Introduction to the Letters
Spinoza published nothing of the Ethics in his lifetime, but parts of it circulated among his friends, first as drafts and later as a nearly finished manuscript, and some of those who read it wrote to him with questions. His answers are the nearest thing we have to his own commentary on the book. The twenty-seven letters printed here are those in which he explains doctrines of the Ethics, or the views on which it rests, to readers who had found them difficult, together with the letters of his correspondents to which he replies point by point. They are numbered, as in the editions of Van Vloten and Land and of Gebhardt, in the order of their dates; the Opera Posthuma of 1677, which first printed them, used a different order and numbering, given in the notes.
The text
The Latin is that of Carl Gebhardt’s edition (Spinoza Opera, vol. IV, Heidelberg, 1925), whose page numbers are given in the Latin in the form [G IV 42]. Where Gebhardt prints both the text of the 1677 edition and a surviving original or copy, the 1677 text is followed, as for the Ethics, and the textual notes report what the manuscript adds; the one exception is Letter 8, whose original survives and of which Gebhardt prints only that. Passages that are found only in the Dutch version of 1677 (De Nagelate Schriften), which Gebhardt gives in Dutch, are left out of the Latin and translated in the notes. The orthography has been brought into line with that of the Latin of the Ethics in this edition: accents are dropped, j is printed as i, and capitals within a sentence are reduced, except in names. A few slips of the digital text used here have been corrected from the edition of Van Vloten and Land and from the 1677 edition, Greek words which it transliterates are restored from the 1677 pages, and two small drawings in Letter 9 and the figure of the two circles in Letter 12 are not reproduced.
As in the Ethics, numbered notes belong to the English and lettered notes to the Latin, and references to the Ethics are linked to the passages they cite.
Nine of the letters were written in Dutch: the exchange with Blyenbergh (Letters 18–24 and 27) and the letter to Jelles (Letter 50). The 1677 edition printed them in a Latin version, headed Versio, and the Dutch in the Dutch edition of the same year; Gebhardt prints both. Here, as for the other letters, the Latin of 1677 is the text translated, so that the English renders a translation; the notes give the Dutch where the two differ in sense, and translate the passages, such as the closing paragraphs of Letters 19 and 23, which only the Dutch has.
The translation follows the conventions of the translation of the Ethics, and renders Spinoza’s technical vocabulary in the same way. The letters of De Vries, Blyenbergh and Tschirnhaus are not always polished Latin; where they are awkward or incomplete, the English is too.
Simon de Vries, 1663 (Letters 8–10)
Simon Joosten de Vries, born around 1634 into an Amsterdam merchant family of Mennonite background, was one of the circle of friends whom Spinoza had known since the 1650s (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 166, 200). In 1663, while Spinoza was living at Rijnsburg, the circle met to read the drafts he sent them, taking turns to explain and demonstrate the propositions; Letter 8, of February 1663, describes these meetings and reports their difficulties with the definitions. What they were reading was an early version of Part I: De Vries quotes its third definition, which then defined substance and attribute together, and the scholium that became the scholium to Prop. 10. Spinoza’s reply, Letter 9, distinguishes a definition that must be true of its object from one that need only be conceivable, restates the definition of substance and attribute, and explains, with the examples of Israel and Jacob, how one thing can bear two names. Letter 10 answers two further questions, about the place of experience in knowing the attributes and about eternal truths.
Lodewijk Meyer, 1663 (Letter 12)
Letter 12, the ’letter on the infinite’, was written to Lodewijk Meyer, the Amsterdam physician who wrote the preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy in the same year and who did more than anyone to bring Spinoza’s writings into print (Nadler, pp. 202–203). It distinguishes three pairs of infinites that the philosophers had confused, explains the difference between eternity and duration, and argues that measure, time and number are aids of the imagination. Much of it reappears, sometimes word for word, in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15, and its closing remarks on an argument of Hasdai Crescas bear on Part I, Prop. 28. Thirteen years later Tschirnhaus asked Spinoza to explain one of its examples (Letters 80 and 81).
Willem van Blyenbergh, 1664–1665 (Letters 18–24, 27)
Willem van Blyenbergh was a grain merchant and broker of Dordrecht with a taste for theology and philosophy, the author of a book of 1663 defending the knowledge of God and religion against the atheists (Nadler, pp. 251–252). In December 1664 he wrote to Spinoza, whom he did not know, after reading the Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy and its appendix, the Metaphysical Thoughts; it was all he knew of Spinoza’s work, and he could not always tell where Spinoza gave his own views and where Descartes’s. His question (Letter 18) was how, if God continually creates every thing and every motion of the will, there can be evil that God does not himself bring about. Spinoza’s reply (Letter 19), written in January 1665 at a farm near Schiedam where he was staying during the plague (Nadler, p. 251), sets out his account of evil: everything, considered in itself, has as much perfection as it has reality; imperfection appears only when things are compared, and the privation we ascribe to them belongs to our way of thinking, not to God’s intellect, the account given in the Preface to Part IV.
Blyenbergh’s answer (Letter 20) made clear that he held two rules of philosophy, the clear and distinct conceptions of the intellect and the revealed word of God, and that the second must prevail; Spinoza replied that they disagreed about first principles themselves, and explained the difference between privation and negation (Letter 21; Nadler, pp. 253–254). In Letter 23 he gives the example of Nero, whose matricide was outwardly the same act as that of Orestes, refuses to speak philosophically of God in the language of theology, and refers to his Ethics, ’not yet published’. After a visit, Blyenbergh asked for the definitions, postulates and axioms of the Ethics (Letter 24), and Spinoza declined (Letter 27). Nine years later Blyenbergh published a refutation of the Theological-Political Treatise (Nadler, p. 255).
Henry Oldenburg, 1665 (Letter 32)
Henry Oldenburg, born in Bremen about 1620, visited Spinoza at Rijnsburg in the summer of 1661 and began a correspondence that, after a long interruption, was renewed in the last years of Spinoza’s life; he was secretary of the Royal Society in London, and passed on to Spinoza the work of Robert Boyle (Nadler, pp. 213, 217, 225, 382–383). In Letter 32, of November 1665, Spinoza answers Oldenburg’s question how each part of nature agrees with its whole and coheres with the rest. He imagines a little worm living in the blood, which would take each particle for a whole, as we take the bodies around us, and could not know how the parts of the blood are governed by its nature as a whole; and he concludes that every body is a part of the whole of nature, and the human mind a part of an infinite intellect. The letter is the fullest statement outside the Ethics of the physics of Part II and of the doctrine of the corollary to Part II, Prop. 11.
Jarig Jelles, 1674 (Letter 50)
Jarig Jelles, an Amsterdam grocer in spices and dried fruit of Mennonite family, who had given up business for a life of religious reflection, was a close and lifelong friend of Spinoza’s (Nadler, pp. 198–199). Letter 50, dated 1674 in its Latin version, answers three of his questions: how Spinoza’s politics differs from Hobbes’s (he keeps natural right intact, so that the sovereign has right over its subjects only in proportion to its power); why God can be called one or unique only improperly, since we number things only after bringing them under a common kind, and God’s essence is not a kind; and why figure is a negation, since it is nothing but determination, and ’determination is negation’. It ends with Spinoza’s opinion of a refutation of the Theological-Political Treatise he had seen in a bookseller’s window.
Henry Oldenburg, 1675 (Letters 73–75)
After an interruption of several years, which followed his first, hostile reaction to the Theological-Political Treatise, Oldenburg wrote to Spinoza again in June 1675 (Nadler, pp. 382–383). In the autumn he told him which passages of the Treatise troubled its readers: those that seemed to confuse God with nature, to take away the authority of miracles, and to keep silent about Christ. Spinoza answered (Letter 73) that he held God to be the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things (Part I, Prop. 18), but did not take God to be a mass of corporeal matter; that the certainty of revelation rests on the wisdom of its teaching, not on miracles, which are ignorance; and that it is not necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh, but only the eternal wisdom of God, which showed itself most of all in Christ. Oldenburg replied (Letter 74) that readers thought Spinoza asserted a fatal necessity of all things, and asked about the raising of Lazarus and the Word made flesh; Spinoza’s answer (Letter 75) explains the necessity of all things by the way in which God understands himself necessarily and yet freely, and reads the resurrection as spiritual. Appendix D describes how Don Garrett’s case for reading Spinoza as a necessitarian starts from this exchange.
Tschirnhaus and Schuller, 1674–1676 (Letters 57–58, 63–66, 80–83)
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, born in 1651 into a noble German family, had studied law at Leiden, where he lodged with a medical student, Georg Hermann Schuller; by 1674 both were in Amsterdam, Schuller now a physician who knew Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus was allowed to take a manuscript of the Ethics with him when he left for London and Paris, on condition that he show it to no one (Nadler, pp. 260, 349). Schuller served as the go-between, and some of the letters pass through his hands. They raise some of the hardest questions the Ethics poses. Letter 57, on free will, prompted Spinoza’s Letter 58, with its account of freedom as free necessity and its image of a stone that, set in motion and conscious of its striving, would think itself free. In 1675 Schuller, writing for Tschirnhaus, asked whether we can know attributes other than thought and extension, and for examples of the infinite modes (Letter 63); Spinoza’s answer (Letter 64) names examples of them, which the Ethics does not give. Tschirnhaus then put the question why the mind, if each thing is expressed under infinitely many attributes, perceives only the body (Letter 65), and Spinoza’s short reply (Letter 66) is the starting point of the discussion of this question in Appendix C. The last exchange, of 1676, concerns whether the variety of bodies can be deduced from extension as Descartes conceived it, and whether more than one property can be deduced from a definition (Letters 80–83); Spinoza answers that matter is wrongly defined by extension, and promises to explain more clearly ’if life lasts’. He died seven months later.
Epistola VIII
Letter 8
Simon de Vries to Spinoza
Simon de Vries.
Simon de Vries
Amice Integerrime,
Most upright friend,
[G IV 38] Iamdudum exoptavi tibi semel adesse,
a sed tempus, magnaque hyems non satis mihi propitia fuerunt. Aliquando de sorte mea queror, quod nobis intercedit spatium, quod nos ab invicem tam longe dividit.
For a long time I have wished to be with you once, but the season and the hard winter have not been kind enough to me. Sometimes I complain of my lot, that there lies between us a distance which separates us so far from one another.
- a The original of this letter survives, and Gebhardt prints its text (G IV 38–41), which is followed here. The version printed in the Opera Posthuma (OP pp. 459–461, Letter 26 of that edition) is shortened and revised: it leaves out De Vries’s complaint about the distance between them and the passage on Casearius, the remark that the group had begun to meet again, and the account of how it worked (Ep8.2, sentences 1–2), which Van Vloten and Land print in square brackets (VVL³ III 27).
Felix, imo Felicissimus tuus socius Casuarius sub eodem tecto remorans, qui inter prandendum, coenandum, ambulandumque tecum optimis de rebus sermones habere potest.
Happy, indeed most happy, is your companion Casearius,
1 who lives under the same roof and can talk with you of the best things at dinner, at supper and on your walks.
- 1 Johannes Casearius, born in Amsterdam in 1642, a student of theology at Leiden, who moved into Spinoza’s house at Rijnsburg to be taught the philosophy of Descartes (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 231–233). Spinoza’s reply, in a passage the 1677 editors left out, warns De Vries not to envy him: see the note at the start of Letter 9.
Quamvis autem corpora ab invicem tam longe divisa sint, animo tamen saepissime praesens adfuisti meo, praesertim tuis in scriptis cum versor, manibusque tracto. Sed cum nobis collegis non omnia satis clara appareant, (ideoque iterum colegii initium fecimus) neque me tui immemorem esse putes, animum ad hasce litteras scribendas appuli.
But although our bodies are separated so far from one another, you have very often been present to my mind, especially when I am occupied with your writings and have them in my hands. But since not everything appears clear enough to us members of the group
2 (and for this reason we have begun our meetings again), and so that you should not think me forgetful of you, I have set myself to write this letter.
- 2 collegis, collegium: the circle of Spinoza’s friends in Amsterdam who met to read and discuss the drafts of his philosophy that he sent them (Nadler, p. 237). What they were reading was an early version of Part I of the Ethics, whose numbering differs from the final text: see the notes on Ep8.3.
[G IV 39] Collegium quod attinet, eo instituitur modo: Unus (sed suae cuique vices) perlegit, pro suo conceptu explicat, porroque omnia demonstrat, secundum tuarum propositionum seriem, ac ordinem; tum si accidat, ut alter alteri satisfacere non possit, operae pretium esse duximus, illud annotare, atque ad te scribere, ut, si possibile, nobis clarius reddatur, et duce te contra superstitiose religiosos, Christianosque veritatem defendere, tum totius impetum mundi stare possimus. Quare, cum prius perlegentibus, explicantibusque, definitiones, non omnes nobis clarae videbantur, non idem de natura definitionis iudicium tulimus.
As for the group, it is arranged in this way. One of us (each in his turn) reads the text through, explains it as he understands it, and then demonstrates everything, following the sequence and order of your propositions. Then, if it happens that one cannot satisfy another, we have thought it worth while to note the point and write to you, so that, if possible, it may be made clearer to us, and so that under your guidance we may defend the truth against those who are superstitiously religious and Christian, and withstand the onslaught of the whole world. So, since not all the definitions seemed clear to us when we first read them through and explained them, we did not all form the same judgment about the nature of definition.
Interim te absente authorem quendam, mathematicum scil., qui Borellus vocatur, consuluimus; ille dum definitionis naturae, axiomatis, et postulati mentionem facit, atque aliorum de ea re sententias adfert.
Meanwhile, in your absence, we consulted an author, namely a mathematician called Borelli;
1 he, while he mentions the nature of definition, of axiom and of postulate, and brings forward the opinions of others on the subject.
- 1 Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, author of Euclides restitutus (1658), as Van Vloten and Land note (VVL³ III 28).
Ipsius vero sententia sic sonat: Definitiones adhibentur in demonstratione, ut praemissae. Quare necesse est, ut sint evidenter cognitae, alias cognitio scientifica, seu evidentissima ex eis acquiri non potest. alio loco: Non temere, sed maxima cautione eligi debet ratio structurae, aut essentialis passio prima, et notissima alicuius subiecti. Nam si constructio, et passio nominata sit impossibilis, tunc non efficietur definitio scientifica, ut si quis diceret: Duae rectae lineae spatium comprehendentes, vocentur figurales, essent definitiones non entium, et impossibiles; et propterea potius ignorantia, quam scientia ex iis deduceretur. Deinde si constructio, aut passio nominata sit quidem possibilis et vera, sed nobis ignota, aut dubia; tunc bona definitio non erit: Nam conclusiones ab ignoto, et dubio ortae, incertae quoque, et dubiae erunt; et ideo suspisionem, aut opinionem; non autem scientiam certam afferent.
His own opinion runs thus: ‘Definitions are used in demonstration as premises. So it is necessary that they should be evidently known; otherwise scientific, or most evident, knowledge cannot be acquired from them.’ And in another place: ‘The principle of the construction, or the first and best-known essential property of a subject,
2 must be chosen not rashly but with the greatest caution. For if the construction and the property named are impossible, then no scientific definition will be produced; as if someone were to say,
Let two straight lines enclosing a space be called figurals: these would be definitions of non-beings, and impossible, and so ignorance rather than knowledge would be deduced from them. Next, if the construction or the property named is indeed possible and true, but unknown or doubtful to us, then the definition will not be a good one; for conclusions which arise from what is unknown and doubtful will also be uncertain and doubtful, and so will produce suspicion or opinion, but not certain knowledge.’
- 2 passio: in the scholastic sense of a property that belongs to a subject, not Spinoza’s ‘passion’.
A cuius opinione dissentire videtur Tacquet, qui autumat ex falso pronuntiato directe ad veram conclusionem procedi posse, uti tibi notum.
Tacquet seems to dissent from this opinion, who maintains, as you know, that one can proceed directly from a false statement to a true conclusion.
3- 3 André Tacquet’s Elementa geometriae planae ac solidae (Antwerp 1654) has an appendix demonstrating that a truth can be deduced directly from a falsehood (VVL³ III 28).
Clavius vero, cuius etiam sententiam introducit, sic sentit: Definitiones sunt artis vocabula, neque opus est, ut ratio afferatur, cur res aliqua hoc aut illo definiatur modo; sed satis esse, ut nunquam res definita asseratur alicui convenire, nisi prius definitionem traditam eidem convenire demonstretur. Ita ut Borellus velit, quod definitio alicuius subiecti debeat constare ex passione sive structura prima, essentiali, nobis notissima, et vera; Clavius non ita, sive prima, sive notissima, sive vera nec ne, nihil refert, modo ne definitionem, quam tradidimus, alicui convenire asseratur, nisi prius definitionem traditam eidem convenire demonstretur.
Clavius, however, whose opinion he also introduces, thinks thus: ‘Definitions are terms of art, and there is no need to give a reason why a thing is defined in this way or in that; it is enough that the thing defined should never be asserted to agree with anything unless it is first demonstrated that the definition given agrees with it.’ So Borelli holds that the definition of a subject must consist of a property, or construction, that is first, essential, best known to us, and true; Clavius not so: whether it is first, or best known, or true or not, makes no difference, provided that the definition we have given is not asserted to agree with anything unless it is first demonstrated that the definition given agrees with it.
Nos potius pedibus in sententiam Borelli iremus; utri dominus, an neutri horum concinnat, non bene scimus: Igitur, cum tales de definitionis natura, quae inter principia demonstrationis numeratur, disceptationes variae moventur, et, si animus non vindicatus est ab eius difficultatibus, etiam non de iis, quae de ea deducuntur; magnum nobis esset desiderium, ut dominatio vestra ad nos, multum nimis negotium tibi si non facessamus, perque otium tuum liceat, scriberet, quid ipsa de ea re sentiat, etiam quae est distinctio inter axiomata et definitiones; Borellus vero nullam veram admittit, nisi quoad nomen, sed te aliam ponere credo.
We would rather side with Borelli’s opinion; but which of the two you, Sir, agree with,
4 or whether with neither, we do not well know. Since, therefore, such various disputes are raised about the nature of definition, which is counted among the principles of demonstration, and since, if the mind is not freed from its difficulties, it is not freed from those either which concern what is deduced from it, we should very much like you, Sir, to write to us, if we are not giving you too much trouble and your leisure allows, what you think of the matter, and also what the distinction is between axioms and definitions. Borelli admits no true distinction except as to the name; but I believe that you posit another.
- 4 dominus, dominatio vestra: De Vries uses the respectful third person, as in Dutch (U.E.), alongside the familiar ‘you’.
[G IV 40] Porro definitio 3tia nobis non satis constat, in exemplum attuli, quod dominus mihi dixit Hagaecomitis, scil.: quod res duobus modis potest considerari, vel prout in se est, vel prout respectum habet ad aliud, uti intellectus, vel enim potest considerari sub cogitatione, vel ut constans ideis. Sed, quaenam hic esset distinctio, non bene videmus; nam existimamus, quod nos, si cogitationem recte concipiamus, oporteat comprehendere sub ideis, quia remotis ab ea omnibus ideis cogitationem destrueremus. Qua de re, cum exemplum nobis satis clarum non est, manet adhuc res ipsa aliquo modo obscura, et ulteriore explicatione indigemus.
Further, the third definition is not clear enough to us.
1 As an example I brought forward what you, Sir, told me at The Hague, namely that a thing can be considered in two ways, either as it is in itself, or as it has a relation to something else; as the intellect, for it can be considered either under thought or as consisting of ideas. But we do not well see what the distinction would be here; for we think that if we conceive thought rightly, we must comprehend it under ideas, since if all ideas were removed from it we would destroy thought. On this account, since the example is not clear enough to us, the matter itself still remains somewhat obscure, and we need a further explanation.
- 1 The draft’s third definition, which Spinoza quotes in his reply (Letter 9), defined substance and attribute together; the final text separates them as Part I, Defs. 3 and 4.
Novissime, in scholio 3tio prop. 8. habetur ab initio, sic scl: Ex his apparet, quod quamvis duo attributa, realiter distincta concipiantur (hoc est unum sine alterius ope) neque ideo ipsa duo entia sive duas diversas substantias constituunt; ratio est, quia de natura substantiae est, ut omnia eius attributa, unumquodque inquam, per se concipiatur, quandoquidem simul in ipsa fuerunt.
Lastly, at the beginning of the third scholium to Prop. 8 there is this: ‘From these things it is apparent that although two attributes are conceived as really distinct (that is, one without the aid of the other), they do not on that account constitute two beings, or two different substances; the reason is that it is of the nature of substance that all its attributes, each one, I say, should be conceived through itself, since they have been in it together.’
2- 2 In the final text this is the scholium to Part I, Prop. 10, with small changes of wording.
Sic dominus videtur supponere, substantiae naturam ita esse constitutam, ut plura possit habere attributa, quod nondum demonstravit, nisi quintam definitionem substantiae absolute infinitae, sive Dei respiceret; alias, si dicam, unamquamque substantiam tantum habere unum attributum, et mihi esset idea duorum attributorum, recte concludere possem, quod ubi duo diversa attributa, ibi duae diversae sint substantiae: in quod etiam clariorem explicationem te rogemus.
So you seem to suppose that the nature of substance is so constituted that it can have several attributes, which you have not yet demonstrated, unless you are referring to the fifth definition,
3 of absolutely infinite substance, or God. Otherwise, if I were to say that each substance has only one attribute, and I had the idea of two attributes, I could rightly conclude that where there are two different attributes, there are two different substances. On this too we ask you for a clearer explanation.
[G IV 41] Porro gratias ago maximas pro tuis scriptis, mihi a P. Balling communicatis; quae magno me gaudio affecerunt. Sed potissimum scholium prop. 19.; si hic et tibi, in aliquo, quod in mea potestate sit, servire possim, ibi tibi sum, tantum opus, ut me scientem facias. Ego collegium annotomiae inivi, medium fere absolvi, absoluto, incipiam chimicum, sicque suasore te percurram totam medicinam.
Further, I thank you very much for your writings, which P. Balling
1 passed on to me, and which delighted me greatly. But above all the scholium to Prop. 19;
2 if here too I can serve you in anything that is in my power, I am at your service; you have only to let me know. I have begun a course in anatomy and am nearly halfway through it; when it is finished I shall begin chemistry, and so, on your advice, I shall go through the whole of medicine.
- 1 Pieter Balling, one of Spinoza’s close friends among the Amsterdam Collegiants (Nadler, p. 166).
- 2 Again the numbering of the draft; which scholium of the final text it became cannot be told from this mention.
Desino, et exspecto responsionem, et a me sis salutatus, qui sum
I stop, and await your reply; and receive my greetings, as from one who is
Tibi addictissimus S. I. de Vries.
Yours most devotedly, S. J. de Vries.
Datum Amstelodami die 24 februarii 1663.
Given at Amsterdam, 24 February 1663.
Epistola IX
Letter 9
Spinoza to Simon de Vries
Doctissimo Iuveni
To the most learned young man
Simoni de Vries
Simon de Vries
Amice colende,
Esteemed friend,
[G IV 42] Quod ad quaestiones a te propositas attinet.
a Video te iis haerere, propterea quod non distinguis inter genera definitionum. Nempe inter definitionem, quae inservit ad rem, cuius essentia tantum quaeritur, et de qua sola dubitatur, explicandam, et inter definitionem, quae ut solum examinetur, proponitur. Illa enim, quia determinatum habet obiectum, vera debet esse; haec vero id non requirit.
As for the questions you have put to me.
1 I see that you are held up by them because you do not distinguish between the kinds of definition: namely between a definition which serves to explain a thing whose essence alone is sought, and about which alone there is doubt, and a definition which is proposed only in order to be examined. For the former, because it has a determinate object, must be true; the latter does not require this.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP, Letter 27), as Gebhardt prints it first (G IV 42–46). The original, which he prints after it, addresses the whole group in the plural where the printed text has the singular (dicitis, noluistis, adfertis, proni estis for dicis, noluisti, adfers, pronius es), and has the opening passage translated in the note to the English.
- 1 The original letter survives (G IV 42–46, second text) and opens with a passage the 1677 editors left out: ‘I have received your long-awaited letter, for which, and for your affection towards me, I thank you very much. Your long absence has been no less irksome to me than to you; meanwhile I am glad that my little night-labours are of use to you and our friends, for in this way I speak to you while you are away. There is no reason for you to envy Casearius. For no one is more tiresome to me, nor is there anyone of whom I have taken more care to beware; so I should like you and all our acquaintances to be warned not to communicate my opinions to him until he has reached a more mature age. He is still too much a boy, too little constant to himself, and more eager for novelty than for truth. But I hope that he will correct these childish faults in a few years; indeed, as far as I can judge from his character, I am almost certain of it. So his nature bids me love him’ (VVL³ III 31). On Casearius see Letter 8.
Ex. gr. si quis templi Solomonis descriptionem me roget, ipsi veram templi descriptionem tradere debeo, nisi cum ipso cupiam garrire. Sed si ego templum aliquod in mente concinnavi, quod aedificare cupio: ex cuius descriptione concludo me talem fundum, totque millia lapidum, aliorumque materialium emere debere, aliquisne sanae mentis mihi dicet, me male conclusisse, ex eo quod forte falsam adhibui definitionem? vel an aliquis a me exiget, ut meam definitionem probem? Is sane nihil aliud mihi dicit, quam quod id, quod conceperam, non conceperim, vel a me exiget, ut id, quod conceperam, probem, me concepisse, quod sane est nugari.
For example, if someone asks me for a description of Solomon’s temple, I must give him a true description of the temple, unless I want to talk nonsense with him. But if I have devised in my mind some temple which I want to build, and conclude from its description that I must buy such a piece of ground and so many thousand stones and other materials, will anyone of sound mind tell me that I have concluded badly because I have perhaps used a false definition? Or will anyone require me to prove my definition? He would certainly be telling me nothing other than that I have not conceived what I had conceived, or requiring me to prove that I have conceived what I had conceived; which is certainly to trifle.
Quare definitio vel explicat rem, prout est extra intellectum, et tum vera debet esse, et a propositione, vel axiomate non differre, nisi quod illa tantum circa rerum, rerumve affectionum essentias versatur; hoc vero latius, nempe ad aeternas veritates etiam se extendit: Vel explicat rem, prout a nobis concipitur, vel concipi potest, tumque in eo etiam differt ab axiomate et propositione, quod non exigit, nisi ut concipiatur absolute, non ut axioma sub ratione veri. Quare mala definitio illa est, quae non concipitur.
So a definition either explains a thing as it is outside the intellect, and then it must be true, and must not differ from a proposition, or axiom, except in that the former is concerned only with the essences of things, or of the affections of things, whereas the latter extends more widely, namely to eternal truths as well; or it explains a thing as it is conceived by us, or can be conceived, and then it differs from an axiom and a proposition in this too, that it requires only that it be conceived absolutely, not, like an axiom, under the aspect of the true. So a bad definition is one which is not conceived.
Quod ut intelligatur, Borelli exemplum capiam. Nempe si quis diceret, duae rectae lineae, spatium comprehendentes, vocentur figurales. Si is per lineam rectam, intelligit id, quod omnes per lineam curvam, tum bona est definitio, (per illam enim definitionem intelligeretur figura, ut [figurae], aut similes
b) modo quadrata, et alias postea non intelligat figuras. Verum si per lineam rectam intelligat id, quod communiter intelligimus, res est plane inconceptibilis, ideoque nulla est definitio. Quae omnia a Borello, in cuius sententia amplectenda pronius es, plane confunduntur.
To make this understood, I shall take Borelli’s example: namely, if someone were to say, Let two straight lines enclosing a space be called figurals. If by a straight line he understands what everyone understands by a curved line, then the definition is good (for by that definition would be understood figures such as [figures], or similar ones), provided that he does not afterwards understand by it squares and other figures. But if by a straight line he understands what we commonly understand, the thing is entirely inconceivable, and so it is no definition. All these things are completely confused by Borelli, to whose opinion you are more inclined.
- b Spinoza draws two small figures here (G IV 44), which are not reproduced.
Aliud exemplum addo, id nempe, quod in fine adfers. Si dicam unamquamque substantiam unum tantum habere attributum, mera est propositio, et eget demonstratione. Si vero dicam per substantiam intelligo id, quod uno tantum attributo constat, bona erit definitio, modo postea entia pluribus attributis constantia alio nomine a substantia diverso insigniantur.
I add another example, namely the one you bring forward at the end. If I say that each substance has only one attribute, it is a mere proposition, and needs demonstration. But if I say, By substance I understand that which consists of only one attribute, it will be a good definition, provided that afterwards beings consisting of several attributes are designated by another name, different from substance.
Quod autem dicis, me non demonstrare substantiam (sive ens) plura habere posse attributa, forte ad demonstrationes noluisti attendere. Duas enim adhibui, prima quod nihil nobis evidentius, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo a nobis concipiatur, et quo plus realitatis, aut esse aliquod ens habet, eo plura attributa ei sunt tribuenda. Unde ens absolute infinitum definiendum, etc. Secunda, et quam ego palmariam iudico, est, quod quo plura attributa alicui enti tribuo, eo magis cogor, ipsi existentiam tribuere, hoc est, eo magis sub ratione veri ipsum concipio, quod plane contrarium esset, si ego chymaeram, aut quid simile finxissem.
As for your saying that I do not demonstrate that substance (or being) can have several attributes, perhaps you did not want to attend to the demonstrations. For I used two. The first: that nothing is more evident to us than that each being is conceived by us under some attribute, and that the more reality, or being, a being has, the more attributes must be attributed to it.
2 Hence a being absolutely infinite must be defined, etc. The second, which I judge the chief one,
3 is that the more attributes I attribute to a being, the more I am compelled to attribute existence to it, that is, the more I conceive it under the aspect of the true; which would be quite the contrary if I had feigned a chimera or something similar.
Quod autem dicis, te non concipere cogitationem, nisi sub ideis, quia remotis ideis cogitationem destruis, credo id tibi contingere propterea, quod dum tu, res scilicet cogitans, id facis, omnes tuas cogitationes et conceptus seponis. Quare non mirum est, quod ubi omnes tuas cogitationes seposuisti, nihil postea tibi cogitandum supersit.
As for your saying that you do not conceive thought except under ideas, because when the ideas are removed you destroy thought, I believe this happens to you because, while you, a thinking thing, do this, you set aside all your thoughts and concepts. So it is no wonder that when you have set aside all your thoughts, nothing afterwards remains for you to think.
Quod autem ad rem attinet, puto me satis clare, et evidenter demonstrasse, intellectum, quamvis infinitum, ad naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem pertinere. Porro quid hoc ad tertiam definitionem intelligendum faciat, nondum video, nec etiam cur ea moram iniiciat.
As for the matter itself, I think I have demonstrated clearly and evidently enough that the intellect, even though infinite, pertains to
Natura naturata, not to
Natura naturans.
4 Further, I do not yet see what this has to do with understanding the third definition, nor why it should hold you up.
[G IV 46] Ipsa enim definitio, ut ipsam, ni fallor, tibi tradidi, sic sonat: Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur, hoc est, cuius conceptus non involvit conceptum alterius rei. Idem per attributum intelligo, nisi quod attributum dicatur respectu intellectus, substantiae certam talem naturam tribuentis. Haec, inquam, definitio satis clare, quid per substantiam, sive attributum intelligere volo, explicat.
For the definition itself, as I gave it to you, if I am not mistaken, runs thus: ‘By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, whose concept does not involve the concept of another thing. By attribute I understand the same, except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such a definite nature to substance.’
1 This definition, I say, explains clearly enough what I want to understand by substance, or attribute.
- 1 The draft’s third definition. The final text gives substance and attribute separate definitions (Part I, Defs. 3 and 4), and defines attribute as ‘that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence’; the relation to the intellect remains. Appendix B discusses how this relation has been read.
Vis tamen, quod minime opus est, ut exemplo explicem, quomodo una, eademque res duobus nominibus insigniri possit. Sed ne parcus videar duo adhibebo.
You want me nevertheless, though there is no need, to explain by an example how one and the same thing can be designated by two names. But so as not to seem stingy, I shall give two.
Primo dico per Israelem intelligi tertium patriarcham, idem per Iacobum intelligo, quod nomen Iacobi ipsi imponebatur propterea, quod calcem fratris apprehenderat. Secundo per planum intelligo id, quod omnes radios lucis sine ulla mutatione reflectit, idem per album intelligo, nisi quod album dicatur respectu hominis planum intuentis. etc.
aFirst, I say that by Israel is understood the third patriarch; I understand the same by Jacob, the name Jacob having been given to him because he had seized his brother’s heel.
2 Second, by plane I understand that which reflects all rays of light without any change; I understand the same by white, except that it is called white in relation to a man looking at the plane, etc.
- a The Dutch version of 1677 ends the letter with a sentence the Latin lacks (G IV 46): ‘I think that with this I have answered your questions. Meanwhile I shall wait to hear your judgment; and if there is anything that you think is not demonstrated well or clearly enough, do not hesitate to point it out to me, etc.’
- 2 Genesis 25:26: וְיָדוֹ אֹחֶזֶת בַּעֲקֵב עֵשָׂו וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ יַעֲקֹב (‘and his hand took hold of Esau’s heel, and his name was called Jacob’), the name יַעֲקֹב (‘Jacob’) being heard in עָקֵב (‘heel’). The second name is given in Genesis 32:29. (Verses as numbered in the Hebrew; the Vulgate numbers them 25:25 and 32:28.)
Epistola X
Letter 10
Spinoza to Simon de Vries
Doctissimo Iuveni,
To the most learned young man
Simoni de Vries
Simon de Vries
Amice colende,
Esteemed friend,
[G IV 47] Petis a me, an egeamus experientia ad sciendum, utrum definitio alicuius attributi sit vera? Ad hoc respondeo, nos nunquam egere experientia, nisi ad illa, quae ex rei definitione non possunt concludi, ut, ex. gr. existentia modorum: haec enim a rei definitione non potest concludi. Non vero ad illa, quorum existentia ab eorundem essentia non distinguitur, ac proinde ab eorum definitione concluditur.
You ask me whether we need experience to know whether the definition of some attribute is true. To this I answer that we never need experience except for those things which cannot be inferred from the definition of the thing, as, for example, the existence of modes;
1 for this cannot be inferred from the definition of the thing. But not for those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence, and is therefore inferred from their definition.
- 1 Compare Part I, Prop. 24: the essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
Imo nulla experientia id unquam nos edocere poterit: nam experientia nullas rerum essentias docet; sed summum, quod efficere potest, est mentem nostram determinare, ut circa certas tantum rerum essentias cogitet. Quare, cum existentia attributorum ab eorum essentia non differat, eam nulla experientia poterimus assequi.
Indeed no experience will ever be able to teach us this; for experience teaches no essences of things, but the most it can do is to determine our mind to think only about certain essences of things. So, since the existence of the attributes does not differ from their essence,
2 we shall not be able to attain it by any experience.
- 2 Part I, Prop. 20 and its demonstration: the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence explain at the same time his eternal existence.
Quod porro petis, anne res etiam, rerumve affectiones sint aeternae veritates? Dico omnino.
As for your further question, whether things too, or the affections of things, are eternal truths: I say, certainly.
Si regeris, cur eas aeternas veritates non voco? respondeo, ut eas distinguam, uti omnes solent, ab iis, quae nullam rem, reive affectionem explicant, ut, ex. gr. a nihilo nihil fit; haec, inquam, similesque propositiones vocantur absolute aeternae veritates, sub quo nihil aliud significare volunt, quam quod talia nullam sedem habent extra mentem etc.
aIf you reply, why then do I not call them eternal truths? I answer: to distinguish them, as everyone usually does, from those which explain no thing, or affection of a thing, as, for example,
nothing comes from nothing; these and similar propositions, I say, are called eternal truths absolutely, by which they mean nothing else than that such things have no seat outside the mind, etc.
1- a The letter survives only in the 1677 edition (OP p. 464, Letter 28), without a date. The questions it answers are not those of Letter 8; De Vries’s letter that put them is lost.
- 1 Descartes’s example in the Principles of Philosophy I.49: the proposition ex nihilo nihil fit is considered ‘not as some existing thing, nor as a mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth which has its seat in our mind’, and is called a common notion, or axiom (AT VIII-1 23). Compare the eternal truth of the existence of substance in Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2.
Epistola XII
Letter 12
Spinoza to Lodewijk Meyer
Viro Doctissimo, atque Expertissimo,
To the most learned and expert man
Ludovico Meyer P. M. Q. D.
Lodewijk Meyer, Doctor of Philosophy and Medicine
Amice singularis,
My special friend,
[G IV 52] Duas abs te accepi epistolas,
a unam die 11 Ianuarii datam, et ab amico N.N. mihi traditam; alteram vero 26 die Martii, et ab amico, nescio quo, Leida missam. Pergratae mihi ambae fuerunt; praecipue, ubi ex iis, omnia tua optime se habere, teque mei saepe memorem intellexi. Porro pro tua erga me humanitate, et honore, quo semper me dignatus es afficere, maximas, quas debeo, ago gratias; simulque precor, ut me tibi non minus addictum credas, quod semper data occasione, quantum mea ferre poterit tenuitas, ostendere conabor. Atque hoc ut incipiam, ad id, quod in tuis epistolis ex me quaeris, respondere curabo.
I have received two letters from you,
1 one dated 11 January and handed to me by our friend N.N., the other dated 26 March and sent from Leiden by some friend, I do not know whom. Both were very welcome to me, especially since I learned from them that all is well with you and that you often think of me. Further, I give you the greatest thanks I owe for the kindness and honour which you have always deigned to show me; and at the same time I beg you to believe that I am no less devoted to you, which, whenever the opportunity is given, I shall try to show, as far as my slender abilities allow. And to make a beginning, I shall see to answering what you ask of me in your letters.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP, Letter 29), as Gebhardt prints it first (G IV 52–62); he also prints a manuscript copy, which begins only at ‘Quaestio de infinito’ and differs in a number of readings. The date of the letter is given only in the Dutch version: ‘Rijnsburg, 20 April 1663’.
- 1 Lodewijk Meyer, born in Amsterdam in 1629, who took doctorates in philosophy and in medicine at Leiden in 1660 (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 202–203); hence the superscription’s P. M. Q. D., Philosophiae Medicinaeque Doctori. He wrote the preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy (1663), and was, more than anyone, responsible for bringing Spinoza’s writings to publication, in his lifetime and after his death (Nadler, pp. 202, 233).
Petis autem, ut, quae de infinito excogitata habeam, tibi communicem, quod libentissime faciam. Quaestio de infinito omnibus semper difficillima, imo inextricabilis visa fuit, propterea quod non distinxerunt inter id, quod sua natura, sive vi suae definitionis sequitur esse infinitum; et id, quod nullos fines habet, non quidem vi suae essentiae; sed vi suae causae. Ac etiam, quia non distinxerunt inter id, quod infinitum dicitur, quia nullos habet fines; et id, cuius partes, quamvis eius maximum et minimum habeamus; nullo tamen numero adaequare, et explicare possumus. Denique quia non distinxerunt inter id, quod solummodo intelligere, non vero imaginari; et inter id, quod etiam imaginari possumus.
You ask, then, that I communicate to you what I have thought out concerning the infinite, which I shall most gladly do. The question of the infinite has always seemed to everyone most difficult, indeed inextricable, because they have not distinguished between that which follows to be infinite by its own nature, or by the force of its definition, and that which has no limits, not indeed by the force of its essence, but by the force of its cause.
2 And also because they have not distinguished between that which is called infinite because it has no limits, and that whose parts, though we have its maximum and minimum, we cannot equal or explain by any number. And finally because they have not distinguished between that which we can only understand, but not imagine, and that which we can also imagine.
- 2 The first kind is substance (Part I, Prop. 8); the second, the infinite modes, which follow from the absolute nature of an attribute and are infinite by the force of their cause (Part I, Props. 21–23). The three distinctions are taken up again at the end of the letter (Ep12.7).
Ad haec, inquam, si attendissent, nunquam tam ingenti difficultatum turba obruti fuissent. Clare enim tum intellexissent, quale infinitum in nullas partes dividi, seu nullas partes habere potest; quale vero contra, idque sine contradictione. Porro etiam intellexissent, quale infinitum maius alio infinito sine ulla implicantia; quale vero non item concipi potest; quod ex mox dicendis clare apparebit.
If they had attended to these things, I say, they would never have been overwhelmed by so great a crowd of difficulties. For they would then have understood clearly what kind of infinite cannot be divided into any parts, or can have no parts, and what kind, on the contrary, can, and that without contradiction. Further, they would also have understood what kind of infinite can be conceived greater than another infinite without any contradiction, and what kind cannot; as will appear clearly from what I am about to say.
Verum prius haec quatuor paucis exponam, videlicet substantiam, modum, aeternitatem, et durationem. Quae circa substantiam considerari velim, sunt.
But first I shall briefly explain these four: namely substance, mode, eternity and duration. What I should like to be considered concerning substance is this.
Primo, quod ad eius essentiam pertinet existentia, hoc est, quod ex sola eius essentia, et definitione sequatur eam existere; quod, nisi me mea fallit memoria, antehac tibi viva voce absque ope aliarum propositionum demonstravi. Secundum, et quod ex hoc primo sequitur, est, quod substantia non multiplex; sed unica duntaxat eiusdem naturae existat. Tertium denique, quod omnis substantia non nisi infinita possit intelligi.
First, that existence pertains to its essence, that is, that it follows from its essence and definition alone that it exists; which, if my memory does not deceive me, I demonstrated to you earlier by word of mouth, without the help of other propositions. Second, and following from the first, that substance does not exist as many, but only as one of the same nature. Third, finally, that every substance can only be understood as infinite.
3
Substantiae vero affectiones modos voco, quorum definitio, quatenus non est ipsa substantiae definitio, nullam existentiam involvere potest. Quapropter, quamvis existant, eos ut non existentes concipere possumus: ex quo porro sequitur, nos, ubi ad solam modorum essentiam; non vero ad ordinem totius naturae attendimus, non posse concludere ex eo, quod iam existant, ipsos postea exstituros, aut non exstituros, vel antea exstitisse, aut non exstitisse. Unde clare apparet, nos existentiam substantiae toto genere a modorum existentia diversam concipere.
But the affections of substance I call modes, whose definition, insofar as it is not the very definition of substance, can involve no existence.
4 So, even though they exist, we can conceive them as not existing; from which it further follows that, when we attend only to the essence of modes and not to the order of the whole of nature, we cannot conclude from their existing now that they will exist afterwards or will not exist, or that they existed before or did not exist. From this it is clearly apparent that we conceive the existence of substance as entirely different in kind from the existence of modes.
Ex quo oritur differentia inter aeternitatem, et durationem; per durationem enim modorum tantum existentiam explicare possumus; substantiae vero per aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem.
From this arises the difference between eternity and duration; for by duration we can explain only the existence of modes, but that of substance by eternity, that is, the infinite enjoyment of existing, or, in defiance of Latinity, of being.
5- 5 essendi, the gerund of esse, which classical Latin does not use, hence the apology. On eternity and duration in the Ethics, see Part I, Def. 8 with its explanation and Part II, Def. 5.
[G IV 55] Ex quibus omnibus clare constat, nos modorum existentiam et durationem, ubi, ut saepissime fit, ad solam eorum essentiam; non vero ad ordinem naturae attendimus, ad libitum, et quidem propterea nullatenus, quem eorum habemus conceptum, destruendo, determinare, maiorem minoremque concipere, atque in partes dividere posse: Aeternitatem vero, et substantiam, quandoquidem non nisi infinitae concipi possunt, nihil eorum pati posse; nisi simul eorum conceptum destruamus.
From all this it is clearly established that when, as very often happens, we attend only to the essence of modes and not to the order of nature, we can determine at will the existence and duration of modes, conceive it as greater or less, and divide it into parts, without thereby in any way destroying the concept we have of them; but that eternity and substance, since they can only be conceived as infinite, can undergo none of these things unless we destroy their concept at the same time.
Quare ii prorsus garriunt, ne dicam insaniunt, qui substantiam extensam ex partibus, sive corporibus ab invicem realiter distinctis conflatam esse putant. Perinde enim est, ac si quis ex sola additione, et coacervatione multorum circulorum quadratum, aut triangulum, aut quid aliud, tota essentia diversum, conflare studeat.
So those who think that extended substance is put together from parts, or bodies really distinct from one another, are talking utter nonsense, not to say raving. For it is just as if someone were to try, by the mere addition and heaping up of many circles, to put together a square, or a triangle, or something else entirely different in its whole essence.
Quare omnis illa farrago argumentorum, quibus substantiam extensam finitam esse ostendere philosophi vulgo moliuntur, sua sponte ruit: Omnia enim illa substantiam corpoream ex partibus conflatam supponunt. Ad eundem etiam modum alii, qui postquam sibi persuaserunt, lineam ex punctis componi, multa invenire potuerunt argumenta, quibus ostenderent lineam non esse in infinitum divisibilem.
So that whole jumble of arguments by which philosophers commonly strive to show that extended substance is finite collapses of its own accord;
1 for all of them suppose that corporeal substance is put together from parts. In the same way others too, having persuaded themselves that a line is composed of points, have been able to find many arguments to show that a line is not divisible to infinity.
- 1 The arguments, and this reply to them, are set out in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15, which also uses the comparison with a line composed of points.
[G IV 56] Si tamen quaeras, cur naturae impulsu adeo propensi simus ad dividendam substantiam extensam: ad id respondeo, quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipiatur; abstracte scilicet, sive superficialiter, prout ope sensuum eam in imaginatione habemus; vel ut substantia, quod non nisi a solo intellectu fit. Itaque si ad quantitatem, prout est in imaginatione, attendimus, quod saepissime, et facilius fit, ea divisibilis, finita, ex partibus composita, et multiplex reperietur. Sin ad eandem, prout est in intellectu, attendamus, et res, ut in se est, percipiatur, quod difficillime fit, tum, ut satis antehac tibi demonstravi, infinita, indivisibilis, et unica reperietur.
If, however, you ask why we are so inclined by the impulse of nature to divide extended substance, I reply that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: namely abstractly, or superficially, as we have it in the imagination with the help of the senses; or as substance, which is done only by the intellect. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which is done very often and more easily, it will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts, and many. But if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and the thing is perceived as it is in itself, which is done with great difficulty, then, as I have sufficiently demonstrated to you before, it will be found infinite, indivisible, and unique.
1
Porro ex eo, quod durationem, et quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur tempus, et mensura; tempus nempe ad durationem; mensura ad quantitatem tali modo determinandam, ut, quoad fieri potest, eas facile imaginemur.
Further, from the fact that we can determine duration and quantity at our pleasure, namely when we conceive the latter abstracted from substance and separate the former from the way in which it flows from eternal things, there arise time and measure: time, namely, for determining duration, and measure for determining quantity, in such a way that we may imagine them easily, as far as can be done.
Deinde ex eo, quod affectiones substantiae ab ipsa substantia separamus, et ad classes, ut eas quoad fieri potest, facile imaginemur, redigimus, oritur numerus, quo ipsas determinamus. Ex quibus clare videre est, mensuram, tempus, et numerum nihil esse praeter cogitandi, seu potius imaginandi modos.
Next, from the fact that we separate the affections of substance from substance itself and reduce them to classes, so that we may imagine them easily, as far as can be done, there arises number, by which we determine them. From these things it can be clearly seen that measure, time and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining.
1
Quare non mirum est, quod omnes, qui similibus notionibus, et quidem praeterea male intellectis, progressum naturae intelligere conati sunt, adeo mirifice se intricarint, ut tandem se extricare nequiverint, nisi omnia perrumpendo, et absurda etiam absurdissima admittendo.
So it is no wonder that all who have tried to understand the progress of nature by such notions, and moreover badly understood ones, have entangled themselves so marvellously that in the end they could not extricate themselves except by breaking through everything and admitting even the most absurd absurdities.
Nam cum multa sint, quae nequaquam imaginatione; sed solo intellectu assequi possumus, qualia sunt substantia, aeternitas, et alia. Si quis talia eiusmodi notionibus, quae duntaxat auxilia imaginationis sunt, explicare conatur: nihilo plus agit, quam si det operam, ut sua imaginatione insaniat.
For since there are many things which we can attain not by the imagination at all, but only by the intellect, such as substance, eternity and others. If anyone tries to explain such things by notions of this kind, which are merely aids of the imagination, he does nothing more than if he were to take pains to go mad with his imagination.
Neque etiam ipsi substantiae modi, si cum eiusmodi entibus rationis, seu imaginationis auxiliis confundantur, unquam recte intelligi poterunt. Nam cum id facimus, eos a substantia, et modo, quo ab aeternitate fluunt, separamus; sine quibus tamen recte intelligi nequeunt.
Nor will the modes of substance themselves ever be rightly understood if they are confused with beings of reason of this kind, or aids of the imagination. For when we do this, we separate them from substance and from the way in which they flow from eternity, without which, however, they cannot be rightly understood.
Quod ut adhuc clarius videas, cape hoc exemplum: nempe, ubi quis durationem abstracte conceperit, eamque cum tempore confundendo in partes dividere inceperit, nunquam poterit intelligere,
a qua ratione hora ex. grat. transire possit. Nam ut hora transeat, necesse erit, eius dimidium prius transire, et postea dimidium reliqui, et deinde dimidium, quod huius reliqui superest; et si sic porro infinite dimidium a reliquo subtrahas, nunquam ad finem horae pervenire poteris.
To see this still more clearly, take this example: when someone has conceived duration abstractly and, confusing it with time, has begun to divide it into parts, he will never be able to understand how an hour, for example, can pass. For for an hour to pass, it will be necessary that half of it pass first, and then half of the remainder, and then half of what is left of this remainder; and if you go on in this way, subtracting half from the remainder to infinity, you will never be able to reach the end of the hour.
- a So Van Vloten and Land (VVL³ III 41); the digital text of Gebhardt used here reads unquam.
Quare multi, qui entia rationis a realibus distinguere assueti non sunt, durationem ex momentis componi, ausi sunt asseverare, et sic in Scyllam inciderunt cupientes vitare Charybdim. Idem enim est durationem ex momentis componere, quam numerum ex sola nullitatum additione.
So many who are not accustomed to distinguish beings of reason from real ones have dared to assert that duration is composed of moments, and so have fallen into Scylla in their desire to avoid Charybdis. For it is the same to compose duration of moments as to compose number by the mere addition of nothings.
[G IV 58] Porro cum ex modo dictis satis pateat, nec numerum, nec mensuram, nec tempus, quandoquidem non nisi auxilia imaginationis sunt, posse esse infinitos: Nam alias numerus non esset numerus, nec mensura mensura, nec tempus tempus. Hinc clare videre est, cur multi, qui haec tria cum rebus ipsis confundebant, propterea quod veram rerum naturam ignorabant, infinitum actu negarunt.
Further, since it is sufficiently evident from what has just been said that neither number nor measure nor time can be infinite, since they are only aids of the imagination: for otherwise number would not be number, nor measure measure, nor time time. Hence it can be clearly seen why many who confused these three with the things themselves, because they were ignorant of the true nature of things, denied the actual infinite.
Sed quam misere ratiocinati sint, iudicent mathematici, quibus huius farinae argumenta nullam moram iniicere potuerunt in rebus, ab ipsis clare, distincteque perceptis. Nam praeterquam quod multa invenerunt, quae nullo numero explicari possunt; quod satis numerorum defectum ad omnia determinandum patefacit: multa etiam habent, quae nullo numero adaequari possunt; sed omnem, qui dari potest, numerum superant.
But how wretchedly they have reasoned, let the mathematicians judge, whom arguments of this sort have been unable to hold up at all in matters clearly and distinctly perceived by them. For besides having found many things which cannot be explained by any number, which sufficiently reveals the inadequacy of numbers for determining everything, they also have many things which cannot be equalled by any number, but surpass every number that can be given.
Nec tamen concludunt, talia omnem numerum superare ex partium multitudine: sed ex eo, quod rei natura non sine manifesta contradictione numerum pati potest, ut ex. grat. omnes inaequalitates spatii duobus circulis AB et CD interpositi,
a omnesque variationes, quas materia, in eo mota, pati debeat, omnem numerum superant.
Yet they do not conclude that such things surpass every number from the multitude of their parts, but from the fact that the nature of the thing cannot admit number without manifest contradiction; as, for example, all the inequalities of the space interposed between the two circles AB and CD, and all the variations which matter moved in it must undergo, surpass every number.
1- a Spinoza gives a figure here (G IV 59), which is not reproduced: two circles with different centres, the space between them being widest at AB and narrowest at CD, as the text that follows explains.
- 1 Thirteen years later Tschirnhaus asked how this was to be understood, since mathematicians seem always to argue from the multitude of parts (Letter 80); Spinoza’s reply is Letter 81.
[G IV 59] Idque non concluditur, ex nimia spatii interpositi magnitudine: Nam quantumvis parvam eius portionem capiamus, huius tamen parvae portionis inaequalitates omnem numerum superabunt.
And this is not concluded from the excessive size of the interposed space. For however small a portion of it we take, the inequalities of this small portion will still surpass every number.
Neque etiam idcirco concluditur, ut in aliis contingit, quod eius maximum, et minimum non habeamus: utrumque enim in hoc nostro exemplo habemus, maximum nempe AB, minimum vero CD: Sed ex eo tantum concluditur, quod natura spatii inter duos circulos, diversa centra habentes, interpositi nihil tale pati possit. Ideoque siquis omnes illas inaequalitates certo aliquo numero determinare velit, simul efficere debebit, ut circulus non sit circulus.
Nor, again, is it concluded, as happens in other cases, from our not having its maximum and minimum; for we have both in this example of ours, the maximum, namely AB, and the minimum, CD. It is concluded only from the fact that the nature of the space interposed between two circles having different centres can admit nothing of the kind. And so, if anyone wanted to determine all those inequalities by some definite number, he would at the same time have to bring it about that a circle is not a circle.
[G IV 60] Sic etiam, ut ad nostrum propositum revertar, si quis omnes materiae motus, qui hucusque fuerunt, determinare volet, eos scilicet, eorumque durationem ad certum numerum, et tempus redigendo; is certe nihil aliud conabitur, quam substantiam corpoream, quam non nisi existentem concipere possumus, suis affectionibus privare, et, ut naturam, quam habet, non habeat, efficere.
So too, to return to our purpose, if anyone wants to determine all the motions of matter that there have been up to now, namely by reducing them and their duration to a definite number and time, he will certainly be attempting nothing else than to deprive corporeal substance, which we can conceive only as existing, of its affections, and to bring it about that it does not have the nature it has.
Quae clare demonstrare hic possem, ut et alia multa, quae in hac epistola attigi, nisi id superfluum iudicarem. Ex omnibus iam dictis clare videre est, quaedam sua natura esse infinita, nec ullo modo finita concipi posse; quaedam vero vi causae, cui inhaerent, quae tamen, ubi abstracte concipiuntur, in partes possunt dividi, et ut finita spectari; quaedam denique infinita, vel, si mavis, indefinita dici, propterea quod nullo numero adaequari queant, quae tamen maiora, et minora possunt concipi; quia non sequitur, illa necessario debere esse aequalia, quae numero adaequari nequeunt, ut ex allato exemplo, et aliis multis satis est manifestum.
I could demonstrate these things clearly here, as well as many others which I have touched on in this letter, if I did not judge it superfluous. From all that has now been said it can be clearly seen that some things are infinite by their nature and cannot in any way be conceived as finite; some by the force of the cause in which they inhere, which however, when they are conceived abstractly, can be divided into parts and regarded as finite; and finally some which are called infinite, or, if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be equalled by any number, which can nevertheless be conceived as greater and less; since it does not follow that things which cannot be equalled by number must necessarily be equal, as is sufficiently manifest from the example given and from many others.
[G IV 61] Denique causas errorum, et confusionum, quae circa quaestionem de infinito ortae sunt, breviter ob oculos posui, easque, ni fallor, ita explicui omnes, ut non putem ullam superesse circa infinitum quaestionem, quam hic non attigi, aut quae ex dictis facillime solvi non queat. Quare in his te detinere diutius, operae pretium esse non iudico.
I have now briefly set before your eyes the causes of the errors and confusions that have arisen concerning the question of the infinite, and, unless I am mistaken, I have explained them all in such a way that I do not think any question concerning the infinite remains which I have not touched on here, or which cannot very easily be solved from what has been said. So I do not judge it worth while to detain you longer on these matters.
Verum hic obiter adhuc notari velim, quod Peripatetici recentiores, ut quidem puto, male intellexerunt demonstrationem veterum, qua ostendere nitebantur Dei existentiam. Nam, ut ipsam apud Iudaeum quendam Rab Ghasdai vocatum, reperio, sic sonat.
But I should like it to be noted here in passing that the more recent Peripatetics, as I at least think, have misunderstood the demonstration of the ancients by which they strove to show God’s existence. For as I find it in a certain Jew called Rab Ghasdai,
1 it runs thus.
- 1 Hasdai Crescas, Or Adonai (אוֹר ה׳, ‘Light of the Lord’), I.3.2, the third of the ‘roots’ of the first treatise: אם שיהיו עלות ועלולים ב״ת או בב״ת אין המלט מהיות עלה אחת לכללם (‘whether causes and effects be finite or infinite, there is no escaping that there is one cause of them all’), since if all were caused, all would be possible in themselves and would need something to determine their existence rather than their non-existence; and that is God.
Si datur progressus causarum in infinitum, erunt omnia, quae sunt, etiam causata: Atqui nulli, quod causatum est, competit, vi suae naturae necessario existere: Ergo nihil est in natura ad cuius essentiam pertinet necessario existere. Sed hoc est absurdum: ergo et illud.
If there is a progression of causes to infinity, all things that are will also be caused; but it belongs to nothing that is caused to exist necessarily by the force of its own nature; therefore there is nothing in nature to whose essence it pertains to exist necessarily. But this is absurd; therefore that is too.
Quare vis argumenti non in eo sita est, quod impossibile sit, dari actu infinitum, aut progressus causarum in infinitum: Sed tantum in eo, quod supponatur, res, quae sua natura non necessario existunt, non determinari ad existendum a re sua natura necessario existenti.
aSo the force of the argument does not lie in the impossibility of there being an actual infinite, or a progression of causes to infinity, but only in the supposition that things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing which exists necessarily by its own nature.
2- a The Dutch version adds: ‘and which is a cause, not a thing caused’ (G IV 62).
- 2 Compare Part I, Prop. 28, on the infinite series of finite causes, with its scholium on God’s causality of finite things.
[G IV 62] Transirem iam, quia tempus me festinare cogit, ad secundam tuam epistolam: sed ad ea, quae isthac continentur, commodius, cum dignatus fueris me invisere, respondere potero. Quaeso itaque, si fieri potest, ut quamprimum venias; nam tempus migrandi festinanter accedit. Tantum est. Vale, meique memor vive, qui sum, etc.
I would now pass on, since time compels me to hurry, to your second letter; but I shall be able to reply more conveniently to what it contains when you deign to visit me. So I beg you to come as soon as possible, if it can be done; for the time of my moving is fast approaching.
1 That is all. Farewell, and remember me, who am, etc.
- 1 Spinoza moved from Rijnsburg to Voorburg in the spring of 1663 (Nadler, p. 239).
Epistola XVIII
Letter 18
Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza
Clarissimo viro
To the most distinguished man
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.
from Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine, et amice ignote,
Sir, and unknown friend,
[G IV 79] Iam saepiuscule tuum tractatum,
a una cum eius appendice, nuper in lucem editum, attente evolvi. Magis me decebit, ut aliis, quam tibi narrem summam, quam in eo reperi, soliditatem, et quam inde percepi voluptatem: id tamen reticere nequeo, quod, quo frequentius cum attentione eum percurro, eo magis mihi placeat, et continuo aliquid observem, quod antea non animadverteram.
I have now quite often read attentively your treatise, together with its appendix, recently published.
1 It would become me better to tell others than you of the very great solidity I found in it and the pleasure I took from it; yet I cannot keep silent about this, that the more often I go through it attentively, the more it pleases me, and I continually notice something I had not observed before.
- a Blyenbergh and Spinoza wrote to each other in Dutch. The text here is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 473–477, Letter 31), headed Versio; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 79–85). The translation follows the Latin; notes give the Dutch where the two differ in sense.
- 1 The Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy with the Metaphysical Thoughts as its appendix, published in 1663 (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 242–243). Blyenbergh, a grain merchant and broker of Dordrecht, had read only this book, and had trouble telling where Spinoza gave his own views and where Descartes’s (Nadler pp. 251–252).
Verumenimvero (ne hac in epistola adulator videar) nolo eius auctorem nimium admirari: Novi, deos omnia laboribus vendere.
But truly (lest I seem a flatterer in this letter), I do not wish to admire its author too much: I know that the gods sell everything for labour.
Ne autem te in admiratione nimis diu detineam, quis sit, et qui fiat, ut tibi ignotus tanta ad te scribendi libertate utatur, dicam tibi, eum esse, qui desiderio purae, et sincerae veritatis impulsus, in brevi hac et fragili vita pedes suos in scientia, quantum humanum nostrum patitur ingenium, figere studet: quique nullum alium, ad indagandum veritatem, scopum sibi praefixit, quam ipsam veritatem: quique scientia nec honores, nec divitias; sed meram veritatem, tranquillitatemque, tanquam veritatis effectum, sibi acquirere conatur: et qui ex omnibus veritatibus, ac scientiis, nullis magis, quam metaphysicis, si non omnibus, saltem aliqua earum parte se oblectat: et qui omnem suam vitae delectationem in eo collocat, ut horas otiosas, et subcisivas in iis transigat.
But not to keep you too long in wonder as to who he is, and how it comes about that someone unknown to you takes such liberty in writing to you, I shall tell you that he is one who, driven by the desire for pure and sincere truth, strives in this short and fragile life to set his feet firmly in knowledge, as far as our human understanding allows; who has set himself no other goal in seeking out truth than truth itself; who tries to gain by knowledge neither honours nor riches, but truth alone, and tranquillity as the effect of truth; who, of all truths and sciences, delights in none more than in metaphysics, if not in all of it, at least in some part of it; and who places all the delight of his life in spending his idle and spare hours on these things.
Verum nec quivis adeo beatus est, nec tantum adhibet studium, quantum mihi persuadeo, te adhibuisse, et propterea quivis eo perfectionis non pervenit, quo te iam pervenisse, ex opere tuo perspicio. Verbo ut absolvam, is ipse est, quem familiarius cognoscere tibi licebit, si eum tibi tantopere devincire placeat, ut aperias, et quasi perfores haerentes eius cogitationes.
But not everyone is so blessed, nor does everyone apply as much study as I am persuaded you have applied; and therefore not everyone arrives at that degree of perfection which I perceive from your work that you have already reached. To finish in a word: he is the man whom you will be able to know more closely, if it please you to oblige him so far as to open up, and as it were bore through, his halting thoughts.
[G IV 80] Sed ad tractatum tuum redeo. Quemadmodum inibi multa inveni, quae summopere palato arridebant, ita etiam quaedam obtulerunt sese, concoctu difficilia, quaeque mihi tibi ignoto ita obiicere haud aequum foret, eoque magis, quod grata, nec ne haec sint futura, me latet: et haec est causa, cur haec praemittam, et rogem, an liceat, si his vesperis Hiemalibus tempus superfuerit, tibique placuerit, ad meas difficultates, quae mihi in libro tuo adhuc restant, respondere, nonnullas earum transmittere; hac tamen lege, et obtestatione, ne ego rei magis necessariae, tibique magis acceptae impedimento sim: quoniam nihil intensius, iuxta promissa in libro tuo facta, quam latiorem opinionum tuarum explicationem, ac editionem desidero.
But I return to your treatise. Just as I found many things in it which were very much to my taste, so also some offered themselves that were hard to digest, which it would hardly be fair for me, as one unknown to you, to put to you thus, the more so since I do not know whether they will be welcome or not; and this is the reason why I send this ahead, and ask whether, if time remains on these winter evenings and it pleases you to answer the difficulties which still remain for me in your book, I may send you some of them; on this condition, however, and with this entreaty, that I should not keep you from anything more necessary or more agreeable to you; since there is nothing I desire more intensely than the fuller explanation and publication of your opinions, in accordance with the promises made in your book.
Ipse id, quod tandem calamo, et chartae credo, coram salute impertita, praestitissem; quia vero primo tuum hospitium mihi ignotum erat, dein morbus contagiosus, et denique munus meum impediebant, hoc ipsum in aliud, ac aliud tempus dilatum est.
What I now at last entrust to pen and paper I should myself have done in person, with a greeting; but because, first, your lodging was unknown to me, then the contagious disease,
1 and finally my office prevented me, it has been put off from one time to another.
- 1 The plague, which in the summer of 1664 was ‘scattered generally over the whole country’, as an English diplomat reported (Nadler p. 250).
[G IV 81] Ne vero haec epistola plane sit vacua, et quia simul spe ducor, non tibi fore ingratum, unicum tantum tibi proponam: nempe, te passim tam in principiis, quam in cogitatis metaphysicis statuere, sive ut propriam sententiam, sive ut Cartesium, cuius philosophiam docebas, explicares, creare, et conservare unum et idem esse, (quod per se adeo clarum est iis, qui eo suas cogitationes direxerunt, ut etiam prima sit notio) et Deum non modo substantias; sed etiam motum in substantiis creasse, hoc est, Deum non solum substantias in statu suo continua creatione; verum etiam earundem motum, ac conatum conservare.
But so that this letter may not be altogether empty, and since I am led at the same time by the hope that it will not be unwelcome to you, I shall put forward just one thing: namely, that in various places, both in the
Principles and in the
Metaphysical Thoughts, whether as your own opinion or in explaining Descartes, whose philosophy you were teaching, you maintain that to create and to preserve are one and the same
1 (which is so clear in itself to those who have turned their thoughts to it that it is even a first notion), and that God has created not only substances but also motion in substances; that is, that God preserves by continual creation not only substances in their state, but also their motion and striving.
- 1 Principles, Part I, Ax. 10 (G I 157): ‘No less a cause is required to preserve a thing than to produce it in the first place’; Metaphysical Thoughts II.10 (G I 269): ‘the operation of God in creating the world is the same as in preserving it’; and II.11 (G I 273): God ‘continually creates a thing as if anew at each moment’.
Deus, verbi causa, non tantum efficit, ut anima, immediata Dei voluntate, atque operatione (perinde est, quomodo id nomines) diutius existat, inque suo perseveret statu; verum etiam causa est, ut tali modo sese ad animae motum habeat:
a hoc est, quemadmodum continua Dei creatio efficit, ut res diutius existant, ita quoque conatus, vel rerum motus per eandem causam fit in rebus; quandoquidem extra Deum nulla motus datur causa.
God, for example, not only brings it about, by his immediate will and operation (it makes no difference what you call it), that the soul continues to exist and perseveres in its state, but is also the cause that he stands in such a relation to the motion of the soul; that is, just as God’s continual creation brings it about that things continue to exist, so also the striving or motion of things comes about in things through the same cause; since outside God there is no cause of motion.
- a The Dutch (G IV 82) says only that God ‘also stands in such a way towards the motion of the Soul’; the Latin version makes him the cause of it.
Sequitur igitur, Deum non tantum causam esse substantiae mentis, sed etiam cuiuscunque conatus, vel motus mentis, quem voluntatem nuncupamus, veluti passim statuis: ex qua assertione etiam necessario sequi videtur, vel nil mali in motu, sive mentis voluntate esse, vel Deum ipsum illud malum immediate operari. Nam ea quoque, quae mala appellamus, per animam, et consequenter per eiusmodi immediatum influxum, et Dei concursum fiunt.
It follows, therefore, that God is the cause not only of the substance of the mind, but also of every striving or motion of the mind, which we call will, as you maintain throughout; and from this assertion it also seems necessarily to follow either that there is no evil in the motion or will of the mind, or that God himself works that evil immediately. For the things which we call evil also come about through the soul, and consequently through such an immediate influence and concurrence of God.
Exempli gratia, anima Adami vult edere de fructu prohibito, efficitur ergo, iuxta superius tradita; non tantum ut illa Adami voluntas per Dei influxum velit; sed etiam, quemadmodum statim ostendetur, ut tali modo velit; adeo ut ille Adami prohibitus actus, quatenus Deus non modo voluntatem eius movebat, sed et quatenus eam tali modo movebat, vel in se non sit malus, vel ut Deus ipse illud operari videatur, quod nos malum vocamus.
For example, Adam’s soul wills to eat of the forbidden fruit; it is brought about, therefore, according to what was said above, not only that this will of Adam wills through God’s influence, but also, as will be shown presently, that it wills in such a way; so that this forbidden act of Adam, insofar as God not only moved his will but also moved it in such a way, is either not evil in itself, or God himself seems to work what we call evil.
Nec aut tu aut D. Cartesius hunc nodum solvere videris, dicendo malum esse non ens, cum quo Deus non concurrit: unde enim voluntas edendi, aut: voluntas Diabolorum ad superbiam procedebat?
Nor do you or Mr Descartes seem to untie this knot by saying that evil is a non-being, with which God does not concur:
2 for where, then, did the will to eat, or the will of the devils to pride, come from?
- 2 Compare the Principles, Part I, Prop. 15 (G I 172): ‘Error is not something positive’, with its scholium.
Nam quoniam voluntas (ut recte animadvertis) non sit diversum quid ab ipsa mente; sed sit hic, aut ille motus, vel mentis conatus, tam ad hanc, quam ad illam motionem concursu Dei ei opus erit; iam vero Dei concursus, ut ex scriptis tuis intelligo, nihil aliud est, quam rem per suam voluntatem hoc, vel illo pacto determinare: sequitur, ergo Deum aeque cum mala voluntate, quatenus mala est, ac cum bona, quatenus bona est, concurrere, hoc est, eam determinare. Nam voluntas Dei, quae causa absoluta est omnium, quae existunt tam in substantia, quam in conatu, videtur etiam prima causa esse malae voluntatis, quatenus mala est.
For since the will (as you rightly observe) is not something different from the mind itself,
3 but is this or that motion or striving of the mind, it will need God’s concurrence as much for the one motion as for the other; and God’s concurrence, as I understand from your writings, is nothing other than to determine a thing by his will in this or that way: it follows, therefore, that God concurs with the evil will, insofar as it is evil, just as much as with the good will, insofar as it is good, that is, determines it. For the will of God, which is the absolute cause of everything that exists, both in substance and in striving, seems also to be the first cause of the evil will, insofar as it is evil.
- 3 Metaphysical Thoughts II.12 (G I 279): ‘we have shown clearly that the will is nothing but the mind itself, which we call a thinking thing, that is, an affirming and denying thing’.
Deinde nulla in nobis fit voluntatis determinatio, quin Deus eam ab aeterno sciverit; alioquin, si nesciverit, in Deo imperfectionem statuimus; sed qui Deus illam aliter sciverit, quam ex suis decretis? Sunt igitur eius decreta nostrarum determinationum causa; et ita rursum sequi videtur, malam voluntatem vel non esse malum quid, vel Deum illius mali causam esse immediatam, et id operari.
Next, no determination of the will occurs in us without God’s having known it from eternity; otherwise, if he did not know it, we ascribe an imperfection to God; but how could God have known it otherwise than from his decrees? His decrees, then, are the cause of our determinations; and so again it seems to follow either that the evil will is not something evil, or that God is the immediate cause of that evil and works it.
Neque hic distinctio Theologorum de differentia inter actum, et malum actui adhaerens locum habere potest: nam Deus cum actum, tum modum actus decrevit, hoc est, Deus non solummodo decrevit, ut Adamus ederet, verum etiam ut necessario contra mandatum ederet. Adeo ut iterum sequi videatur, vel
τὸ edere Adami
b adversus praeceptum non esse malum, vel Deum ipsum illud operari.
Nor can the theologians’ distinction between the act and the evil adhering to the act have any place here: for God decreed both the act and the manner of the act; that is, God decreed not only that Adam should eat, but also that he should necessarily eat against the command. So that again it seems to follow either that Adam’s eating against the command is not evil, or that God himself works it.
- b τὸ (‘the’): the Greek article, which makes the infinitive a noun, ‘the eating of Adam’, as printed in 1677 (OP p. 476). The usage recurs in Letters 19–22; the digital text of Gebhardt transliterates it.
[G IV 84] Haec sunt, vir clarissime, quae in praesentia in tractatu tuo percipere nequeo: extrema namque utrinque statuere durum est. Tale autem responsum a perspicaci tuo iudicio et industria, quod mihi faciat satis, exspecto, et spero me sequentibus meis ostensurum, quantum tibi propterea debeam.
These, most distinguished Sir, are the things which at present I cannot understand in your treatise: for it is hard to maintain either extreme. But I expect from your perspicacious judgment and diligence such an answer as will satisfy me, and I hope to show in my following letters how much I shall owe you for it.
Certo tibi, vir Clar. persuadeas, me haec nulla alia de causa, quam studio veritatis quaerere: liber sum, nulli adstrictus professioni, honestis mercaturis me alo, et tempus, quod mihi reliquum est, hisce rebus impendo. Submisse quoque rogo, ut meae difficultates tibi non sint ingratae; si ad hasce respondere animus est, id quod ardentissime cupio, scribe ad, etc.
aBe assured, most distinguished Sir, that I ask these things for no other reason than the pursuit of truth: I am free, bound to no profession; I support myself by honest trade, and spend the time that remains to me on these matters. I humbly ask, too, that my difficulties may not be unwelcome to you; if you have a mind to answer them, which I most ardently desire, write to, etc.
- a The Dutch gives the address as the initials ‘W. v. B.’, and signs with them (G IV 85).
[G IV 85] Guil. de Blyenbergh.
Willem van Blyenbergh.
Dordraci 12. Decemb. 1664.
Dordrecht, 12 December 1664.
Epistola XIX
Letter 19
Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh
Viro Doctissimo, ac Prudentissimo
To the most learned and most prudent man
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh
Willem van Blyenbergh
Amice Ignote,
Unknown friend,
[G IV 86] Epistolam tuam 12. Decembris datam,
a et in alia inclusam, scripta 21. eiusdem mensis, 26. Schiedami demum accepi; unde intensum tuum veritatis amorem, eamque solummodo omnium studiorum tuorum scopum esse, intelligebam: quod me, qui etiam in nihil aliud animum intendo, ut concluderem coegit, non tantum tuam petitionem, nempe ut ad tuas, quas iam mittis, et imposterum mittes quaestiones, pro viribus mei intellectus responderem, plene concedere; verum omnia quoque pro mea parte conferre, quae ulteriori notitiae, sinceraeque amicitiae inservire queunt.
Your letter dated 12 December, enclosed in another written on the 21st of the same month, I received at last at Schiedam
1 on the 26th; and from it I understood your intense love of truth, and that truth alone is the aim of all your studies: which compelled me, who also set my mind on nothing else, to resolve not only to grant your request fully, namely to answer, as far as my intellect allows, the questions which you send now and will send in future, but also to contribute everything on my part that can serve further acquaintance and sincere friendship.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 477–481, Letter 32), headed Versio. Gebhardt prints Spinoza’s Dutch after it (G IV 86–95); it is dated ‘Op de Lange bogart den 5 Januarii 1665’, and has a closing paragraph and a postscript which the Latin lacks (see the note at the end of the letter).
- 1 During the plague Spinoza spent the winter of 1664–1665 at De Lange Boogert, a farm near Schiedam owned by Jacob Simons Gijsen, the father-in-law of Simon de Vries’s sister (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 251).
Quantum enim ad me attinet: Nullas ex omnibus rebus, quae in potestate mea non sunt, pluris facio, quam cum Viris veritatem sincere amantibus foedus inire amicitiae; quia credo, nos nihil omnino in mundo, quod nostrae potestatis non est, tranquillius, quam istiusmodi homines, posse amare; quoniam tam impossibile est amorem dissolvere, quem ii erga invicem habent, eo quod amore, quem unusquisque erga veritatis cognitionem habet, fundatus est, quam ipsam veritatem semel perceptam non amplecti. Est insuper summus, ac gratissimus, quae in rebus, quae nostri arbitrii non sunt, dari potest; quandoquidem nulla res, praeter veritatem, diversos sensus, et animos penitus unire valet.
For as far as I am concerned, of all the things which are not in my power I value none more highly than to enter into a bond of friendship with men who sincerely love truth; because I believe that of the things in the world which are not in our power we can love nothing at all with more tranquillity than such men; since it is as impossible to dissolve the love which they have for one another, founded as it is on the love which each has for the knowledge of truth, as not to embrace truth itself once it has been perceived. This love is, moreover, the highest and most pleasing that can be had among things not within our choice; since nothing but truth can unite different opinions and minds completely.
2- 2 Compare Part IV, Prop. 35: ‘Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature’.
Taceo maximas utilitates, quae inde fluunt, ut rebus, quas procul dubio ipse nosti, diutius te non detineam, quod tamen huc usque feci, quo eo melius ostenderem, quam gratum mihi, et imposterum futurum sit, occasionem nancisci ad meum tibi officium praestandum.
I pass over the very great advantages which flow from it, so as not to keep you longer with things which you doubtless know yourself; which I have nevertheless done so far, the better to show how welcome it is to me, and will be in future, to have the opportunity of doing you a service.
Ut autem praesentem captem, propius accedam, et ad quaestionem tuam respondebo, quae in eo vertitur cardine, nimirum; quod clare videatur sequi, tam ex Dei providentia, quae ab eius voluntate non differt, quam ex Dei concursu, rerumque creatione continua, vel nulla dari peccata, nullumve malum, vel Deum ea peccata, atque illud malum efficere. Verum non explicas, quid per malum intelligas, et quantum ex exemplo de determinata voluntate Adami perspicere licet, videris per malum intelligere ipsam voluntatem, quatenus tali modo determinata conciperetur, vel quatenus Dei mandato repugnaret, et propterea ais, magnam esse absurditatem (ut et ego, si se ita res haberet) alterutrum horum statuere, nempe, Deum ipsum res, quae contra suam voluntatem sunt, operari, vel eas bonas fore, licet voluntati Dei repugnarent.
But to seize the present one, I shall come closer and answer your question, which turns on this hinge: that it seems clearly to follow, both from God’s providence, which does not differ from his will, and from God’s concurrence and continual creation of things, either that there are no sins and no evil, or that God brings about those sins and that evil. But you do not explain what you understand by evil, and as far as one can see from the example of Adam’s determinate will, you seem to understand by evil the will itself, insofar as it is conceived as determined in such a way, or insofar as it conflicted with God’s command; and therefore you say that it is a great absurdity (as I too would, if the matter stood so) to maintain either of these: namely, that God himself works things which are against his will, or that they would be good although they conflicted with God’s will.
Quoad me, non possum concedere peccata, et malum quid positivum esse, multo minus, aliquid esse, aut fieri contra Dei voluntatem. Econtra dico, non solum peccata non esse quid positivum; verum etiam affirmo, nos non nisi improprie, vel humano more loquendo dicere posse, nos erga Deum peccare, ut cum dicimus, homines Deum offendere.
For my part, I cannot grant that sins and evil are something positive, much less that anything is or happens against God’s will. On the contrary, I say not only that sins are not something positive; I also affirm that we can say only improperly, or speaking in human fashion, that we sin against God,
3 as when we say that men offend God.
- 3 In the Ethics sin can be conceived only in a state, where what is good and evil is decided by common consent (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2).
Nam, primum quod spectat, novimus quicquid est, in se consideratum sine respectu ad aliud quid, perfectionem includere, quae sese eo usque in quacunque re extendit, quo se extendit ipsa rei essentia: nam essentia etiam nihil aliud est.
For as regards the first point, we know that whatever is, considered in itself without relation to anything else, includes perfection, which in each thing extends as far as the very essence of the thing extends: for essence too is nothing else.
4- 4 Compare Part II, Def. 6: ‘By reality and perfection I understand the same thing’.
Sumo, exempli gratia, consilium, sive determinatam Adami voluntatem ad edendum de fructu prohibito: hoc consilium, sive illa determinata voluntas in se sola considerata tantum perfectionis includit, quantum realitatis exprimit; et hoc inde intelligi potest, nempe, quod in rebus nullam imperfectionem possimus concipere, nisi ad alias res attendamus, quae plus habent realitatis; et propterea in Adami decreto, quando illud in se consideramus, nec cum aliis perfectioribus, perfectioremve statum ostendentibus, comparamus, nullam poterimus invenire imperfectionem; imo cum infinitis aliis comparare respectu illius longe imperfectioribus, uti lapidibus, truncis, etc. licet.
Take, for example, the resolve, or determinate will, of Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit: this resolve, or that determinate will, considered in itself alone, includes as much perfection as it expresses reality; and this can be understood from the fact that we can conceive no imperfection in things unless we attend to other things which have more reality;
5 and therefore in Adam’s decree, when we consider it in itself and do not compare it with other things more perfect or showing a more perfect state, we shall be able to find no imperfection; indeed, we may compare it with countless other things, far less perfect in relation to it, such as stones, tree-trunks, etc.
- 5 The account of perfection and imperfection as comparisons in the Preface to Part IV.
Et hoc quivis revera quoque concedit: nam quilibet res, quas in hominibus detestatur, cumque aversione contemplatur, in animalibus cum admiratione intuetur, uti apum bella, atque columbarum zelotypiam, etc. quae in hominibus spernuntur, et nihilominus ob ea animalia perfectiora iudicamus. Haec cum ita sint, clare sequitur, peccata, quandoquidem ea nil nisi imperfectionem indicant, non posse in aliquo consistere, quod realitatem exprimit, sicuti Adami decreto, eiusque executione.
And this, in truth, everyone also concedes: for everyone looks with wonder, in animals, on things which he detests in men and contemplates with aversion, such as the wars of bees and the jealousy of doves, etc., which are despised in men, and yet on account of them we judge the animals more perfect. Since this is so, it clearly follows that sins, since they indicate nothing but imperfection, cannot consist in something which expresses reality, such as Adam’s decree and its execution.
[G IV 90] Praeterea, neque dicere valemus, Adami voluntatem cum lege Dei pugnare, ac ideo illam esse malam, quia Deo displiceret: nam, praeterquam quod magnam in Deo poneret imperfectionem, si quicquam contra eius voluntatem fieret, sique quid desideraret, cuius compos non fieret, eiusque natura tali modo determinata esset, ut, quemadmodum creaturae, cum his sympathiam, cum illis antipathiam haberet; etiam omnino cum voluntatis divinae natura pugnaret, quia enim illa ab eius intellectu non discrepat, impossibile aeque est, aliquid fieri contra eius voluntatem, ac contra eius intellectum, hoc est, id, quod contra eius voluntatem fieret, talis deberet esse naturae, ut eius etiam intellectui repugnaret, ut quadratum Rotundum.
Further, neither can we say that Adam’s will conflicts with God’s law, and that it is evil because it displeases God: for besides the fact that it would posit a great imperfection in God if anything happened against his will, and if he desired something which he did not obtain, and if his nature were so determined that, like creatures, he had sympathy with some things and antipathy towards others; it would also conflict altogether with the nature of the divine will; for since that does not differ from his intellect, it is as impossible for anything to happen against his will as against his intellect; that is, what happened against his will would have to be of such a nature as to conflict with his intellect too, like a round square.
Quandoquidem ergo voluntas, decretumve Adami, in se spectatum, nec malum, nec quoque proprie loquendo contra Dei voluntatem erat; sequitur Deum eius causam posse, immo, iuxta eam rationem, quam animadvertis, debere esse; non vero quatenus malum erat: nam malum, quod in eo erat, non erat aliud, quam privationis perfectioris status, quem propter illud opus Adamus amittere debebat, et certum est, privationem non esse quid positivum, eamque respectu nostri, non vero Dei intellectus ita nominari.
Since, then, Adam’s will or decree, regarded in itself, was neither evil nor, properly speaking, against God’s will, it follows that God can be its cause, indeed, by the reasoning which you point out, must be; but not insofar as it was evil: for the evil that was in it was nothing other than the privation of a more perfect state which Adam had to lose because of that deed; and it is certain that a privation is not something positive, and that it is so called in relation to our intellect, not God’s.
Hoc autem hinc oritur, quia cuncta eiusdem generis singularia, ea omnia, verbi gratia, quae externam hominum figuram habent, una eademque definitione exprimimus, et idcirco iudicamus, ea omnia aeque apta esse ad summam perfectionem, quam ex eiusmodi definitione deducere possumus; quando autem unum invenimus, cuius opera cum ista pugnant perfectione, tunc id ea privatum esse iudicamus, et a sua natura aberrare, quod haud faceremus, si id ad eiusmodi definitionem non retulissemus, talemque ei naturam affinxissemus. Quoniam vero Deus res nec abstracte novit, nec id genus generales format definitiones, nec plus realitatis rebus competit, quam iis divinus intellectus, et potentia immisit, et revera tribuit, manifesto sequitur, privationem istam solummodo respectu nostri intellectus, non vero respectu Dei dici posse.
This arises from the fact that we express all singulars of the same kind, for example all those which have the external figure of men, by one and the same definition,
1 and therefore judge that they are all equally fit for the highest perfection which we can deduce from a definition of that kind; but when we find one whose works conflict with that perfection, we judge that it is deprived of it and departs from its nature; which we would not do if we had not referred it to such a definition and ascribed such a nature to it. But since God neither knows things abstractly nor forms general definitions of that kind, and no more reality belongs to things than the divine intellect and power has put into them and really given them, it plainly follows that this privation can be spoken of only in relation to our intellect, not in relation to God.
- 1 The same explanation, from universal ideas of a kind, in the Preface to Part IV.
[G IV 92] Hisce, mihi ut videtur, quaestio penitus soluta est.
With this, it seems to me, the question is entirely solved.
Ut vero viam magis planam reddam, omnemque scrupulum evellam, necesse habeo, ad has duas sequentes quaestiones respondere, nempe primo, quare S. Scriptura dicat Deum flagitare, ut se improbi convertant, et etiam quare Adamo prohibuerit ex arbore non edere, cum tamen contrarium conclusisset. Secundo, quod ex dictis meis sequi videatur, improbos superbia, avaritia, desperatione. etc. aeque Deum colere, ac probos generositate, patientia, amore, etc. propterea quod Dei voluntatem exsequuntur.
But to make the way smoother and remove every scruple, I must answer the two following questions: first, why Holy Scripture says that God demands that the wicked be converted,
1 and also why he forbade Adam to eat from the tree
2 when he had nevertheless decreed the contrary. Second, that it seems to follow from what I have said that the wicked worship God by their pride, greed, despair, etc., just as much as the good by their nobility, patience, love, etc., because they carry out God’s will.
- 1 For example Ezekiel 33:11: nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua, et vivat (‘I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live’).
- 2 Genesis 2:17.
Ad primum ut respondeam, dico Scripturam, quia plebi praecipue convenit, et inservit, continuo humano more loqui: plebs etenim rebus sublimibus percipiendis inepta est; et haec est ratio, cur mihi persuadeam ea omnia, quae Deus prophetis revelavit ad salutem esse necessaria, legum modo scribi; et hoc pacto integras Parabolas prophetae finxerunt, nempe primo Deum, quia salutis, et perditionis media revelarat, quorumque erat causa, instar Regis, ac Legislatoris adumbrarunt; media, quae nil nisi causae sunt, leges appellarunt, et ad modum Legum conscripserunt; salutem, perditionemque, quae nil nisi effectus sunt, qui necessario ex illis mediis fluunt, tanquam praemium, et poenam proposuerunt, atque iuxta hanc Parabolam magis, quam iuxta veritatem omnia sua verba ordinarunt, Deumque ad instar hominis passim expresserunt, modo iratum, modo misericordem, iam futura desiderantem, iam zelo, et suspicione captum, quin ab ipso Diabolo deceptum; adeo ut philosophi, et simul omnes, qui sunt supra legem, hoc est, qui virtutem, non ut legem; sed ex amore, quia praestantissima est, sequuntur, eiusmodi verbis non debeant offendi.
To answer the first, I say that Scripture, because it is suited chiefly to the common people and serves them, continually speaks in human fashion: for the common people are incapable of perceiving sublime things; and this is the reason why I am persuaded that everything which God revealed to the prophets as necessary for salvation is written in the manner of laws; and in this way the prophets devised whole parables: namely, first, because God had revealed the means of salvation and perdition, and was their cause, they represented him as a king and lawgiver; the means, which are nothing but causes, they called laws and wrote down in the manner of laws;
1 salvation and perdition, which are nothing but effects that follow necessarily from those means, they set forth as reward and punishment; and they ordered all their words more according to this parable than according to the truth, and everywhere depicted God after the likeness of a man, now angry, now merciful, now desiring things to come, now seized by jealousy and suspicion, indeed deceived by the Devil himself; so that philosophers, and with them all who are above the law, that is, who follow virtue not as a law but from love, because it is the most excellent thing, ought not to be offended by words of this kind.
- 1 Developed in the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 4 (G III 63), where Spinoza says that God revealed to Adam only the evil that would necessarily follow if he ate of the tree, and Adam perceived the revelation as a law.
[G IV 93] Edictum ergo Adamo factum in hoc solummodo consistebat, nempe quod Deus Adamo revelavit, τὸ edere ex illa arbore mortem operari, quemadmodum et nobis per naturalem intellectum revelat, venenum esse mortiferum. Si vero roges, in quem finem hoc ei revelaret? responsum do, ut eum tanto scientia perfectiorem redderet.
The command given to Adam, then, consisted solely in this: that God revealed to Adam that eating of that tree brought about death,
1 just as he also reveals to us through the natural intellect that poison is deadly. If you ask to what end he revealed this to him, I reply: to make him so much the more perfect in knowledge.
Deum ergo interrogare, quamobrem ipsi perfectiorem non dederit voluntatem, est aeque absurdum, ac interrogare, cur circulo omnes globi proprietates non fuerit largitus, uti ex supra dictis perspicue sequitur, et ego scholio prop. 15. Partis primae Princip. Cartes. more geometrico demonstrat. demonstravi.
To ask God, therefore, why he did not give him a more perfect will is as absurd as to ask why he did not bestow on the circle all the properties of the sphere, as follows clearly from what has been said above, and as I have demonstrated in the Scholium to Prop. 15 of Part I of
Descartes’s Principles Demonstrated in the Geometrical Manner.
2- 2 Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175): ‘God has no more deprived us of a greater intellect, or a more perfect faculty of understanding, than he has deprived the circle of the properties of the globe, and the circumference of those of the sphere’.
[G IV 94] Secundam difficultatem quod attinet, verum quidem est, impios Dei voluntatem suo modo exprimere; ideo tamen cum probis nullatenus sunt comparandi: quo enim res aliqua plus perfectionis habet, eo etiam magis de Deitate participat, Deique perfectionem exprimit magis.
As for the second difficulty, it is true indeed that the impious express God’s will in their own way; but they are not on that account in any way to be compared with the good: for the more perfection a thing has, the more it also participates in the Deity, and the more it expresses God’s perfection.
Quum ergo probi inaestimabiliter plus perfectionis, quam improbi habeant, virtus eorum cum improborum virtute comparari nequit, eo quod improbi amore divino, qui ex Dei profluit cognitione, et quo solo nos pro humano nostro intellectu Dei servi dicimur, carent. Imo, quia Deum non cognoscunt, non sunt nisi instrumentum in manu artificis, quod inscium servit, et serviendo consumitur; probi contra conscii serviunt, et serviendo perfectiores evadunt.
aSince, then, the good have incomparably more perfection than the wicked, their virtue cannot be compared with the virtue of the wicked, because the wicked lack the divine love which flows from the knowledge of God, and by which alone, according to our human intellect, we are said to be servants of God. Indeed, because they do not know God, they are nothing but a tool in the hand of the craftsman, which serves without knowing it and is used up in serving; the good, on the contrary, serve knowingly, and become more perfect by serving.
- a Spinoza’s Dutch continues (G IV 95): ‘This, Sir, is all I can now bring forward to answer your question. I wish for nothing more than that it may satisfy you. But if you still find difficulty, I ask that I may know it too, to see whether I could remove it. You need not hesitate on your part; as long as you think yourself unsatisfied, I would like nothing better than to know the reason, so that the truth may at last appear. I could wish that I might write in the language in which I was brought up; I could perhaps express my thoughts better; but please take it in good part, and correct the mistakes yourself, and hold me for your devoted friend and servant, B. de Spinoza. At the Lange Bogart, 5 January 1665.’ A postscript says that he will stay at the farm three or four weeks more and then return to Voorburg, and asks for letters to be sent there, ‘to be delivered in the Kerklaan, at the house of Master Daniel Tydeman, the painter’. The language in which he was brought up was Portuguese (Nadler p. 56).
Epistola XX
Letter 20
Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza
Clarissimo viro
To the most distinguished man
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.
from Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine, et Charissime amice,
Sir, and dearest friend,
[G IV 96] Ubi tua mihi primum tradebatur epistola,
a eaque a me cursim evolvebatur, non tantum statim respondere, sed et multa refutare animus erat. Verum quo eam magis volvebam, eo minorem obiectionum materiam inveniebam, et quantum desiderium legendi me ceperat, tantam legendo percepi voluptatem.
When your letter was first handed to me and I ran through it hastily, I had a mind not only to answer at once but also to refute many things. But the more I turned it over, the less matter for objections I found, and as great as the desire to read it that had seized me, so great was the pleasure I took in reading it.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 482–497, Letter 33), headed Versio; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 96–125). The 1677 edition prints in italics the words that Blyenbergh takes from the earlier letters and from Spinoza’s books; quotation marks mark the verbatim quotations here.
Antequam vero ad postulatum accedam, ut nimirum quasdam difficultates solveres, imprimis sciendum est; me duas generales habere regulas, iuxta quas semper studeo philosophari, prior regula est clarus, et distinctus mei intellectus conceptus, posterior est verbum Dei revelatum, vel Dei voluntas. Iuxta priorem amator veritatis, iuxta utramque vero Christianus ut sim philosophus conor; et siquando post longum accideret examen, ut naturalis mea cognitio vel videretur cum hoc verbo pugnare, vel minus bene cum eo convenire, tantum hoc verbum apud me habet auctoritatis, ut conceptus, quos claros esse mihi imaginor, mihi sint potius suspecti, quam ut eos supra et contra illam veritatem, quam in illo libro mihi praescriptam puto, collocarem.
But before I come to my request, namely that you should resolve certain difficulties, you must know first of all that I have two general rules according to which I always try to philosophize:
1 the first rule is the clear and distinct conception of my intellect, the second is the revealed word of God, or the will of God. According to the first I try to be a lover of truth, but according to both a Christian philosopher; and if it should ever happen, after long examination, that my natural knowledge seemed either to conflict with this word or to agree with it less well, this word has so much authority with me that the concepts which I imagine to be clear are rather suspect to me than that I should place them above and against the truth which I think is prescribed to me in that book.
- 1 Spinoza answers this at the start of his reply (Letter 21): with the second rule, he says, they disagree about first principles themselves (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 253).
Et quid mirum? nam constanter credere volo, illud verbum esse Dei verbum, hoc est, id provenisse a summo, et perfectissimo Deo, qui plures perfectiones includit, quam ego capere possum; et forte de se ipso, suisque operibus plures voluit perfectiones praedicare, quam ego finito meo intellectu hodie, hodie inquam, percipere queo: fieri enim potest, ut memet operibus meis maioribus perfectionibus privarim; et ideo, si forte ea praeditus essem perfectione, qua actionibus propriis privatus sum, percipere possem omne id, quod in eo verbo nobis proponitur, et docetur, cum sanissimis meae mentis conceptibus congruere; verum quia mihi ipsi suspectus sum, annon continuo errore memet meliore privaverim conditione, et, ut statuis, Princ. Part. 1. Prop. 15. nostra cognitio, licet clarissima, adhuc imperfectionem includat; potius, etiam sine ratione, ad illud verbum inclino, hoc nisus fundamento, quod a perfectissimo prodiit, (hoc quippe iam praesuppono, quia eius probatio hic non haberet locum, vel nimis longa foret) et propterea a me credi debet.
And what wonder? For I wish to believe constantly that this word is the word of God, that is, that it has come from the highest and most perfect God, who includes more perfections than I can grasp; and perhaps he willed to declare more perfections of himself and his works than I can perceive today, today, I say, with my finite intellect: for it may be that I have deprived myself by my works of greater perfections; and therefore, if I were perhaps endowed with the perfection of which I have been deprived by my own actions, I could perceive that everything which is set before us and taught in that word agrees with the soundest concepts of my mind; but because I am suspicious of myself, whether I have not deprived myself of a better condition by continual error, and since, as you maintain in the Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, our knowledge, however clear, still includes imperfection, I incline rather to that word, even without reason, relying on this foundation: that it has come from the most perfect being (this indeed I now presuppose, because its proof would have no place here, or would be too long), and therefore must be believed by me.
Si iam solo ductu regulae meae primae, exclusa secunda, quasi eam non haberem, aut ea non extaret, de tua epistola iudicarem, multa mihi essent concedenda, ut et concedo, subtilesque conceptus tui essent suspiciendi; secunda vero regula longius a te me dissentire cogit. Verum pro epistolae modo ductu et huius et illius regulae aliquanto latius eos examinabo.
If I were now to judge your letter by the guidance of my first rule alone, the second excluded, as if I did not have it or it did not exist, I should have to grant many things, as I do grant them, and your subtle concepts would have to be admired; but the second rule compels me to disagree with you more widely. But as far as a letter allows I shall examine them somewhat more fully under the guidance of both the one rule and the other.
[G IV 98] Primo, iuxta primo positam regulam, rogaveram, quia, secundum tuam positionem, creare, et conservare unum, idemque erant, et quia Deus non tantum res; sed motus quoque, et rerum modos in statu suo perseverare faciebat, hoc est, cum iis concurrebat; annon videretur sequi, nullum esse malum, aut, ipsum Deum malum operari; hac nixus regula, quod nihil contra Dei voluntatem potest fieri, alioquin involveret imperfectionem, aut res, quas Deus operatur, (quibus etiam res, quas malas dicimus, comprehensae videntur) etiam deberent malae esse. Verum quia et hoc contradictionem includit, et, quocunque eam verterem modo, me a contradictione statuenda liberare non possem, propterea me ad te recipiebam, utpote optimum tuorum conceptuum interpretem.
First, according to the first rule laid down, I had asked
1 whether, since according to your position to create and to preserve were one and the same, and since God made not only things but also the motions and modes of things persevere in their state, that is, concurred with them, it did not seem to follow that there is no evil, or that God himself works evil; relying on this rule, that nothing can happen against God’s will, since otherwise it would involve imperfection, or the things which God works (among which the things we call evil also seem to be included) would also have to be evil. But because this too includes a contradiction, and in whatever way I turned it I could not free myself from asserting a contradiction, I had recourse to you, as the best interpreter of your own concepts.
In responsione dicis, te persistere in prima sententia, nempe nihil contra Dei voluntatem vel fieri, vel posse fieri: Verum quum huic difficultati respondendum esset, annon igitur Deus nullum faciat malum, negas peccatum quid positivum esse, addisque, non nisi valde improprie dici posse nos in Deum, peccare; et appendicis parte I. Cap. 6. dicis, malum absolutum nullum dari, ut per se est manifestum: Nam quicquid existit, in se consideratum, sine respectu ad aliud quid, perfectionem includit, quae sese semper eo usque in quacunque re extendit, quo se extendit ipsa rei essentia, et propterea evidenter sequitur, peccata, quia ea nihil nisi imperfectionem denotant, non posse in aliquo, quod essentiam exprimit, consistere.
In your reply you say that you persist in your first opinion,
2 namely that nothing either happens or can happen against God’s will. But when the difficulty had to be answered whether God then does no evil, you deny that sin is something positive, and add that only very improperly can we be said to sin against God; and in the Appendix, Part I, ch. 6, you say that ‘there is no absolute evil, as is self-evident’:
3 ‘For whatever exists, considered in itself without relation to anything else, includes perfection, which always extends in each thing as far as the very essence of the thing extends; and therefore it evidently follows that sins, because they denote nothing but imperfection, cannot consist in something which expresses essence.’
Si peccatum, malum, error, vel quocunque id appelles nomine, nihil aliud est, quam perfectiorem statum amittere, aut eo privari, utique sequi videtur, τὸ existere non quidem malum, aut imperfectionem esse; sed aliquod malum in re existente posse oriri. Nam perfectum per aeque perfectam actionem perfectiore statu non privabitur; sed quidem per id, quod ad aliquod imperfectum, quia concessis nobis viribus abutimur, inclinamus.
If sin, evil, error, or whatever name you call it by, is nothing other than to lose a more perfect state, or to be deprived of it, it certainly seems to follow that to exist is not indeed evil or imperfection, but that some evil can arise in a thing that exists. For what is perfect will not be deprived of a more perfect state by an equally perfect action, but by our inclining to something imperfect, because we misuse the powers granted to us.
Hoc videris non malum; sed bonum minus appellare, quia res in se consideratae perfectionem includunt: deinde, quia rebus, ut ais, non plus essentiae competit, quam divinus intellectus, et potentia eis tribuit, et revera confert; et propterea non plus etiam existentiae in actionibus suis ostendere, quam essentiae accepere, possunt.
This you seem to call not evil but a lesser good, because things considered in themselves include perfection; and next because, as you say, no more essence belongs to things than the divine intellect and power attributes to them and really confers; and therefore they can show no more existence in their actions than the essence they have received.
Nam si nec plures, nec pauciores possum edere operationes, quam quantum essentiae accepi, nulla perfectioris status privatio fingi potest: si enim nihil contra Dei voluntatem fit, et si solummodo tantum fit, quantum essentiae collatum est, qua via malum, quod melioris conditionis privationem nuncupas, excogitari potest? Quomodo quis per statutum adeo, et dependens opus perfectiorem statum amittere potis est?
For if I can bring forth neither more nor fewer operations than the essence I have received, no privation of a more perfect state can be feigned: for if nothing happens against God’s will, and if only as much happens as there is essence conferred, by what way can evil, which you call the privation of a better condition, be thought up? How can anyone lose a more perfect state through a work so fixed and dependent?
Adeo ut mihi persuadeam, Virum clarissimum alterutrum debere statuere, vel aliquod esse malum, vel si minus, nullam esse posse melioris status privationem: Nam nullum esse malum et meliori conditione orbari contradictorium mihi videtur. At dices, per perfectioris status privationem ad minus quidem bonum; sed non ad absolutum malum recidimus; sed (Append. Part. 1. Cap. 3.) me docuisti, non esse de verbis litigandum.
So that I am persuaded that you, most distinguished Sir, must maintain one of two things: either that there is some evil, or, if not, that there can be no privation of a better state: for that there is no evil and that one is bereft of a better condition seem to me contradictory. But you will say that through the privation of a more perfect state we fall back into a lesser good, but not into absolute evil; but you have taught me (Appendix, Part I, ch. 3) that one should not quarrel about words.
4- 4 Metaphysical Thoughts I.3 (G I 242): ‘for I am not accustomed to dispute about names’.
Quare, an id absolutum, nec ne dicendum sit, iam non disputo; sed solum, annon a meliori in peiorem statum delabi apud nos iure peior status, aut status malus dicatur, et dici debeat. At regeres, malus ille status multum adhuc boni continet; ego vero interrogo, annon ille homo, qui per imprudentiam suam in causa fuit, quod perfectiore statu orbatus est, et per consequens nunc minor est, quam antea fuit, malus vocari queat.
Therefore I do not now dispute whether it should be called absolute or not; but only whether falling from a better into a worse state is not rightly called among us, and ought to be called, a worse state, or an evil state. But you will reply that this evil state still contains much good; I, however, ask whether the man who through his imprudence was the cause of his being bereft of a more perfect state, and is consequently now less than he was before, cannot be called evil.
[G IV 101] Ut autem antecedens ratiocinium, quia nonnullae circa id supersunt tibi difficultates, declines, affirmas malum quidem esse, et in Adamo fuisse, verum id non esse positivum quid, et respectu nostri, non autem Dei intellectus tale dici, nostrique respectu privationem, (sed tantum quatenus eo optima libertate, quae ad nostram naturam spectat, et in nostra potestate est, nosmet ipsos privamus) Dei vero respectu negationem esse. Hic autem examinemus, an illud, quod malum vocas, siquidem duntaxat nostri respectu malum foret, malum non esset; deinde an malum, ut tu vis, acceptum, Dei respectu tantum negatio dici debeat.
But to evade the preceding reasoning, since some difficulties about it remain for you, you affirm that there is indeed evil, and that it was in Adam, but that it is not something positive, and is so called in relation to our intellect, not God’s; and that in relation to us it is privation (‘but only insofar as we thereby deprive ourselves of the best freedom, which belongs to our nature and is in our power’
1), but in relation to God negation. Here, however, let us examine whether what you call evil, if it were evil only in relation to us, would not be evil; and next whether evil, taken as you wish, should be called only negation in relation to God.
- 1 Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175), which ends by calling the imperfection of error a privation in relation to man, but in relation to God a negation.
[G IV 102] Ad primum supra aliquo modo videor respondisse: et quamvis concederem, minus alio ente perfectum esse in me nullum ponere posse malum, eo quod meliorem statum a creatore flagitare nequeo, et tantum efficere, ut meus status gradibus differat; non tamen ideo potero concedere, et fateri, si iam imperfectior sum, quam ante fui, eamque imperfectionem mea culpa mihi creavi, me eatenus non tanto peiorem esse;
a si, inquam, meipsum, antequam in imperfectionem unquam incideram, considero, et me cum aliis tunc maiore, quam ego praeditis perfectione, comparo, minor illa perfectio non malum; sed secundum gradus minus bonum erit: Si vero me ipsum, postquam perfectiore statu excidi, eoque propria orbatus imprudentia, cum prima mea forma, qua ex manu mei Creatoris prodii, et perfectior eram, comparo, me esse deteriorem, quam antea iudicare debeo: nam non creator; sed ego me ipsum eo redegi; vires enim mihi me ab errore praeservandi, uti et tu fateris, suppetebant.
To the first I seem to have answered in some way above; and although I would grant that to be less perfect than another being can posit no evil in me, because I cannot demand a better state from the creator, and it only makes my state differ by degrees; yet I shall not on that account be able to grant and confess, if I am now more imperfect than I was before and have created that imperfection for myself by my own fault, that I am not to that extent so much the worse; if, I say, I consider myself before I ever fell into imperfection, and compare myself with others then endowed with greater perfection than I, that lesser perfection will not be an evil but a lesser good according to degree; but if I compare myself, after I have fallen from a more perfect state and been bereft of it by my own imprudence, with my first form, in which I came forth from the hand of my Creator and was more perfect, I must judge that I am worse than before: for not the creator but I myself brought myself to this; for I had the powers to preserve myself from error, as you too confess.
- a So Gebhardt (G IV 102); the 1677 edition (OP p. 485) and Van Vloten and Land (VVL³ III 73) have eatenus tanto peiorem without non, which makes Blyenbergh deny what he goes on to assert. Gebhardt explains (G IV 397) that the Latin version, having changed the construction of the Dutch, ought to have added non, as Meijer had argued; the Dutch says that he would have to confess that he is so much the worse (G IV 102).
Quod secundum spectat, nempe an malum, quod statuis consistere in melioris status privatione, quem non tantum Adamus; sed et nos omnes subita, et inordinata nimis actione amisimus, an illud, inquam, respectu Dei mera sit negatio. Ut hoc vero sana mente examinemus, videndum nobis est, quomodo hominem constituas et a Deo ante omnem errorem dependentem facias, et quomodo post errorem eundem hominem constituas.
As regards the second: namely whether the evil which you hold to consist in the privation of a better state, which not only Adam but all of us lost by a too sudden and disordered action, whether that, I say, is a mere negation in relation to God. To examine this with a sound mind, we must see how you constitute man and make him dependent on God before all error, and how you constitute the same man after error.
Ante errorem eum describis, quod non plus ipsi essentiae competit, quam quantum ei divinus intellectus, et potentia tribuit, et revera confert, hoc est, (nisi a mente tua aberrem) quod homo nec plus, nec minus perfectionis potest habere, quam quantum essentiae Deus in ipso posuit: hoc vero est hominem tali modo a Deo dependentem facere, quemadmodum elementa, lapides, herbas, etc. Si autem haec tua sit sententia, quid sibi velint verba Princip. P. 1. Prop. 15. non percipio.
Before error you describe him as having no more essence than the divine intellect and power attributes to him and really confers; that is (unless I mistake your mind), that man can have neither more nor less perfection than the essence God has put in him: but this is to make man dependent on God in the same way as the elements, stones, plants, etc. But if this is your opinion, I do not understand what the words of the Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, mean.
Cum autem voluntas, inquis, libera sit ad se determinandum: sequitur nos potestatem habere facultatem assentiendi intra limites intellectus continendi, ac proinde efficiendi, ne in errorem incidamus. Annon videtur contradictio, voluntatem tam liberam, ut se ab errore possit praeservare, et una a Deo dependentem facere, ut nec plus, nec minus perfectionis queat proferre, quam quantum essentiae Deus ipsi dedit?
‘But since the will’, you say, ‘is free to determine itself, it follows that we have the power of containing the faculty of assenting within the limits of the intellect, and so of bringing it about that we do not fall into error.’
1 Does it not seem a contradiction to make the will so free that it can preserve itself from error, and at the same time so dependent on God that it can bring forth neither more nor less perfection than the essence God has given it?
- 1 Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 174).
Ad secundum, nempe quomodo hominem constituis post errorem, dicis, hominem subita nimis actione, nimirum voluntatem non continendo intra intellectus limites, seipsum perfectiore conditione privare: verum mihi videtur, tibi et hic, et in principiis utraque huius privationis extrema propius fuisse explicanda, quid ante privationem possideret quidque post amissionem perfecti istius status (ut eum appellas) sibi servaret. Dicitur quidem quid perdiderimus; sed non quid retinuerimus Princ. Part. 1. Prop. 15. Tota igitur imperfectio erroris in sola optimae libertatis privatione consistet, quae error vocatur.
As to the second, namely how you constitute man after error, you say that man by too sudden an action, namely by not containing the will within the limits of the intellect, deprives himself of a more perfect condition; but it seems to me that both here and in the
Principles you should have explained more closely both extremes of this privation: what he possessed before the privation, and what he kept for himself after the loss of that perfect state (as you call it). We are told indeed what we have lost, but not what we have retained (
Principles, Part I, Prop. 15): ‘The whole imperfection of error, therefore, will consist solely in the privation of the best freedom, which is called error.’
2- 2 Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175).
Examinemus utcumque hoc ea ratione, qua a te statuitur. Statuis non solum tam diversos cogitandi modos in nobis dari, quorum alios volendi, aliosque intelligendi nuncupamus; sed etiam inter eos talem esse ordinem, ut res non debeamus velle, antequam eas clare intelligamus; affirmas etiam, quod, si voluntatem nostram intra limites intellectus continemus, nunquam errabimus, et quod denique in nostra potestate est voluntatem intra limites intellectus continere.
Let us examine this, at any rate, in the way you lay it down. You maintain not only that there are in us such different modes of thinking, of which we call some willing and others understanding, but also that there is such an order between them that we ought not to will things before we understand them clearly; you affirm too that if we contain our will within the limits of the intellect we shall never err, and finally that it is in our power to contain the will within the limits of the intellect.
Cum haec serio mente agito, alterutrum ut verum sit, necessum est; vel omne id, quod ponitur, est fictum, vel Deus eundem ordinem nobis impressit. Si impressit, annon absurdum esset affirmare id sine fine factum esse Deumque, ut ullum ordinem observemus et sequamur, non exigere: nam illud in Deo contradictionem poneret.
When I turn this over seriously in my mind, one of two things must be true: either everything that is laid down is feigned, or God has impressed this same order upon us. If he has impressed it, would it not be absurd to affirm that this was done to no purpose, and that God does not require us to observe and follow any order? For that would posit a contradiction in God.
Et si ordinem in nobis positum debemus observare, quomodo adeo a Deo dependentes possumus et esse, et manere: si enim nemo nec plus, nec minus perfectionis habet, quam quantum essentiae accepit, et si haec vis ex effectibus debeat cognosci, ille, qui voluntatem suam ultra limites intellectus extendit, non tantum virium a Deo accepit, alioquin eas in effectum deduceret; et per consequens is, qui errat, perfectionem non errandi a Deo non accepit, alias nunquam erraret. Nam secundum te tantum essentiae datum est, quantum perfectionis efficitur.
And if we must observe the order placed in us, how can we be and remain so dependent on God? For if no one has more or less perfection than the essence he has received, and if this power must be known from its effects, then he who extends his will beyond the limits of the intellect has not received so much power from God, otherwise he would bring it into effect; and consequently he who errs has not received from God the perfection of not erring, otherwise he would never err. For according to you as much essence has been given as perfection is brought about.
Deinde si Deus nobis tantum essentiae tribuit, ut eum observare queamus ordinem, ut tu nos eum posse servare affirmas, et si tantum perfectionis producimus, quantum essentiae nacti sumus, qui fit, ut eum transgrediamur, qui, ut eum possimus transgredi ordinem, utque voluntatem non semper intra limites intellectus contineamus.
Next, if God has given us so much essence that we can observe that order, as you affirm that we can keep it, and if we produce as much perfection as the essence we have obtained, how does it come about that we transgress it, that we can transgress that order, and that we do not always contain the will within the limits of the intellect.
Tertio, si a Deo tantopere dependeo, ut supra te statuere ostendi, ut nec intra, nec extra limites intellectus voluntatem continere possim, nisi mihi Deus in antecessum tantum dederit essentiae, et sua voluntate prius alterutrum determinaverit: quomodo ergo mihi, si hoc penitius consideremus, voluntatis libertas usu venire potest.
Third, if I depend on God so much, as I have shown above that you hold, that I can contain the will neither within nor beyond the limits of the intellect unless God has given me so much essence beforehand and has first determined the one or the other by his will: how then, if we consider this more deeply, can freedom of the will fall to me.
Nonne in Deo contradictionem ponere videtur, nobis praescribere ordinem nostram voluntatem intra limites nostri intellectus continendi, et non praebere tantum essentiae, vel perfectionum, ut eum observemus; et si, iuxta tuam sententiam, tantum perfectionis nobis concessit, nunquam profecto errare possemus: quantum enim essentiae possidemus, tantum perfectionis producere oportet, semperque concessas vires in nostris operationibus ostendere: nostri autem errores sunt argumentum, nos eiusmodi potentiam a Deo ita dependentem (ut statuis) non possidere; adeo ut alterutrum verum esse debeat, vel nos non adeo Deo dependere, vel nos in nobis potentiam non errandi non habere; at potentiam non errandi habemus, prout statuis. Ergo a Deo non adeo dependemus.
Does it not seem to posit a contradiction in God, to prescribe to us the order of containing our will within the limits of our intellect, and not to provide essence or perfection enough for us to observe it; and if, according to your opinion, he has granted us so much perfection, we could certainly never err: for as much essence as we possess, so much perfection we must produce, and always show in our operations the powers granted; but our errors are proof that we do not possess such a power so dependent on God (as you hold); so that one of two things must be true: either we do not depend on God so much, or we do not have in us the power of not erring; but we do have the power of not erring, as you hold. Therefore we do not depend on God so much.
Ex dictis iam clare patere videtur, impossibile esse, ut malum aut meliori statu privari respectu Dei esset negatio. Quid enim significat privari, aut perfectiorem statum amittere? nonne est a maiori ad minorem perfectionem, et per consequens a maiori ad minorem essentiam transire; et a Deo in certa mensura perfectionis, et essentiae collocari? nonne est velle, nos alium, praeter sui perfectam notitiam, non posse acquirere statum, nisi aliter decrevisset, ac voluisset?
From what has been said it now seems clearly evident that it is impossible that evil, or being deprived of a better state, should be a negation in relation to God. For what does it mean to be deprived, or to lose a more perfect state? Is it not to pass from greater to lesser perfection, and consequently from greater to lesser essence, and to be placed by God in a certain measure of perfection and essence? Is it not his willing that we can acquire no other state outside his perfect knowledge, unless he had decreed and willed otherwise?
Fierine potest, ut illa creatura ab omniscio, et summe perfecto ente producta, quod voluit, ut talem essentiae statum retineret, imo, cum qua Deus, ut eam in eo statu retineret, continuo concurrit; ut, inquam, in essentia declinaret, hoc est, in perfectione praeter Dei notitiam minor fieret? Haec res absurditatem involvere videtur.
Can it be that this creature, produced by an omniscient and supremely perfect being which willed that it should retain such a state of essence, indeed, with which God continually concurs in order to keep it in that state, can it be, I say, that it should decline in essence, that is, become less in perfection, without God’s knowledge? This seems to involve absurdity.
Annon absurdum est dicere, Adamum perfectiorem amisisse conditionem, et consequenter ineptum fuisse ad eum ordinem, quem Deus in anima eius posuerat, Deumque nullam habere notitiam, qualis, quantaeque perfectionis Adamus iacturam fecerat? Potestne comprehendi, Deum ens aliquod constituere ita dependens, ut non nisi eiusmodi opus produceret, et tum propter illud opus perfectiorem perderet statum: (praeterquam quod eius absoluta esset causa) et tamen nullam eius haberet notitiam?
Is it not absurd to say that Adam lost a more perfect condition, and was consequently unfit for the order which God had placed in his soul, and that God has no knowledge of what kind and how great a perfection Adam had lost? Can it be understood that God should constitute some being so dependent that it could produce no work but such a one, and that it should then lose a more perfect state because of that work (besides the fact that he would be its absolute cause), and yet that he should have no knowledge of it?
Concedo inter actum, et malum actui adhaerens dari discrimen; sed vero malum respectu Dei esse negationem superat meum captum. Deum actum scire, eundem determinare, et cum eo concurrere, et tamen malum, quod in illo actu est, eiusque exitum non cognoscere, mihi in Deo impossibile videtur.
I grant that there is a distinction between the act and the evil adhering to the act; but that evil should be a negation in relation to God surpasses my understanding. That God should know the act, determine it and concur with it, and yet not know the evil which is in that act, and its outcome, seems to me impossible in God.
Adverte mecum, Deum in actu meo progignendi cum uxore mea concurrere: est enim positivum quid, et per consequens claram eius habet Deus scientiam; verum quatenus eo actu abutor, et cum alterius uxore contra datam fidem, et iusiurandum meum rem habeo, illum actum malum comitatur. Quid iam hic respectu Dei esset negativum? non quod actum progignendi faciam: quatenus etenim is positivus est, cum eodem Deus concurrit. Debet ergo istud malum, quod illum actum comitatur, tantummodo esse, quod ego contra proprium foedus, vel Dei mandatum cum aliena congredior, cum qua non licet.
Consider with me: God concurs in my act of begetting with my wife; for it is something positive, and consequently God has clear knowledge of it; but insofar as I misuse this act, and have to do with another man’s wife against my given faith and oath, evil accompanies that act. What here would now be negative in relation to God? Not that I perform the act of begetting: for insofar as it is positive, God concurs with it. This evil, then, which accompanies that act, must be only this: that against my own covenant, or God’s command, I go with another’s wife, with whom it is not lawful.
Iam vero, potestne capi, Deum nostras scire actiones, cum iis concurrere, et tamen ignorare, quacum illam actionem producimus, eo magis quod Deus etiam cum illius foeminae actione, cum qua rem habebam, concurrit? Id de Deo sentire durum videtur. Attende occidendi actum; quatenus est actus positivus, cum eo Deus concurrit; sed vero istius actionis effectum, nempe alicuius entis destructionem, et Dei creaturae dissolutionem anne ignoraret? quasi proprium opus Deo foret incognitum.
Now can it be grasped that God knows our actions and concurs with them, and yet does not know with whom we produce that action, the more so since God also concurs with the action of the woman with whom I had to do? It seems hard to think this of God. Consider the act of killing: insofar as it is a positive act, God concurs with it; but would he be ignorant of the effect of this action, namely the destruction of some being and the dissolution of God’s creature? As if his own work were unknown to God.
(Metuo ne mentem tuam bene percipiam:
b Conceptus quippe tui, quam ut tam foedum committas errorem, perspicaciores sunt) fortasse instabis, eos actus, prout eos pono, mere esse bonos, et nullum eos comitari malum; sed tum, quid malum nuncupes, capere nequeo, quod perfectioris conditionis privationem sequitur; et tum mundus in aeterna, et perpetua poneretur confusione, nosque bestiis similes redderemur. Vide quaeso, quam utilitatem ea sententia mundo conferret.
(I fear that I do not perceive your mind well: for your concepts are too perspicacious for you to commit so foul an error.) Perhaps you will insist that these acts, as I put them, are purely good, and that no evil accompanies them; but then I cannot grasp what you call the evil which follows the privation of a more perfect condition; and then the world would be placed in eternal and perpetual confusion, and we should be made like the beasts. See, I pray, what benefit this opinion would bring the world.
- b Strictly, metuo ne … percipiam means ‘I fear that I do perceive’; the sense requires the negative, which the Dutch has: ‘ick vreese dat ick hier U E meeninge niet wel moet verstaen’ (G IV 109).
[G IV 109] Vulgarem hominis descriptionem reiicis, et unicuique homini tantum tribuis perfectionis, quantum Deus ipsi, ut operetur, largitus est. Sed ea ratione mihi videris statuere impios Deum aeque, ac pios, suis operibus colere: Quare? quia utrique perfectiora nequeunt producere opera, quam quantum utrisque essentiae datum est, et suis demonstrant effectibus.
You reject the common description of man, and attribute to each man as much perfection as God has bestowed on him for acting. But in that way you seem to me to maintain that the impious worship God by their works as much as the pious: Why? Because neither can produce more perfect works than the essence given to each, as they show by their effects.
Nec mihi quaestioni satisfacere in secunda responsione videris, dicendo, quo res aliqua plus perfectionis habet, eo etiam magis de Deitate participat, Deique perfectionem exprimit magis. Quum ergo probi inaestimabiliter plus perfectionis, quam improbi habeant, virtus eorum cum improborum virtute comparari nequit. Improbi, quia Deum non cognoscunt, non sunt nisi instrumentum in manu artificis, quod inscium servit et serviendo consumitur: Probi contra conscii serviunt, et serviendo perfectiores evadunt.
Nor do you seem to me to satisfy the question in your second answer,
1 by saying: ‘the more perfection a thing has, the more it also participates in the Deity, and the more it expresses God’s perfection. Since, then, the good have incomparably more perfection than the wicked, their virtue cannot be compared with the virtue of the wicked. The wicked, because they do not know God, are nothing but a tool in the hand of the craftsman, which serves without knowing it and is used up in serving: the good, on the contrary, serve knowingly, and become more perfect by serving.’
In utrisque tamen hoc verum est, eos amplius non posse operari; quanto etenim plus perfectionis hic prae illo efficit, tanto plus essentiae unus prae alio accepit. Annon igitur exigua sua perfectione impii aeque, ac pii, Deum colunt? Nam, secundum tuam sententiam, nihil amplius ab impiis Deus flagitat, alioquin plus essentiae in eos contulisset; sed vero plus essentiae non dedit, uti ex effectibus liquet. Ergo amplius ab eis non petit.
Yet in both this is true, that they cannot do more; for the more perfection the one brings about compared with the other, the more essence the one has received compared with the other. Do not the impious, then, with their slight perfection, worship God as much as the pious? For according to your opinion God demands nothing more from the impious, otherwise he would have conferred more essence on them; but he has not given more essence, as is clear from the effects. Therefore he does not ask more of them.
Et siquando unusquisque in specie, nec plus, nec minus, quam Deus vult, facit, cur is, qui parum operatur, sed tamen tantum, quantum Deus ab ipso exigit, Deo aeque, ac probus, non esset acceptus?
And if each one in particular does neither more nor less than God wills, why should he who does little, but yet as much as God requires of him, not be as acceptable to God as the good man?
Insuper, quemadmodum per malum, quod actum comitatur, nostra imprudentia, ex tua sententia, perfectiorem perdimus statum, ita et hic videris statuere, quod, continendo voluntatem intra limites intellectus, non tantum adeo perfecti manemus, ac sumus; sed quod praeterea serviendo perfectiores evadimus; quod contradictionem involvere mihi persuadeo, si modo tantopere a Deo dependemus, ut nec plus, nec minus perfectionis queamus efficere, quam quantum essentiae accepimus, hoc est, quam Deus voluit, ut tunc per imprudentiam peiores, aut per prudentiam meliores fiamus. Adeo ut nihil aliud statuere videris, quam, si homo talis sit, ac eum describis, impios suis operibus, aeque, ac pios suis, Deum colere, et hac ratione ita, ut elementa, herbae, lapides etc. a Deo dependentes reddimur.
Moreover, just as through the evil which accompanies the act we lose a more perfect state by our imprudence, according to your opinion, so here too you seem to maintain that by containing the will within the limits of the intellect we not only remain as perfect as we are, but besides become more perfect by serving; which I am persuaded involves a contradiction, if only we depend on God so much that we can bring about neither more nor less perfection than the essence we have received, that is, than God has willed, so that we should then become worse through imprudence or better through prudence. So that you seem to maintain nothing other than that, if man is such as you describe him, the impious worship God by their works as much as the pious by theirs, and in this way we are made dependent on God as the elements, plants, stones, etc. are.
Cui rei igitur inserviet noster intellectus? cui voluntatem intra limites intellectus continendi potestas? qua de causa ordo ille nobis infixus est? Et vide, quaeso ab alia parte, qua re nos privemus, nempe anxia, et seria meditatione ad nos ipsos secundum regulam perfectionis Dei, et ordinem nobis impressum perfectos reddendum: nosmet precatione, et ad Deum suspiriis, quibus tam saepe extraordinariam confortationem accepisse percepimus, orbamus: nosmet tota religione, ac omni illa spe, et acquiescentia, quam ex precibus, et religione speramus, orbamus.
To what purpose, then, will our intellect serve? To what purpose the power of containing the will within the limits of the intellect? For what reason has that order been fixed in us? And see, I pray, on the other side, of what we deprive ourselves: namely, of anxious and serious meditation on making ourselves perfect according to the rule of God’s perfection and the order impressed on us; we bereave ourselves of prayer and of sighs to God, by which we have so often perceived that we received extraordinary strengthening; we bereave ourselves of all religion, and of all the hope and contentment which we hope for from prayers and religion.
Enimvero, si nullam mali habet Deus cognitionem, multo minus credibile est, eum malum puniturum. Quaenam ergo supersunt rationes, quo minus facinora quaevis (si modo iudicem effugio) avide perpetrem? cur non detestandis mediis divitias mihi acquiro? cur absque discrimine, et, quo caro nos trahit, id, quod lubet, non perpetro?
Indeed, if God has no knowledge of evil, it is much less credible that he will punish evil. What reasons, then, remain why I should not eagerly commit any crimes (if only I escape the judge)? Why should I not acquire riches by detestable means? Why should I not do whatever I please, without distinction, wherever the flesh draws us?
Dices, quia virtus propter se est amanda. Qui vero virtutem amare possum? mihi tantum essentiae, ac perfectionis non est tributum; et si tantum acquiescentiae, et ex hoc et ex illo habere licet, cur mihi vim, ut voluntatem intra limites intellectus contineam, infero? cur id non facio, quo me affectus trahunt? cur non hominem, qui mihi alicubi obest, clam occido? etc.
You will say: because virtue is to be loved for its own sake.
2 But how can I love virtue? So much essence and perfection has not been given me; and if I may have as much contentment from the one as from the other, why should I do violence to myself to contain the will within the limits of the intellect? Why should I not do what my affects draw me to? Why should I not secretly kill a man who stands in my way somewhere? etc.
Ecce quam cunctis impiis, et impietati demus occasionem? nos truncis, omnesque nostras actiones motibus horologiorum similes reddimus.
See what occasion we give to all the impious and to impiety? We make ourselves like tree-trunks, and all our actions like the motions of clocks.
Ex dictis valde durum mihi videtur, quod improprie tantum in Deum peccare possimus dici: cui enim rei data nobis voluntatem intra limites intellectus continendi potentia inservit, si, ubi eam transgredimur, contra eum peccamus ordinem? Regeres forte, id non esse peccatum in Deum; sed in nos ipsos: nam si proprie erga Deum peccare diceremur, etiam dicendum esset, aliquid contra Dei voluntatem fieri; quod iuxta te est impossibile: Ergo etiam peccatum.
From what has been said it seems to me very hard that we can be said to sin against God only improperly: for to what purpose does the power given us of containing the will within the limits of the intellect serve, if, when we transgress it, we sin against that order? You will perhaps reply that it is not a sin against God but against ourselves: for if we were said to sin properly against God, it would also have to be said that something happens against God’s will; which according to you is impossible: therefore so is sin.
Interim alterutrum verum sit necesse est, Deum vel velle, vel nolle. Si vult, quomodo nostri respectu malum esse potest? Si non vult, id, ex tua opinione, non fieret. Quamvis autem hoc aliquam, ut tua fert sententia, involveret absurditatem, praedictas tamen absurditates admittere periculosissimum videtur. Quis novit, si anxie inquirerem, annon remedium posset inveniri his aliquo modo conciliandis.
Meanwhile, one of two things must be true: God either wills it or does not will it. If he wills it, how can it be evil in relation to us? If he does not will it, on your opinion it would not happen. But although this, as your opinion has it, would involve some absurdity, it still seems most dangerous to admit the absurdities stated above. Who knows, if I were to inquire anxiously, whether a remedy could not be found for reconciling these in some way.
[G IV 113] Atque sic tuae epistolae examen iuxta regulam meam primam generalem finiam: antequam vero ad examen iuxta secundam regulam accedam, duo adhuc proponam, quae epistolam tuam spectant, quaeque scripsisti Princ. Part. 1. Prop. 15 prius est, quod affirmas, nos potestatem volendi, et iudicandi intra limites intellectus retinere posse: quod absolute concedere nequeo.
And so I shall finish the examination of your letter according to my first general rule; but before I come to the examination according to the second rule, I shall put forward two more points which concern your letter and what you wrote in the Principles, Part I, Prop. 15. The first is that you affirm that we can keep the power of willing and judging within the limits of the intellect: which I cannot grant absolutely.
Nam hoc si foret verum, certe ex innumerabilibus vel unus reperiretur homo, qui se ea praeditum potestate ostenderet: etiam quivis apud se experiri potest, se quantas etiam impendat vires, eum scopum attingere non posse. Et si quis de hoc negotio dubitat, seipsum examinet, quoties invito intellectu passiones rationem suam vincant, etiam tum quum summis obnititur viribus.
For if this were true, surely among countless men at least one would be found who showed himself endowed with that power; and anyone can find by experience in himself that, however much force he applies, he cannot reach that goal. And if anyone doubts this matter, let him examine himself, how often, against the will of his intellect, the passions conquer his reason, even when he resists with all his might.
At dices, quod hoc minus praestamus, non est, quia nobis impossibile est; sed quia sufficientem non adhibemus diligentiam; regero, quod, si hoc possibile esset, saltem ex tot millibus vel unus inveniretur; sed ne unus omnium hominum exstitit, vel existit, qui auderet gloriari, se in errores haud incidisse. Quaenam vero huius rei certiora, quam ipsa exempla, possunt adduci argumenta? Si pauci essent, unus esset; iam vero quum nullus sit, nulla eius quoque datur probatio.
But you will say that our failing to do this is not because it is impossible for us, but because we do not apply sufficient diligence; I reply that if this were possible, at least one out of so many thousands would be found; but not one of all men has existed or exists who would dare to boast that he has not fallen into errors. And what more certain arguments for this can be brought than the examples themselves? If there were a few, there would be one; but now, since there is none, there is no proof of it either.
Instabis et dices; si fieri potest, ut iudicium suspendendo, et voluntatem intra terminos intellectus continendo, semel, ne errem, efficere queo, quare, ubi eandem adhibeo diligentiam, semper id efficere non possem? Respondeo, me videre non posse, nos hodie tantum virium habere, ut in eo semper perseveremus; semel una hora, quando omnes intendo nervos, iter duorum milliarium conficere potis sum, verum semper id praestare non possum; ita me summo studio ab errore semel praeservare possum, sed vires ad id semper praestandum deficiunt.
You will insist and say: if it can happen that by suspending judgment and containing the will within the bounds of the intellect I can once bring it about that I do not err, why could I not always bring it about when I apply the same diligence? I answer that I cannot see that we today have so much strength that we can always persevere in it; once, in one hour, when I strain every nerve, I am able to cover a journey of two miles, but I cannot always do it; so I can once preserve myself from error with the greatest effort, but the strength to do so always is lacking.
Clarum mihi videtur, primum hominem, e manu perfecti illius artificis prodeuntem, iis praeditum fuisse viribus; sed (ut in hoc tecum sentio) eum, illis viribus non satis utendo, vel abutendo, statum suum amisisse perfectum ad praestandum, quod antea sui erat arbitrii. Haecque multis rationibus, ni nimius essem, firmarem.
It seems clear to me that the first man, coming forth from the hand of that perfect craftsman, was endowed with those powers; but (as I agree with you in this) that by not using those powers enough, or by misusing them, he lost his perfect state for doing what had before been within his choice. And this I would confirm by many reasons, if I were not being too long.
Et hoc in negotio omnem Sacrae Scripturae essentiam, quae propterea apud nos in honore esse debet, sitam esse opinor, quoniam nos id, quod tam clare intellectus noster naturalis confirmat, docet: nempe, lapsum ex nostra prima perfectione nostra imprudentia factum esse. Quid igitur istius lapsus emendatione magis necessarium? Atque hominem lapsum ad Deum reducere Sacrae Scripturae unicus quoque est scopus.
And in this matter I think the whole essence of Holy Scripture lies, which is why it ought to be held in honour among us, since it teaches us what our natural intellect so clearly confirms: namely, that the fall from our first perfection came about through our imprudence. What, then, is more necessary than the amendment of this fall? And to bring fallen man back to God is also the sole aim of Holy Scripture.
Posterius est, Princip. Part. 1. Prop. 15. quod affirmas, res clare et distincte intelligere repugnare naturae hominis, unde tandem concludis, longe melius esse rebus, quamvis confusis assentiri, et libertatem exercere, quam semper indifferentem, hoc est, in infimo gradu libertatis manere.
The second is what you affirm in the
Principles, Part I, Prop. 15: that to understand things clearly and distinctly is contrary to the nature of man;
1 from which you finally conclude that it is far better to assent to things, even if confused, and to exercise freedom, than always to remain indifferent, that is, in the lowest degree of freedom.
- 1 The Principles (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol., G I 175) draws this conclusion only on the supposition ‘that it is contrary to man’s nature to perceive things clearly and distinctly’.
Quam ut concedam conclusionem, impedit in me obscuritas: nam suspensum iudicium nos in eo statu, in quo a creatore sumus creati, conservat; verum rebus confuse est rebus non intellectis assentiri,
a et ita aeque facile vero ac falso assentiri.
An obscurity in me prevents me from granting this conclusion: for suspended judgment keeps us in the state in which we were created by the creator; but to assent to things confusedly is to assent to things not understood, and so to assent as easily to the false as to the true.
- a So the 1677 edition (OP p. 492) and Gebhardt, evidently for rebus confuse assentiri est rebus non intellectis assentiri; the translation gives that sense.
Et si (ut D. Des Cartes alicubi docet) eum ordinem in assentiendo non usurpamus, quem Deus inter nostrum intellectum, nostramque voluntatem constituit, nempe ut non nisi clare perceptis assentiamur: quamvis tunc casu in veritatem incidamus, tamen quia verum non eo, quo Deus voluit ordine, amplectimur, peccamus; et per consequens, ut assensus cohibitio nos in statu, in quo a Deo constituti sumus, conservat, ita confusus assensus nostrum statum peiorem reddit; erroris quippe ponit fundamentum, quo perfectum deinceps amittimus statum.
And if (as Mr Descartes teaches somewhere
2) we do not use in assenting the order which God has established between our intellect and our will, namely that we assent only to things clearly perceived, then, although we may by chance hit upon the truth, yet because we do not embrace the truth in the order God willed, we sin; and consequently, just as the withholding of assent keeps us in the state in which we were placed by God, so confused assent makes our state worse; for it lays the foundation of error, through which we then lose our perfect state.
- 2 Descartes, Meditations IV (AT VII 60): if I affirm what I do not clearly perceive and it is true, ‘I shall indeed hit upon the truth by chance, but I shall not on that account be free of blame, since it is manifest by the natural light that the perception of the intellect must always precede the determination of the will’.
Sed te dicentem audio: nonne praestat, ut nos perfectiores reddamus, rebus licet confusis assentiendo, quam ut non assentiendo semper in infimo perfectionis, et libertatis gradu maneamus? At praeterquam quod hoc negaverimus, et aliquo modo ostenderimus, nos nosmet non meliores; sed deteriores reddidisse; nobis etiam impossibile, et quasi contradictio videtur, Deum cognitionem rerum, ab ipso determinatarum, longius extendere, ac eam, quam nobis dedit; imo Deum tunc absolutam nostrorum errorum causam involvere.
But I hear you saying: is it not better to make ourselves more perfect by assenting to things, though confused, than by not assenting always to remain in the lowest degree of perfection and freedom? But besides the fact that we have denied this, and have shown in some way that we have made ourselves not better but worse, it also seems to us impossible, and as it were a contradiction, that God should extend the knowledge of things determined by him further than the knowledge which he has given us; indeed, that God would then be involved as the absolute cause of our errors.
Nec huic contrarium est, quod nos Deum, ut plura in nos conferret, quam contulit, non possumus accusare; quia ad id non tenebatur. Verum quidem est, Deum non teneri, ut plura, quam dedit, daret; sed summa Dei etiam infert perfectio, ut creatura ab ipso procedens nullam contradictionem involveret, prout tum videretur sequi.
Nor is it contrary to this that we cannot accuse God of not conferring more on us than he has conferred, because he was not bound to do so. It is true indeed that God is not bound to give more than he has given; but God’s supreme perfection also implies that a creature proceeding from him should involve no contradiction, as would then seem to follow.
Nullibi namque in creata natura, praeterquam in nostro intellectu, deprehendimus scientiam. In quem alium finem ille nobis concessus esset, nisi ut Dei opera contemplaremur et cognosceremus? Et quidnam evidentius sequi videtur, quam quod harmonia inter res cognoscendas, nostrumque intellectum dari debet?
For nowhere in created nature, except in our intellect, do we find knowledge. To what other end would it have been granted us, unless that we should contemplate and know God’s works? And what seems to follow more evidently than that there must be harmony between the things to be known and our intellect?
Si tuam epistolam circa ea, quae modo diximus, ad meam secundam regulam generalem examinarem, magis, quam in prima, discreparemus. Mihi namque videtur, (aberranti commonstra viam) te Sacrae Scripturae eam infallibilem veritatem et divinitatem non adscribere, quam ego in ea esse mihi persuadeo. Verum quidem est, quod te credere ais, Deum res Sacrae Scripturae prophetis revelasse; sed modo adeo imperfecto, ut, si factum est, prout tu statuis, in Deo contradictionem involveret.
If I were to examine your letter, as regards what we have just said, by my second general rule, we should differ more than under the first. For it seems to me (show the way to one who strays) that you do not ascribe to Holy Scripture the infallible truth and divinity which I am persuaded is in it. It is true indeed that you say you believe that God revealed the things of Holy Scripture to the prophets; but in so imperfect a manner
3 that, if it happened as you maintain, it would involve a contradiction in God.
- 3 Spinoza had said that the prophets devised parables (Letter 19).
Si enim Deus suum verbum, ac voluntatem hominibus manifestavit, certum in finem, idque clare iis manifestavit. Si iam prophetae ex illo verbo, quod acceperant, Parabolam finxissent, id Deus vel voluisset, vel noluisset. Si voluisset, ut exin Parabolam fingerent, hoc est, ut ab eius mente aberrarent; Deus istius erroris esset causa, aliquidque quod contrariaretur sibi, vellet. Si noluisset, impossibile erat, ut prophetae inde Parabolam effingerent.
For if God has manifested his word and will to men, he has manifested it to a certain end, and clearly. If, then, the prophets had devised a parable from the word they had received, God either willed it or did not will it. If he had willed that they should devise a parable from it, that is, that they should stray from his mind, God would be the cause of that error, and would will something contrary to himself. If he had not willed it, it was impossible for the prophets to devise a parable from it.
Praeterea credibile est, si supponitur, Deum verbum suum prophetis dedisse, quod ita eis dedit, ut illud accipiendo non erraverint: nam Deus in verbo suo revelando certum finem habere debebat; at sibi finem, ut homines in errorem duceret, proponere nequit: Id enim in Deo esset contradictio. Etiam homo contra Dei voluntatem errare non poterat; nam id, secundum te, fieri nequit.
Moreover, it is credible, if it is supposed that God gave his word to the prophets, that he gave it to them in such a way that they did not err in receiving it: for God must have had a certain end in revealing his word; but he cannot set himself the end of leading men into error: for that would be a contradiction in God. Nor could man err against God’s will; for that, according to you, cannot happen.
Praeter haec omnia, de illo summe perfecto Deo credi non potest, eum permittere, ut suo verbo, prophetis dato, ad illud populo explicandum, alius a prophetis tribueretur sensus, quam Deus voluit: Si enim statuimus, Deum prophetis suum concessisse verbum, simul asserimus, Deum modo extraordinario prophetis apparuisse, vel cum iis loquutum fuisse.
Besides all this, it cannot be believed of that supremely perfect God that he would allow a sense other than he willed to be given by the prophets to his word, given to the prophets for explaining it to the people: for if we maintain that God granted his word to the prophets, we assert at the same time that God appeared to the prophets in an extraordinary way, or spoke with them.
Si iam prophetae de hoc tradito verbo Parabolam fingunt, hoc est, alium ei sensum tribuunt, quam, ut tribuerent, voluit, Deus hanc rem eos edocuisset. Est etiam tam respectu prophetarum impossibile, quam respectu Dei contradictio, prophetas alium sensum potuisse habere, quam eos habere voluit Deus.
If, then, the prophets devise a parable from this word handed down to them, that is, give it a sense other than he willed them to give, God would have taught them this. It is also as impossible with respect to the prophets as it is a contradiction with respect to God that the prophets could have had a sense other than God willed them to have.
[G IV 119] Deum suum ita revelasse verbum, uti tu vis, parum probas, nempe eum salutem, et perditionem tantum revelasse, certa eum in finem decrevisse media, atque salutem, ac perditionem non nisi decretorum mediorum effectus esse.
That God revealed his word in the way you would have it, namely that he revealed only salvation and perdition, that he decreed certain means to that end, and that salvation and perdition are nothing but the effects of the decreed means, you prove poorly.
1
Nam profecto, si prophetae Dei verbum isthoc sensu acceperant, quas rationes, ad alium illi adscribendum sensum, habuissent? Sed et nullam adducis probationem, qua nos, ut hanc tuam supra prophetarum sententiam poneremus, convinceres.
For surely, if the prophets had received God’s word in this sense, what reasons would they have had for ascribing another sense to it? But you also bring no proof by which to convince us to set this opinion of yours above that of the prophets.
Si vero existimas, hanc esse probationem, quod alioquin illud verbum multas imperfectiones, et contrarietates includeret, dico, hoc duntaxat dici, non vero probari. Et quis novit, si uterque sensus produceretur, uter minores includeret imperfectiones? Denique Enti summe perfecto bene perspectum erat, quid populus caperet, quaeque optima esset methodus, iuxta quam populus institui deberet.
And if you think the proof is that otherwise that word would include many imperfections and contrarieties, I say that this is merely said, not proved. And who knows, if both senses were brought forward, which would include fewer imperfections? Finally, the supremely perfect Being well understood what the people could grasp, and what was the best method by which the people ought to be instructed.
[G IV 120] Quantum ad secundum primae tuae quaestionis membrum attinet, quaeris ex te ipso, quare Deus Adamo, ne ex arbore ederet, cum tamen contrarium decrevisset, edixit; respondes vero, edictum Adamo factum in hoc solo consistere, quod nimirum Deus Adamo revelavit τὸ edere ex arbore mortis esse causam, quemadmodum nobis per naturalem rationem venenum mortiferum esse revelat.
As regards the second part of your first question, you ask yourself why God commanded Adam not to eat from the tree when he had nevertheless decreed the contrary; and you answer that ‘the command given to Adam consisted only in this, that God revealed to Adam that eating from the tree was the cause of death, just as he reveals to us by natural reason that poison is deadly’.
1
Si statuitur, Deum aliquid Adamo interdixisse, quaenam rationes sunt, quo magis crederem modum prohibitionis, quem tu adfers, quam quem adducunt prophetae, quibus Deus ipse modum prohibitionis revelavit? Dices, mea prohibendi ratio magis naturalis est, et ideo magis veritati, Deoque conveniens. Sed hoc omne nego.
If it is maintained that God forbade Adam something, what reasons are there why I should believe the manner of prohibition which you bring forward rather than the one which the prophets adduce, to whom God himself revealed the manner of prohibition? You will say: my account of the prohibition is more natural, and therefore more in keeping with truth and with God. But all this I deny.
Nec capio, quod Deus per naturalem intellectum nobis, venenum lethale esse, revelavit; nec rationes video, quibus unquam scirem, aliquid esse venenatum, nisi malos veneni effectus in aliis vidissem, et audivissem. Quod homines, quia venenum non noscunt, inscii edant et moriantur, quotidiana nos docet experientia.
Nor do I grasp that God has revealed to us through the natural intellect that poison is deadly; nor do I see reasons by which I would ever know that something is poisonous, unless I had seen and heard of the bad effects of poison in others. That men, because they do not know poison, eat it unknowingly and die, daily experience teaches us.
Dices, si homines scirent, id venenum esse, etiam malum id esse, eos non lateret; sed respondeo neminem veneni habere notitiam, aut posse habere; nisi qui vidit, aut audivit, aliquem eius usu damnum sibi dedisse; et si ponimus, nos ad hunc usque diem nunquam audivisse, vel vidisse, aliquem eius usu sibi nocuisse, non tantum nunc quoque ignoraremus; sed et sine metu in proprium damnum id usurparemus, quemadmodum tales veritates indies docemur.
You will say that if men knew that it is poison, it would not be hidden from them that it is also evil; but I answer that no one has, or can have, knowledge of poison except one who has seen or heard that someone has done himself harm by using it; and if we suppose that up to this day we had never heard or seen that anyone had harmed himself by using it, not only would we still be ignorant of it now, but we would also use it to our own harm without fear, as we are taught such truths daily.
[G IV 121] Quid magis in hac vita candidum atque erectum animum, quam illius perfectae Deitatis contemplatio, delectat? Nam quemadmodum circa perfectissimum versatur, ita etiam perfectissimum, quod in finitum nostrum intellectum cadere potest, involvere debet. Nec mihi in vita quicquam est, quod cum ea mutarem delectatione.
What delights a candid and upright mind more in this life than the contemplation of that perfect Deity? For as it is concerned with what is most perfect, so it must also involve the most perfect that can fall within our finite intellect. Nor is there anything in my life for which I would exchange that delight.
In hac, caelesti instigatus appetitu, multum temporis insumere possum; sed et simul tristitia affici, quando intueor tam multa finito meo intellectui deesse: verum tristitiam sedo spe ea, quam possideo, quae mihi vita charior est, quod posthac existam, et permanebo et eam Deitatem maiori perfectione, quam nunc, intuebor.
In it, moved by a heavenly appetite, I can spend much time; but I can also at the same time be affected with sadness when I see how much is lacking to my finite intellect: but I calm the sadness with the hope I possess, which is dearer to me than life, that I shall exist hereafter and remain, and shall behold that Deity with greater perfection than now.
Ubi brevem, praetervolantemque considero vitam, in qua singulis momentis mortem exspecto; si deberem credere me finem habiturum, sanctaque illa, et praestantissima cariturum contemplatione, certe omnium creaturarum, quibus cognitio finis sui deest, miserrimus essem. Quippe metus mortis ante obitum miserum me redderet, et post cum plane nihil, et per consequens miser essem, quia divina illa contemplatione privatus essem. Huc vero me tuae videntur ducere opiniones, quod ubi hic esse desino, etiam in aeternum desinam, cum econtra illud verbum, et Dei voluntas consolentur interno suo in anima mea testimonio, quod post hanc vitam in statu perfectiore me aliquando, contemplando summe perfectam Deitatem, oblectabo.
When I consider this short and fleeting life, in which I expect death at every moment, if I had to believe that I would have an end and be deprived of that holy and most excellent contemplation, I would certainly be the most miserable of all creatures, which lack knowledge of their end. For fear of death before my death would make me miserable, and after it I would be altogether nothing, and consequently miserable, because I would be deprived of that divine contemplation. And this is where your opinions seem to lead me: that when I cease to be here, I shall also cease for eternity;
1 whereas, on the contrary, that word and the will of God console me with their inner testimony in my soul that after this life I shall one day delight, in a more perfect state, in contemplating the supremely perfect Deity.
- 1 Nadler quotes this passage as Blyenbergh’s perceptive recognition that Spinoza’s views make it hard to see how the soul is immortal (Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 252). Spinoza’s own doctrine is in Part V, Props. 21–23 and the scholium to Prop. 34.
Profecto licet spes ista aliquando falsa esse deprehenderetur, me tamen, dum spero, beatum reddit.
Certainly, though this hope should one day be found false, yet while I hope it makes me blessed.
Unicum hoc est, quod precibus, suspiriis, et seriis votis a Deo peto, et petam, (utinam ad id plus conferre liceret!) quamdiu spiritus hos reget artus, ut ipsi placeat, me sua bonitate tam beatum reddere, ut, quando hoc corpus dissolvitur, ens intellectuale ad perfectissimam illam Deitatem contemplandum maneam, et si hoc tantum nanciscor, mihi, quomodo hic credatur, quid invicem persuadeatur, an aliquid naturali intellectu fundetur, et percipi ab eo possit, nec ne, perinde est.
This is the one thing that I ask and shall ask of God with prayers, sighs and earnest vows (would that I could contribute more to it!), as long as breath shall rule these limbs:
2 that it may please him, in his goodness, to make me so blessed that when this body is dissolved I may remain an intellectual being to contemplate that most perfect Deity; and if I obtain only this, it is all the same to me how it is believed here, what people persuade one another of, whether something is founded on the natural intellect and can be perceived by it or not.
- 2 Virgil, Aeneid IV.336: dum spiritus hos regit artus.
Hoc, hoc solummodo est votum meum, meum desiderium, continuaeque preces, ut Deus hanc certitudinem in anima mea confirmet, et, si eam possideo, (ah me miserrimum, si eo destituar!) prae desiderio anima mea exclamet, quemadmodum cervus anhelat aquarum rivos, ita te, o Deus vivens, anima mea desiderat: ah! quando veniet dies, quod tecum ero, et te adspiciam. Si hoc tantum obtineo, omne animae meae studium, et desiderium possideo.
This, this alone, is my vow, my desire and my continual prayer: that God may confirm this certainty in my soul, and, if I possess it (ah, most wretched me, if I should lack it!), that my soul may cry out in longing: As the hart pants after the brooks of water, so my soul longs for thee, O living God:
3 ah! when will the day come that I shall be with thee and behold thee? If I obtain only this, I possess all that my soul strives for and desires.
- 3 Psalm 42:1–2 (Vulgate 41:2–3): Quemadmodum desiderat cervus ad fontes aquarum, ita desiderat anima mea ad te, Deus … quando veniam, et apparebo ante faciem Dei?
Quia vero nostrum opus Deo displicet,
a spem istam, ex tua sententia, non video: Nec intelligo, Deum, (siquidem de eo humano more loqui liceat) si nullam ex opere nostro, et laudatione capit voluptatem, nos produxisse, et conservasse. Si vero a tua sententia aberro, tuam explicationem expeto.
But since our work displeases God, I do not see this hope on your opinion: nor do I understand that God (if we may speak of him in human fashion) produced and preserved us if he takes no pleasure in our work and praise. But if I stray from your opinion, I ask for your explanation.
- a The Dutch has ‘because our service is not pleasing to God’ (G IV 123–124).
Verum me, et forte te solito diutius moratus sum; quia vero mihi chartam deesse video, finiam. Horum solutionem videre aveo. Forte hic illic aliquam ex epistola tua eduxi conclusionem, quae fortassis tua non erit opinio; sed super ea re explicationem tuam audire cupio.
But I have detained myself, and perhaps you, longer than usual; and since I see that I am running out of paper, I shall end. I am eager to see the solution of these things. Perhaps here and there I have drawn from your letter some conclusion which will perhaps not be your opinion; but I wish to hear your explanation of it.
[G IV 124] Nuper occupatus fui in quibusdam Dei attributis perpendendis, in quo me tua non parum iuvit appendix. Mentem tuam solummodo fusius explicui, quae mihi non nisi demonstrationes exhibere videtur, et ideo demiror in praefatione affirmari, te illa non sentire; sed obligatum fuisse, ut ita tuum, uti promiseras, Cartesii philosophiam discipulum doceres; et te longe aliam, tam de Deo, quam de anima, speciatim de animae voluntate fovere opinionem: video quoque in illa praefatione dici, te haec cogitata metaphysica brevi prolixiora editurum, quae duo avide desidero: nam de iis aliquid singulare spero.
I have lately been occupied in weighing certain attributes of God, in which your appendix has helped me not a little. I have merely set out your view more fully, which seems to me to present nothing but demonstrations; and so I am surprised that it is affirmed in the preface
1 that you do not hold these views, but were obliged to teach your pupil Descartes’s philosophy as you had promised, and that you hold a very different opinion both of God and of the soul, especially of the soul’s will: I see also that it is said in that preface that you will shortly publish these
Metaphysical Thoughts at greater length, both of which I eagerly desire: for I hope for something singular from them.
- 1 Lodewijk Meyer’s preface to the Principles (G I 131–132): since Spinoza had promised to teach his pupil Descartes’s philosophy, he made it a matter of conscience not to depart from Descartes’s opinions by a hair’s breadth; many things in it he rejects as false, and holds an opinion far different from them.
Mea autem non fert consuetudo aliquem laudibus extollere. Scripsi haec sincero animo, et amicitia non fucata, prout in epistola tua petiisti, utque veritas detegeretur. Excusa nimiam, praeter intentionem, prolixitatem. Si ad has responderis, me tibi summopere devincies.
But it is not my custom to extol anyone with praises. I have written this with a sincere mind and unfeigned friendship, as you asked in your letter, and so that the truth may be uncovered. Excuse the excessive length, beyond my intention. If you answer this, you will oblige me greatly.
Non recuso, si ea lingua, in qua educatus sum, scribere animus est, vel alia, modo Latina, aut Gallica sit; hoc vero responsum, ut eadem exares lingua, peto, quia mentem tuam in ea bene, quod forte in lingua Latina non fieret, percipiebam.
I do not object if you have a mind to write in the language in which I was brought up,
2 or in another, provided it is Latin or French; but this reply I ask you to compose in the same language, because I understood your mind well in it, which perhaps would not happen in Latin.
- 2 Dutch, in which Spinoza had written Letter 19 (see the note there).
Ita me tibi devincies, egoque ero, ac permanebo, Mi Domine, tibi addictissimus atque officiosissimus,
So you will oblige me, and I shall be and remain, Sir, your most devoted and most dutiful
G. de Blyenbergh.
W. van Blyenbergh.
Dordraci 16. Ianuarii 1665.
Dordrecht, 16 January 1665.
[G IV 125] In responsione tua prolixius,
a quid per negationem in Deo intelligas, erudiri exopto.
In your reply I should like to be taught more fully what you understand by negation in God.
1- a Printed after the date, as a postscript (OP p. 497).
- 1 Spinoza explains it in Letter 21.
Epistola XXI
Letter 21
Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh
Viro Doctissimo, ac Ornatissimo,
To the most learned and most accomplished man
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh.
Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine, et amice,
Sir and friend,
[G IV 126] Quum primam tuam epistolam legebam,
a existimabam nostras opiniones fere concordare; sed vero ex secunda, quae 21 huius mensis mihi tradita est, longe aliter se rem habere intelligo, videoque nos non tantum dissentire de iis, quae longe ex primis principiis sunt petenda; sed etiam de eisdem ipsis principiis: adeo ut vix credam fore, ut nos epistolis invicem erudire possimus.
When I read your first letter, I thought our opinions almost agreed; but from the second, which was delivered to me on the 21st of this month,
1 I understand that the matter stands far otherwise, and I see that we disagree not only about the things that must be derived at long remove from first principles, but also about the principles themselves: so that I hardly believe that we can instruct each other by letters.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 497–505, Letter 34), headed Versio; the letter is undated, but Blyenbergh’s reply gives its date as 28 January 1665 (Letter 22). Gebhardt prints only this Latin (G IV 126–133), adding twice from the Dutch edition of 1677 the words over Deskartes Beginselen (‘on Descartes’s Principles’) after Appendice; they are left out here.
- 1 Letter 20, dated 16 January 1665. Nadler quotes this paragraph as showing how far apart the two men stood (Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 253–254).
Video namque nullam demonstrationem, licet pro demonstrationis legibus solidissimam, apud te valere, nisi conveniat cum ea explicatione, quam vel ipse, vel alii theologi, tibi haud ignoti, sacrae Scripturae tribuunt. Verum si deprehendas, Deum per sacram Scripturam clarius, et efficacius loqui, quam per lumen naturalis intellectus, quod nobis etiam concessit, ac assiduo sapientia sua divina firmiter, et incorrupte conservat, validas habes rationes, ut intellectum flectas ad opiniones, quas sacrae Scripturae tribuis, quin ipse haud aliter facere possem.
For I see that no demonstration, however solid according to the laws of demonstration, has weight with you unless it agrees with the explanation which either you yourself or other theologians known to you attribute to Holy Scripture. But if you find that God speaks more clearly and effectively through Holy Scripture than through the light of the natural intellect, which he has also granted us and constantly preserves, firm and uncorrupted, by his divine wisdom, you have strong reasons for bending your intellect to the opinions you attribute to Holy Scripture; indeed, I myself could not do otherwise.
Quod vero me spectat, quia plane, et sine ambagibus profiteor, me S. Scripturam non intelligere, licet aliquot annos in ea insumpserim, et quia me haud fugit, quando solidam nactus sum demonstrationem, me non posse in tales cogitationes incidere, ut unquam de ea dubitare queam, omnino in eo, quod mihi intellectus monstrat, acquiesco sine ulla suspicione, me ea in re deceptum esse, nec Sacram Scripturam, quamvis eam non investigem, ei contradicere posse; quia veritas veritati non repugnat, ut iam ante in appendice mea (caput indicare nequeo, nec enim liber hic ruri penes me est) clare indicavi; et si fructum, quem iam ex intellectu naturali cepi, vel semel falsum esse deprehenderem, me fortunatum redderet, quoniam fruor, et vitam non maerore et gemitu, sed tranquillitate, laetitia, et hilaritate transigere studeo et subinde gradum unum adscendo.
But as for me, since I profess plainly and without circumlocution that I do not understand Holy Scripture, though I have spent some years on it, and since it does not escape me that when I have obtained a solid demonstration I cannot fall into such thoughts that I could ever doubt it, I acquiesce entirely in what the intellect shows me, without any suspicion that I have been deceived in it, or that Holy Scripture, even though I do not search it, can contradict it; because truth does not conflict with truth, as I have already clearly indicated in my appendix
2 (I cannot give the chapter, for the book is not with me here in the country
3); and if I were even once to find that the fruit which I have already gathered from the natural intellect was false, it would still make me fortunate, since I enjoy it, and try to pass my life not in sorrow and sighing but in tranquillity, joy and cheerfulness, and from time to time I climb a step higher.
- 2 Metaphysical Thoughts II.8 (G I 265): ‘for truth does not conflict with truth, nor can Scripture teach the trifles commonly feigned’.
- 3 Spinoza was still at the farm near Schiedam (see the note to Letter 19).
Agnosco interim (id, quod summam mihi praebet satisfactionem, et mentis tranquillitatem) cuncta potentia entis summe perfecti, ac eius immutabili ita fieri decreto.
Meanwhile I recognize (which gives me the greatest satisfaction and tranquillity of mind) that all things happen thus by the power of a supremely perfect being and by his immutable decree.
[G IV 127] Ad tuam vero ut redeam epistolam, dico me tibi summas ex animo agere gratias, quod mihi tuam in tempore philosophandi rationem aperuisti; sed quod tu talia, qualia vis ex mea epistola educere, mihi affingas, pro eo nullas tibi gratis ago. Quam, quaeso, materiam mea praebuit epistola has mihi affingendi opiniones, homines nempe bestiis esse similes, homines bestiarum more mori, et interire, nostra Deo displicere opera, etc. (licet in postremo hoc summopere dissentiamus, quia aliter te non percipio, quam quod intelligis, Deum nostris operibus delectari, tanquam qui finem suum assecutus est, eo quod res ex voto successit).
But to return to your letter, I thank you most heartily for opening to me in time your manner of philosophizing; but for imputing to me such things as you wish to draw out of my letter, I give you no thanks. What material, I ask, did my letter offer for imputing to me these opinions: namely, that men are like beasts, that men die and perish in the manner of beasts, that our works displease God,
1 etc. (though on this last we disagree greatly, since I do not understand you otherwise than as meaning that God delights in our works, as one who has attained his end because the thing has turned out as he wished).
Quantum ad me, ego profecto clare, dixi, probos Deum colere, et assidue colendo perfectiores evadere, Deum amare; hoccine est eos bestiis similes reddere; aut eos instar bestiarum perire, vel denique eorum opera Deo non placere?
As for me, I certainly said clearly that the good worship God, and by constantly worshipping become more perfect, and love God; is this to make them like beasts, or to have them perish like beasts, or finally to say that their works do not please God?
Si meas literas maiore cum attentione legisses, clare perspexisses, nostrum dissensum in hoc solo positum esse; scilicet an Deus, ut Deus, hoc est, absolute, nulla ei humana attributa adscribendo, perfectiones, quas probi accipiunt, eis communicet; (ut ego intelligo) anve ut iudex, quod ultimum tu statuis; et ea de causa defendis impios, quia iuxta Dei decretum, quicquid possunt, faciunt, Deo aeque, ac pios servire. Sed vero secundum mea dicta id nullatenus sequitur: quia Deum tanquam iudicem non introduco, et ideo ego opera ex operis qualitate, non vero ex potentia operatoris aestimo, et merces, quae opus consequitur, tam necessario id consequitur, quam ex natura trianguli sequitur, tres eius angulos duobus rectis aequales esse debere.
If you had read my letter with greater attention, you would have seen clearly that our disagreement lies in this alone: namely, whether God, as God, that is, absolutely, without ascribing any human attributes to him, communicates to the good the perfections which they receive (as I understand it), or as a judge, which is what you maintain; and for that reason you maintain that the impious, because according to God’s decree they do whatever they can, serve God as much as the pious. But according to what I said this by no means follows: because I do not introduce God as a judge, and therefore I value works by the quality of the work, not by the power of the worker; and the reward which follows the work follows it as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles must be equal to two right angles.
Et hoc unusquisque intelliget, qui tantum ad id, quod summa nostra beatitudo in amore erga Deum consistit, attendit, quodque ille amor necessario ex Dei cognitione, quae nobis tantopere commendatur, fluit. Hoc autem generaliter facillime demonstrari potest, si modo ad naturam Decreti Dei attendatur, quemadmodum in mea appendice explicui: Verum fateor, eos omnes, qui divinam naturam cum humana confundunt, valde ad id intelligendum ineptos esse.
And everyone will understand this who attends only to this, that our highest blessedness consists in love towards God,
2 and that this love flows necessarily from the knowledge of God which is so much commended to us. This can be demonstrated very easily in general, if only one attends to the nature of God’s decree, as I have explained in my appendix: but I confess that all who confuse the divine nature with the human are very unfit to understand it.
- 2 Compare Part V, Prop. 36, Schol.: ‘our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists in a constant and eternal love of God’.
[G IV 128] Hisce literis finem hic imponere animus erat, ne tibi amplius essem molestus iis rebus, quae tantummodo (uti clarum est ex valde devoto additamento fini tuae epistolae affixo) pro ioco, et risu inserviunt, nulli autem usui sunt. Ne vero petitionem tuam omni modo reiiciam, ulterius ad explicationem vocum negationis, et privationis, et breviter ad id, quod necessarium est ad sensum praecedentis meae epistolae dilucidius enucleandum, progrediar.
I had intended to put an end to this letter here, so as not to trouble you further with things which serve only (as is clear from the very devout addition appended to the end of your letter
1) for jest and laughter, and are of no use. But so as not to reject your request altogether, I shall go on further to the explanation of the words negation and privation, and briefly to what is necessary to unfold more clearly the sense of my preceding letter.
- 1 Blyenbergh’s prayer for the life to come (Letter 20).
Dico igitur primo privationem non esse privandi actum; sed tantum simplicem, et meram carentiam, quae in se nihil est: est quippe ens rationis tantum, vel modus cogitandi, quem formamus, quum res invicem comparamus. Dicimus, exempli gratia, caecum visu privatum esse, quia eum facile, ut videntem imaginamur, sive imaginatio haec hinc oriatur, quod cum aliis, qui vident, sive quod praesentem suum statum cum praeterito, quum videbat, comparamus; et cum hunc virum ea ratione consideramus, nempe comparando suam naturam cum natura aliorum, vel cum praeterita sua, tunc affirmamus, visum ad suam naturam pertinere, et propterea dicimus, eum eo privatum esse.
I say, then, first, that privation is not the act of depriving, but only a simple and mere lack, which in itself is nothing: it is indeed only a being of reason, or mode of thinking, which we form when we compare things with one another. We say, for example, that a blind man is deprived of sight, because we easily imagine him as seeing, whether this imagination arises from our comparing him with others who see, or his present state with his past one, when he saw; and when we consider this man in that way, namely by comparing his nature with the nature of others or with his own past nature, then we affirm that sight belongs to his nature, and therefore say that he is deprived of it.
Verum quum Dei decretum, eiusque natura consideratur, non magis de illo homine, quam de Lapide possumus affirmare, eum visu orbatum esse, quia illo tempore non magis sine contradictione illi homini visus, quam lapidi competit; quoniam ad hominem illum nil amplius pertinet, et suum est, quam id, quod divinus intellectus et voluntas ei tribuit. Et propterea Deus non magis est causa
τοῦ illius non videre,
a quam
τοῦ non videre lapidis: id quod mera est negatio.
But when God’s decree and its nature are considered, we can no more affirm of that man than of a stone that he is bereft of sight, because at that time sight belongs to that man no more without contradiction than to the stone; since nothing more belongs to that man, and is his, than what the divine intellect and will attribute to him. And therefore God is no more the cause of that man’s not seeing than of the stone’s not seeing: which is mere negation.
- a τοῦ: the Greek article in the genitive, ‘of the not-seeing’, as printed in 1677 (OP p. 500); see the note to Letter 18.
Ita etiam, cum ad naturam hominis, qui appetitu libidinis ducitur, attendimus, praesentemque appetitum cum eo, qui in probis est, vel cum eo, quem ipse alias habuit, comparamus; affirmamus, eum hominem meliore appetitu privatum esse, quia tunc isti virtutis appetitum competere iudicamus; quod facere non possumus, si ad naturam Divini decreti, et intellectus attendimus: nam eo respectu melior ille appetitus non magis ad naturam istius hominis eo tempore, quam ad naturam Diaboli, vel lapidis pertinet, et idcirco eo respectu melior appetitus non est privatio, sed negatio. Adeo ut privatio nihil aliud sit, quam aliquid de re negare, quod iudicamus ad suam naturam pertinere, et negatio nil aliud, quam aliquid de re negare, quia ad suam naturam non pertinet.
So also, when we attend to the nature of a man who is led by the appetite of lust, and compare his present appetite with that which is in the good, or with the one he himself had at another time, we affirm that this man is deprived of a better appetite, because we then judge that the appetite of virtue belongs to him; which we cannot do if we attend to the nature of the divine decree and intellect: for in that respect that better appetite no more belongs to the nature of this man at that time than to the nature of the Devil or of a stone; and therefore in that respect the better appetite is not a privation but a negation. So that privation is nothing other than to deny of a thing something which we judge to belong to its nature, and negation nothing other than to deny of a thing something because it does not belong to its nature.
Et hinc liquet, quare Adami appetitus rerum terrenarum nostri, non vero intellectus Dei respectu tantum malus esset. Licet enim Deus praeteritum et praesentem Adami statum sciret, non idcirco Adamum praeterito statu privatum esse intelligebat, hoc est, praeteritum ad suam naturam pertinere: Nam tunc Deus aliquid contra suam voluntatem, hoc est, contra proprium suum intellectum intelligeret.
And from this it is clear why Adam’s appetite for earthly things was evil only in relation to our intellect, and not to God’s. For although God knew Adam’s past and present state, he did not on that account understand Adam to be deprived of his past state, that is, the past state to belong to his nature: for then God would understand something against his will, that is, against his own intellect.
Hoc si bene percepisses, simulque me illam libertatem, quam Cartesius menti adscribit, non concedere, quemadmodum L. M. in praefatione meo nomine testatus est, vel minimam in meis verbis non invenires contradictionem.
If you had perceived this well, and at the same time that I do not grant the freedom which Descartes ascribes to the mind, as L. M. testified in my name in the preface,
1 you would not find the least contradiction in my words.
- 1 Lodewijk Meyer’s preface to the Principles (G I 132), which gives as an example of what Spinoza rejects the account of the will in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15, of the Principles and in Metaphysical Thoughts II.12: ‘for he does not think it distinct from the intellect, much less endowed with such freedom’.
Sed video, me melius multo facturum fuisse, si in prima mea epistola Cartesii verbis respondissem, dicendo, nos non posse scire, quomodo nostra libertas, et quicquid ab ea dependet cum Dei providentia et libertate congruat, (sicuti in appendice diversis locis feci) adeo ut ex Dei creatione nullam in libertate nostra queamus invenire contradictionem, quia capere haud possumus, quomodo Deus res creavit, et (quod idem est) quomodo eas conservat. Verum putabam, te praefationem legisse, meque, si ex animi sententia non responderem, in amicitiae officium, quam animitus offerebam, peccaturum fuisse. Sed haec susque deque fero.
But I see that I should have done much better if in my first letter I had answered in Descartes’s words, saying that we cannot know how our freedom, and whatever depends on it, agrees with God’s providence and freedom (as I did in several places in the appendix), so that we can find no contradiction to our freedom in God’s creation, because we cannot grasp how God created things and (what is the same) how he preserves them. But I thought that you had read the preface, and that if I did not answer according to my real view I should sin against the duty of the friendship which I was heartily offering. But I care little for all this.
[G IV 129] Quia tamen video, te Cartesii mentem hactenus non bene percepisse, peto, ut haec duo attendas: Primo neque me, neque Cartesium unquam dixisse, quod ad nostram naturam pertinet, ut nostram voluntatem intra limites intellectus contineamus; sed tantum, quod Deus nobis intellectum determinatum, et voluntatem indeterminatam dedit, ita tamen, ut ignoremus, in quem finem nos creavit; porro, quod istiusmodi indeterminata, vel perfecta voluntas nos non solum perfectiores reddit; sed quoque, ut tibi in sequentibus dicam, quod ea nobis sit valde necessaria.
Since, however, I see that you have not so far perceived Descartes’s mind well, I ask you to attend to these two points. First, that neither I nor Descartes ever said that it belongs to our nature to contain our will within the limits of the intellect; but only that God has given us a determinate intellect and an indeterminate will, in such a way, however, that we do not know to what end he created us; further, that such an indeterminate or perfect will not only makes us more perfect, but also, as I shall tell you below, is very necessary to us.
Secundo quod nostra libertas nec in quadam contingentia, nec in quadam indifferentia sita est; sed in modo affirmandi, et negandi; adeo ut, quo rem aliquam minus indifferenter affirmamus, aut negamus, eo liberiores simus: Verbi causa, si Dei natura nobis est cognita, tam necessario ex natura nostra τὸ affirmare sequitur, Deum existere, quam ex natura trianguli eius tres angulos duobus rectis aequari fluit; et tamen nunquam magis liberi sumus, quam quum rem tali modo affirmamus.
Second, that our freedom lies neither in a certain contingency nor in a certain indifference, but in the manner of affirming and denying; so that the less indifferently we affirm or deny something, the freer we are:
1 for example, if the nature of God is known to us, the affirming that God exists follows from our nature as necessarily as it flows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and yet we are never more free than when we affirm a thing in this way.
- 1 So the Principles, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175), where indifference is ‘the lowest degree of freedom’.
Quia vero haec necessitas nihil aliud est, quam Dei decretum, veluti in mea appendice clare ostendi; hinc quodammodo intelligere licet, quo pacto rem libere agamus, eiusque causa simus, non obstante, quod eam necessario, et ex Dei decreto agamus.
But because this necessity is nothing other than God’s decree, as I have shown clearly in my appendix, it can in some way be understood from this how we act freely and are the cause of the action, notwithstanding that we do it necessarily and from God’s decree.
Hoc, inquam, aliquo modo possumus intelligere, cum quid affirmamus, quod clare, et distincte percipimus, ubi vero quicquam, quod clare ac distincte non capimus, asserimus, hoc est, cum patimur, ut voluntas extra nostri intellectus limites exspatietur, tum illam necessitatem, Deique decreta non ita percipere possumus; sed nostram quidem libertatem, quam nostra voluntas semper includit, (quo respectu opera nostra solummodo bona, vel mala appellantur) et si tunc conamur libertatem nostram cum Dei decreto, et continua creatione conciliare, confundimus id, quod clare, et distincte intelligimus, cum eo, quod non percipimus, et propterea frustra id conamur.
This, I say, we can understand in some way when we affirm something which we perceive clearly and distinctly; but when we assert anything which we do not grasp clearly and distinctly, that is, when we allow the will to stray beyond the limits of our intellect, then we cannot perceive that necessity and God’s decrees in the same way, but we do indeed perceive our freedom, which our will always includes (in which respect alone our works are called good or evil); and if we then try to reconcile our freedom with God’s decree and continual creation, we confuse what we understand clearly and distinctly with what we do not perceive, and therefore we try in vain.
Sufficit ergo nobis, quod scimus nos liberos esse, et nos tales esse posse non obstante Dei decreto, nosque mali causam esse, eo quod nullus actus, nisi respectu nostrae libertatis, tantum malus nominari potest. Haec sunt, quae Cartesium spectant, ut demonstrarem eius dicta ab ea parte nullam pati contradictionem.
It is enough for us, then, that we know that we are free, and that we can be so notwithstanding God’s decree, and that we are the cause of evil, because no act can be called evil except in relation to our freedom alone. These are the things that concern Descartes, to show that his words suffer no contradiction on that side.
[G IV 130] Iam ad ea, quae me attinent, me convertam, ac primo breviter referam utilitatem, quae ex mea opinione nascitur, quae praecipue in eo est sita, quod scilicet noster intellectus Deo mentem, et corpus extra omnem superstitionem offert, nec preces nobis valde utiles esse nego: nam meus intellectus est nimis parvus ad omnia media determinandum, quae Deus habet, quibus homines ad sui amorem, hoc est, ad salutem perducat; adeo ut tantum absit hanc opinionem noxiam futuram esse, ut econtra iis, qui nullis praeiudiciis nec puerili superstitione praeoccupati sunt, unicum sit medium ad summum beatitudinis gradum perveniendi.
Now I shall turn to what concerns me, and first I shall briefly report the usefulness which arises from my opinion,
1 which lies chiefly in this, that our intellect offers mind and body to God free of all superstition; nor do I deny that prayers are very useful to us: for my intellect is too small to determine all the means God has by which to bring men to love of him, that is, to salvation; so that this opinion is so far from being harmful that, on the contrary, for those who are not taken up with prejudices and childish superstition, it is the only means of reaching the highest degree of blessedness.
[G IV 131] Quod vero ais, me homines, eos a Deo tam dependentes faciendo, ideo elementis, herbis, et lapidibus similes reddere, id sufficienter ostendit te meam opinionem perversissime intelligere, et res, quae intellectum spectant, cum imaginatione confundere.
But when you say that by making men so dependent on God I make them like the elements, plants and stones, this shows sufficiently that you understand my opinion most perversely, and confuse the things that concern the intellect with the imagination.
Si enim puro intellectu percepisses, quid sit a Deo dependere, certe non cogitares, res, quatenus a Deo dependent, mortuas, corporeas, et imperfectas esse, (quis unquam de ente summe perfecto tam viliter ausus fuit loqui) econtra caperes, ea de causa, et quatenus a Deo dependent, perfectas esse. Adeo ut hanc dependentiam, atque necessariam operationem quam optime per Dei decretum intelligamus, quando non ad truncos, et herbas; sed ad maxime intelligibiles, et res creatas perfectissimas attendimus, ut ex illo, quod secundo de Cartesii mente iam ante memoravimus, clare apparet, quod attendere debuisses.
For if you had perceived with pure intellect what it is to depend on God, you would certainly not think that things, insofar as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal and imperfect (who ever dared to speak so meanly of the supremely perfect being?); on the contrary, you would grasp that they are perfect for that reason, and insofar as they depend on God. So that we understand this dependence and necessary operation best through God’s decree when we attend not to tree-trunks and plants but to the most intelligible and most perfect created things, as is clear from what we mentioned second above concerning Descartes’s mind, to which you should have attended.
Nec reticere possum, me id summopere mirari, quod dicis: si Deus delictum non puniret, (hoc est, tanquam iudex tali poena, quam ipsum delictum non inferret: Id enim solum nostra est quaestio.) quaenam ratio impedit, quo minus quaevis scelera avide perpetrem?
Nor can I keep silent that I am greatly surprised at what you say: if God did not punish wrongdoing (that is, as a judge, with such a punishment as the wrongdoing itself does not bring with it: for that alone is our question), what reason prevents me from eagerly committing any crimes?
1
Certe qui illud tantum (quod de te non spero) formidine poenae omittit, is nulla ratione ex amore operatur, et quam minime virtutem amplectitur. Quantum ad me, ea omitto, vel omittere studeo, quia expresse cum mea singulari natura pugnant, meque a Dei amore, et cognitione aberrare facerent.
Certainly he who refrains from them only for fear of punishment (which I do not hope of you) in no way acts from love, and embraces virtue as little as possible. As for me, I refrain from them, or try to refrain, because they are expressly contrary to my singular nature, and would make me stray from the love and knowledge of God.
Porro si ad naturam humanam paulum attendisses, et naturam Dei decreti, prout in appendice explicui, percepisses, tandemque scivisses, quomodo res esset deducenda, antequam ad conclusionem perveniatur, non adeo temere dixisses, hanc opinionem nos truncis, etc. similes reddere; nec tam multas absurditates, quam imaginaris, mihi affinxisses.
Further, if you had attended a little to human nature, and had perceived the nature of God’s decree as I explained it in the appendix, and had known, finally, how a thing must be deduced before one comes to the conclusion, you would not have said so rashly that this opinion makes us like tree-trunks, etc.; nor would you have imputed to me so many absurdities as you imagine.
De duabus illis rebus, quas ais, priusquam ad secundam tuam regulam pergis, te percipere haud valere, respondeo primo Cartesium sufficere ad conclusionem tuam faciendam, quod nempe, si modo attendis ad naturam tuam, experiris, te posse iudicium tuum suspendere; si vero dicas, te in te ipso non experiri, nos tantum virium hodie in rationem obtinere, ut hoc semper continuare possemus, id idem Cartesio esset, ac nos hodie non posse videre, nos, quamdiu existimus, futuros semper res cogitantes, vel naturam rei cogitantis retenturos, quod profecto contradictionem involvit.
Of those two things which you say you cannot perceive
1 before you go on to your second rule, I answer, first, that Descartes suffices for drawing your conclusion: namely, that if only you attend to your nature, you find by experience that you can suspend your judgment; but if you say that you do not find in yourself that we today have so much power over reason that we could always continue this, that would be the same for Descartes as that we cannot see today that we shall always, as long as we exist, be thinking things, or retain the nature of a thinking thing; which certainly involves a contradiction.
Ad secundum cum Cartesio dico, si voluntatem nostram extra limites intellectus nostri valde limitati extendere non possemus, nos miserrimos futuros, neque in nostra potestate fore vel frustum panis comedere, vel passum progredi, vel subsistere: omnia enim incerta, atque periculis sunt plena.
To the second I say with Descartes that if we could not extend our will beyond the limits of our very limited intellect, we should be most miserable, and it would not be in our power either to eat a piece of bread, or to take a step forward, or to stand still: for all things are uncertain and full of dangers.
[G IV 132] Transeo nunc ad secundam tuam regulam, asseroque, me quidem credere, quod ego eam veritatem, quam tu in scriptura esse credis, illi non tribuam, et tamen credo, quod ego illi tantum, si non plus adscribam authoritatis; quodque longe cautius, quam alii, caveam, ne illi pueriles quasdam, et absurdas sententias affingam, quod nemo praestare potest, nisi is, qui philosophiam bene intelligit, vel Divinas habet revelationes; adeo ut me valde parum moveant explicationes, quas vulgares theologi de scriptura adferunt, praesertim si istius sint farinae, ut Scripturam semper iuxta litteram, sensumque externum sumant; et nunquam, praeter Socinianos, crassum adeo vidi theologum, qui non percipit Sacram Scripturam creberrime more humano de Deo loqui, ac suum sensum Parabolis exprimere; et quod ad contradictionem, quam frustra (mea quidem opinione) conaris ostendere, credo te per Parabolam omnino aliud quid, quam vulgo fit, intelligere: nam quis unquam audivit, eum, qui suos conceptus parabolis exprimit, a suo sensu aberrare.
I pass now to your second rule, and assert that I do indeed believe that I do not attribute to Scripture the truth which you believe is in it, and yet I believe that I ascribe to it as much authority, if not more; and that I take far more care than others not to impute to it certain childish and absurd opinions, which no one can achieve unless he understands philosophy well or has divine revelations; so that I am very little moved by the explanations which the common theologians bring to Scripture, especially if they are of the sort that always take Scripture according to the letter and the outward sense; and, apart from the Socinians, I have never seen a theologian so dull as not to perceive that Holy Scripture very often speaks of God in human fashion and expresses its sense in parables; and as for the contradiction which you try in vain (in my opinion at least) to show, I believe that by a parable you understand something altogether different from what is commonly understood: for who ever heard that he who expresses his concepts in parables strays from his own sense.
Quum Micha Regi Aghabo diceret, se Deum in solio suo sedentem vidisse, ac exercitus caelestes a dextra, et sinistra stantes, Deumque ex illis quaerere, quisnam Aghabum deciperet, illud ipsum certe erat Parabola, qua propheta praecipuum, quod ea occasione (quae non erat, ut sublimia theologiae dogmata doceret) Dei nomine debebat manifestare, sufficienter exprimebat; adeo ut nullo modo a sensu suo aberraret.
When Micaiah told King Ahab that he had seen God sitting on his throne, and the heavenly hosts standing on the right and on the left, and that God asked them which of them would deceive Ahab,
1 that was certainly a parable, by which the prophet sufficiently expressed the chief thing which he had to make known in God’s name on that occasion (which was not one for teaching the sublime dogmas of theology); so that he in no way strayed from his own sense.
Sic etiam caeteri prophetae Dei verbum iussu Dei ea ratione populo manifestarunt, tanquam optimo medio, non vero tanquam illo, quod Deus petebat, populum ad scopum Scripturae primarium ducendi, qui iuxta ipsius Christi dictum in hoc consistit, nimirum in amore Dei supra omnia, et proximi tanquam sui ipsius. Sublimes speculationes, credo, Scripturam minime tangunt. Me quod spectat, nulla Dei aeterna attributa ex sacra scriptura didici, nec discere potui.
So too the other prophets made God’s word known to the people at God’s command in that way, as the best means, but not as the means which God required, of leading the people to the primary aim of Scripture, which according to the saying of Christ himself consists in this: namely, in the love of God above all things, and of one’s neighbour as oneself.
2 Sublime speculations, I believe, do not touch Scripture at all. As for me, I have not learned, nor could I learn, any eternal attributes of God from Holy Scripture.
[G IV 133] Quantum vero quintum attinet argumentum (scilicet prophetas Dei verbum tali ratione manifestum fecisse, quoniam veritas veritati non est contraria) nihil reliqui est, quam ut (quemadmodum quivis, qui demonstrandi methodum percipit, iudicabit) demonstrem, Scripturam, prout est, esse Dei verum verbum revelatum. Cuius mathematicam demonstrationem, nisi divina Revelatione, habere nequeo.
As for the fifth argument (namely, that the prophets made God’s word known in such a way, since truth is not contrary to truth), nothing remains for me (as anyone who perceives the method of demonstrating will judge) but to demonstrate that Scripture, as it is, is the true revealed word of God. Of this I can have no mathematical demonstration except by divine revelation.
Et ideo dixi, credo, sed non more mathematico scio, omnia, quae Deus prophetis etc. quia firmiter credo, non vero mathematice scio, prophetas Dei intimos Consiliarios, et Legatos fuisse fidos; adeo ut in iis, quae ego affirmavi, nulla omnino sit contradictio; cum e contrario ab altera parte haud paucae inveniantur.
And therefore I said, ‘I believe’, but not ‘I know in the mathematical manner’, ‘that all the things which God [revealed] to the prophets’,
1 etc.; because I firmly believe, but do not know mathematically, that the prophets were God’s intimate counsellors and faithful ambassadors; so that in what I have affirmed there is no contradiction at all, whereas on the other side not a few are found.
Reliquum tuae epistolae, nempe ubi dicis: Denique ens summe perfectum noverat, etc. et deinde quod contra exemplum de veneno adfers, ac ultimo, quod appendicem, et id, quod sequitur, spectat, dico hanc praesentem quaestionem non respicere.
The rest of your letter, namely where you say, ‘Finally, the supremely perfect Being knew’,
1 etc., and then what you bring against the example of poison, and lastly what concerns the appendix and what follows, does not, I say, bear on the present question.
Praefationem L. M. quod attinet, in ipsa certe simul ostenditur, quid Cartesio adhuc probandum esset, ut solidam de libero arbitrio demonstrationem formaret, additurque, me contrariam fovere sententiam, et quomodo eam foveam: quam forte suo tempore indicabo, nunc vero animus non est.
As for L. M.’s preface, it certainly shows at the same time what Descartes still had to prove in order to form a solid demonstration of free will, and adds that I hold the contrary opinion, and how I hold it: which I shall perhaps make known in due time, but now I have no mind to.
De opere vero super Cartesium nec cogitavi, nec ulteriorem eius gessi curam, postquam sermone Belgico prodiit: et quidem non sine ratione, quam hic recensere longum foret. Adeo ut nihil dicendum restet, quam me etc.
As for the work on Descartes, I have neither given it a thought nor taken any further care of it since it came out in Dutch:
1 and indeed not without reason, which it would take long to recount here. So that nothing remains to be said but that I am, etc.
- 1 The translation of the Principles by Pieter Balling (Nadler p. 250).
Epistola XXII
Letter 22
Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza
Clarissimo viro
To the most distinguished man
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.
from Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine, et chare amice,
Sir, and dear friend,
[G IV 134] Epistolam tuam, 28 Ianuarii scriptam,
a suo tempore accepi; aliae occupationes praeter studia impediverunt, quo minus ad tuam citius responderim: et quoniam hic illic acribus tua referta est reprehensionibus, quid de ea iudicarem, vix sciebam: nam in prima, 5 Ianuarii exarata, tam liberaliter amicitiam tuam ex animo mihi obtuleras, hac addita obtestatione, meam non solum illo tempore scriptam; sed et subsequentes valde gratas fore; quin amice flagitabas, ut libere, si quas insuper movere possem difficultates, obiicerem, uti in mea, 16 Ianuarii data, prolixius paulo praestiti.
Your letter written on 28 January
1 I received in due time; occupations other than my studies prevented me from answering it sooner; and since it is filled here and there with sharp reproofs, I hardly knew what to think of it: for in the first, written on 5 January,
2 you had so generously offered me your friendship from the heart, adding the assurance that not only my letter written at that time but also later ones would be very welcome; indeed you asked me in friendly fashion to put forward freely any further difficulties I could raise, as I did at somewhat greater length in mine of 16 January.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 505–510, Letter 35), headed Versio; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 134–144). The 1677 edition prints in italics the words that Blyenbergh takes from Spinoza’s letters; quotation marks mark them here.
- 1 Letter 21.
- 2 Letter 19.
Ad eam amicam, et erudientem, iuxta postulatum, et promissum tuum, exspectabam responsionem; sed econtra talem, quae nimiam non redolet amicitiam, accepi; nempe quod nullae demonstrationes, licet validissimae apud me valent, quod mentem Cartesii non percipio, quod res spirituales nimium cum terrenis confundo, etc. ita ut invicem epistolis diutius erudire non possemus.
To that I expected a friendly and instructive reply, in accordance with your request and promise; but instead I received one which does not smell of much friendship:
3 namely, that no demonstrations, however strong, have weight with me, that I do not perceive Descartes’s mind, that I confuse spiritual things too much with earthly ones, etc., so that we could no longer instruct each other by letters.
- 3 Nadler quotes this passage on Blyenbergh’s being taken aback by Spinoza’s tone (Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 254).
Ad quae amice respondeo, me firmiter credere, te supra dicta melius me intelligere, et assuetum magis esse res corporeas a spiritualibus discernere: in metaphysica enim, quam ego inchoo, summum adscendisti gradum, et ideo, ut erudirer, favorem tuum captabam; nunquam vero existimabam, me obiectionibus, libere factis, offensionis causam praebiturum.
To which I reply in friendly fashion that I firmly believe that you understand the things mentioned above better than I, and are more accustomed to distinguish corporeal things from spiritual: for in metaphysics, which I am only beginning, you have climbed to the highest degree, and that is why I sought your favour, to be instructed; but I never thought that by objections freely made I would give cause for offence.
Summas tibi ex animo ago gratias, quod tantum laborem in duabus epistolis exarandis, praecipue in secunda, suscepisti; ex posteriore, quam ex priore, tuam mentem clarius percepi, et nihilominus ei assensum praebere nequeo, nisi difficultates, quas adhuc in ea invenio, tollantur: nec hoc offensionis causam dare potest. Nam illud vitium in intellectu nostro arguit, si veritati sine fundamento necessario assentimur: Licet tui veri essent conceptus, iis assensum praebere non licet, quamdiu in me quaedam obscuritatis, vel dubitationis rationes supersunt, quamvis dubitationes non ex re proposita, sed ex mei intellectus imperfectione orirentur.
I thank you most heartily for undertaking so much labour in writing two letters, especially the second; from the later I perceived your mind more clearly than from the earlier, and nevertheless I cannot give it my assent unless the difficulties which I still find in it are removed: nor can this give cause for offence. For it argues a fault in our intellect if we assent to the truth without a necessary foundation: even if your concepts were true, I may not give them assent so long as some reasons for obscurity or doubt remain in me, even if the doubts arose not from the matter proposed but from the imperfection of my intellect.
Et quia hoc abunde tibi notum est, aegre ferre non debes, si rursus quasdam formem obiectiones: cogor ita facere, quamdiu rem clare percipere nequeo; nam hoc in alium non fit finem, quam ad veritatem inveniendam; non vero ad tuam mentem praeter intentionem tuam detorquendam; et propterea ad haec pauca amicam peto responsionem.
And since this is abundantly known to you, you ought not to take it ill if I again form some objections: I am compelled to do so as long as I cannot perceive the matter clearly; for this is done to no other end than to find the truth, and not to twist your mind against your intention; and therefore I ask a friendly reply to these few points.
Dicis, nihil ad essentiam rei amplius pertinere, quam id, quod divina voluntas, potentiaque ei concedit, et revera tribuit; et cum ad naturam hominis, qui appetitu libidinis ducitur, attendimus, praesentemque appetitum cum eo, qui in probis est, vel cum eo, quem ipse alias habuit, comparamus, affirmamus eum hominem meliore appetitu privatum esse, quia tunc isti virtutis appetitum competere iudicamus; quod facere non possumus, si ad naturam divini decreti et intellectus attendimus: nam eo respectu melior ille appetitus non magis ad naturam istius hominis eo tempore, quam ad naturam Diaboli, aut lapidis pertinet, etc. Licet enim Deus praeteritum, et praesentem Adami statum sciret, non idcirco Adamum praeterito statu privatum esse intelligebat, hoc est, praeteritum ad suam praesentem naturam pertinere, etc.
You say that nothing more belongs to the essence of a thing than what the divine will and power grants and really attributes to it; and ‘when we attend to the nature of a man who is led by the appetite of lust,
4 and compare his present appetite with that which is in the good, or with the one he himself had at another time, we affirm that this man is deprived of a better appetite, because we then judge that the appetite of virtue belongs to him; which we cannot do if we attend to the nature of the divine decree and intellect: for in that respect that better appetite no more belongs to the nature of this man at that time than to the nature of the Devil or of a stone’, etc. ‘For although God knew Adam’s past and present state, he did not on that account understand Adam to be deprived of his past state, that is, the past state to belong to his present nature’, etc.
- 4 Letter 21, where the last words read ‘to his nature’.
Ex quibus verbis clare sequi videtur, iuxta tuam sententiam, nihil aliud ad essentiam pertinere, quam quod eo momento, quo percipitur, res habet, hoc est, si me voluptatis desiderium tenet, illud desiderium ad meam illo tempore pertinet essentiam, et si me non tenet, illud non-desiderium ad meam eo, quo non desidero, tempore essentiam pertinet, unde infallibiliter consequitur, me tum respectu Dei aeque perfectionem in meis operibus includere, (solummodo gradu differentibus) quando voluptatum cupiditate, quam quando ea non teneor; quando omnis generis scelera perpetro, quam quando virtutem, et iustitiam exerceo.
From these words it seems clearly to follow, according to your opinion, that nothing else belongs to the essence than what the thing has at the moment at which it is perceived; that is, if the longing for pleasure holds me, that longing belongs to my essence at that time, and if it does not hold me, that non-longing belongs to my essence at the time when I do not long for it; from which it follows infallibly that, in relation to God, I include perfection in my works equally (differing only in degree) when I am held by the desire for pleasures as when I am not; when I commit crimes of every kind as when I practise virtue and justice.
Ad meam enim essentiam eo tempore tantum duntaxat, quantum operor, pertinet: nec enim plus, nec minus, secundum tuam positionem, operari possum, quam quantum revera accepi perfectionis, quia voluptatum, scelerumque cupiditas ad meam eo tempore, quo facio, pertinet essentiam, et eo tempore illam, non vero maiorem, a divina potentia accipio: Exigit ergo divina potentia eiusmodi duntaxat opera. Et ita ex tua positione clare videtur sequi, Deum scelera una, eademque ratione velle, qua ea vult, quae tu nomine virtutis insignis.
For only so much belongs to my essence at that time as I do: for according to your position I can do neither more nor less than the perfection I have really received, since the desire for pleasures and crimes belongs to my essence at the time when I act, and at that time I receive that essence, and not a greater, from the divine power: the divine power, then, requires only works of that kind. And so from your position it seems clearly to follow that God wills crimes in one and the same way as he wills the things which you mark with the name of virtue.
Ponamus iam, quod Deus, ut Deus, non vero ut iudex, piis, et impiis talem, et tantum essentiae largitur, quantum vult, ut illi efficiant; quaenam rationes dantur, ut unius opus non eodem modo, quam alterius velit? Nam quoniam unicuique ad opus suum qualitatem concedit, sequitur utique, quod, quibus minus largitus est, eadem ratione tantum ab ipsis petit, quantum ab illis, quibus plus dedit; et per consequens Deus sui ipsius respectu maiorem, minoremve nostrorum operum perfectionem, voluptatum et virtutum cupiditatem eodem modo exigit.
Let us now suppose that God, as God and not as judge, bestows on the pious and the impious such and so much essence as he wills them to bring about; what reasons are there why he should not will the work of the one in the same way as that of the other? For since he grants each one the quality for his work, it surely follows that from those to whom he has given less he asks, in the same proportion, as much as from those to whom he has given more; and consequently God, in relation to himself, requires the greater or lesser perfection of our works, the desire for pleasures and for virtues, in the same way.
Adeo ut, qui scelera patrat, necessario eadem patrare debeat, quia nihil aliud ad suam eo tempore essentiam spectat; uti is, qui virtutem exercet, ideo virtutem exercet, quia Dei potentia voluit, ut ad suam eo tempore essentiam id pertineret: Rursum mihi videtur Deum aeque, et eodem modo scelera, quam virtutem velle, quatenus autem utraque vult, tam huius, quam illius est causa, ipsique eatenus grata esse debent. Quod de Deo concipere durum est.
So that he who commits crimes must necessarily commit them, because nothing else belongs to his essence at that time; just as he who practises virtue practises virtue because God’s power willed that it should belong to his essence at that time: again it seems to me that God wills crimes equally and in the same way as virtue, and insofar as he wills both, he is the cause of the one as much as of the other, and to that extent they must both be pleasing to him. Which is hard to conceive of God.
Dicis, ut video, probos Deum colere; verum ex tuis scriptis nihil aliud percipio, quam quod Deo servire tantum sit talia efficere opera, quae Deus, ut operaremur, voluit; idem adscribis impiis, et libidinosis; quaenam ergo est differentia, respectu Dei, inter proborum, et improborum cultum?
You say, as I see, that the good worship God; but from your writings I perceive nothing else than that to serve God is only to bring about such works as God willed us to bring about; you ascribe the same to the impious and lustful; what difference is there, then, in relation to God, between the worship of the good and of the wicked?
Ais etiam, probos Deo servire, et serviendo continuo perfectiores evadere; sed non percipio, quid per τὸ perfectiores evadere intelligas, nec quid significet τὸ continuo perfectiores evadere. Nam et impii, et pii suam essentiam, et conservationem, aut continuam creationem a Deo, ut Deo, non vero, ut iudice, nanciscuntur, voluntatemque eius iuxta Dei decretum utrique eodem modo exequuntur. Quaenam ergo differentia, respectu Dei, inter utrosque potest esse?
You also say that the good serve God and by serving become continually more perfect;
5 but I do not perceive what you understand by ‘becoming more perfect’, nor what ‘becoming continually more perfect’ means. For both the impious and the pious obtain their essence, and their preservation or continual creation, from God as God, not as judge, and both carry out his will in the same way according to God’s decree. What difference, then, can there be between the two in relation to God?
Nam τὸ perfectiores continuo evadere non ex opere; sed ex Dei voluntate fluit; adeo ut, si impii per opera sua imperfectiores fiunt, illud non fluat ex operibus; sed ex sola Dei voluntate; et utrique voluntatem Dei tantum exequuntur: nequit ergo in his duobus, ratione Dei, dari discrimen. Quaenam sunt ergo rationes, ut hi per opus suum continuo perfectiores, illi vero deteriores evadant?
For becoming continually more perfect flows not from the work but from God’s will; so that if the impious become more imperfect through their works, this flows not from the works but from God’s will alone; and both only carry out God’s will: there can be no distinction between these two, then, in respect of God. What, then, are the reasons why these become continually more perfect through their work, and those worse?
Sed vero discrimen operis horum supra alterorum opus in hoc ponere videris, quod hoc opus plus perfectionis, quam illud includit. In his tuum, vel meum certo confido latere errorem: nam nullam in tuis scriptis reperire licet regulam, secundum quam res magis, minusve perfecta dicitur, quam quando plus, minusve habet essentiae.
But you seem to place the distinction between the work of the one and the work of the others in this, that this work includes more perfection than that. In this, I am confident, your error or mine certainly lies: for in your writings no rule can be found according to which a thing is called more or less perfect, except when it has more or less essence.
Si iam haec sit perfectionis regula, sunt igitur scelera, Dei respectu, ei aeque, ac opera proborum grata: nam Deus ea, ut Deus, hoc est, sui respectu, eodem modo vult, quia utraque ex Dei fluunt decreto. Si haec sit sola perfectionis regula, errores non nisi improprie tales dici possunt; sed revera nulli errores, nulla dantur scelera: et quicquid est, illam tantummodo, et talem, quam Deus dedit, essentiam complectitur, quae semper, utcunque ea se habeat, perfectionem involvit.
If this, then, is the rule of perfection, crimes are as pleasing to God, in relation to him, as the works of the good: for God, as God, that is, in relation to himself, wills them in the same way, because both flow from God’s decree. If this is the only rule of perfection, errors can be called errors only improperly; but in truth there are no errors, there are no crimes: and whatever is includes only that essence, and such as God gave it, which always, however it stands, involves perfection.
Me hoc clare non posse percipere, fateor, et tu quaerenti, an occidere Deo aeque placeat, ac eleemosynas largiri? an furtum committere, Dei respectu, aeque bonum sit, ac iustum esse? condona. Si neges, quaenam sunt rationes? si affirmes, quae apud me existunt rationes, quibus moverer, ut hoc opus, quod tu virtutem appellas, magis, quam aliud operarer? quaenam lex magis hoc, quam illud, prohibet?
I confess that I cannot perceive this clearly; and you must pardon me for asking whether killing is as pleasing to God as giving alms?
6 Whether to commit theft is, in relation to God, as good as to be just? If you deny it, what are the reasons? If you affirm it, what reasons do I have by which I should be moved to do this work which you call virtue rather than another? What law forbids this rather than that?
Si ipsam nomines virtutis legem, fatendum mihi certe est, me nullam apud te reperire, iuxta quam virtus moderanda, et ex qua cognoscenda sit. Quicquid enim est, a Dei voluntate inseparabiliter dependet, et per consequens et hoc, et illud ex aequo virtuosum est. Et, quid tibi virtus, vel lex virtutis sit, non capio; ideo etiam, quod asseris, nos ex amore virtutis debere operari, non intelligo.
If you name the law of virtue itself, I must certainly confess that I find none in you according to which virtue is to be regulated and from which it is to be known. For whatever is depends inseparably on God’s will, and consequently this and that are equally virtuous. And I do not grasp what virtue, or the law of virtue, is for you; and so I also do not understand what you assert, that we ought to act from love of virtue.
Dicis quidem, te scelera, et vitia omittere, quia ea cum singulari tua natura pugnant, et te ab divina cognitione, et amore seducunt; verum nullam horum in omnibus tuis scriptis invenio vel regulam, vel probationem. Quin excusa me, si contrarium ex illis sequi dicam.
You do say that you refrain from crimes and vices
7 because they conflict with your singular nature and lead you away from the divine knowledge and love; but in all your writings I find neither rule nor proof of these things. Indeed, forgive me if I say that the contrary follows from them.
Omittis ea, quae vitia appello, quia cum singulari tua natura pugnant, non autem quia vitia complectuntur; omittis ea, quemadmodum cibus, a quo natura nostra abhorret, relinquitur. Certe qui mala omittet, eo quod sua natura ab eis abhorret, parum de virtute gloriari poterit.
You refrain from what I call vices because they conflict with your singular nature, not because they contain vices; you refrain from them as one leaves alone food which our nature abhors. Certainly he who refrains from evils because his nature abhors them can boast little of virtue.
[G IV 141] Hic iam rursum quaestio moveri potest, an, si daretur animus, cum cuius singulari natura non pugnaret; sed conveniret voluptates, sceleraque patrare, an, inquam, ratio virtutis sit, quae ipsum ad virtutem praestandam, malumque omittendum moveret? Sed qui fieri potest, ut quis cupiditatem voluptatis amitteret, quum eius cupiditas eo tempore de sua sit essentia, ipsamque iam modo acceperit, neque dimittere possit?
Here again the question can be raised whether, if there were a mind with whose singular nature it did not conflict, but agreed, to pursue pleasures and commit crimes, whether, I say, there is a reason of virtue which would move it to practise virtue
1 and refrain from evil? But how can it happen that someone should lose the desire for pleasure, when that desire belongs at that time to his essence, and he has only just received it, and cannot let it go?
[G IV 142] Hanc etiam consequentiam in tuis scriptis non video, quod nimirum eae actiones, quas scelerum nomine insignio, te a Dei cognitione, et eius amore seducerent. Nam voluntatem Dei tantum exequutus es, neque amplius praestare poteras, quia ad tuam isto tempore essentiam constituendam a divina voluntate, ac potentia nihil amplius datum erat.
Nor do I see in your writings this consequence, namely that those actions which I mark with the name of crimes would lead you away from the knowledge of God and from his love. For you have only carried out God’s will, and could do no more, because nothing more had been given by the divine will and power to constitute your essence at that time.
Quomodo sic determinatum, ac dependens opus te a divino amore aberrare facit? aberrare est confusum, et independens esse, et hoc secundum te est impossibile. Nam sive hoc, sive illud, sive plus, sive minus perfectionis edimus, illud ad esse nostrum pro illo tempore immediate a Deo accipimus: quomodo ergo possumus aberrare? vel ego, per errorem quid intelligatur, non capio. Attamen in hoc, in hoc, inquam, solo causa vel mei, vel tui erroris latere debet.
How does a work so determined and dependent make you stray from the divine love? To stray is to be confused and independent, and this according to you is impossible. For whether we bring forth this or that, more or less perfection, we receive it for our being at that time immediately from God: how, then, can we stray? Or else I do not grasp what is understood by error. And yet in this, in this alone, I say, the cause of either my error or yours must lie.
Hic multa alia dicerem, et quaererem, primo, an substantiae intellectuales alio modo, quam vitae expertes a Deo dependeant? licet enim entia intellectualia plus essentiae, quam vita carentia involvant, annon utraque Deo, Deique decreto ad suum motum in genere, et ad talem motum in specie conservandum opus habent, et per consequens, quatenus dependent, annon una, eademque ratione dependeant?
Here I would say and ask many other things: first, whether intellectual substances depend on God in another way than lifeless ones? For although intellectual beings involve more essence than lifeless ones, do not both need God, and God’s decree, to preserve their motion in general and such a motion in particular, and consequently, insofar as they depend, do they not depend in one and the same way?
Secundo, quia, quam ei D. des Cartes adsignavit, libertatem animae non concedis, quaenam sit differentia inter dependentiam intellectualium, et anima carentium substantiarum? et si nullam volendi habent libertatem, quomodo tu eas a Deo dependere concipias? et quo pacto anima a Deo dependeat? Tertio, siquidem nostra anima ea non sit praedita libertate, anne nostra actio proprie Dei actio, et nostra voluntas proprie Dei sit voluntas?
Second, since you do not grant the soul the freedom which Mr Descartes assigned to it, what difference is there between the dependence of intellectual substances and of soulless ones? And if they have no freedom of willing, how do you conceive that they depend on God? And in what way does the soul depend on God? Third, if our soul is not endowed with that freedom, is not our action properly God’s action, and our will properly God’s will?
Plura alia quaerere possem, sed tam multa a te petere non ausim: solummodo ad praecedentia responsum tuum brevi exspecto, an forte hoc medio adhibito sententiam tuam melius intelligam, ut postea de hac re coram tecum pluribus agerem. Ubi enim tuum nactus fuero responsum, Leydam profectus, si gratum sit, in transitu te salutabo.
I could ask many other things, but I would not dare to ask so much of you: I only await your reply to the preceding points soon, to see whether by this means I may perhaps understand your opinion better, so that I may afterwards treat this matter at more length with you in person. For when I have obtained your reply, I shall go to Leiden, and, if it is agreeable, I shall greet you on the way.
1- 1 The visit took place: see the beginning of Letter 24, and Nadler pp. 254–255.
His nixus, dico ex animo, tibi salute dicta, me manere tibi addictissimum, atque officiosissimum
Relying on this, I say from my heart, with greetings to you, that I remain your most devoted and most dutiful
G. de Blyenbergh.
W. van Blyenbergh.
[G IV 144] Dordraci 19. Febr. 1665.
Dordrecht, 19 February 1665.
P.S. Nimia festinatione hanc inserere quaestionem oblitus sum: an quod alias nobis eveniret, prudentia nostra non impedire queamus.
P.S. In too great haste I forgot to insert this question: whether we cannot by our prudence prevent what would otherwise happen to us.
1- 1 Spinoza declines to answer it at the end of Letter 23.
Epistola XXIII
Letter 23
Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh
Viro Doctissimo, ac Ornatissimo,
To the most learned and most accomplished man
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh
Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine et amice,
Sir and friend,
[G IV 144] Duas abs te hac septimana accepi epistolas;
a posterior, 9 Martii exarata, tantum ei inserviebat, ut me de priore, 19 Februarii scripta, et mihi Schiedamo missa, certiorem redderet.
I received two letters from you this week; the later, written on 9 March, served only to inform me of the earlier, written on 19 February
1 and sent on to me from Schiedam.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 511–515, Letter 36), headed Versio. Gebhardt prints Spinoza’s Dutch after it (G IV 144–152); it is dated ‘Voorburgh den 13 Maart 1665’ and ends otherwise than the Latin (see the note at the end of the letter).
- 1 Letter 22.
In hac priore te de eo queri video, quod dixerim nullam apud te demonstrationem locum habere posse etc. quasi illud mearum rationum respectu, quia statim tibi non fecerunt satis, locutus fuerim, quod a mente mea longe abest: respiciebam propria tua verba, quae sic habent. Et siquando post diutinam investigationem accideret, ut naturalis mea scientia videretur cum hoc verbo vel pugnare, vel non satis bene etc. illud verbum tantae apud me est authoritatis, ut conceptus, quos existimo clare percipere, mihi potius suspecti sint, etc.
In the earlier I see that you complain of my having said that no demonstration could have a place with you, etc., as if I had said it with regard to my reasons, because they did not satisfy you at once; which is far from my mind: I had in view your own words, which run thus:
2 ‘And if it should ever happen after long investigation that my natural knowledge seemed either to conflict with this word, or not well enough, etc., that word has such authority with me that the concepts which I think I perceive clearly are rather suspect to me’, etc.
- 2 Letter 20. The Latin wording differs a little from that of the Latin version of Letter 20, since both translate the Dutch.
Adeo ut tua tantum verba breviter repetierim, nec propterea credo, me ulla in re irae causam praebuisse, eo magis, quod ea, tanquam rationem, adducebam, quibus magnum nostrum dissensum ostenderem.
So that I only repeated your words briefly, and I do not therefore believe that I gave you cause for anger in anything, the more so since I adduced them as a reason, to show our great disagreement.
[G IV 145] Porro, quia in calce secundae epistolae scripseras, te tantummodo sperare, et optare, ut in fide, ac spe perseveres, atque reliqua, quae nobis invicem de intellectu naturali persuademus, tibi esse indifferentia; animo volvebam, uti et iam revolvo, meas nulli usui futuras, mihique ea de causa consultum magis esse, ut studia (quae alioqui tamdiu intermittere cogor) non negligerem propter res, quae nullum fructum possunt largiri.
Further, because at the end of your second letter
1 you had written that you only hoped and wished to persevere in faith and hope, and that the rest, which we persuade each other of concerning the natural intellect, was indifferent to you, I turned it over in my mind, as I still do, that my letters would be of no use, and that for that reason it would be wiser for me not to neglect my studies (which I am otherwise forced to interrupt for so long) for the sake of things which can yield no fruit.
Nec hoc primae epistolae meae contrariatur: quia ibi te, ut merum philosophum, qui (sicuti haud pauci, qui se Christianos autumant, concedunt) nullum alium veritatis Lydium habet lapidem, praeter naturalem intellectum, non vero theologiam, considerabam. Sed de hac re me aliter edocuisti, simulque ostendisti, quod fundamentum, cui nostram amicitiam superaedificare animus erat, non, ut arbitrabar, esset iactum.
Nor does this contradict my first letter: for there I considered you as a pure philosopher, who (as not a few who call themselves Christians grant) has no other touchstone of truth than the natural intellect, and not theology. But on this matter you have taught me otherwise, and at the same time shown that the foundation on which I intended to build our friendship had not, as I thought, been laid.
Denique reliqua quod attinet, ea plerumque tali modo inter disputandum contingunt, ut propterea humanitatis limites non transgrediamur, et hac de causa in secunda tua epistola, nec non in hac his similia, tanquam non animadversa, praetermittam. Haec de tua offensione, ut, me ei nullam dedisse causam, ostenderem, multo minus me ferre haud posse, ut mihi quisquam obloquatur. Nunc, quo ad tuas obiectiones rursus respondeam, me converto.
Finally, as for the rest, such things mostly happen in disputing in such a way that we do not on that account transgress the limits of courtesy; and for this reason I shall pass over things of this kind in your second letter, and also in this one, as if I had not noticed them. So much for your offence, to show that I gave no cause for it, much less that I cannot bear anyone to contradict me. Now I turn to answering your objections again.
Statuo ergo primo, Deum absolute, et revera causam esse omnium, quae essentiam habent, quaecunque etiam illa sint. Si iam poteris demonstrare, malum, Errorem, Scelera, etc. quicquam esse, quod essentiam exprimit, tibi penitus concedam, Deum scelerum, mali, erroris, etc. causam esse. Videor mihi sufficienter ostendisse id, quod formam mali, erroris, sceleris ponit, non in aliquo, quod essentiam exprimit, consistere, ideoque dici non posse, Deum eius esse causam.
I maintain, then, first, that God is absolutely and really the cause of all things that have essence, whatever they may be. If you can now demonstrate that evil, error, crimes, etc. are anything that expresses essence, I shall grant you entirely that God is the cause of crimes, of evil, of error, etc. I seem to myself to have shown sufficiently that what posits the form of evil, error or crime does not consist in anything that expresses essence, and that therefore it cannot be said that God is its cause.
Neronis, verbi gratia, matricidium, quatenus aliquid positivum comprehendebat, scelus non erat: nam facinus externum fecit, simulque intentionem ad trucidandam Matrem Orestes habuit, et tamen, saltem uti Nero, ita non accusatur. Quodnam ergo Neronis scelus? Non aliud, quam quod hoc facinore ostenderet se ingratum, immisericordem, ac inobedientem esse. Certum autem est, nihil horum aliquid essentiae exprimere, et idcirco Deum eorum etiam non fuisse causam, licet causa actus, et intentionis Neronis fuerit.
Nero’s matricide, for example, insofar as it comprehended something positive, was not a crime:
2 for Orestes did the same outward deed, and at the same time had the intention of killing his mother, and yet he is not accused, at least not as Nero is. What, then, was Nero’s crime? Nothing other than that by this deed he showed himself ungrateful, unmerciful and disobedient. But it is certain that none of these expresses any essence, and therefore God was not their cause either, though he was the cause of Nero’s act and intention.
Porro velim hic notari, nos, dum philosophice loquimur, non debere Phrasibus theologiae uti: Nam, quia theologia Deum passim, nec temere, ut hominem perfectum repraesentat, propterea oportunum est, ut in theologia dicatur Deum quicquam cupere, Deum taedio operibus improborum affici, et proborum delectari; in philosophia vero, ubi clare percipimus, quod Deo illa attributa, quae hominem perfectum reddunt, tam aegre possunt tribui, et adsignari, quam si ea, quae elephantum, asinumve perficiunt, homini tribueremus: Ibi haec, et his similia verba nullum obtinent locum, nec ibi sine nostrorum conceptuum summa confusione ea usurpare licet.
Further, I should like it noted here that when we speak philosophically we ought not to use the phrases of theology: for because theology often, and not without reason, represents God as a perfect man, it is fitting that in theology it should be said that God desires something, that God is affected with distaste by the works of the wicked and takes delight in those of the good; but in philosophy, where we perceive clearly that the attributes which make a man perfect can be ascribed and assigned to God as little as if we were to ascribe to a man those which make an elephant or an ass perfect,
3 there these and similar words have no place, nor may we use them there without the greatest confusion of our concepts.
- 3 Nadler quotes this passage (Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 254).
Quare philosophice loquendo, dici nequit, Deum a quoquam quicquam petere, neque ei taediosum, aut gratum quid esse; haec quippe omnia humana sunt attributa, quae in Deo locum non habent.
Therefore, speaking philosophically, it cannot be said that God asks anything of anyone, nor that anything is distasteful or pleasing to him; for all these are human attributes, which have no place in God.
[G IV 148] Notari tandem voluissem, quod, quamvis opera proborum, (hoc est, eorum, qui claram Dei habent ideam, ad quam cuncta eorum opera, ut et cogitationes determinantur) et improborum, (hoc est, eorum, qui Dei ideam haud possident, sed tantum rerum terrenarum ideas, ad quas eorum opera, cogitationesque determinantur) et denique omnium eorum, quae sunt, ex Dei aeternis legibus, et decretis necessario profluant, continuoque a Deo dependeant, attamen non solum gradibus; sed et essentia ab invicem differunt: licet etenim mus aeque, ac angelus, et aeque tristitia, ac laetitia, a Deo dependeant, nequit tamen mus species angeli, et tristitia species laetitiae esse.
Finally, I should have wished it noted that although the works of the good (that is, of those who have a clear idea of God, to which all their works and thoughts are determined), and of the wicked (that is, of those who do not possess the idea of God, but only ideas of earthly things, to which their works and thoughts are determined), and finally of all things that are, flow necessarily from God’s eternal laws and decrees and depend continually on God, yet they differ from one another not only in degree but also in essence: for although a mouse depends on God as much as an angel, and sadness as much as joy, yet a mouse cannot be a species of angel, nor sadness a species of joy.
Hisce opinor me tuis Obiectionibus (si eas probe intellexi; quippe interdum dubius haereo, num conclusiones, quas inde deducis, non differant ab ipsa propositione, quam demonstrare suscipis) respondisse.
With this I think I have answered your objections (if I have understood them properly; for at times I am in doubt whether the conclusions you draw from them do not differ from the very proposition you undertake to demonstrate).
[G IV 149] Verum illud clarius patebit, si ad quaestiones propositas ex his fundamentis respondeam. Prima est, an occidere Deo adeo acceptum sit, ac eleemosynas elargiri? altera est, an furari Dei respectu aeque bonum sit, ac iustum esse? tertia denique est, an, si daretur animus, cum cuius singulari natura non pugnaret; sed conveniret, libidinibus obtemperare, et scelera perpetrare, an in eo, inquam, ratio virtutis daretur, quae ipsi, ut bonum faceret, et malum omitteret, persuaderet?
But this will be clearer if I answer the questions proposed on these foundations. The first is whether killing is as acceptable to God as giving alms?
1 The second is whether stealing is, in relation to God, as good as being just? The third, finally, is whether, if there were a mind with whose singular nature it did not conflict, but agreed, to obey its lusts and commit crimes, whether, I say, there would be in it a reason of virtue which would persuade it to do good and refrain from evil?
Ad primam hoc do responsum, me (Philosophice loquendo) quid his verbis, Deo acceptum esse, velis, nescire. Si roges, an Deus hunc non odio habeat, illum vero diligat? an Deum alius contumelia affecerit, alius favore prosecutus fuerit? respondeo, quod non.
To the first I give this answer: that (speaking philosophically) I do not know what you mean by these words, ‘to be acceptable to God’. If you ask whether God does not hate the one and love the other? Whether one has affronted God and the other shown him favour? I answer no.
Si vero quaestio est, numne homines, qui occidunt, et eleemosynas distribuunt, aeque probi, et perfecti sint? Rursus negando respondeo.
But if the question is whether men who kill and men who give alms are equally good and perfect? Again I answer in the negative.
[G IV 150] Ad secundam regero: si bonum respectu Dei inferat, iustum aliquid boni Deo praestare, et furem aliquid mali, respondeo neque iustum, neque furem in Deo delectationem, aut taedium posse causari; si vero quaeratur, an utrumque illud opus, quatenus aliquid reale, et a Deo causatum est, aeque sit perfectum? dico, si ad opera tantum animum advertamus, et ad talem modum, posse fieri, ut utrumque aeque fit perfectum.
To the second I reply: if ‘good in relation to God’ implies that the just man does God some good and the thief some evil, I answer that neither the just man nor the thief can cause God delight or distaste; but if it is asked whether both those works, insofar as they are something real and caused by God, are equally perfect, I say that if we attend only to the works, and in such a way, it may be that both are equally perfect.
Si igitur interroges, numne fur, et iustus aeque sint perfecti, beatique? respondeo, non. Per iustum namque eum intelligo, qui constanter cupit, ut unusquisque, quod suum est, possideat; quam cupiditatem ego in mea Ethica (necdum edita) in piis ex clara, quam de seipsis, et Deo habent, cognitione necessario originem ducere, demonstro. Et quoniam eius generis cupiditatem fur non habet, necessario Dei, et sui ipsius cognitione, hoc est, primario, quod nos homines reddit, destituitur.
If, then, you ask whether the thief and the just man are equally perfect and blessed? I answer no. For by a just man I understand one who constantly desires that each should possess what is his; and I demonstrate in my
Ethics (not yet published)
1 that this desire necessarily arises in the pious from the clear knowledge which they have of themselves and of God. And since the thief does not have a desire of that kind, he necessarily lacks the knowledge of God and of himself, that is, the chief thing that makes us men.
- 1 In the Ethics as published, Part IV, Prop. 37: ‘The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men, and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has’; justice is explained in its second scholium.
Si tamen ulterius quaeras, quid te queat movere, ut magis hoc opus, quod virtutem nuncupo, quam aliud facias? dico, me non posse scire, qua via, ex infinitis, Deus utatur, ut te ad hoc opus determinet. Posset esse, ut Deus tibi clare sui ideam impresserit, ut mundum oblivioni propter sui amorem traderes, reliquosque homines, sicut te ipsum, amares; et perspicuum est huiusmodi animi constitutionem cum caeteris omnibus, quae malae vocantur, pugnare, et ea de causa in uno subiecto non posse esse.
If, however, you ask further what could move you to do this work which I call virtue rather than another, I say that I cannot know which way, out of infinitely many, God uses to determine you to this work. It could be that God has impressed on you so clear an idea of himself that for love of him you would consign the world to oblivion and love other men as yourself; and it is plain that such a constitution of mind conflicts with all the others that are called evil, and for that reason they cannot be in one subject.
Porro fundamenta ethices explicandi, et etiam cuncta mea dicta demonstrandi non est hic locus, quia tantum in eo sum, ut ad quaestiones tuas responsum dem, et eas a me avertam, arceamque.
Further, this is not the place to explain the foundations of ethics and also to demonstrate all that I have said, since I am only concerned to answer your questions, and to turn them aside and ward them off from me.
Quantum denique tertiam quaestionem attinet, ea contradictionem supponit, mihique aeque videbatur, ac si quis rogaret: Si melius cum alicuius natura conveniret, ut seipsum suspenderet, an rationes darentur, ut se non suspenderet? Verum, eiusmodi dari naturam, sit possibile, tunc affirmo, (etiamsi liberum arbitrium concederem, sive non concederem) si quis videt, se commodius in cruce posse vivere, quam mensae suae accumbentem, eum stultissime agere, si se ipsum non suspenderet; et is, qui clare videret, se scelera patrando revera perfectiore et meliore vita, vel essentia, quam virtutem sectando, posse frui, is etiam stultus foret, si illa non faceret. Nam scelera respectu istiusmodi naturae humanae perversae virtus essent.
As for the third question, finally, it supposes a contradiction, and seemed to me just as if someone were to ask: If it agreed better with someone’s nature to hang himself, would there be reasons why he should not hang himself? But suppose it possible that there is such a nature; then I affirm (whether I granted free will or not) that if someone sees that he can live more comfortably on the gallows than sitting at his table, he would act most foolishly if he did not hang himself; and he who saw clearly that by committing crimes he could really enjoy a more perfect and better life or essence than by pursuing virtue would also be a fool if he did not commit them. For crimes would be virtue in relation to such a perverted human nature.
Ad aliam quaestionem, quam calci epistolae addidisti, quia una hora vel centum eius generis quaerere possemus, nec tamen unquam ad conclusionem unius perveniremus, et ipse responsionem non adeo urges, non respondebo: hoc tempore tantum dicam, etc.
aTo the other question which you added at the foot of your letter,
2 since we could ask a hundred of that kind in an hour without ever coming to a conclusion about one, and you yourself do not press much for an answer, I shall not reply: at this time I shall only say, etc.
- a Spinoza’s Dutch ends (G IV 152): ‘… and for this time only say that I shall expect you at the time which you appoint, and that you will be very welcome to me. But I should like it to be soon, because I am already intending to go to Amsterdam for a week or two. Meanwhile, after hearty greetings, I remain’, followed by the initials U. E. V. E. D. and the signature ‘B. de Spinoza’.
- 2 The postscript of Letter 22.
Epistola XXIV
Letter 24
Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza
Viro clarissimo,
To the most distinguished man
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.
from Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine, et amice.
Sir and friend,
[G IV 153] Ubi tua honorabar praesentia,
a ut in ea perseverarem non tempus, multo minus memoria permittebat, ut quae colloquentes tractavimus, ei mandarem; licet ego quam primum a te discesseram, omnes memoriae vires, quo audita retinerem, colligerem.
When I was honoured with your presence,
1 time did not allow me to remain in it, much less did memory allow me to commit to it what we discussed together; although as soon as I had left you I gathered all the powers of my memory to retain what I had heard.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 515–517, Letter 37), headed Versio; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 153–157). The digital text of Gebhardt reads honorabor; the 1677 edition has honorabar.
- 1 Blyenbergh had visited Spinoza, as he proposed at the end of Letter 22; they talked about freedom, sin and the nature of the soul (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 254–255).
In proximum ergo profectus locum tuas opiniones chartae mandare conabar; sed experiebar tunc, me revera ne quartam quidem tractatorum partem retinuisse; adeo ut tibi sim excusandus, si adhuc semel, tantum quaerendo de iis, in quibus mentem tuam, vel non bene perceperim, vel non bene retinuerim, tibi molestus sim. Optem, ut hunc laborem aliquo beneficio tibi compensare facultas daretur.
Having gone on to the next place, then, I tried to commit your opinions to paper; but I then found that I had in fact retained not even a quarter of what was discussed;
2 so that you must excuse me if I trouble you once more, asking only about those things in which I either did not perceive your mind well or did not retain it well. I wish that I had the means of repaying this labour to you with some favour.
- 2 Nadler quotes this passage (p. 255).
Primum erat, quomodo, ubi principia, et cogitata tua metaphysica lego, quae tua, quaeque Cartesii sit sententia, internoscere possim?
The first was: how, when I read your Principles and Metaphysical Thoughts, can I distinguish which is your opinion and which Descartes’s?
[G IV 154] Secundum, an proprie detur error, et in quo consistat?
The second: whether there is properly error, and in what it consists?
Tertium, qua ratione statuas, voluntatem non esse liberam.
The third: on what ground you maintain that the will is not free.
Quartum, quid his verbis, quae L. M. in praefatione tuo nomine scripsit, intelligas, nempe. Cum contra author noster admittat quidem in rerum natura esse substantiam cogitantem: attamen neget illam constituere essentiam mentis humanae; sed statuat, eodem modo, quo extensio nullis limitibus determinata est, cogitationem etiam nullis limitibus determinari; adeoque quemadmodum corpus humanum non est absolute, sed tantum certo modo secundum leges naturae extensae per motum et quietem determinata extensio; sic etiam mentem, sive animam humanam non esse absolute, sed tantum secundum leges naturae cogitantis per ideas certo modo determinatam cogitationem; quae necessario dari concluditur, ubi corpus humanum existere incipit.
The fourth: what you understand by these words which L. M. wrote in your name in the preface, namely: ‘Whereas our author admits indeed that there is in nature a thinking substance, yet denies that it constitutes the essence of the human mind; but maintains that, in the same way in which extension is determined by no limits, thought too is determined by no limits; and so, just as the human body is not extension absolutely, but only extension determined in a certain way according to the laws of extended nature by motion and rest, so also the human mind or soul is not thought absolutely, but only thought determined in a certain way according to the laws of thinking nature by ideas; which is concluded to exist necessarily when the human body begins to exist.’
1- 1 Meyer’s preface to the Principles (G I 132). Compare, in the Ethics, Part II, Prop. 11 and Prop. 13: the mind is the idea of the body.
Unde sequi videtur, sicut corpus humanum ex millenis compositum est corporibus, ita etiam humanam mentem ex millenis constare cogitationibus;. et quemadmodum humanum corpus in millena resolvitur, unde componebatur, corpora, sic etiam mentem nostram, ubi corpus deserit, in tam multiplices, ex quibus constabat, cogitationes resolvi: et sicuti resolutae humani nostri corporis partes non amplius unitae manent; sed alia corpora inter ea se insinuant; ita sequi quoque videtur, mente nostra dissoluta, illas innumeras cogitationes, quibus constabat, non amplius combinatas, sed divisas esse: et quemadmodum corpora soluta corpora quidem manent; sed non humana, ita a morte quoque nostram substantiam cogitantem quidem resolvi, ut cogitationes, vel substantiae cogitantes maneant, non vero ita, ut essentia erat earum, quum mens humana dicebantur.
From which it seems to follow that, just as the human body is composed of thousands of bodies, so also the human mind consists of thousands of thoughts;
2 and as the human body is resolved into the thousands of bodies of which it was composed, so also our mind, when it leaves the body, is resolved into the many thoughts of which it consisted; and as the resolved parts of our human body no longer remain united, but other bodies insinuate themselves between them, so it seems to follow too that when our mind is dissolved, those countless thoughts of which it consisted are no longer combined but divided; and as dissolved bodies remain bodies but not human ones, so too after death our thinking substance is resolved in such a way that thoughts or thinking substances remain, but not such as their essence was when they were called a human mind.
- 2 Compare Part II, Prop. 15: the idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas.
Unde mihi videtur, ac si statueres, substantiam hominis cogitantem mutari, et instar corporum resolvi, quin imo quasdam ita, ut de impiis (ni me fallat memoria) affirmabas, omnino perire, nullamque sibi retinere cogitationem reliquam. Et sicut D. des Cartes, ut L. M. habet, mentem esse substantiam absolute cogitantem tantum praesupponit, ita et Tu, et L. M. praesupponitis maximam partem uti mihi videmini: quare tuam hoc in negotio mentem clare non percipio.
From which it seems to me as if you maintained that the thinking substance of man is changed and resolved like bodies, indeed some of them in such a way that, as you affirmed of the impious
3 (if my memory does not deceive me), they perish altogether and retain no thought left to them. And just as Mr Descartes, as L. M. has it, only presupposes that the mind is an absolutely thinking substance,
4 so you too and L. M. presuppose for the most part, as it seems to me: therefore I do not perceive your mind clearly in this matter.
- 3 Compare Part V, Prop. 38, Schol., on the part of the mind which perishes with the body.
- 4 Meyer’s preface (G I 132): Descartes ‘only supposes, does not prove, that the human mind is an absolutely thinking substance’.
[G IV 156] Quintum est, quod tam in colloquio, quam in postrema tua epistola, 13. Martii scripta, statuis, ex clara Dei, et nostri cognitione oriri constantiam, qua, ut quilibet suum sibi habeat, cupimus: Verum hic explicandum restat, qua ratione Dei, et nostri cognitio in nobis constantem voluntatem producat, ut unusquisque, quod suum est, possideat, hoc est, qua via id ex Dei cognitione fluat, vel nos obstringat, ut virtutem amemus, et ea negligamus opera, quae vitia dicimus; et unde procedat (quandoquidem occidere, et furari, iuxta te, aeque quid positivum, ac eleemosynas dare, comprehendant) cur caedem committere non tantum perfectionis, beatitudinis, et acquiescentiae, quantum eleemosynas distribuere, involvat.
The fifth is that, both in conversation and in your last letter, written on 13 March,
1 you maintain that from the clear knowledge of God and of ourselves arises the constancy by which we desire that each should have his own: but here it remains to be explained in what way the knowledge of God and of ourselves produces in us the constant will that each should possess what is his; that is, by what way this flows from the knowledge of God, or binds us to love virtue and to neglect the works which we call vices; and whence it comes (since killing and stealing, according to you, comprehend something positive as much as giving alms) that committing murder does not involve as much perfection, blessedness and contentment as distributing alms.
Dices forte, ut in postrema, quae 13. Martii consignata est, hanc quaestionem ad Ethicam spectare, eamque inibi a te moveri; verum quum sine huius quaestionis, ut et praecedentium elucidatione, ego tuam nequeam percipere mentem, quin semper absurditates supersint, quas conciliare non possum, amice rogo ut latius mihi ad eas respondeas; praesertim ut praecipuas quasdam definitiones, postulata, et axiomata, quibus tua Ethica, et haec imprimis quaestio innititur, proponas, et explanes. Forte, quia labor deterret, te excusabis, verum ut meae satisfacias petitioni saltem hac vice flagito, eo quod absque ultimae quaestionis solutione mentem tuam nunquam recte sim percepturus.
You will perhaps say, as in your last letter, dated 13 March, that this question belongs to the Ethics and is treated there by you; but since without the elucidation of this question, as of the preceding ones, I cannot perceive your mind without absurdities always remaining which I cannot reconcile, I ask you in friendly fashion to answer me more fully on them; especially to set out and explain certain chief definitions, postulates and axioms on which your Ethics, and this question above all, rests. Perhaps you will excuse yourself because the labour deters you; but I beg you to satisfy my request at least this once, because without the solution of the last question I shall never perceive your mind rightly.
Optem, ut laborem tuum aliquo beneficio compensare liceret. Tempus duarum, triumve septimanarum praescribere non audeo; tantum ut ante iter tuum Amstelaedamense ad has responsum des, requiro.
I wish that I could repay your labour with some favour. I do not dare prescribe a time of two or three weeks; I only ask that you answer this before your journey to Amsterdam.
2- 2 Announced at the end of Spinoza’s Dutch letter of 13 March (see the note at the end of Letter 23).
Hoc ubi praestiteris, me tibi summopere devincies, egoque ostendam me esse et permanere, Mi Domine, tuum ad quaevis officia paratissimum,
When you have done this, you will oblige me greatly, and I shall show that I am and remain, Sir, most ready for any service to you,
G. de Blyenberg.
W. van Blyenbergh.
[G IV 157] Dordraci 27. Martii 1665.
Dordrecht, 27 March 1665.
Epistola XXVII
Letter 27
Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh
Humanissimo, Ornatissimoque viro,
To the most courteous and most accomplished man
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh
Willem van Blyenbergh
Mi Domine, et amice.
Sir and friend,
[G IV 160] Ubi tua, 27. Martii ad me data,
a mihi tradebatur, ut Amstelaedamum proficiscerer, in procinctu stabam. Quare, ubi dimidium eius perlegeram, domi relinquebam, donec rediissem, ut tum responderem; quoniam putabam, eam nihil, nisi quaestiones, ad primam spectantes controversiam, comprehendere.
When your letter of 27 March
1 was delivered to me, I was on the point of setting out for Amsterdam. So when I had read half of it, I left it at home until I returned, so as to answer it then; because I thought that it contained nothing but questions concerning our first controversy.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 518–519, Letter 38), headed Versio. Gebhardt prints Spinoza’s Dutch after it (G IV 160–162), dated ‘Voorburg den 3. Juni’ (1665); it says that the second letter came under cover to Spinoza’s landlord.
- 1 Letter 24.
Ego vero postea eam perlegens longe aliud eius argumentum esse deprehendebam, in eaque non modo probationem eorum, quae in praefatione mearum demonstrationum Geometricarum in Cartesii principia curavi scribi, eo tantum fine, ut meam sententiam cuilibet indicarem, non vero probarem, et hominibus persuaderem; sed etiam magnam ethices partem, quae, ut cuivis notum, metaphysica, et Physica fundari debet, desiderari.
But reading it through afterwards, I found that its argument was quite different, and that in it you ask not only for the proof of what I had had written in the preface to my
Geometrical Demonstrations of Descartes’s Principles,
2 only in order to indicate my opinion to anyone, not to prove it and persuade men of it, but also for a great part of ethics, which, as everyone knows, must be founded on metaphysics and physics.
- 2 Meyer’s preface, from which Blyenbergh had quoted in Letter 24.
Qua de causa, ut tuis facerem satis quaestionibus, a me impetrare non potui; sed occasionem exspectare volui, quo amicissime coram, ut postulato desistas, a te peterem, meae negationis rationem darem, et denique ostenderem eas ad primae nostrae controversiae solutionem non facere; sed econtra maximam partem a solutione istius litis pendere. Tantum ergo abest, ut mea opinio, rerum necessitatem spectans, sine iis non possit percipi; quia hae revera percipi nequeunt, antequam ea in antecessum intelligatur.
For this reason I could not bring myself to satisfy your questions; but I wished to wait for an opportunity to ask you in person, in the friendliest way, to desist from your request,
3 to give the reason for my refusal, and finally to show that they do not contribute to the solution of our first controversy, but on the contrary depend for the most part on the solution of that dispute. So far is it, then, from being the case that my opinion concerning the necessity of things cannot be perceived without them, that they in fact cannot be perceived before it is understood.
- 3 Nadler quotes this as Spinoza’s polite but unmistakable request to be left alone (p. 255).
Antequam vero offerebatur occasio, hac hebdomada alterum adhuc mihi tradebatur epistolium, quod aliquam displicentiam, ex nimia mora, prae se ferre videtur. Et ideo haec pauca ad te scribere necessitas me coegit, ut de proposito, et decreto meo certiorem, ut iam reddidi, te redderem.
But before the opportunity offered, another short letter was delivered to me this week, which seems to show some displeasure at the long delay. And so necessity compelled me to write these few lines to you, to inform you of my intention and decision, as I have now done.
Spero te, negotio perpenso, ultro a tua petitione destiturum, et tamen animum in me propensum servaturum. Ego a mea parte pro viribus meis in omnibus demonstrabo, me esse, etc.
I hope that, having weighed the matter, you will of your own accord desist from your request,
4 and yet keep your kindly disposition towards me. For my part I shall show in all things, as far as I can, that I am, etc.
- 4 The correspondence ends here. Nine years later Blyenbergh published a refutation of the Theological-Political Treatise (Leiden, 1674) (Nadler p. 255).
Epistola XXXII
Letter 32
Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg
Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo viro,
To the most noble and most learned man
Henrico Oldenburgio
Henry Oldenburg
Vir Nobilissime,
Most noble Sir,
[G IV 169] Quod me ad philosophandum tu,
a et Nobilissimus D. Boylius benigne hortamini, maximas habeo gratias; ego quidem pro tenuitate mei ingenii, quantum queo, pergo, non dubitans interim de vestro auxilio, et benevolentia.
I give you the greatest thanks that you and the most noble Mr Boyle
1 kindly urge me to philosophize; for my part, I go on as far as I can, according to the slenderness of my talents, not doubting meanwhile your help and goodwill.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 440–442, Letter 15), as Gebhardt prints it first (G IV 169–175). The original, which belongs to the Royal Society of London (VVL³ III 119), is dated ‘Voorburg, 20 November 1665’ and ends with a postscript asking whether all the astronomers judge from the comets’ motion that there were two comets, or only so as to save Kepler’s hypothesis; Gebhardt prints it after the printed text.
- 1 Robert Boyle, the chemist, some of whose essays Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, had sent Spinoza at Rijnsburg in 1661 (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 225).
Ubi quaeris, quid sentiam circa quaestionem, quae in eo versatur, ut cognoscamus, quomodo unaquaeque pars naturae cum suo toto conveniat, et qua ratione cum reliquis cohaereat, puto te rogare rationes, quibus persuademur unamquamque naturae partem cum suo toto convenire, et cum reliquis cohaerere. Nam cognoscere, quomodo revera cohaereant, et unaquaeque pars cum suo toto conveniat, id me ignorare dixi in antecedenti mea epistola; quia ad hoc cognoscendum requireretur totam naturam, omnesque eius partes cognoscere.
When you ask what I think about the question which turns on our knowing how each part of nature agrees with its whole and in what way it coheres with the rest, I think you are asking for the reasons by which we are persuaded that each part of nature agrees with its whole and coheres with the rest. For to know how they really cohere, and how each part agrees with its whole, I said in my preceding letter that I do not know, because to know this it would be required to know the whole of nature and all its parts.
Conabor igitur rationem ostendere, quae me id affirmare cogit; attamen prius monere velim, me naturae non tribuere pulchritudinem, deformitatem, ordinem, neque confusionem. Nam res non, nisi respective ad nostram imaginationem, possunt dici pulchrae, aut deformes, ordinatae, aut confusae.
I shall try, therefore, to show the reason which compels me to affirm it; but first I should like to point out that I do not attribute to nature beauty, ugliness, order or confusion. For things cannot be called beautiful or ugly, ordered or confused, except in relation to our imagination.
2- 2 As the Appendix to Part I argues of order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, which are ‘only modes of imagining’ (Part I, Appendix).
[G IV 170] Per partium igitur cohaerentiam nihil aliud intelligo, quam quod leges, sive natura unius partis ita sese accommodat legibus, sive naturae alterius, ut quam minime sibi contrarientur. Circa totum, et partes considero res eatenus, ut partes alicuius totius, quatenus earum natura invicem se accommodat, ut, quoad fieri potest, inter se consentiant, quatenus vero inter se discrepant, eatenus unaquaeque ideam ab aliis distinctam in nostra mente format, ac proinde, ut totum, non ut pars, consideratur.
By the coherence of parts, then, I understand nothing else than that the laws, or nature, of one part so adapts itself to the laws, or nature, of another that they are as little contrary to one another as possible. Concerning whole and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole insofar as their natures so adapt themselves to one another that they agree among themselves as far as possible; but insofar as they differ among themselves, to that extent each forms in our mind an idea distinct from the others, and so is considered as a whole, not as a part.
Ex. gr. cum motus particularum lymphae, chyli, etc. invicem pro ratione magnitudinis, et figurae ita se accommodant, ut plane inter se consentiant, unumque fluidum simul omnes constituant, eatenus tantum chylus, lympha, etc. ut partes sanguinis considerantur: quatenus vero concipimus particulas lymphaticas ratione figurae, et motus, a particulis chyli discrepare, eatenus eas, ut totum, non ut partem, consideramus.
For example, when the motions of the particles of lymph, chyle, etc. so adapt themselves to one another, according to their size and shape, that they agree entirely among themselves and all together constitute one fluid, to that extent only are chyle, lymph, etc. considered as parts of the blood; but insofar as we conceive the lymphatic particles as differing from the particles of chyle by reason of their shape and motion, to that extent we consider them as a whole, not as a part.
[G IV 171] Fingamus iam, si placet vermiculum in sanguine vivere, qui visu ad discernendas particulas sanguinis, lymphae, etc. valeret, et ratione ad observandum, quomodo unaquaeque particula ex alterius occursu, vel resilit, vel partem sui motus communicat, etc. Ille quidem in hoc sanguine, ut nos in hac parte universi, viveret, et unamquamque sanguinis particulam, ut totum, non vero ut partem, consideraret, nec scire posset, quomodo partes omnes ab universali natura sanguinis moderantur, et invicem, prout universalis natura sanguinis exigit, se accommodare coguntur, ut certa ratione inter se consentiant.
Let us now feign, if you please, that a little worm lives in the blood, which had sight sharp enough to distinguish the particles of blood, lymph, etc., and reason to observe how each particle, on meeting another, either rebounds or communicates part of its motion, etc. It would live in this blood as we live in this part of the universe, and would consider each particle of blood as a whole, not as a part, and could not know how all the parts are regulated by the universal nature of the blood and compelled to adapt themselves to one another, as the universal nature of the blood requires, so as to agree among themselves in a certain ratio.
Nam si fingamus, nullas dari causas extra sanguinem, quae novos motus sanguini communicarent, nec ullum dari spatium extra sanguinem, nec alia corpora, in quae particulae sanguinis suum motum transferre possent, certum est, sanguinem in suo statu semper mansurum, et eius particulas nullas alias variationes passuras, quam eas, quae possunt concipi ex data ratione motus sanguinis ad lympham, chylum, etc. et sic sanguis semper, ut totum, non vero ut pars, considerari deberet.
For if we feign that there are no causes outside the blood which would communicate new motions to the blood, nor any space outside the blood, nor other bodies to which the particles of blood could transfer their motion, it is certain that the blood would always remain in its state and its particles would undergo no variations other than those which can be conceived from the given ratio of the motion of the blood to the lymph, chyle, etc.; and so the blood would always have to be considered as a whole, not as a part.
Verum quia plurimae aliae causae dantur, quae leges naturae sanguinis certo modo moderantur, et vicissim illae a sanguine, hinc fit, ut alii motus, aliaeque variationes in sanguine oriantur, quae consequuntur non a sola ratione motus eius partium ad invicem, sed a ratione motus, sanguinis, et causarum externarum simul ad invicem: hoc modo sanguis rationem partis, non vero totius habet. De toto, et parte modo dixi.
But since there are very many other causes which regulate the laws of the nature of the blood in a certain way, and are in turn regulated by the blood, it comes about that other motions and other variations arise in the blood, which follow not only from the ratio of the motion of its parts to one another, but from the ratio of the motion of the blood and of the external causes together to one another; in this way the blood has the character of a part, not of a whole. I have just spoken of whole and part.
[G IV 172] Iam cum omnia naturae corpora eodem modo possint, et debeant concipi, ac nos hic sanguinem concepimus: omnia enim corpora ab aliis circumcinguntur, et ab invicem determinantur ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione, servata semper in omnibus simul, hoc est, in toto universo eadem ratione motus ad quietem; hinc sequitur omne corpus, quatenus certo modo modificatum existit, ut partem totius universi, considerari debere, cum suo toto convenire, et cum reliquis cohaerere; et quoniam natura universi non est, ut natura sanguinis, limitata; sed absolute infinita, ideo ab hac infinitae potentiae natura eius partes infinitis modis moderantur, et infinitas variationes pati coguntur.
Now since all the bodies of nature can and must be conceived in the same way as we have here conceived the blood (for all bodies are surrounded by others, and are determined by one another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner, the same ratio of motion to rest being always preserved in all of them together, that is, in the whole universe),
1 it follows that every body, insofar as it exists modified in a certain way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, and that it agrees with its whole and coheres with the rest. And since the nature of the universe is not limited, as the nature of the blood is, but absolutely infinite, its parts are regulated in infinite ways by this nature of infinite power, and are compelled to undergo infinite variations.
- 1 The physics of Part II says the same: a composite individual keeps its nature while its parts change, provided they keep the same ratio of motion and rest, and so the whole of nature is one individual whose parts vary in infinite ways without any change of the whole (Part II, Lemma 7, Schol.; the definition of an individual is given after Lemma 3).
Verum ratione substantiae unamquamque partem arctiorem unionem cum suo toto habere concipio. Nam ut antehac in prima mea epistola, quam Rhenoburgi adhuc habitans tibi scripsi, conatus sum demonstrare, cum de natura substantiae sit esse infinitam, sequi ad naturam substantiae corporeae unamquamque partem pertinere, nec sine ea esse, aut concipi posse.
But with respect to substance I conceive that each part has a closer union with its whole. For, as I tried to demonstrate earlier in my first letter,
2 which I wrote to you while I was still living at Rijnsburg, since it is of the nature of substance to be infinite, it follows that each part pertains to the nature of corporeal substance and can neither be nor be conceived without it.
- 2 Letter 2, in which Spinoza undertook to show, among other things, that every substance must be infinite, or supremely perfect in its kind; in the Ethics, Part I, Prop. 8, with the indivisibility of corporeal substance in Props. 12–13 and the scholium to Prop. 15.
[G IV 173] Vides igitur, qua ratione, et rationem, cur sentiam corpus humanum partem esse naturae: quod autem ad mentem humanam attinet, eam etiam partem naturae esse censeo; nempe quia statuo, dari etiam in natura potentiam infinitam cogitandi, quae, quatenus infinita, in se continet totam naturam obiective, et cuius cogitationes procedunt eodem modo, ac natura, eius nimirum ideatum.
You see, therefore, in what way, and for what reason, I think that the human body is a part of nature. As for the human mind, I think that it too is a part of nature; namely, because I maintain that there is also in nature an infinite power of thinking which, insofar as it is infinite, contains in itself the whole of nature objectively, and whose thoughts proceed in the same way as nature, namely its object.
1- 1 ideatum: the object of the idea. Compare Part II, Prop. 7 with its corollary: whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and connection.
[G IV 174] Deinde mentem humanam hanc eandem potentiam statuo, non quatenus infinitam, et totam naturam percipientem; sed finitam, nempe quatenus tantum humanum corpus percipit, et hac ratione mentem humanam partem cuiusdam infiniti intellectus statuo.
Next, I maintain that the human mind is this same power, not insofar as it is infinite and perceives the whole of nature, but insofar as it is finite, namely insofar as it perceives only the human body; and in this way I maintain that the human mind is a part of a certain infinite intellect.
1
Verum haec omnia, et quae huic rei annexa sunt, hic accurate explicare, et demonstrare, res esset nimis prolixa, nec puto te id impraesentiarum a me exspectare. Imo dubito, an mentem tuam satis perceperim, atque aliud responderim, ac rogaveris, quod ex te scire desidero.
But to explain and demonstrate all these things, and what is connected with them, accurately here would be too long a business, and I do not think you expect it of me at present. Indeed I doubt whether I have grasped your meaning well enough, and whether I have not answered something other than what you asked; which I should like to know from you.
Quod deinde scribis, me innuisse Cartesii regulas motus falsas fere omnes esse, si recte memini, D. Hugenium id sentire dixi, nec ullam aliam falsam esse affirmavi, quam regulam sextam Cartesii, circa quam D. Hugenium etiam errare me putare dixi; qua occasione petii, ut mihi communicares experimentum, quod secundum eam hypothesin experti estis in vestra Regia societate; sed tibi id non licere iudico, quia de hoc nihil respondes.
As for your writing next that I hinted that almost all of Descartes’s rules of motion are false: if I remember rightly, I said that Mr Huygens thinks so, and I affirmed no other to be false than Descartes’s sixth rule,
1 about which I said that I thought Mr Huygens too was in error; on which occasion I asked you to communicate to me the experiment which you made in your Royal Society according to that hypothesis; but I judge that you are not permitted to do so, since you reply nothing about it.
- 1 The rules of collision in Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy, II.46–52; the sixth (II.51) concerns a body striking another at rest that is exactly equal to it (AT VIII-1 69).
Dictus Hugenius totus occupatus fuit, et adhuc est in expoliendis vitris dioptricis; in quem finem fabricam adornavit, in qua et patinas tornare potest, satis quidem nitidam: quid autem ea promoverit, adhuc nescio, nec, ut verum fateor, valde scire desidero. Nam me experientia satis docuit in patinis sphaericis libera manu tutius, et melius expoliri, quam quavis machina. De pendulorum successu, et tempore transmigrationis in Galliam nondum aliquid certi possum scribere. etc.
The said Huygens has been, and still is, wholly occupied in polishing dioptrical glasses; for this purpose he has fitted up a workshop, quite a neat one indeed, in which he can also turn dishes;
1 but what he has achieved with it I do not yet know, nor, to tell the truth, do I much wish to know. For experience has taught me well enough that with spherical dishes it is safer and better to polish by free hand than by any machine. Of the success of the pendulums and the time of his moving to France I can write nothing certain yet, etc.
- 1 patinas: the curved tools, ground to the required sphere, on which lenses are polished; Spinoza himself ground lenses.
Epistola L
Letter 50
Viro Humanissimo, atque Prudentissimo,
To the most courteous and most prudent man
Jarigh Jelles
Jarig Jelles
Humanissime vir,
Most courteous Sir,
[G IV 238] Quantum ad Politicam spectat,
a discrimen inter me, et Hobbesium, de quo interrogas, in hoc consistit, quod ego naturale ius semper sartum tectum conservo, quodque Supremo Magistratui in qualibet Urbe non plus in subditos iuris, quam iuxta mensuram potestatis, qua subditum superat, competere statuo, quod in statu naturali semper locum habet.
With regard to politics, the difference between me and Hobbes, which you ask about, consists in this: that I always keep natural right intact, and that I hold that the supreme magistrate in any city has no more right over its subjects than in proportion to the power by which it exceeds the subject;
1 which is always the case in the natural state.
- a The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 557–558, Letter 50), headed Versio, which gives the addressee’s name as asterisks; Van Vloten and Land supply it (VVL³ III 172), and took the Latin to be Spinoza’s own translation, except, it seems, the last sentences. The Dutch text, which Gebhardt prints after the Latin (G IV 239–241), is dated ‘’s Gravenhage, 2 May 1671’; the Latin, The Hague, 2 June 1674. The book by Mansvelt mentioned at the end appeared in 1674.
- 1 The principle of the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 16 (G III 189): ‘the right of each extends as far as its determinate power extends’. On the natural and the civil state in the Ethics, see Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2.
[G IV 239] Porro, quod demonstrationem attinet, quam ego in appendice Geometricarum in Cartesii principia demonstrationum stabilio, nempe Deum non, nisi valde improprie, unum, vel unicum dici posse; respondeo, rem solummodo existentiae, non vero essentiae respectu unam, vel unicam dici: res enim sub numeris, nisi postquam ad commune genus redactae fuerunt, non concipimus.
Further, as regards the demonstration which I establish in the appendix to the
Geometrical Demonstrations of Descartes’s Principles, namely that God cannot be called one or unique except very improperly:
1 I reply that a thing is called one or unique only in respect of its existence, not of its essence; for we do not conceive things under numbers until they have been brought under a common genus.
- 1 The appendix is the Metaphysical Thoughts, Part I, ch. 6 (G I 246), which says only that God may be called one insofar as we separate him from other beings, and unique insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature, and adds: ‘if we wished to examine the matter more accurately, we could perhaps show that God is called one and unique only improperly; but the matter is not of such importance, indeed of none at all, to those who are concerned with things, not with names’. Compare Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 1, ‘God is unique’, where the word is explained as meaning that there is only one substance.
Qui, verbi gratia, sestertium, et imperialem manu tenet, de numero binario non cogitabit, nisi hunc sestertium, et imperialem uno, eodemque, nempe nummorum, vel monetarum, nomine vocare queat: nam tunc, se duos nummos, vel monetas habere, potest affirmare; quoniam non modo sestertium; sed etiam imperialem nummi, vel monetae nomine insignit.
Whoever, for example, holds a sesterce and an imperial
2 in his hand will not think of the number two unless he can call this sesterce and this imperial by one and the same name, namely that of coins or pieces of money: for then he can affirm that he has two coins or two pieces of money, since he designates not only the sesterce but also the imperial by the name of coin or piece of money.
- 2 Roman names for the Dutch coins of the original: ‘een stuiver en een rijksdaalder’, a stiver and a rix-dollar (G IV 239; VVL³ III 173).
Hinc ergo clare patet, nullam rem unam, aut unicam nominari, nisi postquam alia res concepta fuit, quae (ut dictum est) cum ea convenit.
From this, then, it is clear that no thing is called one or unique until another thing has been conceived which (as has been said) agrees with it.
Quoniam vero Dei existentia ipsius sit essentia, deque eius essentia universalem non possimus formare ideam, certum est, eum, qui Deum unum, vel unicum nuncupat, nullam de Deo veram habere ideam, vel improprie de eo loqui.
But since God’s existence is his essence itself,
3 and we cannot form a universal idea of his essence, it is certain that whoever calls God one or unique has no true idea of God, or speaks improperly of him.
[G IV 240] Quantum ad hoc, quod figura negatio, non vero aliquid positivum est; manifestum est, integram materiam, indefinite consideratam, nullam posse habere figuram; figuramque in finitis, ac determinatis corporibus locum tantum obtinere. Qui enim se figuram percipere ait, nil aliud eo indicat, quam se rem determinatam, et quo pacto ea sit determinata, concipere.
As to this, that figure is a negation and not something positive: it is evident that matter as a whole, considered indefinitely, can have no figure, and that figure has a place only in finite and determinate bodies. For whoever says that he perceives a figure indicates by this nothing other than that he conceives a determinate thing, and in what way it is determined.
Haec ergo determinatio ad rem iuxta suum esse non pertinet: sed econtra est eius non esse. Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, et determinatio negatio est; non poterit, ut dictum, aliud quid, quam negatio, esse.
This determination, therefore, does not pertain to the thing according to its being, but on the contrary is its non-being. Since, then, figure is nothing other than determination, and determination is negation,
1 it cannot, as has been said, be anything other than negation.
- 1 Compare Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 1: ‘to be finite is in truth in part a negation, and to be infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature’.
Librum, quem Ultraiectinus professor in meum scripsit, quique post obitum eius luci expositus est, e fenestra Bibliopolae pendentem vidi: et ex paucis, quae tum temporis in eo legeram, eum lectu, multo minus responsione indignum iudicabam. Relinquebam ergo librum, eiusque authorem.
The book which the Utrecht professor wrote against mine,
2 and which was published after his death, I saw hanging in a bookseller’s window; and from the little I read in it at that time I judged it unworthy of being read, much less of being answered. So I left the book, and its author.
- 2 Regnier van Mansvelt (1639–1671), professor of philosophy at Utrecht and a Cartesian: Adversus anonymum theologico-politicum liber singularis (Amsterdam, 1674), against the Theological-Political Treatise (VVL³ III 173; Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s, 1899, p. 279; Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 342).
Mente, subridens volvebam ignarissimos quosque passim audacissimos, et ad scribendum paratissimos esse. Mihi **** merces suas eodem modo, ac propolae, venum exponere videntur, qui semper, quod vilius est, primo loco ostendunt: Ajunt, Diabolum esse vaferrimum; mihi vero, eorum genius longe hunc vafritie superare videtur. Vale.
Smiling, I turned it over in my mind that the most ignorant are everywhere the boldest and the readiest to write. The ****
3 seem to me to set out their wares for sale in the same way as hucksters, who always show what is cheapest first: they say the Devil is most cunning; but to me their genius seems far to surpass him in cunning. Farewell.
- 3 The word is suppressed in the Latin and the Dutch alike (OP p. 558; G IV 241).
[G IV 241] Hagae Comitis 2. Iunii 1674.
The Hague, 2 June 1674.
Epistola LVII
Letter 57
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza
Praestantissimo, Acutissimoque philosopho,
To the most excellent and most acute philosopher
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Praestantissime vir,
Most excellent Sir,
[G IV 262] Miror saltem,
a quod eo ipso, quo demonstrent philosophi, aliquid falsum esse, eadem ratione ostendant eius veritatem: certitudinem enim intellectus in suae methodi initio Cartesius omnibus aequalem esse putat; in meditationibus autem demonstrat. Idem illi probant, qui putant se aliquid certi demonstrare posse hac ratione, ut pro indubitato a singulis hominibus accipiatur.
I am surprised, at least,
1 that philosophers show the truth of something by the very same reasoning by which they demonstrate that it is false. For Descartes, at the beginning of his
Method, holds that the certainty of the intellect is equal in all; in the
Meditations, however, he demonstrates it. Those prove the same who think they can demonstrate something certain in such a way that it is accepted by every single man as beyond doubt.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 580–582, Letter 61), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 262–264).
- 1 The letter answers a letter of Spinoza’s on free will that has not survived, and was sent through G. H. Schuller, to whom Spinoza replied (Letter 58). The 1677 edition prints it without the writer’s name, which Gebhardt supplies; the Dutch version signs it ‘N.N.’.
Sed his missis, experientiam provoco, et, ut ad haec accurate attendas, submisse rogo, sic enim deprehendetur, si ex duobus unus aliquid affirmet, alter vero neget, et ita, ut sibi eius sint conscii, loquantur, quod licet verbis contrarii videantur; attamen perpensis eorum conceptibus, ambo (unusquisque pro suo conceptu) vera dicant.
But leaving these things aside, I appeal to experience, and humbly ask you to attend to this carefully. For so it will be found that if, of two people, one affirms something and the other denies it, and they speak in such a way that they are conscious of what they say, then although they seem to contradict each other in words, yet when their concepts are weighed, both speak the truth (each according to his own concept).
Quod quidem refero, cum immensae sit in vita communi utilitatis, et possent hoc unico observato innumerae controversiae, et inde sequentes contentiones praecaveri; quamvis veritas haec in conceptu non semper absolute vera sit, sed positis tantum iis, quae in intellectu supponuntur, ut vera. Quae regula etiam adeo est universalis, ut apud omnes homines, ne dementibus quidem, ac dormientibus exceptis, reperiatur: quicquid enim hi dicunt, se videre (licet nobis non ita appareat) aut vidisse, certissimum est, haec revera ita se habere.
I mention this because it is of immense use in common life, and by observing this one thing countless controversies, and the quarrels that follow from them, could be prevented; although this truth in the concept is not always absolutely true, but true only given what is supposed in the intellect as true. This rule is also so universal that it is found among all men, not even the mad and the sleeping excepted; for whatever they say they see (though it does not appear so to us), or have seen, it is most certain that these things really are so.
Quod etiam in casu proposito, de libero nempe arbitrio, clarissime conspicitur. Uterque enim tam qui pro, quam qui contra disputat, verum mihi dicere videtur, prout nimirum quilibet libertatem concipit; liberum enim dicit Cartesius, quod a nulla causa cogitur. Et tu econtra, quod a nulla causa determinatur ad aliquid.
This is also seen most clearly in the case proposed, namely that of free will. For both he who argues for it and he who argues against it seem to me to speak the truth, according, namely, to how each conceives freedom. For Descartes calls free that which is compelled by no cause; and you, on the contrary, that which is determined to something by no cause.
1
Fateor itaque tecum, nos in omnibus rebus a certa causa ad aliquid determinari, et sic nullum nos habere liberum arbitrium: sed contra quoque puto cum Cartesio in certis rebus (quod statim aperiam) nos nullatenus cogi, atque ita habere liberum arbitrium. Exemplum formabo a praesenti.
I agree with you, therefore, that in all things we are determined to something by a certain cause, and so have no free will; but on the other hand I also think, with Descartes, that in certain things (as I shall show at once) we are in no way compelled, and so have free will. I shall take an example from the present case.
[G IV 263] Triplex autem est status quaestionis: primo, an in res, quae extra nos sunt, absolute aliquam habeamus potestatem? Quod negatur. Exempli gratia, quod hanc nunc exaro epistolam non est absolute in mea potestate, quandoquidem certe prius scripsissem, ni vel absentia, vel amicorum praesentia impeditus fuissem.
The question, then, has three parts. First, whether we have any absolute power over the things which are outside us? This is denied. For example, that I am now writing this letter is not absolutely in my power, since I would certainly have written earlier if I had not been prevented either by absence or by the presence of friends.
Secundo, an nos in motus corporis nostri, qui sequuntur, voluntate eos ad id determinante, absolute habeamus potestatem? Respondeo limitando, si nimirum sano corpore vivamus. Si enim valeo, semper me ad scribendum applicare, vel non applicare possum.
Second, whether we have absolute power over the motions of our body which follow when the will determines them to it? I answer with a limitation: namely, if we live with a healthy body. For if I am well, I can always apply myself to writing or not apply myself.
Tertio, an, quando mihi meum rationis exercitium usurpare licet, eo liberrime, hoc est, absolute uti possim? Ad quod respondeo affirmative. Quis enim mihi negaret, nisi contradicendo propriae conscientiae, quod non possum in meis cogitationibus cogitare, me velle scribere, aut non scribere.
Third, whether, when I am permitted the use of my reason, I can use it most freely, that is, absolutely? To this I answer affirmatively. For who would deny me, unless by contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think in my thoughts that I want to write, or not to write?
Et quoad operationem quoque, quia hoc externae causae permittunt, (quod secundum concernit casum) quod equidem tam scribendi, quam non scribendi facultatem habeam: fateor quidem tecum, dari causas, quae me ad id determinant, quod iam scribo, quia scilicet primo mihi scripsisti, eademque opera postulavisti, ut prima occasione rescriberem, et, quia impraesentiarum datur occasio, eam non libenter amitterem. Pro certo etiam affirmo, teste conscientia, cum Cartesio, istiusmodi res me propterea non cogere, meque revera (quod negatu videtur impossibile) id nihilominus omittere posse, non obstantibus his rationibus.
And as regards the act too, since external causes permit this (which concerns the second case), namely that I do indeed have the faculty both of writing and of not writing: I admit indeed with you that there are causes which determine me to this, that I am now writing, namely that you wrote to me first, and at the same time asked me to reply at the first opportunity, and since the opportunity now offers, I would not willingly lose it. I also affirm for certain, with Descartes, on the testimony of consciousness, that things of this kind do not on that account compel me, and that I really could (which seems impossible to deny) nevertheless refrain from writing, notwithstanding these reasons.
Si quoque cogeremur a rebus externis, cui possibile est habitum virtutis acquirere? imo hoc posito omnis malitia excusabilis esset. Sed quot modis non fit, ut, si a rebus externis ad aliquid determinemur, obfirmato tamen, ac constanti ei resistamus animo?
Again, if we were compelled by external things, who could acquire the habit of virtue? Indeed, on this supposition all wickedness would be excusable. But in how many ways does it not happen that, when we are determined to something by external things, we nevertheless resist it with a firm and constant mind?
[G IV 264] Ut itaque superioris regulae clariorem dem explicationem. Ambo equidem verum dicitis proprium iuxta conceptum: si autem absolutam veritatem spectemus, haec tantum competit sententiae Cartesii.
So, to give a clearer explanation of the rule stated above. You both speak the truth according to your own concepts; but if we look to absolute truth, it belongs only to Descartes’s opinion.
Supponis enim in conceptu, ut certum, libertatis essentiam in eo consistere, quod a nulla re determinamur. Hoc sic posito, utrumque verum erit; veruntamen cum essentia cuiuslibet rei in eo consistat, sine quo ne quidem concipi possit, et clare sane concipiatur libertas, licet ab externis causis in nostris actionibus ad aliquid determinemur; sive licet semper causae sint, quae incitamento nobis sunt, ut actiones nostras tali modo dirigamus, cum tamen id plane non efficiant; verum nullatenus, posito quod cogamur.
aFor you suppose in your concept, as certain, that the essence of freedom consists in our being determined by nothing. On this supposition both will be true; but since the essence of any thing consists in that without which it cannot even be conceived, and freedom is certainly conceived clearly even though in our actions we are determined to something by external causes, or even though there are always causes which serve as incitements to us to direct our actions in such a way, without, however, bringing this about at all; but by no means, on the supposition that we are compelled.
- a The sentence lacks the main clause that should answer cum essentia … consistat, as Van Vloten and Land observe (VVL³ III 194).
Vide praeterea Cartesii I. Tom. Epist. 8. et 9. item II. Tom. pag. 4. Sed haec sufficiant. Rogo, ut ad has difficultates respondeas,
bSee also Descartes, vol. I, Letters 8 and 9, and vol. II, p. 4. But let this suffice. I ask you to reply to these difficulties,
- b The Latin breaks off here; the Dutch version ends the sentence with a promise of gratitude and the signature ‘N.N.’ (G IV 264).
8. Octob. 1674.
8 October 1674.
Epistola LVIII
Letter 58
Spinoza to Georg Hermann Schuller
Viro Doctissimo, atque Expertissimo
To the most learned and expert man
G. H. Schuller
G. H. Schuller
Expertissime Domine,
Most expert Sir,
[G IV 265] Misit mihi amicus noster I. R.
a literas, quas ad me dignatus es scribere, una cum iudicio tui amici de mea, et Cartesii de libero arbitrio sententia, quae mihi gratissima fuerunt. Et, quamvis in praesentia, praeterquam quod valetudinem non satis firmam habeam, aliis rebus admodum distrahar, tamen vel singularis tua humanitas, vel quod ego praecipuum puto, veritatis studium, quo teneris, me cogit, ut tuo desiderio pro mei ingenii tenuitate, satisfaciam.
Our friend J. R.
1 has sent me the letter which you were good enough to write to me, together with your friend’s judgment
2 of my opinion and of Descartes’s on free will, which were most welcome to me. And although at present, besides not having very firm health, I am much distracted by other matters, yet either your singular kindness or, what I consider the chief thing, the zeal for truth by which you are possessed, compels me to satisfy your wish, as far as my slender talents allow.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP, Letter 62), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 265–268). It bears no date; it answers Letter 57, of 8 October 1674.
- 1 The Amsterdam bookseller Jan Rieuwertsz (VVL³ III 195), who published Spinoza’s Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy and the Theological-Political Treatise (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 124).
- 2 Tschirnhaus’s letter (Letter 57), which Schuller had forwarded.
Etenim quid tuus amicus velit, antequam experientiam provocat, et accuratam attentionem petit, nescio. Quod deinde addit, si quando inter duos alter de re quapiam quid affirmat, alter autem neget etc. Verum est, si intelligit illos duos, quamvis iisdem utantur vocabulis, de rebus tamen diversis cogitare, cuius rei exempla aliquot amico I. R. olim misi, cui iam scribo, ut tibi eadem communicet.
For what your friend means before he appeals to experience and asks for careful attention, I do not know. As for what he adds next, if ever, between two people, one affirms something about some matter and the other denies it, etc.: it is true if he means that the two, although they use the same words, are nevertheless thinking of different things; of which I once sent some examples to our friend J. R., to whom I am now writing that he should communicate them to you.
Transeo igitur ad illam libertatis definitionem, quam meam esse ait; sed nescio, unde illam sumpserit. Ego eam rem liberam esse dico, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et agit; coactam autem, quae ab alio determinatur, ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione.
I pass, therefore, to that definition of freedom which he says is mine; but I do not know where he took it from. I say that that thing is free which exists and acts from the necessity of its nature alone; and compelled, that which is determined by another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.
3- 3 Part I, Def. 7, nearly word for word: ‘That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But that thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.’
Ex. gr. Deus, tametsi necessario, libere tamen existit, quia ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit. Sic etiam Deus se, et absolute omnia libere intelligit, quia ex sola ipsius naturae necessitate sequitur, ut omnia intelligat. Vides igitur me libertatem non in libero decreto; sed in libera necessitate ponere.
For example, God, though necessarily, nevertheless exists freely, because he exists from the necessity of his nature alone. So too God understands himself and absolutely all things freely, because it follows from the necessity of his nature alone that he understands all things. You see, therefore, that I place freedom not in a free decree, but in a free necessity.
4
Sed ad res creatas descendamus, quae omnes a causis externis determinantur ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione. Quod ut clare intelligatur, rem simplicissimam concipiamus. Ex. gr. Lapis a causa externa, ipsum impellente, certam motus quantitatem accipit, qua postea, cessante causae externae impulsu, moveri necessario perget. Haec igitur lapidis in motu permanentia coacta est, non quia necessaria; sed quia impulsu causae externae definiri debet; et quod hic de lapide, id de quacunque re singulari, quantumvis illa composita, et ad plurima apta esse concipiatur, intelligendum est, quod scilicet unaquaeque res necessario a causa externa aliqua determinatur ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione.
But let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.
6 To understand this clearly, let us conceive a very simple thing. For example, a stone receives from an external cause which impels it a certain quantity of motion, by which it will afterwards necessarily continue to move when the impulse of the external cause has ceased.
5 This continuance of the stone in motion is therefore compelled, not because it is necessary, but because it must be defined by the impulse of the external cause; and what is to be understood here of the stone must be understood of any singular thing, however composite and capable of many things it is conceived to be: namely, that each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.
[G IV 266] Porro, concipe iam, si placet, lapidem, dum moveri pergit, cogitare, et scire, se, quantum potest, conari, ut moveri pergat. Hic sane lapis, quandoquidem sui tantummodo conatus est conscius, et minime indifferens, se liberrimum esse, et nulla alia de causa in motu perseverare credet, quam quia vult. Atque haec humana illa libertas est, quam omnes habere iactant, et quae in hoc solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitus sint conscii, et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari.
Now conceive, if you please, that the stone, while it continues to move, thinks, and knows that it is striving, as far as it can, to continue to move. This stone, surely, since it is conscious only of its striving, and is by no means indifferent, will believe that it is most free and that it perseveres in motion for no other cause than because it wills to. And this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists only in this, that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.
1
Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit; puer autem iratus vindictam velle, et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui, quae postea sobrius tacuisse vellet. Sic delirans, garrulus, et huius farinae plurimi se ex libero mentis decreto agere, non autem impetu ferri credunt.
So the infant believes that it freely wants milk; the angry boy that he wants vengeance, and the timid one flight. The drunk, again, believes that he says from a free decree of the mind what afterwards, when sober, he would wish he had kept silent about. So the delirious man, the chatterer, and very many of this stamp believe that they act from a free decree of the mind, and are not carried away by impulse.
2
Et quia hoc praeiudicium omnibus hominibus innatum est, non ita facile eodem liberantur. Nam quamvis experientia satis superque doceat, homines nihil minus posse, quam appetitus moderari suos, et quod saepe, dum contrariis affectibus conflictantur, meliora videant, et deteriora sequantur, se tamen liberos esse credunt, idque propterea, quod res quasdam leviter appetant, et quarum appetitus facile potest contrahi memoria alterius rei, cuius frequenter recordamur.
And since this prejudice is innate in all men, they are not so easily freed from it. For although experience teaches more than enough that men can do nothing less than moderate their appetites, and that often, when they are torn by contrary affects, they see the better and follow the worse, they nevertheless believe themselves free; and that because they want some things lightly, and their appetite for these can easily be reduced by the memory of another thing which we frequently recollect.
His, quaenam mea de libera, et coacta necessitate, deque ficta humana libertate sit sententia, satis, ni fallor, explicui; ex quibus facile ad tui amici obiectiones respondetur. Nam, quod cum Cartesio ait, illum liberum esse, qui a nulla causa externa cogitur, si per hominem coactum intelligit eum, qui invitus agit, concedo nos quibusdam in rebus nullatenus cogi, hocque respectu habere liberum arbitrium; sed si per coactum intelligit, qui quamvis non invitus, necessario tamen agit, (ut supra explicui) nego nos aliqua in re liberos esse.
With these things I have, unless I am mistaken, explained sufficiently what my opinion is of free and compelled necessity, and of feigned human freedom; from which your friend’s objections are easily answered. For when he says, with Descartes, that he is free who is compelled by no external cause: if by a man compelled he understands one who acts against his will, I grant that in certain things we are in no way compelled, and in this respect have free will; but if by compelled he understands one who, though not against his will, nevertheless acts necessarily (as I explained above), I deny that we are free in anything.
[G IV 267] At amicus tuus contra affirmat; nos rationis exercitio liberrime, hoc est, absolute uti posse, qua in re satis, ne dicam nimis confidenter perstat. Quis enim, ait, nisi propriae contradicendo conscientiae, negaret, me cogitationibus meis cogitare posse, quod vellem, et quod non vellem scribere.
But your friend, on the contrary, affirms that we can use the exercise of reason most freely, that is, absolutely; in which he persists confidently enough, not to say too confidently. For who, he says, would deny, unless by contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think in my thoughts that I want to write, and that I do not want to write?
Pervelim scire, quam ille conscientiam, praeter illam, quam supra exemplo lapidis explicui, narrat: Ego sane, ne meae conscientiae, hoc est, ne rationi, et experientiae contradicam, et ne praeiudicia, et ignorantiam foveam, nego, me ulla absoluta cogitandi potentia cogitare posse, quod vellem, et quod non vellem scribere.
I should very much like to know what consciousness he speaks of, other than the one I explained above with the example of the stone. For my part, so as not to contradict my consciousness, that is, reason and experience, and so as not to foster prejudices and ignorance, I deny that I can, by any absolute power of thinking, think that I want to write and that I do not want to write.
Sed ipsius conscientiam appello, qui sine dubio expertus est, se in somnis non habere potestatem cogitandi, quod vellet et quod non vellet scribere; nec cum somniat se velle scribere, potestatem habet, non somniandi se velle scribere; nec minus expertum illum esse credo, quod mens non semper aeque apta sit ad cogitandum de eodem obiecto; sed prout corpus aptius est, ut in eo huius, vel illius obiecti imago excitetur, ita mens aptior est ad hoc, vel illud obiectum contemplandum.
But I appeal to his own consciousness. He has no doubt experienced that in sleep he does not have the power of thinking that he wants to write and that he does not want to; nor, when he dreams that he wants to write, does he have the power not to dream that he wants to write. Nor do I believe that he has any less experienced that the mind is not always equally capable of thinking of the same object, but that, as the body is more capable of having the image of this or that object aroused in it, so the mind is more capable of contemplating this or that object.
1
Cum praeterea addit, quod causae, cur animum ad scribendum applicuerit, ipsum quidem ad scribendum impulerint; sed non coegerint, nihil aliud significat, (si rem aequo pondere examinare velis) quam quod ipsius animus ita tum erat constitutus, ut causae, quae ipsum alias, cum scilicet magno aliquo affectu conflictatur, non potuissent, nunc facile potuerunt flectere, hoc est, causae, quae ipsum alias non potuissent cogere, coegerunt iam, non ut invitus scriberet; sed ut necessario scribendi esset cupidus.
When he adds, further, that the causes for which he applied his mind to writing impelled him to write but did not compel him, he means nothing else (if you are willing to weigh the matter fairly) than that his mind was then so constituted that causes which at other times, namely when he was torn by some great affect, could not have bent him, now could easily do so; that is, causes which at other times could not have compelled him have now compelled him, not to write against his will, but to be necessarily desirous of writing.
Quod porro statuit: quod si a causis externis cogeremur, virtutis habitum acquirere possit nemo; nescio, quis ipsi dixerit, non posse ex fatali necessitate; sed tantummodo ex libero mentis decreto, fieri, ut firmato, et constanti simus animo.
As for his further statement that if we were compelled by external causes, no one could acquire the habit of virtue: I do not know who told him that it cannot happen from fatal necessity, but only from a free decree of the mind, that we are of a firm and constant mind.
Et quod denique addit: quod hoc posito omnis malitia excusabilis esset. Quid inde? Nam homines mali non minus timendi sunt, nec minus perniciosi, quando necessario mali sunt.
And what he finally adds: that on this supposition all wickedness would be excusable. What then? For wicked men are no less to be feared, and no less pernicious, when they are necessarily wicked.
Sed de his si placet, vide meae appendicis ad Cartesii principiorum lib. I. et II. ordine geometrico demonstrator. Partis II. Caput VIII.
But on these matters see, if you please, Part II, Chapter 8, of my Appendix
1 to the first and second books of Descartes’s
Principles demonstrated in geometrical order.
- 1 The Metaphysical Thoughts (Cogitata Metaphysica) appended to Spinoza’s Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy (1663); Part II, chapter 8, is ‘On the will of God’ (G I 264).
[G IV 268] Denique tuus amicus, qui haec mihi obiicit, vellem, ut mihi responderet, qua ratione ille humanam virtutem, quae ex libero mentis decreto oritur, simul concipiat cum Dei praeordinatione. Quod si cum Cartesio fatetur, se haec nescire conciliare, ergo telum, quo ipse transfixus iam est, in me vibrare conatur. Sed frustra. Nam si meam sententiam attento animo examinare velis, omnia congruere videbis, etc.
Finally, I should like your friend, who makes these objections to me, to answer me how he conceives human virtue, which arises from a free decree of the mind, together with God’s preordination. If he admits, with Descartes, that he does not know how to reconcile these,
1 then he is trying to hurl at me the weapon by which he himself has already been pierced. But in vain. For if you are willing to examine my opinion attentively, you will see that everything agrees, etc.
- 1 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy I.41: the freedom of our will and God’s preordination are both certain, though we cannot comprehend how they agree (AT VIII-1 20).
Epistola LXIII
Letter 63
Georg Hermann Schuller to Spinoza
Praestantissimo, acutissimoque philosopho,
To the most excellent and most acute philosopher
G. H. Schuller.
from G. H. Schuller
Praestantissime vir,
Most excellent Sir,
[G IV 274] Serio abs te peto,
a ut dubitationes hic motas solvere, tuamque ad eas responsionem mittere placeat. Sit, rogo, demonstratio ea ostensiva; non vero ad impossibile deducens, num scilicet primo nos plura de Deo attributa, quam cogitationem, extensionemque possimus cognoscere? Porro num inde sequatur creaturas, aliis constantes attributis, nullam posse concipere extensionem? Unde sequeretur tot constituendos esse mundos, quot dantur Dei attributa.
I earnestly ask you
1 to be good enough to resolve the doubts raised here, and to send me your reply to them. Let the demonstration, I ask, be ostensive, not one leading to the impossible:
2 namely, first, whether we can know more attributes of God than thought and extension? Further, whether it follows from this that creatures consisting of other attributes can conceive no extension? From which it would follow that as many worlds must be constituted as there are attributes of God.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 590–591, Letter 65), which prints the letter without the writer’s name. Gebhardt prints first the original, which survives (G IV 274–276), and then this text. In the original Schuller apologizes for his long silence; writes that their friend Tschirnhaus, still in England, sends his respects and has asked him to put these questions; and adds that Tschirnhaus has removed the strange opinion of Spinoza that Boyle and Oldenburg had formed, so that they now think most highly of him and greatly esteem the Theological-Political Treatise. It closes with greetings from ‘D. a. Gent’ and Jan Rieuwertsz.
- 1 Georg Hermann Schuller, an Amsterdam physician (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., p. 260), writes on behalf of their friend Tschirnhaus, then in England; Spinoza’s answer is Letter 64.
- 2 A direct proof, not a reductio ad absurdum; Spinoza remarks in his reply that he prefers the latter for negative propositions (Letter 64).
Quantae ex. gr. extensionis noster existeret mundus, tantae quoque extensionis mundi, aliis affecti attributis, essent: quemadmodum vero, praeter cogitationem, non nisi extensionem percipimus, ita etiam istius mundi creaturae, non nisi sui mundi attributa, atque cogitationem perciperent.
For example, of however great an extension our world exists, of so great an extension also would the worlds be that are affected with other attributes; and just as we perceive, besides thought, nothing but extension, so too the creatures of such a world would perceive nothing but the attributes of their world, and thought.
[G IV 275] Secundo, quoniam Dei intellectus tam essentia, quam existentia a nostro differt intellectu; nihil ergo cum nostro commune habebit; ac proinde (per 3 Ethic. Prop. part. 1.) Dei intellectus nostri causa esse nequit.
Second, since God’s intellect differs from our intellect both in essence and in existence,
1 it will therefore have nothing in common with ours; and so (by
Prop. 3 of Part I of the Ethics) God’s intellect cannot be the cause of ours.
- 1 As argued in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 17: God’s intellect is the cause of our intellect both as to essence and as to existence, and therefore differs from it in both, as the Dog, the heavenly constellation, differs from the dog that barks.
Tertio, in schol. 10. Prop. part. 1. Ethic. ais nihil in natura clarius esse, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi; (quod optime capio) et quo plus realitatis, aut esse habeat, eo plura ei competant attributa. Hinc sequi videtur, dari entia, quae tria, quatuor, aliaque plura habent attributa, licet ex demonstratis colligere licuerit, unumquodque ens duobus tantum constare attributis, nimirum certo quodam Dei attributo, eiusdemque attributi idea.
Third, in the
scholium to Prop. 10 of Part I of the Ethics you say that nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute (which I understand very well), and that the more reality, or being, it has, the more attributes belong to it. From this it seems to follow that there are beings which have three, four, or still more attributes, although from what has been demonstrated it could be gathered that each being consists of only two attributes, namely a certain attribute of God and the idea of that attribute.
Quarto, eorum, quae a Deo immediate producta sunt, quaeque mediante infinita quadam modificatione producuntur, exempla desiderarem. Prioris generis cogitatio, ac extensio; posterioris vero intellectus in cogitatione, motus in extensione esse videntur.
Fourth, I should like examples of those things which are produced immediately by God, and of those which are produced by the mediation of some infinite modification.
1 Of the first kind seem to be thought and extension; of the second, intellect in thought, motion in extension.
Haec sunt, quae abs te, siquidem tempus aliquod tibi sit reliquum, peto. Vale etc.
These are the things I ask of you, if you have any time left over. Farewell, etc.
25 Iulii 1675.
25 July 1675.
Epistola LXIV
Letter 64
Spinoza to Georg Hermann Schuller
Doctissimo, Expertissimoque viro.
To the most learned and expert man
G. H. Schuller
G. H. Schuller
Expertissime vir,
Most expert Sir,
[G IV 277] Gaudeo, quod tandem occasio
a tibi oblata fuerit, ut me tuis literis, mihi semper gratissimis, recreares, quod ut frequenter facias, enixe rogo, etc.
I am glad that an opportunity has at last been offered you to refresh me with a letter of yours, always most welcome to me; and I earnestly ask you to do so often, etc.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 591–593, Letter 66), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 277–278).
Ad dubia pergo, et quidem ad primum dico, mentem humanam illa tantummodo posse cognitione assequi, quae idea corporis actu existentis involvit, vel quod ex hac ipsa idea potest concludi. Nam cuiuscunque rei potentia sola eius essentia definitur, (per prop. 7. p. 3. Ethices) mentis autem essentia (per prop. 13. p. 2.) in hoc solo consistit, quod sit idea corporis actu existentis, ac proinde mentis intelligendi potentia ad ea tantum se extendit, quae haec idea corporis in se continet, vel quae ex eadem sequuntur.
I proceed to the doubts, and to the first I say that the human mind can attain to knowledge only of those things which the idea of a body actually existing involves, or which can be inferred from this idea itself. For the power of any thing is defined by its essence alone (by
Prop. 7, Part III of the Ethics), and the essence of the mind (by
Prop. 13, Part II) consists only in this, that it is the idea of a body actually existing; and so the mind’s power of understanding extends only to those things which this idea of the body contains in itself, or which follow from it.
At haec corporis idea nulla alia Dei attributa involvit, neque exprimit, quam extensionem, et cogitationem. Nam eius ideatum, nempe corpus (per prop. 6. p. 2.) Deum pro causa habet, quatenus sub attributo extensionis, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, atque adeo (per axiom. 6. p. 1.) haec corporis idea Dei cognitionem involvit, quatenus tantummodo sub extensionis attributo consideratur. Deinde haec idea, quatenus cogitandi modus est, Deum etiam (per eandem prop.) pro causa habet, quatenus res est cogitans, et non quatenus sub alio attributo consideratur; adeoque (per idem axiom.) huius ideae idea Dei cognitionem involvit, quatenus sub cogitationis, et non quatenus sub alio attributo consideratur.
But this idea of the body involves and expresses no attributes of God other than extension and thought. For its object, namely the body (by
Prop. 6, Part II), has God for its cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension, and not insofar as he is considered under any other; and so (by
Ax. 6, Part I)
1 this idea of the body involves the knowledge of God only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension. Next, this idea, insofar as it is a mode of thinking, also has God for its cause (by the same Prop.) insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is considered under another attribute; and so (by the same axiom) the idea of this idea involves the knowledge of God insofar as he is considered under the attribute of thought, and not insofar as he is considered under another attribute.
- 1 So the Latin. Axiom 6 says that a true idea must agree with its object; the step seems rather to rest on Axiom 4, that the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.
Apparet itaque mentem humanam, sive corporis humani ideam praeter haec duo nulla alia Dei attributa involvere, neque exprimere. Caeterum ex his duobus attributis, vel eorundem affectionibus nullum aliud Dei attributum (per prop. 10. p. 1.) concludi, neque concipi potest. Atque adeo concludo mentem humanam nullum Dei attributum praeter haec posse cognitione assequi, ut fuit propositum.
It is apparent, therefore, that the human mind, or the idea of the human body, involves and expresses no attributes of God besides these two. Moreover, from these two attributes, or from their affections, no other attribute of God can be inferred or conceived (by
Prop. 10, Part I). And so I conclude that the human mind can attain to knowledge of no attribute of God besides these, as was proposed.
Quod autem addis, an ergo tot mundi constituendi sunt, quot dantur attributa? vide schol. Prop. 7. p. 2. Ethices. Posset praeterea haec propositio facilius demonstrari, deducendo rem ad absurdum; quod quidem demonstrandi genus, quando propositio negativa est, prae altero eligere soleo, quia cum natura similium magis convenit.
As for your further question, whether therefore as many worlds must be constituted as there are attributes, see the
scholium to Prop. 7, Part II of the Ethics.
2 This proposition could, moreover, be demonstrated more easily by reducing the matter to absurdity; which kind of demonstration, when the proposition is negative, I usually choose in preference to the other, because it agrees more with the nature of such things.
- 2 That a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways, and that whether nature is conceived under one attribute or another, one and the same order, or connection of causes, is found.
Sed quia positivum tantummodo petis, ad alterum transeo, quod est, an id possit ab alio produci, in quo tam essentia, quam existentia discrepat: nam quae ab invicem ita differunt nihil commune habere videntur. Sed cum omnia singularia, praeter illa, quae a suis similibus producuntur, differant a suis causis, tam essentia, quam existentia, nullam hic dubitandi rationem video.
But since you ask only for a positive one, I pass to the other question, which is whether a thing can be produced by another from which it differs both in essence and in existence: for things which differ from one another in this way seem to have nothing in common. But since all singular things, except those produced by their like, differ from their causes both in essence and in existence, I see no reason for doubt here.
[G IV 278] Quo autem ego sensu intelligam, quod Deus sit causa efficiens rerum, tam essentiae, quam existentiae, credo me satis explicuisse in schol. et coroll. Prop. 25. p. 1. Ethic.
Axioma scholii prop. 10. p. 1. ut in fine eiusd. Scholii innui, formamus ex idea, quam habemus entis absolute infiniti, et non ex eo, quod dentur, aut possint dari entia, quae tria, quatuor, etc. attributa habeant.
The axiom of the
scholium to Prop. 10, Part I we form, as I indicated at the end of that scholium, from the idea which we have of a being absolutely infinite, and not from there being, or being able to be, beings which have three, four, etc. attributes.
Denique exempla, quae petis, primi generis sunt in cogitatione, intellectus absolute infinitus; in extensione autem motus et quies; secundi autem, facies totius universi, quae quamvis infinitis modis variet, manet tamen semper eadem, de quo vide schol. 7. Lemmatis ante prop. 14. p. 2.
Finally, the examples you ask for: of the first kind are,
1 in thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in extension, motion and rest; of the second, the face of the whole universe, which, although it varies in infinite ways, nevertheless remains always the same;
2 on which see the
scholium to Lemma 7, before Prop. 14, Part II.
- 1 The Ethics describes the infinite modes of Part I, Props. 21–23 without naming any: those that follow from the absolute nature of an attribute (the first kind) and those that follow from an attribute modified by such a mode (the second). This letter supplies the examples.
- 2 Compare Part II, Lemma 7, Schol.: the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual.
His, vir praestantissime, ad tuas, nostrique amici obiectiones respondisse me credo, si tamen scrupulum adhuc remanere existimas, rogo, ut mihi significare non graveris, ut eum etiam, si possim, evellam. Vale, etc.
With these I think, most excellent Sir, I have answered the objections of yourself and our friend; if, however, you think some difficulty still remains, I beg you not to hesitate to tell me of it, so that I may remove it too, if I can. Farewell, etc.
Hagae Com. 29 Iulii, 1675.
The Hague, 29 July 1675.
Epistola LXV
Letter 65
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza
Acutissimo, ac Doctissimo philosopho,
To the most acute and most learned philosopher
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Vir clarissime,
Most distinguished Sir,
[G IV 279] Abs te peto demonstrationem
a eius, quod dicis; nempe quod anima non possit plura attributa Dei, quam extensionem, et cogitationem percipere. Quod quidem licet evidenter videam, contrarium tamen ex schol prop. 7. part. 2. Ethices posse deduci, mihi videtur, forte non aliam ob causam, quam quia sensum huius scholii non satis recte percipio. Constitui ergo, haec qua ratione deducam, exponere, te, vir Cl. obnixe rogans, ut mihi velis, ubicunque sensum tuum non recte assequor, solita tua humanitate sucurrere. Ea autem sic sese habent.
I ask you for a demonstration of what you say, namely that the soul cannot perceive more attributes of God than extension and thought. Although I see this evidently, it nevertheless seems to me that the contrary can be deduced from the
scholium to Prop. 7, Part II of the Ethics, perhaps for no other reason than that I do not grasp the sense of this scholium rightly enough. I have decided, therefore, to set out how I deduce it, earnestly asking you, distinguished Sir, to be good enough to help me with your usual kindness wherever I do not follow your meaning rightly. The matter stands as follows.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 593–594, Letter 67), which prints the letter without the writer’s name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 279).
Quod, licet inde colligam, mundum utique unicum esse, id tamen exinde non minus quoque clarum est, eum ipsum infinitis modis expressum; ac proinde unamquamque rem singularem infinitis modis expressam esse. Unde videtur sequi, quod modificatio illa, quae mentem meam constituit; ac modificatio illa, quae corpus meum exprimit, licet una, et eadem sit modificatio, ea tamen infinitis modis sit expressa, uno modo per cogitationem, altero per extensionem, tertio per attributum Dei mihi incognitum, atque sic porro in infinitum, quia infinita dantur attributa Dei, et ordo, et connexio modificationum videtur esse eadem in omnibus.
Although I gather from it that the world is certainly one, it is nevertheless no less clear from it that it is expressed in infinite ways, and so that each singular thing is expressed in infinite ways. From this it seems to follow that the modification which constitutes my mind and the modification which expresses my body, although it is one and the same modification, is nevertheless expressed in infinite ways: in one way through thought, in another through extension, in a third through an attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity, since there are infinite attributes of God, and the order and connection of the modifications seems to be the same in all.
Hinc iam quaestio oritur, quare mens, quae certam modificationem repraesentat, et quae eadem modificatio non solum extensione, sed infinitis aliis modis est expressa; quare, inquam, tantum modificationem illam per extensionem expressam, hoc est, corpus humanum, et nullam aliam expressionem per alia attributa percipiat. Sed tempus mihi non permittit, ut ea prolixius prosequar, forte haec dubia omnia crebrioribus meditationibus eximentur.
Hence the question now arises why the mind, which represents a certain modification, and which same modification is expressed not only in extension but in infinite other ways, why, I say, it perceives only that modification expressed through extension, that is, the human body, and no other expression through the other attributes.
1 But time does not allow me to pursue these things at greater length; perhaps all these doubts will be removed by more frequent meditation.
Londini, 12. August. 1675.
London, 12 August 1675.
Epistola LXVI
Letter 66
Spinoza to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo viro,
To the most noble and most learned man
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Nobilissime vir,
Most noble Sir,
[G IV 280] Caeterum, ad tuam obiectionem
a ut respondeam, dico, quod quamvis unaquaeque res infinitis modis expressa sit in infinito Dei intellectu, illae tamen infinitae ideae, quibus exprimitur, unam eandemque rei singularis mentem constituere nequeunt; sed infinitas: quandoquidem unaquaeque harum infinitarum idearum nullam connexionem cum invicem habent, ut in eodem scholio propositionis 7. Part. 2. Ethic. explicui, et ex prop. 10. Part. 1. patet. Ad haec si aliquantulum attendas, nihil difficultatis superesse videbis, etc.
But, to reply to your objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in infinite ways in the infinite intellect of God, those infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinite minds; since each of these infinite ideas has no connection with the others,
1 as I explained in the same
scholium to Prop. 7, Part II of the Ethics, and as is evident from
Prop. 10, Part I. If you attend to these things a little, you will see that no difficulty remains, etc.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 594, Letter 68), which prints the letter without the addressee’s name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 280). Its opening Caeterum (‘But’, ‘For the rest’) suggests that only the end of the letter was printed.
- 1 Each attribute must be conceived through itself (Part I, Prop. 10), and the modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes (Part II, Prop. 6); so the idea of a mode of one attribute can neither involve nor be connected with the idea of a mode of another.
Hagae 18 August. 1675.
The Hague, 18 August 1675.
Epistola LXXIII
Letter 73
Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg
Viro Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo,
To the most noble and most learned man
Henrico Oldenburgio
Henry Oldenburg
Nobilissime Domine,
Most noble Sir,
[G IV 306] Perbreves tuas literas,
a 15. Nov. ad me datas, die Saturni elapsa accepi: in iis ea tantummodo indicas, quae in tractatu theologico-Politico crucem lectoribus fixere. Cum tamen ex iis etiam cognoscere speraverim, quaenam eae opiniones essent, quae religiosae virtutis praxin labefactare viderentur, de quibus antea monueras.
Your very short letter, sent to me on 15 November,
1 I received last Saturday: in it you indicate only those things in the
Theological-Political Treatise which have been a torment to its readers. Though I had hoped also to learn from it what those opinions were which seemed to undermine the practice of religious virtue, of which you had warned me before.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 449–451, Letter 21), where the letter carries no date. Gebhardt prints after it a copy made for Leibniz (G IV 306–309), whose readings include materiam incorpoream for materiam corpoream, praecipue agnoscere for praecipuam agnoscere, and in mente Christi Jesu (‘in the mind of Christ Jesus’) for in Christo Iesu.
- 1 Letter 71 (G IV 304), not included here. Spinoza had asked in Letter 68 (G IV 299) which doctrines Oldenburg thought would undermine the practice of religious virtue, and which passages of the Treatise had troubled learned men, since he wished to explain the Treatise with notes; he had gone to Amsterdam to have a book printed and had put the printing off because of a rumour that in it he tried to show that there is no God. Oldenburg answered in a few lines that the troubling passages were those that seemed to treat God and nature ambiguously, so that many thought he confused the two; those that seemed to take away the authority of miracles, by which alone almost all Christians are persuaded that the certainty of revelation can be established; and his silence about Jesus Christ, his incarnation and his satisfaction. These are the ‘three heads’ answered here.
Sed, ut de tribus illis capitibus, quae notas, mentem meam tibi aperiam, dico, et quidem ad primum, me de Deo, et natura sententiam fovere longe diversam ab ea, quam Neoterici Christiani defendere solent. Deum enim rerum omnium causam immanentem, ut aiunt, non vero transeuntem statuo.
But to open my mind to you on those three heads which you note, I say, and indeed as to the first, that I hold an opinion of God and nature far different from the one which the modern Christians usually defend. For I hold that God is the immanent cause, as they say, of all things, and not the transitive cause.
2
Omnia, inquam, in Deo esse, et in Deo moveri cum Paulo affirmo, et forte etiam cum omnibus antiquis philosophis, licet alio modo; et auderem etiam dicere, cum antiquis omnibus Hebraeis, quantum ex quibusdam traditionibus, tametsi multis modis adulteratis, coniicere licet. Attamen quod quidam putant, tractatum theologico-Politicum eo niti, quod Deus, et natura (per quam massam quandam, sive materiam corpoream intelligunt) unum, et idem sint, tota errant via.
All things, I say, are in God and move in God: this I affirm with Paul,
3 and perhaps also with all the ancient philosophers, though in another way; and I would even dare to say, with all the ancient Hebrews, so far as may be conjectured from certain traditions, even though these have been corrupted in many ways. Yet those who think that the
Theological-Political Treatise rests on this, that God and nature (by which they understand a certain mass, or corporeal matter)
4 are one and the same, are entirely mistaken.
- 3 Paul at Athens, Acts 17:28: In ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus (‘For in him we live, and move, and are’). Compare Part I, Prop. 15: ‘Whatever is, is in God’.
- 4 In the Ethics extension is an attribute of God (Part II, Prop. 2), but corporeal substance ‘can be conceived only as infinite, only as unique and only as indivisible’ (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.), not as a mass made up of parts.
Ad miracula deinde quod attinet, mihi contra persuasum est, divinae revelationis certitudinem sola doctrinae sapientia, non autem miraculis, hoc est, ignorantia adstrui posse, quod satis prolixe cap. VI. de miraculis ostendi.
Next, as for miracles, I am on the contrary persuaded that the certainty of divine revelation can be built up only on the wisdom of its teaching, and not on miracles, that is, on ignorance; which I have shown at some length in chapter VI, on miracles.
5- 5 Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 6, ‘De Miraculis’ (G III 81 ff.).
Hoc tantum hic addo, me inter religionem, et superstitionem hanc praecipuam agnoscere differentiam, quod haec ignorantiam, illa autem sapientiam pro fundamento habeat, et hanc causam esse credo, cur Christiani non fide, neque charitate, neque reliquis spiritus Sancti fructibus; sed sola opinione inter reliquos dignoscuntur; nempe, quia, ut omnes, solis miraculis, hoc est ignorantia, quae omnis malitiae fons est, se defendunt; atque adeo fidem, licet veram, in superstitionem vertunt. Verum an huic malo remedium adhibere reges unquam concedent, valde dubito.
I add only this here, that I recognize this chief difference between religion and superstition: that the latter has ignorance for its foundation, the former wisdom; and I believe that this is the reason why Christians are distinguished from others not by faith, nor by charity, nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit,
6 but by opinion alone; namely, because, like everyone, they defend themselves by miracles alone, that is, by ignorance,
7 which is the source of all wickedness; and so they turn faith, though true, into superstition. But whether kings will ever allow a remedy to be applied to this evil, I very much doubt.
- 6 Galatians 5:22: Fructus autem Spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax … (‘But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace …’).
- 7 Compare the Appendix to Part I, on those who flee at last to the will of God, ‘that is, the asylum of ignorance’ (Part I, Appendix).
Denique, ut de tertio etiam capite mentem meam clarius aperiam, dico ad salutem non esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere; sed de aeterno illo filio Dei, hoc est, Dei aeterna sapientia, quae sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana, et omnium maxime in Christo Iesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum.
Finally, to open my mind more clearly on the third head too, I say that for salvation it is not altogether necessary to know Christ according to the flesh;
8 but of that eternal son of God, that is, the eternal wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things, and chiefly in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus,
9 one must think quite otherwise.
- 8 II Corinthians 5:16: Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum, sed nunc jam non novimus (‘And if we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer’).
- 9 Compare the Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 1 (G III 21): God revealed himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ, and ‘in this sense we can also say that the Wisdom of God, that is, a wisdom which is above the human, took on human nature in Christ’; and Part IV, Prop. 68, Schol.: ‘the spirit of Christ, that is, the idea of God’.
Nam nemo absque hac ad statum beatitudinis potest pervenire, utpote quae sola docet, quid verum et falsum, bonum et malum sit. Et quia, uti dixi, haec sapientia per Iesum Christum maxime manifestata fuit, ideo ipsius discipuli eandem, quatenus ab ipso ipsis fuit revelata, praedicaverunt, seseque spiritu illo Christi supra reliquos gloriari posse ostenderunt.
For no one can attain to the state of blessedness without this, since it alone teaches what is true and false, good and evil. And because, as I said, this wisdom was manifested most of all through Jesus Christ, his disciples preached it, insofar as it was revealed to them by him, and showed that they could glory in that spirit of Christ above others.
Caeterum quod quaedam Ecclesiae his addunt, quod Deus naturam humanam assumpserit, monui expresse, me, quid dicant, nescire; imo, ut verum fatear, non minus absurde mihi loqui videntur, quam si quis mihi diceret, quod circulus naturam quadrati induerit.
As for what certain Churches add to these things, that God took on human nature, I have expressly pointed out that I do not know what they say;
10 indeed, to confess the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than if someone were to tell me that a circle had put on the nature of a square.
11- 10 Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 1 (G III 21): ‘I must point out here that I am not speaking at all of the things which certain Churches maintain about Christ, nor denying them; for I gladly confess that I do not grasp them’.
- 11 The same image of an absurdity in Part I, Prop. 15, Schol.: ‘as if someone, from having feigned that a circle has the properties of a square, concluded that a circle does not have a centre’.
Atque haec sufficere arbitror ad explicandum, quid de tribus illis capitibus sentiam. An eadem Christianis, quos nosti, placitura sint, id tu melius scire poteris. Vale.
And this, I think, is enough to explain what I think about those three heads. Whether the same will please the Christians you know, you will be able to know better. Farewell.
Epistola LXXIV
Letter 74
Henry Oldenburg to Spinoza
Clarissimo, Doctissimoque viro,
To the most distinguished and most learned man
Henr. Oldenburgius
from Henry Oldenburg
[G IV 309] Quandoquidem accusare me videris
a nimiae brevitatis, culpam illam hac vice nimia prolixitate eluam. Exspectaveras, ut video, earum in scriptis tuis opinionum enarrationem, quae religiosae virtutis praxin convellere Lectoribus tuis videantur. Dicam quid sit rei, quod potissimum eos excruciet.
Since you seem to accuse me of excessive brevity, I shall wash that fault away this time with excessive prolixity. You had expected, as I see, an account of those opinions in your writings which seem to your readers to overturn the practice of religious virtue. I shall tell you what the matter is that chiefly torments them.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 451–452, Letter 22), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 309–311). The edition prints the two Greek words in Greek; the digital text of Gebhardt used here transliterates them, and they are restored from the 1677 page.
Fatalem videris rerum, et actionum omnium necessitatem adstruere: atqui illa concessa, assertaque, legum omnium, omnis virtutis, et religionis incidi nervos, omnesque remunerationes, et poenas inanes esse, autumant. Quicquid cogit, vel necessitatem infert, excusare iidem arbitrantur; proindeque neminem inexcusabilem in Dei conspectu fore censent. Si fatis agamur, duraque revoluta manu omnia certo, et inevitabili tramite vadunt, quis culpae, poenarumque sit locus, illi equidem non assequuntur.
You seem to establish a fatal necessity of all things and actions;
1 but if this is granted and asserted, they declare, the sinews of all laws, of all virtue and religion are cut, and all rewards and punishments are empty. Whatever compels, or brings necessity with it, they think excuses; and so they consider that no one will be inexcusable in the sight of God. If we are driven by the fates, and all things, unwound by a hard hand, go along a certain and inevitable path, they for their part cannot see what place there is for blame and punishment.
Quis huic nodo adhiberi possit cuneus, perquam ardua res dictu est. Tu quid opis hanc in rem suppeditare posses, scire et discere pervelim.
What wedge can be applied to this knot is a very hard thing to say. What help you could supply in this matter I should very much like to know and to learn.
[G IV 310] Ad sententiam illam tuam, quam de tribus capitibus, a me notatis, aperire mihi dignaris, haec inquirenda subeunt. Primo, quonam sensu miracula, et ignorantiam pro Synonymis, et aequipollentibus habeas, ut in Novissimis tuis sentire videris; cum Lazari a mortuis resuscitatio, et Iesu Christi a morte resurrectio omnem naturae creatae vim superare, et soli potentiae divinae competere videatur; neque id ignorantiam culpabilem arguat, quod intelligentiae finitae, certisque repagulis constrictae limites excedat necessum est.
On that opinion of yours which you deign to open to me on the three heads I noted, these questions occur to me. First, in what sense you hold miracles and ignorance to be synonyms and equivalents, as you seem to think in your last letter;
1 since the raising of Lazarus from the dead
2 and the resurrection of Jesus Christ from death seem to surpass all the power of created nature and to belong to the divine power alone; nor does that which must exceed the limits of a finite intelligence, confined within fixed bounds, argue a culpable ignorance.
An non convenire censes creatae menti et scientiae, increatae mentis, ac supremi Numinis talem scientiam, potentiamque agnoscere, quae penetrare, ac praestare ea possit, quorum ratio, ac modus a nobis homuncionibus reddi, et explicari nequeat? Homines sumus, humani nihil a nobis alienum ducendum videtur.
Do you not think it fitting for a created mind and knowledge to acknowledge in the uncreated mind and supreme Deity such knowledge and power as can penetrate and accomplish things whose reason and manner cannot be rendered and explained by us little men? We are men; nothing human, it seems, should be thought foreign to us.
3- 3 Terence, Heauton Timorumenos 77: Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto (‘I am a man; I count nothing human foreign to me’).
Deinde, cum capere te nequire fatearis, Deum revera naturam humanam assumpsisse, quaerere ex te fas sit, quomodo illa Euangelii nostri, et epistolae ad Hebraeos scriptae locos intelligas, quorum prior affirmat, verbum carnem factum esse; posterior, Filium Dei non Angelos, sed semen Abrahae assumpsisse.
Next, since you confess that you cannot grasp that God really took on human nature, may I ask you how you understand those passages of our Gospel and of the Epistle written to the Hebrews, of which the former affirms that the Word was made flesh,
4 the latter that the Son of God took on not angels but the seed of Abraham?
5- 4 John 1:14: Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (‘And the Word became flesh’); Vulgate Et Verbum caro factum est.
- 5 Hebrews 2:16: οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται, ἀλλὰ σπέρματος Ἀβραὰμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται (‘For surely he does not take hold of angels, but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham’); Vulgate Nusquam enim angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit.
Et totius Euangelii tenorem id inferre putem Filium Dei unigenitum λόγον, (qui et Deus, et apud Deum erat) in natura humana se ostendisse, et pro nobis peccatoribus ἀντίλυτρον, redemptionis precium, passione, et morte sua exsolvisse. Quid de his, et similibus dicendum, ut sua constet Euangelio, et Christianae religioni, cui te favere opinor, veritas, lubens edoceri vellem.
And I should think that the tenor of the whole Gospel implies that the only-begotten Son of God, the
λόγον (‘Word’), who was both God and with God,
6 showed himself in human nature, and by his passion and death paid for us sinners the
ἀντίλυτρον (‘ransom’),
7 the price of redemption. What should be said about these and similar things, so that the Gospel and the Christian religion, which I believe you favour, may keep their truth, I should gladly be taught.
- 6 John 1:1: καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος (‘and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’). Oldenburg writes λόγον in the accusative, as the grammar of his Latin sentence requires.
- 7 The word of I Timothy 2:6: ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων (‘who gave himself a ransom for all’); Vulgate qui dedit redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus.
Plura scribere statueram, sed interpellant amici invisentes, quibus negare humanitatis officia nefas duco. Sed et haec, quae congessi hac epistola, suffecerint, et fortasse taedium tibi philosophanti creaverint. Vale igitur, et me iugem Eruditionis et scientiae tuae cultorem crede.
I had decided to write more, but friends calling on me interrupt, to whom I hold it wrong to refuse the duties of courtesy. But these things too which I have gathered in this letter will suffice, and will perhaps have wearied you as you philosophize. Farewell, then, and believe me a constant admirer of your learning and knowledge.
[G IV 311] Dab. Londini die 16. Decemb. 1675.
Given at London, 16 December 1675.
Epistola LXXV
Letter 75
Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg
Viro Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo,
To the most noble and most learned man
Henr. Oldenburgio
Henry Oldenburg
Nobilissime Domine,
Most noble Sir,
[G IV 311] Video tandem,
a quid id fuerit, quod a me postulabas ne evulgarem; sed quia id ipsum praecipuum est fundamentum eorum omnium, quae in tractatu, quem edere destinaveram, habentur, volo hic paucis explicare, qua ratione ego fatalem omnium rerum, et actionum necessitatem statuam.
I see at last what it was that you asked me not to make public; but since this very thing is the chief foundation of everything in the treatise which I had intended to publish,
1 I wish to explain here briefly in what way I hold the fatal necessity of all things and actions.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 452–455, Letter 23), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 311–313); the letter carries no date.
- 1 The Ethics, whose printing Spinoza had put off in the summer of 1675 (Letter 68, G IV 299; see the note to Letter 73).
Nam Deum nullo modo fato subiicio, sed omnia inevitabili necessitate ex Dei natura sequi concipio eodem modo, ac omnes concipiunt, ex ipsius Dei natura sequi, ut Deus se ipsum intelligat; quod sane nemo negat ex divina natura necessario sequi, et tamen nemo concipit, Deum fato aliquo coactum, sed omnino libere, tametsi necessario se ipsum intelligere.
For I in no way subject God to fate, but I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God in the same way that everyone conceives that it follows from the very nature of God that God understands himself; which surely no one denies follows necessarily from the divine nature, and yet no one conceives that God understands himself compelled by some fate, but that he understands himself altogether freely, although necessarily.
2
[G IV 312] Deinde haec inevitabilis rerum necessitas nec iura divina, nec humana tollit. Nam ipsa moralia documenta, sive formam legis, seu iuris ab ipso Deo accipiant, sive non, divina tamen sunt, et salutaria, et si bonum, quod ex virtute, et amore divino sequitur, a Deo tanquam Iudice accipiamus, vel ex necessitate divinae naturae emanet, non erit propterea magis, aut minus optabile, ut nec contra mala, quae ex pravis actionibus, et affectibus sequuntur, ideo, quia necessario ex iisdem sequuntur, minus timenda sunt, et denique sive ea, quae agimus, necessario, vel contingenter agamus, spe tamen, et metu ducimur.
Next, this inevitable necessity of things takes away neither divine nor human laws. For the moral teachings themselves, whether or not they receive the form of law or right from God himself, are nevertheless divine and salutary; and whether we receive the good which follows from virtue and the divine love from God as a judge, or it emanates from the necessity of the divine nature, it will not on that account be more or less desirable;
1 just as, on the other hand, the evils which follow from wicked actions and affects are not less to be feared because they follow from them necessarily; and finally, whether we do what we do necessarily or contingently, we are still led by hope and fear.
Porro homines coram Deo nulla alia de causa sunt inexcusabiles, quam quia in ipsius Dei potestate sunt, ut lutum in potestate figuli, qui ex eadem massa vasa facit, alia ad decus, alia ad dedecus.
Further, men are inexcusable before God for no other reason than that they are in the power of God himself, as clay is in the power of the potter, who from the same lump makes vessels, some for honour, others for dishonour.
1- 1 Romans 9:21: an non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? (‘Has not the potter power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honour and another for dishonour?’).
Ad haec pauca si attendere velis aliquantulum, non dubito, quin facili negotio ad omnia argumenta, quae in hanc sententiam obiici solent, respondere possis, ut multi iam mecum experti sunt.
If you will attend a little to these few points, I do not doubt that you will easily be able to answer all the arguments that are usually raised against this opinion, as many have already found with me.
[G IV 313] Miracula, et ignorantiam pro aequipollentibus sumpsi, quia ii, qui Dei existentiam, et religionem miraculis adstruere conantur, rem obscuram per aliam magis obscuram, et quam maxime ignorant, ostendere volunt, atque ita novum argumentandi genus adferunt, redigendo scilicet non ad impossibile, ut aiunt, sed ignorantiam. Caeterum meam de miraculis sententiam satis, ni fallor, explicui in tractatu theologico-Politico.
I took miracles and ignorance as equivalents because those who try to establish God’s existence and religion by miracles want to show something obscure through something else more obscure, of which they are most ignorant, and so bring in a new kind of argument, reducing, namely, not to the impossible, as they say, but to ignorance.
1 For the rest, I have explained my view of miracles sufficiently, if I am not mistaken, in the
Theological-Political Treatise.
- 1 The phrase of the Appendix to Part I: ‘a new way of arguing … namely, reduction not to the impossible, but to ignorance’.
Hoc tantum hic addo, quod si ad haec attendas, quod scilicet Christus non Senatui, nec Pilato, nec cuiquam infidelium; sed sanctis tantummodo apparuerit, et quod Deus neque dextram, neque sinistram habeat, nec in loco; sed ubique secundum essentiam sit, et quod materia ubique sit eadem, et quod Deus extra Mundum in spatio, quod fingunt, imaginario, sese non manifestet, et quod denique corporis humani compages intra debitos limites solo aeris pondere coerceatur, facile videbis, hanc Christi apparitionem non absimilem esse illi, qua Deus Abrahamo apparuit, quando tres vidit homines, quos ad secum prandendum invitavit.
I add only this here: that if you attend to these things, namely that Christ appeared not to the Senate, nor to Pilate, nor to any of the unbelievers, but only to the saints;
2 and that God has neither right hand nor left,
3 and is not in a place, but is everywhere according to his essence; and that matter is everywhere the same; and that God does not manifest himself outside the world, in the imaginary space which they feign; and finally that the frame of the human body is held within its due limits by the weight of the air alone: you will easily see that this appearance of Christ is not unlike the one in which God appeared to Abraham, when he saw three men whom he invited to dine with him.
4- 2 Compare Acts 10:40–41: God raised him on the third day and made him manifest, non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo (‘not to all the people, but to witnesses chosen beforehand by God’).
- 3 Mark 16:19: assumptus est in caelum, et sedet a dextris Dei (‘he was taken up into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God’).
- 4 Genesis 18:1–8.
At dices, Apostolos omnes omnino credidisse, quod Christus a morte resurrexerit, et ad coelum revera ascenderit: quod ego non nego. Nam ipse etiam Abrahamus credidit, quod Deus apud ipsum pransus fuerit, et omnes Israelitae, quod Deus e coelo igne circumdatus ad montem Sinai descenderit, et cum iis immediate locutus fuerit, cum tamen haec, et plura alia huiusmodi apparitiones, seu revelationes fuerint, captui, et opinionibus eorum hominum accommodatae, quibus Deus mentem suam iisdem revelare voluit.
But you will say that the Apostles all believed absolutely that Christ rose from death and really ascended to heaven: which I do not deny. For Abraham himself also believed that God had dined with him, and all the Israelites that God had descended from heaven surrounded by fire onto Mount Sinai and had spoken with them directly;
5 whereas these, and many other things of this kind, were appearances or revelations accommodated to the understanding and opinions of those men to whom God willed to reveal his mind through them.
- 5 Exodus 19:18, descendisset Dominus super eum in igne (‘the Lord had descended upon it in fire’); Deuteronomy 5:4, Facie ad faciem locutus est nobis in monte de medio ignis (‘He spoke to us face to face on the mountain from the midst of the fire’).
Concludo itaque Christi a mortuis resurrectionem revera spiritualem, et solis fidelibus ad eorum captum revelatam fuisse, nempe quod Christus aeternitate donatus fuit, et a mortuis, (mortuos hic intelligo eo sensu, quo Christus dixit: sinite mortuos mortuos suos sepelire) surrexit, simulatque vita et morte singularis sanctitatis exemplum dedit, et eatenus discipulos suos a mortuis suscitat, quatenus ipsi hoc vitae eius, et mortis exemplum sequuntur.
I conclude, therefore, that Christ’s resurrection from the dead was in truth spiritual, and revealed only to the faithful according to their understanding; namely, that Christ was endowed with eternity and rose from the dead (I understand ‘the dead’ here in the sense in which Christ said: let the dead bury their dead
6) as soon as he gave, by his life and death, an example of singular holiness; and that he raises his disciples from the dead insofar as they themselves follow this example of his life and death.
- 6 Matthew 8:22, dimitte mortuos sepelire mortuos suos; Luke 9:60.
Nec difficile esset totam Euangelii doctrinam secundum hanc hypothesin explicare. Imo caput 15. Ep. 1. ad Corinthios ex sola hac hypothesi explicari potest, et Pauli argumenta intelligi, cum alias communem hypothesin sequendo infirma appareant, et facili negotio refelli possint, ut iam taceam, quod Christiani omnia, quae Iudaei carnaliter, Spiritualiter interpretati sunt.
Nor would it be difficult to explain the whole teaching of the Gospel according to this hypothesis. Indeed, chapter 15 of the First Epistle to the Corinthians
7 can be explained by this hypothesis alone, and Paul’s arguments understood, whereas if the common hypothesis is followed they appear weak and can easily be refuted; to say nothing of the fact that Christians have interpreted spiritually everything that the Jews interpreted carnally.
- 7 Paul’s chapter on the resurrection; for example I Corinthians 15:44, seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale (‘it is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body’), and 15:50, ‘flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God’.
Humanam imbecillitatem tecum agnosco. Sed te contra rogare mihi liceat, an nos homunciones tantam naturae cognitionem habeamus, ut determinare possimus, quousque eius vis, et potentia se extendit, et quid eius vim superat? quod quia nemo sine arrogantia praesumere potest, licet ergo absque iactantia miracula per causas naturales, quantum fieri potest, explicare, et quae explicare non possumus, nec etiam demonstrare, quod absurda sint, satius erit iudicium de iis suspendere, et religionem, uti dixi, sola doctrinae sapientia adstruere.
I acknowledge human weakness with you.
8 But may I in turn ask you whether we little men have such knowledge of nature that we can determine how far its force and power extend, and what surpasses its force? Since no one can presume this without arrogance, it is permissible, then, without boasting, to explain miracles by natural causes as far as possible; and as for those which we cannot explain, nor yet demonstrate to be absurd, it will be better to suspend judgment about them, and to establish religion, as I said, on the wisdom of its teaching alone.
9
Loca denique Euangelii Iohannis et epistolae ad Hebraeos iis, quae dixi, repugnare credis, quia linguarum orientalium phrases Europaeis loquendi modis metiris, et quamvis Iohannes suum Euangelium Graece scripserit, hebraizat tamen.
Finally, you believe that the passages of the Gospel of John and of the Epistle to the Hebrews conflict with what I have said, because you measure the phrases of Oriental languages by European ways of speaking; and although John wrote his Gospel in Greek, he nevertheless Hebraizes.
Quicquid sit, an credis, quando scriptura ait, quod Deus in Nube sese manifestaverit, aut quod in Tabernaculo, et in Templo habitaverit, quod ipse Deus naturam Nubis, Tabernaculi, et templi assumpserit? atqui hoc summum est, quod Christus de se ipso dixit, se scilicet templum Dei esse, nimirum quia, ut in meis praecedentibus dixi, Deus sese maxime in Christo manifestavit, quod Iohannes ut efficacius exprimeret, dixit verbum factum esse carnem. Sed de his satis.
However that may be, do you believe, when Scripture says that God manifested himself in a cloud,
10 or that he dwelt in the Tabernacle and in the Temple, that God himself took on the nature of the cloud, the Tabernacle and the Temple? Yet this is the most that Christ said of himself, namely that he was the temple of God;
11 namely because, as I said in my previous letter,
12 God manifested himself most of all in Christ; which John, to express it more forcefully, put by saying that the Word was made flesh.
13 But enough of these things.
- 10 For example Exodus 16:10, et ecce gloria Domini apparuit in nube (‘and behold, the glory of the Lord appeared in a cloud’).
- 11 John 2:19 and 2:21: ‘Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up … But he spoke of the temple of his body’.
- 12 Letter 73.
- 13 John 1:14.
Epistola LXXX
Letter 80
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza
Acutissimo, atque Doctissimo philosopho,
To the most acute and most learned philosopher
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Vir clarissime,
Most distinguished Sir,
[G IV 331] Primo difficulter admodum concipere queo,
a qui a priori corporum existentia demonstretur, quae motus, et figuras habent; cum in extensione, absolute rem considerando, nil tale occurrat.
First, I can only with great difficulty conceive how the existence of bodies which have motion and figure is demonstrated a priori, since in extension, considering the thing absolutely, nothing of the kind is found.
1- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 595, Letter 69), which prints the letter without the writer’s name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 331).
- 1 Spinoza’s answer to this question is in Letter 81, and more fully in Letter 83.
Secundo erudiri abs te vellem, quomodo intelligendum sit, cuius meministi epistola de infinito his verbis. Nec tamen concludunt talia omnem numerum superare ex partium multitudine.
Second, I should like to be taught by you how what you mention in
the letter on the infinite is to be understood, in these words: ‘Yet they do not conclude that such things surpass every number from the multitude of their parts.’
Nam revera omnes mathematici mihi videntur circa talia infinita semper demonstrare, quod partium numerus sit tam magnus, ut omnem assignabilem numerum superent, et in exemplo, de duobus circulis ibidem allato, non hoc ipsum declarare videris, quod tamen susceperas. Ibi enim tantum ostendis, quod non hoc ipsum concludunt ex nimia spatii interpositi magnitudine, et quod eius maximum et minimum non habeamus; sed non demonstras prout volebas, quod id non concludant ex partium multitudine.
bFor in truth all mathematicians seem to me always to demonstrate, concerning such infinites, that the number of parts is so great that it surpasses every assignable number; and in the example of the two circles given there you do not seem to show this very thing, which you had undertaken to do. For there you show only that they do not conclude this from the excessive size of the interposed space, and from our not having its maximum and minimum; but you do not demonstrate, as you wished, that they do not conclude it from the multitude of the parts.
- b The Dutch version adds (G IV 331): ‘Further, I have heard from Mr Leibniz that the tutor of the Dauphin of France, called Huet, a man of outstanding learning, is going to write on the truth of human religion, and to refute your Theological-Political Treatise. Farewell.’ This is the book Spinoza asks about in Letter 83.
2. Maii, 1676.
2 May 1676.
Epistola LXXXI
Letter 81
Spinoza to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Nobilissimo, atque Doctissimo viro,
To the most noble and most learned man
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Nobilissime vir,
Most noble Sir,
[G IV 332] Quod in epistola de infinito dixi,
a quod partium infinitatem ex earum multitudine non concludant, hinc patet, quod, si ea ex earum multitudine concluderetur, non possemus maiorem partium multitudinem concipere; sed earum multitudo, quavis data, deberet esse maior, quod falsum est: nam in toto spatio, inter duos circulos, diversa centra habentes, duplo maiorem partium multitudinem concipimus, quam in eiusdem dimidio, et tamen partium numerus, tam dimidii, quam totius spatii omni assignabili numero maior est.
What I said in
the letter on the infinite, that they do not conclude the infinity of the parts from their multitude, is evident from this: that if it were concluded from their multitude, we could not conceive a greater multitude of parts, but their multitude would have to be greater than any given one; which is false. For in the whole space between two circles having different centres we conceive a multitude of parts twice as great as in half of it, and yet the number of the parts, both of the half and of the whole space, is greater than any assignable number.
1- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 596, Letter 70), which prints the letter without the addressee’s name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 332).
- 1 The third of the distinctions of Letter 12: things which cannot be equalled by any number, yet can be conceived as greater and less.
Porro ex extensione, ut eam Cartesius concipit, molem scilicet quiescentem, corporum existentiam demonstrare non tantum difficile; ut ais; sed omnino impossibile est. Materia enim quiescens, quantum in se est, in sua quiete perseverabit, nec ad motum concitabitur, nisi a causa potentiori externa; et hac de causa non dubitavi olim affirmare; rerum naturalium principia Cartesiana inutilia esse, ne dicam absurda.
Further, from extension as Descartes conceives it, namely as a mass at rest, it is not only difficult, as you say, but altogether impossible to demonstrate the existence of bodies. For matter at rest, as far as it is in itself,
2 will persevere in its rest, and will not be set in motion except by a more powerful external cause; and for this reason I did not hesitate to affirm once that Descartes’s principles of natural things are useless, not to say absurd.
Hagae 5 Maii, 1676
The Hague, 5 May 1676.
Epistola LXXXII
Letter 82
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza
Acutissimo, Doctissimoque philosopho,
To the most acute and most learned philosopher
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Doctissime vir,
Most learned Sir,
[G IV 333] Velim, ut hac in re mihi gratificeris,
a indicando, qui ex conceptu extensionis secundum tuas meditationes varietas rerum a priori possit ostendi, quandoquidem meministi opinionis Cartesii, in qua Cartesius statuit, se eam ex extensione nullo alio modo deducere posse, quam supponendo motu a Deo excitato hoc effectum fuisse in extensione: deducit ergo iuxta meam opinionem corporum existentiam non ex quiescente materia, nisi forte suppositionem motoris Dei pro nihilo haberes; quandoquidem, qui illud ex essentia Dei a priori necessario sequi debeat, abs te non sit ostensum; id quod Cartesius ostensurus captum humanum superare credebat.
I should like you to do me the favour, in this matter, of indicating how, according to your meditations, the variety of things can be shown a priori from the concept of extension; since you mentioned the opinion of Descartes, in which Descartes maintains that he can deduce it from extension in no other way than by supposing that this was brought about in extension by motion excited by God. So in my opinion he deduces the existence of bodies not from matter at rest, unless perhaps you count the supposition of God as mover for nothing; since you have not shown how it must follow necessarily, a priori, from the essence of God, something which Descartes believed it beyond human grasp to show.
- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 597–598, Letter 71), which prints the letter without the writer’s name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 333–334).
Quare a te hanc rem requiro, sciens bene, te alias cogitationes habere, nisi alia sontica subsit forte causa, quare illud hactenus manifestum facere nolueris; et si hoc, de quo non dubito, non opus fuisset, non tale quid obscure indicares. Sed certo tibi persuasum habeas, quod sive candide mihi aliquid indices, sive celes, meus tamen erga te affectus immutatus maneat.
So I ask this of you, knowing well that you have other thoughts, unless perhaps there is some other serious cause why you have not wished to make it known until now; and if this, which I do not doubt, had not been necessary, you would not hint at any such thing obscurely. But be assured that whether you tell me something candidly or conceal it, my affection towards you will remain unchanged.
Rationes tamen, cur illud specialiter desiderem, hae sunt, quod in mathematicis semper observarim, quod nos ex quavis re in se considerata, hoc est, ex definitione cuiusque rei, unicam saltem proprietatem deducere valeamus; quod si autem plures proprietates desideremus, necesse esse, ut rem definitam ad alia referamus: tunc siquidem ex coniunctione definitionum harum rerum novae proprietates resultant.
The reasons, however, why I particularly desire this are these: that in mathematics I have always observed that from any thing considered in itself, that is, from the definition of any thing, we are able to deduce only a single property; but if we desire more properties, it is necessary to relate the thing defined to other things; for then new properties result from the conjunction of the definitions of these things.
Ex. gr. Si circuli peripheriam considerem solam, nihil aliud concludere potero, quam quod ubique sibi similis, sive uniformis existat, qua quidem proprietate ab omnibus aliis curvis essentialiter differt, nec ullas alias unquam potero deducere.
For example, if I consider the circumference of a circle alone, I shall be able to conclude nothing else than that it is everywhere like itself, or uniform, by which property it differs essentially from all other curves; and I shall never be able to deduce any others.
Verum si ad alia referam, nimirum ad radios ex centro deductos, ad duas lineas sese intersecantes, aut plures quoque, plures utique hinc proprietates deducere valebo; quae quidem aliquo modo videntur adversari prop. 16. Ethices, quae praecipua fere est 1 lib. tui tractatus: In qua tanquam notum assumitur, posse ex data cuiuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates deduci, quod mihi videtur impossibile, si non ad alia referamus rem definitam; et quod porro effecit, ut non possim videre, qua ratione ex attributo aliquo solo considerato, ex. gr. extensione infinita corporum varietas exsurgere possit; vel si existimas hoc quoque non posse concludi ex unico solo considerato; sed omnibus simul sumptis, vellem hoc edoceri abs te, et qua ratione hoc concipiendum foret. Vale etc.
But if I relate it to other things, namely to the radii drawn from the centre, to two lines intersecting each other, or to more, I shall certainly be able to deduce more properties from this; which indeed seems in some way to conflict with
Prop. 16 of the Ethics, which is almost the chief proposition of the first book of your treatise. In it it is taken as known that a number of properties can be deduced from the given definition of any thing,
1 which seems to me impossible if we do not relate the thing defined to others; and this has further brought it about that I cannot see in what way, from some attribute considered alone, for example infinite extension, the variety of bodies can arise; or, if you think that this too cannot be inferred from one attribute considered alone, but from all taken together, I should like to be taught this by you, and in what way it is to be conceived. Farewell, etc.
- 1 The demonstration of Part I, Prop. 16: ‘from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties’.
[G IV 334] Parisiis, 23 Iun. 1676.
Paris, 23 June 1676.
Epistola LXXXIII
Letter 83
Spinoza to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Nobilissimo, atque Doctissimo viro,
To the most noble and most learned man
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus
Nobilissime vir,
Most noble Sir,
[G IV 334] Quod petis, an ex solo extensionis conceptu
a rerum varietas a priori possit demonstrari, credo me iam satis clare ostendisse, id impossibile esse; ideoque materiam a Cartesio male definiri per extensionem; sed eam necessario debere explicari per attributum, quod aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimat.
As for your question whether the variety of things can be demonstrated a priori from the concept of extension alone, I believe I have already shown clearly enough that it is impossible; and that therefore matter is badly defined by Descartes through extension, but must necessarily be explained through an attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
1- a The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 598, Letter 72), which prints the letter without the addressee’s name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 334–335). The Dutch version adds a signature.
- 1 The language of Part I, Def. 6; that extension is such an attribute is Part II, Prop. 2.
Sed de his forsan aliquando, si vita suppetit, clarius tecum agam. Nam huc usque nihil de his ordine disponere mihi licuit.
But perhaps some day, if life lasts,
2 I shall discuss these things with you more clearly. For up to now it has not been possible for me to set anything out in order on these matters.
- 2 Spinoza died at The Hague seven months later, on 21 February 1677 (Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 287).
Quod autem addis, nos ex definitione cuiusque rei, in se consideratae, unicam tantum proprietatem deducere valere, locum forsan habet in rebus simplicissimis, vel entibus rationis, (ad quae figuras etiam refero) at non in realibus. Nam ex hoc solo, quod Deum definio esse ens ad cuius essentiam pertinet existentia, plures eius proprietates concludo: nempe quod necessario existit, quod sit unicus, immutabilis, infinitus, etc. et ad hunc modum plura alia exempla adferre possem, quae impraesentiarum omitto.
As for your addition that from the definition of each thing, considered in itself, we can deduce only one property: this perhaps holds in the simplest things, or beings of reason (to which I also refer figures), but not in real things. For from this alone, that I define God to be a being to whose essence existence pertains, I infer a number of his properties: namely that he exists necessarily, that he is unique, immutable, infinite, etc.;
3 and in this way I could bring many other examples, which I omit for the present.
Denique rogo, ut inquiras, an tractatus D. Huet, (nempe contra tractatum theologico-Politicum) de quo antea scripsisti, lucem iam viderit, et an mihi exemplar transmittere poteris, deinde an iam noveris, quaenam ea sint, quae de refractione noviter inventa sint.
Finally, I ask you to find out whether the treatise of Mr Huet
4 (namely, against the
Theological-Political Treatise), of which you wrote earlier, has yet seen the light, and whether you could send me a copy; and next, whether you already know what the things are that have recently been discovered about refraction.
- 4 Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio evangelica, which appeared in Paris in 1679 (Israel, pp. 453–455, 731), ‘a work intended to combat incredulity, Naturalism, and Spinozism’ (Israel, p. 647). Tschirnhaus had passed on the news in Letter 80, in a passage found only in the Dutch version.
Hisce vale, Nobilissime vir, et amare perge, etc.
Farewell with these, most noble Sir, and continue to love me, etc.
Hagae Com. 15 Iulii. 1676.
The Hague, 15 July 1676.