Introduction

The Ethics is one of the few books in the history of philosophy that try to say everything at once. It begins with God, proceeds through the nature of the human mind and the origin of the emotions, and ends with an account of human freedom and of the mind’s highest happiness, and it does all this in the form of a geometrical treatise, with definitions, axioms and numbered propositions, each demonstrated from those before it. It was written by a man who had been expelled from his religious community in his early twenties, who published only one book under his own name in his lifetime, and who did not dare to publish this one. It appeared a few months after his death, without his name, under his initials; within a year it had been banned by the States of Holland. For a century it was read chiefly by those who wished to refute it. Since then it has been read as the purest expression of philosophical rationalism, as a religious work and as an atheist one, as the foundation of a modern science of human nature and as a guide to life.

This introduction tries to give the reader what is needed to begin. It describes Spinoza’s life and the world in which he wrote, the making of the Ethics and its publication, Spinoza as an author, and the argument of the book as a whole. Each Part has an introduction of its own, which describes its argument in detail; the epilogue describes the later history of the book, and the appendices take up some of the principal questions of interpretation.

A life

Baruch de Spinoza, who later signed himself Benedictus, was born in Amsterdam in November 1632, into the community of Portuguese Jews in that city. The community kept its records in Portuguese; its school taught Hebrew, the Bible and Rashi’s commentary, and the Talmud, and translated the weekly portion of the Law into Spanish (Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 113–114). Spanish and Portuguese were the languages of the community, and Hebrew the language of its learning. He learned Latin later, according to his early biographer Johannes Colerus from Franciscus van den Enden, a former Jesuit who kept a school in Amsterdam and who was reputed to teach his pupils more than Latin. His father, Michael, was a merchant who had served on the community’s governing board; when he died early in 1654, a few months after Spinoza’s stepmother, Spinoza, at twenty-one, found himself running the family’s trading business, which was heavily in debt, and he carried it on with his younger brother Gabriel under the name of Bento y Gabriel de Spinoza (Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 2nd ed., pp. 98–101).

On 27 July 1656, when he was twenty-three, the leaders of the community pronounced a ban (herem) against him. The text, which survives in Portuguese, declares that the leaders had long known of “the evil opinions and acts of Baruch de Espinoza,” had tried by various means and promises to turn him from his evil ways, and, receiving every day more news of “the horrible heresies which he practised and taught, and the monstrous deeds which he did,” had resolved with the counsel of the rabbis that he be excommunicated and expelled from the people of Israel. The ban curses him by day and by night, lying down and rising up, going out and coming in, and it ends with an order: “that no one may communicate with him orally or in writing, nor show him any favour, nor stay with him under the same roof, nor come within four cubits of him, nor read any paper made or written by him” (Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 114–116). What the heresies were the text does not say. An early French life of Spinoza tells of two young men who pressed him for his real opinions, and reports his answer: that, finding nothing immaterial or incorporeal in the Bible, he saw no difficulty in believing that God is a body; that the Old Testament says nothing of the creation of angels; and that wherever Scripture speaks of the soul it means simply life, so that nothing can be found in it to support the soul’s immortality (Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 5–6). Whatever he said in Amsterdam, the doctrines of the Ethics and the Theological-Political Treatise make it unsurprising that the community found it intolerable.

Spinoza left Amsterdam some years later. In 1661 he was living at Rijnsburg near Leiden, where Henry Oldenburg, of the Royal Society in London, visited him and began a correspondence that would last, with interruptions, until Spinoza’s death (Letter 1). In 1663 he moved to Voorburg, near The Hague, and, when the Theological-Political Treatise was in the press, to The Hague itself, where he lived for the rest of his life, from 1671 in a rented room in the house of the painter Hendrik van der Spyck (Nadler, pp. 334–335). In 1672, the year of the French invasion of the Republic, a mob in The Hague murdered the Grand Pensionary, Johan de Witt, and his brother Cornelis. Spinoza told Leibniz, who visited him four years later, that on the day of the murders he had wanted to go out at night and post a placard near the place reading ultimi barbarorum, roughly “the greatest of barbarians,” but that his host had locked the house to keep him from going out, “for he would be exposed to being torn to pieces” (Nadler, p. 356). According to Colerus, he had learned “to make glasses for telescopes, and for some other uses,” and lived by it, and a considerable number of the lenses he had polished were found among his effects after his death; his letters discuss the methods of polishing lenses as well as the optics of Descartes and Huygens (Letter 32). He never married and held no office, and in 1673 he declined the offer of a professorship at Heidelberg made to him on behalf of the Elector Palatine (Letter 48; VVL³ III 171). He died at The Hague on Sunday, 21 February 1677, at the age of forty-four, in the presence of a physician from Amsterdam, probably his friend Lodewijk Meyer (Nadler, p. 407); Colerus says that he had been troubled with a disease of the lungs for more than twenty years (Colerus, Life).

The picture of Spinoza as a solitary has been exaggerated. He had friends in Amsterdam who read his work in manuscript and met to discuss it: in February 1663 one of them, Simon de Vries, wrote to tell him that a group of them were reading his propositions in order, one of them reading, explaining and demonstrating each in turn, and writing to him about what they could not understand (Letter 8). He corresponded with Oldenburg and, through him, with Robert Boyle on chemistry; with a merchant of Dordrecht, Willem van Blyenbergh, troubled by the problem of evil (Letters 18–24, 27); with a young nobleman, Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, who had studied his work in manuscript; and, on a question of optics, with Leibniz (Letters 45–46). The correspondence that survives, published in the Opera Posthuma, is one of the best guides to the Ethics that exists.

The Republic and the new philosophy

The Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century was a wealthy commercial state and, by the standards of its time, a tolerant one. Its presses printed books that could not be printed elsewhere, and it had been for some twenty years the home of Descartes, who published most of his works there. By the 1650s the new philosophy of Descartes had been taken up by some of the professors at Leiden and Utrecht and had provoked a long controversy with the orthodox Reformed theologians, who saw in it a threat to Aristotelian philosophy and to the theology built on it.

Spinoza was formed by this philosophy. His first published book, which appeared in 1663 and was the only one to bear his name in his lifetime, was a geometrical exposition of the first two parts of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, with an appendix of Metaphysical Thoughts. It had begun, he told Oldenburg, as a set of dictations of the second part of Descartes’ Principles “in geometrical order” for a young man “to whom I did not wish to teach my own opinions openly”; his friends asked him to treat the first part in the same way, which he did in two weeks, and then to let them publish the whole, on the condition that one of them would add a preface warning readers that the author did not accept everything in it as his own (Letter 13; VVL³ III 44). The preface was written by Lodewijk Meyer, and it says that the author holds, among other things, that the will is not distinct from the intellect, and that the faculty of affirming and denying is a fiction.

The political setting mattered as much as the philosophical one. In 1665 Spinoza interrupted his work on the Ethics to write a treatise on the interpretation of Scripture, and he told Oldenburg his reasons: the prejudices of the theologians, which more than anything prevent men from applying their minds to philosophy; the opinion of the common people, who did not cease to accuse him of atheism; and “the freedom of philosophizing and of saying what we think,” which he wished to defend in every way, and which was being suppressed by the excessive authority and petulance of the preachers (Letter 30; VVL³ III 117). The Theological-Political Treatise appeared anonymously in 1670, with a false imprint, and argued that the freedom to philosophize could be granted without harm to piety or to the peace of the state, and could not be taken away without destroying both. Its argument for the freedom of thought and expression rested on a political philosophy that began, like Hobbes’s, from natural right; but Spinoza insisted on the difference. “With regard to politics, the difference between me and Hobbes, which you ask about, consists in this: that I always keep natural right intact” (Letter 50).

The book was answered and denounced in print; all who refuted it, Bayle later wrote, had found in it the seeds of atheism (Bayle, “Spinoza,” 1820 ed. XIII 418). The freedom on which Spinoza had counted was never secure, and the Ethics, which he was finishing in these years, was written in the knowledge of it.

The making of the Ethics

The Ethics was long in the making. In 1661, writing to Oldenburg, Spinoza already defined God as “a being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite, or supremely perfect, in its kind,” and explained what he meant by an attribute (Letter 2; VVL³ III 5). By 1663 his friends in Amsterdam were reading a draft of the opening propositions. In June 1665 he wrote that he would soon send part of “the third part of our philosophy,” “up to about the eightieth proposition” (Letter 28; VVL³ III 113); at that time the work was planned in three parts, and a survival of that plan has been detected in a cross-reference in Part II, which in the first edition refers to “the third Part” for a doctrine that appears in Part IV. Work on the Ethics was then interrupted by the Theological-Political Treatise, and when the book was finished it had five Parts.

By 1675 the book was finished, and Spinoza went to Amsterdam to have it printed. He explained to Oldenburg what happened next. “While I was occupied with this, a rumour spread everywhere that a certain book of mine about God was in the press, and that in it I was trying to show that there is no God.” Certain theologians took the occasion to complain of him to the Prince and the magistrates, and the “stupid Cartesians,” to clear themselves of the suspicion of favouring him, did not cease to denounce his opinions. Told by trustworthy people that the theologians were lying in wait for him everywhere, he decided to put off the publication until he saw how matters would turn out (Letter 68; VVL³ III 218). He never saw it printed.

After his death his friends, among them the publisher Jan Rieuwertsz, gathered his manuscripts and published them at the end of 1677 as B. D. S. Opera Posthuma, with only his initials on the title page. The volume contained the Ethics, the unfinished Political Treatise and Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, a selection of letters, and an unfinished Hebrew grammar. A Dutch translation, De Nagelate Schriften, appeared at the same time; it rests in places on a different, probably earlier, form of the text, and its readings are recorded in the notes to the Latin of this edition. In June 1678 the States of Holland and West Friesland banned the book, declaring that it contained “very many profane, blasphemous and godless doctrines,” by which simple readers might be led from the only true way of salvation and the principal articles of the Christian faith might be shaken (Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 179).

Spinoza’s other works

The Ethics is best read with some knowledge of the rest of Spinoza’s work, which is small. Besides the exposition of Descartes of 1663 and the Theological-Political Treatise of 1670, the Opera Posthuma contained the unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, an early work on method which promises a philosophy and breaks off before reaching it; the Political Treatise, which applies the principles of the Ethics to the constitution of monarchies and aristocracies and breaks off at the beginning of the chapter on democracy; a selection of letters, both to and from Spinoza; and a grammar of the Hebrew language. A Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, an early version of some of the doctrines of the Ethics that survives only in Dutch, was not published until 1862. Of these the letters and the Theological-Political Treatise are the most useful to a reader of the Ethics: the letters because Spinoza explains himself in them to correspondents who had read his work and had difficulties with it (twenty-seven letters of his correspondence are translated after the text of the Ethics in this edition), and the Treatise because it treats at length, in a more accessible form, many of the themes the Ethics treats briefly, the nature of religion, the interpretation of Scripture, the meaning of words like “law” and “the will of God,” and the relation between philosophy and theology.

Spinoza’s reading

The inventory of Spinoza’s possessions made after his death survives, and with it a list of his books, about a hundred and sixty in all (Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 160–164). It shows a library small even for a scholar of modest means, and a mind of wide range. There are the tools of a Hebrew scholar: Buxtorf’s rabbinic Bible, a Hebrew concordance, a rabbinic dictionary, a Passover prayer book, and the Guide of the Perplexed of Maimonides in a Venice edition. There is a Bible in Spanish and Calvin’s Institutes in Spanish translation. There are several works of Descartes, Hobbes’s Elementa Philosophica, Machiavelli, Grotius, and the Dialogues of Love of Leone Ebreo. There are Euclid, Diophantus and Viète, Huygens’s treatise on the pendulum clock, works of Boyle on the spring of the air and on hydrostatics, and books on anatomy. And there are the Latin classics he read and sometimes quoted: Ovid, Virgil, Tacitus, Livy, Cicero’s letters, Seneca’s letters and tragedies, Epictetus, Martial and Petronius, along with the Spanish poets Quevedo and Góngora.

Some of these books can be seen at work in the Ethics. Descartes is its constant interlocutor, named three times and present everywhere. Maimonides lies behind its discussions of the divine attributes and of final causes, as the notes point out. Hobbes is the background of its political scholia, though Spinoza insisted on the difference. Ovid supplies the line that states the problem of Part IV, and Seneca, Tacitus and Terence are quoted or echoed in the notes and scholia. A reader who knows the books Spinoza read will hear more in the Ethics than one who does not, and the notes to this edition try to make some of these voices audible.

Spinoza as an author

Spinoza wrote the Ethics in Latin, the language of learned Europe, which he had learned as an adult. It was not his first language, nor his second. He grew up speaking Portuguese and Spanish, read and wrote Hebrew, and lived his adult life among Dutch speakers; in a letter written in Dutch to Blyenbergh, he said that he wished he could write “in the language in which I was brought up,” since he could perhaps express his thoughts better in it (Letter 19; VVL³ III 70). His Latin is plain and precise, without ornament, often repetitive, and dense with the technical vocabulary of the scholastic and Cartesian philosophy he had studied: substance, attribute, mode, essence, existence, cause, idea. He uses this vocabulary to say things the scholastics would have rejected, and the reader must learn from his definitions what he means by words they also used.

The form of the book reflects the man. The geometrical order allowed Spinoza to state his conclusions without rhetoric and to rest each of them on reasons the reader could check. It also concealed, behind the impersonal sequence of propositions, the passion with which some of them were held. That passion breaks out in the scholia and prefaces, where Spinoza argues, mocks and exhorts, and where the reader meets the author of the Theological-Political Treatise, a writer of great polemical force. The Appendix to Part I and the Prefaces to Parts III, IV and V are among the finest pages he wrote.

Spinoza was cautious, and he did not publish what he could not publish safely. The Ethics itself is careful in its language. It speaks of God on nearly every page, quotes Scripture where Scripture agrees with it, and uses the words of theology, “salvation,” “blessedness,” “the love of God,” “the spirit of Christ,” in senses it defines for itself. Readers have disagreed about whether this language is a disguise or an honest use of old words for new things. The notes and essays of this edition point out where the question arises, and take the view that Spinoza meant what he defined his words to mean.

The argument of the book

The Ethics is divided into five Parts. The first, “Of God,” argues that there is only one substance, God, which exists necessarily and has infinitely many attributes, of which we know thought and extension; that everything else is a mode of this substance; that everything follows from the nature of God with the necessity with which the properties of a triangle follow from its nature; and that God does not act for ends. The second, “Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind,” derives from this the doctrine that the human mind is the idea of the human body, a mode of thought corresponding to a mode of extension, and builds on it a theory of perception, imagination and memory, of error, and of three kinds of knowledge: imagination, reason and intuition. The third, “Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects,” treats the emotions as natural things, to be understood like lines, planes and bodies, and derives all of them from the striving of each thing to persevere in its being and from the three primary affects of desire, joy and sadness. The fourth, “Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects,” explains why human beings are subject to their passions and why knowledge of the good is so often powerless against them, and sets out what reason prescribes: an ethics of self-preservation that turns out to be an ethics of community. The fifth, “Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom,” shows what the mind can do against the passions, and argues that the mind’s highest good is the intellectual love of God, in which its freedom and blessedness consist, and that something of the mind is eternal.

Several convictions run through the whole. The first is that everything is intelligible: everything has a cause, or reason, for its existence or non-existence, and to understand a thing is to know its cause. The second is that human beings are part of nature, and are to be understood by the same principles as everything else; there is no “dominion within a dominion.” The third is that the mind and the body are one thing, conceived under two attributes, so that neither acts on the other and the life of the mind is the life of the body seen from within. The fourth is that there is no free will, if that means a power of acting without a cause, and that freedom is something else: acting from the necessity of one’s own nature, which for a human being means acting from understanding. The fifth is that understanding is not only the means to the good life but its substance: the more we understand, the more powerful, the more active and the more joyful we are.

These convictions make the Ethics a single argument. Its metaphysics is not a preface to its ethics but the ground of it, and its ethics is the point of its metaphysics. The reader who wants to know how to live is sent first to learn what God is, because the answer to the practical question depends on the answer to the theoretical one; and the reader who wants to know what God is will find that the answer has consequences for how to live. The book’s last sentence, that “all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare,” refers to both.

On reading the Ethics

The Ethics is difficult, and readers should not be discouraged if they find the first Part hard going. It may help to read each Part first for its enunciations and scholia, which state and explain the conclusions, and only then for its demonstrations; to follow Spinoza’s references back to the propositions he cites, which in this edition are linked or given with their page; and to read the introduction to each Part before the Part itself. The notes explain technical terms, point out where Spinoza is answering another author, and indicate where the text has been read in different ways. The glossary at the end records the English adopted for Spinoza’s technical vocabulary.

The Latin is given alongside the English, passage by passage, so that readers with some Latin can see what lies behind the translation, and the notes to the Latin record the readings of the first edition and the Dutch translation where they differ from the text printed here. A note on the text, before this introduction, describes the sources of the Latin.

Above all, it is worth remembering that the Ethics was written to be useful. Spinoza thought that the knowledge it contains could change the life of the person who acquired it, freeing him from fear, hatred and superstition, and giving him a joy that nothing could take away. Whether he was right is a question the reader can only answer by reading it.

How to Read a Geometrical Demonstration

Descartes once remarked that geometers divide their propositions small for a purpose: “propositionum minuta distinctio ad hoc est parata, ut facile citari atque ita vel nolentibus in memoriam reduci possint” (“the minute division of the propositions is designed so that they can easily be cited, and so recalled to mind even for the unwilling”, AT VII 157). The Ethics is built to be cited. Its two hundred and fifty-nine propositions are tied together by more than fifteen hundred references in Spinoza’s text, and almost every demonstration names, by number, what it rests on. The introduction to the First Part, which follows this essay, describes the parts of the geometrical form and its models. This essay turns to practice: what definitions and axioms do for Spinoza, why so much of the argument lies in the scholia, how his method stands to Euclid’s and to Descartes’s account of the geometrical order, and how to follow one chain of references, from Part I, Prop. 11 back to the definitions.

The edition gives three aids for this. Each of Spinoza’s references, kept in his abbreviated form (“by Prop. 7”), is a link to the passage it cites; in the printed book it is followed instead, in square brackets, by the page on which that passage begins, and in the web edition pointing at it shows the opening of the passage. After every element cited elsewhere in the Ethics, a line in small type headed Cited in lists the places that cite it, in the order of the text and in the compact form explained under Abbreviations and Conventions (1P11D is the demonstration of Part I, Prop. 11); a second line names any letters in this edition that cite it. And the Synopsis of the Propositions, at the end of the book, gives every enunciation in order, with its page or its link. The references lead backward, from a proposition to its grounds; the Cited in lines lead forward, from a principle to its uses; the Synopsis shows the whole route at once.

The order and the manner of demonstrating

The geometrical exposition at the end of Descartes’s Second Replies was his objectors’ idea: they had asked him to set out definitions, postulates and axioms and conclude the whole matter in the geometrical manner, so that the reader might take it in as if at a single glance (AT VII 128). His reply is more doubtful about the form than one might expect. “Duas res in modo scribendi geometrico distinguo, ordinem scilicet, & rationem demonstrandi” (“In the geometrical manner of writing I distinguish two things, the order and the manner of demonstrating”, AT VII 155). The order requires only that what comes first be known without help from what follows, and that the rest be demonstrated from what precedes alone. The manner is twofold. Analysis shows the way by which the thing was found, so that an attentive reader makes it his own as if he had found it himself, but it cannot compel a resisting one. Synthesis goes the opposite way, through a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, showing that whatever is denied is contained in what went before, “sicque a lectore, quantumvis repugnante ac pertinaci, assensionem extorqueat” (“and so wrings assent from the reader, however resisting and obstinate”); but it satisfies less, “quia modum quo res fuit inventa non docet” (“because it does not teach the way in which the thing was found”, AT VII 156).

Synthesis, Descartes thought, suits metaphysics less well than geometry. In geometry the first notions agree with the senses and are readily granted, and the only difficulty is drawing consequences, for which the numbered propositions help (AT VII 156–157); in metaphysics the first notions are the difficulty, since the prejudices of the senses resist them (AT VII 157). The exposition he appended bears the mark of this doubt. Its first proposition, that God’s existence is known from his nature alone, is demonstrated in two steps, “per def. 9” and “per axio. 10”; he adds that its conclusion can be self-evident to those free of prejudice, “sed quia non facile est ad tantam perspicacitatem pervenire, aliis modis idem quaeremus” (“but because it is not easy to reach such clarity of sight, we shall seek the same thing in other ways”), and proceeds to an a posteriori proof (AT VII 166–167). The reader of the Ethics will meet the same pattern at Part I, Prop. 11: a two-step demonstration followed by two more, and a scholium saying that the a posteriori one was given “so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily” (Part I, Prop. 11, Schol.).

Lodewijk Meyer’s preface to Spinoza’s geometrical version of Descartes’s Principles (1663) calls the method of the mathematicians, in which conclusions are demonstrated from definitions, postulates and axioms, the best and surest way of seeking and teaching truth (G I 127). Descartes, Meyer says, wrote in the analytic way; readers who were not mathematicians could repeat Descartes’s opinions but not demonstrate them, and Meyer had long wished that someone would put them into synthetic order, “more Geometris familiari” (“in the manner familiar to geometers”, G I 129). Spinoza did this for Descartes. In the Ethics he did it for himself, using throughout a long work of metaphysics the form Descartes had thought ill suited to metaphysics (Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934, I 44).

What that choice means is disputed. Wolfson held that nothing in the philosophy required the Euclidean form, which Spinoza used for clarity, as one uses outlines and diagrams (I 45, 55). Gueroult held that Spinoza reversed Descartes’s estimate of the two ways, taking synthesis for the true method of discovery, so that the Ethics is “demonstrated” in geometrical order where Descartes’s exposition was only “arranged” in it (Spinoza I 35). Della Rocca finds the form suited to a system in which everything follows from the nature of God (Spinoza, 2008, pp. 10–11); Curley takes it to conceal a dialogue with Spinoza’s predecessors that the reader must reconstruct (Behind the Geometrical Method, 1988, p. xi). Whatever the form was meant to do, it gives the reader demonstrations whose grounds are named, and which he can therefore check.

Euclid’s form and Spinoza’s

The model behind both expositions is the first book of Euclid’s Elements, which opens with three kinds of principle: ὅροι (“definitions”), αἰτήματα (“postulates”, literally “requests”) and κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι (“common notions”), the axioms of later usage (Heiberg I 2, 8, 10). Part I of the Ethics has definitions and axioms but no postulates, which appear only in the physical digression of Part II and at the start of Part III. Nor are the axioms all gathered at the beginning: Part II adds new ones in the middle of its physics, and Parts IV and V have their own. Axioms stand where the argument needs them.

Euclid’s proofs differ from Spinoza’s in one point that matters to the reader: Euclid does not cite. In the first proposition of the Elements the first common notion is not referred to by number but stated again in the proof, τὰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἴσα (“but things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another”, I.1; Heiberg I 12). The references a modern reader finds in Euclid are supplied in square brackets by editors and translators, by Heiberg in his facing Latin and by Heath in English (Heiberg I 13, 19; Heath, I.1, I.47). Spinoza’s demonstrations name their own grounds, as Descartes’s exposition had done. Euclid ends a theorem with ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι (“which was to be shown”), in Latin quod erat demonstrandum, and a problem, which constructs something, with ὅπερ ἔδει ποιῆσαι (“which was to be done”) (Heiberg I 12–13, 18–19). The Ethics has no problems; its demonstrations end, when they end with a formula, with Q.E.D. Spinoza names Euclid only once (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2).

What definitions and axioms do

The introduction to the First Part notes that Spinoza, writing to Simon de Vries, distinguished definitions that must be true of their objects from definitions that need only be conceivable (Letter 9). The occasion shows what was at stake. De Vries reported that the friends reading Spinoza’s draft disagreed about the nature of definition, and had consulted Borelli, author of a restored Euclid, Euclides restitutus (1658), for whom definitions are premises and must be evidently known; they asked too how an axiom differs from a definition (Letter 8; VVL³ III 28). Spinoza’s answer brings the first kind of definition close to the axiom. A definition that “explains a thing as it is outside the intellect” “must be true, and must not differ from a proposition, or axiom, except in that the former is concerned only with the essences of things, or of the affections of things, whereas the latter extends more widely, namely to eternal truths as well.” Of the other kind, he says: “So a bad definition is one which is not conceived.” The example he takes up from De Vries bears on the Ethics: “If I say that each substance has only one attribute, it is a mere proposition, and needs demonstration. But if I say, By substance I understand that which consists of only one attribute, it will be a good definition, provided that afterwards beings consisting of several attributes are designated by another name, different from substance” (Letter 9).

Meyer had called definitions “nothing but the clearest explanations of the terms and names by which the things to be treated are designated” (terminorum atque nominum ... apertissimae explicationes, G I 127). The definitions of the Ethics claim more: they say what things are, and the reader may ask whether they are true. Bennett shows how much depends on this. The demonstration of Part I, Prop. 7, followed below, argues that a substance, produced by nothing else, is caused by itself, and then applies what Def. 1 says of a “cause of itself”; if that definition merely fixed a sense for a new phrase, the passage from the ordinary sense to the defined one would be invalid, and the demonstration holds only if the definition is a substantive thesis about self-causation (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 1984, pp. 17–18).

Axioms raise the question from the other side. Meyer calls them statements so clear that no one who understands the words can refuse assent (G I 127). Yet Descartes granted that most of his own axioms should have been proposed as theorems “si accuratior esse voluissem” (“if I had wished to be more exact”, AT VII 164), and Meyer says that Spinoza knew the same of the axioms in his version of Descartes (G I 130–131). The line between axiom and proposition depends on the reader as well as on the content. Of Part I, Prop. 7 Spinoza says that if men would attend to the nature of substance, “this proposition would be an axiom for all, and would be numbered among the common notions” (Prop. 8, Schol. 2), as Descartes had said that some things are self-evident to some which others understand only by reasoning (AT VII 164). Bennett proposes accepting the axioms provisionally, to see how they work out (p. 18), and Curley came to think that one often grasps more of a formula from what Spinoza takes to follow from it than from the formula itself (p. 52).

The Cited in lines are made for this. Under each definition and axiom they list its uses. The definition of God (Part I, Def. 6) is cited in thirteen places, the definition of substance (Def. 3) in ten, from the first proposition to the twenty-eighth. Ax. 5 is cited once, in the demonstration of Prop. 3, and Ax. 7 once, in the first demonstration of Prop. 11. Ax. 2 has no such line, because nothing cites it by number. Reading a definition with its uses beside it is the quickest way to learn what Spinoza means by it.

Why the scholia carry the argument

The introduction to the First Part describes what the scholia do: explain, offer easier proofs, answer objections, attack opponents. Spinoza himself treats them as standing outside the demonstrative order. “But before I begin to demonstrate these things in our prolix geometrical order,” he writes, “I should like first to show briefly here the dictates of reason themselves, so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone” (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol.). In the version of Descartes he had declined for the same reason to put Descartes’s doubt into mathematical order, since the length this required would keep things “quae uno obtutu, tanquam in pictura, videri debent” (“which ought to be seen at one glance, as in a picture”) from being understood (G I 141). The order is prolix, Steenbakkers observes, because no step may be skipped, and from Spinoza’s point of view the scholia are asides outside it (Spinoza’s Ethica from Manuscript to Print, 1994, p. 159).

The Cited in lines show that the asides are not outside the argument. Of the hundred and thirty scholia of the Ethics, seventy-two are cited elsewhere in it, and the most frequently cited passage in the whole book is not a proposition but the scholium to Part III, Prop. 11, which defines joy and sadness and is cited in twenty-seven places. The scholium to Part III, Prop. 13, defining love and hatred, is cited in twenty-one, and the second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40, on the three kinds of knowledge, in fifteen. Definitions given in passing in a scholium become premises of later demonstrations; Part III defines its affects in this way, one by one in the scholia, as the essay before the Definitions of the Affects describes. Steenbakkers concedes as much: once such passages stand in the text, the later reasoning can and does draw on them, so they are not redundant in the deduction (p. 161). A reader should not pass over a scholium that a demonstration cites, and should notice that what it supplies was explained rather than demonstrated.

Scholia also do what demonstrations cannot. Some prove a proposition again by another road, as the second scholium to Part I, Prop. 8 proves Prop. 5 from four observations about definition and cause. Some explain the order itself, as when Spinoza, explaining why he did not define essence in the usual way, says of those who did that “they did not keep to the order of philosophizing,” and put last in the order of knowledge the divine nature, which is first (Part II, Prop. 10, Cor., Schol.).

Following a chain: Part I, Prop. 11

A demonstration can be read in two directions. Read as printed, it moves from grounds to conclusion. Read backward, it shows what the conclusion needs. Bennett, recalling John Aubrey’s story of Hobbes, who found Euclid open at the forty-seventh proposition of the first book, declared it impossible, and was sent back from proposition to proposition until he was convinced, doubts that the Ethics can convince in that way (pp. 17–18). The doubt is fair, but the exercise is still the best way to learn how the book works. The example that follows takes the first demonstration of God’s existence back to the definitions; all its references are to Part I. It is worth beginning with the Synopsis, where the eleven enunciations from “Substance is prior in nature to its affections” to the existence of God can be read straight through, as the route without the demonstrations. The demonstrations show which steps the conclusion actually uses.

Prop. 11 states that “God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.” Its first demonstration reads in full: “If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, that God does not exist. Then (by Ax. 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.” (Prop. 11, Dem.). It is a reduction to absurdity with two references. The first leads to Ax. 7, “If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence,” whose Cited in line has a single entry, 1P11D: the axiom stands among the axioms for this one demonstration. The second leads to Prop. 7, which speaks of substance and applies to God only because God is defined as a substance. The enunciation carries that definition with it, in the words of Def. 6, but the demonstration does not cite it, and Garrett, setting out the argument, has to supply the premise (Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy, 2018, pp. 35–36). Following references back means noticing what is used and not cited as well as what is cited.

Prop. 7, “It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist,” is demonstrated thus: “A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by the Cor. of the preceding Prop.); it will therefore be the cause of itself, that is (by Def. 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist” (Prop. 7, Dem.). The reference to Def. 1 raises Bennett’s question. Between the two references lies a step that cites nothing, from “cannot be produced by anything else” to “will therefore be the cause of itself.” The note to the demonstration names the unstated premise, that everything has a cause, in itself or in another, the first appearance in the Ethics of a principle of sufficient reason. Garrett adds that, so supplemented, the demonstration shows only that a substance which exists is the cause of itself, whereas Prop. 11 needs Prop. 7 to hold of any possible substance; he finds what is missing in the second demonstration of Prop. 11, which argues that nothing could take God’s existence away (pp. 36–37).

The corollary of Prop. 6, that a substance cannot be produced by anything else, has two demonstrations. The first argues that there is nothing in nature but substances and their affections, “as is evident from Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5,” and that a substance cannot be produced by a substance “by the preceding Prop.”, which in a corollary is the proposition it belongs to, Prop. 6 itself (Prop. 6, Cor.). The second, headed Alternatively, is shorter: “This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of its contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by Ax. 4); and so (by Def. 3) it would not be a substance” (Prop. 6, Cor., alternative Dem.). Here the chain reaches the definitions in two steps. By this road the first demonstration of God’s existence rests on Defs. 1 and 3 and Axs. 4 and 7, with Def. 6 to say that God is a substance, and needs neither Prop. 5 nor Prop. 1. Spinoza himself knew that the conclusion of Prop. 7 did not need a long road. He reminded Meyer in 1663 that, if his memory served, he had once demonstrated to him by word of mouth that existence pertains to the essence of substance, “without the help of other propositions” (Letter 12).

The main road is longer. Prop. 6 is demonstrated from three propositions: there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by Prop. 5), “that is (by Prop. 2), which have something in common with one another; and so (by Prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other” (Prop. 6, Dem.). The “that is” hides a step, which the note to the demonstration spells out. The Cited in line of Prop. 3 shows that it is cited nowhere else in the Ethics, though the second demonstration of Prop. 11 uses it without citing it. Prop. 5, by contrast, is the hub of the first half of the Part: its line lists eight places, among them the demonstrations of Props. 6, 8, 12, 13 and 14, and Garrett calls it the linchpin of the argument for a single substance (p. 62). Its demonstration cites Prop. 4 twice, Prop. 1, and “Def. 3 and Ax. 6”, and the last reference shows something else about the links. The first edition of 1677 prints per Defin. 3. & 6., a reference to the definition of God that makes no sense here; Van Vloten and Land corrected it to Ax. 6, on the true idea, which suits the words “considered truly”, and Gebhardt adopted their reading (OP p. 4; G II 48; Textgestaltung II 346). The translation and its links follow the corrected text, and the notes to the Latin record the readings of 1677: a reference that seems not to fit is worth checking there.

Prop. 1, “Substance is prior in nature to its affections,” is “evident from Defs. 3 and 5” (Prop. 1, Dem.), and its Cited in line has one entry, 1P5D. So far as the citations show, the first proposition of the Ethics exists to serve the fifth, as Bennett also observed (p. 148), and it serves at one of the two points in that demonstration that readers have contested. If two substances differed only in their affections, then, since substance is prior in nature to its affections, “if the affections are put to one side and it is considered in itself, that is (by Def. 3 and Ax. 6), considered truly, it cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another” (Prop. 5, Dem.). Bennett asked what entitles Spinoza to put the affections to one side, and could not rescue the step (p. 67); Leibniz’s objection to the other branch, discussed in the introduction to the First Part, is better known.

Taken together, the references of these demonstrations end in four definitions (Defs. 1, 3, 4 and 5) and five axioms (Axs. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7), with Def. 6 supplying the subject. Def. 2, on what is finite in its kind, Def. 7, on freedom, Def. 8, on eternity, and Ax. 3 are not cited in this proof (though the note to Prop. 7 compares its unstated premise with Ax. 3) and come into the argument later; Ax. 2 is never cited. A chain followed to its end shows what a conclusion depends on and what it does not, and where the weight falls: here on Def. 3, cited in six of the ten demonstrations, on the unstated principle that everything has a cause, and on Prop. 5.

The Cited in lines also lead the other way. Prop. 7 is cited in nine places, among them all three demonstrations of Prop. 11, so that all three proofs of God’s existence pass through it. The line after Prop. 11 names ten places, among them the demonstration that except God no substance can be or be conceived (Prop. 14), the corollary that God alone is a free cause (Prop. 17, Cor. 2), and, at the far end of the book, the demonstration that “God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love,” which appeals to “Prop. 11 and Def. 1 of Part I” to show that God’s idea of himself is the idea of his own cause (Part V, Prop. 35, Dem.). The chain followed backward from Prop. 11 to Def. 1 runs forward, in the end, to the intellectual love of God.

Descartes held that synthesis does not teach the way by which a thing was found. Following a chain backward is not the analysis he meant, but it travels the synthetic order in reverse, from the thing shown to what it rests on, and lets the reader see where the weight lies, where a step goes unstated and where interpreters have stopped. Spinoza claimed much for such reading: “For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves” (Part V, Prop. 23, Schol.). He also knew its limit. Of the demonstration in Part I that all things depend on God he wrote that, “although it is legitimate and placed beyond the hazard of doubt,” it “still does not affect our mind as much as when this same thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God” (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol.). The demonstrations are where the reader begins, not where Spinoza hoped he would end.

The introduction to the First Part follows, and after it the definitions with which the Ethics begins.