Key Concepts
The essays in this book follow the Ethics in its own order, Part by Part. The entries below cut across that order. Each takes one of the terms on which the argument turns and follows it from the place where it is defined or first introduced through the Parts that develop, apply or transform it, with links to the passages, so that a reader who meets a word in Part IV can find where its sense was fixed in Part I or II and where it leads in Part V. The entries do not argue a case; they say where to look. The English terms are those of the translation, as the glossary records them, with Spinoza’s Latin. The entries are in alphabetical order, and each ends by naming the essays or appendices that treat its subject at length.
Action and passion
The pair actio and passio, acting and being acted on, runs through the whole book but is defined only at the head of Part III. Part I prepares it: the free thing of Part I, Def. 7 is determined “to act” by itself alone, the compelled thing “to operate” by another. Part III, Def. 2 then says that we act when something follows from our nature of which we are the adequate cause, that is, through which alone it can be clearly and distinctly understood (Def. 1), and that we are acted on when we are only its partial cause. The definition mentions no will. The theory of ideas of Part II decides instead: the mind acts insofar as it has adequate ideas and is acted on insofar as it has inadequate ones (Part III, Props. 1 and 3). An affect is an action or a passion by the same test (Def. 3, Expl.), and there are active affects of joy and desire, but none of sadness (Props. 58–59). Part IV measures the reach of passion. We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature that cannot be conceived through itself (Prop. 2), and so man is “necessarily always subject to passions” (Prop. 4, Cor.); yet to every action to which a passion determines us, reason could determine us without it (Prop. 59). Part V turns the definition into a remedy, since a passion ceases to be one as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it (Prop. 3), and ends by naming the intellect as the part of the mind through which we act and the imagination as the part through which we are acted on (Prop. 40, Cor.). The introduction to Part III treats the definitions at length.
Adequate idea
An adequate idea (idea adaequata) is one which, “insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations, of a true idea” (Part II, Def. 4). Part I had laid down that a true idea must agree with its object (Part I, Ax. 6); adequacy is, on Spinoza’s own account to Tschirnhaus, the same perfection seen from within the idea (Letter 60; VVL³ III 199–200), and the explanation expressly sets the extrinsic mark aside (Part II, Def. 4, Expl.). Part II then shows how adequacy is distributed. Every idea is true insofar as it is related to God (Prop. 32); it is inadequate in a human mind when God has it not only insofar as he constitutes that mind but together with the idea of another thing (Prop. 11, Cor.), and so the mind’s knowledge of itself and of bodies is confused and mutilated whenever it perceives things “from the common order of nature” (Prop. 29, Cor.). Falsity is the privation of knowledge that such ideas involve (Prop. 35). Yet every human mind has some adequate ideas: of what is common to all things (Prop. 38), of whatever follows from ideas already adequate in it (Prop. 40), and of the eternal and infinite essence of God (Prop. 47). Part III makes the distinction practical, defining the adequate cause by the same clarity (Def. 1) and grounding action in adequate ideas and passion in inadequate ones (Prop. 3). Part IV holds that a man acts from virtue only insofar as he is determined by what he understands (Prop. 23), and Part V rests its remedies on the claim that we can form some clear and distinct concept of every affection of the body (Prop. 4). The introduction to Part II discusses the definition and the relation of adequacy to truth.
Affect
Affectus is rendered “affect” so that its tie to affectio, “affection,” is kept. Part I uses the word only in passing, of those who ascribe human affects to God (Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2), and Part II counts love and desire among modes of thinking that require an idea of the thing loved or desired (Part II, Ax. 3). The definition comes in Part III, Def. 3: affects are affections of the body by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, together with the ideas of these affections. An affect is therefore bodily and mental at once, and an action or a passion according as we are or are not its adequate cause (Def. 3, Expl.). The Preface announces that human actions and appetites will be considered “just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies.” The Part derives every affect from three primary ones, desire, joy and sadness (Prop. 11, Schol.), and closes with a General Definition of the affect that is a passion of the mind as “a confused idea.” Part IV turns on the principle that an affect can be restrained only by a contrary and stronger affect (Prop. 7), so that the true knowledge of good and evil restrains nothing except insofar as it is considered as an affect (Prop. 14), and goes on to judge each affect by reason. Part V applies the definition as a remedy: a passion ceases to be a passion once we form a clear and distinct idea of it (Prop. 3), and the scholium to Prop. 20 gathers the mind’s power over the affects under five heads. The introduction to Part III and the essay before the definitions of the affects treat the subject at length.
Blessedness
Beatitudo is named at the start of Part II, which will explain only what can lead us “as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness” (Part II, Preface), and the last proposition of the book is devoted to it. The scholium closing Part II gives a first account: the doctrine of the will teaches “in what our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists: namely in the knowledge of God alone,” and those who expect God to reward their virtue forget that virtue is itself happiness and the highest freedom (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol.). Part III does not use the word, but it supplies the measure of it, joy being a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater perfection (Part III, Def. Aff. 2). Part IV observes that no one can desire to be blessed who does not desire to be, to act and to live (Prop. 21), and its Appendix says that blessedness “is nothing but the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God” (ch. 4). Part V takes “freedom of mind, or blessedness” as its subject (Preface). If joy is the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness consists in the mind’s being endowed with perfection itself (Prop. 33, Schol.); it is identified with salvation and freedom, and placed in a constant and eternal love towards God (Prop. 36, Schol.). The last proposition draws the consequence for the ethics of Part IV: “Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself” (Prop. 42). The introduction to Part V and the essay on the eternity of the mind before Part V, Prop. 21 treat it at length.
Bondage
Servitus gives Part IV its title, De servitute humana, and is defined in the first sentence of its Preface: “Man’s lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects I call bondage.” A man subject to the affects is under the control of fortune, and often sees the better and follows the worse (Part IV, Preface). Before Part IV the word occurs only twice, both times in one sentence of the scholium closing Part II, where it is rendered “servitude”: those who expect rewards for virtue as if for “the utmost servitude” stray far from the true estimate of virtue, as if “servitude to God” were not happiness itself and the highest freedom (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol.). Yet the condition was described earlier: the Appendix to Part I traces men’s belief in their freedom to their ignorance of causes (Part I, Appendix); Part II shows that the mind perceiving things from the common order of nature has only confused knowledge (Part II, Prop. 29, Cor.); and Part III ends its account of the passions with men driven about by external causes, “like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds” (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol.). Part IV explains why bondage cannot be escaped altogether: the force by which a man perseveres in existing is infinitely surpassed by external causes (Prop. 3), he is necessarily always subject to passions (Prop. 4, Cor.), and a desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil can be restrained by other desires, above all by desires for things present (Props. 15–17). The scholium to Prop. 66 calls the man led by affect or opinion a slave. Part V turns the popular view round: the multitude think themselves free when they may obey their lust, and bear piety as a servitude for which they hope to be rewarded after death (Part V, Prop. 41, Schol.). The introduction to Part IV treats the subject at length.
Cause
Causa is for Spinoza a principle of explanation as much as of production. The first definition of the book is of cause of itself, “that whose essence involves existence” (Part I, Def. 1); the axioms bind effect to cause by necessity, and knowledge of the effect to knowledge of the cause (Axs. 3–4); and the second proof of God’s existence requires that for each thing “there must be assigned a cause, or reason” (Prop. 11, second Dem.). God is the efficient cause of all things (Prop. 16, Cor. 1), the only free cause (Prop. 17, Cor. 2), their immanent, not transitive, cause (Prop. 18), and their cause “in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself” (Prop. 25, Schol.); each finite thing is determined by another finite cause, and so to infinity (Prop. 28). Part II confines causation within each attribute: modes have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes (Part II, Prop. 6), and so body and mind cannot determine one another (Part III, Prop. 2). Part III defines the adequate cause, whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it, and makes it the measure of action (Defs. 1–2). Part IV reduces the final cause to an efficient one, an appetite whose own causes are unknown (Part IV, Preface). Part V states as an axiom that the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause (Part V, Ax. 2), and calls the mind, insofar as it is eternal, the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge (Prop. 31), “formal” being equated in the demonstration with “adequate” in the sense of Part III (Prop. 31, Dem.). The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 discusses God’s causality, and Appendix F the principle of sufficient reason behind the equation of cause and reason.
Common notions
Notiones communes are first mentioned in the second scholium to Part I, Prop. 8, which says that if men attended to the nature of substance, the proposition that existence pertains to it would be numbered among the common notions. Their theory belongs to Part II. What is common to all things and equally in the part and in the whole constitutes the essence of no singular thing (Part II, Prop. 37) and can only be conceived adequately (Prop. 38), so that there are notions common to all men (Prop. 38, Cor.). The first scholium to Prop. 40 calls these notions “the foundations of our reasoning” and sets them apart from transcendental terms and universals, which arise from images confused in the body; the second makes them, with adequate ideas of the properties of things, the starting point of reason, the second kind of knowledge (Prop. 40, Schol. 2). Because they explain no singular essence, they must be conceived “without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity” (Prop. 44, Cor. 2, Dem.). The term does not recur after Part II. Part IV holds that the highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all (Part IV, Prop. 36), and Part V, which speaks instead of the common properties of things (Prop. 7, Dem.), puts the notions to work. Because what is common to all can only be conceived adequately, there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept (Part V, Prop. 4, Dem.); and affects that arise from reason, being related to common properties that we always contemplate as present, are in time more powerful than those related to things absent (Prop. 7). The introduction to Part II discusses the common notions with the three kinds of knowledge.
Eternity
Eternity (aeternitas) is “existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing” (Part I, Def. 8), which cannot be explained through duration or time, “even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end” (Def. 8, Expl.). God and all his attributes are eternal (Prop. 19), as are the infinite modes (Prop. 21), and “in eternity there is no when, before, or after” (Prop. 33, Schol. 2). Part II defines duration as “an indefinite continuation of existing” (Part II, Def. 5), distinguishes the essences of things as contained in God’s attributes from their existence in duration (Prop. 8 and Cor.), and introduces the phrase sub quadam aeternitatis specie, which Part V shortens to sub specie aeternitatis: “It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity” (Prop. 44, Cor. 2). Part IV understands perfection as reality without any regard to duration (Part IV, Preface), and holds that the mind which conceives things from the dictate of reason is equally affected by the idea of a future, past or present thing (Prop. 62). Part V applies the doctrine to the mind itself. There is in God an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity (Part V, Prop. 22), and so something of the mind remains which is eternal (Prop. 23): “we feel and experience that we are eternal” (Prop. 23, Schol.), though men confuse this eternity with duration (Prop. 34, Schol.). The eternal part of the mind is the intellect (Prop. 40, Cor.), and it is greater in a mind whose body is capable of a great many things (Prop. 39). The essay on the eternity of the mind before Part V, Prop. 21 and Appendix E treat the doctrine at length.
Final cause
The final cause (causa finalis) is the target of the Appendix to Part I. All the prejudices it exposes depend on one, “that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end”; Spinoza traces this to men’s ignorance of causes and their conscious appetite for their own advantage (Part I, Appendix), and argues that the doctrine of ends “entirely overturns nature,” and that its defenders finally take refuge in the will of God, “the sanctuary of ignorance” (Appendix). The demonstrations had already excluded it, since everything follows necessarily from God’s nature (Prop. 16) and God does not operate from freedom of the will (Prop. 32, Cor. 1). Part III, without naming final causes, reverses the order they presuppose: “we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it” (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.). Part IV gives the positive account. Nature acts for no end, since the being we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists; and “what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing,” an efficient cause taken for a first one because its own causes are unknown (Part IV, Preface). The definitions accordingly understand by the end for the sake of which we do something nothing but appetite (Def. 7), and the Appendix can still name the final end of a man led by reason, the desire to conceive adequately himself and all things that fall within his understanding (ch. 4). The essay before the Appendix to Part I and Appendix D discuss whether Spinoza denies all purposes or only those ascribed to God and nature.
Freedom
The definition of freedom (libertas) opposes the free not to the necessary but to the compelled: “That thing will be called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone” (Part I, Def. 7). In this sense “God alone is a free cause” (Prop. 17, Cor. 2), though he does not operate from freedom of the will (Prop. 32, Cor. 1); Spinoza told a correspondent that he placed freedom “not in a free decree, but in a free necessity” (Letter 58). The freedom men commonly claim rests on ignorance: they think themselves free because they are conscious of their actions and appetites and ignorant of their causes (Part I, Appendix; Part II, Prop. 35, Schol.; Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.), and there is in the mind no absolute, or free, will (Part II, Prop. 48). Human freedom is freedom in the sense of the definition, possessed in degrees: a man is free insofar as he is the adequate cause of what he does, that is, insofar as he has adequate ideas (Part III, Prop. 3). Part IV calls the man led by reason free and the man led by affect a slave (Prop. 66, Schol.), portrays the free man in its last seven propositions, and declares the hypothesis that men are born free to be false (Prop. 68, Schol.). Part V, “Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom,” shows what the intellect can do against the affects, and places “our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom” in a constant and eternal love towards God (Prop. 36, Schol.). The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 and the essays on will and intellect and on the free man treat freedom at length.
Free man
The free man (homo liber) is usually taken to be the figure announced in the Preface to Part IV, where Spinoza keeps the words “good” and “evil” because “we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to” (Part IV, Preface); Spinoza does not make the identification himself, and Appendix H considers it. The figure takes its sense from the definition of freedom in Part I, Def. 7, and Part IV puts it briefly: “he is free who is led by reason alone” (Part IV, Prop. 68, Dem.). The scholium to Prop. 66 introduces him by contrast with the slave, who “whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant.” The free man thinks of nothing less than of death (Prop. 67). If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil (Prop. 68); the scholium declares the hypothesis false, and reads the story of the first man as signifying what has been shown (Prop. 68, Schol.). The free man’s virtue is as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them (Prop. 69); he strives to decline the favours of the ignorant (Prop. 70); only free men are most grateful to one another (Prop. 71); he never acts deceptively (Prop. 72); and he is more free in a state than in solitude (Prop. 73). The closing scholium (Prop. 73, Schol.) refers all this to strength of character, that is, to the tenacity and nobility defined in Part III, Prop. 59, Schol.. The term does not return in Part V, but the wise man of its last scholium, “conscious of himself, and of God, and of things by a certain eternal necessity,” recalls the figure (Part V, Prop. 42, Schol.). The essay on the free man before Part IV, Prop. 67 treats the portrait at length, and Appendix H the question whether the free man is possible.
God, or nature
The formula Deus seu natura occurs only in Part IV, in the Preface and in the demonstration of Prop. 4, but the identification it states is made in Part I. God is “a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes” (Part I, Def. 6); he necessarily exists (Prop. 11), he is the only substance (Prop. 14), and whatever is, is in him (Prop. 15). The scholium to Prop. 29 distinguishes Natura naturans, God considered as a free cause, from Natura naturata, all the modes that follow from him, and so gives “nature” a sense wide enough to cover both. Part II shows that God is a thinking thing and an extended thing (Part II, Props. 1–2), and conceives the whole of nature as one individual whose parts vary in infinitely many ways without any change of the whole (Lemma 7, Schol.). The Preface to Part III insists that “nature is always the same,” its power of acting everywhere one and the same (Part III, Preface). Part IV uses the formula to draw two consequences: “that eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists,” and so for no end (Part IV, Preface); and the power by which a man preserves his being is “the very power of God, or nature” (Prop. 4, Dem.). Part V speaks of God in the language of love, as the object of the mind’s intellectual love and as loving himself with an infinite intellectual love (Part V, Props. 35–36). The introduction to Part I and the essay before Part I, Prop. 16 discuss what Spinoza means by God, and Appendix A and Appendix B how his modes and his attributes are related to him.
Good and evil
Bonum and malum are first discussed in the Appendix to Part I, among the notions men formed after persuading themselves that everything happens for their sake; such notions are “only modes of imagining,” which indicate the constitution of the imagination and not the nature of anything (Part I, Appendix). Part III gives them a psychological origin: “we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it” (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.), and by good Spinoza understands “every kind of joy, and whatever, further, leads to it,” so that “each judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good, what evil” (Prop. 39, Schol.). The Preface to Part IV repeats that good and evil indicate nothing positive in things, yet keeps the words, calling good what we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer to the model of human nature we set before ourselves (Part IV, Preface). The definitions make good what we certainly know to be useful to us, and evil what we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good (Defs. 1–2). The knowledge of good and evil is itself an affect of joy or sadness of which we are conscious (Prop. 8). Reason narrows the certain good to what leads to understanding (Prop. 27) and places the highest good of the mind in the knowledge of God (Prop. 28); the knowledge of evil is inadequate (Prop. 64). Part V advises us, in ordering our thoughts, to attend to what is good in each thing, so as to be determined to act from joy (Part V, Prop. 10, Schol.). The essay before the Appendix to Part I treats the origin of these notions, and the introductions to Parts III and IV their definitions.
Imagination
Imaginatio is defined in Part II, but Part I already sets it against understanding: we divide quantity into parts when we attend to it “as it is in the imagination” (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.), and the notions by which the common people explain nature are “only modes of imagining” (Appendix). Part II, Prop. 17, Schol. calls the affections of the body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us “images of things,” and says that when the mind contemplates bodies in this way it imagines. Imagination thus covers sense perception as well as fancy, and “the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error.” Memory follows the order of the affections of the body, not that of the intellect (Prop. 18, Schol.); imagination gives its name to the first kind of knowledge, which comprises knowledge from random experience and from signs and is the only cause of falsity (Prop. 40, Schol. 2; Prop. 41); and it depends on the imagination alone that we contemplate things as contingent (Prop. 44, Cor. 1). Part III builds the passions from it: the mind strives to imagine whatever increases or aids the body’s power of acting (Part III, Prop. 12), and hope and fear arise from the image of a thing of doubtful outcome (Prop. 18, Schol. 2). Part IV explains why knowing the truth does not remove an imagination, as the sun still looks near when we know its distance (Part IV, Prop. 1, Schol.). Part V sets the order of the intellect against it (Part V, Prop. 10), confines imagination and memory to the duration of the body (Prop. 21), and identifies the imagination as the part of the mind that perishes (Prop. 40, Cor.). The introduction to Part II treats the theory at length.
Intellectual love of God
The amor Dei intellectualis is named in Part V, Prop. 32, Cor., but its elements are prepared from Part I on. Part I refers love, with intellect, will and desire, to Natura naturata and not to Natura naturans (Part I, Prop. 31). Part III defines love as “joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (Part III, Prop. 13, Schol.). Part IV makes the knowledge of God the mind’s highest good (Part IV, Prop. 28). Part V first derives a love of God from the remedies: he who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God (Part V, Prop. 15), and this love must occupy the mind most (Prop. 16). Yet God is without passions (Prop. 17): “Strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one” (Prop. 17, Cor.). The intellectual love arises from the third kind of knowledge, whose delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (Prop. 32); it is the love of God not insofar as we imagine him as present but insofar as we understand him to be eternal (Prop. 32, Cor.), and it is itself eternal (Prop. 33). God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love (Prop. 35), of which the mind’s intellectual love towards God is part (Prop. 36), so that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same (Prop. 36, Cor.). In this love our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists (Prop. 36, Schol.). The introduction to Part V explains how this love differs from the love that God, strictly speaking, does not have, and the essay on the eternity of the mind before Part V, Prop. 21 places it in the second half of the Part.
Joy, sadness and desire
Laetitia, tristitia and cupiditas are the three primary affects of Part III, from which all the others are derived (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol.). Desire is defined first. The striving of each thing to persevere in its being is called appetite when it is related to mind and body together, and “desire is appetite together with consciousness of it” (Prop. 9, Schol.). Joy and sadness are the passions by which the mind passes to a greater or a lesser perfection (Prop. 11, Schol.), and the definitions of the affects insist that they are passages, not states: “joy is not perfection itself” (Def. Aff. 3, Expl.). Desire is there redefined as “the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something” (Def. Aff. 1). Love and hatred are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Prop. 13, Schol.), and the other affects follow; there are also active affects of joy and desire, but none of sadness (Props. 58–59). Part IV evaluates them. A desire arising from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than one arising from sadness (Part IV, Prop. 18); joy is not directly evil but good, and sadness directly evil (Prop. 41); “the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass” (Prop. 45, Schol. 2); and a desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive (Prop. 61). Part V ends with the joy that accompanies the third kind of knowledge, from which the intellectual love of God arises (Part V, Prop. 32, Cor.), and with blessedness, which is not a passage to perfection but the possession of it (Prop. 33, Schol.). The introduction to Part III treats the primary affects at length.
Mind
Mens is the subject of Part II, which will lead us to “the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness” (Part II, Preface). Part I has made the thinking thing an attribute of God or an affection of one (Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2). Part II defines the human mind as an idea: “The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing” (Part II, Prop. 11). The mind is therefore part of the infinite intellect of God (Prop. 11, Cor.), and the thing of which it is the idea is a body (Prop. 13). A mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways (Prop. 7, Schol.), and minds differ as their bodies differ in what they can do and undergo (Prop. 13, Schol.). The mind knows its body, and itself, only through the ideas of the body’s affections (Props. 19 and 23). Part III concludes that neither mind nor body can determine the other (Part III, Prop. 2), that whatever increases the body’s power of acting increases the mind’s power of thinking (Prop. 11), and that the mind acts insofar as it has adequate ideas (Prop. 3). Part IV places the mind’s highest good and highest virtue in the knowledge of God (Part IV, Prop. 28). Part V shows that something of the mind remains which is eternal (Part V, Prop. 23), namely the intellect, while the imagination perishes (Prop. 40, Cor.), and says that “the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone” (Prop. 36, Schol.). The introduction to Part II, the essay on the physical digression and Appendix C treat the mind and its body at length.
Necessity
Necessity (necessitas) is first defined by contrast: a free thing exists “from the necessity of its own nature alone,” while a thing determined by another is called “necessary, or rather compelled” (Part I, Def. 7). Part I then makes it universal. From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily (Ax. 3); from the necessity of the divine nature infinitely many things follow in infinitely many modes (Prop. 16), as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles (Prop. 17, Schol.); nothing in the nature of things is contingent (Prop. 29); and things could have been produced in no other way and in no other order (Prop. 33). A thing is called contingent “for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge” (Prop. 33, Schol. 1). Part II extends necessity to thought, inadequate ideas following “with the same necessity” as adequate ones (Part II, Prop. 36), and makes it the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary (Prop. 44); its closing scholium teaches us to bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind (Prop. 49, Schol.). The Preface to Part III applies the same necessity to the affects. Part IV defines the contingent and the possible by what we find, or do not know, when we attend to the essence of singular things or to their causes (Part IV, Defs. 3–4), and observes that an affect towards a thing imagined as necessary is the more intense (Prop. 11). Part V makes the understanding of necessity a remedy: “Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects” (Part V, Prop. 6). The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 and Appendix D treat the question at length.
Perfection
Perfectio is joined to reality in Part I’s proof that God exists: things produced by external causes owe “all the perfection, or reality, they have” to those causes, and perfection “does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary posits it” (Part I, Prop. 11, Schol.). The Appendix denies that things are more or less perfect because they please or offend us, for “the perfection of things is to be judged from their nature and power alone” (Appendix). Part II makes the equation a definition: “By reality and perfection I understand the same thing” (Part II, Def. 6). Part III uses it to define the primary passions, joy and sadness being the mind’s passage to a greater or a lesser perfection (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol.), a passage and not perfection itself (Def. Aff. 3, Expl.). The Preface to Part IV explains how the words arose, from comparing works with the aims of their makers and natural things with universal models, and calls perfection and imperfection “only modes of thinking” (Part IV, Preface). It keeps them nonetheless: men are more or less perfect as they come nearer to the model of human nature or are further from it, and to pass to a greater perfection is not to be changed into another essence but to have one’s power of acting increased (Preface). Part V carries the notion to its limit. If joy is the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness consists in the mind’s being endowed with perfection itself (Part V, Prop. 33, Schol.), and the more perfection a thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on (Prop. 40). The introductions to Parts I and IV discuss the equation of perfection with reality.
Power
Power (potentia) enters the Ethics with the third proof of God’s existence: “To be able not to exist is lack of power, and conversely, to be able to exist is power” (Part I, Prop. 11, third Dem.). Part I ends by identifying God’s power with his essence (Prop. 34), so that whatever we conceive to be in his power necessarily is (Prop. 35) and nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow (Prop. 36). Spinoza distinguishes potentia from potestas, what lies within someone’s power; both are rendered “power,” with notes where the difference matters, as at Prop. 17, Schol.. Part II makes God’s power of thinking equal to his actual power of acting (Part II, Prop. 7, Cor.). In Part III each singular thing expresses God’s power in a certain and determinate way, and its power, or striving, to persevere in its being is its actual essence (Part III, Prop. 6, Dem.; Prop. 7, Dem.); affects are changes in the body’s power of acting (Def. 3). Part IV defines bondage as lack of power (Part IV, Preface), measures human power against external causes, which infinitely surpass it (Prop. 3), makes a man’s power a part of the infinite power of God, or nature (Prop. 4, Dem.), and identifies virtue with power (Def. 8). Part V, whose title names the power of the intellect, holds that the power of the mind is defined by understanding alone (Part V, Preface), and ends by showing how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant (Prop. 42, Schol.). The introduction to Part I and the essay before Part I, Prop. 16 discuss God’s power, and the introduction to Part III the power of things to persevere.
Reason
Reason (ratio), as a kind of knowledge, is defined in the second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40: knowledge that arises “from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things,” which Spinoza calls “reason, and knowledge of the second kind.” In Part I the word often means a ground, as in the formula “a cause, or reason” of Part I, Prop. 11, second Dem.. Reason is necessarily true (Part II, Prop. 41); it contemplates things not as contingent but as necessary (Prop. 44), and under a certain species of eternity (Prop. 44, Cor. 2). Part III introduces its dictates: tenacity and nobility are desires by which each strives, “from the dictate of reason alone,” to preserve his being and to join others to himself in friendship (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol.). Part IV states those dictates in advance, that each love himself, seek his own advantage and strive to preserve his being (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol.), and then demonstrates them: whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding (Prop. 26); men always agree in nature only insofar as they live from the guidance of reason (Prop. 35); and to every action to which a passion determines us, reason could determine us without it (Prop. 59). Its Appendix places man’s highest happiness in perfecting “the intellect, or reason” (ch. 4). Part V treats “the power of reason” (Part V, Preface), shows that affects arising from reason are, if account is taken of time, the more powerful (Prop. 7), and that the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge can arise from the second kind, though not from the first (Prop. 28). The introductions to Parts II and IV treat reason at length.
Self-contentment
Acquiescentia in se ipso, “self-contentment,” and animi acquiescentia, “contentment of mind,” name a joy in which the mind comes to rest in itself. Part III introduces it as “joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause” (Part III, Prop. 30, Schol.), more exactly the joy that arises from the contemplation of ourselves (Prop. 55, Schol.), and defines it as “joy arising from a man’s contemplating himself and his power of acting” (Def. Aff. 25), the opposite of humility (Def. Aff. 26, Expl.). Part IV shows that self-contentment can arise from reason, and that only the self-contentment which so arises is the greatest there can be (Part IV, Prop. 52); the scholium calls it “in truth the highest thing we can hope for” (Prop. 52, Schol.). The Appendix to Part IV identifies blessedness with “the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God” (ch. 4), and its last chapter says that the better part of us, which is defined by understanding, will be entirely content once it understands that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow (ch. 32). Part V derives “the greatest contentment of mind there can be” from the third kind of knowledge (Part V, Prop. 27); it says that the intellectual love of God, whether related to God or to the mind, can rightly be called contentment of mind, which is not distinguished from glory (Prop. 36, Schol.); and it closes by contrasting the ignorant man, who never possesses true contentment of mind, with the wise man, who always possesses it (Prop. 42, Schol.). The introduction to Part IV discusses self-contentment among the affects that reason approves.
Striving
Conatus, rendered “striving” (the Latin is also used in the notes and essays), is the centre of Part III, but its ground is laid earlier. Part I ends with the claim that nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow (Part I, Prop. 36), and the physical digression of Part II gives the corresponding law of bodies: a body in motion moves until another determines it to rest, and a body at rest remains at rest until another determines it to motion (Part II, Lemma 3, Cor.). Part III states the doctrine. No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause (Part III, Prop. 4); “Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (Prop. 6), because singular things express God’s power in a certain and determinate way (Prop. 6, Dem.); and this striving is “nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself” (Prop. 7), involving an indefinite time, not a finite one (Prop. 8). Related to the mind alone it is called will, related to mind and body together appetite, and appetite with consciousness of it is desire (Prop. 9, Schol.). Part IV builds its ethics on it: reason demands that each strive to preserve his own being (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol.); “The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue” (Prop. 22, Cor.); no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing (Prop. 25); and whatever we strive for from reason is understanding (Prop. 26). Part V names the end of the mind’s striving: “The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge” (Part V, Prop. 25). The introduction to Part III treats the doctrine at length, and Appendix G the questions it raises.
Substance, attribute and mode
Substantia, attributum and modus are defined together at the head of Part I. Substance is “what is in itself and is conceived through itself” (Part I, Def. 3); an attribute is “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Def. 4); and a mode is an affection of a substance, “that which is in another, through which it is also conceived” (Def. 5). The first half of Part I argues that there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (Prop. 5), that the real distinction of attributes does not make them distinct substances (Prop. 10, Schol.), and that except God no substance can be or be conceived (Prop. 14). Thought and extension are therefore attributes of God or affections of his attributes (Prop. 14, Cor. 2), and particular things are modes expressing God’s attributes in a certain and determinate way (Prop. 25, Cor.). Part II applies the scheme to man: the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, which is constituted by certain modifications of God’s attributes (Part II, Prop. 10 and Cor.); and a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways (Prop. 7, Schol.). Part III restates this of mind and body (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol.) and grounds striving in the status of singular things as modes (Prop. 6, Dem.); Part IV infers that a man cannot but be a part of nature (Part IV, Prop. 4); and Part V distinguishes conceiving things in relation to a time and place from conceiving them as contained in God (Part V, Prop. 29, Schol.). The introduction to Part I treats the definitions at length, Appendix A the relation of substance to mode, and Appendix B the attributes.
Three kinds of knowledge
The kinds of knowledge (cognitionis genera) are distinguished in the second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40. The first, “opinion, or imagination,” comprises knowledge from random experience and from signs; the second, “reason,” proceeds from common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things; the third, “intuitive knowledge” (scientia intuitiva), “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.” The first kind is the only cause of falsity, the second and third are necessarily true (Prop. 41), and the third rests on the adequate knowledge of God’s essence that every human mind has (Prop. 47 and Schol.). Part III does not name the kinds, but its distinction between action and passion rests on that between adequate and inadequate ideas (Part III, Prop. 3); Part IV turns it into the contrast between the man led by affect or opinion and the man led by reason (Part IV, Prop. 66, Schol.), and its Appendix places blessedness in the contentment that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God (ch. 4). Part V puts the third kind to work. The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God (Part V, Prop. 24); to understand by the third kind is the mind’s highest striving and highest virtue (Prop. 25); the desire for it can arise from the second kind but not from the first (Prop. 28); it depends on the mind as its formal cause insofar as the mind is eternal (Prop. 31); and from it arise the greatest contentment of mind (Prop. 27) and the intellectual love of God (Prop. 32, Cor.). The introduction to Part II and the essay on the eternity of the mind treat the doctrine at length.
Virtue
Virtus first appears in the sense of causal power, and in Part I, Prop. 11, Schol. the translation renders it “power,” with a note. The scholium closing Part II uses it in the ethical sense, rebuking those who expect God to reward their virtue, “as if virtue itself and servitude to God were not happiness itself and the highest freedom” (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol.). The Preface to Part III speaks of nature’s “virtue and power of acting” as everywhere one and the same (Part III, Preface). Part IV joins the two senses by definition: “By virtue and power I understand the same thing,” virtue in man being his very essence insofar as he has the power of bringing about what can be understood through the laws of his nature alone (Part IV, Def. 8). The dictates of reason follow: the foundation of virtue is the striving to preserve one’s own being, and virtue is to be desired for its own sake (Prop. 18, Schol.); the more each one seeks his own advantage, the more he is endowed with virtue (Prop. 20); a man acts from virtue only insofar as he understands (Prop. 23); and “the highest virtue of the mind is to know God” (Prop. 28). The same standard decides which affects are virtues: humility and repentance are not, since they do not arise from reason (Props. 53–54), and the virtue of a free man is as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them (Prop. 69). Part V makes understanding by the third kind of knowledge the mind’s highest virtue (Part V, Prop. 25), and ends: “Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself” (Prop. 42). The introduction to Part IV treats virtue at length, and Appendix H the question whether its ethics is egoistic.
Will
Will (voluntas) is in the Ethics chiefly the object of a denial. Part I refuses it to God’s nature: if intellect and will pertained to God, they would agree with ours in nothing except the name, as the Dog, a heavenly constellation, agrees with the dog, a barking animal (Part I, Prop. 17, Schol.). Will belongs to Natura naturata (Prop. 31), it is a necessary and not a free cause (Prop. 32), and “God does not operate from freedom of the will” (Prop. 32, Cor. 1); the Appendix calls the will of God, in which the defenders of final causes take refuge, “the sanctuary of ignorance” (Appendix). Part II denies that there is any absolute, or free, will in the mind (Part II, Prop. 48), treats the faculty of willing as a universal formed from singular volitions (Prop. 48, Schol.), and identifies each volition with the affirmation or negation an idea involves (Prop. 49), concluding: “Will and intellect are one and the same” (Prop. 49, Cor.). Part III gives the word a second sense, the striving to persevere “when it is related to the mind alone” (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol.), and argues that the decrees of the mind “are nothing but the appetites themselves” (Prop. 2, Schol.). Part IV accordingly speaks not of what the will chooses but of what reason demands (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol.). Part V rejects in its Preface the view of the Stoics, and of Descartes, that the will can acquire absolute dominion over the affects (Part V, Preface), and seeks the mind’s power over them in understanding instead. The essay on will and intellect before Part II, Prop. 48 treats the doctrine at length.
Summary Tables
These tables set out in summary four structures that the Ethics builds over many pages: the order of what exists, from substance to singular things; the derivation of the affects from desire, joy and sadness; the three kinds of knowledge; and the remedies for the affects that Part V gathers in one scholium. They are aids to finding one’s way, not substitutes for the text: each row gives the passage where the matter is stated, and the wording in the third column is abbreviated from it.
The order of being
Part I distinguishes substance, its attributes and its modes (Defs. 3–5), and then the modes that follow from God’s nature without limit from those that are finite. Spinoza names an example of each kind of infinite mode in a letter, at Tschirnhaus’s request (Letter 64).
| Level | What it is | Where stated | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Substance | what is in itself and is conceived through itself; there is only one, God | Part I, Def. 3; Prop. 14 | God, or nature (Part IV, Preface) |
| Attributes | what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence; God consists of infinite attributes | Part I, Def. 4; Def. 6 | thought and extension, the two we know (Part II, Ax. 5; Props. 1–2) |
| Immediate infinite modes | what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute, eternal and infinite | Part I, Prop. 21 | in thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in extension, motion and rest (Letter 64) |
| Mediate infinite modes | what follows from an attribute modified by such a mode, necessary and infinite | Part I, Prop. 22 | the face of the whole universe, which varies in infinite ways yet remains the same (Letter 64; Part II, Lemma 7, Schol.) |
| Finite modes | singular things, each determined to exist and act by another finite cause, and so to infinity | Part I, Prop. 28; Part II, Def. 7 | a human body and the mind that is its idea (Part II, Props. 11–13) |
The affects and their derivation
Part III recognizes three primary affects, desire, joy and sadness (Prop. 11, Schol.), and defines the others from them (Definitions of the Affects). The tables follow the definitions, grouped by the primary affect each one is a form of; the affects defined from love or hatred are listed with joy and sadness, since love is a joy and hatred a sadness. Wonder and contempt (Def. Aff. 4–5) are defined as imaginations, and Spinoza does not number wonder among the affects (Def. Aff. 4, Expl.).
| Def. | Affect | A joy … |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | joy | a passage from a lesser to a greater perfection |
| 6 | love | accompanied by the idea of an external cause |
| 8 | inclination | accompanied by the idea of what is accidentally its cause |
| 11 | mockery | from imagining something we despise in a thing we hate |
| 12 | hope | inconstant, from a future or past thing of doubtful outcome |
| 14 | confidence | from such a thing when the cause of doubt is removed |
| 16 | gladness | from a past thing that turned out contrary to expectation |
| 25 | self-contentment | from contemplating oneself and one’s power of acting |
| 30 | glory | from an action of ours we imagine others to praise |
| 10 | devotion | love towards one whom we wonder at |
| 19 | favour | love towards one who has done good to another |
| 21 | overestimation | thinking more highly of someone than is just, out of love |
| 24 | compassion | love rejoicing in another’s good, saddened by another’s ill |
| 28 | pride | thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of self-love |
| Def. | Affect | A sadness … |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | sadness | a passage from a greater to a lesser perfection |
| 7 | hatred | accompanied by the idea of an external cause |
| 9 | aversion | accompanied by the idea of what is accidentally its cause |
| 13 | fear | inconstant, from a future or past thing of doubtful outcome |
| 15 | despair | from such a thing when the cause of doubt is removed |
| 17 | remorse | from a past thing that turned out contrary to expectation |
| 18 | pity | from an evil that has happened to another like us |
| 26 | humility | from contemplating one’s lack of power, or weakness |
| 27 | repentance | from a deed we believe we did from a free decree of the mind |
| 29 | self-abasement | thinking less highly of oneself than is just, out of sadness |
| 31 | shame | from an action of ours we imagine others to blame |
| 20 | indignation | hatred towards one who has done evil to another |
| 22 | scorn | thinking less highly of someone than is just, out of hatred |
| 23 | envy | hatred saddened by another’s happiness, rejoicing in his ill |
| Def. | Affect | A desire … |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | desire | the very essence of man, determined to do something |
| 32 | longing | to possess a thing, fostered and restrained by memory |
| 33 | emulation | for a thing, because we imagine others to desire it |
| 34 | thankfulness | to do good to one who has done good to us from love |
| 35 | benevolence | to do good to one we pity |
| 36 | anger | from hatred, to do evil to one we hate |
| 37 | vengeance | from reciprocal hatred, to do evil to one who has harmed us |
| 38 | cruelty | to do evil to one whom we love or pity |
| 39 | timidity | to avoid a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser |
| 40 | daring | to act in a danger which one’s equals fear to face |
| 41 | cowardice | restrained by timidity before a danger one’s equals dare to face |
| 42 | consternation | to avoid an evil, restrained by wonder at the evil feared |
| 43 | courtesy | to do what pleases men and omit what displeases them |
| 44 | ambition | an immoderate desire for glory |
| 45 | gluttony | an immoderate desire, or love, of feasting |
| 46 | drunkenness | an immoderate desire and love of drinking |
| 47 | greed | an immoderate desire and love of riches |
| 48 | lust | a desire and love in the joining of bodies |
The three kinds of knowledge
Part II distinguishes the kinds of knowledge in one scholium and illustrates them all with a single example: three numbers are given, and a fourth is sought which is to the third as the second is to the first (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2).
| Kind | Name | Arises from | The example | Truth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First | opinion, or imagination | singulars presented confusedly through the senses (random experience), and signs | merchants multiply the second by the third and divide by the first, because a teacher told them so or because it held in simple cases | the only cause of falsity (Prop. 41) |
| Second | reason | common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things | from the demonstration of Euclid, Book VII, Prop. 19, the common property of proportionals | necessarily true; teaches us to distinguish the true from the false (Props. 41–42) |
| Third | intuitive knowledge | an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God, proceeding to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things | given 1, 2 and 3, everyone sees at a glance that the fourth is 6 | necessarily true; the mind’s highest striving and virtue (Part V, Prop. 25) |
The remedies for the affects
At the close of the first half of Part V, Spinoza sums up what the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects (Part V, Prop. 20, Schol.).
| The power of the mind over the affects consists … | Where shown | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | in the knowledge itself of the affects | Part V, Prop. 4, Schol. |
| 2 | in separating the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly | Prop. 2; Prop. 4, Schol. |
| 3 | in time, by which affections related to things we understand surpass those related to things conceived confusedly | Prop. 7 |
| 4 | in the multitude of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are fostered | Props. 9 and 11 |
| 5 | in the order in which the mind can order its affects and connect them with one another | Prop. 10, Schol.; Props. 12–14 |
The second half of Part V shows what the mind can do insofar as it is related to itself alone, without relation to the body; the essay before Part V, Prop. 21 follows it.
Synopsis of the Propositions
The enunciation of every proposition of the Ethics, with the lemmas of the physical digression in Part II (L1–L7), in the order of the text; each number is linked to its place.
First Part of the Ethics: Of God
- 1Substance is prior in nature to its affections.
- 2Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.
- 3Of things that have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other.
- 4Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by a diversity of the attributes of the substances or by a diversity of their affections.
- 5In the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.
- 6One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
- 7It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.
- 8Every substance is necessarily infinite.
- 9The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.
- 10Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself.
- 11God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
- 12No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that the substance can be divided.
- 13A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible.
- 14Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.
- 15Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.
- 16From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).
- 17God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.
- 18God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.
- 19God, or all of God’s attributes, are eternal.
- 20God’s existence and his essence are one and the same.
- 21All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have had to exist always and as infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.
- 22Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which, through the same attribute, exists both necessarily and as infinite, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite.
- 23Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists both necessarily and as infinite.
- 24The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
- 25God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
- 26A thing which has been determined to produce some effect has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to operate.
- 27A thing which has been determined by God to produce some effect cannot render itself undetermined.
- 28Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on to infinity.
- 29In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way.
- 30An intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else.
- 31The actual intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.
- 32The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.
- 33Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced.
- 34God’s power is his very essence.
- 35Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power necessarily is.
- 36Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.
Second Part of the Ethics: Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
- 1Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
- 2Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.
- 3In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from his essence.
- 4The idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be unique.
- 5The formal being of ideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of God’s attributes and of singular things admit as their efficient cause not the objects themselves, or the things perceived, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.
- 6The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other.
- 7The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
- 8The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes.
- 9The idea of a singular thing actually existing has God for its cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing actually existing, of which God is also the cause insofar as he is affected by another, third idea, and so on to infinity.
- 10The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.
- 11The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing.
- 12Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body that is not perceived by the mind.
- 13The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else.
- L1Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.
- L2All bodies agree in certain things.
- L3A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity.
- L4If from a body, or individual, which is composed of several bodies, certain bodies are separated, and at the same time as many other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form.
- L5If the parts composing an individual become greater or smaller, but in such proportion that all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, as before, without any change of form.
- L6If certain bodies composing an individual are compelled to turn aside the motion they have towards one part towards another, but in such a way that they can continue their motions and communicate them to one another in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature without any change of form.
- L7Further, an individual so composed retains its nature whether it moves as a whole or is at rest, or moves towards this part or towards that, provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before.
- 14The human mind is capable of perceiving very many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in more ways.
- 15The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas.
- 16The idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body.
- 17If the human body is affected in a mode that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body.
- 18If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.
- 19The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through the ideas of affections by which the body is affected.
- 20There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body.
- 21This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.
- 22The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections.
- 23The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.
- 24The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
- 25The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body.
- 26The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.
- 27The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
- 28The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.
- 29The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind.
- 30We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.
- 31We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things that are outside us.
- 32All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.
- 33There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.
- 34Every idea which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.
- 35Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.
- 36Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.
- 37That which is common to all things (on which see Lemma 2 above), and which is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.
- 38Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.
- 39Of that which is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and which is equally in the part of each of these and in the whole, there will also be an adequate idea in the mind.
- 40Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it are also adequate.
- 41Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, but knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.
- 42Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.
- 43He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.
- 44It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary.
- 45Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
- 46The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.
- 47The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
- 48In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will; but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.
- 49There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, besides that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves.
Third Part of the Ethics: Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects
- 1Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things.
- 2The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).
- 3The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.
- 4No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause.
- 5Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.
- 6Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.
- 7The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.
- 8The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
- 9The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this striving of its own.
- 10An idea which excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.
- 11Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting of our body, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of thinking of our mind.
- 12The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body’s power of acting.
- 13When the mind imagines those things which diminish or restrain the body’s power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things which exclude their existence.
- 14If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.
- 15Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of joy, sadness or desire.
- 16From the mere fact that we imagine some thing to have something similar to an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sadness, we shall love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.
- 17If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of sadness has something similar to another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.
- 18A man is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy and sadness as by the image of a present thing.
- 19He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but if he imagines that it is preserved, he will rejoice.
- 20He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.
- 21He who imagines that what he loves is affected with joy or sadness will also be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or less in the lover as it is greater or less in the thing loved.
- 22If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with sadness, we shall, on the contrary, also be affected with hatred towards him.
- 23He who imagines that what he hates is affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened; and each of these affects will be greater or less as its contrary is greater or less in what he hates.
- 24If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with hatred towards him also. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect that same thing with sadness, we shall be affected with love towards him.
- 25We strive to affirm of ourselves and of the thing loved whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy; and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with sadness.
- 26We strive to affirm of a thing we hate whatever we imagine to affect it with sadness, and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect it with joy.
- 27From the fact that we imagine a thing like us, towards which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.
- 28We strive to promote the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy; but whatever we imagine is opposed to it, or leads to sadness, we strive to remove or destroy.
- 29We shall also strive to do whatever we imagine men to look on with joy, and, on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men to be averse to.
- 30If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he imagines affects others with sadness, he will, on the contrary, contemplate himself with sadness.
- 31If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something which we ourselves love, desire or hate, we shall thereby love it, etc., more constantly. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the contrary, then we shall suffer fluctuation of mind.
- 32If we imagine that someone enjoys some thing which only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it.
- 33When we love a thing like us, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return.
- 34The greater the affect with which we imagine a thing we love to be affected towards us, the more we shall exult in glory.
- 35If someone imagines that a thing he loves joins another to itself with the same bond of friendship, or a closer one, than that by which he alone possessed it, he will be affected with hatred towards the thing loved, and will envy that other.
- 36He who recollects a thing in which he once took delight desires to possess it with the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it.
- 37The desire which arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is the greater, the greater the affect is.
- 38If someone begins to hate a thing he loved, so that the love is completely destroyed, he will, from an equal cause, hate it with a greater hatred than if he had never loved it, and with a hatred the greater, the greater the love had been before.
- 39He who hates someone will strive to do him evil, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from it; and, on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive, by the same law, to do him good.
- 40He who imagines that he is hated by someone, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate him in return.
- 41If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe that he has given any cause for it (which can happen by Cor. of Prop. 15 and by Prop. 16 of this Part), he will love him in return.
- 42He who has conferred a benefit on someone, moved by love or by hope of glory, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with an ungrateful spirit.
- 43Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love.
- 44Hatred which is completely conquered by love passes into love; and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it.
- 45If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred towards a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate him.
- 46If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, accompanied by the idea of him under the universal name of the class or nation as cause, he will love or hate not only him, but all of the same class or nation.
- 47The joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed or affected with some other evil does not arise without some sadness of mind.
- 48Love and hatred, for example towards Peter, are destroyed if the sadness which the latter involves, and the joy which the former involves, are joined to the idea of another cause; and each is diminished insofar as we imagine that Peter was not the only cause of either.
- 49Love and hatred towards a thing we imagine to be free must both, from an equal cause, be greater than towards a necessary thing.
- 50Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of hope or fear.
- 51Different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times.
- 52An object which we have previously seen together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, we shall not contemplate for as long as one which we imagine to have something singular.
- 53When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting, it rejoices; and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.
- 54The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting.
- 55When the mind imagines its lack of power, it is thereby saddened.
- 56There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of each affect which is composed of these, like fluctuation of mind, or which is derived from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.
- 57Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
- 58Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act.
- 59Among all the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none but those which are related to joy or desire.
Fourth Part of the Ethics: Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects
- 1Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true.
- 2We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others.
- 3The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.
- 4It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.
- 5The force and increase of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.
- 6The force of some passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man.
- 7An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained.
- 8The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.
- 9An affect whose cause we imagine as now present to us is stronger than if we imagined it not to be present.
- 10We are affected more intensely towards a future thing which we imagine will soon be present than if we imagined its time of existing to be further distant from the present; and we are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago than if we imagined it to have passed long ago.
- 11An affect towards a thing which we imagine as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a thing possible or contingent, or not necessary.
- 12An affect towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a contingent thing.
- 13An affect towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present is, other things being equal, less intense than an affect towards a past thing.
- 14The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.
- 15A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires which arise from the affects by which we are troubled.
- 16A desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for things which are pleasant in the present.
- 17A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can be restrained still much more easily by a desire for things which are present.
- 18A desire which arises from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than a desire which arises from sadness.
- 19Each one, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily wants or is averse to what he judges to be good or evil.
- 20The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; and on the contrary, insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, to that extent he lacks power.
- 21No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live, that is, actually to exist.
- 22No virtue can be conceived prior to this one (namely, the striving to preserve oneself).
- 23A man, insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands.
- 24To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve our being (these three signify the same) from the guidance of reason, and that from the foundation of seeking one’s own advantage.
- 25No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing.
- 26Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; and the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding.
- 27We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding.
- 28The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.
- 29Any singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can neither aid nor restrain our power of acting, and absolutely, nothing can be good or evil for us unless it has something in common with us.
- 30No thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, to that extent it is contrary to us.
- 31Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good.
- 32Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree in nature.
- 33Men can differ in nature insofar as they are troubled by affects which are passions, and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconstant.
- 34Insofar as men are troubled by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.
- 35Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature.
- 36The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally.
- 37The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men, and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has.
- 38What so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is useful to man; and the more useful, the more capable it renders the body of being affected in many ways and of affecting other bodies; and on the contrary, that is harmful which renders the body less capable of these things.
- 39Those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved are good; and on the contrary, those are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different ratio of motion and rest to one another.
- 40Things which conduce to the common society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; and on the contrary, those are evil which introduce discord into the state.
- 41Joy is not directly evil, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil.
- 42Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good; and on the contrary, melancholy is always evil.
- 43Pleasure can be excessive and be evil; but pain can be good insofar as pleasure, or joy, is evil.
- 44Love and desire can be excessive.
- 45Hatred can never be good.
- 46He who lives from the guidance of reason strives as far as he can to repay another’s hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him with love in return, or nobility.
- 47The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves.
- 48The affects of overestimation and scorn are always evil.
- 49Overestimation easily makes the man who is overestimated proud.
- 50Pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless.
- 51Favour is not opposed to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.
- 52Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only that self-contentment which arises from reason is the greatest there can be.
- 53Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.
- 54Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power.
- 55The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of oneself.
- 56The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest lack of power of mind.
- 57The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates that of the noble.
- 58Glory is not opposed to reason, but can arise from it.
- 59To all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason without it.
- 60A desire which arises from a joy or sadness that is related to one or several, but not to all, of the parts of the body has no regard for the advantage of the whole man.
- 61A desire which arises from reason cannot be excessive.
- 62Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.
- 63He who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.
- 64The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.
- 65Of two goods we shall follow, from the guidance of reason, the greater, and of two evils the lesser.
- 66From the guidance of reason we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.
- 67A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.
- 68If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.
- 69The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them.
- 70A free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to decline their favours.
- 71Only free men are most grateful to one another.
- 72A free man never acts deceptively, but always in good faith.
- 73A man who is led by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone.
Fifth Part of the Ethics: Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom
- 1In just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected exactly in the body.
- 2If we separate a commotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as the fluctuations of mind which arise from these affects, will be destroyed.
- 3An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.
- 4There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.
- 5An affect towards a thing which we imagine simply, and not as necessary, or as possible, or as contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.
- 6Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them.
- 7Affects which arise from or are aroused by reason are, if account is taken of time, more powerful than those which are related to singular things which we contemplate as absent.
- 8The more causes concurring at the same time by which some affect is aroused, the greater it is.
- 9An affect which is related to many and different causes, which the mind contemplates together with the affect itself, is less harmful, and we are acted on less by it and are affected less towards each cause, than by another equally great affect which is related to one only or to fewer causes.
- 10So long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.
- 11The more things an image is related to, the more frequent it is, or the more often it is vivid, and the more it occupies the mind.
- 12The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others.
- 13The more other images an image is joined to, the more often it is vivid.
- 14The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.
- 15He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects.
- 16This love towards God must occupy the mind most.
- 17God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.
- 18No one can hate God.
- 19He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.
- 20This love towards God cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or of jealousy; but it is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love.
- 21The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures.
- 22Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity.
- 23The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.
- 24The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.
- 25The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
- 26The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.
- 27From this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be.
- 28The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second.
- 29Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity.
- 30Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.
- 31The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.
- 32Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause.
- 33The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
- 34Only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions.
- 35God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.
- 36The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered under a species of eternity; that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.
- 37There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
- 38The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death.
- 39He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.
- 40The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.
- 41Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility.
- 42Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts, but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts.