. The mind can imagine and remember nothing except while the body endures; yet there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity, and so “the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (Prop. 23). The part that remains is the intellect, the part that perishes the imagination (Prop. 40, Cor.); and “he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal” (Prop. 39). This appendix describes how readers have understood these claims and what they have thought of them.

Eternity and time

The first question is what kind of eternity is meant. Part I, Def. 8 defines eternity as existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing, and its explanation adds that such existence “cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end.” Read strictly, this makes the eternal part of the mind something outside time altogether: it neither existed before the body nor survives it, and to say that it “remains” is to say that it is not destroyed when the body is, because it was never the kind of thing that lasts or ends. Many readers have taken this to be the point of the doctrine, and Spinoza’s own warning that men “confuse” the eternity of the mind “with duration and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death” (Prop. 34, Schol.) supports them.

Others have read the doctrine in more temporal terms. H. A. Wolfson, who placed it in the tradition of medieval Jewish philosophy, wrote that the thinking part of the mind “existed from eternity prior to the existence of its particular body, and it remains to eternity even after the death of the body” (The Philosophy of Spinoza, II 292). Jonathan Bennett held that eternity in Spinoza’s sense “entails sempiternity though it is not entailed by it”: what is eternal is necessary, and what is necessary is true at all times, even if being true at all times is not enough to make a thing eternal (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 358). On either of these readings the eternal part of the mind is at least everlasting, whatever more it may be. The disagreement matters, because the more strictly the atemporal reading is held, the less the doctrine resembles a doctrine of immortality, and the more it resembles a claim about the kind of being that belongs to true ideas.

The medieval background

Wolfson argued that Spinoza’s doctrine takes one side of an old debate. Philosophers who believed in immortality had held one of two views of the soul. Some held it to be a self-subsisting spiritual substance that dwells for a time in the body, and taught that the whole soul is immortal; others held it to be the inseparable form of the body, and taught that the soul as a whole perishes with the body, except for the part of the intellect that has become, through knowledge, what was called the “acquired intellect.” Wolfson found the second view in Ibn Ezra, Maimonides and Gersonides, and noted that Manasseh ben Israel, whom he calls Spinoza’s teacher (Nadler thinks this possible but unproven, p. 115), reproduced Maimonides’ view with approval in a treatise on the immortality of the soul. Spinoza’s doctrine, in which the mind is inseparable from the body and only the intellect remains, is “more like the second of the two views” (II 289–291).

Wolfson went further, and argued that the doctrine was meant as a defence of immortality against a contemporary denial of it. Uriel da Costa, whose arguments against immortality had been answered in Amsterdam by Samuel da Silva in 1623, had held that the soul dies with the body, and that “it cannot be proven from the Law that the human soul is immortal.” Spinoza agreed with him that the mind is united to the body, but, on Wolfson’s reading, turned against him in affirming that something of the mind is eternal, so that “we shall thus find Spinoza in the unblemished company of Samuel da Silva and Manasseh ben Israel battling on the side of tradition in defence of immortality” (II 322–324). Whatever one makes of this conclusion, Wolfson’s account shows how much of the vocabulary of Part V, in which the intellect alone survives and its survival depends on what it has come to know, had a long history before Spinoza used it.

The symmetrical reading and its difficulties

The demonstration of Prop. 23 rests on the idea in God of the essence of the body, and that idea rests in turn on Part II, Prop. 8, which says that the ideas of things that do not exist are comprehended in God’s infinite idea as their formal essences are contained in his attributes. Edwin Curley read the doctrine in this light. Just as the idea of a building that has never existed may be true, so the essence of the building is contained eternally in the attributes of God; and so the eternity of the mind is matched by an eternity of the body. “To say this is to imply that even the human body is not absolutely destroyed in death, that something of it too remains which is eternal.” That Spinoza says this only of the mind Curley regarded as “a rather dubious argument from silence” (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, p. 142).

Curley saw the difficulty this reading faces. Spinoza speaks of only a part of the mind as eternal, and he says that the more the mind understands, and the more the body is capable of, the greater the part that is eternal (Props. 38–39). The apparent implication, Curley wrote, “is that a person could increase the portion of his mind which is eternal by coming to understand more and more things sub specie aeternitatis and (Heaven help us!) by improving the fitness of his body.” If Spinoza had said only that our consciousness of the mind’s eternity grows as our understanding grows, there would be no problem. “But Spinoza’s language suggests that an increase in our understanding involves, not merely an increase in our consciousness of the eternity of the mind, but an increase in the eternity of the mind itself. And this is a doctrine which, at present, I find completely unintelligible” (pp. 142–143).

Leibniz had made a similar objection. Commenting on Prop. 23 and its scholium, he called these claims “illusory”: the idea which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity is like the figure of a sphere, whose eternity has no bearing on the existence of any sphere, since it is only the ideal possibility of one; so it means nothing to say that our mind is eternal insofar as it involves the body under a species of eternity, and it would be just as eternal because it understands eternal truths about the triangle. On Spinoza’s principles, he concluded, the mind does not endure beyond the actual existence of the body, and Spinoza in effect holds that it perishes with the body (Animadversiones in Wachterum, ed. Foucher de Careil, pp. 54–56). In a letter quoted by Bennett, Leibniz described Spinoza’s view as the opinion that “the Platonic idea of my being, which is doubtless as eternal as that of a circle or a triangle, is what properly constitutes our immortality,” and that one should perfect oneself in virtue “so as to leave behind at death that much more perfect an eternal essence or Platonic idea,” and went on to mock it (Bennett, p. 359).

Bennett’s reconstruction and verdict

Bennett rejected the symmetrical reading, because it makes the doctrine “a mere truism (essences are eternal) decorated with a mistake (the suggestion that essences are parts),” and because it cannot explain the asymmetry of the text or its practical conclusion (p. 359). He offered instead a reconstruction that explains, he thought, why Spinoza believed what he did, while showing that it is false. Spinoza has no good account of how a mind can think a necessary truth; the only account available to him is that a thought of a necessary truth is the mental counterpart of something in the body. Applied to the eternal truth that there could be a body of my body’s kind, this yields two things that Spinoza cannot tell apart: an eternal truth about my mind, and a thought in my mind of my body’s essence. Since the one is eternal and the other is a part of my mind, Spinoza concludes that a part of my mind is eternal (pp. 359–361). And by running the same false identification in the other direction, starting from my thoughts of necessary truths and treating them as eternal items, he concludes that by intellectual effort I can enlarge the eternal part of my mind. “This is dreadful, but not ’completely unintelligible’” (p. 362).

Bennett’s final judgment on the last propositions of the Ethics was severe. “I don’t think that the final three doctrines can be rescued,” he wrote, and “the time has come to admit that this part of the Ethics has nothing to teach us and is pretty certainly worthless” (p. 372). He quoted Stuart Hampshire’s more sympathetic account, in which “at the more successful moments of completely disinterested, logical thought, we have these glimpses of the possibility of living, not as finite and perishing modes of Nature, but identified or ’united’ with God or Nature as a whole,” and Hampshire’s admission that the reader may find himself “beyond the limits of literal understanding”; Bennett replied that “we should say openly that Spinoza is talking nonsense” (pp. 372–373). He quoted, too, Frederick Pollock’s remark that the doctrine “throws a sort of poetical glow over the formality of his exposition,” and agreed that the phrase was “exactly right” (p. 374).

Two recent reconstructions

Bennett’s verdict did not end the discussion. Don Garrett began an essay on these propositions by quoting both Bennett’s description of the last part of the Ethics as “an unmitigated and seemingly unmotivated disaster” (Bennett, p. 357) and a later admission of Curley’s: “In spite of many years of study, I still do not feel that I understand this part of the Ethics at all adequately” (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, p. 243). He then set out three doctrines that seem, on their face, inconsistent with the rest of Spinoza’s philosophy: that there is in God an idea of the formal essence of each human body; that this idea remains after the destruction of the body, so that part of the mind is eternal; and that the wiser one is, the greater the part of one’s mind that is eternal. His proposal is that the formal essence of a human body is a real infinite mode of extension, a permanent capacity of extended nature, through its general laws, to sustain a body of a particular structure whenever and wherever the series of finite causes requires it, and that all intellection derives from the mind’s idea of this essence. The idea exists complete and fully conscious in God; human beings struggle, with limited and varying power, to make its contents their own. “No matter what they do, of course, they cannot achieve personal immortality, with continuing sensation or memory. Their minds perish with their bodies—because these are identical—even though a part of each remains. But to the extent that they are successful in their struggle, Spinoza holds, human beings understand in the same way that God does. Indeed, they literally participate—for a period of duration—in God’s own eternally conscious cognition, and they thereby achieve a mind the greater part of which is eternal” (p. 255).

Michael Della Rocca’s reconstruction starts from the principle that every fact has an explanation, the subject of Appendix F. Since everything follows necessarily from God’s nature, everything, on Spinoza’s definition, is in a sense eternal: “the dog, the rock and my pancreas” as well as my mind. That seems to make the doctrine trivial, and to leave no room for the claim that we can increase the eternal part of our minds by acquiring adequate ideas (Spinoza, 2008, pp. 257–260). Della Rocca’s answer is that, for Spinoza, existence itself is intelligibility: “For a thing to exist is for it to be intelligible, conceivable, explicable” (p. 261). If existence is intelligibility, then a thing that is only partly intelligible only partly exists; and so Della Rocca denies “that, for Spinoza, my inadequate ideas are genuinely states of God, are genuinely in God” (pp. 260–263). Adequate ideas are fully intelligible, and therefore fully real and eternal; and so the more adequate ideas a mind has, the greater the part of it that is eternal. Della Rocca also stresses what separates this doctrine from traditional ones. It requires something bodily that corresponds to the eternal part of the mind; it does not treat the mind as an indestructible simple substance; and it rejects the idea that virtue needs a reward in another life, since for Spinoza “virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment” (pp. 254–256).

Readings that look for sense

Bennett mentions attempts at “complete salvage” that he found unintelligible (p. 372), and a reader who wants to find a sense in which the doctrine is true has three features of the text to work with. The first is that Spinoza ties eternity to a kind of knowing. The mind “is eternal insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity” (Prop. 31, Schol.), and the third kind of knowledge “depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal” (Prop. 31). On one natural proposal, the eternal part of the mind is the part that consists of adequate ideas, which are ideas in God as well as in us and which do not depend on the momentary state of the body. A mind that understands more has more of such ideas, and so a greater part of it is eternal in the only sense in which anything is eternal: it is a truth, contained in the infinite intellect of God (Prop. 40, Schol.).

The second feature is the claim that “we feel and experience that we are eternal,” since “the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves” (Prop. 23, Schol.). This suggests that the eternity of the mind is not a fact about the future that we must take on trust, but a feature of present experience, the experience of seeing that something must be so. Hampshire’s reading developed this suggestion, and so in a different spirit did Wolfson’s remark that, for Spinoza, we can experience “that state of immortality” during our lifetime, in the love of God (II 297). The third feature is Spinoza’s insistence that his ethics does not depend on the doctrine: “even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion” (Prop. 41). Whatever the doctrine means, it is not offered as a reward, and the readers who think it can be stated without promising survival of any kind are at least in agreement with the text on this point.

The questions that remain are the ones Bennett and Curley pressed: why the eternal part of the mind should be larger in some people than in others, if every essence is eternal; and in what sense something that has no memory and no relation to time can be mine. No reading has answered them to the satisfaction of all.

Further reading

Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (1934), vol. II, chapter 20, section 3; Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics (1969), pp. 137–143; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 82–85; Garrett, Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (2018), chapter 9; Della Rocca, Spinoza (2008), chapter 7; Leibniz’s comments in his Animadversiones on Wachter, ed. Foucher de Careil (1854). Stuart Hampshire’s Spinoza (1951) and Frederick Pollock’s Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (1880) are cited here as Bennett quotes them.

Appendix F. The Principle of Sufficient Reason

The second demonstration of Part I, Prop. 11 rests on a principle that Spinoza states almost in passing: “For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for why it exists as for why it does not exist.” The principle that everything has a reason, now usually called the principle of sufficient reason, is most often associated with Leibniz, who, in Michael Della Rocca’s words, “built his system—as far as he could—around his commitment to the PSR” (Spinoza, 2008, p. 4). Spinoza does not name it and does not set it down among his axioms in so many words. Yet some recent readers, Della Rocca above all, have argued that it is the deepest principle of the Ethics, and that many of the book’s most surprising doctrines follow from it. This appendix describes that reading and some of the questions it raises.

Where the principle appears

The principle is nowhere stated as a separate axiom, but it is implied in several. The second axiom of Part I says that “what cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself” (Part I, Ax. 2): everything can be conceived through something. The third says that “from a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible for an effect to follow” (Ax. 3). Don Garrett observed that if “effect” in this axiom is read broadly, as any state of affairs, the axiom claims “that a sufficient reason can be given why everything should be as it is”; read strictly, it says less. He adopted the name “Spinoza’s principle of sufficient reason” for “the principle that every state of affairs has a sufficient reason or explanation,” since “it is clear that Spinoza does believe every state of affairs to have a cause, even if he does not intend to make this claim in the Axioms” (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, p. 34).

The version in Prop. 11 is unusually strong, for it demands a reason not only for what exists but for what does not. Della Rocca, whose short book on Spinoza is the fullest statement of the reading described here, stressed this feature: the principle “is strong because it requires an explanation not only for existence, but also for non-existence.” He took the second axiom to express the same commitment, since “for Spinoza, to conceive of a thing is to explain it,” and in presupposing that everything can be conceived through something, Spinoza “builds the notion of intelligibility into the heart of his metaphysical system” (pp. 4–5).

Della Rocca’s reading

Della Rocca opened his book with a contrast. Almost all philosophers expect explanations to run out somewhere, at facts that simply are so: “almost all philosophers reach this point. Almost all philosophers. But not Spinoza. His spade is never turned.” Spinoza’s philosophy, he wrote, “is characterized by perhaps the boldest and most thoroughgoing commitment ever to appear in the history of philosophy to the intelligibility of everything” (p. 1).

From the principle of sufficient reason Della Rocca derived what he called Spinoza’s naturalism, “his thesis that everything in the world plays by the same rules.” Its clearest statement is the Preface to Part III, where Spinoza objects that most writers on the affects “seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion,” and insists that “nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form into another, are always and everywhere the same” (Part III, Preface). If human beings obeyed laws of their own, the relations between them and the rest of nature could be explained neither by the general laws nor by the local ones, and would be brute facts; so the principle of sufficient reason forbids such divisions in reality (pp. 5–7).

The principle, on this reading, drives a series of unifications. It “dictates the collapse of any distinction between necessary truths and possible truths,” and so leads to necessitarianism; it dictates that causation, explanation and the inherence of a property in a subject “all amount to the same phenomenon”; it reduces the consciousness of a mental state to the fact that the state represents something; and it dictates “that an action’s goodness, rightness, and power all come to the same thing” (pp. 7–8). Della Rocca found in these arguments a characteristic pattern, which he called the “twofold use” of the principle. Spinoza first demands an account of some notion, such as causation, refusing to treat it as primitive; and he then explains it in terms of explanation itself, so that for one thing to cause another is for it to make the other intelligible. The most fundamental case is existence: “For Spinoza, to be is to be intelligible” (pp. 8–9).

Some applications

The reading claims to explain many of the arguments of Part I. The second demonstration of Prop. 11 argues that God must exist, since if he did not there would have to be a reason for his non-existence, and none can be found either in his nature or outside it; Della Rocca called Spinoza’s version of the ontological argument “perhaps, unique in the way in which it relies heavily on the PSR” (pp. 51–52). The argument for monism depends on the claim that two substances could be distinguished only by a difference in their attributes or their modes (Prop. 4, Dem.). This, Della Rocca argued, is a form of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, “more often associated with Leibniz than with Spinoza,” and its roots lie in the principle of sufficient reason: “Non-identities, by the PSR, require explanation, and the way to explain non-identity is to appeal to some difference in properties” (p. 47).

The same principle underlies the case for necessitarianism described in Appendix D. If an attribute could produce only one finite mode, nothing could explain why it produced that one alone, and “certainly, for Spinoza, it cannot be a brute fact that the attribute produces only this one mode”; so finite modes follow from God only as part of an infinite series, as Prop. 28 says (pp. 71–72). And if more than one series were possible, there would be no reason why this one exists rather than another. Garrett made the same point against Curley’s view that Spinoza allows other possible series: such a view leaves “a crucial fact about the universe” with “no explanation at all” (Nature and Necessity, p. 125). Della Rocca also used the principle to interpret the doctrine of the eternity of the mind, as Appendix E describes: if existence is intelligibility, then the more fully a mind understands, the more fully it exists, and exists eternally.

Questions the reading raises

The reading has the merit of unity: it shows a single demand at work in doctrines that otherwise seem unrelated, from the existence of God to the nature of the emotions. Its critics and qualifiers have asked whether it attributes to Spinoza a principle stronger than the one he actually uses. Curley, as Appendix D describes, held that Spinoza never explicitly accepts the consequence that there is a reason why this series of finite things exists rather than another, and Garrett described Curley’s later work with Gregory Walski as seeking “to downplay the strength of Spinoza’s principle of sufficient reason” (p. 125). Della Rocca himself conceded that Spinoza’s ambitions “are, of course, not always fully realized” (p. 2).

There is also the question whether the principle can be true. Jonathan Bennett called the same commitment “explanatory rationalism,” “the refusal to admit brute facts,” and judged that “the explanatory rationalist’s problems are insoluble, and that his position is therefore untenable.” But he admitted “the discomfort of this stand,” proclaimed “the attractiveness of the idea that everything can in principle be explained,” and advised that “disbelief in explanatory rationalism, though perhaps it may be carried out of our study of the Ethics, is not something to be carried into it” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 29). Garrett, for his part, has stressed a related but different feature of Spinoza’s method, which he called “incremental naturalism”: the attempt to explain human intentionality, desire, belief, understanding and consciousness “as already present in their most rudimentary (and perhaps even initially unrecognizable) forms throughout all of nature,” so that humanity appears “as a complex and sophisticated expression of nature rather than as something arising from the introduction of non-natural elements” (p. 405). Both emphases agree that Spinoza refused to treat human beings, or anything else, as an exception to the order of nature; they differ on how far that refusal rests on a single principle.

Further reading

Della Rocca, Spinoza (2008), especially chapters 1, 2 and 7; Garrett, Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (2018), chapters 2 and 4 with its postscript, and chapter 14; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), § 8.

Appendix G. Striving

“Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (Part III, Prop. 6). Don Garrett has compared the argument for it with the argument for substance monism: as the foundations of Spinoza’s metaphysics cannot be understood without the one, so those of his natural philosophy, psychology, politics and ethics cannot be understood without the other (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, p. 352). The introduction to Part III sets out the doctrine, and the Key Concepts follow the word conatus through the book; this appendix takes up questions they leave open: whether the argument of Props. 4–6 succeeds, what striving is and what “as far as it is in itself” adds, how a principle that holds of stones as well as of men can ground a psychology and an ethics, and whether the language of striving brings back the purposes that the Appendix to Part I had banished.

The argument

The doctrine is older than the Ethics. The Short Treatise had identified God’s providence with the striving that we find in the whole of nature and in particular things towards the preservation of their own being, and had called it evident “dat geen ding door syn eige natuur zoude konnen tragten tot syn zelfs vernietinge” (“that no thing could, through its own nature, strive towards its own annihilation”; KV I.5, G I 40). In the Ethics the claim is demonstrated, but from very little. The demonstration of Prop. 4 begins “This Proposition is evident through itself,” and its argument appeals to no earlier axiom or proposition, only to the nature of a definition: “the definition of any thing affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it” (Prop. 4, Dem.). Jonathan Bennett observed that it is the only proposition of the Ethics demonstrated without help from previously declared doctrines (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 234).

Prop. 5 infers from Prop. 4 that things are contrary insofar as one can destroy the other. The demonstration of Prop. 6 adds two propositions of Part I, from which it follows that singular things express in a certain and determinate way the power by which God is and acts (Part I, Prop. 25, Cor.; Prop. 34); each thing, having nothing in it by which it could be destroyed and being opposed to whatever could destroy it, therefore strives to persevere (Prop. 6, Dem.). These are the only earlier propositions that the argument of Props. 4–6 cites (Garrett, p. 352). Prop. 7 identifies the striving with the thing’s actual essence, and its demonstration says more than its enunciation: “the power of any thing, or the striving by which it, either alone or with others, does anything or strives to do anything” is its striving to persevere (Prop. 7, Dem.). All that a thing does tends to its preservation, a further thesis which, Garrett notes, rests on Part I, Prop. 29 and not on Prop. 6 alone (pp. 388–389). Prop. 8 rests on Prop. 4 again: if the striving involved a limited time, the thing’s own power would destroy it when the time was up (Prop. 8, Dem.). Prop. 9 carries the result to the mind, which strives insofar as it has adequate and inadequate ideas alike, and is conscious of its striving because it knows itself through the ideas of the body’s affections (Prop. 9, Dem.; Part II, Prop. 23). The next demonstration gives the mind’s striving its first content: “the first and principal thing in the striving of our mind is ... to affirm the existence of our body” (Prop. 10, Dem.).

Does the argument work?

“Since the conclusion is false, the argument is faulty,” Bennett wrote; but locating the fault was “a nontrivial exercise,” and the argument was “a real achievement” (p. 234). He placed the root of the trouble in its neglect of time: causal laws cover stretches of time, and a thing’s state at one moment can lead to its non-existence at a later one without any contradiction in its nature; Prop. 8, which brings time in, gets it wrong (p. 235). He found besides a series of shifts of meaning, which Garrett counts as four (Garrett, p. 352). The phrase “external cause” in Prop. 4 may mean external to the thing’s essence, the properties it cannot lose, or external to its whole nature; Bennett conjectured that the first reading underlies the sentence about the definition and the second the rest, but “There seems to be no way of deciding which reading is correct” (Bennett, pp. 236–237). The phrase “cannot be in the same subject” in Prop. 5 may mean that the natures of two things cannot belong to one thing, which follows from Prop. 4, or that the things cannot be parts of one larger whole, which does not; Spinoza’s later uses of the proposition divide between the two (p. 241). The step in the demonstration of Prop. 6 from being contrary in nature to whatever could destroy a thing to being opposed to it, in the sense of exerting itself against it, Bennett called “glaringly fallacious” (p. 242). The fourth shift, in the word “strives,” is taken up at the end of this appendix, and Garrett lists a fifth, found by Della Rocca in an essay of 1996, in the phrase quantum in se est (Garrett, pp. 352, 359–360).

Garrett’s own defence takes the qualifying phrase at its word. Quantum in se est means “insofar as it is in itself” (p. 360), which this edition renders “as far as it is in itself,” and it recalls the definition of substance as “what is in itself and is conceived through itself” (Part I, Def. 3). Singular things, on his reading, are finite approximations to substance, in themselves to limited and varying degrees (pp. 365–366). Whatever is in a thing is conceived through it and so caused by its essence, and a thing’s essence cannot cause its destruction; so whatever can destroy a thing is not in it (pp. 367–368). Whatever is in itself is to that extent cause of itself, and since a singular thing cannot bring itself into existence, it can cause itself only by causing its own continuation (p. 371). The five equivocations disappear, but the premises about inherence, conception and causation express “a rigorous Principle of Sufficient Reason,” and Garrett’s verdict was that “we can defend the validity of Spinoza’s argument, as supplemented, but not its soundness” (p. 379). Michael Della Rocca also traces Prop. 4 to that principle, the subject of Appendix F: a thing’s essence, which for Spinoza consists in its having certain causes, contains only what posits the thing, so that its non-existence must be explained by something beyond its essence or be a brute fact (Spinoza, 2008, p. 139). Since being in a thing comes in degrees (p. 144), Prop. 6 says, in effect, “that a thing strives to persist to the degree to which it is a substance” (p. 323).

Suicide and other counterexamples

Spinoza answers the objection from suicide in Part IV: “No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, but only when compelled by external causes, is averse to food or kills himself.” Another may twist a man’s hand so that his own sword enters his heart, a tyrant may command him to open his veins, as Seneca was commanded, or hidden causes may give his body another nature; but that a man should strive from the necessity of his own nature not to exist “is as impossible as that something should come from nothing” (Part IV, Prop. 20, Schol.). Bennett compared the tyrant’s order with eating the only apple of a man who prefers apples to oranges: no one would say that the man was forced to take an orange, and Spinoza has no means of telling the cases apart. If Seneca was forced, everyone who does anything is forced, and Part III, Prop. 4, is true only vacuously; if not, his death flowed from his nature as it then was, including his belief that a worse death awaited him in the morning. “I conclude that Seneca falsifies 3p4” (pp. 237–238). Bennett suspected a blind spot: Spinoza could not see that a man may want to die because of how bad it will be for him to live (p. 240). When Blyenbergh asked whether a mind whose nature agreed with crime would have any reason to be virtuous, Spinoza answered that the question “supposes a contradiction,” and compared it to asking whether a man should hang himself if that agreed better with his nature (Letter 23).

The replies share a strategy: they place the cause of every self-destruction partly outside what the thing is. Della Rocca distinguishes a thing’s essence from its total state. A time bomb, a burning candle and a suicide are destroyed by their total state, but that state includes what other things have done to them, the setting of the bomb or the lighting of the candle; their destruction never follows from their essence alone, and this is how the scholium treats suicide (pp. 140–141). Against an “essential time bomb,” whose essence alone would end it after fifteen minutes, he appeals to the axiom of Part IV: there is always something more powerful (Part IV, Ax.), which could sustain it longer as well as destroy it sooner (pp. 141–143). For Garrett a thing’s accidents are only partly in it, as a mind may be called depressed without that quality being fully in it, so that suicides and self-consuming things are destroyed by causes not, or not fully, in them (p. 374). Edwin Curley’s candle, burning on Spinoza’s table, has already been acted on by whatever lit it (Behind the Geometrical Method, 1988, p. 110). To the charge that such replies make the doctrine trivial, he answered that the same could be said of the principle of inertia, which has content because it belongs to a system of laws that say how external forces act; the conatus doctrine has content to the extent that it can be built into a psychology that yields testable results (p. 113). The replies leave open whether a thing’s essence can be specified apart from what preserves it. Bennett doubted it: we never know which features belong to an individual’s essence, and the “proportion of motion and rest” is a placeholder for an analysis Spinoza did not have (pp. 232, 239).

The inertial reading

The notes to Prop. 6 and Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. the essay on the physical digression and Appendix I record that quantum in se est is the phrase of Descartes’ first law of nature (Principles II.37), which Spinoza had stated for bodies. The inertial reading takes the conatus to be a principle of the same kind, made general. On Della Rocca’s version Spinoza shares with Descartes a “stripped-down” notion of striving: for a thing to strive to do something is for its present state to be such that it will do it unless external causes prevent it (p. 146). The qualification then does the work Prop. 4 requires. Insofar as its total state is concerned, a thing may tend towards its destruction; insofar as it is in itself, that is, as conceived through its essence, it cannot (p. 147).

The text also resists a purely inertial reading. The demonstration of Prop. 6 grounds the striving not in a law of motion but in the power by which God is and acts. Part II, Prop. 45, Schol. had said that “the force by which each perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God,” and Part IV calls a man’s power “a part of the infinite power of God, or nature” (Part IV, Prop. 4, Dem.). Descartes had ended his statement of the first law with a clause close to Prop. 4, “nihilque ad suum contrarium, sive ad destructionem sui ipsius, ex propria natura ferri potest” (“and nothing can be carried by its own nature towards its contrary, or towards its own destruction”; AT VIII-1 63); but he derived the law from the immutability of God, whereas Spinoza, as Garrett observes, derives the striving from his own premises about inherence, essence and causation (pp. 378–379). And the striving belongs to minds as much as to bodies (Part III, Prop. 9); Della Rocca remarks that it is not clear how Descartes could have accounted in these terms for the striving of minds (p. 322).

From striving to the affects

Will, appetite and desire are names of one striving (Prop. 9, Schol.), and the essay on the definitions of the affects describes how the first definition widens desire to cover them all. Three questions arise.

The first is how a striving to persevere becomes a striving to increase one’s power. “The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body’s power of acting” (Prop. 12), and the demonstration rests the striving on Prop. 6 or 9, which speak only of persevering. Della Rocca found it “far from clear” how the one follows from the other, and noted that the Ethics asserts the striving for more power only of human beings (p. 155). His solution is that a being able to anticipate future threats has reason to gather as much power as it can now, while simpler things, which cannot anticipate, strive only to persist; he called the answer “clearly Spinozistic, even if not Spinoza’s” (p. 172). Curley drew the same conclusion from the axiom of Part IV: since powerful external forces are ranged against us, a striving for self-preservation must also be a striving for increased power (p. 115). The Short Treatise had joined the two without argument: each thing has in itself a striving “om zig zelfs en in syn stand te bewaaren, en tot beter te brengen” (“to preserve itself in its state, and to bring itself to a better one”; KV I.5, G I 40).

The second question is where desire belongs among the affects. Joy and sadness are passages, changes in the power of striving (Def. Aff. 3, Expl.); desire is the striving itself. Bennett argued that the definitions collide: if appetite is a man’s nature insofar as it causes what he does, and whatever he does from his own nature raises his power, every desire is a rise in power, so that “desire is a species of pleasure!” (Bennett’s word for joy) and is left “with no work to do” (p. 259). In practice, he concluded, Spinoza mainly uses “desire” in its ordinary teleological sense (pp. 260, 262), as when he argues that the greater the sadness, “the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the sadness” (Prop. 37, Dem.).

The third question concerns the clause of Prop. 9 that the mind “is conscious of this striving of its own.” If it means that in everything we desire we consciously desire our own preservation, Spinoza is a psychological egoist of a very simple kind, and Michael LeBuffe calls that view “a patently bad account of human desire” (From Bondage to Freedom, 2010, p. 108). He argues that the clause says only that the mind is conscious of its striving “in some way and not necessarily veridically” (p. 123). Part of his evidence is that the demonstration rests on Part II, Prop. 23, a proposition about the limits of the mind’s knowledge of itself (pp. 127–128).

Striving and virtue

Part IV joins striving to virtue by a definition: “By virtue and power I understand the same thing” (Part IV, Def. 8). Several of the propositions that follow are short because their demonstrations run through Part III, Prop. 7. Desire is the essence of man, that is, the striving (Part IV, Prop. 18, Dem.); virtue is human power, defined by the striving alone, and whoever neglects to preserve his being lacks power, by Props. 4 and 6 of Part III (Prop. 20, Dem.); that no one can desire to live well without desiring to exist is “evident through itself, and also from the definition of desire” (Prop. 21, Dem.); a virtue prior to the striving would make the essence conceived “prior to itself” (Prop. 22, Dem.); and since the striving is defined by the thing’s essence alone, “No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing” (Prop. 25).

If every thing strives to persevere as far as it is in itself, what can an ethics of striving ask? The text answers in terms of degree and of adequacy. Virtue grows as one “strives, and is able” (Part IV, Prop. 20), and a man can be said absolutely to act from virtue “only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands” (Prop. 23), since only then does what he does follow from his essence alone. If, as Garrett and Della Rocca hold, being in oneself is a matter of degree, the standard of virtue is the qualification in Part III, Prop. 6, itself: a man is virtuous to the extent that he is in himself, and the ethics asks him to become more so. Bennett objected that Prop. 21 of Part IV assumes that every motive aims at a state of affairs that essentially involves oneself, whereas a man who wants the starving fed might be prepared to stay still, or to die, if that were the best way to feed them (p. 246). Whether this makes the ethics egoistic is a question this appendix leaves aside. The same principle, “ut unaquaeque res in suo statu, quantum in se est, conetur perseverare” (“that each thing strive, as far as it is in itself, to persevere in its state”), is the highest law of nature from which the Theological-Political Treatise derives natural right (ch. 16, G III 189).

Does purpose return?

Appendix D describes the dispute over whether the Appendix to Part I denies all purposes or only those ascribed to God and nature, and whether the striving of Part III is compatible with it. The doctrine of striving also raises a narrower question, about the logical form of Prop. 6 of Part III. Bennett put it as the difference between a conditional and its converse: “If he does it, it will help him” and “If it would help him, he will do it.” The difference is “though simple, enormous,” since only the second, the teleological form, supports positive predictions of what a man will do (p. 244). The argument from Prop. 4 can yield at most the first, which Prop. 7 fits (pp. 243–244); but Spinoza uses the second. The qualifying phrase of Prop. 6, which Bennett cites as “as far as it can,” attaches naturally only to the second; the scholium to Prop. 9 says that from man’s nature “there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation,” that is, all the helpful things and not only helpful things; and, by his count, eleven propositions of Part III, beginning with Prop. 12, infer what we strive for from what would help us (p. 245). The demonstration of Prop. 12 shows the move. Since “as long as the mind imagines those things which increase or aid our body’s power of acting, so long is the body affected in ways which increase or aid its power of acting,” and so the mind’s power of thinking is increased, Spinoza concludes that “the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things” (Prop. 12, Dem.).

Curley accepted the teleological reading but distinguished it from a stronger one. Prop. 6 has the form “If it would help him, he will do it,” not “If he thinks it would help him, he will do it,” since it applies to things that cannot think about the future. Prop. 28, “We strive to promote the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy,” has the stronger form; it does not follow from the doctrine of striving, and since we sometimes mistake our interests, it is inconsistent with it (p. 164). Garrett’s reconstruction yields a teleological reading “with a crucial qualification”: a thing strives to do what would preserve it, provided that it is sufficiently in itself to have that action within its repertoire in the circumstances (p. 376). The dispute over Prop. 6 suggests that whether purpose returns depends less on Spinoza’s vocabulary than on the direction of a conditional, and that the psychology of Part III needs the direction that the argument of Props. 4–6 has most difficulty in supplying.

Further reading

Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 54–60; Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method (1988), chapter III, §§ 12–18; Garrett, Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (2018), chapter 13; Della Rocca, Spinoza (2008), chapter 4; LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom (2010), chapters 5–6.

Appendix H. Virtue, Self-Interest and the Free Man

Part IV builds its ethics on the striving of each thing to preserve its being, and ends with the portrait of a man who lives by reason alone. The introduction to Part IV follows the argument from the one to the other, and the essay before Prop. 67 describes the portrait. Three questions are left open: in what sense the ethics of Part IV is egoistic, and whether a concern for others can be derived from it; how the good, defined as the useful, is related to the “model of human nature” of the Preface; and whether the free man is a possible human being at all. This appendix describes how readers have answered them. The questions are connected: on several of the readings described here, the place where the derivation of concern for others is weakest is the place where the free man becomes impossible.

What kind of egoism?

Two theses must be kept apart. The first is psychological: “No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing” (Prop. 25), and no one neglects his own advantage “unless he is conquered by external causes contrary to his nature” (Prop. 20, Schol.). The second is evaluative. Virtue is power (Def. 8), and so “the more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue” (Prop. 20). Spinoza set out the dictates of reason before demonstrating them, he says, to win the attention of “those who believe that this principle, that each is bound to seek his own advantage, is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety” (Prop. 18, Schol.).

That the evaluative thesis is a form of ethical egoism is common ground among the readers discussed here. Bennett calls individual egoism “Spinoza’s only moral premiss,” and reads the argument that follows the scholium to Prop. 18 as saying, in effect, that “since the only possible value system is egoism, the only rational value system is informed egoism” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, pp. 298–299). Della Rocca, who calls the system “fundamentally egoistic,” traces it to the principle of sufficient reason, the subject of Appendix F. Any standard of goodness taken from outside the thing evaluated, even the utilitarian standard of general happiness, would be arbitrary; the only standard that is not is the success of the thing’s own striving, so that a thing is good and virtuous to the extent that it is powerful (Spinoza, 2008, pp. 175–183). Kisner likewise ascribes to Spinoza “ethical egoism, the view that the right action best promotes our self-interest” (Spinoza on Human Freedom, 2011, p. 135).

The psychological thesis raises a puzzle. If everyone necessarily seeks his own advantage, what is reason asking for when it “demands ... that each man love himself, seek his own advantage” (Prop. 18, Schol.)? Bennett thought the passage from necessity to evaluation reasonable only if the egoism says that a man will do what he thinks will preserve him, and for that “teleological and cognitive” version Spinoza had, in his view, laid no foundation (pp. 294–295, 298). LeBuffe denies that the striving of Part III is a conscious desire for self-preservation. The view that “I always and only consciously desire perseverance or its means” is, he says, “a patently bad account of human desire,” and it is not Spinoza’s, since there would be no point in telling people to preserve their being, as the scholium to Prop. 18 does, if they always consciously did so (From Bondage to Freedom, 2010, pp. 106, 108, 123). On his reading what men strive for and what they consciously want can come apart, and reason’s demand has content because they do. Garrett adds that Spinoza need not deny the phenomena of altruism, even of self-sacrifice; he holds only that their causal origin always lies in the individual’s striving for his own preservation, which circumstances can direct onto the welfare of others (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, 2018, pp. 491–492).

What makes the egoism unusual is the self it serves. A man acts from virtue only “insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands” (Prop. 23), and what the mind strives for from reason is understanding (Prop. 26). Hence Garrett’s verdict: “Although its basis is undeniably egoistic, the ethical theory that Spinoza provides in these terms is nevertheless a cooperative rather than a competitive one,” since one person’s knowledge of God leaves no less for others (p. 24).

From one’s own advantage to the good of others

The argument of Props. 29–37 has two stages. The first, which the introduction to Part IV summarizes, runs from agreement in nature. The corollary to Prop. 31 states that “the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or the better, it is for us”; men always agree in nature only insofar as they live by reason (Props. 32–35), since “things which agree only in a negation, or in what they do not have, really agree in nothing” (Prop. 32, Schol.); and so nothing is more useful to a man than a man who lives by reason (Prop. 35, Cor. 1). The second stage turns this into a desire for the good of others: “Men, insofar as they live from the guidance of reason, are most useful to man (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 35 of this Part); and so (by Prop. 19 of this Part) we shall necessarily strive, from the guidance of reason, to bring it about that men live from the guidance of reason” (Prop. 37, Dem.). Since the good the virtuous man wants for himself is to understand, he wants it for others too.

The second demonstration takes another route, through the psychology of Part III. “The good which a man wants for himself and loves he will love more constantly if he sees that others love the same thing (by Prop. 31 of Part III)”; he will therefore strive that others love it too, and, since this good is common to all, that all may enjoy it (Prop. 37, second Dem.). The mechanism is the one stated in the corollary to Part III, Prop. 31: “each strives, as far as he can, that everyone should love what he loves.” The first scholium to Prop. 37 calls the man who strives for this from affect alone “hateful,” and observes that the highest good men want from affect “is often such that only one can possess it,” whereas he who strives to lead others by reason “acts not by impulse but humanely and kindly” (Prop. 37, Schol. 1). What the second demonstration adds is the object: a good which, by Prop. 36, is common to all. Della Rocca distinguishes the two arguments. On the first, a rational person benefits me simply by acting from a nature I share, whether or not he knows of me; the second requires me to observe his desire for the good and imitate it, and is “less sweeping.” Neither depends, as the argument Della Rocca calls Hobbesian does, on others’ returning the help I give them (pp. 193–199).

The gaps in the derivation

The derivation has been severely criticized. Bennett found that the first stage rests on a premiss about the logic of helping and harming: that these are relations to natures, so that whatever helps or harms one thing must help or harm anything with the same nature. From this premiss, in Bennett’s reconstruction, Spinoza infers that “out of utter egoism flows a collaborative morality, without help from politics.” But even if the premiss is accepted, it covers only things exactly alike; and it is false, since what helps or harms me depends also on such facts as where I am: if floodwaters are rising in a mine and the lift has room for only one, our likeness does us no good, and when we compete for food it makes us rivals (pp. 300–301). Spinoza knew this in Part III, where we strive that another shall not possess “some thing which only one can possess” (Part III, Prop. 32); but in Part IV, Bennett says, “he forgets 3p32,” and the scholium to Prop. 34 considers only the man who has lost what his rival possesses, whose hatred can be traced to a difference between them (p. 301). Bennett judged the argument of Props. 33–34 “flatly invalid” (p. 303), and the demonstration of Prop. 36, which, as he read it, infers that all can have the greater knowledge of God because all have the knowledge of Part II, Prop. 47, “on a par with arguing that because all men eat, it is possible for them all to eat well.” “I am afraid,” he concluded, “that Spinoza fails at every step in his journey towards his collaborative morality” (p. 306). Della Rocca, more sympathetic, found the first argument “deeply problematic” for another reason: it implies that every rational person benefits me, however remote in space or time (p. 197).

Kisner has answered several of these objections. To agree in nature, on his reading, is not to have the same nature but to share essential properties, so that the argument does not confuse one individual with another (pp. 136–139). Bennett’s rivals compete for what Kisner calls competing goods, and reason does not direct us to such goods, since its good is understanding, which, as the demonstration of Prop. 36 says, can be possessed equally by all (p. 140). Indeed reason, on his reading of Part II, Props. 38–39, grasps adequately only what is common, and is “blind” to what distinguishes one person from another (p. 142). And because the argument is a priori, not an appeal to the good will that kindness usually earns, it makes benevolence part of one’s own good, not merely a means to it (pp. 143–146).

Even this defence concedes something. To the objection that understanding itself requires competing goods, such as money, Kisner replies that reason does not direct us to them, although it may be in our interest to seek them (pp. 140–141). Garrett is plainer: because individuals must stay alive to pursue even understanding, they may compete for limited resources, and “a complete coincidence of human interests is not possible” (p. 492). The text, too, limits its conclusion, for “it rarely happens that men live from the guidance of reason” (Prop. 35, Schol.). On these readings the derivation is exact for men who live by reason alone, and holds of actual men in the measure that they do.

The good, the useful and the model

Part IV defines the good twice: in the Preface as “that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which we set before ourselves” (Preface), in the first definition as “that which we certainly know to be useful to us” (Def. 1). The word exemplar occurs in the Ethics only in this Preface and in the second scholium to Part I, Prop. 33, which rejects the view that God attends to something “as to a model in operating”; the model of Part IV is one “which we set before ourselves.” Bennett called the Preface’s definition “a relic of a time when Spinoza planned to make the concept of a favoured model of mankind do some work for him in the body of Part 4,” and thought that the two definitions “differ greatly in content” (p. 296). Spinoza had taken this approach, Bennett noted, in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (p. 296, n. 3). There a man whose weakness cannot grasp the eternal order of nature conceives “naturam aliquam humanam sua multo firmiorem” (“some human nature much stronger than his own”); whatever can be a means of reaching it is called a true good, and the highest good is to enjoy such a nature “cum aliis individuis, si fieri potest” (“with other individuals, if possible”; § 13, G II 8). The early treatise joins the model and the concern for others in a single sentence.

Other readers have not set the model aside. Curley, replying to Bennett, held that “the whole of Part IV of the Ethics is the construction of the idea of a model human being,” and that the talk of models is “a guide to the interpretation” of the definitions (Behind the Geometrical Method, 1988, p. 123, and p. 167, n. 44). Garrett argued that the model is developed through Part IV and culminates in the free man, and suggested that the definition speaks only of what is useful “to us” because the model has not yet been specified. He also drew a distinction: a man is perfect to the extent that he now resembles the model, whereas a thing is good to the extent that it helps him become like it; what one must do to reach a state is not always what one would do in it, as a poor man who aspires to the life of the idle rich must work (pp. 450–451). Kisner, who found Bennett’s account of the passage’s origin plausible, held that it was nonetheless kept for a reason (p. 163, n. 3); he reads the model as the object of rational desire, so that what helps us towards it, what satisfies our active desires and what is useful to our striving come to the same thing (pp. 97–99). LeBuffe sees a pragmatic decision: Spinoza keeps the ordinary words of value, to which men are accustomed, but replaces the providential model behind them with one founded on changes in our power of striving (pp. 160, 171, 188). On these readings, unlike Bennett’s, the model belongs to Spinoza’s account of the good, though for Kisner the reference to it is “more or less implied” by his general theory of the good as what increases our power (p. 99); and the question becomes what the model is. Most readers have answered that it is the free man.

Can there be a free man?

“I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas” (Prop. 68, Dem.). But a man cannot undergo only those changes of which he is the adequate cause (Prop. 4), and so “man is necessarily always subject to passions” (Prop. 4, Cor.). The scholium to Prop. 68 appeals to Prop. 4 to show that the hypothesis of a man born free “is false and cannot be conceived except insofar as we attend to human nature alone” (Prop. 68, Schol.). It may be asked whether what is false is only that a man could be born free, or that a man could be free in this sense at all. Kisner is inclined to read the scholium as rejecting both, since Prop. 4 rules out any man’s being entirely self-determined (p. 167, n. 6), and the demonstration of Prop. 4 supports him: a man who underwent only the changes he himself causes could never perish, and would have to be infinite (Prop. 4, Dem.). The contrast with the early treatise is instructive. There the man who conceives a stronger human nature “nihil obstare videat, quominus talem naturam acquirat” (“sees nothing to prevent his acquiring such a nature”; § 13, G II 8); in the Ethics, Prop. 4 names what prevents it.

The portrait itself shows the strain. The free man must decline or overcome dangers (Prop. 69), and among the ignorant declines their favours “as far as he can” (Prop. 70), so as not to be hated by them; he is, it seems, exposed to the power of other men. Bennett found Spinoza “in a bind about the place of sense perception in the life of a free man”: an intelligently self-interested man must inform himself about his circumstances, yet his freedom consists in being self-caused, and that would require him not to use his senses (p. 324). Kisner asks the same question: since a free man has only adequate ideas, how can he have sensations, which are necessarily inadequate (pp. 165–166)?

Ideal, limiting case or thought experiment

The readers discussed here agree that no human being is, or could be, free in the sense of the demonstration of Prop. 68. They differ about what the figure is for.

On the most common view, which the essay on the free man adopts, he is an ideal to be approached. Garrett calls the concept of the free man “the concept of a model of human nature that we properly strive to exemplify,” and adds that human beings can approximate more or less closely to the freedom that God alone has absolutely (p. 23). For Della Rocca he is “an impossible ideal” which nonetheless “presents for us the character our aspirations should take” (p. 196; see p. 189). The text supports them: men are more or less perfect “insofar as they come nearer to or are further from this same model” (Preface), and the last scholium of the portrait promises to show “how far human virtue extends in attaining these things” (Prop. 73, Schol.).

Bennett proposed a more austere version. Since only God is free, “when he says that a free man is F, he must mean that a man is F to the extent that he is free,” and the concept of the free man might be seen as “a theoretically convenient limiting case, like the concept of an ’ideal gas’” (p. 317). Garrett’s essay of 1990 on the free man’s honesty gives a fuller account of such a limit. The concept of a completely free man “involves a contradiction,” since a man is necessarily a part of nature; it is “the concept of a limit that can be approached but not completely attained by finite human beings,” and statements about it say that one characteristic is fully explained by another and varies with it, as honesty with freedom (p. 452). On this reading the case of Prop. 72, Schol., which the essay on the free man describes, loses its paradox. The ideal free man never deceives, but deception may still be good for an actual man who must choose between it and death, since the good is what brings us nearer the model, not what the model would do (pp. 451–452). Della Rocca reaches a similar result: a completely free man would never be in a situation that called for a lie, and the obligation not to lie comes in degrees, strictest for the most free (pp. 200–201). Bennett thought the scholium simply mistaken: reason must speak generally, but why can it not say “No one should lie except to save his life” (pp. 317–318)?

LeBuffe takes the propositions about the free man to be neither directly action-guiding nor accounts of the means to perseverance, but “tools for the diagnosis of our particular situations” (p. 176). When we think of death, accept the favours of the ignorant or deceive, we are to that extent not free (p. 188). The proposition on good faith thus “does not recommend any particular kind of action directly”; it tells a man who lies that he lacks power in that circumstance, and in some circumstances deceiving may well be best for him (p. 189). Spinoza “does not argue at 4p72, that we should always be honest” (p. 190).

Kisner goes furthest, rejecting “the nearly universally accepted reading, that the free man is the model of human nature” (p. 162). The text never identifies them (p. 163), and the identification would make Spinoza inconsistent three times over: reason would bid us strive for what it knows to be impossible; every passivity would be an imperfection, though food, the information of the senses and the help of others increase our power; and we would be held to a standard we cannot meet, though at the opening of the Political Treatise Spinoza mocks the philosophers who conceive men not as they are but as they would like them to be (pp. 166–171). The model, for Kisner, is “the most active and perfect human being possible,” whose description occupies the whole Ethics (pp. 172–173). The free man is “a kind of thought experiment,” a perfectly rational being by which Spinoza determines what reason prescribes and which affects are rational, comparable to Hume’s perfect reasoner (p. 175). He remains a model only in the sense that he shows what reason is and prescribes, not one whose conduct we should simply copy (pp. 172, 177).

The readings differ over the identity of the model and the use of the portrait more than over the facts. All agree that what is said of the free man holds of actual men only to the extent that they are free, and all except Bennett, including those that keep him as a model to approach, use in some form the distinction that Garrett drew: what the free man would do is not always what a man not yet free should do. The readings also join the two halves of this appendix. The derivation of concern for others is exact only for men who live by reason alone; for actual men, who compete for food and may have to choose between a lie and death, interests diverge. “If we were perfectly guided by reason,” Garrett writes, “our good and the good of others would indeed perfectly coincide” (p. 454), and Della Rocca supposes that at the ideal point two rational men would act solely from their shared nature and become indistinguishable (p. 196). On these readings the free man is the one in whom self-interest and the good of others coincide entirely, and he is impossible for the same reason that in everyone else the coincidence is incomplete.

Further reading

Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984), §§ 67–74; Della Rocca, Spinoza (2008), chapter 5; Garrett, Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (2018), chapters 1, 16 and 17; LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom (2010), chapters 5–6 and 9–10; Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom (2011), chapters 5, 7 and 8; Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method (1988), chapter 3.

Appendix I. Spinoza and Descartes

Descartes is named in three passages of the Ethics. Once he is the subject of Spinoza’s own first book, when a scholium sends the reader for a second proof of God’s eternity to “Prop. 19 of the Principles of Descartes” (Part I, Prop. 19, Schol.); twice he is an opponent, “the most celebrated Descartes” of the Preface to Part III (Part III, Preface) and the man whose doctrine Spinoza “would hardly have believed ... to have been put forward by so great a man, if it had been less acute” (Part V, Preface). The Introduction calls him the book’s constant interlocutor, and this edition meets him at every turn: in the notes, in the introductions to Parts I, II, III and V, in the essay before Part II, Prop. 48, and in Appendix A and Appendix C. This appendix does not repeat these encounters. It asks what pattern they form.

Spinoza gave his own summary early. In 1661 Henry Oldenburg asked him what defects he saw in the philosophy of Descartes and of Bacon (Letter 1; VVL³ III 4), and Spinoza named three errors: “Primus itaque et maximus est, quod tam longe a cognitione Primae Causae et originis omnium rerum aberrarint. Secundus, quod veram naturam humanae Mentis non cognoverint. Tertius, quod veram causam Erroris nunquam assecuti sint” (“The first and greatest is that they strayed so far from the knowledge of the first cause and origin of all things; the second, that they did not know the true nature of the human mind; the third, that they never grasped the true cause of error”; Letter 2; VVL³ III 6). These are the first three subjects of this appendix: substance, mind and body, will and intellect. The fourth, the passions, is the subject on which the Ethics names Descartes. In all four the same movement recurs. Spinoza accepts a Cartesian principle, often a Cartesian definition, and applies it without the exceptions Descartes allowed himself, so that the conclusion is anti-Cartesian and the argument Descartes’ own. Edwin Curley made this the method of a book, which tries to show how “some of the most distinctive features of Spinoza’s philosophy arose from internal tensions within the Cartesian system” (Behind the Geometrical Method, 1988, pp. 3–4); Michael Della Rocca puts it more sharply, calling Descartes’ acceptance of mind–body causation that cannot be understood “a sign of Descartes’s failure to be truly a rationalist” (Spinoza, 2008, p. 45).

The Principles of 1663

The Introduction tells how Spinoza’s only book published under his name, a geometrical exposition of the first two parts of Descartes’ Principles, came to be written, and how Lodewijk Meyer’s preface warned that its author did not share Descartes’ view of the will. The book shows how exactly Spinoza could speak in Descartes’ voice. Its definitions are copied, with small changes, from those Descartes set at the head of the arguments he arranged in geometrical order at the end of the Replies to the Second Objections (AT VII 160–162; Principles of Cartesian Philosophy I, Defs. 1–10, G I 149–151). Mind is the substance in which thought inheres, body the subject of extension, “but whether the substance called mind and the substance called body are one and the same, or two different ones, will have to be inquired afterwards” (Def. 7); two substances are really distinct when each can exist without the other (Def. 10). On this basis Spinoza demonstrated, in Descartes’ name, that mind and body are really distinct (I, Prop. 8, G I 167); that God is incorporeal, since body is divisible and divisibility is an imperfection (I, Prop. 16, G I 176); and that the will is free, so that it is in our power to keep it within the limits of the intellect and never err (I, Prop. 15, Schol., G I 173–174). The Ethics denies the first and the third; of the second it keeps only the denial that God is a body, and makes extension, which it holds to be indivisible, an attribute of God (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.).

Spinoza did not hide the distance. He asked Meyer to tell the reader that he demonstrated many things otherwise than Descartes, “non ut Cartesium corrigam, sed tantum ut meum ordinem melius retineam” (“not to correct Descartes, but only to keep my own order better”; Letter 15; VVL³ III 52), and Meyer did (G I 131). The preface then traces the disagreement about the will to a deeper one, and adds a second. Descartes, it says, only supposes, and does not prove, that the human mind is a substance that thinks absolutely; the author admits a thinking substance in nature but denies that it constitutes the essence of the human mind, holding that “just as the human body is not extension absolutely, but only extension determined in a certain way according to the laws of extended nature by motion and rest, so also the human mind or soul is not thought absolutely, but only thought determined in a certain way according to the laws of thinking nature by ideas” (G I 132, as Blyenbergh quoted it back to Spinoza in Letter 24). That is the doctrine of Part II, Props. 11 and 13 in outline, in print in 1663, and from this definition, the preface says, the author thinks it not hard to demonstrate that the will is not distinct from the intellect (G I 132). Further, whatever the book says surpasses human understanding is said only from Descartes’ mind: the author thinks that such things can be clearly conceived and explained if the intellect is led by another way than the one Descartes opened, and that the foundations Descartes laid do not suffice for the hardest questions of metaphysics (G I 132–133). When Blyenbergh confused the two voices, Spinoza told him he would have done better to answer “in Descartes’s words” (Letter 21). The Ethics keeps the language and changes the doctrine.

Substance and attribute

The introduction to Part I describes how Spinoza takes Descartes’ definition of substance and refuses his concession. In the Principles substance is a thing that needs no other thing in order to exist; strictly only God is such, and so, Descartes says, the name does not apply to God and to creatures “univoce, ut dici solet in Scholis” (“univocally, as they say in the Schools”; I.51, AT VIII-1 24). Minds and bodies are substances in a second sense, needing only God’s concurrence. Spinoza joins conception to existence in his definition, and with the added clause makes the word univocal again: on Martial Gueroult’s account he restores its univocity by conceiving every substance as a divine being, in itself and conceived through itself (Spinoza I: Dieu, 1968, p. 55). Della Rocca describes the step as the refusal of an escape clause: if only God meets the requirements, one should “have the courage of one’s convictions” and call finite things modes (Della Rocca, pp. 42–43), as Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2 does with Descartes’ thinking and extended things.

The same holds of attribute. Descartes held that a substance is known not from the bare fact that it exists, but through any of its attributes (I.52, AT VIII-1 25); that each has one principal attribute which constitutes its nature and essence (I.53); and that between a substance and that attribute there is only a distinction of reason (I.62, AT VIII-1 30), so that thought and extension, taken as constituting the natures of mind and body, “non aliter concipi debent, quam ipsa substantia cogitans et substantia extensa” (“must be conceived in no other way than as thinking substance itself and extended substance itself”; I.63, AT VIII-1 30–31). Spinoza’s attribute, “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Part I, Def. 4), the same as substance “except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect” (Letter 9), stands in this line. Gueroult argued that Spinoza reserves the word for what Descartes called the principal attribute, and keeps most of its Cartesian marks: it is known clearly by abstraction from everything else, constitutes an essence, and differs from its substance only by reason. What he adds is infinity; the attributes become the constituents of God, and the intelligibility Descartes had confined to the finite is carried to the absolute (Gueroult, p. 56). Curley drew the consequence: if a substance cannot be conceived apart from its principal attribute, nothing remains by which two substances of one attribute could be told apart, and the demonstration of Part I, Prop. 5 seems effective at least against Descartes (Curley, pp. 13–16). Appendix B describes the modern debate over the attributes.

The real distinction is the plainest case of an argument taken over and turned. For Descartes two things are really distinct, and so two substances, when each can be clearly and distinctly understood without the other (I.60, AT VIII-1 28); the Sixth Meditation uses the test to conclude that the mind can exist without the body (AT VII 78). The Ethics keeps the test and refuses the inference: “although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct, that is, one without the aid of the other, we still cannot infer from this that they constitute two beings, or two different substances” (Part I, Prop. 10, Schol.). Don Garrett has said what Spinoza must think goes wrong (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, 2018, pp. 221–225). Spinoza “takes the Cartesian test as constitutive of a real distinction” (p. 224), which can therefore hold between attributes of one substance; and Descartes’ argument slides from conceiving one thing without conceiving the other to conceiving the one as existing without the other. The slide overlooks the case in which neither depends on the other for its conception, and yet neither can exist without the other because both exist necessarily; and that is Spinoza’s case.

Extension shows the same movement. Descartes made extension the nature of body (Principles II.4) and denied that God is a body, since divisibility goes with extension and to be divisible is an imperfection (I.23, AT VIII-1 13). The scholium to Part I, Prop. 15 answers an argument of this form, and its conclusion, that the parts of matter “are distinguished only modally, but not really” (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.), reverses the article in which Descartes had said that every part of extended substance marked out in thought is really distinct from the others (I.60, AT VIII-1 28). Late in life Spinoza went further: from extension “as Descartes conceives it, namely as a mass at rest,” the existence of bodies cannot be demonstrated, and “matter is badly defined by Descartes through extension, but must necessarily be explained through an attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence” (Letters 81 and 83). Descartes had needed God to put motion into matter and conserve it (Principles II.36, AT VIII-1 61), as Tschirnhaus observed (Letter 82); for Spinoza motion and rest is the infinite mode that follows from the nature of extension itself (Letter 64). He keeps the Cartesian identification of matter with extension and makes the extension divine, indivisible and active.

Mind and body

The introduction to Part II, Appendix C and the notes describe Descartes’ two substances, their union and their interaction through the gland, and Spinoza’s doctrine that the mind is the idea of the body. What should be added is how much of the Cartesian argument survives inside Spinoza’s. Spinoza rules out any conceptual connection between the attributes, as Della Rocca says, “just as Descartes does” (p. 43): no concept of extension enters the concept of thought (Part I, Prop. 10; Part II, Prop. 6). The two differ about what follows. For Descartes the barrier separates two substances which nonetheless act on each other. For Spinoza, who holds that the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of its cause (Part I, Ax. 4), conceptual independence is causal independence, and the barrier forbids interaction: “The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else” (Part III, Prop. 2). It is, in Della Rocca’s words, “precisely because thought and extension are conceptually separate” that they cannot causally interact (p. 43). The premise by which Descartes divided the mind from the body becomes the premise by which Spinoza denies that either acts on the other.

What then of the union on which Descartes also insisted, that I am not in my body as a sailor in a ship but closely joined and as it were intermingled with it (AT VII 81)? Curley has argued that this, more than the difficulty of interaction, is what moved Spinoza: he was answering the tension between the Cartesian real distinction and the Cartesian substantial union, and the intuitions of unity Descartes tried to express were “more important in the genesis of the Spinozistic position than any concerns about the intelligibility of interaction” (Curley, pp. 59–60). The Preface to Part V bears him out in part, for its first question is not how the mind moves the body but “What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body?” Spinoza would have liked Descartes “to explain this union through its proximate cause,” but Descartes had conceived the mind as so distinct from the body that “he could assign no singular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, but had to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God” (Part V, Preface). Spinoza had answered the question in Part II: once the mind is shown to be the idea of the body, “we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body” (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol.), and the two are “one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension” (Part II, Prop. 21, Schol.). The question Descartes’ definitions left open, whether mind and body are one substance or two (AT VII 162), and which the fourth Meditation gives as an example of indifference (AT VII 59), receives the answer Descartes rejected: “the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that” (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol.).

There is also a difference of order. Descartes found the mind first and God afterwards, and titled his Second Meditation “Of the nature of the human mind: that it is better known than the body” (AT VII 23); Spinoza holds that the mind knows itself only through the ideas of the body’s affections (Part II, Prop. 23), and says of those who believed the divine nature “to be last in the order of knowledge” that they “did not keep to the order of philosophizing” (Part II, Prop. 10, Cor., Schol.). The complaint is aimed at many, and fits Descartes only in part, for he put the mind, not the objects of the senses, first, and held that his perception of God was in a certain way prior to his perception of himself (AT VII 45); but the Meditations reach God only after the mind, and the complaint is close to the first of the errors he named to Oldenburg.

Will and intellect

The essay before Part II, Prop. 48 sets out the Cartesian theory of judgment, in which a finite intellect perceives and an infinite will assents. Spinoza had told Oldenburg that all the causes of error Bacon assigned reduce to Descartes’ one, “quia voluntas humana est libera, et latior intellectu” (“because the human will is free, and wider than the intellect”; Letter 2; VVL³ III 6), and answered it at once with the argument of Part II, Prop. 48, Schol.. Three further points show the Cartesian doctrine turned rather than simply refused.

The first is that Descartes himself placed the perfection of freedom in determination. “Neque enim opus est me in utramque partem ferri posse, ut sim liber, sed contra, quo magis in unam propendeo, ... tanto liberius illam eligo” (“For in order to be free I need not be capable of being moved either way; on the contrary, the more I incline to one side, ... the more freely I choose it”); indifference “est infimus gradus libertatis” (“is the lowest degree of freedom”); and when he found that he existed, “non potui quidem non iudicare illud quod tam clare intelligebam verum esse” (“I could not but judge that what I understood so clearly was true”), because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the will (Meditations IV, AT VII 57–59). Spinoza expounded this faithfully: when we perceive something clearly and distinctly we cannot but assent, and the will is never more free than when it determines itself entirely (Principles of Cartesian Philosophy I, Prop. 15, Schol., G I 174). To Blyenbergh he put Descartes’ view thus: “our freedom lies neither in a certain contingency nor in a certain indifference, but in the manner of affirming and denying; so that the less indifferently we affirm or deny something, the freer we are” (Letter 21). In the autograph of a later letter he credited Descartes again with the view “nos tum maxime liberos esse, cum rebus clare et distincte perceptis assentimus, tametsi impossibile est, iisdem non assentire, quando eas ita percepimus” (“that we are most free when we assent to things clearly and distinctly perceived, although it is impossible not to assent to them when we have perceived them so”), and struck the sentence out (Letter 43; Gebhardt’s apparatus, G IV 413). The Ethics keeps this part of Descartes and lets it absorb the rest. A thing is free which “exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone” (Part I, Def. 7); “I place freedom,” Spinoza wrote, “not in a free decree, but in a free necessity” (Letter 58). What Descartes called the highest degree of freedom becomes the only kind, the indifference he called the lowest becomes none, and since the necessity of assent belongs to the clear idea itself, the will that was to give the assent has nothing left to do (Part II, Prop. 49).

The second point concerns the feeling of freedom. In the same passage Descartes says that freedom consists in our being so moved to affirm or deny, pursue or avoid, “ut a nulla vi externa nos ad id determinari sentiamus” (“that we feel that we are determined to it by no external force”; AT VII 57). Spinoza grants the feeling and explains it: men think themselves free “since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them” (Part I, Appendix). To Tschirnhaus’s claim that “Descartes calls free that which is compelled by no cause” (Letter 57) he answered that we are in some things not compelled, if that means acting against one’s will, but free in nothing, if it means acting necessarily (Letter 58).

The third concerns the limits of understanding. Descartes held that our freedom and God’s preordination are both certain, though we cannot comprehend how they agree (Principles I.41, AT VIII-1 20), and the Metaphysical Thoughts repeat that how human freedom is preserved “captum nostrum excedit” (“exceeds our grasp”; I.3, G I 243). Later Spinoza used the admission as a weapon. To Velthuysen’s charge of fatalism he replied by asking what Velthuysen thought of his own Descartes, who held that we do nothing God has not preordained and yet act from free will, “quod profecto, ipso Cartesio fatente, comprehendere nemo potest” (“which, as Descartes himself confesses, no one can comprehend”; Letter 43; VVL³ III 160–161). Of Tschirnhaus he said that if he admits, with Descartes, that he cannot reconcile the two, “then he is trying to hurl at me the weapon by which he himself has already been pierced,” whereas on Spinoza’s view “everything agrees” (Letter 58). Della Rocca suggests that the Cartesian division of the mind into passive ideas and an active will would be “an objectionable replication within the mind itself of the mind–body problem” (p. 126). The identity of will and intellect removes the second dualism on the principle that removed the first.

The passions

The introductions to Parts III and V, the essay on the definitions of the affects and the notes describe what Part III takes from The Passions of the Soul and what it rejects: the derivation of all passions from a few primitive ones, Descartes’ six reduced to three, wonder demoted, love and generosity redefined. Three further features deserve notice.

The first is a shared project and a reversed correlation. Descartes said that he meant to explain the passions not as an orator, nor even as a moral philosopher, “mais seulement en Physicien” (“but only as a natural philosopher”; AT XI 326), and Spinoza credits him with trying “to explain human affects through their first causes” (Part III, Preface). Descartes began from the received doctrine that action and passion are one thing with two names, referred to two subjects, and inferred that, since nothing acts more immediately on the soul than the body, “ce qui est en elle une Passion, est communément en luy une Action” (“what is a passion in the soul is commonly an action in the body”; arts. 1–2, AT XI 328). Spinoza keeps the thought that one event can be described in two relations and inverts the correlation: “the order of actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of actions and passions of the mind” (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.). The mind is passive when and as the body is, and acting is defined by whether we are the adequate cause of what happens (Part III, Def. 2), not by which substance acts on the other. With this the Cartesian picture of inner conflict goes. For Descartes the combats imagined between the lower and the higher part of the soul are only the opposition of the movements that the spirits and the will excite at once in the gland, for there is one soul, “& tous ses appétits sont des volontez” (“and all its appetites are volitions”; art. 47, AT XI 364). Spinoza reverses the reduction. Will is appetite, the striving by which each thing perseveres in its being “when it is related to the mind alone,” and so “we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it” (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.).

The second feature is Part IV’s reply to a single article. In article 48 Descartes measures the strength of souls by the outcome of the will’s combats with the passions. Some never let it fight “avec ses propres armes, mais seulement avec celles que luy fournissent quelques passions pour resister à quelques autres” (“with its own arms, but only with those which some passions furnish it to resist others”); its own arms are “des jugemens fermes & déterminez touchant la connoissance du bien & du mal” (“firm and determinate judgments concerning the knowledge of good and evil”); and the weakest souls, pulled by one passion after another, are made “esclave & malheureuse” (“slave and unhappy”; AT XI 366–367). Spinoza answers that “An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained” (Part IV, Prop. 7), and that “The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (Part IV, Prop. 14). Jonathan Bennett saw the target: Descartes said that misguided people fight passions with passions, “and Spinoza replies that there is no other way to win” (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, p. 286). What Descartes reserved for the weakest souls, and called slavery, Spinoza makes the human condition, the bondage of the title of Part IV. Bennett thought the reply went too far, since Spinoza also holds that affects can be changed by knowledge, for instance by separating an affect from the thought of its external cause (Part V, Prop. 2), and he could not reconcile the two (p. 286). Yet the last clause of Prop. 14 can be read as the reconciliation: knowledge restrains an affect not as true but as itself an affect, and the remedies of Part V work because the clear idea of an affect is itself an affect, and an active one (Part V, Prop. 3). What Spinoza denies is a power of judgment that is not also a power of feeling, which is what the Cartesian will was meant to be.

The third feature is how much of the Cartesian therapy survives, relocated. Descartes taught that the will acts on a passion only indirectly (art. 45; see the note on Part IV, Prop. 7), that habit can join the movements of the gland to other thoughts (art. 50), and, in the article on a general remedy, that we can correct the defects of our nature by “la premeditation, & l’industrie ... en s’exerçant à separer en soy les mouvemens du sang & des esprits, d’avec les pensées ausquelles ils ont coustume d’estre joins” (“premeditation, and the industry ... by exercising ourselves to separate within ourselves the movements of the blood and spirits from the thoughts to which they are usually joined”; art. 211, AT XI 486). Spinoza’s remedies separate an affect from the thought of its external cause and join it to other thoughts (Part V, Prop. 2), and recommend that, so long as we lack perfect knowledge of our affects, we “conceive a right way of living, or sure principles of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life,” rehearsing beforehand the common injuries and dangers (Part V, Prop. 10, Schol.). This is premeditation and habit, and the sure principles of life are not far from the firm judgments of article 48. What has changed is the mechanism. The joining and separating take place among ideas and images, and the affections of the body follow because the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things (Part II, Prop. 7; Part V, Prop. 1), not because a will moves a gland. The limit Descartes admitted in the same article, that the movements of the blood follow so promptly that no human wisdom can resist them in one who is unprepared (AT XI 486), is written into Spinoza’s proposition: we can order the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect “so long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature” (Part V, Prop. 10).

The Preface to Part V

The introduction to Part V summarizes the Preface’s account of Descartes, and the notes trace it to its articles in the Passions. What the comparison adds is that nearly every objection applies Descartes’ own rules. Descartes “had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing except what he perceived clearly and distinctly,” and had reproached the scholastics for explaining obscure things by occult qualities; by these standards a thought “most closely united to a certain small portion of quantity” is “a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality” (Part V, Preface). The decisive objection, “since there is no ratio of will to motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body,” turns against the doctrine the barrier between thought and extension that Descartes himself had set up. Only the anatomical objections come from outside his system. The root of the error, for Spinoza, is the premise that “the determination of the will depends on our power alone.”

What Spinoza kept

A list of Spinoza’s debts to Descartes would be long: the vocabulary of substance, attribute and mode, of formal and objective being and degrees of reality; the distinctions real, modal and of reason; clear and distinct ideas as the standard of truth; matter as extension; the law that each thing, “quantum in se est” (“as far as is in it”), remains in the same state (Principles II.37, AT VIII-1 62), which returns in the conatus of Part III, Prop. 6. Della Rocca traces Spinoza’s striving to Descartes’ conatus of bodies that have no thought (Principles III.56), freed from Descartes’ restriction to things simple and undivided (pp. 145–147). The list of rejections would be as long: created substances, the real distinction of mind and body and their interaction, the free will, the freely created eternal truths discussed in the essay before Part I, Prop. 16, and Descartes’ modest reason for excluding final causes from physics. The two lists are connected. Again and again Descartes stopped short, by a concession or by a declaration that something exceeds our grasp: substance in a second sense for things that are not strictly substances; a union whose only cause is God; a freedom whose agreement with God’s decree no one can comprehend; an infinite will in a finite mind. Meyer’s preface said in 1663 that Spinoza thought such things could be understood by another way than Descartes’, and the way, as Spinoza told Oldenburg, begins from the first cause. The Ethics starts with God and arrives at the mind. It applies Descartes’ principles without his exceptions and finds that they yield another philosophy, which is why it can be read, as Curley read it, as a long argument with Descartes in Descartes’ terms, and why the author it names in only three passages is present on nearly every page.

Appendix J. The Ethics and the Short Treatise

The Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being is the nearest thing to a first draft of the Ethics that survives. The Introduction, the chronology, a few notes, two essays and Appendix G mention it; the essay before Part V, Prop. 21 recalls its chapter on immortality. This appendix asks what the Ethics kept of the treatise and what it changed. H. A. Wolfson called it “nothing but a tentative draft” of the philosophy completed in the Ethics, and held that in Spinoza’s essential doctrines “no change or even development is to be noticed” from one work to another (The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934, I 32, 34). Edwin Curley thought it an immature work, in which Spinoza often seems confused and had not yet reached many of the views of the Ethics, and valuable as the record of a stage on the way (Behind the Geometrical Method, 1988, p. xii). A comparison bears out something of both: most of the main theses are already present, and almost all of them are argued differently.

The manuscripts

The treatise was long known only by report. In 1704 Gottlieb Stolle was shown by the younger Jan Rieuwertsz a manuscript of “the Ethics, in Dutch, as Spinoza first composed it,” in chapters, without demonstrations, and with a chapter on the devil (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung I 409–410). After Eduard Boehmer had published a summary of it in 1852, the bookseller Frederik Muller found a manuscript of the whole, and Johannes van Vloten published it in 1862 with a Latin translation, helped by a second manuscript lent by Adriaan Bogaers. Van Vloten rejected the report that the work had first been written in Dutch: a note at its head and its many Latinisms said otherwise (Supplementum, 1862, pp. I–II; Textgestaltung I 411–413).

Both manuscripts are now in the Royal Library at The Hague. The older, Bogaers’s, was neatly copied in the seventeenth century by an unlearned hand; the younger was copied from it in the eighteenth by Johannes Monnikhoff, an Amsterdam surgeon, who emended it freely, though not without skill (VVL² III v). Gebhardt’s edition of 1925 rests on the older alone, Monnikhoff’s copy being “a redaction or paraphrase” of it (Textgestaltung I 424).

The title calls the work “voor deze in de Latynse taal beschreven door B. D. S. ... En nu in de Neërduytse spraak overgezet” (“formerly written in Latin by B. D. S. ... and now translated into the Dutch tongue”; G I 11). Gebhardt noticed that the closing words address “the friends to whom I write this,” while a marginal note calls the treatise dictated to them at their request. He concluded that Spinoza first dictated it in Dutch in Amsterdam, then rewrote it in Latin as a series of treatises sent from Rijnsburg and translated as they arrived, and went on adding to it; a friend, probably Jarig Jelles, who had no Latin, arranged the whole as a handbook for his own use (Textgestaltung I 425–432). Nadler, after Filippo Mignini, has Spinoza write it in Latin in Amsterdam between the middle of 1660 and his move to Rijnsburg, and rework it when his friends asked for a Dutch version (Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., 2018, pp. 219–220 and n. 16). In 1662 Spinoza told Oldenburg that he had written a whole little work (“integrum opusculum”) on how things began to be and on the emendation of the intellect, which he was copying out and correcting, and that he feared to publish it lest the theologians take offence (Letter 6; VVL³ III 25).

God, substance and attribute

The first part moves from the existence of God to his essence, to his “proper” attributes, mere adjectives that tell us nothing of what he is, to those falsely ascribed to him, to Natura naturans and naturata, and to good and evil. It goes, as Gueroult put it, from quod to quid, from whether God is to what he is; the Ethics goes from quid to quod (Spinoza I: Dieu, 1968, p. 479).

The first chapter proves God’s existence a priori, in two forms, and a posteriori. The first a priori proof argues that whatever we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the nature of a thing may truly be affirmed of it, and that existence belongs to the nature of God; the a posteriori proof argues from the idea of God in us, which a finite intellect could not have produced by its own fiction (KV I.1; G I 15–18). Wolfson traced them to Descartes’ ontological argument and to the first proof of the Third Meditation (I 178). The chapter judges the a priori proof the better, against the dictum of Aquinas that God cannot be proved a priori because he has no cause (G I 18). The Ethics keeps the a priori argument as the first demonstration of Part I, Prop. 11. The proof from the idea of God has gone; the a posteriori demonstration argues from power (third Dem.), and was given, the scholium says, only “so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily” (Schol.).

The second chapter defines God as “een wezen van de welke alles, ofte oneyndelyke eigenschappen gezeid worden, van welke eigenschappen een yder des zelfs in syn geslagte oneyndelyk volmaakt is” (“a being of which all, or infinite, attributes are predicated, each of which is infinitely perfect in its kind”; G I 19), close to Part I, Def. 6. What differs is the place of the word substance. The chapter proves that there is no limited substance; that there are no two equal substances; that one substance cannot produce another; and that there is no substance in God’s infinite intellect which is not formally in Nature (G I 19–22). The substances are the attributes (G I 21, 115). The treatise speaks of “substantial thinking” and “substantial extension” (G I 51), and of the being they constitute as God, or Nature; only rarely, as in a sentence of the second part, is the whole of Nature “one single substance” (G I 101). In Gueroult’s formula, the treatise identifies God with Nature, the Ethics God with substance; in the latter, on his reading, the substances of one attribute of Props. 5–8 are a provisional stage (p. 480). The order of proof changes too: the treatise shows each substance unique in its kind because it is infinite, the Ethics infinite because it is unique (Part I, Prop. 8, Dem.; Gueroult, p. 475).

Much of the early argument turns a creator’s attributes against him. A limited substance must have been limited by God, because he could give no more, which contradicts his omnipotence, or would not, which “smacks of envy” (G I 20–21). God has created everything that was in his infinite intellect, and to the objection that he could then create nothing more Spinoza replies that it is the greater perfection to have created it all (G I 22). Objection and reply return in Part I, Prop. 17, Schol., where the adversaries “are compelled to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create.” But in the treatise God brings about everything “as perfectly as it is conceived in his Idea” (G I 36), and Gueroult saw in this the last trace of a “creative intellect” (pp. 482–483).

Other doctrines are only recast. Providence is “the striving which we find both in the whole of Nature and in particular things, tending to the preservation and maintenance of their own being” (G I 40), the doctrine of Part III, Prop. 6 without the theological name, as Appendix G notes; and extension is defended against the charge of divisibility with the example of Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.: to divide water is to divide only a mode of substance (G I 26).

The two dialogues

After the second chapter stand two dialogues, which Gebhardt assigned to the period of the additions, since, as Freudenthal had seen, they presuppose the finished treatise (Textgestaltung I 430, 455). In the first, Love asks Understanding whether it has conceived a supremely perfect being in which Love too is comprehended; Reason answers that Nature is an eternal unity; Desire objects that thinking substance has nothing in common with extended substance (G I 28). Reason’s reply goes further: infinite extension and thought, “or, in your style, substances,” are nothing but modes “van dat eenige, eeuwige, oneyndige, door zig zelfs bestaande Wezen” (“of that one, eternal, infinite Being, existing through itself”; G I 29–30). Gueroult, who took the dialogues to be the oldest layer of the work (p. 472 and n. 4), read this as a doctrine of its own, in which the attributes constitute Nature without constituting God, leaving a distance between the cause and its effects (pp. 472–473). Desire’s last objection draws from Reason the account of the immanent cause, on the model of the intellect and its ideas (G I 30), part of which the note on Part I, Prop. 18 quotes.

In the second, between Erasmus and Theophilus, “serving partly for the preceding, partly for the second part that follows,” God is called a remote cause only by contrast with the things he has produced immediately, the qualification of Part I, Prop. 28, Schol.; his essence does not grow by the effects united with him; and Erasmus recalls Theophilus’s claim that the human intellect is immortal, because God has produced it in himself (G I 31–33). The Ethics has no dialogues.

Nature naturing and the infinite modes

Chapters 8 and 9 divide Nature into Natura naturans, which is God, and Natura naturata. The Thomists, the treatise adds, also understood God by the first, “but their Natura naturans was a being (as they called it) outside all substances” (G I 47), a remark Wolfson traced to Aquinas (I 254). Natura naturata is general or particular. The general consists of the modes that depend immediately on God, of which we know two, motion in matter and understanding in the thinking thing, eternal and immutable, each a Son of God, motion being “een Zone, maakzel, of uytwerkzel, onmiddelyk van God geschapen” (“a Son, product, or effect, created immediately by God”; G I 48); the particular, of the singular things these cause. A note warns that what is said of motion is not said in earnest, a reservation, Gebhardt thought, that Spinoza made in speaking (Textgestaltung I 427); later the treatise counts motion and rest together (G I 91).

In the Ethics the two terms occur only in the scholium to Prop. 29 and in Prop. 31 and its demonstration; Prop. 31 refers the actual intellect, finite or infinite, to Natura naturata, as the treatise had done (Part I, Prop. 31). The general modes become what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute and is eternal and infinite (Part I, Prop. 21), exemplified by “the idea of God in thought” (Dem.) and, in a letter, by “absolutely infinite intellect” in thought and “motion and rest” in extension (Letter 64). The intellect is no longer a son. The treatise itself glosses the name: a note explains the infinite intellect, “which we called the Son of God,” as God’s idea of himself (G I 101), and the appendix calls it an infinite idea, containing objectively the formal essence of all things (G I 117).

Mind, body and knowledge

The preface to the second part, with its note, describes the mind. The soul is not a substance, since no substance is limited, but a mode of thinking, the idea of a body that is itself a certain proportion of motion and rest; when other bodies destroy the proportion, the soul, insofar as it is only the idea of that body, perishes with it (G I 51–52). The preface also lays down that there belongs to the nature of a thing that without which it can neither be nor be understood, but only if the relation is reciprocal, since without God nothing can be or be understood (G I 53): the rule and the reason of Part II, Def. 2 and Part II, Prop. 10, Cor., Schol.. The appendix adds that the essences of modes that do not exist are comprehended in their attributes without distinction, which arises only when they exist (G I 119), as in Part II, Prop. 8, Schol.; and the soul is “a part of the infinite Idea arising immediately from God” (G I 121), as in Part II, Prop. 11, Cor..

Curley observed that the treatise nowhere explicitly states that mind and body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes, and that, while it finds full interaction unacceptable, it admits a limited one (p. 153 nn. 8, 11): the soul, like the body, can turn the animal spirits from one side to the other (G I 92). The Ethics withdraws even this (Part III, Prop. 2 and Schol.), as the essay on Spinoza and Descartes describes.

The treatise counts three kinds of knowledge: belief, from experience or hearsay, which can err; true belief; and clear and distinct conception. Four men find the fourth proportional by hearsay, by trial, by reason and by seeing the proportion at once (KV II.1; G I 54–55). Elsewhere it counts four, and calls clear knowledge “the fourth and last” (G I 61, 100; Wolfson II 132). What changes is what each kind is. True belief shows us “what the thing ought to be, but not what it really is,” and so cannot unite us with what it knows (G I 59). There are no common notions; Gueroult noted that their place is taken by general concepts, such as the idea of a perfect man, which the Ethics treats as products of imagination (Spinoza II: L’âme, 1974, p. 374). Clear knowledge comes “niet ... door overtuyging van reeden maar door een gevoelen, en genieten van de zaake zelve” (“not by conviction of reason but by a feeling and enjoyment of the thing itself”; G I 55); apart from the example, its only object seems to be God (Gueroult, pp. 593–594), whereas the third kind of the Ethics proceeds from the idea of God’s attributes to the essence of things (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2).

The deepest change concerns the activity of the mind. Understanding, “though the word sounds otherwise,” is “een zuyvere of pure lyding” (“a pure passion”; G I 79): “it is never we who affirm or deny something of the thing, but the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us” (G I 83). The treatise already denies free will, the will being a being of reason formed from particular volitions (KV II.16; G I 82–83). The Ethics keeps the conclusion, as the essay before Part II, Prop. 48 shows, but reverses the premise: Spinoza says concept rather than perception “because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind” (Part II, Def. 3, Expl.), and insofar as it has adequate ideas the mind acts (Part III, Prop. 1). One doctrine passes over unchanged: truth makes manifest both itself and falsity, so that whoever has it cannot doubt it (G I 79; Part II, Prop. 43, Schol.).

The passions

Van Vloten found the principles of the Ethics “minus adhuc elaborata” in the treatise, “as yet less worked out,” above all in the doctrine of the passions (Supplementum, p. II). The treatise derives the passions from knowledge, not from a striving: knowledge is “the proximate cause of all the passions in the soul” (G I 56). Opinion produces the passions contrary to reason, true belief good desires, clear knowledge true love (G I 55–56); good and evil are measured against the idea of a perfect man (G I 60). The first passions treated are wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, Descartes’ six primitive passions in his order (Passions, art. 69), and the definition of love as “een zaak te genieten, en daar mede vereenigt te worden” (“to enjoy a thing and be united with it”; G I 62) also comes from Descartes (Wolfson II 279). The Ethics founds the affects on the striving of Part III, Prop. 6 and on three primary affects (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol.), excludes wonder (Def. Aff. 4, Expl.), and says that the definition of love by union “expresses not the essence of love but a property of it” (Def. Aff. 6, Expl.).

Chapters 5 to 14 judge each passion by reason, and many verdicts stand. Hatred has no place in one who uses his reason rightly (G I 67); hope and fear arise from a bad opinion, and confidence and despair too can have no place in a perfect man (G I 72); remorse and repentance are harmful and evil (G I 73); compare Part IV, Prop. 45, Prop. 47 and Prop. 54. Others change. The treatise praises true humility, a man’s knowing his imperfection without regard to contempt of himself, as “the true step by which we climb to our highest salvation” (G I 69–70); the Ethics says that “humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason” (Part IV, Prop. 53). The treatise denies that gratitude can have any place in a perfect man, who helps his neighbour from necessity alone, and the more, the greater the misery he finds, even in the most godless (G I 76); the Ethics holds that “only free men are most grateful to one another” (Part IV, Prop. 71). Nor has the treatise anything like the scholium which grants that humility, repentance, hope and fear do more good than harm among men who rarely live by reason (Part IV, Prop. 54, Schol.). Its verdicts are pronounced for a perfect man; the later book provides also for those who are not.

Union with God and true freedom

Reason, the treatise argues, can destroy the opinions we have from hearsay, but not those we have from experience, for what we enjoy in ourselves cannot be overcome by what reason shows us without letting us enjoy it (KV II.21; G I 99–100). Only the fourth kind of knowledge can free us. If we know God “at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we know our body,” we must be united with him more closely than with the body, and as it were released from it (G I 93). Then we are born again: our first birth was our union with the body, the second, the wedergeboorte, a union with an incorporeal object, from which an eternal and unchangeable constancy follows (KV II.22; G I 102). The Ethics has its own form of the first point: an affect is restrained only by a stronger affect (Part IV, Prop. 7), and true knowledge of good and evil restrains none insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is itself an affect (Prop. 14); its remedies begin with the knowledge of the affects themselves (Part V, Prop. 20, Schol.); and it keeps “regenerated” only for the body, which needs other bodies “by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated” (Part II, Post. 4).

The chapter on immortality draws the consequence, but the thought runs through the work: the soul, uniting itself with substances that always remain the same, “could have made itself eternal” (G I 52); “the true intellect can never perish” (G I 111). Nadler found the language, which calls the soul both “immortal” and “eternal,” ambiguous, and the union with God at once a union in being and in knowing (Spinoza’s Heresy, 2001, pp. 109–110).

The last chapters anticipate the end of the Ethics. God does not love men, since no modes of thinking can be ascribed to him besides those in creatures, and such love would make him mutable (KV II.24; G I 103–104; Wolfson II 286–288); the Ethics agrees that “strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one” (Part V, Prop. 17, Cor.), but then lets God love men insofar as he loves himself (Prop. 36, Cor.). The chapter on true freedom denies that the passions must be curbed before we can come to the knowledge and love of God, which would be as if an ignorant man had to give up his ignorance before he could come to knowledge; knowledge alone destroys them (KV II.26; G I 108). That is the thesis of Part V, Prop. 42. Theologians who would seek their own good elsewhere if the love of God brought no eternal life are likened to a fish that would leave the water on the same condition (G I 109), as the multitude of Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. are likened to someone who would fill himself with poisons. Freedom the treatise defines as “a firm existence which our intellect acquires through immediate union with God” (G I 112), and it calls it true freedom to be bound “met de lieffelyke ketenen van syne liefde” (“with the lovely chains of his love”; G I 109); men are “servants, indeed slaves, of God,” and that is their greatest perfection (G I 87). In the Ethics bondage names the condition described in Part IV, and the man led by reason is free (Part IV, Prop. 66, Schol.).

The appendix in geometrical form

After the closing words to the friends comes an appendix in two parts, the second on the human soul. The first sets out seven axioms and four propositions with a corollary in geometrical order (G I 114–116). The first axiom, that substance by its nature is prior to all its modifications, is Part I, Prop. 1. The propositions prove that no two substances can share an attribute, that one substance cannot cause the existence of another, that “alle eigenschappen of zelfstandigheid” (“every attribute, or substance”) is by its nature infinite and supremely perfect in its kind, and that existence so belongs to the essence of every substance that no infinite intellect can contain the idea of a substance that does not exist in Nature: in substance Props. 5, 6, 8 and 7 of Part I. The corollary concludes that Nature, consisting of infinite attributes, to whose essence existence belongs, agrees exactly with the essence of “the only glorious and blessed God.” In 1661 Spinoza had sent Oldenburg, separately, demonstrations “more Geometrico” of theses close to these (Letter 2; VVL³ III 5–6). Nadler thinks the appendix later than the body of the treatise, and perhaps part of an early draft of the Ethics (Spinoza: A Life, pp. 234–235).

Gueroult saw in it progress and a gap. The appendix no longer proves first that God is and then what he is: existence belongs to each substance by its nature, and God’s existence follows by a corollary. But the principle that the more reality a being has, the more attributes belong to it, which becomes Part I, Prop. 9, is absent, and nothing proves that the substances form one being; the Ethics closes the gap by proving God to be a substance of infinite attributes (Spinoza I 484–487).

What the Ethics kept

An eighteenth-century note in the copy of Colerus that held the summary says that the treatise, though not in mathematical order, contains “the same thoughts and things” as the Ethics, which, more polished and expanded, is for most readers much more obscure, because geometrical order is unusual in metaphysics (Textgestaltung I 412). The Ethics kept the one being of infinite attributes, God’s immanent and necessary causality, the denial of free will, the soul as the idea of the body, the ways of knowing with their example, the love of God as the highest good, and knowledge, not restraint, as the way to it. It changed the place of substance, the activity of the mind, the foundation of the affects and several verdicts on them, God’s love and the language of immortality; and it dropped the dialogues, the Son of God, regeneration and the chapter on devils (KV II.25; G I 107–108) that Stolle had noticed in 1704. The note’s second claim may be turned around: Gueroult’s analysis suggests that several of these changes, above all in the doctrine of substance, came with the geometrical order itself (Spinoza I 481, 484–487).

Appendix K. Right, Power and the State

The Ethics contains a political philosophy in a few pages. The second scholium to Part IV, Prop. 37 describes the natural and the civil state and defines sin, merit, justice and injustice; Prop. 40 calls useful whatever brings it about that men live harmoniously; the scholium to Prop. 54 explains why humility and fear are of use among men who rarely live by reason; and the portrait of the free man ends with the proposition that a man led by reason “is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone” (Prop. 73). Spinoza set the Ethics aside in 1665 to write the Theological-Political Treatise (1670), whose last chapters argue the same principles at length, and he was at work on the Political Treatise when he died. The introduction to Part IV summarizes the second scholium, and the essay on the free man discusses Prop. 73. This appendix takes up three questions about these pages on which modern readers have divided: what Spinoza means by saying that right extends as far as power; whether, having said so, he can found the state on a contract; and what, for him, the state is for.

Right and power

In the Ethics the thesis on which Spinoza’s politics turns appears only in passing. Defending the use of animals, he remarks that “the right of each is defined by the virtue, or power, of each,” so that “men have far greater right against beasts than beasts against men” (Prop. 37, Schol. 1); and the account of the natural state in the next scholium begins: “Each one exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently by the highest right of nature each one does what follows from the necessity of his own nature” (Prop. 37, Schol. 2). The Theological-Political Treatise gives the argument. Nature considered absolutely “has the highest right to everything it can do, that is, the right of nature extends as far as its power extends; for the power of nature is the very power of God, who has the highest right to everything”; and since the power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all individuals together, “each individual has the highest right to everything it can do.” So fish are determined by nature to swim, and the large ones to eat the smaller, and by the highest natural right fish possess the water and the large eat the small (jus naturae eo usque se extendere, quo usque ejus potentia se extendit; TTP ch. 16, G III 189). The Political Treatise repeats the principle, “each has as much right as he has power” (unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentia valet; TP II.8), and applies it to the state, whose body and mind have as much right as they have power (TP III.2).

Edwin Curley, for whom Spinoza is arguably the most Machiavellian of the great modern political philosophers, grants that at first glance he can look like an eccentric Hobbesian. Like Hobbes he imagines a state of nature in which each may do whatever he can, and in which justice and injustice have no place until there is a civil law to obey; but his thesis is stronger than Hobbes’s, since it applies to every individual, not only to human beings, and it is not confined to the state of nature (Curley, “Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 2nd ed., 2022, pp. 309–312). The argument of the Treatise, Curley observes, depends on identifying the power of God with the power of nature, which Spinoza’s readers had no reason to grant. He finds a stronger argument in its fourth chapter, where a law in the proper sense is a command that can be disobeyed, and therefore a human command: as far as God or nature is concerned, “what we can do, we may do” (pp. 313–315).

To many readers the thesis has seemed to make right a mere name for force. Curley quotes Alexandre Matheron’s example: a new Genghis Khan who overran a small Spinozist republic would have the right to conquer it, and to oppress its people for as long as fear kept them from resisting; Matheron adds that Spinoza does not mean by this to justify tyranny. Curley agrees, if to justify means to impose on the conquered a duty to submit. But he denies that Spinoza identifies right with power. Spinoza says that right extends as far as power, and the claim has normative force: there is no transcendent standard of justice by which the conqueror’s acts can be judged unjust, and that is compatible with judging that he acts against the law of reason (pp. 315–316). The Ethics bears the distinction out. In the natural state “sin cannot be conceived,” and “just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which explain the nature of the mind” (Prop. 37, Schol. 2); yet the same Part measures every action by reason, by which “there is no singular thing in the nature of things which is more useful to man than a man who lives from the guidance of reason” (Prop. 35, Cor. 1). Natural right marks out what nothing forbids; reason, what is good. Étienne Balibar stresses the other edge of the thesis. Since both treatises define right as power, every right except God’s is limited, not by a prohibition or an obligation, but by the limits of a real power; and a state that cannot impose its authority on its subjects, by constraint or by consent, has no right over them (Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 1998, ch. 5, section “Power and Freedom”). The principle that seems to license the conqueror also deprives every ruler of a right that outlasts his power.

A contract that binds only while it is useful

The second scholium seems to describe a covenant: men must “give up their natural right and make one another confident that they will do nothing which could lead to harm to another,” and the confidence is secured by threats, not by reason (Prop. 37, Schol. 2; the introduction to Part IV summarizes the argument). The Theological-Political Treatise tells the same story as a contract by which men transfer their right to the sovereign. Yet the same chapter lays down that “a contract can have no force except by reason of its utility; when that is taken away, the contract is taken away with it, and remains void” (pactum nullam vim habere posse, nisi ratione utilitatis, qua sublata pactum simul tollitur, et irritum manet; TTP ch. 16, G III 192).

Commentators have often concluded, Curley reports, that the contract does no work. If no promise binds without utility, the sovereign’s right depends only on his power to persuade his subjects that obedience is in their interest; and the Political Treatise, which no longer founds the state on a contract, would show that Spinoza came to see this (Curley, p. 317). Curley himself denies that Spinoza changed his mind in any fundamental way about political legitimacy. Even in the earlier work the contract is odd, since the act of promising cannot by itself give the sovereign authority. Spinoza reconceives it, on Curley’s reading, as a transfer not of right but of power, so that a ruler governs with right just so far as his subjects consent to his rule by obeying it (pp. 317–320). The next chapter of the Treatise draws the limit at once: “no one will ever be able to transfer his power, and consequently his right, to another in such a way that he ceases to be a man” (nemo unquam suam potentiam et consequenter neque suum jus ita in alium transferre poterit, ut homo esse desinat; TTP ch. 17, G III 201). A sovereign would command in vain that a subject hate his benefactor, or not be offended by insults, or not wish to be freed from fear; and what his power cannot reach, his right does not reach either (Curley, p. 323). This is the sense of the remark to Jelles that the Introduction quotes: “I always keep natural right intact,” and the supreme magistrate “has no more right over its subjects than in proportion to the power by which it exceeds the subject” (Letter 50).

The Ethics adds what the treatises, which take men as they are, can leave aside. What holds the man led by reason to his agreements is not the promise but reason itself, which cannot advise anyone to make agreements deceptively, since it would then advise all men “not really to have common rights, which is absurd” (Prop. 72, Schol.); the essay on the free man discusses the case. The threats of the second scholium are for the others.

Fear, hope and concord

Balibar reads Prop. 37 as giving two accounts of how a city comes to be. The first demonstration and the first scholium give a rational genesis: men led by reason want for others the good they want for themselves, since nothing is more useful to a man than other men. The alternative demonstration and the second scholium give an affective one, in which a good is loved more constantly when others are imagined to love it too (Prop. 37, second Dem.), and fear restrains those who would otherwise harm one another (Appendix H discusses the two demonstrations as ethics). The affective genesis is real, but ambivalent: the shared love rests on each one’s sense of his own impotence, on hope and on fear, and so can change at any moment into its contrary. Balibar’s conclusion is that the two are not two kinds of city, an ideal and a real one, but two aspects of a single process: every actual city is founded at once on a rational agreement and on an imagined agreement that needs constraint, and the state obliges individuals to behave as if they lived by reason by working on their passions (Balibar, ch. 5, section “Desire Is Man’s Very Essence”).

The Ethics is candid about the use of fear. Humility and repentance, and with them hope and fear, “bring more advantage than harm”; “The mob is a terror, unless it is afraid,” and that is why the prophets commended humility, repentance and reverence (Prop. 54, Schol.). Justin Steinberg takes the passage as an instance of the accommodation that Spinoza demands of any ethics or politics meant for use: where conditions are not ideal, affects that are not good in themselves are to be encouraged (Steinberg, Spinoza’s Political Psychology, 2018, p. 119). Yet the same Part denies that fear can found an agreement in good faith. “Concord, moreover, is usually begotten from fear, but without good faith” (Part IV, Appendix, ch. 16); the affects of hope and fear “cannot be good in themselves” (Prop. 47); and he who does good in order to avoid evil “is not led by reason” (Prop. 63). Steinberg and Susan James both cite the chapter of the Appendix to mark the limit of fear in politics (Steinberg, p. 92 n. 34; James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 2012, p. 194 n. 28). For Steinberg the security that the state exists to provide is not physical safety only but a condition of social trust, the firm hope of citizens that they will benefit from the order in which they live; a hopeful citizenry is both more stable and more powerful than a fearful one (pp. 92–93). The Treatise says as much: the ultimate end of the state “is not to dominate, nor to restrain men by fear and make them subject to another’s right, but on the contrary to free each one from fear, so that he may live securely, as far as possible” (finem ejus ultimum non esse dominari, nec homines metu retinere, et alterius juris facere, sed contra unumquemque metu liberare, ut secure, quoad ejus fieri potest, vivat; TTP ch. 20, G III 240–241).

What the state is for

The Treatise draws its conclusion in the sentence that the introduction to Part IV quotes: “the end of the state, therefore, is really freedom” (Finis ergo Reipublicae revera libertas est; TTP ch. 20, G III 241). Just before, it says what this means: the end of the state is not to turn men from rational beings into beasts or automata, “but on the contrary that their mind and body may perform their functions safely, and that they themselves may use their reason freely, and not contend with hatred, anger or deceit” (G III 241). Which freedom is meant has divided interpreters. On what Steinberg calls the classical liberal interpretation, the freedom of the political works is weaker than the freedom of the Ethics: since it would be utopian to expect a society not moved chiefly by passions, freedom in politics means little more than peace, that is, security and harmony, and the state’s task is to keep the peace and leave its citizens free to pursue their own desires. Steinberg quotes Douglas Den Uyl for this view, and the Political Treatise seems to support it when it says that the end of the civil state “is nothing other than peace and security of life” (qui scilicet nullus alius est, quam pax, vitaeque securitas; TP V.2); Balibar takes the change from the earlier treatise to mean that freedom is no longer the declared purpose of the state (ch. 5, section “The Aporia of the Community and the Question of Knowledge”). But the same chapter adds that peace “is not the absence of war, but a virtue that arises from strength of mind” (Pax enim non belli privatio, sed virtus est, quae ex animi fortitudine oritur; TP V.4), and that the life it means is a human life, defined “above all by reason, the true virtue and life of the mind” (maxime ratione, vera Mentis virtute, et vita; TP V.5). Against the deflationary reading Steinberg defends a thesis of continuity: the state has a single directive, to liberate or empower its citizens as far as possible, so that the aim of politics is continuous with the aim of ethics, and a state can achieve peace and security only by empowering its citizens (Steinberg, pp. 64–65).

The Ethics gives each reading something to hold. For the man led by reason the state is the condition of a freer life: he “is not led to obey by fear,” but desires, “in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state” (Prop. 73, Dem.), and whatever brings it about that men live harmoniously is useful (Prop. 40). The state of the second scholium, on the other hand, asks of its citizens obedience, not understanding: sin “is nothing but disobedience,” and obedience “is counted as merit in a citizen” (Prop. 37, Schol. 2), and the scholium to Prop. 54 is written for the many who rarely live by reason.

The Political Treatise opens by mocking the philosophers who “conceive men not as they are, but as they would like them to be,” and so have for the most part written satire instead of ethics, and never conceived a politics that could be put to use (Homines namque, non ut sunt, sed, ut eosdem esse vellent, concipiunt: unde factum est, ut plerumque pro Ethica Satyram scripserint; TP I.1). Curley sees in this pragmatic attitude a likeness between Spinoza and Machiavelli more fundamental than any agreement about right and power (Curley, pp. 321–322), though the most important, for him, is their common preference for a republic in which the people check their rulers (p. 325). He also reports Matheron’s argument that the criticism, taken strictly, reaches Hobbes too, and finds some justice in it, since Hobbes, in some moods, founds the sovereign’s power on men’s willingness to stand by their promise come what may (pp. 322–323). The Ethics explains why the criticism holds, since men are “necessarily subject to affects” and “inconstant and changeable” (Prop. 37, Schol. 2); but it also says what such men may become. Those who are subject to humility and repentance “can be led far more easily than others to live, in the end, from the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed” (Prop. 54, Schol.). The treatises show how a state may be built from men as they are; the Ethics shows what the best of them can be, and why even he is more free in a state than alone.