Ethica

ordine geometrico demonstrata

Ethics

demonstrated in geometrical order

Benedictus de Spinoza
ברוך שפינוזה

Latin text with an annotated English translation
and expository essays

Translated by Anthropic language models and facilitated by Benjamin V. Lehmann

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Preface

This book sets Spinoza's Latin text of the *Ethics* alongside an English translation, with notes to both, essays introducing each Part and several passages within the Parts, an introduction, twenty-seven letters to and from Spinoza in which he explains the *Ethics* and the doctrines behind it to its first readers, also in Latin and English, an epilogue on the later history of the work, appendices on the main lines of modern interpretation, on Spinoza's relation to Descartes and on his early *Short Treatise*, and aids to reading. It was made in an unusual way, and the reader is entitled to know how. The translation, the notes and the essays were written by Anthropic's Claude language models, working at the direction of Benjamin V. Lehmann in a version-controlled repository in November 2026. This preface describes what was done, the rules that governed it, and the safeguards that were put in place, so that the reader can judge how far to trust the result and where to look when in doubt.

The Latin text

The Latin is the digital transcription by Rudolf W. Meijer prepared for the *Corpus Corporum* of the University of Zurich, in classical orthography. It follows the text of Carl Gebhardt's edition of 1925, without the passages from the Dutch version of 1677 that Gebhardt prints within his Latin. The transcription was divided into units, one for each paragraph of the original, under the conventional citation scheme (E1P8 for Part I, Proposition 8; E1P8S2 for its second scholium; and so on), and each unit into numbered sentences. The translation refers to these sentences by number, so that the Latin is never retyped and the two texts can be aligned mechanically.

The transcription was then checked against the principal witnesses. These were the first edition, the *Opera Posthuma* of 1677, with its lists of errata, from a complete scan; the Dutch translation published in the same year, *De Nagelate Schriften*; Gebhardt's own text and his account of its constitution (*Textgestaltung*), from a scan of the 1925 volume; and the revision of Gebhardt's text by Wolfgang Bartuschat. The nineteenth-century editions of Bruder, Ginsberg and Van Vloten and Land, and Gentile's of 1915, were consulted where they bear on a reading. Every difference was listed and decided against the 1677 edition and Gebhardt's grounds. Where the transcription was wrong, it was corrected, and the 164 corrections are printed in the lettered notes to the Latin, together with the readings of the first edition wherever Gebhardt departs from it, and the readings of Bartuschat where he differs from Gebhardt. The lettered notes also give, with a translation, the passages found only in the Dutch version, and the identifications of quoted authors made by nineteenth-century editors. Gebhardt's page numbers are printed in the Latin column.

The translation

The aim was a single academic translation, as close to the Latin as English allows, with Spinoza's technical vocabulary rendered consistently, so that a reader without Latin can follow the argument term by term. A short set of binding conventions governed the work. Every sentence of the Latin is translated, and nothing that is not in the Latin enters the English text: no bracketed glosses and no inserted Latin, explanations being reserved for the notes. Spinoza's sentence divisions and his connectives are kept, with their logical force. The particles *sive* and *seu*, which usually introduce an equivalent description rather than an alternative, are rendered "or," so that the English reader meets the same ambiguity as the Latin one. Proposition statements are set in italic, as in 1677. Where a clean English sentence and fidelity to the Latin pull apart, fidelity wins, and a note says what is lost.

Consistency of terminology was secured by a glossary, which records the rendering adopted for each of 156 technical terms, the place where it first occurs and, for many, the alternatives considered or a note on the choice, and which every batch of translation was required to follow; the glossary is printed at the end of the volume. Twenty-three entries were left open during the translation and decided at the end, following an audit that checked every rendering of every glossary term across the text; the conventions adopted are recorded with the entries. A running log recorded which terms and doctrines had already been explained in a note, so that later notes could refer back rather than repeat, and which renderings had been decided case by case. The text was translated in forty-four batches, in the order of the work.

Existing English translations were not consulted while translating. Two public-domain translations, those of R. H. M. Elwes and W. Hale White, were kept in the repository for comparison after the fact only. Where a note mentions how another translator or editor has rendered a passage, it is because the note is about the interpretation of that passage.

The notes

There are two series of notes. The numbered notes, some four hundred in all, are the translator's notes to the English. They explain technical terms, point out where Spinoza is quoting or answering another author, record textual problems that affect the sense, and indicate where the text has been read in conflicting ways. The lettered notes, some two hundred and forty, are notes to the Latin, and record the textual matters described above. Quotations in Hebrew and Greek are given in the original script, never transliterated, and always translated; Hebrew is pointed where the source is pointed, and quotations from unpointed sources are left unpointed.

Every claim a note makes about another text, whether a quotation, a reference, a date or an attribution, was checked against a copy of that text held in the repository, and logged, with the evidence, in a verification record that now runs to over nine hundred entries. The texts used for this purpose include the works of Descartes in the edition of Adam and Tannery, Hobbes, Maimonides in the Judaeo-Arabic, Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew and Friedländer's English, Crescas, the Hebrew Bible and the Vulgate, the Greek and Latin classics, Bayle's article on Spinoza, Leibniz's notes on the *Ethics*, Spinoza's other works and letters, and a small number of modern studies. Where a claim could not be verified, it was removed or qualified. Copyrighted modern studies were used for reference only.

The essays

The essays are meant for a reader meeting the *Ethics* for the first time, or returning to it after a long interval. Each Part opens with an introduction that describes its place in the argument, its main doctrines and the difficulties a reader is likely to meet; and several essays stand within the Parts, at points where the argument changes direction or where a reader is most likely to need help: before the second half of Part I, before its Appendix, before the physical digression and the propositions on the will in Part II, before the Definitions of the Affects in Part III, before the portrait of the free man in Part IV, and before the propositions on the eternity of the mind in Part V. Each of these opens by saying what at that point in the text calls for comment, and closes by saying what the text does next. The essays are set apart from the text by a running head and a rule in the outer margin, and are listed separately in the contents. They quote the *Ethics* in the words of this translation, and their claims about other texts were verified in the same way as those of the notes.

The essays try to describe the main lines of interpretation without settling them. Spinoza's readers have disagreed about almost every doctrine of the book, and where they disagree the essays say so, name representative positions, and send the reader to the passages at issue. The appendices take up several of these disagreements at greater length.

What a reader should keep in mind

A translation made in this way has particular strengths and particular risks. Its strengths are consistency, completeness, and a record: every rendering of a technical term can be traced to the glossary, every textual decision to the collation, every claim in the notes to the verification log, and the whole history of the work is preserved. Its risks are those of any translation, together with one that is more specific: a language model can produce fluent and confident prose that is wrong, and fluency is not evidence of accuracy. The procedures described above were designed against that risk, by requiring that claims about texts be checked against the texts themselves and by recording the checks; but they do not replace the judgment of expert readers, and the work should be regarded as a draft until it has had such a review. Corrections are welcome, and the record makes them easy to trace and to make.

The layout

The Latin is printed on the left-hand page and the English on the right, aligned paragraph by paragraph and, within long paragraphs, by groups of sentences, using the reledmac and reledpar packages for LuaLaTeX. Spinoza's internal references ("by Prop. 7") are given in his abbreviated form; in the version of the book made for the screen they are links to the passages they cite, and in the version made for print they are followed by the page on which the cited passage begins. A guide for first-time readers and a note on the text follow this preface, and an introduction to the *Ethics* as a whole precedes the first Part.

A Guide for First-Time Readers

The Preface has said for whom the essays were written and where they stand. This guide suggests an order. The *Ethics* need not be read straight through as it is printed, and Spinoza himself provided a shorter way in: more than once he interrupts the demonstrations to address the reader in plain prose.

Before the text

Of the front matter, the first section of Abbreviations and Conventions should be read at once, since it explains Spinoza's abbreviated references and the compact form (1P11D, 3P11S) of the lines headed *Cited in*. The Note on the Text concerns chiefly the Latin. On Translating Spinoza's Vocabulary is worth reading before Part III, where the names of the affects begin, and at once by anyone who knows another translation, since it explains why *affectus* is "affect" here and *laetitia* "joy". The Chronology is for reference.

The Introduction comes next. Its last two sections give the plan of the five Parts and the advice, repeated in the introduction to Part I, to read enunciations and scholia before demonstrations; its historical sections may be read at any time. How to Read a Geometrical Demonstration opens by describing the edition's three aids to following the argument: the links or page numbers of Spinoza's references, the *Cited in* lines and the Synopsis of the Propositions. Its last section, which traces a chain of references from Part I, Prop. 11 back to the definitions, is best read with those propositions open, or after them.

Spinoza's own way in

Spinoza wrote some passages for readers not yet persuaded by demonstration. Before demonstrating the dictates of reason, he sets them out briefly, so that his meaning may be grasped more easily (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]); and after showing that mind and body do not act on each other, he writes: "I hardly believe that men can be induced to weigh them with an equal mind unless I confirm the matter by experience" (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]). With the prefaces and the two appendices, such passages make a short route through the book in Spinoza's own words, to be taken before the demonstrations or alongside Part I:

1. The Appendix to Part I [p. 101]. It opens by summarizing Part I, then traces the belief that nature acts for ends to two facts about human beings, that they are born ignorant of the causes of things and are conscious of their appetite for their own advantage, and the notions of good and evil, order and beauty, to the imagination.

2. The second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40 [p. 189], on the three kinds of knowledge, explained by the example of finding a fourth proportional. To understand by the third kind is, in Part V,

the mind's "highest virtue" (Part V, Prop. 25 [p. 505]).

3. The last paragraph of the scholium to Part II, Prop. 49 [p. 217], on what the denial of free will contributes to life: among other things, it teaches "to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no one, to envy no one."

4. The Preface to Part III [p. 229], with its resolve to "consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies," and the scholium to Prop. 2 [p. 235], which argues from sleepwalkers, drunkards and dreams that those who think they act from a free decree of the mind "dream with their eyes open."

5. The Preface to Part IV [p. 351], which defines bondage and says in what sense the book will speak of good and evil: in relation to "a model of human nature which we may look to."

6. The scholium to Part IV, Prop. 18 [p. 377], the dictates of reason in brief ("To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man"); and, against any impression that this is an ethics of renunciation, the second scholium to Prop. 45 [p. 411]: "Nothing, certainly, but grim and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves."

7. The Appendix to Part IV [p. 449], thirty-two short chapters that gather under main headings what had been "demonstrated by me piecemeal."

8. The Preface to Part V [p. 469], on the Stoics and Descartes; the scholium to Prop. 10 [p. 483], perhaps the most practical page of the book, on committing "sure principles of life" to memory against injury, fear and ambition; the scholium to Prop. 20 [p. 491], which gathers the remedies for the affects under five heads; and the last scholium [p. 523], on the wise man and the ignorant.

These passages do not replace the demonstrations, since what a scholium supplies is explained rather than demonstrated; but a reader who knows where the argument is going can follow its steps.

Reading the Parts

Then read the Parts in order, each after its introduction and with the essays where they stand. Some of the essays make a first reading lighter. The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 gathers in a few sentences what the first fifteen propositions have established, and a reader who has lost the thread can take it up again there. The essay before the physical digression of Part II says that a first reading need not master all its axioms, lemmas and postulates, and names those on which the later propositions chiefly draw. Part III defines the affects one by one in its scholia and restates them in order at its end; with the essay that explains their plan, the Definitions of the Affects can serve as a reference while the Part is read. The introduction to Part IV answers in advance some of the objections first-time readers raise against it, and the introduction to Part V separates the remedies of Props. 1–20 from the more disputed propositions on the eternity of the mind, which have an essay of their own before Prop. 21.

A few letters are best read with the passages they explain. Letter 12 [p. 541], on the infinite, reappears in part in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15. Letter 58 [p. 623] shares with the scholium to Part III, Prop. 2 the infant, the angry boy and the drunkard, and adds the stone that, conscious of its striving, would believe itself free. no text outside the *Ethics* states the physics of Part II more fully than Letter 32 [p. 611], with its worm in the blood, and Letter 19 [p. 553], to Blyenbergh, gives the account of evil found in the Preface to Part IV. Letters that cite a passage are listed after it, under *Cited in Letters*; these four cite none.

The appendices belong to a second stage. Most take up a question on which readers have divided, and all presuppose the passages they discuss, so most are best read after the Part they concern: Appendix A [p. 657] on substance and mode, Appendix B [p. 660] on the attributes, Appendix D [p. 667] on necessity and purpose and Appendix F [p. 677] on the principle of sufficient reason after Part I; Appendix C [p. 663] on mind and body after Part II; Appendix G [p. 680] on striving after Part III; Appendix H [p. 686] on virtue and the free man and Appendix K [p. 707] on right, power and the state after Part IV; Appendix E [p. 672] on the eternity of the mind after Part V. Appendix I [p. 692], on Spinoza and Descartes, and Appendix J [p. 700], on the *Ethics* and the *Short Treatise*, look back over the whole and are best left to the end, with the Epilogue [p. 652], on the book's readers from its prohibition to modern scholarship.

The Aids to Reading, after the appendices, serve every stage. Key Concepts follows each of its terms from the place where its sense is fixed through the Parts that use it, and each entry ends by naming the essays or appendices on its subject. The Summary Tables set out the order of being, the derivation of the affects, the three kinds of knowledge and the remedies, each row with the passage where the matter is stated; they are for review. The Synopsis of the Propositions gives every enunciation in order; read straight through for one Part, it shows the route without the demonstrations. After them come the Bibliography, the Glossary and the indexes, of which the Index of Subjects gives the principal places where each subject is discussed, in the essays and letters as well as the text.

A second reading can then turn to the demonstrations, in the way the essay on reading them describes.

Note on the Text

The Latin is the digital transcription by Rudolf W. Meijer prepared for the *Corpus Corporum* (University of Zurich), with classical orthography. It follows the text of Carl Gebhardt's edition (*Spinoza Opera*, vol. II, Heidelberg, 1925), without the passages of the Dutch version of 1677 that Gebhardt prints within it. Corrections to the transcription are printed in the lettered notes to the Latin, which also record the readings of the first edition, the *Opera Posthuma* of 1677 (including its lists of errata), wherever Gebhardt departs from it, with his grounds, and the readings of Wolfgang Bartuschat's revision of Gebhardt's text where it differs. They also give, with a translation, the passages found only in the Dutch version of 1677 (*De Nagelate Schriften*), which Gebhardt, following his view that the Dutch rests on an earlier draft of Spinoza's, prints in Dutch within his Latin text; and they carry the identifications of quoted authors that the transcription marks, nearly all of them C. H. Bruder's (1843). Gebhardt's page numbers are given in the Latin in the form [G II 47].

Homo is rendered "man" and "men" in the generic sense of the Latin, which includes women; where Spinoza means a male (*vir*), the context makes it plain.

The first edition sets the enunciations of propositions in italic, and this edition follows it. It does not italicize the terms being defined; the italics on defined terms here, on both sides, are an editorial aid inherited from the transcription.

Spinoza's internal references are given in his abbreviated form and are followed, in square brackets, by the page of this edition on which the passage cited begins. Numbered notes are the translator's notes to the English; lettered notes are notes to the Latin.

After each definition, axiom, postulate, lemma, proposition, demonstration, corollary or scholium that Spinoza cites elsewhere in the *Ethics*, a line in small type lists the places that cite it, in the order of the text, each with the page on which it begins. They are given in the compact form explained under Abbreviations and Conventions. A second line names the letters in this edition that cite the passage.

Abbreviations and Conventions

References to the *Ethics*

In the translation, Spinoza's internal references keep his own abbreviated form: "by Prop. 7", "by Ax. 4", "by Def. Aff. 19" (the definitions of the affects at the end of Part III), "by Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III", "by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part". In the Latin they stand as he wrote them ("per prop. 7.", "per aff. defin. 19."). Proposition headings are numbered in Roman figures, as in the first edition; the references, the notes, the essays and the lists of contents use Arabic figures.

The lines in small type that list the places citing a passage use a compact form, without the initial E (for *Ethics*): the number of the Part, then P for proposition, D for definition (1D3) or, after the item it belongs to, for demonstration (1P11D), A for axiom, Post for postulate, L for lemma, C for corollary, S for scholium, Ex for explanation, Alt for an alternative demonstration, DA for the definitions of the affects, GDA for their general definition, Pref for a preface and App for an appendix. A number after D, C or S distinguishes several of them (1P11D2, 2P40S2). So 3P11S is the scholium to Proposition 11 of Part III, and 4App7 the seventh chapter of the Appendix to Part IV.

Spinoza's other works

KV: *Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en des zelfs Welstand* (*Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*), cited by part and chapter. TTP: *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (1670), cited by chapter. TP: *Tractatus politicus* (unfinished; first printed in 1677), cited by chapter and section (TP II.8). The *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, the *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* and the *Metaphysical Thoughts* are cited by their English titles. The letters are numbered, as in the editions of Van Vloten and Land and of Gebhardt, in the order of their dates; the numbers of the 1677 edition, where they are needed, are given with its pages (OP pp. 515–517, Letter 37).

Editions

G: Carl Gebhardt (ed.), *Spinoza Opera*, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), cited by volume and page (G II 47). "Textgestaltung" is Gebhardt's account of the text, printed in each volume after the texts, cited in the same way (Textgestaltung II 346).

OP: *Opera posthuma* ([Amsterdam: Jan Rieuwertsz], 1677), the first edition of the *Ethics*, the *Political Treatise* and the letters, cited by page (OP p. 9).

NS: *De Nagelate Schriften van B. d. S.* ([Amsterdam: Rieuwertsz], 1677), the Dutch translation published with it, cited by page.

VVL[2], VVL[3]: J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land (eds.), *Opera quotquot reperta sunt* (The Hague: Nijhoff), 2nd edition 1895 and 3rd edition 1914, cited by volume and page (VVL[3] III 206).

AT: Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds.), *Œuvres de Descartes* (Paris: Léopold Cerf), cited by volume and page (AT VII 60; AT VIII-1 is the first part of volume VIII).

Other editions and translations are named by their editors or translators in the notes.

Notes and marks

Numbered notes are the translator's notes to the English. Lettered notes are notes to the Latin: they record the corrections made to the transcription, in the form "reading printed] *transcr.* reading of the transcription", followed by the reason; the readings of the first edition, the Dutch version and the later editions where they differ; and, with a translation, the passages found only in the Dutch version. A lettered note ending "[Bruder]" gives the identification of a quoted author made by C. H. Bruder in his edition of 1843 and carried by the transcription; one ending "[Meijer]", an identification marked "Me." in the transcription, which does not say whose it is. Elsewhere in the notes, "Meijer" or "W. Meijer" is Willem Meijer, whose Dutch translation of 1896 Gebhardt reports.

In the Latin, a mark such as [G II 47] shows where a page of Gebhardt's edition begins.

In the indexes, the numbers are pages (two joined by a dash, the pages of a passage or essay that runs over several), and n after a page marks a note on that page.

On Translating Spinoza's Vocabulary

A reader who sets this translation beside another will find some of Spinoza's terms rendered in unfamiliar ways: *affectus* as "affect" rather than "emotion", *laetitia* as "joy" rather than "pleasure", *fortitudo* as "strength of character" rather than "fortitude", *ingenium* as "temperament". This note gives the reasons: first the principles that governed the vocabulary, then the main terms, by kind. The renderings are listed in the glossary at the end of the volume, which records for many of them the alternatives considered or a note on the choice; the translator's notes explain many of the terms at their first important occurrence.

The comparisons are with the English translations of R. H. M. Elwes (1884) and W. Hale White (1883), which were kept with this edition and, as the Preface says, consulted only after the translation was made. They are cited to show other solutions and what follows from them: both were made for readers of their own day, and where they differ from this edition they mostly differ in judgment, not by error. Elwes is cited by the page of the second volume of his *Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, White by the page of the first edition of his *Ethic*; the place in the *Ethics* is given by a link to the passage in this edition.

Principles

The aim, as the Preface puts it, was a translation with Spinoza's technical vocabulary rendered consistently, "so that a reader without Latin can follow the argument term by term." The geometrical order makes this more than a matter of tidiness. Spinoza demonstrates by citing his definitions, and a citation works only if the reader can recognise in the demonstration the word that was defined. When he needs, late in Part IV, the virtue that restrains daring as much as fear, he calls it "an equally great virtue of mind, or strength of character (whose definition see in Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III)" (Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem. [p. 445]); when he demonstrates Part I, Prop. 2 [p. 31], he repeats the words of Ax. 5 [p. 29]: "the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other." A translation that varies its words at such places may read well sentence by sentence and still hide the argument. Elwes and White, as will be seen, vary them at just such places.

Hence the first rule: one English word for one Latin term. Its converse is harder to keep and accounts for many of the renderings below: an English word once given to a term is not used for another. "Joy" is reserved for *laetitia*, so *gaudium* is "gladness"; "fear" for *metus*, so *timor*, as the affect defined in the Definitions of the Affects, is "timidity"; "striving" for *conatus*, so that when

the ambitious "seek" honour (*ambire*, Part V, Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 483]) the verb is a different one.

The second rule follows Spinoza's own practice. He takes his words from common use and fixes their sense by definition: "my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose meaning from usage is not wholly at odds with the meaning in which I wish to use them" (Part III, Def. Aff. 20, Expl. [p. 327]). The translation does the same in English, choosing the word whose ordinary meaning is not wholly at odds with the definition and letting the definition do the rest. Where Spinoza takes over a traditional word and redefines it, the traditional English word is kept and a note gives his sense: "religion", "blessedness", "glory", and "piety" for *pietas*, which he defines as "the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason" (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]). A word that stated his sense outright would make the redefinition invisible. Nor is a word chosen because it fits a later theory: "self-esteem" was rejected for *acquiescentia in se ipso* because it brings a modern psychological sense with it.

Where the Latin is ambiguous, the English is left ambiguous in the same way, and nothing is added to the text to explain a term; explanations are kept for the notes. The first rule bends only where a Latin word plainly has distinct senses: *virtus* is "power" where, in Parts I and II, it means causal efficacy; *sentire* is "feel", "sense" or "think" according to the context; *ingenium* is "ingenuity" or "talent" where it means wit or ability. The glossary records these cases, so that the exceptions are as visible as the rule.

Terms of metaphysics

Involvere is always "involve", never "imply". A involves B when B is contained in the concept of A, so that A cannot be conceived without B: the cause of itself is that "whose essence involves existence" (Part I, Def. 1 [p. 25]), and knowledge of an effect "depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause" (Ax. 4 [p. 29]). "Imply" suggests a relation between propositions, which is not what Spinoza means. Elwes writes "involve" in Axiom 5 and "imply" in the demonstration of Prop. 2, where Spinoza repeats the axiom's words, so that the repetition disappears (Elwes, pp. 46–47); he has "imply" again in "No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals" (Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35]; Elwes, pp. 49–50). White has "involve" in both of the first places (White, pp. 2–3).

Ideatum, literally "the ideated", that of which the idea is an idea, is "object", with a note at its first occurrence (Part I, Ax. 6 [p. 29]). Elwes has "its ideate or object" there (Elwes, p. 46). White usually prefers a paraphrase, "that of which it is the idea", as in that axiom and four times in the scholium on the standard of truth (Part II, Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]; White, pp. 2, 89–90); it is exact, but it turns a noun into a clause in sentences that already carry several. "Object" has a cost. In scholastic usage, as the notes explain, a thing is "objectively" in the intellect when it is there as the content of an idea, so that the adverb points the opposite way from the noun: "A true idea must agree with its object (by Ax. 6), that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature" (Part I, Prop. 30, Dem. [p. 83]). "Object" also renders *obiectum* (Part II, Prop. 13 [p. 141]), but there the two Latin words name the same thing.

Res singularis is "singular thing", the term defined in Part II, Def. 7 [p. 123], whose second sentence uses a second term: "if several individuals so concur in one action that all are together the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing." An individual (*individuum*) is defined in the physical digression after Prop. 13 [p. 153] as a body composed

of bodies. White renders *res singulares* as "individual things", so that his definition considers a number of individuals "as a one individual thing" (White, p. 48). Elwes has "particular things" in the definition but "individual things" in Part III, Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 243] (Elwes, pp. 83, 136). Spinoza also speaks of particular things (*res particulares*, Part I, Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]), and treats them as close to singular ones: that demonstration of Part III cites this corollary. The translation keeps the two words apart nonetheless, so that the reader sees which one he wrote, and "singular" keeps the opposition to the universal, as when Part V sets the intuitive knowledge of singular things above "the universal knowledge which I have said is of the second kind" (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]).

Potentia and *potestas* are both "power". Spinoza distinguishes the power by which God and all things are and act from what is in someone's power, at his disposal, and argues that in God the two coincide: "Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily is" (Part I, Prop. 35 [p. 91]). Notes mark *potestas* where the difference matters, as at Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67] and in the Preface to Part V [p. 469]. Elwes and White also write "power" in most places, as in Prop. 35 (Elwes, p. 74; White, p. 37), but both have "control" in Part V, Prop. 3, Cor. [p. 475] (Elwes, p. 248; White, p. 255), which this edition renders "An affect, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind is acted on by it the less, the better it is known to us." As the note to the Preface to Part V says, the question of Part V is how far the affects are in our power in the second sense, and the answer is given in terms of the mind's power in the first. "Control" would separate the question from the answer, and would misrender *Dei potestas* in Part I.

Sub specie aeternitatis is "under a species of eternity". Elwes and White both have "under the form of eternity", at its first occurrence "under a certain form of eternity" (Part II, Prop. 44, Cor. 2 [p. 197]; Elwes, p. 117; White, p. 91). But "form" is needed for *forma*, which Spinoza uses throughout the book and with a definite sense: the form of man (Part II, Prop. 10 [p. 135]), the form that a composite body keeps while its parts change (Lemma 4 [p. 153]), "the form of the human body" (Part IV, Prop. 39, Dem. [p. 405]), "the form of love or hatred" (Part V, Prop. 2, Dem. [p. 475]). "Aspect" already renders *ratio* in "under the aspect of the good" (Part I, Prop. 33, Schol. 2 [p. 89]). *Species* means a look or appearance and also a kind, as when temperance and sobriety are "species of tenacity" (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]); "species" keeps both senses without choosing, as the note at the first occurrence says.

Mens is "mind" and *anima* "soul", and "soul" occurs only where the Latin has *anima*. Spinoza's word for the human mind, the idea of the body, is *mens*. *Anima* appears when he reports the views of others, those who "feign seats and dwelling places of the soul" (Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181]) and Descartes, who held that "the soul, or mind" is united to the pineal gland (Part V, Preface [p. 469]), and once in a passage on the affects of animals, of the "idea, or soul" of each individual (Part III, Prop. 57, Schol. [p. 309]). Elwes uses "soul" for *animus* as well, calling the affect in the General Definition "a passivity of the soul" (Elwes, p. 185); White uses it for *mens* when he writes of those who imagine God "composed of body and soul" (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 49]; White, p. 14). *Animus*, the ordinary word for the mind as the seat of feeling and resolve, is not a term Spinoza defines. It occurs mostly in set phrases, which are usually rendered with "mind": fluctuation of mind, contentment of mind, presence of mind. English has one word where Latin has two, and here the loss is accepted.

The theory of the affects rests on the striving. *Conatus* and *conari* are "striving" and "strive", noun and verb from one root as in the Latin: "The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself" (Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243]). The pairing matters because the noun is then identified with other terms: the striving related to the mind alone is will, related to mind and body together appetite (Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]); desire is defined so as to comprehend "all the strivings of human nature" (Def. Aff. 1, Expl. [p. 319]); and a later scholium speaks of "the striving, or desire" to eat and of "this desire, or striving" (Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]). White breaks the pair: "The effort by which each thing endeavours" (White, p. 114). Elwes keeps it in Prop. 7, "The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours" (Elwes, p. 136), but in the scholium of Prop. 59 defines one virtue with "strives" and the next with "endeavours", where Spinoza has the same verb, and renders "this desire, or striving" as "the desire or attempt" (Elwes, pp. 171–172). "Endeavour" would have served as well as "strive" if held to; what matters is that one word is. Where *conari* means only a writer's attempt, as when Descartes "tries to prove" something (Part V, Preface [p. 469]), it is "try".

Affectus is "affect". The definition makes affects a kind of affection: "By *affect* I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections" (Part III, Def. 3 [p. 231]). "Affect" keeps the tie with *affectio*, the word of the definition of mode (Part I, Def. 5 [p. 25]). It also covers the active affects (Part III, Props. 58–59 [p. 309]), which "passion" does not, and "passion" is needed for *passio*; "emotion" names a feeling, where Spinoza's affect is a change in the body's power of acting together with its idea. Elwes has "emotion" for *affectus* and "modifications" for *affectiones*, so that, although his definition calls emotions "the modifications of the body", the name of the affect no longer recalls the word that defines it (Elwes, pp. 45, 130). White has "affect" and "affections" (White, pp. 1, 106), and this edition follows the same course.

Laetitia and *tristitia* are "joy" and "sadness". Joy is "the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection", sadness the passion by which it passes to a lesser (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]), and joy is the passage itself, not the perfection reached (Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]). The same scholium names their bodily forms: joy related to mind and body together is *titillatio* or *hilaritas*, "pleasure" or "cheerfulness", according as one part of a man is affected more than the rest or all equally; sadness so related is *dolor* or *melancholia*, "pain" or "melancholy". These are "only species of joy or sadness" (Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]), and Part IV judges them separately: "Pleasure can be excessive and be evil; but pain can be good insofar as pleasure, or joy, is evil" (Part IV, Prop. 43 [p. 409]). If *laetitia* is "pleasure", as in Elwes, the species needs another name. Elwes calls *titillatio* "stimulation", *hilaritas* "merriment" and *dolor* "suffering" (Elwes, p. 138), and later "grief" and "mirth" (Elwes, pp. 174, 217). White has "joy" and "sorrow", with "pleasurable excitement", "cheerfulness", "pain" and "melancholy" (White, p. 117), close to this edition, though he too has "grief" for *dolor* in the explanation of Def. Aff. 3 (White, p. 162). How much the definition carries is shown by Spinoza's own hesitation. God, who "can pass neither to a greater nor to a lesser perfection", is affected by no joy (Part V, Prop. 17, Dem. [p. 489]); and when Spinoza applies the word to the love with which God loves himself, he adds, "if we may still use this word" (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]).

The names of the particular affects follow the second rule: the word Spinoza chose is kept, and the definition corrects it. *Gaudium* is "gladness", kept apart from joy. Elwes, having used "pleasure" for *laetitia*, uses "joy" for *gaudium* (Part III, Prop. 18, Schol. 2 [p. 259]; Def. Aff.

16 [p. 325]; Elwes, pp. 144, 177), so that "joy" in his version and in this one stand for different Latin words. *Conscientiae morsus* is "remorse", though Spinoza defines it as sadness at a past thing "which has turned out contrary to expectation" (Def. Aff. 17 [p. 325]), and a note says that it is not moral remorse. Elwes has "Disappointment", which fits the definition but not the word (Elwes, p. 177); White has "Gladness" and "Remorse" (White, pp. 123, 165). *Gloria* is "glory". Elwes has "Honour" in its definition (Def. Aff. 30 [p. 331]; Elwes, p. 181) and calls ambition "the immoderate desire of power" (Def. Aff. 44 [p. 337]; Elwes, p. 183), where White has "glory" (White, p. 172), though his definition of the affect itself has "Self-exaltation" (White, p. 169). The traditional word is needed in Part V, where blessedness "is called glory in the sacred books, and not without reason," and contentment of mind "in reality is not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. 25 and 30)" (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]).

Humanitas is "courtesy". Spinoza introduces it as the moderate form of a striving whose excess is ambition: "This striving to do something, and also to omit something, solely in order to please men, is called *ambition*, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the multitude that we do or omit certain things to our own harm or another's; otherwise it is usually called *courtesy*" (Part III, Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 271]). The definition identifies it with *modestia*, "the desire to do what pleases men and to omit what displeases them" (Def. Aff. 43 [p. 337]), and "modesty is a species of ambition" (Def. Aff. 48, Expl. [p. 337]). The affect is a desire to please, not a kindness, and "human kindness" was rejected for that reason. Elwes and White both have "Courtesy" in the definition (Elwes, p. 183; White, p. 172), but in the scholium where the word first appears Elwes has "kindliness" and White "humanity" (Elwes, p. 150; White, p. 131), and the reader cannot see that the definition takes up the scholium.

Ethical terms

The virtues that crown Part III are named in a single passage: "All the actions which follow from the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it understands I relate to *strength of character*, which I divide into *tenacity* and *nobility*." Tenacity (*animositas*) is "the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to preserve his being", nobility (*generositas*) "the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship"; temperance, sobriety and presence of mind are species of the first, modesty and clemency of the second (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]). *Fortitudo* is thus the genus of every action that follows from the mind's understanding, whether it serves the agent or another. The English "fortitude", White's word (White, p. 159), names a single virtue, endurance; "strength of character" covers the whole, and keeps the link with the "strong man" (*vir fortis*) who, at the close of the portrait of the free man, "hates no one" (Part IV, Prop. 73, Schol. [p. 449]). For the species, "courage" narrows *animositas* to the facing of danger, though temperance and sobriety belong to it; "strength of mind" would be confused with *animi fortitudo*; and "generosity" means liberality in English and recalls Descartes' *générosité*, from which, as the essay before the Definitions of the Affects shows, Spinoza's *generositas* differs entirely. "Tenacity", holding fast to one's own being, and "nobility" were chosen instead.

Spinoza refers back to the scholium for the definition of *fortitudo* (Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem. [p. 445]) and of *animositas* (Prop. 69, Schol. [p. 445]), relates what was shown about freedom "to strength of character, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III), to tenacity and nobility" (Prop. 73, Schol. [p. 449]), and in Part V considers "all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility" (Part V, Prop. 41 [p. 521]). In Elwes, *fortitudo*

is "strength of character" in the defining scholium, "firmness" in Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem., "strength" in Prop. 73, Schol., and "firmness of mind" in Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523] (Elwes, pp. 171, 233, 235, 269); *animositas* is "courage", but "valour" in Def. Aff. 48, Expl. (Elwes, p. 184); *generositas* is "highmindedness", but "nobility of character" in Prop. 73, Schol., and "kindness" in Part IV, Prop. 46 [p. 413] (Elwes, pp. 235, 220). White keeps "generosity" except in Def. Aff. 48, Expl., where it becomes "nobility of soul" (White, p. 173); and in Part IV, Prop. 69, Dem. he renders *animi virtus seu fortitudo* as "The virtue or strength of mind", giving *fortitudo* the words he uses for *animositas* in the corollary on the same page (White, p. 236), so that the genus and its species cannot be told apart.

Acquiescentia in se ipso is "self-contentment", and *animi* or *mentis acquiescentia* "contentment of mind". The root sense is coming to rest (*quies*), and the joy is that of a man who contemplates himself and his power of acting (Part III, Def. Aff. 25 [p. 327]). Part IV calls it "in truth the highest thing we can hope for" (Part IV, Prop. 52, Schol. [p. 419]), and Part V, Prop. 27 [p. 507] derives "the greatest contentment of mind there can be" from the third kind of knowledge, proving it from the definition of self-contentment: "(by Def. Aff. 25) from this kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment there can be" (Dem. [p. 507]). The citation works only if the English word is recognisably the same in both places. In Elwes the affect is "self-complacency" in Part III, Prop. 30, Schol. [p. 271] and "Self-approval" in the definition, and what Part V derives is "acquiescence" and "acquiescence of spirit" (Elwes, pp. 151, 178, 261, 265). White has "contentment with one's self", "self-approval" and "Self-satisfaction" in Part III, and "peace of mind" and "repose of mind" in Part V (White, pp. 132, 149, 167, 271, 277). "Peace of mind" was rejected here because it loses the reflexive *in se ipso*.

Ingenium is "temperament", a man's characteristic cast of mind. The word carries one of the central observations of Part III, that "each by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament" (Part III, Prop. 31, Schol. [p. 275]), to which Spinoza returns when he describes the man who acts from affect alone (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]) and when he shows that the same appetite is, in a man led by reason, the virtue called piety (Part V, Prop. 4, Schol. [p. 477]); and "Each one judges from his own temperament what is good" (Part IV, Prop. 70, Dem. [p. 445]). The sentence of Part III sets *natura* and *ingenium* side by side, and the English must keep them apart. Elwes renders *ingenium* as "natures" in the Appendix to Part I, then as "individual disposition", "fancy" and "inclinations" (Elwes, pp. 75, 152, 212, 269); White as "mind" and "way of thinking" (White, pp. 39, 133), so that *ingenium* and *mens* coincide in English. Where it means wit, as with those who wished "to show off their ingenuity" in assigning ends (Part I, Appendix [p. 103]), the English says so.

Small words

Sive and *seu* are rendered "or", never "that is" or "in other words". They usually introduce an equivalent description of the same thing rather than an alternative, but the strength of the equivalence varies, and the translation leaves the reader to judge it, as the Latin reader had to. White writes "that is to say" for them in Part I, Ax. 5 and Prop. 2, Dem. (White, pp. 2–3), the phrase he also uses for *hoc est*; Elwes leaves *sive* out of the axiom and writes "in other words" in the demonstration (Elwes, pp. 46–47). Spinoza has *hoc est* when he means "that is", and one demonstration can contain both: singular things are modes, "that is (by Prop. 34 of Part I), things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God", and no thing has in itself "anything by which it could be destroyed, or which takes its existence away" (Part III, Prop.

6, Dem. [p. 243]). Sometimes the equivalence is plainly loose: the free man "chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, as combat" (Part IV, Prop. 69, Cor. [p. 445]), though presence of mind was named in Part III as one species of tenacity among several. "God, or nature" (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]; Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 361]) leaves the reader to weigh the equivalence in the same way.

Quatenus is "insofar as", and is not varied for elegance. It restricts what is said to a respect in which a thing is considered, and the argument depends on these restrictions at every stage: "The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect" (Part IV, Prop. 14 [p. 373]). Elwes renders the first *quatenus* "by virtue of being true" and the second "in so far as" (Elwes, p. 198), turning a restriction into a cause and losing the parallel on which the proposition turns; White keeps "in so far as" in both places (White, p. 190). Small as they are, these words carry the logic of the book.

Chronology

Dates are those of Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life* (2nd ed., 2018), with his qualifications; Leibniz's visit is dated by a note of his of November 1676 reported by Gerhardt (*Philosophische Schriften* I 118), and the events of 1678 are from Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment* (2001), pp. 291–292; the publication of the *Short Treatise* in 1862 is from Van Vloten's *Supplementum* (1862) and Gebhardt's Textgestaltung (G I 411–413).

1632	Born in Amsterdam in November (on the 24th, according to his early biographer Colerus), the second son of Michael d'Espinoza and Hanna Deborah Senior; named Bento, in Hebrew Baruch.
1638	5 November: death of his mother.
1649	September: death of his elder brother Isaac. Bento probably leaves his formal studies for his father's import and export business in late 1649 or soon after.
1653–1654	His stepmother Esther dies on 24 October 1653, and his father five months later. With his younger brother Gabriel he carries on the business, as the firm of Bento y Gabriel de Spinoza.
c. 1654–1658	Learns Latin at the school of Franciscus van den Enden, perhaps from about 1654 or 1655 (possibly not until 1657), and attends it until early 1658.
1656	March: has himself declared an orphan, and a guardian appointed by the Orphan Masters of Amsterdam, to free himself from the debts of his father's estate. 27 July: the governors of the Portuguese-Jewish congregation pronounce a *herem*, a ban, against him.
Before 1659	Studies at the University of Leiden, living there or visiting it; there is no record of his enrolment.
1659–1660	In Amsterdam, works on the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, which he abandons in late 1659 or early 1660, and begins the *Short Treatise*.
1661	Summer: moves to Rijnsburg, near Leiden, where Henry Oldenburg visits him in mid-July. Works on the *Short Treatise* through 1661 and into 1662; by the end of 1661 he is at work on the early parts of the *Ethics*.
1663	Spring: moves to Voorburg, into the house of Daniel Tydeman (end of April). Autumn: Jan Rieuwertsz publishes his *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy*, Parts I and II, demonstrated in the geometrical manner, with the *Metaphysical Thoughts* as an appendix, the only writings he published under his name.
1665	Autumn: sets aside the *Ethics*, then in three parts, to write the *Theological-Political Treatise*.
1669–1670	Moves to The Hague at the end of 1669 or early in 1670. The *Theological-Political Treatise*, printed by Rieuwertsz in Amsterdam without the author's name and with a false imprint ("Hamburg, Henricus Künraht"), reaches the public early in 1670.
1671	May: moves to the house of Hendrik van der Spyck on the Paviljoensgracht, his last home.

1672 August: a mob in The Hague kills Johan and Cornelis de Witt. By his own account to Leibniz, Spinoza wanted to put up a placard reading *ultimi barbarorum* near the place, but his landlord locked the house.

1673 February: offered the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg by Johann Ludwig Fabritius on behalf of the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig; after a month he declines. Late July: travels to the French camp at Utrecht, where he stays about three weeks.

1674 19 July: the Court of Holland bans the *Theological-Political Treatise*, together with Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Lodewijk Meyer's *Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres*.

1675 Late July: goes to Amsterdam to have the *Ethics* printed, and after two weeks stops the printing.

1676 By the middle of the year at work on the *Political Treatise*, which remains unfinished at his death. November: Leibniz visits him in The Hague.

1677 21 February, a Sunday: dies in The Hague, of consumption according to his friends; buried on 25 February at the New Church. By the end of the year his posthumous works exist in Latin and in Dutch, the *Opera posthuma* and *De Nagelate Schriften*.

1678 January: Rieuwertsz begins to put copies of both into circulation. June: the States of Holland and West Friesland ban the book.

1862 The *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*, known until then only by report and from a summary that Eduard Boehmer published in 1852, is published by Johannes van Vloten with a Latin translation, from a manuscript found by the bookseller Frederik Muller and a second lent by Adriaan Bogaers.

Introduction

The *Ethics* is one of the few books in the history of philosophy that try to say everything at once. It begins with God, proceeds through the nature of the human mind and the origin of the emotions, and ends with an account of human freedom and of the mind's highest happiness, and it does all this in the form of a geometrical treatise, with definitions, axioms and numbered propositions, each demonstrated from those before it. It was written by a man who had been expelled from his religious community in his early twenties, who published only one book under his own name in his lifetime, and who did not dare to publish this one. It appeared a few months after his death, without his name, under his initials; within a year it had been banned by the States of Holland. For a century it was read chiefly by those who wished to refute it. Since then it has been read as the purest expression of philosophical rationalism, as a religious work and as an atheist one, as the foundation of a modern science of human nature and as a guide to life.

This introduction tries to give the reader what is needed to begin. It describes Spinoza's life and the world in which he wrote, the making of the *Ethics* and its publication, Spinoza as an author, and the argument of the book as a whole. Each Part has an introduction of its own, which describes its argument in detail; the epilogue describes the later history of the book, and the appendices take up some of the principal questions of interpretation.

A life

Baruch de Spinoza, who later signed himself Benedictus, was born in Amsterdam in November 1632, into the community of Portuguese Jews in that city. The community kept its records in Portuguese; its school taught Hebrew, the Bible and Rashi's commentary, and the Talmud, and translated the weekly portion of the Law into Spanish (Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, 113–114). Spanish and Portuguese were the languages of the community, and Hebrew the language of its learning. He learned Latin later, according to his early biographer Johannes Colerus from Franciscus van den Enden, a former Jesuit who kept a school in Amsterdam and who was reputed to teach his pupils more than Latin. His father, Michael, was a merchant who had served on the community's governing board; when he died early in 1654, a few months after Spinoza's stepmother, Spinoza, at twenty-one, found himself running the family's trading business, which was heavily in debt, and he carried it on with his younger brother Gabriel under the name of Bento y Gabriel de Spinoza (Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 98–101).

On 27 July 1656, when he was twenty-three, the leaders of the community pronounced a ban (*herem*) against him. The text, which survives in Portuguese, declares that the leaders had long known of "the evil opinions and acts of Baruch de Espinoza," had tried by various means and promises to turn him from his evil ways, and, receiving every day more news of "the horrible heresies which he practised and taught, and the monstrous deeds which he did," had resolved with the counsel of the rabbis that he be excommunicated and expelled from the people of Israel. The ban curses him by day and by night, lying down and rising up, going out and coming in, and it ends with an order: "that no one may communicate with him orally or in writing, nor show him

any favour, nor stay with him under the same roof, nor come within four cubits of him, nor read any paper made or written by him" (Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, 114–116). What the heresies were the text does not say. An early French life of Spinoza tells of two young men who pressed him for his real opinions, and reports his answer: that, finding nothing immaterial or incorporeal in the Bible, he saw no difficulty in believing that God is a body; that the Old Testament says nothing of the creation of angels; and that wherever Scripture speaks of the soul it means simply life, so that nothing can be found in it to support the soul's immortality (Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, 5–6). Whatever he said in Amsterdam, the doctrines of the *Ethics* and the *Theological-Political Treatise* make it unsurprising that the community found it intolerable.

Spinoza left Amsterdam some years later. In 1661 he was living at Rijnsburg near Leiden, where Henry Oldenburg, of the Royal Society in London, visited him and began a correspondence that would last, with interruptions, until Spinoza's death (Letter 1). In 1663 he moved to Voorburg, near The Hague, and, when the *Theological-Political Treatise* was in the press, to The Hague itself, where he lived for the rest of his life, from 1671 in a rented room in the house of the painter Hendrik van der Spyck (Nadler, pp. 334–335). In 1672, the year of the French invasion of the Republic, a mob in The Hague murdered the Grand Pensionary, Johan de Witt, and his brother Cornelis. Spinoza told Leibniz, who visited him four years later, that on the day of the murders he had wanted to go out at night and post a placard near the place reading *ultimi barbarorum*, roughly "the greatest of barbarians," but that his host had locked the house to keep him from going out, "for he would be exposed to being torn to pieces" (Nadler, p. 356). According to Colerus, he had learned "to make glasses for telescopes, and for some other uses," and lived by it, and a considerable number of the lenses he had polished were found among his effects after his death; his letters discuss the methods of polishing lenses as well as the optics of Descartes and Huygens (Letter 32 [p. 611]). He never married and held no office, and in 1673 he declined the offer of a professorship at Heidelberg made to him on behalf of the Elector Palatine (Letter 48; VVL[3] III 171). He died at The Hague on Sunday, 21 February 1677, at the age of forty-four, in the presence of a physician from Amsterdam, probably his friend Lodewijk Meyer (Nadler, p. 407); Colerus says that he had been troubled with a disease of the lungs for more than twenty years (Colerus, *Life*).

The picture of Spinoza as a solitary has been exaggerated. He had friends in Amsterdam who read his work in manuscript and met to discuss it: in February 1663 one of them, Simon de Vries, wrote to tell him that a group of them were reading his propositions in order, one of them reading, explaining and demonstrating each in turn, and writing to him about what they could not understand (Letter 8 [p. 531]). He corresponded with Oldenburg and, through him, with Robert Boyle on chemistry; with a merchant of Dordrecht, Willem van Blyenbergh, troubled by the problem of evil (Letters 18–24, 27 [p. 549]); with a young nobleman, Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, who had studied his work in manuscript; and, on a question of optics, with Leibniz (Letters 45–46). The correspondence that survives, published in the *Opera Posthuma*, is one of the best guides to the *Ethics* that exists.

The Republic and the new philosophy

The Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century was a wealthy commercial state and, by the standards of its time, a tolerant one. Its presses printed books that could not be printed elsewhere, and it had been for some twenty years the home of Descartes, who published most of his works there. By the 1650s the new philosophy of Descartes had been taken up by some of the profes-

sors at Leiden and Utrecht and had provoked a long controversy with the orthodox Reformed theologians, who saw in it a threat to Aristotelian philosophy and to the theology built on it.

Spinoza was formed by this philosophy. His first published book, which appeared in 1663 and was the only one to bear his name in his lifetime, was a geometrical exposition of the first two parts of Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy*, with an appendix of *Metaphysical Thoughts*. It had begun, he told Oldenburg, as a set of dictations of the second part of Descartes' *Principles* "in geometrical order" for a young man "to whom I did not wish to teach my own opinions openly"; his friends asked him to treat the first part in the same way, which he did in two weeks, and then to let them publish the whole, on the condition that one of them would add a preface warning readers that the author did not accept everything in it as his own (Letter 13; VVL[3] III 44). The preface was written by Lodewijk Meyer, and it says that the author holds, among other things, that the will is not distinct from the intellect, and that the faculty of affirming and denying is a fiction.

The political setting mattered as much as the philosophical one. In 1665 Spinoza interrupted his work on the *Ethics* to write a treatise on the interpretation of Scripture, and he told Oldenburg his reasons: the prejudices of the theologians, which more than anything prevent men from applying their minds to philosophy; the opinion of the common people, who did not cease to accuse him of atheism; and "the freedom of philosophizing and of saying what we think," which he wished to defend in every way, and which was being suppressed by the excessive authority and petulance of the preachers (Letter 30; VVL[3] III 117). The *Theological-Political Treatise* appeared anonymously in 1670, with a false imprint, and argued that the freedom to philosophize could be granted without harm to piety or to the peace of the state, and could not be taken away without destroying both. Its argument for the freedom of thought and expression rested on a political philosophy that began, like Hobbes's, from natural right; but Spinoza insisted on the difference. "With regard to politics, the difference between me and Hobbes, which you ask about, consists in this: that I always keep natural right intact" (Letter 50 [p. 617]).

The book was answered and denounced in print; all who refuted it, Bayle later wrote, had found in it the seeds of atheism (Bayle, "Spinoza," 1820 ed. XIII 418). The freedom on which Spinoza had counted was never secure, and the *Ethics*, which he was finishing in these years, was written in the knowledge of it.

The making of the Ethics

The *Ethics* was long in the making. In 1661, writing to Oldenburg, Spinoza already defined God as "a being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite, or supremely perfect, in its kind," and explained what he meant by an attribute (Letter 2; VVL[3] III 5). By 1663 his friends in Amsterdam were reading a draft of the opening propositions. In June 1665 he wrote that he would soon send part of "the third part of our philosophy," "up to about the eightieth proposition" (Letter 28; VVL[3] III 113); at that time the work was planned in three parts, and a survival of that plan has been detected in a cross-reference in Part II, which in the first edition refers to "the third Part" for a doctrine that appears in Part IV. Work on the *Ethics* was then interrupted by the *Theological-Political Treatise*, and when the book was finished it had five Parts.

By 1675 the book was finished, and Spinoza went to Amsterdam to have it printed. He explained to Oldenburg what happened next. "While I was occupied with this, a rumour spread everywhere that a certain book of mine about God was in the press, and that in it I was trying to show that there is no God." Certain theologians took the occasion to complain of him to

the Prince and the magistrates, and the "stupid Cartesians," to clear themselves of the suspicion of favouring him, did not cease to denounce his opinions. Told by trustworthy people that the theologians were lying in wait for him everywhere, he decided to put off the publication until he saw how matters would turn out (Letter 68; VVL[3] III 218). He never saw it printed.

After his death his friends, among them the publisher Jan Rieuwertsz, gathered his manuscripts and published them at the end of 1677 as *B. D. S. Opera Posthuma*, with only his initials on the title page. The volume contained the *Ethics*, the unfinished *Political Treatise* and *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, a selection of letters, and an unfinished Hebrew grammar. A Dutch translation, *De Nagelate Schriften*, appeared at the same time; it rests in places on a different, probably earlier, form of the text, and its readings are recorded in the notes to the Latin of this edition. In June 1678 the States of Holland and West Friesland banned the book, declaring that it contained "very many profane, blasphemous and godless doctrines," by which simple readers might be led from the only true way of salvation and the principal articles of the Christian faith might be shaken (Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, 179).

Spinoza's other works

The *Ethics* is best read with some knowledge of the rest of Spinoza's work, which is small. Besides the exposition of Descartes of 1663 and the *Theological-Political Treatise* of 1670, the *Opera Posthuma* contained the unfinished *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, an early work on method which promises a philosophy and breaks off before reaching it; the *Political Treatise*, which applies the principles of the *Ethics* to the constitution of monarchies and aristocracies and breaks off at the beginning of the chapter on democracy; a selection of letters, both to and from Spinoza; and a grammar of the Hebrew language. A *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*, an early version of some of the doctrines of the *Ethics* that survives only in Dutch, was not published until 1862. Of these the letters and the *Theological-Political Treatise* are the most useful to a reader of the *Ethics*: the letters because Spinoza explains himself in them to correspondents who had read his work and had difficulties with it (twenty-seven letters of his correspondence are translated after the text of the *Ethics* in this edition), and the *Treatise* because it treats at length, in a more accessible form, many of the themes the *Ethics* treats briefly, the nature of religion, the interpretation of Scripture, the meaning of words like "law" and "the will of God," and the relation between philosophy and theology.

Spinoza's reading

The inventory of Spinoza's possessions made after his death survives, and with it a list of his books, about a hundred and sixty in all (Freudenthal, *Lebensgeschichte*, 160–164). It shows a library small even for a scholar of modest means, and a mind of wide range. There are the tools of a Hebrew scholar: Buxtorf's rabbinic Bible, a Hebrew concordance, a rabbinic dictionary, a Passover prayer book, and the *Guide of the Perplexed* of Maimonides in a Venice edition. There is a Bible in Spanish and Calvin's *Institutes* in Spanish translation. There are several works of Descartes, Hobbes's *Elementa Philosophica*, Machiavelli, Grotius, and the *Dialogues of Love* of Leone Ebreo. There are Euclid, Diophantus and Viète, Huygens's treatise on the pendulum clock, works of Boyle on the spring of the air and on hydrostatics, and books on anatomy. And there are the Latin classics he read and sometimes quoted: Ovid, Virgil, Tacitus, Livy, Cicero's letters, Seneca's letters and tragedies, Epictetus, Martial and Petronius, along with the Spanish poets Quevedo and Góngora.

Some of these books can be seen at work in the *Ethics*. Descartes is its constant interlocutor, named three times and present everywhere. Maimonides lies behind its discussions of the divine attributes and of final causes, as the notes point out. Hobbes is the background of its political scholia, though Spinoza insisted on the difference. Ovid supplies the line that states the problem of Part IV, and Seneca, Tacitus and Terence are quoted or echoed in the notes and scholia. A reader who knows the books Spinoza read will hear more in the *Ethics* than one who does not, and the notes to this edition try to make some of these voices audible.

Spinoza as an author

Spinoza wrote the *Ethics* in Latin, the language of learned Europe, which he had learned as an adult. It was not his first language, nor his second. He grew up speaking Portuguese and Spanish, read and wrote Hebrew, and lived his adult life among Dutch speakers; in a letter written in Dutch to Blyenbergh, he said that he wished he could write "in the language in which I was brought up," since he could perhaps express his thoughts better in it (Letter 19 [p. 559]; VVL^3 III 70). His Latin is plain and precise, without ornament, often repetitive, and dense with the technical vocabulary of the scholastic and Cartesian philosophy he had studied: substance, attribute, mode, essence, existence, cause, idea. He uses this vocabulary to say things the scholastics would have rejected, and the reader must learn from his definitions what he means by words they also used.

The form of the book reflects the man. The geometrical order allowed Spinoza to state his conclusions without rhetoric and to rest each of them on reasons the reader could check. It also concealed, behind the impersonal sequence of propositions, the passion with which some of them were held. That passion breaks out in the scholia and prefaces, where Spinoza argues, mocks and exhorts, and where the reader meets the author of the *Theological-Political Treatise*, a writer of great polemical force. The Appendix to Part I and the Prefaces to Parts III, IV and V are among the finest pages he wrote.

Spinoza was cautious, and he did not publish what he could not publish safely. The *Ethics* itself is careful in its language. It speaks of God on nearly every page, quotes Scripture where Scripture agrees with it, and uses the words of theology, "salvation," "blessedness," "the love of God," "the spirit of Christ," in senses it defines for itself. Readers have disagreed about whether this language is a disguise or an honest use of old words for new things. The notes and essays of this edition point out where the question arises, and take the view that Spinoza meant what he defined his words to mean.

The argument of the book

The *Ethics* is divided into five Parts. The first, "Of God," argues that there is only one substance, God, which exists necessarily and has infinitely many attributes, of which we know thought and extension; that everything else is a mode of this substance; that everything follows from the nature of God with the necessity with which the properties of a triangle follow from its nature; and that God does not act for ends. The second, "Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind," derives from this the doctrine that the human mind is the idea of the human body, a mode of thought corresponding to a mode of extension, and builds on it a theory of perception, imagination and memory, of error, and of three kinds of knowledge: imagination, reason and intuition. The third, "Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects," treats the emotions as natural things, to be understood like lines, planes and bodies, and derives all of them from the striving of each thing to persevere in its being and from the three primary affects of desire, joy and sadness. The fourth,

"Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects," explains why human beings are subject to their passions and why knowledge of the good is so often powerless against them, and sets out what reason prescribes: an ethics of self-preservation that turns out to be an ethics of community. The fifth, "Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom," shows what the mind can do against the passions, and argues that the mind's highest good is the intellectual love of God, in which its freedom and blessedness consist, and that something of the mind is eternal.

Several convictions run through the whole. The first is that everything is intelligible: everything has a cause, or reason, for its existence or non-existence, and to understand a thing is to know its cause. The second is that human beings are part of nature, and are to be understood by the same principles as everything else; there is no "dominion within a dominion." The third is that the mind and the body are one thing, conceived under two attributes, so that neither acts on the other and the life of the mind is the life of the body seen from within. The fourth is that there is no free will, if that means a power of acting without a cause, and that freedom is something else: acting from the necessity of one's own nature, which for a human being means acting from understanding. The fifth is that understanding is not only the means to the good life but its substance: the more we understand, the more powerful, the more active and the more joyful we are.

These convictions make the *Ethics* a single argument. Its metaphysics is not a preface to its ethics but the ground of it, and its ethics is the point of its metaphysics. The reader who wants to know how to live is sent first to learn what God is, because the answer to the practical question depends on the answer to the theoretical one; and the reader who wants to know what God is will find that the answer has consequences for how to live. The book's last sentence, that "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare," refers to both.

On reading the Ethics

The *Ethics* is difficult, and readers should not be discouraged if they find the first Part hard going. It may help to read each Part first for its enunciations and scholia, which state and explain the conclusions, and only then for its demonstrations; to follow Spinoza's references back to the propositions he cites, which in this edition are linked or given with their page; and to read the introduction to each Part before the Part itself. The notes explain technical terms, point out where Spinoza is answering another author, and indicate where the text has been read in different ways. The glossary at the end records the English adopted for Spinoza's technical vocabulary.

The Latin is given alongside the English, passage by passage, so that readers with some Latin can see what lies behind the translation, and the notes to the Latin record the readings of the first edition and the Dutch translation where they differ from the text printed here. A note on the text, before this introduction, describes the sources of the Latin.

Above all, it is worth remembering that the *Ethics* was written to be useful. Spinoza thought that the knowledge it contains could change the life of the person who acquired it, freeing him from fear, hatred and superstition, and giving him a joy that nothing could take away. Whether he was right is a question the reader can only answer by reading it.

How to Read a Geometrical Demonstration

Descartes once remarked that geometers divide their propositions small for a purpose: "propositionum minuta distinctio ad hoc est parata, ut facile citari atque ita vel nolentibus in memoriam reduci possint" ("the minute division of the propositions is designed so that they can easily be cited, and so recalled to mind even for the unwilling", AT VII 157). The *Ethics* is built to be cited. Its two hundred and fifty-nine propositions are tied together by more than fifteen hundred references in Spinoza's text, and almost every demonstration names, by number, what it rests on. The introduction to the First Part, which follows this essay, describes the parts of the geometrical form and its models. This essay turns to practice: what definitions and axioms do for Spinoza, why so much of the argument lies in the scholia, how his method stands to Euclid's and to Descartes's account of the geometrical order, and how to follow one chain of references, from Part I, Prop. 11 back to the definitions.

The edition gives three aids for this. Each of Spinoza's references, kept in his abbreviated form ("by Prop. 7"), is a link to the passage it cites; in the printed book it is followed instead, in square brackets, by the page on which that passage begins, and in the web edition pointing at it shows the opening of the passage. After every element cited elsewhere in the *Ethics*, a line in small type headed *Cited in* lists the places that cite it, in the order of the text and in the compact form explained under Abbreviations and Conventions (1P11D is the demonstration of Part I, Prop. 11); a second line names any letters in this edition that cite it. And the Synopsis of the Propositions, at the end of the book, gives every enunciation in order, with its page or its link. The references lead backward, from a proposition to its grounds; the *Cited in* lines lead forward, from a principle to its uses; the Synopsis shows the whole route at once.

The order and the manner of demonstrating

The geometrical exposition at the end of Descartes's Second Replies was his objectors' idea: they had asked him to set out definitions, postulates and axioms and conclude the whole matter in the geometrical manner, so that the reader might take it in as if at a single glance (AT VII 128). His reply is more doubtful about the form than one might expect. "Duas res in modo scribendi geometrico distinguo, ordinem scilicet, & rationem demonstrandi" ("In the geometrical manner of writing I distinguish two things, the order and the manner of demonstrating", AT VII 155). The order requires only that what comes first be known without help from what follows, and that the rest be demonstrated from what precedes alone. The manner is twofold. Analysis shows the way by which the thing was found, so that an attentive reader makes it his own as if he had found it himself, but it cannot compel a resisting one. Synthesis goes the opposite way, through a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, showing that whatever is denied is contained in what went before, "sicque a lectore, quantumvis repugnante ac pertinaci, assensionem extorqueat" ("and so wrings assent from the reader, however resisting and obstinate"); but it satisfies less, "quia modum quo res fuit inventa non docet" ("because it does not teach the way in which the thing was found", AT VII 156).

Synthesis, Descartes thought, suits metaphysics less well than geometry. In geometry the first notions agree with the senses and are readily granted, and the only difficulty is drawing consequences, for which the numbered propositions help (AT VII 156–157); in metaphysics the first notions are the difficulty, since the prejudices of the senses resist them (AT VII 157). The exposition he appended bears the mark of this doubt. Its first proposition, that God's existence is known from his nature alone, is demonstrated in two steps, "per def. 9" and "per axio. 10"; he adds that its conclusion can be self-evident to those free of prejudice, "sed quia non facile est ad tantam perspicacitatem pervenire, aliis modis idem quaeremus" ("but because it is not easy to reach such clarity of sight, we shall seek the same thing in other ways"), and proceeds to an *a posteriori* proof (AT VII 166–167). The reader of the *Ethics* will meet the same pattern at Part I, Prop. 11: a two-step demonstration followed by two more, and a scholium saying that the *a posteriori* one was given "so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily" (Part I, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 43]).

Lodewijk Meyer's preface to Spinoza's geometrical version of Descartes's *Principles* (1663) calls the method of the mathematicians, in which conclusions are demonstrated from definitions, postulates and axioms, the best and surest way of seeking and teaching truth (G I 127). Descartes, Meyer says, wrote in the analytic way; readers who were not mathematicians could repeat Descartes's opinions but not demonstrate them, and Meyer had long wished that someone would put them into synthetic order, "more Geometris familiari" ("in the manner familiar to geometers", G I 129). Spinoza did this for Descartes. In the *Ethics* he did it for himself, using throughout a long work of metaphysics the form Descartes had thought ill suited to metaphysics (Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1934, I 44).

What that choice means is disputed. Wolfson held that nothing in the philosophy required the Euclidean form, which Spinoza used for clarity, as one uses outlines and diagrams (I 45, 55). Gueroult held that Spinoza reversed Descartes's estimate of the two ways, taking synthesis for the true method of discovery, so that the *Ethics* is "demonstrated" in geometrical order where Descartes's exposition was only "arranged" in it (*Spinoza* I 35). Della Rocca finds the form suited to a system in which everything follows from the nature of God (*Spinoza*, 2008, pp. 10–11); Curley takes it to conceal a dialogue with Spinoza's predecessors that the reader must reconstruct (*Behind the Geometrical Method*, 1988, p. xi). Whatever the form was meant to do, it gives the reader demonstrations whose grounds are named, and which he can therefore check.

Euclid's form and Spinoza's

The model behind both expositions is the first book of Euclid's *Elements*, which opens with three kinds of principle: ὅροι ("definitions"), αἰτήματα ("postulates", literally "requests") and κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι ("common notions"), the axioms of later usage (Heiberg I 2, 8, 10). Part I of the *Ethics* has definitions and axioms but no postulates, which appear only in the physical digression of Part II and at the start of Part III. Nor are the axioms all gathered at the beginning: Part II adds new ones in the middle of its physics, and Parts IV and V have their own. Axioms stand where the argument needs them.

Euclid's proofs differ from Spinoza's in one point that matters to the reader: Euclid does not cite. In the first proposition of the *Elements* the first common notion is not referred to by number but stated again in the proof, τὰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἴσα ("but things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another", I.1; Heiberg I 12). The references a modern reader finds in Euclid are supplied in square brackets by editors and translators, by Heiberg in his facing

Latin and by Heath in English (Heiberg I 13, 19; Heath, I.1, I.47). Spinoza's demonstrations name their own grounds, as Descartes's exposition had done. Euclid ends a theorem with ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι ("which was to be shown"), in Latin *quod erat demonstrandum*, and a problem, which constructs something, with ὅπερ ἔδει ποιῆσαι ("which was to be done") (Heiberg I 12–13, 18–19). The *Ethics* has no problems; its demonstrations end, when they end with a formula, with Q.E.D. Spinoza names Euclid only once (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]).

What definitions and axioms do

The introduction to the First Part notes that Spinoza, writing to Simon de Vries, distinguished definitions that must be true of their objects from definitions that need only be conceivable (Letter 9 [p. 535]). The occasion shows what was at stake. De Vries reported that the friends reading Spinoza's draft disagreed about the nature of definition, and had consulted Borelli, author of a restored Euclid, *Euclides restitutus* (1658), for whom definitions are premises and must be evidently known; they asked too how an axiom differs from a definition (Letter 8 [p. 531]; VVL[3] III 28). Spinoza's answer brings the first kind of definition close to the axiom. A definition that "explains a thing as it is outside the intellect" "must be true, and must not differ from a proposition, or axiom, except in that the former is concerned only with the essences of things, or of the affections of things, whereas the latter extends more widely, namely to eternal truths as well." Of the other kind, he says: "So a bad definition is one which is not conceived." The example he takes up from De Vries bears on the *Ethics*: "If I say that each substance has only one attribute, it is a mere proposition, and needs demonstration. But if I say, *By substance I understand that which consists of only one attribute*, it will be a good definition, provided that afterwards beings consisting of several attributes are designated by another name, different from substance" (Letter 9 [p. 535]).

Meyer had called definitions "nothing but the clearest explanations of the terms and names by which the things to be treated are designated" (*terminorum atque nominum … apertissimae explicationes*, G I 127). The definitions of the *Ethics* claim more: they say what things are, and the reader may ask whether they are true. Bennett shows how much depends on this. The demonstration of Part I, Prop. 7, followed below, argues that a substance, produced by nothing else, is caused by itself, and then applies what Def. 1 says of a "cause of itself"; if that definition merely fixed a sense for a new phrase, the passage from the ordinary sense to the defined one would be invalid, and the demonstration holds only if the definition is a substantive thesis about self-causation (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, pp. 17–18).

Axioms raise the question from the other side. Meyer calls them statements so clear that no one who understands the words can refuse assent (G I 127). Yet Descartes granted that most of his own axioms should have been proposed as theorems "si accuratior esse voluissem" ("if I had wished to be more exact", AT VII 164), and Meyer says that Spinoza knew the same of the axioms in his version of Descartes (G I 130–131). The line between axiom and proposition depends on the reader as well as on the content. Of Part I, Prop. 7 [p. 33] Spinoza says that if men would attend to the nature of substance, "this proposition would be an axiom for all, and would be numbered among the common notions" (Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35]), as Descartes had said that some things are self-evident to some which others understand only by reasoning (AT VII 164). Bennett proposes accepting the axioms provisionally, to see how they work out (p. 18), and Curley came to think that one often grasps more of a formula from what Spinoza takes to follow from it than from the formula itself (p. 52).

The *Cited in* lines are made for this. Under each definition and axiom they list its uses. The definition of God (Part I, Def. 6 [p. 27]) is cited in thirteen places, the definition of substance (Def. 3 [p. 25]) in ten, from the first proposition to the twenty-eighth. Ax. 5 [p. 29] is cited once, in the demonstration of Prop. 3, and Ax. 7 [p. 29] once, in the first demonstration of Prop. 11. Ax. 2 [p. 29] has no such line, because nothing cites it by number. Reading a definition with its uses beside it is the quickest way to learn what Spinoza means by it.

Why the scholia carry the argument

The introduction to the First Part describes what the scholia do: explain, offer easier proofs, answer objections, attack opponents. Spinoza himself treats them as standing outside the demonstrative order. "But before I begin to demonstrate these things in our prolix geometrical order," he writes, "I should like first to show briefly here the *dictates of reason* themselves, so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone" (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]). In the version of Descartes he had declined for the same reason to put Descartes's doubt into mathematical order, since the length this required would keep things "quae uno obtutu, tanquam in pictura, videri debent" ("which ought to be seen at one glance, as in a picture") from being understood (G I 141). The order is prolix, Steenbakkers observes, because no step may be skipped, and from Spinoza's point of view the scholia are asides outside it (*Spinoza's Ethica from Manuscript to Print*, 1994, p. 159).

The *Cited in* lines show that the asides are not outside the argument. Of the hundred and thirty scholia of the *Ethics*, seventy-two are cited elsewhere in it, and the most frequently cited passage in the whole book is not a proposition but the scholium to Part III, Prop. 11, which defines joy and sadness and is cited in twenty-seven places. The scholium to Part III, Prop. 13, defining love and hatred, is cited in twenty-one, and the second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40, on the three kinds of knowledge, in fifteen. Definitions given in passing in a scholium become premises of later demonstrations; Part III defines its affects in this way, one by one in the scholia, as the essay before the Definitions of the Affects describes. Steenbakkers concedes as much: once such passages stand in the text, the later reasoning can and does draw on them, so they are not redundant in the deduction (p. 161). A reader should not pass over a scholium that a demonstration cites, and should notice that what it supplies was explained rather than demonstrated.

Scholia also do what demonstrations cannot. Some prove a proposition again by another road, as the second scholium to Part I, Prop. 8 [p. 35] proves Prop. 5 from four observations about definition and cause. Some explain the order itself, as when Spinoza, explaining why he did not define essence in the usual way, says of those who did that "they did not keep to the order of philosophizing," and put last in the order of knowledge the divine nature, which is first (Part II, Prop. 10, Cor., Schol. [p. 137]).

Following a chain: Part I, Prop. 11

A demonstration can be read in two directions. Read as printed, it moves from grounds to conclusion. Read backward, it shows what the conclusion needs. Bennett, recalling John Aubrey's story of Hobbes, who found Euclid open at the forty-seventh proposition of the first book, declared it impossible, and was sent back from proposition to proposition until he was convinced, doubts that the *Ethics* can convince in that way (pp. 17–18). The doubt is fair, but the exercise is still the best way to learn how the book works. The example that follows takes the first demonstration of God's existence back to the definitions; all its references are to Part I. It is worth beginning with

the Synopsis, where the eleven enunciations from "Substance is prior in nature to its affections" to the existence of God can be read straight through, as the route without the demonstrations. The demonstrations show which steps the conclusion actually uses.

Prop. 11 [p. 41] states that "God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists." Its first demonstration reads in full: "If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, that God does not exist. Then (by Ax. 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D." (Prop. 11, Dem. [p. 41]). It is a reduction to absurdity with two references. The first leads to Ax. 7 [p. 29], "If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence," whose *Cited in* line has a single entry, 1P11D: the axiom stands among the axioms for this one demonstration. The second leads to Prop. 7, which speaks of substance and applies to God only because God is defined as a substance. The enunciation carries that definition with it, in the words of Def. 6 [p. 27], but the demonstration does not cite it, and Garrett, setting out the argument, has to supply the premise (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, 2018, pp. 35–36). Following references back means noticing what is used and not cited as well as what is cited.

Prop. 7 [p. 33], "It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist," is demonstrated thus: "A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by the Cor. of the preceding Prop.); it will therefore be the cause of itself, that is (by Def. 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist" (Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 33]). The reference to Def. 1 [p. 25] raises Bennett's question. Between the two references lies a step that cites nothing, from "cannot be produced by anything else" to "will therefore be the cause of itself." The note to the demonstration names the unstated premise, that everything has a cause, in itself or in another, the first appearance in the *Ethics* of a principle of sufficient reason. Garrett adds that, so supplemented, the demonstration shows only that a substance which exists is the cause of itself, whereas Prop. 11 needs Prop. 7 to hold of any possible substance; he finds what is missing in the second demonstration of Prop. 11, which argues that nothing could take God's existence away (pp. 36–37).

The corollary of Prop. 6 [p. 33], that a substance cannot be produced by anything else, has two demonstrations. The first argues that there is nothing in nature but substances and their affections, "as is evident from Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5," and that a substance cannot be produced by a substance "by the preceding Prop.", which in a corollary is the proposition it belongs to, Prop. 6 itself (Prop. 6, Cor. [p. 33]). The second, headed *Alternatively*, is shorter: "This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of its contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by Ax. 4); and so (by Def. 3) it would not be a substance" (Prop. 6, Cor., alternative Dem. [p. 33]). Here the chain reaches the definitions in two steps. By this road the first demonstration of God's existence rests on Defs. 1 and 3 and Axs. 4 and 7, with Def. 6 to say that God is a substance, and needs neither Prop. 5 nor Prop. 1. Spinoza himself knew that the conclusion of Prop. 7 did not need a long road. He reminded Meyer in 1663 that, if his memory served, he had once demonstrated to him by word of mouth that existence pertains to the essence of substance, "without the help of other propositions" (Letter 12 [p. 541]).

The main road is longer. Prop. 6 is demonstrated from three propositions: there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by Prop. 5), "that is (by Prop. 2), which have something in common with one another; and so (by Prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other" (Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 33]). The "that is" hides a step, which the note to the demonstration spells out. The

Cited in line of Prop. 3 [p. 31] shows that it is cited nowhere else in the *Ethics*, though the second demonstration of Prop. 11 [p. 41] uses it without citing it. Prop. 5 [p. 31], by contrast, is the hub of the first half of the Part: its line lists eight places, among them the demonstrations of Props. 6, 8, 12, 13 and 14, and Garrett calls it the linchpin of the argument for a single substance (p. 62). Its demonstration cites Prop. 4 twice, Prop. 1, and "Def. 3 and Ax. 6", and the last reference shows something else about the links. The first edition of 1677 prints *per Defin. 3. & 6.*, a reference to the definition of God that makes no sense here; Van Vloten and Land corrected it to Ax. 6, on the true idea, which suits the words "considered truly", and Gebhardt adopted their reading (OP p. 4; G II 48; Textgestaltung II 346). The translation and its links follow the corrected text, and the notes to the Latin record the readings of 1677: a reference that seems not to fit is worth checking there.

Prop. 1 [p. 29], "Substance is prior in nature to its affections," is "evident from Defs. 3 and 5" (Prop. 1, Dem. [p. 29]), and its *Cited in* line has one entry, 1P5D. So far as the citations show, the first proposition of the *Ethics* exists to serve the fifth, as Bennett also observed (p. 148), and it serves at one of the two points in that demonstration that readers have contested. If two substances differed only in their affections, then, since substance is prior in nature to its affections, "if the affections are put to one side and it is considered in itself, that is (by Def. 3 and Ax. 6), considered truly, it cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another" (Prop. 5, Dem. [p. 31]). Bennett asked what entitles Spinoza to put the affections to one side, and could not rescue the step (p. 67); Leibniz's objection to the other branch, discussed in the introduction to the First Part, is better known.

Taken together, the references of these demonstrations end in four definitions (Defs. 1, 3, 4 and 5) and five axioms (Axs. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7), with Def. 6 supplying the subject. Def. 2, on what is finite in its kind, Def. 7, on freedom, Def. 8, on eternity, and Ax. 3 are not cited in this proof (though the note to Prop. 7 compares its unstated premise with Ax. 3) and come into the argument later; Ax. 2 is never cited. A chain followed to its end shows what a conclusion depends on and what it does not, and where the weight falls: here on Def. 3, cited in six of the ten demonstrations, on the unstated principle that everything has a cause, and on Prop. 5.

The *Cited in* lines also lead the other way. Prop. 7 is cited in nine places, among them all three demonstrations of Prop. 11, so that all three proofs of God's existence pass through it. The line after Prop. 11 names ten places, among them the demonstration that except God no substance can be or be conceived (Prop. 14), the corollary that God alone is a free cause (Prop. 17, Cor. 2), and, at the far end of the book, the demonstration that "God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love," which appeals to "Prop. 11 and Def. 1 of Part I" to show that God's idea of himself is the idea of his own cause (Part V, Prop. 35, Dem. [p. 513]). The chain followed backward from Prop. 11 to Def. 1 runs forward, in the end, to the intellectual love of God.

Descartes held that synthesis does not teach the way by which a thing was found. Following a chain backward is not the analysis he meant, but it travels the synthetic order in reverse, from the thing shown to what it rests on, and lets the reader see where the weight lies, where a step goes unstated and where interpreters have stopped. Spinoza claimed much for such reading: "For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves" (Part V, Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503]). He also knew its limit. Of the demonstration in Part I that all things depend on God he wrote that, "although it is legitimate and placed beyond the hazard of doubt," it "still does not affect our mind as much as when this same thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God" (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]).

The demonstrations are where the reader begins, not where Spinoza hoped he would end.

The introduction to the First Part follows, and after it the definitions with which the *Ethics* begins.

Ethices Pars Prima
De Deo

First Part of the Ethics
Of God

Introduction to the First Part

The *Ethics* does not begin with ethics. Its first Part is entitled *De Deo*, "Of God," and only in its last two Parts does the work reach the subjects its title promises: the power of the affects over us, and the freedom that the intellect can win from them. A reader who opens the book hoping for advice on how to live finds instead eight definitions, seven axioms and thirty-six propositions about substance, attributes, modes, causes and necessity, and is entitled to ask why. Spinoza's answer is given at the start of Part II. He will not explain everything that follows from the nature of God, since infinitely many things follow from it, "but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the *human mind* and its highest blessedness" (Part II, Preface [p. 121]). The road to blessedness runs through the knowledge of God, and it does so for a reason the whole work tries to make good: human beings are parts of nature, subject to the same necessity as everything else, and we can neither understand our bondage nor gain our freedom except by understanding the whole of which we are parts. Part IV will say that "the highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God" (Part IV, Prop. 28 [p. 387]), and Part V that the mind's highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (Part V, Prop. 25 [p. 505]), which proceeds from an adequate idea of God's attributes. Part I is where that idea is first worked out.

What it works out can be put in a few sentences, though nearly every word of them needs the propositions that follow to give it its sense. There is exactly one substance, which Spinoza calls God. This substance has infinitely many attributes, each of which expresses its essence, and we know two of them, thought and extension. Everything else that exists is a mode of this substance, something that is in God and is conceived through God (Prop. 15 [p. 49]). Everything follows from the nature of God with the same necessity with which it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles (Prop. 17, Scholium [p. 67]). Nothing is contingent (Prop. 29 [p. 81]), and nothing could have been produced in any other way or order than it has been (Prop. 33 [p. 85]). God does not act for ends, and the belief that he does, together with the belief that we ourselves are free in the sense of being uncaused, is diagnosed in the Appendix as the source of superstition.

Stated so baldly, these theses can sound like a set of dogmas. The point of the geometrical order is that they are not meant to be accepted on authority or for their edifying effect, but derived, one at a time, from definitions and axioms that a careful reader is asked to grant. The rest of this introduction tries to make that derivation easier to follow: first by saying something about the form of the work, then about the vocabulary Spinoza inherited and the use he made of it, then about the course of the argument and the places where readers most often lose their way.

Reading the geometrical order

Like the whole of the *Ethics*, Part I is set out "in geometrical order." Definitions and axioms come first, followed by numbered propositions, each with its demonstration; corollaries state immediate consequences, and scholia (from the Greek for a comment or note) explain, illustrate and argue. Within a demonstration every step is justified by a reference to a definition, an axiom or an earlier proposition, given in Spinoza's abbreviated form ("by Prop. 7," "by Def. 3 and Ax. 6"). These references are the skeleton of the book, and following a few of them back to their source is the best way to learn how it works. The edition links each of them to the passage it cites.

The model is Euclid, whose *Elements* was the standard of rigour for the learned of the seventeenth century, but the immediate precedent was Cartesian. At the end of his Replies to the Second Objections to the *Meditations*, Descartes had set out some of his principal arguments "in geometrical fashion," with definitions, postulates, axioms and propositions (AT VII 160 ff.). Spinoza's first published book, *Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I et II* (1663), recast the first two parts of Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy* in the same form, with a preface by his friend Lodewijk Meyer explaining the method and warning that the author did not share all the views he expounded. The *Ethics* is the work in which Spinoza used the method for his own philosophy, and it shows the marks of long revision. By February 1663 a group of his friends in Amsterdam was meeting to read a draft of its opening in order, one of them reading, explaining and demonstrating each proposition while the others raised their difficulties, which they sent to him by letter (Letter 8 [p. 531]); the book was not printed until after his death in 1677.

For Spinoza the form is not merely a vehicle of persuasion. He holds that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 129]), and a demonstration that derives each truth from those prior to it is meant to reproduce, in thought, the way in which things themselves follow from their causes. When the order is right, to understand a thing is to see it follow from what it depends on. This is why the *Ethics* begins with God: God is first in the order of being, and so must be first in the order of knowing, if our knowledge is to be adequate. It is also why Spinoza is impatient with those who begin elsewhere. Men who "do not know the true causes of things confuse everything," he says, and "without any repugnance of mind feign that trees, no less than men, speak" (Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35]); their mistake is not a want of cleverness but a wrong order of thinking, in which the things that come first in experience are taken for the things that come first in nature.

The reader should not expect the definitions to be neutral stipulations. In a letter to Simon de Vries (Letter 9 [p. 535]), Spinoza distinguished definitions that only explain how we use a word, which need only be consistent, from definitions that explain a thing as it is outside the intellect, which must be true. The definitions of the *Ethics* are meant to be of the second kind, and a good deal of philosophy is packed into them. Some of them are definitions of a familiar term with an unfamiliar content: "free" (Def. 7 [p. 27]) does not mean what the reader expects. Others contain, in a subordinate clause, a thesis that will turn out to carry great weight: the definition of substance ends with the words "that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (Def. 3 [p. 25]), and it is this conceptual condition, more than anything else, that sets Spinoza's metaphysics apart from Descartes'.

Nor should the reader take the scholia for idle asides. They are where Spinoza speaks most directly. He uses them to explain the point of a demonstration, to give an easier proof alongside a strict one, to answer objections, and to attack the views of others, sometimes at length. The scholium to Prop. 15 [p. 49] is a small treatise on the infinite divisibility of matter, the scholium

to Prop. 17 [p. 67] an attack on the God of the theologians, the two scholia to Prop. 33 [p. 87] a discussion of contingency and of the divine will. The Appendix with which Part I ends is a polemical essay in continuous prose, with no numbered propositions at all. A useful way to read the Part for the first time is to read each enunciation, then its scholium if it has one, and only then the demonstration, returning to the demonstrations once the shape of the whole is clear.

The inherited vocabulary

The central terms of Part I are substance, attribute and mode, and none of them was new. They come from the scholastic metaphysics of substance and accident, which went back to Aristotle and was still taught in the universities of the Dutch Republic, as reformed by Descartes. In the *Principles of Philosophy* (I.51), Descartes defines substance as "a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist" (*rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum*), and adds at once that a substance which needs nothing at all "can be understood to be unique, namely God" (*unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus*; AT VIII-1 24). All other things, he says, can exist only with God's concurrence, and so the word "substance" does not apply to God and to them in the same sense. He then admits, in a weaker sense, created substances, things that need nothing except God's concurrence in order to exist: minds and bodies. Each created substance has one principal attribute that constitutes its nature and essence, thought in the case of minds and extension in length, breadth and depth in the case of bodies, and everything else we find in it is a mode of that attribute, a way of being thinking or of being extended (I.53). Shape and motion are modes of extension; imagination, sensation and will are modes of thought.

Spinoza keeps the terms and changes what they mean. His definition of substance (Def. 3 [p. 25]) has two clauses: a substance is "what is in itself and is conceived through itself." The first clause corresponds to Descartes' independence in existence; the second adds an independence in conception. A substance is something we can understand without understanding anything else, and a mode, correspondingly, is "that which is in another, through which it is also conceived" (Def. 5 [p. 25]). The two definitions together divide everything there is, for "whatever is, is either in itself or in another" (Ax. 1 [p. 29]). With these definitions in hand Spinoza refuses Descartes' concession. If only God strictly satisfies the definition of substance, then only God is a substance, and minds and bodies must be modes: "the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of God, or ... affections of the attributes of God" (Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]). Thought and extension, which for Descartes were the natures of two kinds of created substance, become two attributes of one substance.

The definition of attribute is the shortest in the book and the most disputed: "By *attribute* I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence" (Def. 4 [p. 25]). An attribute is a substance's essence as an intellect grasps it. Because each attribute is conceived through itself (Prop. 10 [p. 39]), the attributes of one substance are really distinct, in the sense that none can be understood through another; thought cannot be explained by extension, nor extension by thought. But, Spinoza argues, their real distinction does not make them distinct substances. "It is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance," he writes; "indeed nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has" (Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 39]). This step, by which a plurality of attributes is combined with a single substance, is what allows the God of Part I to be both thinking and extended without being a composite of a mind and a body.

The definition of God gathers these terms together: "By *God* I understand a being absolutely

infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence" (Def. 6 [p. 27]). The explanation that follows distinguishes two kinds of infinity. A thing infinite "in its own kind," such as extension, is limited by nothing of its kind, but other attributes can be denied of it: extension is not thought. A thing absolutely infinite admits no such denial, for "to the essence of what is absolutely infinite there pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation." God is infinite in this second sense. Most readers take "infinite attributes" to mean infinitely many attributes. Spinoza never names any attribute besides thought and extension, and he explained to a correspondent why: the human mind is the idea of a body, and the idea of a body involves no attribute of God except extension and thought (Letter 64 [p. 629]).

Three further definitions should be read with care, because each gives a familiar word a sense of its own. A thing is "free," according to Def. 7 [p. 27], if it "exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone," and "necessary, or rather compelled," if it is determined by another. Freedom here is opposed not to necessity but to external compulsion, and the definition prepares the conclusion that God, who acts from the necessity of his own nature, is the only free cause (Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67]). "Eternity" (Def. 8 [p. 27]) is not endless duration but "existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing," and the explanation adds that such existence "cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end." The distinction between eternity and everlastingness will matter a great deal in Part V. And "cause of itself" (Def. 1 [p. 25]), the first term defined in the book, is "that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing." The phrase was scholastic and Cartesian, but in Spinoza it carries the whole weight of his conception of God, who exists not because something else brings him about but because existing belongs to what he is.

Two principles do much of the work in the argument, and it helps to have them in view from the start. The first is that being and being conceived go together. To be in itself is to be conceived through itself, and to be in another is to be conceived through that other (Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25]; Axs. 1–2 [p. 29]). The second is that causation and explanation go together. "Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause" (Ax. 4 [p. 29]); things that have nothing in common cannot be understood through one another (Ax. 5 [p. 29]); and "for each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for why it exists as for why it does not exist" (Prop. 11, second Dem. [p. 41]). The equation of cause with reason (*causa seu ratio*) is the deepest commitment of Spinoza's rationalism. It is why he can say that God is the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is the cause of himself (Prop. 25, Schol. [p. 77]), why the necessity with which things follow from God can be compared to the necessity with which properties follow from a definition, and why nothing, for Spinoza, simply happens.

The argument for one substance

Part I divides into two halves and an appendix. The first half, Props. 1–15 [p. 29], establishes what God is. It begins, perhaps surprisingly, without mentioning God at all. Props. 1–8 [p. 29] prove general theorems about substance as such, any substance there might be. Substance is prior in nature to its affections (Prop. 1 [p. 29]). Two substances with different attributes have nothing in common (Prop. 2 [p. 31]), and of two things with nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other (Prop. 3 [p. 31]). Things are distinguished from one another either by their attributes or by their affections (Prop. 4 [p. 31]), and from this Spinoza infers that "in

the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute" (Prop. 5 [p. 31]). The reasoning is that two substances with the same attribute could not be told apart by their attribute, and could not be told apart by their affections either, since a substance considered truly is considered in itself, apart from its affections.

This is the first place where many readers stop. Leibniz, in notes he made on the *Ethics*, objected that the demonstration contains a paralogism: two substances could differ in some attributes and share others, and so be distinguished by their attributes while having one in common (Gerhardt, *Philosophische Schriften* I 142). The objection supposes that a substance might have one attribute among several that it shares with another. Spinoza's reply, on most readings, lies in the doctrine that each attribute is conceived through itself and expresses the whole essence of its substance (Prop. 10 [p. 39]): if two substances shared an attribute, each could be conceived completely through that attribute alone, and nothing in that conception could tell them apart. Whether the reply works is still debated, and the note to the demonstration of Prop. 5 sets out the issue.

From Prop. 5 the rest of the first group follows quickly. One substance cannot be produced by another, since two substances share no attribute and so have nothing in common (Prop. 6 [p. 33]); a substance therefore cannot be produced by anything at all (Prop. 6, Cor. [p. 33]), and so must be the cause of itself: "It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist" (Prop. 7 [p. 33]). Every substance is infinite (Prop. 8 [p. 35]), for a finite substance would be limited by another of the same nature, which Prop. 5 excludes. The first scholium to Prop. 8 states the principle behind this in a form that will recur: "being finite is in truth partly a negation, and being infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature" (Prop. 8, Schol. 1 [p. 35]). Determination, for Spinoza, is limitation; what is finite is so because something else bounds it.

At this point nothing yet excludes a world of many substances, each infinite in its own kind and each with a single attribute: one thinking substance, one extended substance, and so on. Props. 9–10 [p. 39] begin to close that possibility by turning from substances to attributes. The more reality a thing has, the more attributes belong to it (Prop. 9 [p. 39]), and each attribute of one substance is conceived through itself (Prop. 10 [p. 39]), so that the real distinction of attributes does not show that they belong to different substances (Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 39]). Then comes the proof of God's existence. Prop. 11 [p. 41] states that God, "or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists," and gives three demonstrations of it. The first is a brief version of the ontological argument: if God did not exist, his essence would not involve existence, which contradicts Prop. 7. The second rests on the principle that everything must have a cause or reason for its existence or non-existence, and argues that nothing could prevent God's existence, since a reason for his non-existence would have to lie either in his own nature, which would then be contradictory, or in another substance, which, being of another nature, would have nothing in common with God and so could neither give him existence nor take it away. The third argues *a posteriori*: "To be able not to exist is lack of power, and conversely, to be able to exist is power" (Prop. 11, third Dem. [p. 43]); if only finite things existed, finite things would be more powerful than a being absolutely infinite; but we exist; therefore a being absolutely infinite exists too. The scholium explains that the third proof was given because it is easier to see, not because God's existence does not follow *a priori* from the same foundation (Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 43]).

The first half ends with the conclusion that has made the book famous. Props. 12–13 [p. 45] argue that substance, and especially absolutely infinite substance, is indivisible. Then Prop. 14 [p. 47]: "Except God, no substance can be or be conceived." The demonstration is short. God

has every attribute, since he is absolutely infinite; two substances cannot share an attribute; so any other substance would have to share an attribute with God, which is impossible. Hence God is unique, and thought and extension are either attributes of God or affections of his attributes (Prop. 14, Cors. 1–2 [p. 47]). Prop. 15 [p. 49] draws the consequence for everything that is not substance: "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God."

Extension in God

The scholium to Prop. 15 defends the most scandalous consequence of this conclusion, that extension belongs to God, and it is worth reading slowly, because it also shows how Spinoza thinks about the relation between substance and its modes. His opponents, he says, deny that God is corporeal on the ground that body is a finite quantity bounded by a figure, and that nothing could be more absurd to say of a being absolutely infinite. With this he agrees. But they go on to remove extended substance itself from the divine nature, saying that God created it, and on this point he holds that they do not understand what they say, since no substance can be created (Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 49]).

Their arguments, he continues, come down to two. The first is that an infinite extended substance would be composed of parts, and that dividing it leads to absurdities: an infinite made of two finite halves, or an infinite twice as great as another, or a number of feet that is twelve times smaller than an equally infinite number of inches. The second is that extended substance is divisible and therefore can be acted on, which is unworthy of a supremely perfect being. Spinoza's reply is that both arguments assume what he has shown to be absurd, that extended substance is composed of parts. The absurdities show only that infinite quantity is not measurable and not composed of finite parts, which is what he has already demonstrated; the weapon his opponents aim at him "they in fact turn against themselves." Matter, considered as substance, is indivisible. We divide it only in the imagination, by attending to quantity "as it is in the imagination," abstractly and superficially, and not as it is in the intellect, where it is conceived as substance. "Matter is everywhere the same, and parts are not distinguished in it except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really. For example, we conceive that water, insofar as it is water, is divided, and that its parts are separated from one another; but not insofar as it is corporeal substance" (Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 51]).

The water example deserves attention because it contains, in miniature, the relation between substance and mode that the whole *Ethics* depends on. Water comes into being and passes away, is divided and poured out; extended substance does none of these things. The same reality is described in both statements, but under different concepts. As water, it is a mode, a determinate way in which extension is affected; as corporeal substance, it is extension itself, infinite and indivisible. The distinction is not between two things but between two ways of conceiving one thing, and the same structure will return in Part II, where a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are said to be "one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways" (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]). The scholium ends by restating the thesis it has defended: "All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen happen only through the laws of God's infinite nature, and follow (as I shall soon show) from the necessity of his essence."

What follows from God

With that sentence the second half of Part I is announced. Props. 16–36 [p. 65] turn from what God is to what follows from God. Their governing proposition is Prop. 16 [p. 65]: "From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect)." God is therefore the efficient cause of all things, a cause through himself and not by accident, and absolutely the first cause (Prop. 16, Cors. [p. 65]). He acts from the laws of his nature alone and is compelled by no one, so that he alone is a free cause (Prop. 17 [p. 65] and Cor. 2 [p. 67]). He is the immanent and not the transitive cause of all things (Prop. 18 [p. 71]), which means that his effects remain in him. His existence and his essence are one and the same (Prop. 20 [p. 71]). From the absolute nature of his attributes follow infinite modes, eternal and infinite like the attributes themselves (Props. 21–23 [p. 73]); and each finite thing is determined to exist and to act by another finite thing, and that by another, to infinity (Prop. 28 [p. 79]). "In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way" (Prop. 29 [p. 81]). Intellect and will, even infinite intellect, belong to what follows from God, *Natura naturata*, not to God as cause, *Natura naturans* (Props. 29, Schol. [p. 81], 31 [p. 83]), and the will is a necessary, not a free, cause (Prop. 32 [p. 85]). So "things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced" (Prop. 33 [p. 85]). The Part closes with three short propositions on God's power: it is his very essence (Prop. 34 [p. 91]); whatever we conceive to be in his power necessarily exists (Prop. 35 [p. 91]); and nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow (Prop. 36 [p. 93]). An essay at the point where the second half begins introduces these propositions more fully, and another, before the Appendix, introduces Spinoza's attack on final causes.

What Spinoza means by "God"

No word in Part I is more likely to mislead than its first, and it is worth saying plainly what Spinoza's God is not. It is not a person who deliberates, chooses among possibilities, issues commands, rewards and punishes, or acts for the sake of ends. Spinoza denies that intellect and will pertain to God's essence in anything like the human sense. If they did, he says, they "would have to differ by all the breadth of heaven from our intellect and will, and could agree with them in nothing except the name; no more, that is, than the Dog, a heavenly constellation, and the dog, a barking animal, agree with one another" (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]). God's power is not a reserve of possibilities among which he selects, but the very essence from which everything follows (Prop. 34 [p. 91]). The Appendix traces the belief that God directs all things toward an end, and made them for man, to the prejudices of the imagination.

At the same time Spinoza does not simply rename the physical world. Extension is only one of God's infinitely many attributes, and thought is as fully divine as extension. The formula most often associated with him, "God, or Nature" (*Deus seu Natura*), occurs only in Part IV, where Spinoza writes that "that eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists" (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]). Nature there means the whole of what is, considered as active and productive, *Natura naturans* together with *Natura naturata*, and not merely the totality of bodies. Spinoza could also write, in the second half of this Part, that God is the cause of the essence of things as well as of their existence (Prop. 25 [p. 77]), and that "particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's

attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way" (Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]). The language is theological; the content is a theory of what it is for anything to exist and to be intelligible. Appendix F [p. 677] considers how far that theory rests on a principle of sufficient reason.

Whether this is a philosophical theology or an atheism in theological dress was disputed from the moment the book appeared, and the dispute has never quite ended. Pierre Bayle, in the long article on Spinoza in his *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697), called Spinoza's system the most monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined. Novalis, a century later, called Spinoza "a God-intoxicated man." Both judgments respond to something real in the text: the first to the identification of God with a substance of which we and everything around us are modes, the second to the fact that Spinoza speaks of God on nearly every page and makes the knowledge and love of God the end of human life. The translation does not take sides, but the notes point out where the text has been read in conflicting ways.

Questions the reader will meet

Several questions in Part I remain open among interpreters, and a reader will meet them whether or not he goes looking for them. It may help to know in advance what they are.

The first concerns the attributes. The definition says that an attribute is what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence. If the emphasis falls on "what the intellect perceives," the attributes may seem to be ways in which an intellect apprehends a substance whose essence is in itself undivided; if it falls on "constituting its essence," they are real features of the substance, discovered rather than invented by the intellect. H. A. Wolfson, in his study of 1934, defended the first, "subjective," reading and connected it with the medieval Jewish debate about the divine attributes (*The Philosophy of Spinoza* I 146–147). Martial Gueroult, in the first volume of his commentary (1968), rejected it, arguing among other things that the demonstration of Prop. 4 [p. 31] speaks of "substances, or what is the same (by Def. 4), their attributes," and so identifies attributes with substance itself (*Spinoza* I 117). Most recent readers incline to the objective reading, but the question of how one substance can have many really distinct essences remains one of the hardest in the book. Appendix B [p. 660] sets out the two readings and the arguments for each.

The second concerns the relation between God and his modes. Spinoza says that modes are "in" God and are conceived through him. The traditional reading, which goes back to Bayle, takes this as the relation of a property to its subject, so that a stone, a man and a thought are states of God as a shape is a state of a body. Bayle drew from it the consequence that God would be not only the cause but the subject of every crime and every misery in the world, so that the sentence "the Germans have killed ten thousand Turks" would mean that God modified into Germans had killed God modified into ten thousand Turks (*Dictionnaire*, "Spinoza," remark N). Edwin Curley, in *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (1969), argued instead that "the relation of mode to substance is a relation of causal dependence which is unlike the relation of predicate to subject" (p. 40): for things to be in God is for them to depend on God as effects depend on their cause. Yitzhak Melamed has since defended the older view in a revised form, arguing that modes both inhere in God and are predicated of him, and that Bayle's objections rest on misunderstandings (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, 2013, ch. 1). The dispute bears directly on Props. 15 [p. 49], 18 [p. 71] and 25, Cor. [p. 77], and the notes return to it there. Appendix A [p. 657] follows the dispute from Bayle to Melamed.

The third concerns necessity. Spinoza says that nothing is contingent and that nothing could

have been otherwise, and he means it. But he also says that each finite thing is determined by another finite thing, to infinity (Prop. 28 [p. 79]), and not by God's absolute nature alone. Readers have asked how the two claims fit together, whether everything really follows from the divine nature or only the infinite modes, and whether Spinoza leaves any room for things that might not have existed. The essay before Prop. 16 discusses these questions, and Appendix D [p. 667] follows the modern debate.

A last group of difficulties is verbal. Spinoza uses "in," "through," "involve," "express" and "follow" in senses he never fully defines, and the reader does well to watch how each is used. "Power" (*potentia*) is not a capacity that might go unused but activity itself, and God's power is identical with his essence (Prop. 34 [p. 91]). "Reality" and "perfection" are the same (Part II, Def. 6 [p. 123]), and a thing has more of them the more it is and does, not the more it pleases us. "Infinite" means unlimited, either in a kind or absolutely, and "eternal" means necessary existence, not endless time. None of these senses is arbitrary, but none of them is the sense the words have in ordinary speech.

The place of Part I in the whole

The doctrines of Part I are not left behind when the *Ethics* turns to human beings; they are applied. The human mind will be defined in Part II as the idea of an actually existing body, a mode of thought corresponding to a mode of extension, and the parallel of the two attributes will explain why mind and body neither act on each other nor need to. The denial of free will in Part II rests on Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67] and Prop. 28 [p. 79] of this Part. The striving by which each thing perseveres in its being, the foundation of the theory of the affects in Part III, is derived from the doctrine that each thing expresses God's power in a certain and determinate way. The ethics of Part IV begins from the claim, already implicit in the Appendix, that good and evil are not features of things in themselves. And Part V's account of the eternity of the mind returns to the propositions of this Part about essence and existence, citing Prop. 25 [p. 77] and Prop. 16 [p. 65] in its demonstration that there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of each human body under a species of eternity (Part V, Prop. 22 [p. 503]). A reader who finds the First Part forbidding may take some comfort in knowing that nothing in it is idle.

On the translation

Spinoza's technical vocabulary is rendered consistently, so that the reader can follow a word from one proposition to the next. "Involve" (*involvere*), "express" (*exprimere*), "be in itself" (*in se esse*), "be conceived through itself" (*per se concipi*) and "insofar as" (*quatenus*) are terms of art, and the English does not vary them for elegance. Where the Latin is ambiguous, the English tries to be ambiguous in the same way, and a note explains what is at stake. The glossary at the end of the volume records the renderings adopted.

The text begins with the definitions. They are short, and the reader will be tempted to pass over them quickly; it is better to read them twice, and to return to them whenever a demonstration cites one, since the argument of the whole Part is contained in them more fully than their brevity suggests.

Definitiones

[G II 45] I. Per *causam sui* intelligo id, cuius essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens.

II. Ea *res* dicitur in suo genere finita,[a] quae alia eiusdem naturae terminari potest. Ex. gr. corpus dicitur finitum, quia aliud semper maius concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione, nec cogitatio corpore.

III. Per *substantiam* intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id cuius conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.

IV. Per *attributum* intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tamquam eiusdem essentiam constituens.

V. Per *modum* intelligo substantiae affectiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur.

[a] in suo genere finita] *transcr.* in suo genere inita. The transcription reads 'inita', an evident slip; the 1677 edition (OP p. 1) and Gebhardt (G II 45) read 'finita'.

Definitions

I. By *cause of itself*[1] I understand that whose essence involves[2] existence, or[3] that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.

Cited in 1P7D [p. 33], 1P24D [p. 75], 5P35D [p. 513]

II. That thing is said to be *finite in its own kind*[4] which can be limited by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. So a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.[5]

Cited in 1P8D [p. 35], 1P21D [p. 73]

III. By *substance* I understand what is in itself[6] and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.

Cited in 1P1D [p. 29], 1P2D [p. 31], 1P4D [p. 31], 1P5D [p. 31], 1P6C [p. 33], 1P6CAlt [p. 33], 1P10D [p. 39], 1P15D [p. 49], 1P18D [p. 71], 1P28D [p. 79]

IV. By *attribute* I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence.[7]

Cited in 1P4D [p. 31], 1P9D [p. 39], 1P10D [p. 39], 1P12D [p. 45], 1P19D [p. 71], 1P20D [p. 71], 2P1S [p. 125]

V. By *mode* I understand the affections[8] of a substance, or that which is in another, through

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[1] *causa sui*. The scholastics called God *a se* ('from himself') but generally refused to call him the cause of himself, since a cause must be prior to its effect and nothing can be prior to itself. Descartes defended the expression in a qualified sense (*Replies* to the First and Fourth Objections, AT VII 106–111, 236 ff.): the immensity of God's power is the reason why he needs no cause, so that he stands to himself in a way analogous to an efficient cause. Spinoza defines the notion without any appeal to efficient causation, purely in terms of the relation between essence and existence.

[2] *involvit*. A term of art throughout the *Ethics*: A involves B when B is contained in the concept of A, so that A cannot be conceived without B. It is always rendered 'involve', never 'imply'.

[3] *sive*. Spinoza's *sive* and *seu* regularly introduce an equivalent description of the same thing rather than an alternative to it. They are rendered 'or' throughout, leaving the reader to judge, as the Latin reader had to, how strong the equivalence is.

[4] The transcription italicizes *res* ('thing'). These italics are editorial (the 1677 edition has none in the definitions), so they are placed here on the term being defined. 'In its own kind' (*in suo genere*) prepares the contrast, in Def. 6 [p. 27] and its Explanation, between what is infinite in its own kind and what is absolutely infinite.

[5] The two examples anticipate the doctrine that thought and extension are attributes each conceived through itself (Prop. 10 [p. 39]), between which there is no limitation and, by Prop. 3 [p. 31], no causal interaction.

[6] *in se est*. 'Being in' is the scholastic relation of inherence: accidents are *in* a subject, which is not itself in anything. Descartes (*Principles* I.51, AT VIII-1 24) defined substance as 'a thing which exists in such a way that it needs no other thing in order to exist', conceded that strictly only God satisfies this, and then admitted created substances (minds and bodies) that need only God's concurrence. Spinoza's definition joins the ontological condition to a conceptual one ('conceived through itself'), and it is the conceptual condition that drives the argument of Props. 2–6 [p. 31].

[7] *tamquam eiusdem essentiam constituens*. A famous crux. On a 'subjectivist' reading (classically H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1934), *tamquam* means 'as if': attributes are the ways an intellect apprehends a substance whose essence is in itself undifferentiated. Wolfson translates 'as if constituting its essence' and judges that 'the abundance of both literary and material evidence is in favor of the subjective interpretation' (I 146). On an 'objectivist' reading (M. Gueroult, *Spinoza I: Dieu*, 1968, ch. 1 §XV and Appendix 3), the intellect perceives what really does constitute the essence: otherwise, Gueroult argues, the nature of substance would be unknowable and God, remaining incomprehensible, would become again the 'sanctuary of ignorance' (*ignorantiae asylum*) of the Appendix [p. 103] (p. 50); and the identification of substances with their attributes in Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 31], made by appeal to this definition, 'ruine irrémédiablement, d'avance' (ruins irreparably, in advance) the subjectivist reading (p. 117; the 1677 edition there cites Axiom 4, see the note to the Latin). 'As constituting' is chosen because it preserves the ambiguity of the Latin. The intellect in question includes God's infinite intellect (cf. Part II, Prop. 7, Scholium [p. 131]).

[8] *affectiones*: states, properties or modifications of a thing. The word must be kept apart from *affectus* ('affect'), the subject of Part III, although Spinoza will define affects as certain affections of the body together with their ideas (Part III, Def. 3 [p. 231]).

VI. Per *Deum* intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.

[G II 46] Explicatio. Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere. Quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus;[b] quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad eius essentiam pertinet, quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.

VII. Ea *res libera* dicetur, quae ex sola[c] suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur: *necessaria* autem, vel potius *coacta*, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.[d]

VIII. Per *aeternitatem* intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur.

Explicatio. Talis enim existentia, ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur, propterea-

[b] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dat is, men kan oneindige toeëigeningen bevatten, die tot des zelfs natuur niet behoren' ('that is, one can conceive infinite attributes which do not belong to its nature'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 46; Textgestaltung II 346). In the Dutch version the parenthesis is in italics.
[c] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 2). Gebhardt (G II 46; Textgestaltung II 346) corrects to *dicitur* from the Dutch version (*word gezegt*), and Bartuschat follows him; our transcription keeps the 1677 reading, and the translation follows it.
[d] *coacta*, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.] *transcr. coacta, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.* Editorial italics restricted to the defined term, as with *libera* and *necessaria*; the 1677 edition italicizes none of them (OP p. 2).

which it is also conceived.

Cited in 1P1D [p. 29], 1P4D [p. 31], 1P6C [p. 33], 1P15D [p. 49], 1P23D [p. 75], 1P25C [p. 77], 1P28D [p. 79], 1P31D [p. 83], 2P1D [p. 125]

VI. By *God* I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes,[9] each of which expresses[10] an eternal and infinite essence.

Cited in 1P10S [p. 39], 1P11D3 [p. 43], 1P14D [p. 47], 1P14C1 [p. 47], 1P16D [p. 65], 1P19D [p. 71], 1P23D [p. 75], 1P31D [p. 83], 2P1D [p. 125], 2P1S [p. 125], 2P45D [p. 197], 4P28D [p. 387], 5P35D [p. 513]

Explanation. I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind. For of whatever is infinite only in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite there pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.[11]

VII. That thing will be called *free*[12] which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. That thing, however, will be called *necessary*, or rather *compelled*, which is determined by another to exist and to operate[13] in a certain and determinate manner.[14]

Cited in 1P17C2 [p. 67], 1P32D [p. 85], 1P33S2 [p. 87], 2P17S [p. 161], 3P49D [p. 293]

VIII. By *eternity*[15] I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.

Cited in 1P19D [p. 71], 1P20D [p. 71], 1P23D [p. 75], 5P29D [p. 507], 5P30D [p. 509]

Explanation. For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth,[16] like the essence of the thing,

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[9] *infinitis attributis*. The Latin can mean 'infinitely many attributes' or 'attributes that are (each) infinite'; the English keeps the same ambiguity. Most readers take Spinoza to assert infinitely many attributes, of which we know only two, thought and extension (Part II, Ax. 5 [p. 123]); J. Bennett argued that Spinoza 'often takes infinity to imply totality', so that the definition says only that God has every possible attribute; this gives 'a case for interpreting the *Ethics* as not containing the doctrine that there are more than two attributes', though Bennett does 'not say that Spinoza thought there were only two' (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, §19, pp. 75–76). The question was put to Spinoza himself: in Letter 63 [p. 627] Schuller passes on Tschirnhaus's request for a demonstration that we cannot know any attributes of God besides thought and extension (VVL[3] III 203); Spinoza answers in Letter 64 [p. 629], and the exchange continues in Letters 65–66.

[10] *exprimit*. 'Expression' is Spinoza's preferred term for the relation between attributes and the essence of substance, and later between modes and attributes (Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]).

[11] The idea that limitation is negation, and perfection pure affirmation, is developed in Prop. 8, Schol. 1 [p. 35]; compare Letter 36 to Hudde on what is 'infinite in its own kind'.

[12] Freedom is opposed here not to necessity but to compulsion by something external. Compare Letter 58 [p. 623], to G. H. Schuller (1674): 'You see, then, that I place freedom not in a free decree but in a free necessity' (*me libertatem non in libero decreto, sed in libera necessitate ponere*; VVL[3] III 195). The same letter describes created things as determined by external causes 'to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner', the formula of this definition.

[13] Spinoza says that the free thing is determined *ad agendum* ('to act'), but the compelled thing *ad operandum* ('to operate', i.e. to produce effects). The shift anticipates Part III, where acting (*agere*) is reserved for being the adequate cause of an effect (Part III, Def. 2 [p. 231]); the two verbs are kept distinct throughout.

[14] *certa ac determinata ratione*, a formula that recurs with variations in Part I: *certo et determinato modo* (Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]), *ad certo modo existendum et operandum* (Prop. 29, Dem. [p. 81]), and being determined 'to exist and to operate' in Props. 26–28 [p. 77]. *Ratio* here means 'manner' or 'way', and *certus* has its older sense, 'definite'.

[15] Eternity is not endless duration (what the scholastics called sempiternity) but a kind of existence that has no relation to time at all, the existence of what exists by the necessity of its own definition. Spinoza had discussed the distinction in his *Cogitata Metaphysica* (I.4, 'Of eternity, duration and time', and II.1, 'Of God's eternity'). The doctrine returns, with decisive consequences, in Part V (Part V, Prop. 23, Scholium [p. 503]; Part V, Prop. 34, Scholium [p. 513]).

[16] The comparison is with truths such as those of geometry, which hold without reference to any time. Descartes had held that the eternal truths were freely created by God (letters to Mersenne of 15 April, 6 May and 27 May 1630, AT I

que per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.

Axiomata

I. Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.

II. Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet.

III. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus, et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur.

IV. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit.

V. Quae nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt, sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.

[G II 47] VI. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.

VII. Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, eius essentia non involvit existentiam.

Propositiones

Propositio I

Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.

Demonstratio. Patet ex defin. 3. et 5.

145, 149, 152); Spinoza will deny that God creates anything by free will (Prop. 17, Scholium [p. 67]; Prop. 33, Scholium 2 [p. 87]).

and therefore cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end.
Cited in 5P29D [p. 507]

Axioms

I. Whatever is, is either in itself or in another.
Cited in 1P4D [p. 31], 1P6C [p. 33], 1P11D3 [p. 43], 1P14C2 [p. 47], 1P15D [p. 49], 1P28D [p. 79]

II. What cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.

III. From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible for an effect to follow.
Cited in 1P27D [p. 79], 5P33D [p. 511]

IV. Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause.[17]
Cited in 1P3D [p. 31], 1P6CAlt [p. 33], 1P25D [p. 77], 2P5D [p. 127], 2P6D [p. 129], 2P7D [p. 129], 2P16D [p. 159], 2P45D [p. 197], 5P22D [p. 503]

V. Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.
Cited in 1P3D [p. 31]

VI. A true idea must agree with its object.[18]
Cited in 1P5D [p. 31], 1P30D [p. 83], 2P29D [p. 175], 2P32D [p. 179], 2P44D [p. 195], 2P44C2D [p. 197]
Cited in Letters 64 [p. 629]

VII. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.
Cited in 1P11D [p. 41]

Propositions

Proposition I

Substance is prior in nature[19] *to its affections.*
Cited in 1P5D [p. 31]

Demonstration. This is evident from Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25].

[17] This axiom ties causal dependence to conceptual dependence: what is caused by another is also conceived through it. Much of the argument of Part I (Prop. 3 [p. 31], Prop. 6, Cor. [p. 33], Prop. 25 [p. 77]) and the parallelism of Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 129] rest on it; the demonstration of the latter consists of little more than a reference to this axiom.
[18] *suo ideato*: literally 'its ideated', that of which the idea is an idea. The axiom states a correspondence condition on truth; Spinoza will add an intrinsic characterization of truth, the adequate idea, in Part II, Def. 4 [p. 121].
[19] Priority 'in nature' is not priority in time. In the scholastic sense, A is naturally prior to B when B depends on A, in being and in being conceived, but not conversely.

Propositio II

Duae substantiae diversa attributa habentes nihil inter se commune habent.

Demonstratio. Patet etiam ex defin. 3. Unaquaeque enim in se debet esse et per se debet concipi, sive conceptus unius conceptum alterius non involvit.

Propositio III

Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.

Demonstratio. Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per axiom. 5.) nec per se invicem possunt intelligi, adeoque (per axiom. 4.) una alterius causa esse non potest. Q. E. D.

Propositio IV

Duae aut plures res distinctae vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum, vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum.

Demonstratio. Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt (per axiom. 1.), hoc est (per defin. 3. et 5.) extra intellectum nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones.[e] Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur, per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt praeter substantias, sive quod idem est (per defin. 4.)[f] earum attributa earumque affectiones. Q. E. D.

Propositio V

[G II 48] *In rerum natura non possunt dari duae aut plures substantiae eiusdem naturae sive attributi.*

Demonstratio. Si darentur plures distinctae, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum, vel ex diversitate affectionum (per prop. praeced.). Si tantum ex diversitate attributorum, concedetur ergo, non dari nisi unam eiusdem attributi.

[e] The 1677 edition (OP p. 3) reads *eiusque affectiones*; the Dutch version has the plural (*der zelfder aandoeningen*), and Gebhardt (G II 47; Textgestaltung II 346), like Van Vloten–Land, corrects to *earumque*.

[f] The 1677 edition (OP p. 4) reads *per Axiom. 4.*, and the Dutch version agrees. Gebhardt (G II 48; Textgestaltung II 346), following Schmidt, Auerbach, Sigwart and Camerer, and Van Vloten–Land, reads *per Defin. 4.*, the definition of attribute, which the sense requires. The translation follows the correction.

Proposition II

Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.
Cited in 1P6D [p. 33], 1P11D2 [p. 41], 1P12D [p. 45]

Demonstration. This too is evident from Def. 3 [p. 25]. For each must be in itself and must be conceived through itself, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

Proposition III

Of things that have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other.[20]
Cited in 1P6D [p. 33]
Cited in Letters 63 [p. 629]

Demonstration. If they have nothing in common with one another, then (by Ax. 5 [p. 29]) they cannot be understood through one another, and so (by Ax. 4 [p. 29]) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.E.D.

Proposition IV

Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by a diversity of the attributes of the substances or by a diversity of their affections.
Cited in 1P5D [p. 31]

Demonstration. Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by Ax. 1 [p. 29]), that is (by Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25]), outside the intellect[21] there is nothing except substances and their affections. Therefore there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by Def. 4 [p. 25]), their attributes,[22] and their affections. Q.E.D.

Proposition V

In the nature of things[23] *there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.*
Cited in 1P6D [p. 33], 1P8D [p. 35], 1P12D [p. 45], 1P13D [p. 45], 1P14D [p. 47], 1P15S [p. 51], 2P10S [p. 137], 2L1D [p. 151]

Demonstration. If there were several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a diversity of attributes or by a diversity of affections (by the preceding Prop. [p. 31]). If only by a diversity of attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one

[20] Applied to thought and extension, this rules out the causal interaction of mind and body that Descartes had defended; see Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129], Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235] and the Preface to Part V.
[21] *extra intellectum*: in reality, as opposed to merely in thought.
[22] The identification of substances with their attributes is one of the most debated moves in Part I. It is hard to square with a purely subjectivist reading of Def. 4 [p. 25], and Spinoza repeats it elsewhere (cf. Prop. 19 [p. 71], Prop. 20, Cor. 2 [p. 73]).
[23] *in rerum natura*, idiomatic Latin for 'in reality'. The phrase is rendered literally throughout, so that 'Nature' with a capital is reserved for Nature as a whole.

At si ex diversitate affectionum, cum substantia sit prior natura suis affectionibus (per prop. 1.), depositis ergo affectionibus et in se considerata, hoc est (per defin. 3. et axiom. 6.)[g] vere considerata, non poterit concipi ab alia distingui, hoc est (per prop. praeced.) non poterunt dari plures, sed tantum una. Q. E. D.

Propositio VI

Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.

Demonstratio. In rerum natura non possunt dari duae substantiae eiusdem attributi (per prop. praeced.), hoc est (per prop. 2.) quae aliquid inter se commune habent; adeoque (per prop. 3.) una alterius causa esse nequit, sive una ab alia[h] non potest produci. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur substantiam ab alio produci non posse. Nam in rerum natura nihil datur praeter substantias, earumque affectiones, ut patet ex axiom. 1. et defin. 3. et 5. Atqui a substantia produci non potest (per prop. praeced.). Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci non potest. Q. E. D.

Aliter. Demonstratur hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, eius cognitio a cognitione suae causae deberet pendere (per axiom. 4.); adeoque (per defin. 3.) non esset substantia.

Propositio VII

[G II 49] *Ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere.*

Demonstratio. Substantia non potest produci ab alio (per coroll. prop. praeced.); erit itaque

[g] The 1677 edition (OP p. 4) reads *per Defin. 3. & 6.*, and the Dutch version agrees. Saisset proposed *Defin. 3. & 4.*; Gebhardt (G II 48; Textgestaltung II 346) adopts Van Vloten–Land's *per Defin. 3. & Axiom. 6.*: Ax. 6 (on the true idea) fits 'considered truly', whereas Def. 6 defines God. The translation follows the correction.

[h] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 4); Gebhardt (G II 48) and Bartuschat omit *una*.

of the same attribute.
But if by a diversity of affections, then, since substance is prior in nature to its affections (by Prop. 1 [p. 29]), if the affections are put to one side and it is considered in itself, that is (by Def. 3 [p. 25] and Ax. 6 [p. 29]), considered truly, it cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, that is (by the preceding Prop. [p. 31]), there cannot be several substances, but only one. Q.E.D.[24]

Proposition VI

One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
Cited in 1P6C [p. 33], 1P11S [p. 43], 1P12D [p. 45]

Demonstration. In the nature of things there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by the preceding Prop. [p. 31]), that is (by Prop. 2 [p. 31]), which have something in common with one another;[25] and so (by Prop. 3 [p. 31]) one cannot be the cause of the other, or one cannot be produced by the other. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything else.[26] For in the nature of things there is nothing except substances and their affections, as is evident from Ax. 1 [p. 29] and Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25]. But it cannot be produced by a substance (by the preceding Prop. [p. 33]).[27] Therefore a substance absolutely cannot be produced by anything else. Q.E.D.
Cited in 1P7D [p. 33], 1P15S [p. 49]

Alternatively. This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of its contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by Ax. 4 [p. 29]); and so (by Def. 3 [p. 25]) it would not be a substance.

Proposition VII

It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.
Cited in 1P8D [p. 35], 1P8S1 [p. 35], 1P8S2 [p. 35], 1P11D [p. 41], 1P11D2 [p. 41], 1P11D3 [p. 43], 1P12D [p. 45], 1P19D [p. 71], 2P10D [p. 135]

Demonstration. A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by the Cor. of the

[24] Leibniz objected, in notes he made on the *Ethics*, that the argument contains a paralogism: 'two substances can be distinguished by their attributes and yet have some attribute in common, provided they also have others of their own' (*duae substantiae possunt distingui attributis, et tamen habere aliquod attributum commune, modo etiam aliqua praeterea habeant propria*; Gerhardt, *Philosophische Schriften* I 142). A common line of reply on Spinoza's behalf: since each attribute is conceived through itself (Prop. 10 [p. 39]) and expresses the whole essence of its substance, a shared attribute would let us conceive each substance through it alone, with nothing in that conception to tell the two apart.
[25] The step is compressed. Prop. 2 [p. 31] says that substances with different attributes have nothing in common; Spinoza takes it that two substances could have something in common only by sharing an attribute, which Prop. 5 [p. 31] excludes.
[26] For Descartes, minds and bodies are created substances (*Principles* I.51–52, AT VIII-1 24–25). Spinoza denies that any substance can be created; see Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35] and Prop. 15, Scholium [p. 49].
[27] In a corollary or scholium, 'the preceding Proposition' is the one to which it is attached, here Prop. 6 itself.

causa sui, id est (per defin. 1.) ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam, sive ad eius naturam pertinet existere. Q. E. D.

Propositio VIII

Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.

Demonstratio. Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit (per prop. 5.) et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere (per prop. 7.). Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam (per defin. 2.) deberet terminari ab alia eiusdem naturae, quae etiam necessario deberet existere (per prop. 7.); adeoque darentur duae substantiae eiusdem attributi, quod est absurdum (per prop. 5.). Existit ergo infinita. Q. E. D.

Scholium I. Cum finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio, et infinitum absoluta affirmatio existentiae alicuius naturae, sequitur ergo ex sola prop. 7. omnem substantiam debere esse infinitam.[i]

Scholium II. Non dubito, quin omnibus, qui de rebus confuse iudicant, nec res per primas suas causas noscere consueverunt, difficile sit, demonstrationem prop. 7. concipere; nimirum quia non distinguunt inter modificationes substantiarum et ipsas substantias, neque sciunt, quomodo res producuntur.
Unde fit, ut principium, quod res naturales habere vident, substantiis affingant. Qui enim veras rerum causas ignorant, omnia confundunt et sine ulla mentis repugnantia tam arbores, quam homines, loquentes fingunt et homines tam ex lapidibus quam ex semine formari et quascumque formas in alias quascumque mutari imaginantur. Sic etiam, qui naturam divinam cum humana confundunt, facile Deo affectus humanos tribuunt, praesertim quamdiu etiam ignorant, quomodo affectus in mente producuntur.

[i] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'Want indien men de zelfstandigheit eindig stelde, zo zou men in haar natuur ten deel het wezentlijk te zijn ontkennen; 't welk (volgens de gezeide Voorstelling) ongerijmt is' ('For if one supposed substance to be finite, one would in part deny existence in its nature, which (by the said proposition) is absurd'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 49; Textgestaltung II 346). The Latin terms *Existere* and *Negare* stand in the margin.

preceding Prop. [p. 33]); it will therefore be the cause of itself,[28] that is (by Def. 1 [p. 25]), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist. Q.E.D.

Proposition VIII

Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Cited in 1P12D [p. 45], 1P13S [p. 47], 1P15S [p. 51], 2L1D [p. 151]

Demonstration. A substance of one attribute[29] exists only as unique (by Prop. 5 [p. 31]), and it pertains to its nature to exist (by Prop. 7 [p. 33]). It will therefore be of its nature to exist either as finite or as infinite. But not as finite. For (by Def. 2 [p. 25]) it would have to be limited by another of the same nature, which would also have to exist necessarily (by Prop. 7 [p. 33]); and so there would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by Prop. 5 [p. 31]). It exists, therefore, as infinite. Q.E.D.

Scholium I. Since being finite is in truth partly a negation,[30] and being infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from Prop. 7 [p. 33] alone that every substance must be infinite.

Scholium II. I do not doubt that for all who judge of things confusedly, and are not accustomed to know things through their first causes, it is difficult to conceive the demonstration of Prop. 7 [p. 33]; namely, because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced.
Hence it comes about that they fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning which they see natural things have. For those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything, and without any repugnance of mind feign[31] that trees, no less than men, speak, and imagine that men are formed from stones as well as from seed,[32] and that any forms whatever are changed into any others whatever. So also those who confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe human affects[33] to God, especially so long as they are also ignorant of how affects are produced in the mind.

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[28] The inference from 'not produced by anything else' to 'cause of itself' assumes that everything has a cause, either in itself or in another (cf. Ax. 3 [p. 29], the 'third note' of Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35], and the second demonstration of Prop. 11 [p. 41]). It is the first appearance in the *Ethics* of a principle of sufficient reason.

[29] Up to this point the argument has spoken of substance in general, and has not excluded substances of a single attribute. Only with God, the substance of infinite attributes (Props. 9–11 [p. 39]), and the uniqueness of God (Prop. 14 [p. 47]), does it emerge that there is just one substance, with all the attributes.

[30] Compare Letter 50, to Jelles: since figure is nothing but determination, 'and determination is negation' (*determinatio negatio est*; VVL[3] III 173), figure cannot be anything positive. Hegel quoted the principle as Spinoza's (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1812, Book I, pp. 75–76: 'Determinatio est negatio, sagte Spinoza'); it is often cited in the form *omnis determinatio est negatio*, which is not Spinoza's wording.

[31] *fingunt*; compare *affingant* just before ('fictitiously ascribe'). *Fingere* ('to feign', 'to fashion') and *fictio* are technical terms, developed in the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*: to frame an idea that does not arise from knowledge of the thing's causes. They are rendered 'feign' and 'fiction' throughout.

[32] The examples recall the poets' fables: speaking trees (as with Polydorus' myrtle in Virgil, *Aeneid* III), and men born from stones (Deucalion and Pyrrha, Ovid, *Metamorphoses* I), together with the transformations of the *Metamorphoses* generally.

[33] The first occurrence of *affectus* ('affect'), the subject of Part III. Spinoza's polemic against anthropomorphic conceptions of God returns at length in Prop. 15, Scholium [p. 49], Prop. 17, Scholium [p. 67] and the Appendix [p. 101].

Si autem homines ad naturam substantiae attenderent, minime de veritate prop. 7. dubitarent; imo haec prop. omnibus axioma esset et inter notiones communes numeraretur. Nam per *substantiam* intelligerent id quod in se est et per se concipitur, hoc est, id cuius cognitio non indiget cognitione alterius rei. Per *modificationes* autem id quod in alio est et quarum conceptus a conceptu rei, in qua sunt, formatur.

Quocirca modificationum non existentium veras ideas possumus habere; quandoquidem, quamvis non existant actu extra intellectum, earum tamen essentia ita in alio comprehenditur, ut per idem concipi possint. Verum substantiarum veritas extra intellectum non est, nisi in se ipsis, quia per se concipiuntur.
Si quis ergo diceret, se claram et distinctam, hoc est, veram ideam substantiae habere et nihilominus dubitare, num talis substantia existat, idem hercle esset, ac si diceret, se veram habere ideam et nihilominus dubitare, num falsa sit (ut satis attendenti fit manifestum); vel, si quis statuat, substantiam creari, simul statuit, ideam falsam factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest. Adeoque fatendum necessario est, substantiae existentiam, sicut eius essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem.

Atque hinc alio modo concludere possumus, non dari nisi unicam eiusdem naturae; quod hic ostendere, operae pretium esse duxi. Ut autem hoc ordine faciam, notandum est, 1. veram uniuscuiusque rei definitionem nihil involvere, neque exprimere praeter rei definitae naturam. Ex quo sequitur hoc 2. nempe nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuorum[j] involvere, neque exprimere, quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit, quam naturam rei definitae. Ex. gr. definitio trianguli nihil aliud exprimit, quam simplicem naturam trianguli; at non certum aliquem triangulorum numerum.
3. Notandum, dari necessario uniuscuiusque rei existentis certam aliquam causam, propter quam existit. 4. Denique notandum, hanc causam, propter quam aliqua res existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et definitione rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere), vel debere extra ipsam dari.
His positis sequitur, quod, si in natura certus aliquis numerus individuorum existat, debeat necessario dari causa, cur illa individua et cur non plura nec pauciora existunt. Si ex. gr. in rerum natura viginti homines existant (quos maioris perspicuitatis causa suppono simul existere, nec alios antea in natura exstitisse), non satis erit (ut scilicet rationem reddamus, cur viginti

[j] The Dutch version has a marginal note on this word (*ondeeligen*, 'individuals'): 'By ondeeligen worden de bezonderen verstaan, die onder een geslacht behoren' ('By individuals are understood the particulars that belong under a genus'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 50; Textgestaltung II 347). Gebhardt prints it as a footnote.

But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of the truth of Prop. 7 [p. 33]; indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for all, and would be numbered among the common notions.[34] For by *substance* they would understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of another thing; but by *modifications*, what is in another, and whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are.

This is why we can have true ideas of modifications that do not exist;[35] for although they do not actually exist outside the intellect, their essence is nevertheless comprehended in another in such a way that they can be conceived through it. But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect except in themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.

If someone, therefore, were to say that he had a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of a substance, and nevertheless doubted whether such a substance existed, that would really be[36] the same as if he were to say that he had a true idea and nevertheless doubted whether it was false (as is manifest to anyone who attends sufficiently); or if someone maintains that a substance is created,[37] he maintains at the same time that a false idea has become true, than which surely nothing more absurd can be conceived. So it must necessarily be admitted that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth.

And from this we can conclude in another way[38] that there is only one substance of the same nature, which I have thought it worthwhile to show here. But to do this in order, it must be noted, 1. that the true definition of each thing involves and expresses nothing except the nature of the thing defined. From which there follows this, 2. namely, that no definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of the triangle expresses nothing other than the simple nature of the triangle, but not any certain number of triangles.

3. It must be noted that for each existing thing there is necessarily some certain cause on account of which it exists. 4. Finally, it must be noted that this cause, on account of which some thing exists, either must be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (namely, because it pertains to its nature to exist), or must be given outside it.

With these points established, it follows that if some certain number of individuals exists in nature, there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals exist, and why neither more nor fewer. If, for example, twenty men exist in the nature of things (whom, for the sake of greater clarity, I suppose to exist at the same time, and that no others existed in nature before), it will not

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[34] *notiones communes*. The axioms of Euclid's *Elements* I stand under the heading Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι ('common notions'; Heiberg I 10), which Latin versions rendered variously (Heiberg's own Latin has *communes animi conceptiones*, I 11). In Spinoza's circle the term meant the axioms of a geometrical exposition: Lodewijk Meyer's preface to Spinoza's *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* speaks of 'Postulata, & Axiomata, seu communes animi Notiones' (G I 127); Descartes used it for self-evident truths (*Principles* I.13, I.49; AT VIII-1 9, 23). Spinoza gives the term a theory of its own in Part II, Props. 37–40 [p. 183].

[35] Spinoza returns to the ideas of non-existent modes in Part II, Prop. 8 [p. 133] and its Corollary and Scholium.

[36] *hercle*, a colloquial oath ('by Hercules') that Spinoza uses for emphasis; it recurs in Prop. 15, Scholium [p. 49].

[37] Against the Cartesian doctrine of created substances. If the idea of a substance includes its existence, then before its supposed creation the true idea would have represented as existing something that did not exist, and so would have been false.

[38] What follows is an independent proof of Prop. 5 [p. 31], resting on four 'notes' about definition and causation. The third note is a version of the principle of sufficient reason (see the note on Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 33]).

homines existant) causam naturae humanae in genere ostendere; sed insuper necesse erit, causam ostendere, cur non plures, nec pauciores, quam viginti existant; quandoquidem (per notam 3.) uniuscuiusque debet necessario dari causa, cur existat.
At haec causa (per notam 2. et 3.) non potest in ipsa natura humana contineri, quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit. Adeoque (per notam. 4.) causa, cur hi viginti homines existunt et consequenter cur unusquisque existit, debet necessario extra unumquemque dari et propterea absolute concludendum, omne id, cuius naturae plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario, ut existant, causam externam habere.

Iam quoniam ad naturam substantiae (per iam ostensa in hoc schol.) pertinet existere, debet eius definitio necessariam existentiam involvere et consequenter ex sola eius definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. At ex ipsius definitione (ut iam ex nota 2. et 3. ostendimus) non potest sequi plurium substantiarum existentia. Sequitur ergo ex ea necessario, unicam tantum eiusdem naturae existere, ut proponebatur.

Propositio IX

[G II 51] *Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquaeque res habet, eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.*

Demonstratio. Patet ex defin. 4.

Propositio X

Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet.

Demonstratio. Attributum enim est id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tamquam eius essentiam constituens (per defin. 4.); adeoque (per defin. 3.) per se concipi debet. Q. E. D.

[G II 52] Scholium. Ex his apparet, quod, quamvis duo attributa realiter distincta concipiantur, hoc est, unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere, ipsa duo entia, sive duas diversas substantias constituere. Id enim est de natura substantiae, ut unumquodque eius attributorum per se concipiatur; quandoquidem omnia quae habet attributa simul in ipsa semper fuerunt, nec unum ab alio produci potuit; sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiae exprimit.

be enough (in order, that is, to give a reason why twenty men exist) to show the cause of human nature in general; but it will be necessary in addition to show the cause why not more and not fewer than twenty exist, since (by note 3) there must necessarily be a cause for each, why it exists. But this cause (by notes 2 and 3) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. And so (by note 4) the cause why these twenty men exist, and consequently why each of them exists, must necessarily be given outside each of them; and therefore it must be concluded absolutely that whatever is of such a nature that several individuals of it can exist must necessarily, in order that they may exist, have an external cause.

Now since it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (by what has already been shown in this Scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently its existence must be inferred from its definition alone. But from its definition (as we have already shown from notes 2 and 3) the existence of several substances cannot follow. It follows necessarily from it, therefore, that there exists only one substance of the same nature, as was proposed.

Cited in 1P15S [p. 49]

Proposition IX

The more reality or being[39] *each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.*

Demonstration. This is evident from Def. 4 [p. 25].

Proposition X

Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself.

Cited in 1P12D [p. 45], 2P5D [p. 127], 2P6D [p. 129]

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 629], 66 [p. 633]

Demonstration. For an attribute is what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (by Def. 4 [p. 25]); and so (by Def. 3 [p. 25]) it must be conceived through itself. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From these things it is apparent that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct,[40] that is, one without the aid of the other, we still cannot infer from this that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another; but each expresses the reality, or being, of substance.

[39] Degrees of reality are Cartesian (*Meditations* III, AT VII 40: substance has more 'objective reality' than a mode, infinite substance more than finite). Spinoza connects them with the number of attributes. The one-line demonstration has puzzled readers; the thought seems to be that attributes are what express the reality of a substance (see Prop. 10, Scholium [p. 39]).

[40] *realiter distincta*. In Descartes, a 'real distinction' holds between substances, and is established when each can be clearly and distinctly conceived without the other (*Principles* I.60, AT VIII-1 28); this is how the Sixth Meditation concludes that mind and body are distinct substances (AT VII 78). Spinoza accepts the conceptual test for attributes but denies that it establishes distinct substances, a direct reply to Descartes.

Longe ergo abest, ut absurdum sit, uni substantiae plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi, et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat, eo plura attributa, quae et necessitatem sive aeternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat; et consequenter nihil etiam clarius, quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut defin. 6. tradidimus) ens, quod constat infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit.
Si quis autem iam quaerit, ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quae ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere, eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quaereretur.

Propositio XI

Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.

Demonstratio. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, Deum non existere. Ergo (per axiom. 7.) eius essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per prop. 7.) est absurdum. Ergo Deus necessario existit. Q. E. D.

Aliter. Cuiuscumque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio, tam cur existit, quam cur non existit. Ex. gr. si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet, cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet, quae impedit quominus existat, sive quae eius existentiam tollat. Haec vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet, vel extra ipsam.

Ex. gr. rationem, cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa eius natura indicat; nimirum, quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam eius natura sequitur, quia scilicet existentiam involvit[k] (vide prop. 7.).
At ratio, cur circulus vel triangulus existit,[l] vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur, sed ex ordine universae naturae corporeae. Ex eo enim sequi debet, vel iam triangulum necessario existere, vel impossibile esse ut iam existat. Atque haec per se manifesta sunt.

Ex quibus sequitur, id necessario existere, cuius nulla ratio nec causa datur, quae impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit, quae impedit quominus Deus existat, vel

[k] The 1677 edition (OP p. 9) prints *quae scilicet existentiam involvit* ('its nature, which involves existence') but corrects it to *quia* in its list of errata (*Sphalmata corrigenda*); the Dutch version has *om dat* ('because'). Gebhardt (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347) and Bartuschat read *quia*; Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn kept *quae*. The sense is the same.
[l] The 1677 edition (OP p. 9) and Bartuschat read *triangulum*; Gebhardt (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347) reads *triangulus*, with the Dutch version's marginal gloss and with *triangulus* a few lines earlier (G II 52), as Van Vloten–Land had corrected.

So it is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance; indeed nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity; and consequently nothing is clearer, either, than that a being absolutely infinite must necessarily be defined (as we taught in Def. 6 [p. 27]) as a being which consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

But if someone now asks by what sign, then, we shall be able to recognize a diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in the nature of things there exists only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite; so that such a sign would be sought in vain.

Cited in 1P14C1 [p. 47]

Cited in Letters 63 [p. 629], 64 [p. 631]

Proposition XI

God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.[41]

Cited in 1P13D [p. 45], 1P14D [p. 47], 1P17C2 [p. 67], 1P19D [p. 71], 1P19S [p. 71], 1P21D [p. 73], 1P29D [p. 81], 1P33D [p. 87], 1P34D [p. 91], 5P35D [p. 513]

Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, that God does not exist. Then (by Ax. 7 [p. 29]) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. 7 [p. 33]) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Alternatively. For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason,[42] as much for why it exists as for why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it does not exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing, or which takes its existence away. This reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.

For example, the reason why a square circle does not exist is indicated by its very nature, namely, because it involves a contradiction. Why, on the other hand, a substance exists also follows from its nature alone, namely, because it involves existence (see Prop. 7 [p. 33]).

But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from their nature, but from the order of the whole of corporeal nature. For from this it must follow either that the triangle now necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should now exist. And these things are self-evident.[43]

From which it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause which prevents it from existing. Therefore, if there can be no reason or cause which prevents God from existing,

[41] Three demonstrations follow. The first is a version of the ontological argument (cf. Descartes, *Meditations* V, AT VII 65–66), but it runs through Prop. 7 [p. 33], the claim that existence pertains to the nature of every substance, rather than through the idea of a supremely perfect being. The second rests on a principle of sufficient reason; the third, by Spinoza's own account in the Scholium, is a posteriori.

[42] *causa seu ratio*. The equation of cause and reason is basic to Spinoza's rationalism: to have a cause is to have an explanation, and conversely. Here the principle of sufficient reason is stated in its strongest form, requiring a reason for non-existence as well as for existence.

[43] *per se manifesta*, literally 'manifest through themselves'; similarly *per se notum* is rendered 'self-evident'.

quae eius existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est, eundem necessario existere.
At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura, vel extra ipsam dari deberet, hoc est, in alia substantia alterius naturae. Nam si eiusdem naturae esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum. At substantia, quae alterius esset naturae,[m] nihil cum Deo commune habere (per prop. 2.), adeoque neque eius existentiam ponere neque tollere posset.

Cum igitur ratio seu causa, quae divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa eius natura, quae propterea[n] contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de ente absolute infinito[o] et summe perfecto affirmare, absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo, nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur, quae eius existentiam tollat, ac proinde Deus necessario existit. Q. E. D.

[G II 53] Aliter. Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id, quod iam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora ente absolute infinito: atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est. Ergo vel nihil existit, vel ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit.
Atqui nos, vel in nobis, vel in alio, quod necessario existit, existimus (vid.axiom. 1. et prop. 7.). Ergo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est (per defin. 6.), Deus necessario existit. Q. E. D.

[G II 54] Scholium. In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui, ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea, quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur, quo plus realitatis alicuius rei naturae competit, eo plus virium a se habere, ut existat; adeoque ens absolute infinitum, sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit.
Multi tamen forsan non facile huius demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt, quia assueti sunt, eas solummodo res contemplari, quae a causis externis fluunt; et ex his, quae cito fiunt, hoc est, quae facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contra eas res factu difficiliores iudicant, hoc est, ad existendum non adeo faciles, ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt. Verum ut ab his praeiudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere, qua ratione hoc enunciatum: quod cito fit, cito perit, verum sit, nec etiam, an respectu totius naturae omnia aeque facilia sint, an secus.

Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit, me hic non loqui de rebus, quae a causis externis fiunt, sed de solis substantiis, quae (per prop. 6.) a nulla causa externa produci possunt. Res enim, quae a causis externis fiunt, sive eae multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis

[m] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dan de goddelijke' ('than the divine'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347).
[n] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'volgens onz tweede Voorbeelt' ('by our second example'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 53; Textgestaltung II 347). The second example is the square circle, whose nature involves a contradiction.
[o] The 1677 edition (OP p. 9) reads *Atque* ('And'), followed by Bruder, Van Vloten–Land and Bartuschat. *Atqui* ('But'), which introduces the minor premise of the reductio, is Gebhardt's correction (G II 53 l. 25; Textgestaltung II 348) from the Dutch version: 'Doch dit ... te zeggen, zou ongerijmt wezen' (NS p. 10); Baensch had proposed it without knowledge of the Dutch. Gueroult defends *Atqui* (*Spinoza I: Dieu*, p. 187 n. 25, where the passage is cited as G II 52 l. 28).

or which takes his existence away, it must certainly be concluded that he necessarily exists.
But if there were such a reason, or cause, it would have to be either in the very nature of God or outside it, that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, by that very fact it would be granted that God exists. But a substance that was of another nature would have nothing in common with God (by Prop. 2 [p. 31]), and so could neither posit nor take away his existence.
Since, therefore, a reason or cause which would take away the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, it will necessarily have to be, if indeed God does not exist, in his very nature, which would therefore involve a contradiction. But to affirm this of a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in God nor outside God is there any cause or reason which takes his existence away, and hence God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Alternatively. To be able not to exist is lack of power,[44] and conversely, to be able to exist is power (as is self-evident). So, if what now necessarily exists is only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite: and this (as is self-evident) is absurd. So either nothing exists, or a being absolutely infinite also necessarily exists.
But we exist, either in ourselves or in something else which necessarily exists (see Ax. 1 [p. 29] and Prop. 7 [p. 33]). Therefore a being absolutely infinite, that is (by Def. 6 [p. 27]), God, necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Scholium. In this last demonstration I wanted to show God's existence a posteriori,[45] so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily; but not because God's existence does not follow a priori from this same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist; and so a being absolutely infinite, or God, has of himself an absolutely infinite power of existing, and therefore he exists absolutely.
Still, perhaps many will not easily be able to see the evidentness of this demonstration, because they have been accustomed to contemplate only those things that flow from external causes; and of these they see that those which quickly come to be, that is, which easily exist, also easily perish, and conversely they judge those things more difficult to bring about, that is, not so easy to exist, to which they conceive more things to pertain. But to free them from these prejudices, I have no need to show here in what way this saying, *what quickly comes to be quickly perishes*,[46] is true, nor even whether, in respect of the whole of nature, all things are equally easy, or not.
But it suffices to note only this, that I am not speaking here of things that come to be from external causes, but only of substances, which (by Prop. 6 [p. 33]) can be produced by no external cause. For things that come to be from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or of

[44] *impotentia*, the privative of *potentia* ('power'); not 'impotence' in the modern sense.
[45] In the seventeenth-century sense, a demonstration a posteriori proceeds from effects to causes (here, from the fact that we exist), and one a priori from causes, or from the essence of a thing, to what follows from it.
[46] *quod cito fit, cito perit*. Spinoza calls it an *enunciatum*, a 'saying', and treats it as something his readers take for granted.

habent, id omne virtuti causae externae debetur, adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causae externae, non autem suae oritur. Contra, quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causae externae debetur; quare eius etiam existentia ex sola eius natura sequi debet, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam eius essentia.
Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit, sed contra ponit; imperfectio autem contra eandem tollit, adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus, quam de existentia entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti, hoc est, Dei. Nam quandoquidem eius essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit, summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.

Propositio XII

[G II 55] *Nullum substantiae attributum potest vere concipi, ex quo sequatur, substantiam posse dividi.*

Demonstratio. Partes enim, in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel naturam substantiae retinebunt, vel non. Si primum,[p] tum (per prop. 8.) unaquaeque pars debebit esse infinita et (per prop. 6.) causa sui[q] et (per prop. 5.) constare debebit ex diverso attributo, adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (per prop. 6.) est absurdum.

Adde, quod partes (per prop. 2.) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent, et totum (per defin. 4. et prop. 10.) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse, nemo dubitare poterit. Si autem secundum ponatur, quod scilicet partes naturam substantiae non retinebunt; ergo, cum tota substantia in aequales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiae amitteret et esse desineret, quod (per prop. 7.) est absurdum.

Propositio XIII

Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.

Demonstratio. Si enim divisibilis esset, partes, in quas divideretur, vel naturam substantiae absolute infinitae retinebunt, vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiae eiusdem naturae, quod (per prop. 5.) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (ut supra) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (per prop. 11.) est etiam absurdum.

[p] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'namelijk dat zy de natuur van de zelfstandigheit behouden' ('namely, that they retain the nature of substance'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 55; Textgestaltung II 348).
[q] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 11) and the Dutch version. W. Meijer proposed *prop. 7.*, which Bartuschat adopts; Gebhardt (G II 55; Textgestaltung II 348) keeps *prop. 6.* as the proposition that corresponds.

few, owe all the perfection, or reality, they have to the power of the external cause;[47] and so their existence arises only from the perfection of the external cause, and not from their own. On the other hand, whatever perfection a substance has is owed to no external cause; so its existence too must follow from its nature alone, and is therefore nothing other than its essence.[48]
Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary posits it; imperfection, on the other hand, takes it away; and so there is no existence of which we can be more certain than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite, or perfect, that is, God. For since his essence excludes all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it takes away every cause of doubting his existence and gives the greatest certainty concerning it, which I believe will be clear to anyone who attends even moderately.

Proposition XII

No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that the substance can be divided.

Cited in 1P15S [p. 51]

Demonstration. For the parts into which a substance so conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance or will not. If the first, then (by Prop. 8 [p. 35]) each part will have to be infinite, and (by Prop. 6 [p. 33]) cause of itself,[49] and (by Prop. 5 [p. 31]) will have to consist of a different attribute; and so many substances could be constituted from one, which (by Prop. 6 [p. 33]) is absurd.
Add that the parts (by Prop. 2 [p. 31]) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. 4 [p. 25] and Prop. 10 [p. 39]) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which no one will be able to doubt is absurd. But if the second is asserted, namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance, then, when the whole substance had been divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and would cease to be, which (by Prop. 7 [p. 33]) is absurd.

Proposition XIII

A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Demonstration. For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided either will retain the nature of an absolutely infinite substance or will not. If the first, there will be several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. 5 [p. 31]) is absurd. If the second is asserted, then (as above) a substance absolutely infinite could cease to be, which (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) is also

[47] *virtuti*. *Virtus* here has its scholastic sense of causal power or efficacy; it is rendered 'power' rather than the glossary's 'virtue', which is reserved for the ethical sense that Part IV, Def. 8 [p. 357] will in turn identify with power.
[48] The grammar leaves open whether 'which' (*quae*) refers to the existence or to the nature of the substance; either way the claim anticipates Prop. 20 [p. 71], that God's existence and his essence are one and the same.
[49] Strictly, that a substance is cause of itself was shown in Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 33], on the basis of Prop. 6 [p. 33] and its Corollary; W. Meijer accordingly proposed to read Prop. 7, and Bartuschat does. The 1677 edition and the Dutch version read 'Prop. 6', which Gebhardt defends: a substance that cannot be produced by another must be its own cause, as Prop. 6 teaches (G II 348). The translation keeps it.

Corollarium. Ex his sequitur, nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.

Scholium. Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc solo intelligitur, quod natura substantiae non potest concipi nisi infinita et quod per partem substantiae nihil aliud intelligi potest, quam substantia finita, quod (per prop. 8.) manifestam contradictionem implicat.

Propositio XIV

[G II 56] *Praeter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.*

Demonstratio. Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum, de quo nullum attributum, quod essentiam substantiae exprimit, negari potest (per defin. 6.), isque necessario existat (per prop. 11.), si aliqua substantia praeter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei, sicque duae substantiae eiusdem attributi existerent, quod (per prop. 5.) est absurdum; adeoque nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest et consequenter non etiam concipi.

Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi, ut existens; atqui hoc (per primam partem huius demonst.) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest substantia. Q. E. D.

Corollarium I. Hinc clarissime sequitur 1. Deum esse unicum, hoc est (per defin. 6.) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari, eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in scholio prop. 10. iam innuimus.

Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. rem extensam et rem cogitantem, vel Dei attributa esse, vel (per axiom. 1.) affectiones attributorum Dei.

absurd.

Corollary. From these it follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance,[50] is divisible.

Cited in 1P15S [p. 51]

Scholium. That substance is indivisible is understood more simply from this alone, that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of a substance nothing can be understood except a finite substance, which (by Prop. 8 [p. 35]) implies a manifest contradiction.

Proposition XIV

Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.[51]

Cited in 1P15D [p. 49], 1P15S [p. 49], 1P18D [p. 71]

Demonstration. Since God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute which expresses an essence of substance can be denied[52] (by Def. 6 [p. 27]), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]), if there were any substance except God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. 5 [p. 31]) is absurd; and so no substance outside God can be, and consequently none can be conceived either.

For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore, outside God no substance can be or be conceived. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. From this it follows most clearly, 1. that God is unique, that is (by Def. 6 [p. 27]), that in the nature of things there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated in the Scholium to Prop. 10 [p. 39].

Cited in 1P17C2 [p. 67], 1P24C [p. 77], 1P29S [p. 81], 1P30D [p. 83], 1P33D [p. 87], 2P4D [p. 127]

Corollary II. It follows, 2. that the extended thing and the thinking thing[53] are either attributes of God, or (by Ax. 1 [p. 29]) affections of the attributes of God.

[50] *quatenus*, 'insofar as', one of the most important words in the *Ethics*: the same thing considered in different respects has different properties. Matter considered as substance is indivisible; considered as affected in various ways, it has parts (Prop. 15, Scholium [p. 49]).

[51] *dari*, literally 'be given', Spinoza's usual verb for being or existing; it is rendered idiomatically throughout (see the glossary).

[52] This reading of Def. 6 [p. 27] and its Explanation, on which God has every attribute there is, is what forces the conclusion: any other substance would have to share an attribute with God.

[53] *rem extensam et rem cogitantem*, Descartes' two kinds of created substance, body and mind. Spinoza demotes both: they are either attributes or affections of God. That thought and extension are attributes is shown in Part II, Props. 1–2 [p. 125].

Propositio XV

Quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.

Demonstratio. Praeter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (per prop. 14.), hoc est (per defin. 3.) res, quae in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (per defin. 5.) sine substantia nec esse, nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse et per ipsam solam concipi possunt. Atqui praeter substantias et modos nil datur (per axiom. 1.). Ergo nihil sine Deo esse, neque concipi potest. Q. E. D.

[G II 57] Scholium. Sunt qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt. Sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex iam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto. Nam omnes, qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum, negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo, quod per corpus intelligimus quamcumque quantitatem, longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest.

Attamen interim aliis rationibus, quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt, se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere, atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant; quod clare ostendit, illos id quod ipsimet dicunt, non intelligere. Ego saltem satis clare, meo quidem iudicio, demonstravi (vide coroll. prop. 6. et schol. 2. prop. 8.) nullam substantiam ab alio posse produci vel creari.

Porro prop. 14. ostendimus, praeter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam. Atque hinc[r] conclusimus, substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Verum, ad pleniorem explicationem adversariorum argumenta refutabo, quae omnia huc redeunt.

[r] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'in de tweede Toegift van de zelfde Voorstelling in dit deel' ('in the second Corollary of the same proposition in this Part'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 57; Textgestaltung II 349). The reference is to Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47].

Proposition XV

Whatever is, is in God,[54] *and nothing can be or be conceived without God.*

Cited in 1P17D [p. 65], 1P18D [p. 71], 1P23D [p. 75], 1P25D [p. 77], 1P25C [p. 77], 1P28S [p. 81], 1P29D [p. 81], 1P30D [p. 83], 1P31D [p. 83], 2P3D [p. 125], 2P10C [p. 137], 2P33D [p. 179], 2P36D [p. 181], 2P45D [p. 197], 4P28D [p. 387], 4P37D [p. 397], 5P14D [p. 487], 5P36S [p. 515]

Demonstration. Except God there is no substance, nor can any be conceived (by Prop. 14 [p. 47]), that is (by Def. 3 [p. 25]), a thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. 5 [p. 25]) can neither be nor be conceived without substance; so they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But except substances and modes there is nothing (by Ax. 1 [p. 29]). Therefore nothing can be or be conceived without God. Q.E.D.

Scholium. There are those who feign a God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and subject to passions.[55] But how far they wander from the true knowledge of God is sufficiently established by what has already been demonstrated. But these I dismiss. For all who have in any way contemplated the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. They also prove this very well from the fact that by body we understand any quantity, with length, breadth and depth, bounded by some certain figure; and nothing more absurd than this can be said of God, a being, that is, absolutely infinite.

But meanwhile, by other arguments by which they try to demonstrate this same point, they clearly show that they entirely remove corporeal, or extended, substance itself from the divine nature, and they maintain that it is created by God. But by what divine power it could have been created they are utterly ignorant; which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves say. I, at least, have demonstrated clearly enough, in my judgment at any rate, that no substance can be produced or created by anything else (see Cor. Prop. 6 [p. 33] and Schol. 2 Prop. 8 [p. 35]).

Further, we have shown in Prop. 14 [p. 47] that except God no substance can be or be conceived. And from this we have concluded that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.[56] But for a fuller explanation I shall refute my adversaries' arguments, which all come down

[54] In the sense of Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25], 'being in' is inherence: finite things are modes of God. Pierre Bayle (*Dictionnaire historique et critique*, article 'Spinoza', remark N) objected that God would then be the subject of every change and of contrary predicates: when the Germans kill ten thousand Turks, one would have to say that 'God modified into Germans has killed God modified into ten thousand Turks'. E. Curley proposed that modes depend on substance as effects on a cause rather than inhering in it as properties in a subject: 'the relation of mode to substance is a relation of causal dependence which is unlike the relation of predicate to subject' (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, 1969, p. 40). Y. Melamed defends the traditional reading, that modes 'both inhere in and are predicated of the substance', and argues that Bayle's critique rests on misunderstandings (*Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought*, 2013, ch. 1).

[55] Spinoza names no one. The literal reading of the Bible's corporeal language about God is the target of the opening chapters of Maimonides' מוֹרֶה נְבוּכִים (*Guide of the Perplexed*), which begin with צֶלֶם ('image') and דְּמוּת ('likeness') in נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ ('Let us make man in our image, after our likeness', Gen. 1:26): כבר חשבו בני אדם כי 'צלם' בלשון העברי יורה על תמונת הדבר ותארו; והביא זה אל הגשמה גמורה ('People have thought that "image" in the Hebrew language denotes the shape and outline of a thing, and this led them to a complete corporealization [of God]'; *Guide* I.1, Ibn Tibbon).

[56] 'Extended substance' is here identified with an attribute; compare the identification of substances with their attributes in Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 31].

Primo, quod substantia corporea, quatenus substantia, constat, ut putant, partibus; et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse, et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant, ex quibus unum, aut alterum afferam.
Si substantia corporea, aiunt, est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquaeque pars, vel finita, vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum. Si hoc,[s] datur ergo infinitum duplo maius alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum.

Porro, si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes aequantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit, ut et si partibus mensuretur digitos aequantibus; ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies maior alio infinito.[t]
Denique, si ex uno puncto infinitae cuiusdam quantitatis concipiatur, duas lineas, ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi; certum est, distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore.

[G II 58] Cum igitur haec absurda sequantur, ut putant, ex eo, quod quantitas infinita supponitur: inde concludunt, substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam, et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione. Deus enim, inquiunt, cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest; atqui substantia corporea, quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest; sequitur ergo, ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere.

Haec sunt, quae apud scriptores invenio argumenta, quibus ostendere conantur, substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse, nec ad eandem posse pertinere. Verumenimvero si quis recte attendat, me ad haec iam respondisse comperiet; quandoquidem haec argumenta in eo tantum fundantur, quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi supponunt, quod iam (prop. 12. cum coroll. prop. 13.) absurdum esse ostendi.
Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit, omnia illa absurda (siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo iam non disputo), ex quibus concludere volunt, substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi, quod quantitas infinita supponatur, sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflari[u] supponunt; quare ex absurdis, quae inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt, quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est, quod nos supra (prop. 12. etc.) iam demonstravimus. Quare telum, quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera coniiciunt.

Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt, substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt, quam si quis ex eo, quod finxit, circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit, circulum non habere centrum, ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam ductae

[s] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'te weten dat yder deel onëindig is' ('namely, that each part is infinite'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 57; Textgestaltung II 350). The Dutch has 'But if one says the second' for *Si hoc*.
[t] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: ''t welk niet minder ongerijmt is' ('which is no less absurd'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 57; Textgestaltung II 350).
[u] ex partibus finitis conflari] *transcr.* ex partibus finits conflari. The transcription reads 'finits'; Gebhardt (G II 58) reads 'finitis'.

to these.

First, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, consists, as they think, of parts; and therefore they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God. And they explain this by many examples, of which I shall bring forward one or two.

If corporeal substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then there is an infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is also absurd.

Further, if an infinite quantity is measured by parts each equal to a foot, it will have to consist of infinitely many such parts, as it will also if it is measured by parts each equal to an inch;[57] and therefore one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite number.

Finally, if from one point of some infinite quantity two lines, such as AB and AC, are conceived to be extended to infinity, at a certain and determinate distance from one another at the beginning, it is certain that the distance between B and C is continually increased, and at length, from being determinate, will become indeterminable.[58]

Since, therefore, these absurdities follow, as they think, from the supposition of an infinite quantity, they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently does not pertain to God's essence. The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. For God, they say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be acted on;[59] but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can be acted on; it follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence.

These are the arguments I find in the writers by which they try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature and cannot pertain to it. But in truth, if someone attends rightly, he will find that I have already replied to these, since these arguments are founded only on their supposing that corporeal substance is composed of parts, which I have already shown to be absurd (Prop. 12 [p. 45] with Cor. Prop. 13 [p. 47]).

Next, if someone wishes to consider the matter rightly, he will see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, which I am not now disputing), from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the supposition of an infinite quantity, but from their supposing that infinite quantity is measurable and composed of finite parts; so from the absurdities which follow from this they can conclude nothing but that infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be composed of finite parts. And this is the same thing we have already demonstrated above (Prop. 12 [p. 45] etc.). So the weapon they aim at us, they in fact turn against themselves.

If, therefore, from this absurdity of theirs they nevertheless wish to conclude that extended substance must be finite, they are really doing nothing other than if someone, from having feigned that a circle has the properties of a square, concluded that a circle does not have a centre

[57] *digitos*, literally 'fingers' (finger-breadths). Spinoza's 'twelve times' shows that he means the inch, a twelfth of a foot.

[58] Arguments of this shape against an actually infinite magnitude go back to Aristotle, who argued from lines diverging from a centre that an infinite body could not rotate (*De caelo* I.5).

[59] *pati*, 'to be acted on', 'to undergo', the root of *passio*. The traditional doctrine of divine impassibility held that God, being perfect, cannot be affected by anything.

lineae sunt aequales. Nam substantiam corpoream, quae non nisi infinita, non nisi unica et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (vid. prop. 8. 5. et 12.), eam ipsi ad concludendum, eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflari[v] et multiplicem esse et divisibilem, concipiunt.

Sic etiam alii, postquam fingunt, lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta, quibus ostendant, lineam non posse in infinitum dividi. Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere, quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur, quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineae denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes, qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent, et imprimis ii, qui negant, dari vacuum. Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi, ut eius partes realiter distinctae essent, cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari manentibus reliquis, ut ante, inter se connexis? et cur omnes ita aptari debent, ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum, quae realiter ab invicem distinctae sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest. Cum igitur vacuum in natura non detur (de quo alias), sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent, ne detur vacuum, sequitur hinc etiam, easdem non posse realiter distingui, hoc est, substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi.

Si quis tamen iam quaerat, cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? ei respondeo, quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet sive superficialiter, prout nempe ipsam[w] imaginamur, vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectu[x] fit. Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus, prout in imaginatione est, quod saepe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis et ex partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam, prout in intellectu est, attendimus et eam, quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum, ut iam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica et indivisibilis reperietur.
Quod omnibus, qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit; praecipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur, quod materia ubique eadem est, nec partes in eadem distinguuntur, nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde eius partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Ex. gr. aquam, quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus eiusque partes ab invicem separari; at non, quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur. Porro aqua, quatenus aqua, generatur et corrumpitur; at, quatenus substantia, nec generatur, nec corrumpitur.

Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto; quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur, quod materia, quatenus substantia, divisibilis sit et ex partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio, cur divina natura indigna esset, quandoquidem (per prop. 14.) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest, a qua ipsa pateretur.

[v] ex partibus finitis conflari] *transcr.* ex partibus finits conflari. The transcription reads 'finits'; Gebhardt (G II 58) reads 'finitis'.
[w] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'gemenelijk' ('commonly'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 59; Textgestaltung II 350). That is, 'as we commonly imagine it'.
[x] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'zonder behulp van d' inbeelding' ('without the help of the imagination'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 59; Textgestaltung II 350).

from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which can be conceived only as infinite, only as unique, and only as indivisible (see Props. 8 [p. 35], 5 [p. 31] and 12 [p. 45]), they conceive, in order to conclude that it is finite, as composed of finite parts, and as multiple and divisible.

So also others, after they have feigned that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments by which they may show that a line cannot be divided to infinity. And indeed it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of bodies, or parts, than that a body is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines, finally, of points. And all who know clear reason to be infallible must admit this, and especially those who deny that there is a vacuum.[60]

For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before? And why must they all fit together so that there is no vacuum? Surely, of things that are really distinct from one another, one can be without the other and remain in its own state. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature (of which elsewhere), but all the parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows from this also that they cannot be really distinguished, that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be divided.

But if someone should now ask why we are by nature so inclined to divide quantity, I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: abstractly, or superficially, namely, as we imagine it,[61] or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is substance, which happens with great difficulty, then, as we have already sufficiently demonstrated, it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible.

This will be sufficiently manifest to all who have known how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect, especially if attention is also paid to this, that matter is everywhere the same, and parts are not distinguished in it except insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really.[62] For example, we conceive that water, insofar as it is water, is divided, and that its parts are separated from one another; but not insofar as it is corporeal substance; for in that respect it is neither separated nor divided. Further, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted; but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.

And with this I think I have also replied to the second argument, since it too is founded on this, that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if this were not so, I do not know why it would be unworthy of the divine nature, since (by Prop. 14 [p. 47]) there can be no substance outside God by which it would be acted on.

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[60] Above all Descartes, for whom extension is the essence of matter, so that empty space is a contradiction (*Principles* II.16–18, AT VIII-1 49–50). Spinoza turns the Cartesian denial of the vacuum against the real divisibility of matter. He had himself expounded the Cartesian argument in his *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* (Part II, Prop. 3).

[61] The first appearance of the distinction between imagination and intellect that organizes Spinoza's theory of knowledge (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]). The same distinction, applied to quantity, is the subject of Letter 12 [p. 541], to Lodewijk Meyer, 'on the nature of the infinite'.

[62] Descartes distinguished real distinction (between substances), modal distinction (between a mode and its substance, or between modes of one substance) and distinction of reason (*Principles* I.60–62, AT VIII-1 28–30). On Spinoza's view the parts of matter are modes of one substance.

Omnia, inquam, in Deo sunt et omnia, quae fiunt, per solas leges infinitae Dei naturae fiunt et ex necessitate eius essentiae (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur. Quare nulla ratione dici potest, Deum ab alio pati, aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse; tametsi divisibilis supponatur, dummodo aeterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impraesentiarum satis.

All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen happen only through the laws of God's infinite nature, and follow (as I shall soon show)[63] from the necessity of his essence. So it cannot be said in any way that God is acted on by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, so long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But enough of these matters for the present.

Cited in 2L1D [p. 151]

[63] In Prop. 16 [p. 65] and the propositions that follow it.

From the Nature of God to What Follows from It

With Prop. 15 [p. 49] and its long scholium the first half of Part I is complete, and the argument turns. So far Spinoza has asked what God is; from Prop. 16 [p. 65] on he asks what follows from God's nature, and his answer, that everything follows from it necessarily and nothing could have been otherwise, is the most disputed doctrine of the Part. Since that answer draws at every step on results the first half reached one at a time, it is worth having them in view together, and worth knowing in advance where the second half is going and where its readers have found it hardest to follow.

What the first half has established

The results of the first fifteen propositions can be gathered in a few sentences. There is one substance, God, which exists necessarily, is infinite and indivisible, and has infinitely many attributes, among them extension and thought. There is nothing outside this substance, and everything that is not substance is a mode, something that is in God and cannot be or be conceived without God. Descartes' world of created minds and bodies has been reinterpreted: what Descartes called substances are, for Spinoza, either attributes of God or affections of those attributes (Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]). The scholium to Prop. 15 has defended the claim that extension, as well as thought, belongs to God, by distinguishing quantity as it is in the imagination, finite and divisible, from quantity as it is in the intellect, infinite, unique and indivisible.

So far, however, Spinoza has said almost nothing about how modes are related to God beyond the bare fact of their dependence. We know that they are in God and are conceived through him; we do not yet know in what way they come from him, whether they could have been different, or how the finite things of ordinary experience, which come into being and pass away, are related to an eternal and infinite substance. These are the questions of the second half.

The model of geometrical consequence

Its governing thought is announced in the last sentences of the scholium to Prop. 15: "all things that happen happen only through the laws of God's infinite nature, and follow ... from the necessity of his essence." Prop. 16 [p. 65] states it formally: "From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect)." Its demonstration is three sentences long. It begins from a principle about definitions: from the definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties which really follow from it, and the more reality the definition expresses, the more properties it infers. It then applies the principle to God, whose nature has absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6 [p. 27]): from such a nature infinitely many things must follow.

The model is mathematical, and Spinoza makes it explicit in the scholium to Prop. 17 [p. 67]. Some think, he says, that God is a free cause because he can bring it about that the things which follow from his nature should not come about. "But this is the same as if they were to say that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles." The comparison is the key to the whole second half. A triangle does not choose to have its properties, and the properties do not come into being at some moment after the triangle; they belong to it necessarily and eternally, as consequences of what it is. In the same way, all things "have necessarily flowed, or always follow with the same necessity, in

the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles." God's causality is not the act of a will that might have chosen otherwise. It is the necessity of a nature unfolding its consequences.

The comparison has a limit that Spinoza himself points out. The properties of a triangle follow from it as from a formal cause; God is called the *efficient* cause of all things (Prop. 16, Cor. 1 [p. 65]), the term that philosophy reserved for the cause that brings something about. Spinoza does not keep the two kinds of cause apart, and the refusal is deliberate. For him to bring something about is to be that from which it follows, and the order of real causes is the same as the order of logical consequence; the demonstration of Prop. 16 [p. 65] passes from "the intellect infers" to "there must follow" without pause. Readers who find this identification of causation with logical consequence implausible have found the deepest assumption of the Part, and many of the second half's most surprising theses follow from it.

Freedom without choice

The second half keeps the word "free" and changes its sense. According to Def. 7 [p. 27], a thing is free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. God acts "from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one" (Prop. 17 [p. 65]), and so "God alone is a free cause" (Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67]). Freedom, so understood, is not a power of choosing between alternatives. It is the absence of external determination, and it is entirely compatible with necessity; indeed it is a kind of necessity, the necessity of acting from one's own nature.

The scholium to Prop. 17 turns this definition against the theologians. They think that God would lose his omnipotence if he created everything that is in his intellect, since he would then have nothing left to create, and so they maintain that God understands infinitely many things that he could create but does not, and "creates nothing except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will." Spinoza replies that this denies God's omnipotence rather than defending it: "they are compelled to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create," and so "they are reduced to having to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends." On his own view, "God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity." Nothing is held in reserve. Everything God can do, he does, and the distinction between what God can do and what he does disappears.

The same scholium adds a second argument, against attributing intellect and will to God at all. If intellect and will pertained to God's essence, they would have to be the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence, and a cause of both essence and existence must differ from its effect in both. God's intellect would therefore differ from ours entirely, "and could agree with them in nothing except the name; no more, that is, than the Dog, a heavenly constellation, and the dog, a barking animal, agree with one another" (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]). Props. 31–32 [p. 83] later draw the formal conclusion. Actual intellect, finite or infinite, and will, desire and love belong to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans* (Prop. 31 [p. 83]); the will is not a free cause but a necessary one (Prop. 32 [p. 85]); and so "God does not operate from freedom of the will" (Prop. 32, Cor. 1 [p. 85]). Will and intellect are related to God's nature as motion and rest are, as things that follow from it, not as its principle (Prop. 32, Cor. 2 [p. 85]).

The voluntarist position Spinoza opposes had its most radical defender in Descartes. In letters to Mersenne of 1630 Descartes had maintained that the mathematical truths "which you call

eternal" were "established by God and depend on him entirely, as do all the rest of the creatures" (AT I 145), and that God "was as free to make it not true that all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal as not to create the world" (AT I 152). The second scholium to Prop. 33 [p. 87] takes up the view that everything depends on God's indifferent will and argues, granting it for the sake of argument, that even on its own terms things could not have been otherwise. All God's decrees were established from eternity; "since in eternity there is no *when*, *before*, or *after*," God can never decree anything else, and never could have. Elsewhere in the same scholium Spinoza adds a striking judgment: the view that subjects all things to an indifferent divine will is nearer the truth than the view that God does everything for the sake of the good, since those who hold the latter "seem to posit something outside God which does not depend on God, to which God attends as to a model in operating" (Prop. 33, Schol. 2 [p. 89]), and that is "to subject God to fate." Both views are false; but the first at least does not make God depend on something other than himself.

The immanent cause

Prop. 18 [p. 71] states that "God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things." A transitive cause produces an effect outside itself, as a builder produces a house; an immanent cause produces an effect that remains in it. The demonstration is brief: all things are in God and conceived through him, and God is their cause; and there is nothing outside God. So God's effects are in him. The distinction belonged to the school logic of the period. In the *Short Treatise* Spinoza had classified God's causality under eight headings, a scheme H. A. Wolfson traced to the Leiden logician Franco Burgersdijk (*The Philosophy of Spinoza* I 304), and in the first dialogue of the same work the model of an immanent cause is the intellect, which is the cause of its ideas and does not produce them outside itself (KV I, first dialogue; G I 30). The model is apt. Ideas do not leave the mind that has them, and they are not separate things standing over against it; they are the mind's own activity. So too the modes are not things God makes and then releases, but ways in which God's own being is determined.

The proposition is easily read as a restatement of Prop. 15 [p. 49], and in a sense it is. Its importance lies in what it excludes. A transitive creator stands outside his creation and could have refrained from it; an immanent cause cannot be separated from its effects, since they are its own states. This is the point at which Spinoza's God differs most sharply from the God of the creation narratives, and also the point at which the question of how modes are in God, whether as properties in a subject or as effects in a cause, becomes most pressing. The Introduction to this Part describes the two main answers.

Infinite modes

Props. 21–23 [p. 73] introduce a class of modes that has puzzled readers ever since. "All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God's attributes have had to exist always and as infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite" (Prop. 21 [p. 73]). Whatever follows from an attribute modified by such an infinite mode is likewise infinite and necessary (Prop. 22 [p. 75]), and every infinite and necessary mode follows either directly from an attribute or through another infinite mode (Prop. 23 [p. 75]). Between God and the finite things of experience there is thus a layer of modes that are neither substance nor finite: the immediate infinite modes, which follow directly from the attributes, and the mediate ones, which follow from the attributes through the immediate ones.

The *Ethics* gives no examples. When a correspondent, G. H. Schuller, asked for some, Spinoza replied that in thought the immediate infinite mode is "absolutely infinite intellect," and in extension "motion and rest," and that the mediate infinite mode of extension is "the face of the whole universe" (*facies totius universi*), "which, although it varies in infinite ways, nevertheless remains always the same" (Letter 64 [p. 629]; VVL^3 III 206). He referred Schuller for the last to the scholium to Lemma 7 in Part II, where the whole of nature is described as one individual whose parts vary in infinitely many ways without any change of the whole individual. No example of a mediate infinite mode of thought is given anywhere.

What these entities are has been much discussed. On one influential reading, proposed by Edwin Curley, the infinite modes are best understood as the laws of nature, or as the general facts that the laws describe. The thesis of Prop. 23 [p. 75], that every infinite mode of extension follows either directly from the attribute or through other infinite modes, then "amounts to the thesis that every scientific law relating to extended objects can be derived either directly from the fundamental laws governing extended objects or from a finite series of nomological propositions which terminates ultimately in the fundamental laws" (Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics*, 59). The reading fits Spinoza's example of motion and rest, which the physical digression of Part II makes the principle by which bodies are distinguished and individuated. But it is not the only one. Spinoza's own description of the face of the whole universe as a single individual, whose parts vary while it remains the same, has led other readers to take the infinite modes as infinite individuals, the totality of bodies or of ideas, rather than as laws. The notes return to the question at Prop. 21 [p. 73].

Finite things and the infinite series

The finite things of ordinary experience are taken up next. Their essence does not involve existence (Prop. 24 [p. 75]), so they cannot be the cause of themselves. God is the cause of their essence as well as of their existence (Prop. 25 [p. 77]), and "particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way" (Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]). A thing that has been determined to act has been so determined by God, and cannot make itself undetermined (Props. 26–27 [p. 77]). Then comes Prop. 28 [p. 79], the longest enunciation in the Part: every singular thing, or thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, "can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence," and that cause by another, "and so on to infinity."

Prop. 28 raises one of the hardest problems in the *Ethics*. If finite things are determined by other finite things, to infinity, how do they come from God? An infinite cause cannot produce them directly, since what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute is itself infinite (Prop. 21 [p. 73]); and if each is produced by another finite thing, the series never reaches God. Leibniz put the difficulty sharply in his notes on a book by Johann Georg Wachter which presented Spinoza as a follower of the ancient philosophy of the Hebrews: Spinoza holds that finite and temporal things are not produced immediately by an infinite cause, but by other singular and finite things. "But how then do they finally arise from God? For they do not arise from him mediately in this way either, since one would never arrive at things which are not likewise produced by another finite thing" (*Animadversiones in Wachterum*, ed. Foucher de Careil, 70). Curley quotes the passage and states the problem as a double requirement: Spinoza seems to need "both an infinite series of finite causes and a finite series of infinite causes terminating in God" (*Spinoza's*

Metaphysics, 64).

Spinoza's own answer is given in the demonstration and scholium of Prop. 28. A finite thing is determined by God, not insofar as God is infinite, but insofar as God is modified by a finite modification; God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things that follow immediately from his absolute nature, and cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, since "by a remote cause we understand one which is in no way conjoined with its effect," and "all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither be nor be conceived" (Prop. 28, Schol. [p. 81]). On the reading of the infinite modes as laws, the answer can be put in modern terms: each finite thing follows from the laws of nature together with prior finite things, and neither the laws alone nor the prior things alone are sufficient. Whether that is what Spinoza meant, and whether it leaves the finite world as strictly necessary as Prop. 29 [p. 81] and Prop. 33 [p. 85] declare it to be, are questions the reader will meet again.

Necessity

"In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way" (Prop. 29 [p. 81]). "Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced" (Prop. 33 [p. 85]). These propositions are the core of Spinoza's necessitarianism. The demonstration of Prop. 33 is short: all things have followed necessarily from God's nature, so if they could have been of another nature or determined to act in another way, God's nature too could have been other than it is, and that other nature would also exist, so that there would be two Gods, which is absurd.

The first scholium to Prop. 33 explains what remains of the ordinary vocabulary of modality. A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause, and impossible either because its essence involves a contradiction or because there is no external cause determined to produce it. "But a thing is called *contingent* for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge" (Prop. 33, Schol. 1 [p. 87]). We call a thing contingent or possible when we do not know that its essence involves a contradiction, and yet cannot affirm anything certain about its existence "because the order of causes is hidden from us." Contingency is an artefact of ignorance, not a feature of things. Part IV will reintroduce the words "contingent" and "possible," explicitly defined in these terms, because a mind that does not know the whole order of causes must still think and act in a world it cannot fully foresee.

Readers have divided over how strictly to take these claims. On the strongest reading, nothing whatever could have been otherwise: not the laws of nature, not the existence of any particular thing, not the order of events. Others have thought that Spinoza needs, or at least leaves room for, a weaker position, in which the infinite modes follow necessarily from God's nature but the particular finite things depend in part on the infinite series of other finite things, so that their existence is necessary only given that series. Jonathan Bennett, who discusses the question at length, finds Spinoza pulled both ways. His explanatory rationalism commits him to denying that there are any contingent truths, and the second scholium to Prop. 33 seems to defend the absolute necessity of all truths; yet much of what he says, on Bennett's reading including the demonstration of Prop. 33 itself, asserts no more than that the laws of nature could not have been different and that every event is determined by prior events. Bennett concludes that, forced to choose, he would say that Spinoza held this to be the only possible world, "though it is not really right," since Spinoza "did not think his situation through" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, § 29,

pp. 119–124). The second scholium to Prop. 33 is the strongest evidence for the strong reading, and Prop. 28 the strongest for the weaker one. Appendix D [p. 667] sets out the arguments on both sides.

Nature naturing and nature natured

The scholium to Prop. 29 [p. 81] introduces a pair of terms from the scholastic tradition, *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata*, "Nature naturing" and "Nature natured." By the first Spinoza understands "what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is ... God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause"; by the second, "everything that follows from the necessity of God's nature, or of each of God's attributes, that is, all the modes of God's attributes, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God." The distinction is not between two things. It is between God considered as the active source of everything and the totality of what follows from him, the same reality viewed as producing and as produced. The terms show how far Spinoza is willing to use the language of theology for a doctrine that is not theological in the ordinary sense, and they explain how he can say, in Part IV, "God, or nature," without meaning by "nature" only the world of bodies.

God's power

The Part closes with three short propositions. "God's power is his very essence" (Prop. 34 [p. 91]): God's power is not a faculty that might be exercised or not, but the activity by which he exists and acts, and it is identical with what he is. "Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily is" (Prop. 35 [p. 91]): there is no gap between the possible and the actual in God. "Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow" (Prop. 36 [p. 93]): since every thing expresses God's power in a certain and determinate way, every thing is active, and produces effects. This last proposition is easily overlooked, but Part III depends on it. There the striving of each thing to persevere in its being is derived from the doctrine that each thing expresses God's power in a certain and determinate way (Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]), and Prop. 36 is cited in the demonstration that this striving is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself (Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243]). The Appendix then turns from demonstration to diagnosis, asking why human beings resist these conclusions, and finding the answer in the prejudice that nature, and God, act for ends.

Two cautions

Two cautions may help the reader. First, Spinoza's claims about necessity are strong, and he means them: he denies not only that anything happens by chance but that anything could have happened otherwise. Second, his language of God's "freedom," "power" and "causality" is continuous with the theology he rejects, and the words are defined anew as he goes. The free cause is the one that acts from the necessity of its own nature (Def. 7 [p. 27]); God's power is identical with his essence; and to say that God is the cause of all things is to say that they follow from his nature, not that he made them by a decree.

The text resumes with Prop. 16. Its demonstration, three sentences long, joins a principle about definitions (the more reality the definition of a thing expresses, the more properties the intellect infers from it) to the definition of God as a being of absolutely infinite attributes (Def.

6 [p. 27]). Much of what follows rests on it: Prop. 16 or one of its corollaries is cited in the demonstrations of Props. 17, 18, 26, 29, 33, 34 and 36, and twice in the Appendix.

Propositio XVI

[G II 60] *Ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.*

Demonstratio. Haec propositio unicuique manifesta esse debet, si modo ad hoc attendat, quod ex data cuiuscumque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quae revera ex eadem (hoc est, ipsa rei essentia) necessario sequuntur et eo plures, quo plus realitatis rei definitio exprimit, hoc est, quo plus realitatis rei definitae essentia involvit.

Cum autem natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat (per defin. 6.), quorum etiam unumquodque infinitam essentiam in suo genere exprimit, ex eiusdem ergo necessitate infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) necessario sequi debent. Q. E. D.

Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur, Deum omnium rerum, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.

[G II 61] Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.

Corollarium III. Sequitur 3. Deum esse absolute causam primam.

Propositio XVII

Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus agit.

Demonstratio. Ex sola divinae naturae necessitate, vel (quod idem est) ex solis eiusdem naturae legibus, infinita absolute sequi, modo prop. 16.[y] ostendimus; et prop. 15. demonstravimus, nihil sine Deo esse nec concipi posse, sed omnia in Deo esse. Quare nihil extra ipsum esse potest, a quo ad agendum determinetur vel cogatur; atque adeo Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus agit. Q. E. D.

[y] modo prop. 16.] *transcr.* modoprop. 16. Word division restored (Gebhardt, G II 61: 'modò Prop. 16.').

Proposition XVI

From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes[64] *(that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect).*

Cited in 1P17D [p. 65], 1P17S [p. 67], 1P25S [p. 77], 1P26D [p. 77], 1P29D [p. 81], 1P33D [p. 87], 1P34D [p. 91], 1P36D [p. 93], 1App [p. 103], 2Pref [p. 121], 2P3D [p. 125], 2P3S [p. 125], 2P44C2D [p. 197], 2P45S [p. 197], 4Pref [p. 351], 4P4D [p. 361], 5P22D [p. 503]

Cited in Letters 82 [p. 647]

Demonstration. This proposition must be plain to everyone, provided he attends to this: that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties which really do follow necessarily from it (that is, from the very essence of the thing), and the more properties, the more reality the definition of the thing expresses, that is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined involves.

But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. 6 [p. 27]), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity, therefore, there must necessarily follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect). Q.E.D.

Corollary I. From this it follows that God is the efficient cause[65] of all things that can fall under an infinite intellect.

Cited in 1P17S [p. 67], 1P18D [p. 71], 1P34D [p. 91]

Corollary II. It follows, 2. that God is a cause through himself, and not by accident.[66]

Corollary III. It follows, 3. that God is absolutely the first cause.

Proposition XVII

God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.

Cited in 1P17C2 [p. 67]

Demonstration. We have just shown in Prop. 16 [p. 65] that from the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (what is the same) from the laws of that nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow; and we have demonstrated in Prop. 15 [p. 49] that nothing can be or be conceived without God, but that all things are in God. So there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act; and therefore God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one. Q.E.D.

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[64] *infinita infinitis modis*. As with the 'infinite attributes' of Def. 6 [p. 27], 'infinite' can mean 'infinitely many'. Spinoza's own gloss in the parenthesis, 'everything that can fall under an infinite intellect', is one of the passages from which J. Bennett concludes that Spinoza 'often takes infinity to imply totality' (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, §19, p. 75). *Modis* may also be taken non-technically: 'in infinitely many ways'.

[65] *causam efficientem*: the cause that produces an effect, as distinct from the material, formal and final causes of the Aristotelian scheme. The Appendix [p. 101] to this Part rejects final causes outright.

[66] *per se, non vero per accidens*. A cause *per se* produces its effect by its own nature; a cause *per accidens* is called a cause only because of something incidentally joined to it. Aristotle's example: Polyclitus is the cause of a statue only because the sculptor happens to be Polyclitus (*Physics* II.3, 195a–b).

Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur 1. nullam dari causam, quae Deum extrinsece vel intrinsece praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem incitet ad agendum.[z]

Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit (per prop. 11. et coroll. 1. prop. 14.), et ex sola suae naturae necessitate agit (per prop. praeced.). Adeoque (per defin. 7.) solus est causa libera. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Alii putant, Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut putant, efficere, ut ea, quae ex eius natura sequi diximus, hoc est, quae in eius potestate sunt, non fiant, sive ut ab ipso non producantur. Sed hoc idem est, ac si dicerent, quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, eius tres angulos aequales esse duobus rectis; sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est absurdum.

Porro infra absque ope huius propositionis ostendam, ad Dei naturam neque intellectum, neque voluntatem pertinere. Scio equidem plures esse qui putant, se posse demonstrare, ad Dei naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere; nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese aiunt, quod Deo tribuere possunt, quam id quod in nobis summa est perfectio. Porro, tametsi Deum actu summe intelligentem concipiant, non tamen credunt, eum posse omnia, quae actu intelligit, efficere ut existant; nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant.

Si omnia, inquiunt, quae in eius intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil tum amplius creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotentiae repugnare; ideoque maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere, nec aliud creantem praeter id quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit creare. Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto (vid. prop. 16.), a summa Dei potentia, sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis, hoc est, omnia necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo, ac ex natura trianguli ab aeterno et in aeternum sequitur, eius tres angulos aequari duobus rectis. Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab aeterno fuit et in aeternum in eadem actualitate manebit.

Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe, meo quidem iudicio, perfectior statuitur. Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri, Deum infinita creabilia intelligere, quae tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias, si scilicet omnia quae intelligit crearet, suam iuxta ipsos exhauriret omnipotentiam et se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant, ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quae eius potentia se extendit; quo absurdius aut Dei omnipotentiae magis repugnans non video, quid fingi possit.

[z] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'maar dat hy uit kracht van zijn volmaaktheit alleen een werkende oorzaak is' ('but that he is an efficient cause by the force of his perfection alone'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 61; Textgestaltung II 350). The Dutch version lacks *praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem* and has this clause instead; the margin glosses *werkende oorzaak* as *Causa efficiens*.

Corollary I. From this it follows, 1. that there is no cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, except the perfection of his own nature, which moves God to act.

Corollary II. It follows, 2. that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his nature alone (by Prop. 11 [p. 41] and Cor. 1 of Prop. 14 [p. 47]), and acts from the necessity of his nature alone (by the preceding Prop. [p. 65]). And so (by Def. 7 [p. 27]) he alone is a free cause. Q.E.D.

Cited in 1P29S [p. 81], 2P48D [p. 207]

Scholium. Others think that God is a free cause because he can, as they think, bring it about that the things we have said follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power,[67] should not come about, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they were to say that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles,[68] or that from a given cause the effect should not follow, which is absurd.

Further, I shall show below, without the help of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertains to the nature of God. I know, of course, that there are many who think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect and a free will pertain to God's nature; for they say they know nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than what is the highest perfection in us. Further, although they conceive God to understand, actually, in the highest degree, they do not believe that he can bring it about that everything he actually understands should exist; for they think that in that way they would destroy God's power.

If, they say, he had created everything that is in his intellect, he would then have been unable to create anything more, which they believe to be inconsistent with God's omnipotence; and so they have preferred to maintain that God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will. But I think I have shown clearly enough (see Prop. 16 [p. 65]) that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, infinite things in infinite modes, that is, all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow with the same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity.

And in this way God's omnipotence is maintained, in my judgment at least, far more perfectly. Indeed, my adversaries seem (if I may speak openly) to deny God's omnipotence. For they are compelled to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create. For otherwise, if, that is, he created everything he understands, he would, according to them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. So in order to maintain that God is perfect, they are reduced to having to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends; and I do not see what could be

[67] *quae in eius potestate sunt*. Spinoza has two words for power: *potentia*, the power by which God and all things are and act, which Prop. 34 [p. 91] identifies with God's essence, and *potestas*, what is 'in' someone's power, at his disposal (Prop. 35 [p. 91]). Both are rendered 'power' in this Part; a note marks *potestas*.

[68] Descartes uses the same example: existence can no more be separated from God's essence than the equality of its three angles to two right angles from the essence of a triangle (*Meditations* V, AT VII 66).

Porro (ut de intellectu et voluntate, quos Deo communiter tribuimus, hic etiam aliquid dicam) si ad aeternam Dei essentiam intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est, quam quod vulgo solent homines. Nam intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto coelo differre deberent, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis signum coeleste, et canis animal latrans. Quod sic demonstrabo.

Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque placet), vel simul natura esse cum rebus intellectis, quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.); sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei intellectu existit obiective. Quare Dei intellectus, quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum tam earum essentiae, quam earum existentiae; quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse animadversum, qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt.
Cum itaque Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa, videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentiae, quam earum existentiae, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre tam ratione essentiae, quam ratione existentiae. Nam causatum differt a sua causa praecise in eo, quod a causa habet.[aa] Ex. gr. homo est causa existentiae, non vero essentiae alterius hominis (est enim haec aeterna veritas); et ideo secundum essentiam prorsus convenire possunt, in existendo autem differre debent; et propterea, si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit; sed, si unius essentia destrui posset et fieri falsa, destrueretur etiam alterius essentia.

Quapropter res, quae et essentiae et existentiae alicuius effectus est causa, a tali effectu differre debet tam ratione essentiae, quam ratione existentiae. Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiae et existentiae nostri intellectus causa; ergo Dei intellectus, quatenus divinam essentiam constituere concipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentiae, quam ratione existentiae differt, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in nomine, cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.

[aa] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'daaröm het een gewrocht van zulk een oorzaak gezegt word' ('on account of which it is called the effect of such a cause'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 63; Textgestaltung II 351).

feigned that is more absurd than this, or more inconsistent with God's omnipotence.

Further (to say something here also about the intellect and will that we commonly attribute to God), if intellect and will pertain to the eternal essence of God, something different must surely be understood by each of these attributes from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and will that would constitute God's essence would have to differ by all the breadth of heaven[69] from our intellect and will, and could agree with them in nothing except the name; no more, that is, than the Dog, a heavenly constellation, and the dog, a barking animal,[70] agree with one another. This I shall demonstrate as follows.

If intellect pertains to the divine nature, it will not be able, like our intellect, to be by nature posterior to (as most hold), or simultaneous with, the things understood, since God is prior in causality to all things (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 16 [p. 65]); on the contrary, the truth and formal essence[71] of things is what it is because it exists objectively in that way in God's intellect. So God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is really the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence; which seems to have been noticed also by those who have asserted that God's intellect, will and power are one and the same.[72]

Since, therefore, God's intellect is the only cause of things, namely (as we have shown), both of their essence and of their existence, it must necessarily differ from them both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. For what is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from the cause. For example, a man is the cause of the existence, but not of the essence, of another man (for the latter is an eternal truth); and so they can agree entirely in essence, but must differ in existing; and for that reason, if the existence of one perishes, the existence of the other will not perish on that account; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would also be destroyed.

So a thing that is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of some effect must differ from such an effect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. But God's intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect; therefore God's intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence, and can agree with it in nothing except the name, as we wished to show. The procedure is the same concerning the will, as anyone can easily see.

Cited in 1P33S2 [p. 87]

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[69] *toto coelo*, a proverbial phrase ('by the whole sky'), here given a pointed echo by the constellation that follows.

[70] The constellation of the Dog contains Sirius, the Dog-star. The thought, that intellect and will said of God and of us would share only the name, recalls Maimonides' teaching that such attributes are said of God and of creatures homonymously: הותרו החכמה והיכולת והרצון והחיים עליו ית' ועל כל בעל חכמה ויכולת ורצון וחיים – בהשתתפות גמור, אשר אין דמיון ענין ביניהם כלל ('wisdom, power, will and life are applied to Him, may He be exalted, and to every possessor of wisdom, power, will and life, by complete homonymy, with no likeness of meaning between them at all'; *Guide* I.56, Ibn Tibbon).

[71] *formalis ... obiective*. Scholastic and Cartesian terms: a thing exists 'formally' when it exists in its own right, and 'objectively' when it exists as the object of an idea, that is, as represented in an intellect. 'Objectively' thus has almost the reverse of its modern sense. Descartes uses the pair in *Meditations* III (AT VII 41). The terms recur in Prop. 30, Dem. [p. 83] and throughout Part II.

[72] Spinoza names no one. That God's attributes are not something added to his essence was common ground in medieval theology; Maimonides concludes from the homonymy of the attributes that אין ראוי שתאמין ענינים מוספים על העצם ('one ought not to believe in notions superadded to the essence'; *Guide* I.56, Ibn Tibbon).

Propositio XVIII

[G II 63] *Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.*

[G II 64] Demonstratio. Omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et per Deum concipi debent (per prop. 15.), adeoque (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.) Deus rerum, quae in ipso sunt, est causa; quod est primum.[ab] Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia (per prop. 14.), hoc est (per defin. 3.) res, quae extra Deum in se sit; quod erat secundum. Deus ergo est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. Q. E. D.

Propositio XIX

Deus sive omnia Dei attributa sunt aeterna.

Demonstratio. Deus enim (per defin. 6.) est substantia, quae (per prop. 11.) necessario existit, hoc est (per prop. 7.) ad cuius naturam pertinet existere, sive (quod idem est) ex cuius definitione sequitur ipsum existere, adeoque (per defin. 8.) est aeternus.
Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id quod (per defin. 4.) divinae substantiae essentiam exprimit, hoc est, id quod ad substantiam pertinet; id ipsum, inquam, ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiae (ut iam ex prop. 7. demonstravi) pertinet aeternitas; ergo unumquodque attributorum aeternitatem involvere debet, adeoque omnia sunt aeterna. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec propositio quam clarissime etiam patet ex modo, quo (prop. 11.) Dei existentiam demonstravi. Ex ea, inquam, demonstratione constat, Dei existentiam, sicut eius essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem. Deinde (prop. 19. Principiorum Cartesii) alio[ac] etiam modo Dei aeternitatem demonstravi, nec opus est eum hic repetere.

Propositio XX

Dei existentia eiusque essentia unum et idem sunt.

Demonstratio. Deus (per anteced. prop.) eiusque omnia attributa sunt aeterna, hoc est (per defin. 8.) unumquodque eius attributorum existentiam exprimit. Eadem ergo Dei attributa, quae (per defin. 4.) Dei aeternam essentiam explicant, eius simul aeternam existentiam explicant, hoc est, illud ipsum, quod essentiam Dei constituit, constituit simul ipsius existentiam; adeoque haec

[ab] The 1677 edition (OP p. 20) omits the clause 'adeoque (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.) Deus rerum, quae in ipso sunt, est causa' in its text and supplies it in its list of errata, with the misprint *Prop. 6.* for *Prop. 16.* (the Dutch version has *de zestiende*); Schmidt and Bruder corrected the number. Gebhardt (G II 64; Textgestaltung II 351) prints *per Coroll. 1. Prop. 16. hujus*. The first point of the demonstration requires the clause.
[ac] Deinde (prop. 19. Principiorum Cartesii) alio] *transcr.* Deinde princip. philos. Cartesii P. 1. prop. 19. alio. The 1677 edition (OP p. 20), Gebhardt (G II 64) and Bartuschat read '(Prop. 19. Principiorum Cartesii)'; the transcription regularizes the citation.

Proposition XVIII

God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause[73] *of all things.*

Demonstration. All things that are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. 15 [p. 49]), and so (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 16 [p. 65]) God is the cause of the things that are in him; which is the first point. Next, outside God there can be no substance (by Prop. 14 [p. 47]), that is (by Def. 3 [p. 25]), a thing which is in itself outside God; which was the second point. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. Q.E.D.

Proposition XIX

God, or all of God's attributes, are eternal.[74]
Cited in 1P20D [p. 71], 1P23D [p. 75]

Demonstration. For God (by Def. 6 [p. 27]) is a substance which (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. 7 [p. 33]), to whose nature it pertains to exist, or (what is the same) from whose definition it follows that he exists; and so (by Def. 8 [p. 27]) he is eternal. Next, by God's attributes must be understood that which (by Def. 4 [p. 25]) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is, that which pertains to substance: that very thing, I say, the attributes themselves must involve. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance (as I have already demonstrated from Prop. 7 [p. 33]); therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and so all are eternal. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition is also evident, as clearly as possible, from the way in which I demonstrated God's existence (Prop. 11 [p. 41]). From that demonstration, I say, it is established that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further, I have also demonstrated God's eternity in another way (Prop. 19 of the *Principles of Descartes*[75]), and there is no need to repeat it here.

Proposition XX

God's existence and his essence are one and the same.
Cited in 1P20C2 [p. 73]

Demonstration. God (by the preceding Prop. [p. 71]) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def. 8 [p. 27]), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which (by Def. 4 [p. 25]) explain his eternal essence, at the same time explain his eternal existence, that is, that very thing which constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his

[73] *causa immanens, non vero transiens*. An immanent cause produces its effect within itself; a transitive (or transient) cause produces it outside itself. Spinoza had used the pair in the *Short Treatise*, whose first dialogue speaks of 'de inblyvende oorzaak, de welke geenzins iets buyten zig zelve voortbrengt' ('the immanent cause, which produces nothing outside itself'; KV I, first dialogue, G I 30).

[74] The *sive* again marks an identification: God is nothing over and above his attributes (compare the note on Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 31]). The plural verb (*sunt*) follows the attributes.

[75] Spinoza's *Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I et II, more geometrico demonstratae* (1663), Part I, Prop. 19: 'Deus est aeternus' (G I 178).

et ipsius essentia unum et idem sunt. Q. E. D.

[G II 65] Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur 1. Dei existentiam, sicut eius essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem.

Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. Deum, sive omnia Dei attributa esse immutabilia. Nam, si ratione existentiae mutarentur, deberent etiam (per prop. praeced.) ratione essentiae mutari, hoc est (ut per se notum) ex veris falsa fieri; quod est absurdum.

Propositio XXI

Omnia, quae ex absoluta natura alicuius attributi Dei sequuntur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt, sive per idem attributum aeterna et infinita sunt.

Demonstratio. Concipe, si fieri potest (siquidem neges), aliquid in aliquo Dei attributo ex ipsius absoluta natura sequi, quod finitum sit et determinatam habeat existentiam sive durationem, ex. gr. ideam Dei in cogitatione. At cogitatio, quandoquidem Dei attributum supponitur, est necessario (per prop. 11.) sua natura infinita. Verum quatenus ipsa ideam Dei habet, finita supponitur.
At (per defin. 2.) finita concipi non potest, nisi per ipsam cogitationem determinetur; sed non per ipsam cogitationem, quatenus ideam Dei constituit (eatenus enim finita supponitur esse); ergo per cogitationem, quatenus ideam Dei non constituit, quae tamen (per prop. 11.) necessario existere debet. Datur igitur cogitatio non constituens ideam Dei, ac propterea ex eius natura, quatenus est absoluta cogitatio, non sequitur necessario idea Dei (concipitur enim ideam Dei constituens et non constituens); quod est contra hypothesin.

Quare si idea Dei in cogitatione, aut aliquid (perinde est, quicquid sumatur, quandoquidem demonstratio universalis est) in aliquo Dei attributo ex necessitate absolutae naturae ipsius attributi sequatur, id debet necessario esse infinitum; quod erat primum.

Deinde id, quod ex necessitate naturae alicuius attributi ita sequitur, non potest determinatam habere existentiam sive durationem.[ad] Nam si neges, supponatur res, quae ex necessitate naturae alicuius attributi sequitur, dari in aliquo Dei attributo, ex. gr. idea Dei in cogitatione, eaque supponatur aliquando non exstitisse, vel non exstitura. Cum autem cogitatio Dei attributum supponatur, debet et necessario et immutabilis existere (per prop. 11. et coroll. 2. prop. 20.).

[ad] The 1677 edition (OP p. 22) and Bartuschat read *determinatam habere durationem*. Gebhardt (G II 66; Textgestaltung II 351) supplies *existentiam sive* from the Dutch version (*bepaalde wezentlijkheit, of during*, with the marginal gloss 'Existentia sive duratio determinata') and in agreement with the first part of the demonstration.

existence; and so his existence and his essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. From this it follows, 1. that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

Corollary II. It follows, 2. that God, or all of God's attributes, are immutable. For if they changed in respect of existence, they would also (by the preceding Prop. [p. 71]) have to change in respect of essence, that is (as is self-evident), from being true become false; which is absurd.
Cited in 1P21D [p. 73], 5P17D [p. 489]

Proposition XXI

All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God's attributes have had to exist always and as infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.[76]
Cited in 1P23D [p. 75], 1P28D [p. 79], 1P29D [p. 81], 1App [p. 103], 2P11D [p. 139], 2P30D [p. 177], 4P4D [p. 361], 5P40S [p. 521]

Demonstration. Conceive, if it can be done (if indeed you deny this), that something which is finite and has a determinate existence or duration follows in some attribute of God from its absolute nature, for example, the idea of God in thought.[77] But thought, since it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) infinite by its nature. But insofar as it has the idea of God, it is supposed to be finite.
But (by Def. 2 [p. 25]) it cannot be conceived as finite unless it is determined by thought itself; but not by thought itself insofar as it constitutes the idea of God (for to that extent it is supposed to be finite); therefore by thought insofar as it does not constitute the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) must necessarily exist. There is, therefore, thought which does not constitute the idea of God, and on that account the idea of God does not follow necessarily from its nature insofar as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived both as constituting and as not constituting the idea of God); which is contrary to the hypothesis.
So if the idea of God in thought, or anything else (it makes no difference what is taken, since the demonstration is universal), follows in some attribute of God from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite; which was the first point.

Next, what follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of some attribute cannot have a determinate existence, or duration. For if you deny this, suppose that a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute is in some attribute of God, for example, the idea of God in thought, and suppose that it at some time did not exist, or will not exist. But since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must exist both necessarily and as immutable

[76] The first of three propositions on the 'infinite modes'. The *Ethics* gives no examples, but Letter 64 [p. 629] does: 'in Cogitatione intellectus absolute infinitus, in Extensione autem motus et quies; secundi autem, facies totius Universi' ('in thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in extension, motion and rest; and of the second kind, the face of the whole universe'; VVL[3] III 206). E. Curley proposed reading the infinite modes as the most general facts of nature: the immediate infinite mode of extension 'will consist of that set of general facts which are described by the laws of motion' (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, 1969, p. 60).
[77] Spinoza's example of an infinite mode of thought; the idea of God, by which God understands his own essence and all that follows from it, is introduced formally in Part II, Prop. 3 [p. 125].

Quare ultra limites durationis ideae Dei (supponitur enim aliquando non exstitisse, aut non exstitura) cogitatio sine idea Dei existere debebit; atqui hoc est contra hypothesin; supponitur enim, ex data cogitatione necessario sequi ideam Dei. Ergo idea Dei in cogitatione, aut aliquid quod necessario ex absoluta natura alicuius attributi Dei sequitur, non potest determinatam habere durationem, sed per idem attributum aeternum est; quod erat secundum.[ae] Nota, hoc idem esse affirmandum de quacumque re, quae in aliquo Dei attributo ex Dei absoluta natura necessario sequitur.

Propositio XXII

[G II 66] *Quicquid ex aliquo Dei attributo, quatenus modificatum est tali modificatione, quae et necessario et infinita per idem existit, sequitur, debet quoque et necessario et infinitum existere.*

Demonstratio. Huius propositionis demonstratio procedit eodem modo, ac demonstratio praecedentis.

Propositio XXIII

Omnis modus, qui et necessario et infinitus existit, necessario sequi debuit vel ex absoluta natura alicuius attributi Dei, vel ex aliquo attributo modificato modificatione, quae et necessario et infinita existit.

Demonstratio. Modus enim in alio est, per quod concipi debet (per defin. 5.), hoc est (per prop. 15.) in solo Deo est et per solum Deum concipi potest. Si ergo modus concipitur necessario existere et infinitus esse, utrumque hoc debet necessario concludi sive percipi per aliquod Dei attributum, quatenus idem concipitur infinitatem et necessitatem existentiae, sive (quod per defin. 8. idem est) aeternitatem exprimere, hoc est (per defin. 6. et prop. 19.) quatenus absolute consideratur.
Modus ergo, qui et necessario et infinitus existit, ex absoluta natura alicuius Dei attributi sequi debuit; hocque vel immediate (de quo prop. 21.) vel mediante aliqua modificatione, quae ex eius absoluta natura sequitur, hoc est (per prop. praeced.) quae et necessario et infinita existit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIV

[G II 67] *Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam.*

Demonstratio. Patet ex defin. 1. Id enim, cuius natura (in se scilicet considerata) involvit existentiam, causa est sui et ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit.

[ae] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dat te betogen stond' ('which was to be demonstrated'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 66; Textgestaltung II 351).

(by Prop. 11 [p. 41] and Cor. 2 of Prop. 20 [p. 73]).
So beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for it is supposed at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist) thought will have to exist without the idea of God; but this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that, given thought, the idea of God follows necessarily. Therefore the idea of God in thought, or anything that follows necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, but is, through the same attribute, eternal; which was the second point. Note that the same is to be affirmed of any thing that follows necessarily, in some attribute of God, from God's absolute nature.

Proposition XXII

Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which, through the same attribute, exists both necessarily and as infinite, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite.

Cited in 1P23D [p. 75], 1P28D [p. 79], 1App [p. 103], 2P11D [p. 139]

Demonstration. The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding one.

Proposition XXIII

Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists both necessarily and as infinite.

Cited in 1P32D [p. 85], 1App [p. 103]

Demonstration. For a mode is in another, through which it must be conceived (by Def. 5 [p. 25]), that is (by Prop. 15 [p. 49]), it is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone. If, therefore, a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, both of these must necessarily be inferred, or perceived, through some attribute of God, insofar as that attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (what is the same, by Def. 8 [p. 27]) eternity, that is (by Def. 6 [p. 27] and Prop. 19 [p. 71]), insofar as it is considered absolutely.
A mode, therefore, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God; and this either immediately (concerning which see Prop. 21 [p. 73]), or by the mediation of some modification which follows from its absolute nature, that is (by the preceding Prop. [p. 75]), which exists both necessarily and as infinite. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIV

The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

Demonstration. This is evident from Def. 1 [p. 25]. For that whose nature (considered, that is, in itself) involves existence is the cause of itself, and exists from the necessity of its own nature

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, Deum non tantum esse causam, ut res incipiant existere; sed etiam, ut in existendo perseverent, sive (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. Nam sive res existant, sive non existant, quotiescumque ad earum essentiam attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere comperimus; adeoque earum essentia neque suae existentiae, neque suae durationis potest esse causa, sed tantum Deus, ad cuius solam naturam pertinet existere (per coroll. 1. prop. 14.).

Propositio XXV

Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiae, sed etiam essentiae.

Demonstratio. Si negas, ergo rerum essentiae Deus non est causa; adeoque (per axiom. 4.) potest rerum essentia sine Deo concipi. Atqui hoc (per prop. 15.) est absurdum. Ergo rerum etiam essentiae Deus est causa. Q. E. D.

[G II 68] Scholium. Haec propositio clarius sequitur ex prop. 16. Ex ea enim sequitur, quod ex data natura divina tam rerum essentia quam existentia debeat necessario concludi; et, ut verbo dicam, eo sensu, quo Deus dicitur causa sui, etiam omnium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti corollario constabit.

Corollarium. Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demonstratio patet ex prop. 15. et defin. 5.

Propositio XXVI

Res, quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata; et quae a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare.

Demonstratio. Id, per quod res determinatae ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario

alone.

Corollary. From this it follows that God is not only the cause of things' beginning to exist, but also of their persevering in existing, or (to use a scholastic term) that God is the cause of the being of things.[78] For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we attend to their essence we find that it involves neither existence nor duration; and so their essence can be the cause neither of their existence nor of their duration, but only God, to whose nature alone it pertains to exist (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14 [p. 47]).

Cited in 1P28D [p. 79], 1P28S [p. 81], 1P29D [p. 81], 2P45S [p. 197], 4P4D [p. 361]

Proposition XXV

God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

Cited in 1P26D [p. 77], 5P22D [p. 503]

Demonstration. If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by Ax. 4 [p. 29]) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this (by Prop. 15 [p. 49]) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause also of the essence of things. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. 16 [p. 65]. For from it it follows that, from the given divine nature, both the essence and the existence of things must necessarily be inferred; and, in a word, God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself, which will be established still more clearly from the following corollary.

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 631]

Corollary. Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.[79] The demonstration is evident from Prop. 15 [p. 49] and Def. 5 [p. 25].

Cited in 1P28D [p. 79], 1P36D [p. 93], 2D1 [p. 121], 2P1D [p. 125], 2P5D [p. 127], 2P10C [p. 137], 3P6D [p. 243], 5P24D [p. 505], 5P36D [p. 515]

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 631]

Proposition XXVI

A thing which has been determined to produce some effect[80] *has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to operate.*

Cited in 1P28D [p. 79], 1P29D [p. 81]

Demonstration. That through which things are said to be determined to produce some effect

[78] *causam essendi rerum*. As the sentence itself explains, a cause of being sustains a thing in existence, as opposed to a cause merely of its coming to be. On this view God's causality does not end when a thing begins to exist.

[79] *modi, quibus ... certo et determinato modo exprimuntur*: the technical 'modes' and the ordinary 'way' (*modo*) stand side by side. Compare the formula of Def. 7 [p. 27].

[80] *ad aliquid operandum*, literally 'to operate something'; *operari* is rendered 'operate' where it stands alone (see the note on Def. 7 [p. 27]), and 'produce an effect' where it takes an object, as here.

quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque, tam eius essentiae, quam existentiae, Deus ex necessitate suae naturae est causa efficiens (per prop. 25. et 16.); quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam, quod secundo proponitur, clarissime sequitur. Nam si res, quae a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars huius falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.

Propositio XXVII

Res, quae a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest.

Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex axiom. 3.

Propositio XXVIII

[G II 69] *Quodcumque singulare, sive quaevis res quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam; et rursus haec causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum, et sic in infinitum.*

Demonstratio. Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per prop. 26. et coroll. prop. 24.). At id, quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicuius Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicuius Dei attributi sequitur, id infinitum et aeternum est (per prop. 21.).

Debuit ergo ex Deo, vel aliquo eius attributo sequi, quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; praeter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axiom. 1. et defin. 3. et 5.) et modi (per coroll. prop. 25.) nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel aliquo eius attributo, quatenus affectum est modificatione, quae aeterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per prop. 22.).
Debuit ergo sequi, vel ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, vel aliquo eius attributo, quatenus modificatum est modificatione, quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum.
Deinde haec rursus causa, sive hic modus (per eandem rationem, qua primam partem huius iam iam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia, et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q. E. D.

is necessarily something positive (as is self-evident). And so God, from the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (by Props. 25 [p. 77] and 16 [p. 65]); which was the first point. From this the second point proposed also follows very clearly. For if a thing which has not been determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this proposition would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.

Proposition XXVII

A thing which has been determined by God to produce some effect cannot render itself undetermined.
Cited in 1P29D [p. 81]

Demonstration. This proposition is evident from Ax. 3 [p. 29].

Proposition XXVIII

Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on to infinity.[81]

Cited in 1P32D [p. 85], 2P9D [p. 135], 2L3D [p. 151], 2P30D [p. 177], 2P31D [p. 177], 2P48D [p. 207], 4P29D [p. 389], 5P6D [p. 479]

Demonstration. Whatever has been determined to exist and to operate has been so determined by God (by Prop. 26 [p. 77] and Cor. of Prop. 24 [p. 77]). But what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. 21 [p. 73]).
It must, therefore, have followed from God, or some attribute of God, insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode; for except substance and modes there is nothing (by Ax. 1 [p. 29] and Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25]), and modes (by Cor. of Prop. 25 [p. 77]) are nothing but affections of God's attributes. But it also could not have followed from God, or some attribute of God, insofar as it is affected by a modification which is eternal and infinite (by Prop. 22 [p. 75]). It must, therefore, have followed from, or have been determined to exist and to operate by, God or some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence. Which was the first point.
Next, this cause in turn, or this mode (by the same reasoning by which we have just now demonstrated the first part of this proposition), must also have been determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and again this last (by the same reasoning) by another, and so always (by the same reasoning) to infinity. Q.E.D.

[81] Alongside the dependence of all things on God's nature (Prop. 16 [p. 65]), this proposition sets an infinite series of finite causes, each determined by another. How the two relate is one of the central questions of Part I: the finite thing does not follow from the absolute nature of an attribute (Prop. 21 [p. 73]), but from God insofar as he is modified by another finite mode, as the demonstration argues.

[G II 70] Scholium. Cum quaedam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt, videlicet ea quae ex absoluta eius natura necessario sequuntur, et alia mediantibus his primis,[af] quae tamen sine Deo nec esse, nec concipi possunt; hinc sequitur 1. quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima;[ag] non vero in suo genere, ut aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per prop. 15. et coroll. prop. 24.).

Sequitur 2. quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium, nisi forte ea de causa, ut scilicet has ab iis, quas immediate produxit, vel potius, quae ex absoluta eius natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus, quae cum effectu nullo modo coniuncta est. At omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent, ut sine ipso nec esse, nec concipi possint.

Propositio XXIX

In rerum natura nullum datur contingens, sed omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.

Demonstratio. Quicquid est, in Deo est (per prop. 15.). Deus autem non potest dici res contingens. Nam (per prop. 11.) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinae naturae ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (per prop. 16.); idque vel quatenus divina natura absolute (per prop. 21.), vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (per prop. 27.).[ah]
Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa, quatenus simpliciter existunt (per coroll. prop. 24.), sed etiam (per prop. 26.), quatenus ad aliquid operandum determinati considerantur. Quod si a Deo (per eand. prop.) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est, ut se ipsos determinent; et contra (per prop. 27.) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est, ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant.

Quare omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandum, nullumque datur contingens. Q. E. D.

[G II 71] Scholium. Antequam ulterius pergam, hic quid nobis per *naturam naturantem* et quid per *naturam naturatam* intelligendum sit, explicare volo, vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus iam constare existimo, nempe, quod per *naturam naturantem* nobis intelligendum

[af] The 1677 edition (OP p. 26) has only 'mediantibus his primis', where something has evidently fallen out. Gebhardt (G II 70; Textgestaltung II 352–353) supplies 'et alia' from the Dutch version ('en anderen door middel van deze eersten', 'and others by means of these first'); Boehmer had conjectured 'quaedam', which Bartuschat adopts.
[ag] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'Ik zeg volstrektelijk de naaste oorzaak, en' ('I say the absolutely proximate cause, and'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 70; Textgestaltung II 353). That is, proximate absolutely, and not in its own kind.
[ah] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 26) and the Dutch version (*zevenëntwintigste*). W. Meijer proposed *prop. 22.*; Gebhardt (G II 70; Textgestaltung II 353) defends *prop. 27.*: the contrast is between the infinite modes, which follow from God's nature considered absolutely (Prop. 21 [p. 73]), and the finite modes, which follow from it as determined to act in a certain way (Prop. 27 [p. 79]). Bartuschat reads *prop. 28.*

Scholium. Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, and others by the mediation of these first ones, which nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God, it follows, 1. that God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him; but not proximate in his own kind, as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by Prop. 15 [p. 49] and Cor. of Prop. 24 [p. 77]).
It follows, 2. that God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, unless perhaps for this reason, namely, that we may distinguish them from those which he has produced immediately, or rather, which follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is in no way conjoined with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

Proposition XXIX

In the nature of things there is nothing contingent,[82] *but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way.*

Cited in 1P32C2 [p. 85], 1P33D [p. 87], 2P31C [p. 177], 2P44D [p. 195], 3P7D [p. 243], 5P6D [p. 479]

Demonstration. Whatever is, is in God (by Prop. 15 [p. 49]). But God cannot be called a contingent thing. For (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily, not contingently (by Prop. 16 [p. 65]); and that either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by Prop. 21 [p. 73]) or insofar as it is considered to be determined to act in a certain way (by Prop. 27 [p. 79]).
Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (by Cor. of Prop. 24 [p. 77]), but also (by Prop. 26 [p. 77]) insofar as they are considered to be determined to produce some effect. If they have not been determined by God (by the same proposition), it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; and conversely (by Prop. 27 [p. 79]), if they have been determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves undetermined.
So all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and to operate in a certain way, and there is nothing contingent. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Before I proceed further, I wish to explain here, or rather to advise the reader, what we must understand by *Natura naturans* and what by *Natura naturata*.[83] For from the preceding I think it is already established that by *Natura naturans* we must understand what

[82] What 'contingent' means, and why things nonetheless seem contingent to us, is explained in Prop. 33, Schol. 1 [p. 87].
[83] Literally 'Nature naturing' and 'Nature natured': the active participle for Nature as cause, the passive for Nature as effect. The terms are scholastic, and Spinoza says he means only to 'advise' (*monere*) the reader, as of something familiar. He had used them already in the *Short Treatise*: 'te weten in Natura naturans, en Natura naturata' ('namely into Natura naturans and Natura naturata'; KV I.8, G I 47). They are left in Latin in this translation.

est id quod in se est et per se concipitur, sive talia substantiae attributa, quae aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt, hoc est (per coroll. 1. prop. 14. et coroll. 2. prop. 17.) Deus, quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per *naturatam* autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturae sive uniuscuiusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est, omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur ut res, quae in Deo sunt et quae sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt.

Propositio XXX

Intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.

Demonstratio. Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axiom. 6.), hoc est (ut per se notum) id, quod in intellectu obiective continetur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per coroll. 1. prop. 14.) non nisi una substantia datur, nempe Deus, nec ullae aliae affectiones (per prop. 15.) quam quae in Deo sunt et quae (per eandem prop.) sine Deo nec esse, nec concipi possunt.
Ergo intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXI

Intellectus actu, sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent.

[G II 72] Demonstratio. Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem, sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis, scilicet cupiditate, amore etc. differt, adeoque (per defin. 5.) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet; nempe (per prop. 15. et defin. 6.) per aliquod Dei attributum, quod aeternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit.
Ac propterea (per schol. prop. 29.) ad naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet, ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Ratio, cur hic loquar de intellectu actu, non est, quia concedo, ullum dari intellectum potentia; sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime

is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14 [p. 47] and Cor. 2 of Prop. 17 [p. 67]), God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. But by *naturata* I understand everything that follows from the necessity of God's nature, or of each of God's attributes, that is, all the modes of God's attributes, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God.
Cited in 1P31D [p. 83]

Proposition XXX

An intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend[84] *the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else.*
Cited in 2P4D [p. 127]

Demonstration. A true idea must agree with its object (by Ax. 6 [p. 29]), that is (as is self-evident), what is contained objectively[85] in the intellect must necessarily be in nature.[86] But in nature (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14 [p. 47]) there is only one substance, namely God, and there are no other affections (by Prop. 15 [p. 49]) than those which are in God and which (by the same proposition) can neither be nor be conceived without God.
Therefore an intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXI

The actual intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to Natura naturata*, not to* Natura naturans.[87]

Demonstration. For by intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from others, namely desire, love, etc., and so (by Def. 5 [p. 25]) must be conceived through absolute thought; namely (by Prop. 15 [p. 49] and Def. 6 [p. 27]) it must be so conceived through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, that without it it can neither be nor be conceived.
And therefore (by Schol. of Prop. 29 [p. 81]) it must be referred to *Natura naturata*, not to *naturans*, as must the other modes of thinking also. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The reason why I speak here of actual intellect is not that I grant that there is any potential intellect;[88] but because I wish to avoid all confusion, I have been unwilling to speak of

[84] *comprehendere*: both 'grasp' and 'contain'. The demonstration uses the second sense: what an intellect grasps, it contains objectively.
[85] On *objective*, 'as the content of an idea', see the note on Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67].
[86] The step from the axiom takes it that what an intellect comprehends, it comprehends truly. For Spinoza the intellect is not the seat of error: falsity arises only from knowledge of the first kind, the imagination, while knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true (Part II, Prop. 41 [p. 189]).
[87] Intellect and will, which the tradition placed in God's essence, are here counted among his effects. Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67] has argued that an intellect and will belonging to God's essence would agree with ours in nothing but the name; Prop. 32, Cor. 2 [p. 85] puts will and intellect on the same footing as motion and rest.
[88] The scholastic distinction of potential and actual intellect goes back to Aristotle, for whom the intellect is actually nothing until it thinks: ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς … οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν ('so the part of the soul called intellect … is actually none of the things that are, before it thinks'; *De anima* III.4, 429a22–24). A potential intellect would be a faculty prior to and distinct from its acts. Spinoza admits no such thing; in Part II faculties such as intellect and will are 'either entirely fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals', formed from particular ideas and volitions (Part II, Prop. 48, Schol. [p. 207]).

percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione, qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus, quod ad perfectiorem intellectionis cognitionem non conducat.

Propositio XXXII

Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera, sed tantum necessaria.

Demonstratio. Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est, sicuti intellectus; adeoque (per prop. 28.) unaquaeque volitio non potest existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, et haec rursus ab alia, et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est, sed quatenus attributum habet, quod infinitam et aeternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per prop. 23.).
Quocumque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit, a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur; adeoque (per defin. 7.) non potest dici causa libera, sed tantum necessaria vel coacta. Q. E. D.

[G II 73] Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur 1. Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.

Corollarium II. Sequitur 2. voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere, ut motus et quies, et absolute, ut omnia naturalia, quae (per prop. 29.) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget, a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur.
Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere, quam propter ea, quae ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur), dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet, quam reliqua naturalia, sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet, ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua, quae ostendimus ex necessitate divinae naturae sequi, et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.

Propositio XXXIII

Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productae sunt.

anything except what is perceived by us as clearly as possible, namely of intellection itself,[89] than which nothing is perceived more clearly by us. For we can understand nothing that does not lead to a more perfect knowledge of intellection.

Proposition XXXII

The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.[90]

Demonstration. The will is only a certain mode of thinking, like the intellect; and so (by Prop. 28 [p. 79]) each volition can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on to infinity. But if the will is supposed to be infinite, it too must be determined to exist and to operate by God, not insofar as he is absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as he has an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. 23 [p. 75]).
So in whatever way it is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to operate; and so (by Def. 7 [p. 27]) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. From this it follows, 1. that God does not operate from freedom of the will.
Cited in 1App [p. 103], 2P3S [p. 125]

Corollary II. It follows, 2. that will and intellect are related to God's nature as motion and rest are,[91] and absolutely, as are all natural things, which (by Prop. 29 [p. 81]) must be determined by God to exist and to operate in a certain way. For the will, like all other things, requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and to operate in a certain way.
And although infinitely many things follow from a given will or intellect, God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will any more than, on account of the things that follow from motion and rest (for infinitely many things follow from these also), he can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest. So will does not pertain to God's nature any more than other natural things do, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and to operate in a certain way.
Cited in 1App [p. 103], 2P3S [p. 125]

Proposition XXXIII

Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced.[92]

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[89] *intellectio*, the act of understanding, as distinct from the faculty (*intellectus*).
[90] In the terms of Def. 7 [p. 27], 'necessary, or rather compelled'. Part II draws the consequence for the human mind, in which there is 'no absolute, or free, will' (Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207]).
[91] Motion and rest are Spinoza's example of the infinite mode that follows immediately from the attribute of extension, as absolutely infinite intellect is of the one that follows from thought (Letter 64 [p. 629]; see the note on Prop. 21 [p. 73]).
[92] How strict a necessity this asserts is disputed. J. Bennett finds two commitments in the *Ethics*: 'In certain ways Spinoza commits himself to the remarkable conclusion that there are no contingent truths, i.e., that this is the only possible world. In other ways he commits himself to the opposite' (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, p. 111). E. Curley argues that 'all truths are necessary, but not all truths are necessary in the same sense': some are 'absolutely necessary', their denial being self-contradictory, while others, such as truths about finite things grounded in an infinite series of prior finite causes (Prop. 28 [p. 79]), are only 'relatively necessary' (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, 1969, pp. 83, 89–90). The two grounds of necessity are those named in Schol. 1 [p. 87].

Demonstratio. Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario secutae sunt (per prop. 16.), et ex necessitate naturae Dei determinatae sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per prop. 29.). Si itaque res alterius naturae potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari, ut naturae ordo alius esset, ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse, quam iam est; ac proinde (per prop. 11.) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo, vel plures possent dari dii; quod (per coroll. 1. prop. 14.) est absurdum.

Quapropter res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine etc. Q. E. D.

[G II 74] Scholium I. Quoniam his luce meridiana clarius ostendi, nihil absolute in rebus dari, propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare iam paucis volo, quid nobis per *contingens* erit intelligendum; sed prius, quid per *necessarium* et *impossibile*.

Res aliqua *necessaria* dicitur vel ratione suae essentiae vel ratione causae. Rei enim alicuius existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione, vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua *impossibilis* dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit, vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata.
At res aliqua nulla alia de causa *contingens* dicitur, nisi respectu defectus nostrae cognitionis. Res enim, cuius essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus, vel de qua probe scimus, eandem nullam contradictionem involvere, et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus, propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest; ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.

Scholium II. Ex praecedentibus clare sequitur, res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas, quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutae sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex huius contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi), Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia, si res alio modo fuissent productae, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda diversa ab ea, quam ex consideratione entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere.

Verum non dubito, quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant, nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint; idque nulla alia de causa, quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa, quae a nobis (defin. 7.)[ai] tradita est, videlicet absolutam voluntatem. Verum neque etiam dubito, si rem meditari vellent, nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem, qualem iam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam, sed ut magnum scientiae obstaculum plane reiiciant. Nec opus est ut ea,

[ai] The 1677 edition (OP p. 30) reads *Defin. 6.*; Gebhardt (G II 74; Textgestaltung II 354), following Sigwart and Van Vloten–Land, corrects to *defin. 7.*, the definition of freedom, and Bartuschat follows him. The translation follows the correction.

Demonstration. For all things have followed necessarily from the given nature of God (by Prop. 16 [p. 65]), and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature to exist and to operate in a certain way (by Prop. 29 [p. 81]). So if things could have been of another nature, or have been determined to operate in another way, so that the order of nature would be different, then God's nature also could be other than it now is; and therefore (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) that nature too would have to exist, and consequently there could be two or more Gods; which (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14 [p. 47]) is absurd.
Therefore things could have been produced in no other way and in no other order, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium I. Since by the foregoing I have shown more clearly than the noonday light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they may be called contingent, I wish now to explain briefly what we must understand by *contingent*; but first, what by *necessary* and *impossible*.
A thing is called *necessary* either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For the existence of any thing follows necessarily either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. Next, a thing is also called *impossible* for these same reasons: namely, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause determined to produce such a thing.
But a thing is called *contingent* for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge. For a thing whose essence we do not know to involve a contradiction, or of which we know well that it involves no contradiction, and yet about whose existence we can affirm nothing with certainty, because the order of causes is hidden from us, can never seem to us either necessary or impossible; and so we call it either contingent or possible.[93]
Cited in 2P31C [p. 177], 4D4 [p. 355], 4P11D [p. 369]

Scholium II. From the foregoing it follows clearly that things have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection; for it is his perfection that has compelled us to affirm it. Indeed, from the contrary it would clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God is not supremely perfect; namely because, if things had been produced in another way, another nature would have to be attributed to God, different from the one we have been compelled to attribute to him from the consideration of the most perfect being.
But I do not doubt that many will dismiss this view as absurd and will not be willing to apply their minds to weighing it; and for no other reason than that they have been accustomed to attribute to God another freedom, far different from the one laid down by us (Def. 7 [p. 27]), namely an absolute will. But neither do I doubt that, if they were willing to meditate on the matter and to weigh the sequence of our demonstrations rightly for themselves, they would in the end entirely reject such a freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as trifling but as a great obstacle

[93] So also, at greater length, the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (I.3), which makes the possible and the contingent 'non nisi defectus nostrae perceptionis, nec aliquid reale esse' ('nothing but defects of our perception, and nothing real') and declines to fix the terms: 'neque enim de nominibus disputare soleo' ('for I am not in the habit of disputing about names'; G I 242). Part IV, Defs. 3 [p. 355] and 4 [p. 355] distinguish them: singular things are called contingent insofar as their essence alone neither posits nor excludes their existence, possible insofar as we do not know whether the causes from which they must be produced are determined to produce them.

quae in schol. prop. 17. dicta sunt, hic repetam.

Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam, quod, quamvis concedatur, voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex eius perfectione nihilominus sequatur, res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere, si prius consideremus id quod ipsimet concedunt, videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere, ut unaquaeque res id quod est sit; nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset.
Deinde quod omnia Dei decreta ab aeterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt. Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstantiae argueretur. At cum in aeterno non detur *quando*, *ante*, nec *post*,[aj] hinc, ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione, sequitur, Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse nec unquam potuisse; sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse, nec sine ipsis esse posse.

At dicent, quod,[ak] quamvis supponeretur, quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset, vel quod ab aeterno aliud de natura eiusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio. Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul, Deum posse sua mutare decreta.

Nam si Deus de natura eiusque ordine aliud, quam decrevit, decrevisset, hoc est, ut aliud de natura voluisset et concepisset, alium necessario quam iam habet intellectum, et aliam quam iam habet voluntatem habuisset.
Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet absque ulla eius essentiae eiusque perfectionis mutatione; quid causae est, cur iam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare et nihilominus aeque perfectus manere? Eius enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem in respectu suae essentiae et perfectionis perinde est quomodocumque concipiatur.

Deinde omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt, nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia, sed tantum actu. Cum autem et eius intellectus et eius voluntas ab eiusdem essentia non distinguantur, ut etiam omnes concedunt; sequitur ergo hinc etiam, quod, si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset et aliam voluntatem, eius etiam essentia alia necessario esset; ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi) si aliter res, quam iam sunt, a Deo productae essent, Dei intellectus eiusque voluntas, hoc est (ut conceditur) eius essentia alia esse deberet; quod est absurdum.

[G II 76] Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint,[al] et hoc verum esse ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur; nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest, ut credamus, quod Deus noluerit omnia, quae in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione, qua ipsa intelligit, creare.

[aj] non detur *quando*, *ante*, nec *post*,] *transcr.* non detur quando, ante, nec post,. Italics restored from the 1677 edition (OP p. 31).
[ak] The 1677 edition (OP p. 31) reads *At dicunt* ('But they say'). Gebhardt (G II 75; Textgestaltung II 354) corrects to *dicent* from the Dutch version (*Maar (zullen zy zeggen)*) and in view of *concedent* and of *At dicent* at the head of the next paragraph; Bartuschat follows him.
[al] a Deo produci potuerint] *transcr.* a Deo produci potuerit. Gebhardt prints 'potuerit', a misprint corrected in his own corrigenda (G II 76 l. 5), which the transcription reproduces; the 1677 edition (OP p. 32) and Bartuschat read 'potuerint'.

to science. Nor is there any need for me to repeat here what was said in the Scholium to Prop. 17 [p. 67].

Nevertheless, for their sake I shall show further that, even if it is granted that will pertains to God's essence, it still follows from his perfection that things could have been created by God in no other way or order, which will be easy to show if we first consider what they themselves grant, namely that it depends on God's decree and will alone that each thing is what it is; for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things.

Next, that all God's decrees have been established by God himself from eternity. For otherwise he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since in eternity there is no *when*, *before*, or *after*,[94] it follows from this, namely from God's perfection alone, that God can never decree anything else, and never could have; or that God was not prior to his decrees, and cannot be without them.

But they will say that, even if it were supposed that God had made another nature of things, or that from eternity he had decreed something else concerning nature and its order, no imperfection in God would follow from this. But if they say this, they will grant at the same time that God can change his decrees.

For if God had decreed something concerning nature and its order other than he has decreed, that is, if he had willed and conceived something else concerning nature, he would necessarily have had another intellect than the one he now has, and another will than the one he now has. And if it is permissible to attribute to God another intellect and another will without any change of his essence and of his perfection, what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees concerning created things and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For with respect to his essence and perfection, it makes no difference how his intellect and will concerning created things and their order are conceived.

Further, all the philosophers I have seen grant that there is no potential intellect in God, but only actual intellect.[95] But since his intellect and his will are not distinguished from his essence, as they all grant as well, it follows from this too that if God had had another actual intellect and another will, his essence would also necessarily be other; and therefore (as I concluded at the beginning), if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, God's intellect and his will, that is (as is granted), his essence, would have to be other; which is absurd.

Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other way or order, and since the truth of this follows from God's supreme perfection, there is surely no sound reason that can persuade us to believe that God did not wish to create all the things that are in his intellect with the same perfection with which he understands them.

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[94] The argument is already in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (I.3), nearly word for word: 'cum in aeternitate non detur quando, nec ante, nec post, neque ulla affectio temporis, sequitur, Deum nunquam ante illa decreta extitisse, ut aliud decernere posset' ('since in eternity there is no when, before, or after, nor any affection of time, it follows that God never existed before those decrees so as to be able to decree something else'; G I 243). On eternity as excluding time, see Def. 8, Exp. [p. 27].

[95] So, for example, Maimonides: 'וכאשר בא המופת שהאלוה יתּ׳ הוא שכל בפועל ואין כח בו כלל ... אבל הוא שכל בפועל תמיד' ('since it has been demonstrated that God, may he be exalted, is intellect in actuality and that there is no potentiality in him at all ... but he is always intellect in actuality'; מורה נבוכים (*Guide of the Perplexed*) I.68); and Descartes, for whom the idea of God contains nothing potential: 'in qua nempe nihil omnino est potentiale' (*Meditations* III, AT VII 47). On the identity of God's intellect and will with his essence, see the notes on Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67].

At dicent, in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem, sed id quod in ipsis est, propter quod perfectae sunt aut imperfectae, et bonae aut malae dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere; atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere, ut id quod iam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio, et contra.[am] Verum quid hoc aliud esset, quam aperte affirmare, quod Deus, qui id quod vult necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest, ut res alio modo, quam intelligit, intelligat? Quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum.

Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum, hoc modo: „Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntas[an] aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus); ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt."
Fateor, hanc opinionem, quae omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subiicit et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare, quam illorum, qui statuunt, Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere.
Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere, quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus tamquam ad exemplar in operando attendit, vel ad quod tamquam ad certum scopum collimat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est, quam Deum fato subiicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiae, quam earum existentiae primam et unicam liberam causam esse. Quare non est, ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.

Propositio XXXIV

Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia.

[G II 77] Demonstratio. Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiae sequitur, Deum esse causam sui (per prop. 11.) et (per prop. 16. eiusque coroll.)[ao] omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei, qua ipse et omnia sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXV

Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est.

Demonstratio. Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (per prop. praeced.) in eius essentia ita

[am] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dat het geen, 't welk nu in de dingen een onvolmaaktheit is, het volmaaktste geweest zou zijn' ('that what is now an imperfection in things would have been the most perfect'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 76; Textgestaltung II 354). The Dutch version has this in place of *et contra*.
[an] possint, Dei necessario voluntas] *transcr.* possint, necessario Dei voluntas. The 1677 edition (OP p. 32), Gebhardt (G II 76) and Bartuschat read 'Dei necessario voluntas'.
[ao] eiusque coroll.)] *transcr.* eiusque coroll. 1.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 33), Gebhardt (G II 77) and Bartuschat read 'ejusque Coroll.', without a number.

But they will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things, but that what is in them, on account of which they are perfect or imperfect, and are called good or evil, depends on God's will alone; and so, if God had willed, he could have brought it about that what is now perfection would be the greatest imperfection, and conversely. But what else would this be than to affirm openly that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, can by his will bring it about that he understands things in another way than he understands them? Which (as I have just shown) is a great absurdity.

So I can turn the argument against them, in this way: 'All things depend on God's power.[96] For things to be able to be otherwise, therefore, God's will would necessarily also have to be otherwise; but God's will cannot be otherwise (as we have just shown most evidently from God's perfection); therefore neither can things be otherwise.'

I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God and maintains that all things depend on his good pleasure,[97] is less far from the truth than the opinion of those who maintain that God does all things under the aspect of the good.[98]

For these seem to posit something outside God which does not depend on God, to which God attends as to a model in operating, or at which he aims as at a definite goal. This is surely nothing else than to subject God to fate, than which nothing more absurd can be maintained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause both of the essence of all things and of their existence. So there is no reason for me to waste time refuting this absurdity.

Proposition XXXIV

God's power is his very essence.

Cited in 1P35D [p. 91], 1P36D [p. 93], 2P3S [p. 125], 3P6D [p. 243], 4P4D [p. 361]

Demonstration. For from the necessity of God's essence alone it follows that God is the cause of himself (by Prop. 11 [p. 41]) and (by Prop. 16 [p. 65] and its Cor. [p. 65]) of all things. Therefore God's power, by which he and all things are and act, is his very essence. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXV

Whatever we conceive to be in God's power[99] necessarily is.

Cited in 2P3D [p. 125]

Demonstration. For whatever is in God's power must (by the preceding Prop. [p. 91]) be so

[96] *potestate*: on this word, distinct from *potentia*, see the note on Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67].

[97] The first opinion is Descartes's: 'Repugnat enim Dei voluntatem non fuisse ab aeterno indifferentem ad omnia quae facta sunt aut unquam fient' ('for it is contradictory that God's will should not have been indifferent from eternity to all things that have been made or ever will be'). So God did not will the three angles of a triangle to equal two right angles because he knew it could not be otherwise, but 'quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario aequales esse duobus rectis, idcirco iam hoc verum est' ('because he willed the three angles of a triangle to be necessarily equal to two right angles, therefore this is now true'; Sixth Replies, AT VII 431–432).

[98] *sub ratione boni*, the scholastic formula for willing an object as good. Suárez, discussing God's freedom, says that the use of freedom has no place 'nisi ubi sub ratione boni repraesentatur' ('except where something is represented under the aspect of the good'; *Disputationes metaphysicae* XXX.9).

[99] *in Dei potestate*: on *potestas* see the note on Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]. The proposition answers those who, as described there, hold that God can bring it about that things which are in his power should not come about.

debet comprehendi, ut ex ea necessario sequatur, adeoque necessario est. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXVI

Nihil existit, ex cuius natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.

Demonstratio. Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (per coroll. prop. 25.),[ap] hoc est (per prop. 34.) quicquid existit, Dei potentiam, quae omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit, adeoque (per prop. 16.) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. Q. E. D.

[ap] The 1677 edition (OP p. 33) prints *per Prop. 25.* and corrects it to *per Coroll. Prop. 25.* in its list of errata in the references (*Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda*). The Corollary has the formula 'certo et determinato modo exprimuntur'.

comprehended in his essence that it follows necessarily from it, and so it necessarily is. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXVI

Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.[100]

Cited in 2P13D [p. 141], 3P1D [p. 233], 3P7D [p. 243], 5P4S [p. 477]

Demonstration. Whatever exists expresses God's nature, or essence, in a certain and determinate way (by Cor. of Prop. 25 [p. 77]), that is (by Prop. 34 [p. 91]), whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way God's power, which is the cause of all things; and so (by Prop. 16 [p. 65]) some effect must follow from it. Q.E.D.

[100] The proposition is the first premise of Part III, Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 243], which identifies each thing's power, or striving to persevere in its being, with its actual essence: what Prop. 34 [p. 91] says of God is there said of every thing.

The Appendix to Part I

With Prop. 36 [p. 93] the demonstrations of Part I end, and Spinoza changes register. The Appendix has no definitions, axioms or propositions; it is continuous prose, often sarcastic, and it addresses the reader directly ("See, I ask you, what the matter has come to in the end!"). The geometrical order proves; the Appendix diagnoses why the proofs will not be believed. A reader coming to it straight from the demonstrations meets a different kind of writing with a different target, not a thesis to be proved but a habit of mind to be exposed, and the Appendix is easier to follow with its plan, and the earlier writers whose views it answers, in view.

The plan and the tone

Its first sentence summarizes the Part. Spinoza has explained "the nature of God and its properties": that he exists necessarily, that he is unique, that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature alone, that he is the free cause of all things, that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived, "and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will, or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite power" (Appendix [p. 101]). He has tried, wherever the occasion arose, to remove the prejudices that might prevent his demonstrations from being understood. But many remain, and they could prevent men, "indeed most of all," from "embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it." The phrase is worth noticing. What the Appendix defends is not one doctrine among others but the whole picture of a nature in which everything follows from everything else by necessity, and its claim is that this picture meets an obstacle in the mind of the reader before it meets any argument.

All the prejudices in question, Spinoza says, depend on one: "that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end, and indeed hold it as certain that God himself directs all things to some definite end (for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship him)." He announces three tasks. He will ask why most men acquiesce in this prejudice and why all are by nature inclined to it; he will show that it is false; and he will show how the prejudices about good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness arose from it. The Appendix follows that plan closely. The divisions of the present text (E1App [p. 101], E1App.2 [p. 103], E1App.3 [p. 107], E1App.4 [p. 109]) are paragraphs of the transcription, but they correspond roughly to its stages.

The tone deserves a word. The Appendix is the first place in the *Ethics* where Spinoza allows himself open mockery, and it is directed less at the common people, whose errors he explains, than at those who exploit them: the "interpreters of nature and of the gods" who brand as heretics anyone who seeks the true causes of things, "for they know that if ignorance is taken away, astonishment, that is, the only means they have of arguing and of defending their authority, is taken away too" (E1App.2 [p. 103]). The author of the *Theological-Political Treatise*, which he had published anonymously in 1670 and in which, as Bayle later reported, all its refuters had found "the seeds of atheism," knew what he was describing.

Two facts about human nature

The explanation rests on two facts that "must be acknowledged by all": "that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek their own advantage, of which

they are conscious." Spinoza does not derive these facts here from the nature of the mind, which is the task of Parts II and III; he takes them as common ground. From them two consequences follow at once.

The first is the belief in free will. Men "think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them." The feeling of freedom is not evidence of an undetermined will; it is the form ignorance of causes takes in a being that is conscious of its own desires. Spinoza returns to the analysis in Part II, where men's "idea of freedom" is said to consist only in their being conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined (Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181]), and in Part III (Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]). He gave it its most memorable form in a letter to G. H. Schuller (Letter 58 [p. 623]), where he asks his correspondent to conceive a stone, set in motion by an external cause, which while it continues to move could think and know that it is striving, as far as it can, to keep moving. Such a stone, conscious only of its striving and not indifferent to it, "would believe itself to be most free, and to persevere in motion for no other reason than that it wills to. And this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists only in this, that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined" (VVL[3] III 196).

The second consequence is the habit of explaining everything by ends. Since men act for the sake of the advantage they want, "they always want to know only the final causes of things done, and when they have heard them, they are at rest." When no one can tell them the end for which something happened, they reflect on the ends by which they themselves are usually moved, and so "necessarily judge the temperament of another from their own." Finding in nature many things useful to them which they had not made, "eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish," they came to regard all natural things as means to their advantage, and since they knew that they had found these means and not provided them, they concluded that someone else had provided them: "some ruler, or some rulers, of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have taken care of all things for them and made all things for their use."

From prejudice to superstition

The rest of the first stage is a natural history of religion in a few sentences. Having no information about the temperament of these rulers, men judged it from their own, and concluded that the gods direct all things for the use of men in order to bind men to them and be held in the highest honour. Each then devised, from his own temperament, a way of worshipping God so that God might love him above the rest and direct the whole of nature to serve his "blind desire and insatiable greed." So the prejudice "was turned into superstition and struck deep roots in their minds." But nature also contains storms, earthquakes and diseases, and men explained these as the anger of the gods at wrongs done to them; and when experience showed "by infinitely many examples that benefits and harms befall the pious and the impious alike," they did not give up the prejudice, but declared that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding.

That last move, Spinoza says, "would surely have been the only cause why the truth should have been hidden from the human race to eternity, had not mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown men another standard of truth" (E1App [p. 101]). The remark explains, in passing, why the *Ethics* is written as it is. The

geometrical order is not only a method of proof; it is a training in a way of thinking about things that asks what they are and what follows from them, never what they are for. A triangle has no purpose, and its properties are not explained by any.

Earlier critics of final causes

The rejection of final causes was not new. Descartes had excluded them from physics: "totum illud causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus Physicis nullum usum habere existimo" ("I consider that the whole class of causes customarily sought from the end has no use in physical matters"; *Meditations* IV, AT VII 55; compare *Principles* I.28). But his reason was modesty: we cannot, without rashness, investigate the ends of God. Spinoza's reason is that there are none. Final causes are "nothing but human fictions" (*humana figmenta*), and a God who acted for an end would lack something he wanted, which contradicts his perfection.

Nor was it new to deny that the universe exists for human beings. Maimonides reports the opinion "שתכלית המציאות כולו – מציאות מין האדם לבד לעבוד את האלוה ושכל מה שנעשה אמנם נעשה בגללו" ("that the end of all existence is solely the existence of the human species, to worship God, and that everything that has been made was made for its sake"; מורה נבוכים (*Guide of the Perplexed*) III.13), nearly in Spinoza's words, and rejects it. But Maimonides concludes that everything exists because God willed it, and that no further cause or end should be sought (III.13). That is precisely the answer the Appendix ridicules: those who explain events by their purposes "will not cease to ask for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance" (E1App.2 [p. 103]). The voluntarist God of Prop. 33, Schol. 2 [p. 89], whose will is the only reason for things, is "less far from the truth" than the God who aims at the good; but neither is Spinoza's.

The arguments

The second stage gives the arguments against final causes, and Spinoza says there is no need for many words, since the falsity of the doctrine is already established by the account of its origin, by Prop. 16 [p. 65], by the corollaries of Prop. 32 [p. 85], and by all the propositions that show that everything in nature proceeds "by a certain eternal necessity and with the highest perfection" (E1App.2 [p. 103]). He adds three considerations.

First, the doctrine "entirely overturns nature." It takes the cause for the effect and the effect for the cause; it makes what is prior posterior; and it makes what is most perfect least perfect. The last point draws on the propositions about infinite modes: the effect produced by God immediately is the most perfect, and the more intermediate causes something needs, the more imperfect it is (Props. 21–23 [p. 73]). If the first things had been made for the sake of the last, the last would be the most excellent of all. Second, the doctrine takes away God's perfection, "for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something that he lacks." The theologians' distinction between an end of need and an end of assimilation does not help, since they confess that God did all things for his own sake, and so must confess that he lacked the things for whose sake he provided the means. Third, its defenders have invented a new way of arguing, "reduction not to the impossible, but to ignorance." A stone falls from a roof and kills a man; it must have fallen for that purpose, they argue, since so many circumstances could not have come together by chance. Tell them that the wind was blowing and the man was passing, and they ask why the wind was blowing at that moment and why the man was passing at that hour; tell them about the sea that was rough the day before and the friend who had invited the man, and they ask again, "since

there is no end to asking," until you take refuge in the will of God. The same habit makes men look at the structure of the human body and conclude, because they do not know the causes of so much art, that it was made by a supernatural and not by a mechanical art.

The stone from the roof is the most famous image in the Appendix, and it repays attention. Spinoza does not deny that the man's death has a complete explanation; he insists on it. Every circumstance has its cause, and the causes have their causes, to infinity, as Prop. 28 [p. 79] has shown. What the believer in final causes cannot bear is that the explanation never comes to an end in a reason that satisfies him, a purpose that makes the event intelligible as meant. Spinoza's answer is that the demand is misplaced. The infinite series of finite causes is not a failure of explanation but its form, and the order of the whole follows from the nature of God.

Notions of the imagination

The third stage turns to the notions that arose from the prejudice. Once men had persuaded themselves that everything happens for their sake, they had to regard as most important in each thing what is most useful to them, and so they formed the notions "*good*, *evil*, *order*, *confusion*, *hot*, *cold*, *beauty* and *ugliness*," and, because they think themselves free, "*praise* and *blame*, *sin* and *merit*" (E1App.3 [p. 107]). Whatever conduces to health and to the worship of God they called good, and its contrary evil. Things easy to imagine and remember they called well ordered, and the rest confused; and since they prefer what they can easily imagine, they suppose that order is something in nature beyond its relation to our imagination, and say that God created all things in order, "and in this way, without knowing it, attribute imagination to God." Beauty and ugliness, fragrance and stench, sweetness and bitterness, harmony and noise are named after the way objects move the nerves; harmony "has driven men so mad that they have believed that God too delights in harmony," and there are philosophers who think that the heavenly motions compose one.

All this shows, Spinoza concludes, that each has judged things according to the disposition of his brain, "or rather has taken the affections of the imagination for things." Since human bodies differ in many respects, what seems good to one seems evil to another, and from these differences come controversy and, finally, scepticism. Everyone repeats the proverbs "So many heads, so many opinions," "everyone abounds in his own sense," "there are no fewer differences of brains than of palates." Such notions "indicate the nature of nothing, but only the constitution of the imagination"; and because they have names, as if they named things existing outside the imagination, Spinoza calls them "beings not of reason but of imagination" (E1App.4 [p. 109]). The scholastics had distinguished real beings from beings of reason (*entia rationis*), such as genera and species, which exist only in the intellect; Spinoza adds a third class, lower than the second, of notions that do not even belong to the intellect.

The analysis is not Spinoza's last word on these notions, and the reader should not take it for a simple relativism. Part II gives an account of the imagination that explains why such notions arise and how they differ from adequate ideas. The Preface to Part IV keeps "good" and "evil" as modes of thinking that compare things with one another, and gives them a use: they are to be defined by reference to a "model of human nature" that we set before ourselves, and Part IV defines them accordingly (Part IV, Defs. 1–2 [p. 355]). Praise and blame are defined in Part III (Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 271]), and merit and sin in Part IV (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]), which recalls the promise made here. What the Appendix denies is that these notions describe things as they are in themselves, apart from their relation to us.

The problem of imperfection

The Appendix ends with the objection from imperfection. If all things have followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, where have so many imperfections come from: corruption to the point of stench, ugliness that moves nausea, confusion, evil, sin? The reply follows from what has just been said. "The perfection of things is to be judged from their nature and power alone; nor are things more or less perfect because they please or offend men's senses, or because they are of use to human nature or are repugnant to it." To those who ask why God did not create all men to be governed by reason alone, Spinoza answers only that God did not lack material to create all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest, "or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed for producing all things that can be conceived by some infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in Prop. 16" (E1App.4 [p. 109]). It is an answer to the problem of evil that declines to be a theodicy: nothing is justified, because nothing was intended.

Does Spinoza reject all purposes?

One question about the Appendix has divided its readers. Spinoza plainly denies that God acts for ends and that natural things exist for ours. But does he also deny that human beings act for ends? The Appendix itself seems to say that they do: "men do all things for the sake of an end, namely for the sake of the advantage they want." Yet two of its arguments, if they are sound, tell against every kind of purposive explanation. If final causes are excluded because everything proceeds by eternal necessity from efficient causes, then a man who raises his hand to shade his eyes is no more acting for an end than an elbow is shaped for the sake of raising the hand; and if teleology inverts the order of nature by explaining a cause through its effect, it does so in the human case as much as in the divine. Jonathan Bennett takes this "radical attack on teleology" seriously and argues that Spinoza needs it, since if human beings were allowed to act purposively Spinoza would have as much reason to ascribe purposes to God as he has to ascribe thought to him; on Bennett's reading, much of Part III is an attempt to give a non-teleological theory of human motivation (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, § 51, pp. 215–216).

Other readers point to the way Spinoza himself redescribes human ends. The Preface to Part IV says that "what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing." When we say that habitation was the final cause of a house, we mean only that a man, imagining the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build one; and this appetite "is really an efficient cause, which is considered as first because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites" (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]). Part IV then defines "the end for the sake of which we do something" as appetite (Part IV, Def. 7 [p. 357]). On this reading Spinoza does not eliminate human purposes but explains them: a purpose is an appetite, and appetite is "nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation" (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]), an efficient cause like any other. What is excluded is the idea that the future state aimed at does the explaining, and the projection of such purposes onto God and nature. The question is not merely verbal, since it decides how the ethics of Parts IV and V, which speaks constantly of what we should seek and of the end of life, is to be read. Appendix D [p. 667] describes how interpreters have answered it.

The Appendix follows. It cites only a handful of propositions (Prop. 16 [p. 65], Props. 21–23 [p. 73] and the corollaries of Prop. 32 [p. 85]) and can be read on its own; but it is meant

to be read after the demonstrations, as an account of why their conclusions meet resistance. With it Part I ends, and Part II turns from God to the nature and origin of the human mind.

Appendix. His Dei naturam, eiusque proprietates explicui, ut quod *necessario existit;*[aq] *quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suae naturae necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant, ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint praedeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis, sive absoluto beneplacito, sed ex absoluta Dei natura, sive infinita potentia*.

Porro ubicumque data fuit occasio, praeiudicia, quae impedire poterant, quominus meae demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi. Sed quia non pauca adhuc restant praeiudicia, quae etiam, imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt, quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operae pretium duxi.
Et quoniam omnia, quae hic indicare suscipio, praeiudicia pendent ab hoc uno, quod scilicet communiter supponant homines, omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere; imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere, pro certo statuant (dicunt enim, Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem, ut ipsum coleret): hoc igitur unum prius considerabo, quaerendo scilicet, primo causam, cur plerique hoc in praeiudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum, deinde eiusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem, quomodo ex hoc orta sint praeiudicia de *bono* et *malo*, *merito* et *peccato*, *laude* et *vituperio*, *ordine* et *confusione*, *pulchritudine* et *deformitate*[ar] et de aliis huius generis.
Verum, haec ab humanae mentis natura deducere, non est huius loci. Satis hic erit, si pro fundamento id capiam, quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso; nempe hoc, quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur, et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quaerendi, cuius rei sunt conscii.
Ex his enim sequitur primo, quod homines se liberos esse opinentur, quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii, et de causis, a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari, nec per somnium cogitant.
Sequitur secundo, homines omnia propter finem agere, videlicet propter utile, quod appetunt. Unde fit, ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant, et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum, quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat, nisi ut ad semet se convertant, et ad fines, a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant; et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario iudicant.

Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media, quae ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant, ut ex. gr. oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces[as] etc., hinc factum, ut omnia

[aq] necessario existit;] *transcr.* necessario existat;. The 1677 edition (OP p. 33), Gebhardt (G II 77) and Bartuschat read 'existit'.
[ar] praeiudicia de *bono* et *malo*, *merito* et *peccato*, *laude* et *vituperio*, *ordine* et *confusione*, *pulchritudine* et *deformitate*] *transcr.* praeiudicia de bono etmalo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate. Word division ('etmalo') corrected; italics as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 34).
[as] The Dutch version has, in place of *etc.*: 'en dus byna met alle andere dingen, van welker naturelijke oorzaaken zy geen oorzaak om te twijffelen hebben' ('and so with almost all other things, about whose natural causes they have no cause to doubt'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 78; Textgestaltung II 354).

Appendix. In the foregoing I have explained the nature of God and its properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature alone; that he is the free cause of all things, and how; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will, or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite power.

Further, wherever the occasion arose, I have taken care to remove prejudices that could prevent my demonstrations from being perceived. But because not a few prejudices still remain which could also prevent, and still can prevent, indeed most of all, men from embracing the concatenation of things in the way I have explained it, I have thought it worth while to summon them here before the judgment of reason.

And since all the prejudices that I undertake to point out here depend on this one, namely that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end, and indeed hold it as certain that God himself directs all things to some definite end (for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship him[101]), I shall therefore consider this one first. I shall ask, first, why most men acquiesce in this prejudice, and why all are by nature so inclined to embrace it; next I shall show its falsity; and finally, how from it have arisen the prejudices about *good* and *evil*, *merit* and *sin*, *praise* and *blame*, *order* and *confusion*, *beauty* and *ugliness*, and others of this kind.

To deduce these things from the nature of the human mind, however, is not the business of this place. It will be enough here if I take as a foundation what must be acknowledged by all: namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek their own advantage, of which they are conscious.

For from these it follows, first, that men think themselves free, since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them.[102]

It follows, second, that men do all things for the sake of an end, namely for the sake of the advantage they want. Hence it comes about that they always want to know only the final causes of things done, and when they have heard them, they are at rest; namely, because they have no further cause for doubt. But if they cannot hear them from another, nothing remains for them but to turn to themselves and reflect on the ends by which they themselves are usually determined to similar things; and so they necessarily judge the temperament of another from their own.

Further, since they find in themselves and outside themselves not a few means that are of no little help in attaining their own advantage, as, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish, etc., it has come about

[101] Maimonides reports the same opinion in nearly these terms and rejects it: 'יחשבו שתכלית המציאות כולו – מציאות מין האדם לבד לעבוד את האלוה' ('they think that the end of all existence is solely the existence of the human species, to worship God'; מורה נבוכים (*Guide of the Perplexed*) III.13). See the essay before the Appendix.

[102] The same analysis of the belief in freedom in Letter 58 [p. 623], to Schuller: 'haec humana illa libertas est, quam omnes habere iactant, et quae in hoc solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitus sint conscii, et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari' ('this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists in this alone, that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined'; VVL[3] III 196). Compare Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181] and Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235].

naturalia tamquam ad suum utile media considerent; et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt, aliquem alium esse, qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt, easdem se ipsas fecisse; sed ex mediis, quae sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt, dari aliquem vel aliquos naturae rectores humana praeditos libertate, qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint.

Atque horum etiam ingenium, quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo iudicare debuerunt; atque hinc statuerunt, deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere, ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur. Unde factum, ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit, ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum caecae illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiae dirigeret.

Atque ita hoc praeiudicium in superstitionem versum et altas[at] in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit, ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere, easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quaesiverunt ostendere, naturam nihil frustra (hoc est, quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse, quam naturam deosque aeque ac homines delirare.
Vide quaeso, quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturae commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terrae motus, morbos etc., atque haec statuerunt propterea evenire, quod dii[au] irati essent ob iniurias sibi ab hominibus factas, sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa; et quamvis experientia in dies reclamaret ac infinitis[av] exemplis ostenderet, commoda atque incommoda piis aeque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato praeiudicio destiterunt.
Facilius enim iis fuit, hoc inter alia incognita, quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic praesentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiae retinere, quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt, deorum iudicia humanum captum longissime superare: quae sane unica fuisset causa, ut veritas humanum genus in aeternum lateret, nisi mathesis, quae non circa fines, sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset.
Et praeter mathesin aliae etiam adsignari possunt causae (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est), a quibus fieri potuit, ut homines communia[aw] haec praeiudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur.

[G II 80] His satis explicui id, quod primo loco promisi. Ut iam autem ostendam, naturam

[at] in superstitionem versum et altas] *transcr.* in superstitionem versum est et altas. The 1677 edition (OP p. 35), Gebhardt (G II 79) and Bartuschat have no 'est'.
[au] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'die zy van een zelfde aart als de hunne oordeelen' ('whom they judge to be of the same nature as their own'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 79; Textgestaltung II 354). Gebhardt takes the passage to have been struck from the Latin out of caution.
[av] reclamaret ac infinitis] *transcr.* reclamaret et infinitis. The 1677 edition (OP p. 35), Gebhardt (G II 79) and Bartuschat read 'ac'.
[aw] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'doch zeer weinig, ten opzicht van 't geheel menschelijk geslacht' ('though very few, in comparison with the whole human race'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 79; Textgestaltung II 355). The parenthesis was struck in the Latin.

that they consider all natural things as means to their own advantage. And because they know that they found these means, and did not provide them, they had cause to believe that there is someone else who provided these means for their use. For after they had considered things as means, they could not believe that these things had made themselves; but from the means that they are accustomed to provide for themselves, they had to conclude that there is some ruler, or some rulers, of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have taken care of all things for them and made all things for their use.

And they had to judge the temperament of these rulers too from their own, since they had never heard anything about it; and hence they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of men, in order to bind men to themselves and to be held by them in the highest honour. Hence it has come about that each has devised, from his own temperament, different ways of worshiping God, so that God might love him above the rest and direct the whole of nature to serve his blind desire and insatiable greed.

And so this prejudice was turned into superstition and struck deep roots in their minds; which was the reason why each strove with the greatest effort to understand and explain the final causes of all things. But while they sought to show that nature does nothing in vain[103] (that is, nothing that is not for the use of men), they seem to have shown only that nature and the gods are as mad as men.

See, I ask you, what the matter has come to in the end! Among so many benefits of nature they had to find not a few harms: storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc.; and they maintained that these happen because the gods are angry on account of wrongs done to them by men, or on account of sins committed in their worship. And although experience protested daily, and showed by infinitely many examples that benefits and harms befall the pious and the impious alike, indiscriminately, they did not on that account give up their inveterate prejudice.

For it was easier for them to put this among other unknown things whose use they did not know, and so to keep their present and innate state of ignorance, than to destroy that whole fabric and devise a new one. Hence they held it as certain that the judgments of the gods far surpass human understanding: which would surely have been the only cause why the truth should have been hidden from the human race to eternity, had not mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, shown men another standard of truth.[104]

And besides mathematics other causes can also be assigned (which it is superfluous to enumerate here) by which it could happen that men noticed these common prejudices and were led to the true knowledge of things.

With this I have sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place. Now to show that

[103] Aristotle's maxim: μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις ('nature does nothing in vain'; *De anima* III.12, 434a31; cf. III.9, 432b21).

[104] *aliam veritatis normam*. Part II supplies it: 'as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false' (Part II, Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]).

finem nullum sibi praefixum habere, et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id iam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis, unde hoc praeiudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi, quam ex prop. 16. et coroll. 1. et 2. prop. 32.,[ax] et praeterea ex iis omnibus, quibus ostendi, omnia naturae aeterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere.

Hoc tamen adhuc addam, nempe, hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat, et contra;[ay] deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius; et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum.
Nam (duobus prioribus omissis, quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex prop. 21.[az] 22. et 23. constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est, qui a Deo immediate producitur, et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res, quae immediate a Deo productae sunt, ea de causa factae essent, ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimae, quarum de causa priores factae sunt, omnium praestantissimae essent.

Deinde haec doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit; nam, si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit, quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici[ba] distinguant inter finem indigentiae et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse; quia nihil ante creationem praeter Deum assignare possunt, propter quod Deus ageret; adeoque necessario fateri coguntur, Deum iis, propter quae media parare voluit, caruisse, eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum.

Nec hic praetereundum est, quod huius doctrinae sectatores, qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi, reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile, sed ad ignorantiam; quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinae argumentandi medium. Nam si ex. gr. ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicuius caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt, lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse; ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiae (saepe enim multae simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt?
Respondebis fortasse, id ex eo, quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt: cur ventus illo tempore flavit? cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas, ventum tum ortum, quia mare praecedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat, et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat; instabunt iterum, quia nullus rogandi finis: cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit?

[ax] The 1677 edition (OP p. 36) reads *Corollario Propositionis 32*, in the singular, and so does the Dutch version (*de Toegift*). Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to *Corollariis*, as do Gebhardt (G II 80; Textgestaltung II 355), who suggests that the two corollaries were originally one, and Bartuschat. Our transcription spells the reference out as *coroll. 1. et 2.*
[ay] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'het geen als een oorzaak, 't welk een gewrocht is' ('what is an effect, as a cause'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 80; Textgestaltung II 355).
[az] ut ex prop. 21.] *transcr.* ut exprop. 21. Word division restored (OP p. 36: 'ex Propositionibus 21. 22. & 23.').
[ba] theologi et metaphysici] *transcr.* theologi et methapysici. Gebhardt prints 'Methapysici', a misprint corrected in his own corrigenda (G II 80 l. 24), which the transcription reproduces; the 1677 edition (OP p. 36) reads 'Metaphysici'.

nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions, there is no need of many words. For I believe that this is already sufficiently established, both from the foundations and causes from which I have shown that this prejudice took its origin, and from Prop. 16 [p. 65] and Cors. 1 [p. 85] and 2 of Prop. 32 [p. 85], and further from all those propositions by which I have shown that all things in nature proceed by a certain eternal necessity and with the highest perfection.

This, however, I shall add, namely that this doctrine about the end entirely overturns nature. For what is in reality a cause it considers as an effect, and conversely; next, it makes what is by nature prior, posterior; and finally, it renders what is supreme and most perfect, most imperfect.

For (passing over the first two, because they are self-evident) as is established from Props. 21 [p. 73], 22 [p. 75] and 23 [p. 75], that effect is most perfect which is produced by God immediately, and the more intermediate causes something needs in order to be produced, the more imperfect it is. But if the things produced immediately by God had been made so that God might attain his end, then the last things, for the sake of which the earlier were made, would necessarily be the most excellent of all.

Next, this doctrine takes away God's perfection; for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something that he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation,[105] they nevertheless confess that God did all things for his own sake, not for the sake of the things to be created; because before creation they can assign nothing except God for whose sake God would act; and so they are necessarily compelled to confess that God lacked the things for whose sake he willed to provide means, and that he desired them, as is self-evident.

Nor should it be passed over here that the followers of this doctrine, who have wished to show off their ingenuity in assigning the ends of things, have introduced a new way of arguing to prove this doctrine of theirs: namely, reduction not to the impossible, but to ignorance; which shows that this doctrine had no other means of argument. For if, for example, a stone has fallen from a roof onto someone's head and killed him, they will demonstrate in this way that the stone fell in order to kill the man: for if it did not fall for that end, by the will of God, how could so many circumstances (for often many concur at once) have concurred by chance?

You will perhaps answer that it happened because the wind was blowing and the man was going that way. But they will insist: why was the wind blowing at that time? Why was the man going that way at that very time? If you answer again that the wind arose then because on the preceding day, while the weather was still calm, the sea had begun to be agitated, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will insist again, since there is no end to asking: but why was the sea agitated? Why was the man invited at that time?

[105] *finis indigentiae*, *finis assimilationis*. Adriaan Heereboord gives the formula of the scholastics: 'Deus omnia fecit propter finem, non indigentiae, sed assimilationis' ('God made all things for an end, not of need but of assimilation'), that is, to make other things like himself by benefiting them (*Meletemata philosophica*, Amsterdam, 1665, Disputationes ex philosophia selectae II, disp. 24, p. 269; quoted by H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1934, I 432).

Et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt, donec ad Dei voluntatem, hoc est, ignorantiae asylum confugeris. Sic etiam, ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo, quod tantae artis causas ignorant, concludunt, eandem[bb] non mechanica, sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari, talique modo constitui, ut una pars alteram non laedat.

Atque hinc fit, ut qui miraculorum causas veras quaerit, quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro haeretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis, quos vulgus tamquam naturae deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt, quod sublata ignorantia[bc] stupor, hoc est, unicum argumentandi, tuendaeque suae auctoritatis medium, quod habent, tollitur.[bd] Sed haec relinquo et ad id, quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo.

[G II 81] Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt, omnia quae fiunt propter ipsos fieri; id in unaquaque re praecipuum iudicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum, et illa omnia praestantissima aestimare, a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones, quibus rerum naturas explicarent, scilicet *bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem* et *deformitatem*;[be] et quia se liberos existimant, inde hae notiones ortae sunt, scilicet *laus* et *vituperium*, *peccatum* et *meritum*.[bf]
Sed has infra, postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne, quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum; quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt.
Et quia ii, qui rerum naturam non intelligunt, nihil de rebus affirmant, sed res tantummodo imaginantur[bg] et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suaeque naturae ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositae, ut, cum nobis per sensus repraesentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas,[bh] si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas, sive confusas esse dicimus.

Et quoniam ea nobis prae ceteris grata sunt, quae facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines

[bb] The 1677 edition (OP p. 37) and Bartuschat read *concludent*. Gebhardt (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355) corrects to *concludunt*, matching *stupescunt*, from the Dutch version (*zo besluiten zij daaruit*), as Leopold and Appuhn had done.
[bc] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of liever botheit' ('or rather stupidity'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355). Gebhardt takes the words to have been struck in the Latin to soften the passage.
[bd] The Dutch version has, in place of *Sed haec relinquo*: 'Doch ik geef aan hen zelven t' oordeelen wat kracht in zodanig redeneren is' ('But I leave it to them to judge what force there is in such reasoning'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355). The margin glosses *redeneren* as *Argumentari*.
[be] scilicet *bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem* et *deformitatem*;] *transcr.* scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem;. Italics restored from the 1677 edition (OP p. 37), which marks the notions under discussion.
[bf] scilicet *laus* et *vituperium*, *peccatum* et *meritum*] *transcr.* scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum. Italics restored from the 1677 edition (OP p. 37).
[bg] non intelligunt, nihil de rebus affirmant, sed res tantummodo imaginantur] *transcr.* non intelligunt, sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant sed res tantummodo imaginantur. The transcription has 'sed res tantummodo imaginantur' twice, conflating two orders. The 1677 edition (OP p. 37) and Bartuschat have it once, after 'affirmant', as printed here; Gebhardt (G II 81; Textgestaltung II 355–356) moves it before 'nihil de rebus affirmant', to repair a disorder he traces to Spinoza's revision of the wording preserved in the Dutch version.
[bh] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'in goede ordening, of' ('in good order, or'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 82; Textgestaltung II 356). That is, 'we say that they are in good order, or well ordered'.

And so they will not cease to ask for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance. So too, when they see the structure of the human body, they are astonished, and because they do not know the causes of so much art, they conclude that it is fashioned not by mechanical but by divine or supernatural art, and constituted in such a way that one part does not injure another.

And hence it comes about that one who seeks the true causes of miracles,[106] and strives to understand natural things as a learned man, and not to wonder at them as a fool, is everywhere held and proclaimed a heretic and impious by those whom the common people worship as interpreters of nature and of the gods. For they know that if ignorance is taken away, astonishment, that is, the only means they have of arguing and of defending their authority, is taken away too. But I leave these things and pass on to what I decided to treat here in the third place.

After men persuaded themselves that everything that happens happens for their sake, they had to judge that the principal thing in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by which they were most agreeably affected. Hence they had to form these notions, by which to explain the natures of things: *good*, *evil*, *order*, *confusion*, *hot*, *cold*, *beauty* and *ugliness*; and because they think themselves free, these notions have arisen: *praise* and *blame*, *sin* and *merit*.

But the latter I shall explain below, after I have treated human nature;[107] the former I shall explain briefly here. Namely, whatever conduces to health and to the worship of God they have called good; what is contrary to these, evil.[108]

And because those who do not understand the nature of things affirm nothing about things, but only imagine them and take the imagination for the intellect, they firmly believe, ignorant of things and of their own nature, that there is order in things. For when things are so disposed that, when they are presented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them and consequently easily remember them, we say that they are well ordered; but if the contrary, that they are badly ordered, or confused.

And since those things are more pleasing to us than others which we can easily imagine, men prefer

[106] Miracles are treated at length in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, ch. 6 ('De miraculis').

[107] Praise and blame are defined in Part III, Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 271]; merit and sin in Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401], which begins by recalling this promise.

[108] Part IV keeps the words: good and evil are 'modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from comparing things with one another', and are defined by reference to a model of human nature (Part IV, Pref. [p. 353]; Def. 1 [p. 355]).

ordinem confusioni praeferunt; quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse, et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt; nisi velint forte, Deum humanae imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo, quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis iniiciet, quod infinita reperiantur, quae nostram imaginationem longe superant, et plurima, quae ipsam propter eius imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis.
Ceterae deinde notiones etiam praeter imaginandi modos, quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt, et tamen ab ignaris tamquam praecipua rerum attributa considerantur; quia, ut iam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt, et rei alicuius naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt, prout ab eadem afficiuntur.

Ex. gr. si motus, quem nervi ab obiectis per oculos repraesentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, obiecta, a quibus causatur, pulchra dicuntur, quae autem contrarium motum cient, deformia. Quae deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel faetida vocant, quae per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc.; quae autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut laevia, etc.

Et quae denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur, quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit, ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi, qui sibi persuaserint, motus coelestes harmoniam componere.

Quae omnia satis ostendunt, unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus iudicasse, vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus), quod inter homines tot, quot experimur, controversiae ortae sint, ex quibus tandem scepticismus.
Nam, quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant, et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est; et sic de ceteris, quibus hic supersedeo, cum quia huius loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt.
Omnibus enim in ore est: quot capita, tot sensus,[bi] suo quemque sensu abundare, non minora cerebrorum, quam palatorum esse discrimina; quae sententiae satis ostendunt, homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus iudicare, resque potius imaginari, quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illae omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.

[G II 83] Videmus itaque omnes notiones,[bj] quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi, nec ullius rei naturam, sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare; et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium, extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis, sed imaginationis voco; atque adeo omnia argumenta, quae contra nos ex

[bi] Terentius, Phormio 454 [Meijer]
[bj] The 1677 edition (OP p. 39) reads *omnes rationes*. Gebhardt (G II 83; Textgestaltung II 356) corrects to *notiones* from the Dutch version (*de kundigheden*, with the marginal gloss 'Notiones'), as Stern had conjectured; Bartuschat follows him.

order to confusion, as if order were something in nature beyond its relation to our imagination; and they say that God has created all things in order, and in this way, without knowing it, attribute imagination to God; unless perhaps they mean that God, providing for human imagination, has disposed all things in the way in which they could most easily imagine them. Nor perhaps will it give them pause that infinitely many things are found which far surpass our imagination, and very many which confuse it on account of its weakness. But enough of this.

Next, the other notions too are nothing but modes of imagining, by which the imagination is affected in various ways; and yet the ignorant consider them the principal attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe that all things have been made for their sake, and they call the nature of a thing good or evil, healthy or rotten and corrupt, according as they are affected by it.

For example, if the motion which the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes conduces to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful, and those which cause the contrary motion, ugly. Those, next, which move the sense through the nostrils they call fragrant or fetid; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless, etc.; and through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.

And finally, those which move the ears are said to produce noise, sound or harmony, the last of which has driven men so mad that they have believed that God too delights in harmony. Nor are there lacking philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions compose a harmony.[109]

All of which shows sufficiently that each has judged things according to the disposition of his brain, or rather has taken the affections of the imagination for things. So it is no wonder (to note this too in passing) that as many controversies as we experience have arisen among men, and from them, finally, scepticism.

For although human bodies agree in many things, they differ in very many, and so what seems good to one seems evil to another; what seems ordered to one, confused to another; what is pleasing to one is displeasing to another; and so of the rest, which I pass over here, both because this is not the place to treat them expressly, and because everyone has experienced this sufficiently. For everyone has these sayings on his lips: 'So many heads, so many opinions', 'everyone abounds in his own sense',[110] 'there are no fewer differences of brains than of palates': which sayings show sufficiently that men judge things according to the disposition of the brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they had understood things, these would all, as mathematics testifies, if not attract them, at least convince them.

We see, therefore, that all the notions by which the common people are accustomed to explain nature are only modes of imagining, and indicate the nature of nothing, but only the constitution of the imagination; and because they have names, as if they were notions of beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings not of reason but of imagination;[111] and so all the arguments

[109] The Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle, who reports and rejects the doctrine that the moving stars produce a harmony (*ἁρμονία*) which we do not notice because we have heard it from birth (*De caelo* II.9, 290b12–291a8).

[110] The first saying recalls Terence, *Phormio* 454: 'Quot homines, tot sententiae' ('So many men, so many opinions'), the identification given in the note to the Latin; the second, the Vulgate of Romans 14:5: 'unusquisque in suo sensu abundet' ('let each abound in his own sense').

[111] *entia non rationis, sed imaginationis*. The *Cogitata Metaphysica* (I.1) had already said of certain modes of thinking that men 'nomina ipsis imposuerunt, tanquam ad significandum entia extra mentem nostram existentia, quae Entia, sive potius Non-entia Entia rationis vocaverunt' ('gave them names, as if to signify beings existing outside our mind, and called these beings, or rather non-beings, beings of reason'; G I 234–235). Here Spinoza traces such notions to the imagination rather than to reason.

similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt.
Solent enim multi sic argumentari: si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimae Dei naturae sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortae?[bk] Videlicet rerum corruptio ad faetorem usque, rerum deformitas, quae nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc.

Sed, ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est aestimanda; nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectae sunt, propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanae naturae conducunt, vel quod eidem repugnant.
Iis autem, qui quaerunt: cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo, quam: quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo: quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut prop. 16. demonstravi.
Haec sunt, quae hic notare suscepi praeiudicia. Si quaedam huius farinae adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.[bl]

[bk] The 1677 edition (OP p. 39) prints *unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura?* without a verb, but supplies *ortae* in its list of errata; the Dutch version has *gesproten*. Van Vloten–Land left it out; Gebhardt (G II 83; Textgestaltung II 356) and Bartuschat print it.
[bl] The Dutch version ends the Appendix with a further clause: 'en dieshalven vind ik geen reden om op deze dingen langer te blijven, enz.' ('and therefore I find no reason to dwell on these things any longer, etc.'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 83; Textgestaltung II 356). Leopold rendered it *itaque nullam invenio causam, ut his rebus diutius insistam etc.*; Gebhardt holds that Spinoza meant the Appendix to end without it.

that are drawn against us from such notions can easily be repelled.

For many are accustomed to argue thus: if all things have followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, where then have so many imperfections in nature come from? For instance, the corruption of things to the point of stench, the ugliness of things that moves nausea, confusion, evil, sin, etc.

But, as I have just said, these are easily refuted. For the perfection of things is to be judged from their nature and power alone; nor are things more or less perfect because they please or offend men's senses, or because they are of use to human nature or are repugnant to it.

But to those who ask why God did not create all men so that they would be governed by the guidance of reason alone, I answer nothing but this: because he did not lack material for creating all things, namely from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were so ample that they sufficed for producing all things that can be conceived by some infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in Prop. 16 [p. 65].

These are the prejudices I undertook to note here. If some of this sort still remain,[112] anyone can correct them with a little meditation.

Cited in 2P16C2 [p. 159], 2P48S [p. 207], 4Pref [p. 351], 4P37S2 [p. 401]

[112] *huius farinae*, literally 'of this flour', a colloquial idiom.

Ethices Pars Secunda
De Natura et Origine Mentis

Second Part of the Ethics
Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Introduction to the Second Part

Part I deduced God and the necessity with which everything follows from him. Part II narrows the field at once. Spinoza will not explain everything that follows from God's essence, for infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways (Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65]), "but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the *human mind* and its highest blessedness" (Preface [p. 121]). The word *beatitudo* points to the end of the book; the promise is redeemed only in Part V (Part V, Prop. 42 [p. 523]). Part II is the first step toward it: a theory of the mind, of knowledge and of error, built on the metaphysics of Part I.

It is also the Part in which the reader first sees what the metaphysics of Part I is for. Substance, attribute and mode were abstract terms; in Part II they become a theory of what a human being is. A human being is a mode of God, and so is the mind, and so is the body, and the relation between the mind and the body is the relation between a mode of thought and a mode of extension. Much of what Part II says about perception, memory, error and knowledge follows from this one thesis, that the mind is the idea of the body. The rest of this introduction explains the problem Spinoza inherited, the doctrine he put in its place, and the theory of knowledge that grows out of it, and points to the places where readers most often go astray.

The problem it inherits

The problem is Descartes'. For Descartes the mind and the body are two created substances, a thinking and an extended one, each with its own principal attribute (*Principles* I.53), really distinct and yet united, so that the mind moves the body and is affected by it through a small gland in the brain. Spinoza returns to this view in the Preface to Part V, where he expresses his astonishment that a philosopher who had resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles should have assumed a hypothesis "more occult than any occult quality."

Part I has already removed the two substances: thought and extension are attributes of the one substance, God (Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]). Part II begins by stating this in form. Prop. 1 [p. 125] argues that "thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing," from the existence of particular thoughts which must be conceived through some attribute, and adds in a scholium that we can conceive an infinite thinking being, since "the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality or perfection we conceive it to contain" (Prop. 1, Schol. [p. 125]). Prop. 2 [p. 125] does the same for extension. A reader who has followed Part I will not be surprised. What is new is the use to which these propositions are put. Mind and body are not two things that need to be joined; they are two modes, of two attributes, of one substance.

The definitions and axioms

The definitions and axioms bring in the vocabulary the rest of the Part needs, and several of them repay attention. A body is "a mode which expresses God's essence, insofar as he is considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate way" (Def. 1 [p. 121]): not a substance, and not a thing that could exist without God. The definition of essence (Def. 2 [p. 121]) adds a reciprocal clause to the traditional one: the essence of a thing is that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, "and which in turn without the thing" can neither be nor be conceived. The addition matters, because without it God, without whom nothing can be or be conceived, would belong to the essence of everything; Spinoza explains the point later (Prop. 10, Cor., Schol. [p. 137]).

An idea is "a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing" (Def. 3 [p. 121]), and the explanation adds: "I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind." Spinoza will insist on this throughout. An idea is not "something mute, like a picture on a panel" (Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]), an image waiting to be judged, but an act of thinking that already affirms or denies something. An adequate idea is one "which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations, of a true idea" (Def. 4 [p. 121]). The definition separates two things that ordinary usage runs together: truth, which is the agreement of an idea with its object (Part I, Ax. 6 [p. 29]), and adequacy, which is a property the idea has in itself. Every adequate idea is true, but the converse is the burden of the second half of the Part.

Duration is "an indefinite continuation of existing" (Def. 5 [p. 123]), indefinite because it cannot be determined by the nature of the existing thing itself. Reality and perfection are the same (Def. 6 [p. 123]), which means that perfection is not a moral or aesthetic grade but a measure of being. And singular things are "things that are finite and have a determinate existence," to which Spinoza adds that several individuals which so concur in one action that all are together the cause of one effect may be considered "as one singular thing" (Def. 7 [p. 123]). The clause prepares the account of composite bodies in the physical digression, and with it the possibility that a human being, a society or the whole of nature may count as one individual.

The axioms include the only empirical premises of the Part. "Man thinks" (Ax. 2 [p. 123]). "We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways" (Ax. 4 [p. 123]). "We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking" (Ax. 5 [p. 123]). Spinoza is sparing with appeals to experience, and these are the ones he allows himself. Another axiom will matter later: modes of thinking such as love and desire are not given unless there is in the same individual an idea of the thing loved or desired, though an idea can be given without any other mode of thinking (Ax. 3 [p. 123]). The idea is the basic mode of thought; the affects of Part III will be ideas of a certain kind.

Ideas in God

Props. 3–6 [p. 125] work out the place of ideas in God. "In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from his essence" (Prop. 3 [p. 125]), and this idea is unique (Prop. 4 [p. 127]). Ideas, considered in their own being as modes of thinking, their "formal being," are caused by God only insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not by the things they are ideas of (Prop. 5 [p. 127]); and in general the modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under that attribute (Prop. 6 [p. 129]). Causation

does not cross from one attribute to another.

The corollary to Prop. 6 draws a consequence that cuts against a long tradition: "the formal being of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God first knew the things; rather, the things that are the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their own attributes in the same way and with the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought" (Prop. 6, Cor. [p. 129]). On the traditional picture, God creates the world according to the ideas in his intellect, as an architect builds according to a plan. Spinoza denies it. Bodies do not follow from God's ideas of them; they follow from extension, as ideas follow from thought. Long before human minds appear, the ground has been taken away from any interaction between mind and body. Part III will say so outright: "The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)" (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235]).

Parallelism and identity

Prop. 7 [p. 129] states the doctrine for which Part II is best known: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." Commentators call it Spinoza's "parallelism"; the word is not his (M. Della Rocca, *Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza*, 1996, p. 19). The demonstration is a single line, an appeal to the axiom that the knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of its cause (Part I, Ax. 4 [p. 29]). As Della Rocca points out, the axiom by itself does not guarantee that every thing has an idea; for that Spinoza needs Prop. 3 [p. 125] (pp. 22–23). The corollary puts the doctrine in terms of power: "God's power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting; that is, whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature, all of it follows objectively in God, in the same order and with the same connection, from the idea of God" (Prop. 7, Cor. [p. 129]). The scholastic pair of "formal" and "objective" being, which Descartes had used in the third *Meditation* (AT VII 40–41), here names the two sides of one order: a thing as it is in itself, and the same thing as it is represented in an idea.

The scholium goes further than the proposition. It recalls that "the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that," and concludes: "So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways" (Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]). The claim is no longer that two series correspond, but that each pair of corresponding items is one thing. Martial Gueroult describes the step as a passage from the identity of the chains to the identity of the things chained, and notes that Prop. 7 is proved by an axiom about knowledge, while the scholium explains by ontological truths why it holds (*Spinoza II: L'âme*, 1974, pp. 85–86). The second half of the scholium then guards the distinction of the attributes: although a circle existing in nature and the idea of that circle are one and the same thing, the idea is to be explained only through other modes of thinking, the circle only through other modes of extension. One thing, two explanations, and no explanation that passes from one attribute to the other.

Prop. 8 [p. 133] adds a doctrine that will be needed in Part V. The ideas of singular things that do not exist are comprehended in God's infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of those things are contained in God's attributes. The scholium gives an illustration, which Spinoza admits cannot be adequate, since the case is unique: in a circle there are infinitely many rectangles formed from the segments of intersecting chords, all equal to one another, and none of them can

be said to exist except insofar as the circle exists; but if two of them are actually drawn, their ideas now exist not only as comprehended in the idea of the circle but also as involving the existence of those rectangles (Prop. 8, Schol. [p. 133]). The distinction between a thing's essence as contained in God's attributes and its existence in duration is the distinction on which Part V's account of the eternity of the mind will turn.

The mind as the idea of the body

Applied to the human being, all this becomes the thesis of Props. 11–13 [p. 139]. "The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing" (Prop. 11 [p. 139]). The mind is therefore "part of the infinite intellect of God," and when we say that the human mind perceives something, "we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea" (Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]). Spinoza expects resistance at this point: readers "will come to a halt and think of many things that give them pause," and he asks them "not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read through everything" (Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 139]). Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the mind must be perceived by the mind (Prop. 12 [p. 141]), and that object is "a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else" (Prop. 13 [p. 141]). The corollary draws the conclusion "that man consists of a mind and a body, and that the human body exists as we feel it" (Prop. 13, Cor. [p. 143]).

The scholium to Prop. 13 makes two remarks that every reader should keep in view. The first is that "the things we have shown so far are very general and pertain no more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate" (Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]). There is an idea in God of every body, and so, in the sense defined, a mind of every body. Jonathan Bennett calls the resulting position panpsychism, and argues that Spinoza is driven to it because, once mind and body are conceptually independent, no line drawn across nature between things that have minds and things that do not could be anything but arbitrary; he adds that this "is not to say that every physical thing has a mind properly so-called, or indeed that it has anything we would recognize as mental" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, § 33, pp. 137–138). The second remark is that minds differ as their bodies do: "the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once." To know what is distinctive about the human mind, then, we must know what is distinctive about the human body, and Spinoza interrupts the propositions at this point to give a brief account of bodies, the physical digression introduced in the essay that follows the scholium.

Imagination, memory and inadequate knowledge

The propositions that follow the physical digression build an account of perception on this foundation. The idea of any way in which the human body is affected by external bodies "must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body" (Prop. 16 [p. 159]), and so "the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies" (Prop. 16, Cor. 2 [p. 159]). When the body is affected in a way that involves the nature of an external body, the mind will regard that body as present until the body is affected in a way that excludes its presence (Prop. 17 [p. 161]), which explains how we can regard as present things that no longer exist. Spinoza calls the affections of

the body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us "images of things," "even though they do not reproduce the figures of things," and when the mind regards bodies in this way he says that it "imagines" (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 161]).

The word "imagination" therefore has a much wider sense in the *Ethics* than in English. It covers sense perception as well as fantasy, and it means every way of perceiving things through the affections of one's own body. Spinoza adds at once that imagination is not in itself an error: "the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error," and the mind errs only insofar as it lacks an idea that excludes the existence of the things it imagines as present. Memory, likewise, is "a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body," which takes place "according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body," and not according to the order of the intellect (Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 165]). The example is memorable. A soldier who sees the tracks of a horse in the sand passes at once from the thought of a horse to that of a horseman, and from there to the thought of war; a farmer passes from the thought of a horse to that of a plough and a field. Each follows the order in which the images were joined in his own body.

The consequences for self-knowledge are severe. The mind does not know the human body, nor that it exists, except through the ideas of the body's affections (Prop. 19 [p. 165]); it does not know itself except insofar as it perceives these ideas (Prop. 23 [p. 169]); it has no adequate knowledge of the parts of its body (Prop. 24 [p. 171]), of external bodies (Prop. 25 [p. 171]), or of the duration of its body or of other things (Props. 30–31 [p. 177]). The conclusion is drawn in the corollary to Prop. 29: whenever the mind "perceives things from the common order of nature," it has "neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies an adequate knowledge, but only a confused and mutilated one" (Prop. 29, Cor. [p. 175]). The scholium adds the qualification on which the rest of the book depends. This holds whenever the mind is determined externally, "from the fortuitous encounter with things," to regard this or that, and not whenever it is determined internally, "from the fact that it contemplates several things at once, to understanding their agreements, differences and oppositions" (Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 175]). There is another way of thinking, and the second half of Part II describes it.

Truth, error and the three kinds of knowledge

The account of truth and error begins with a surprising claim: "All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true" (Prop. 32 [p. 179]), and "there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false" (Prop. 33 [p. 179]). Falsity "consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve" (Prop. 35 [p. 179]). The scholium gives two examples. Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of their causes. And when we look at the sun, "we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us; an error which does not consist in this imagining alone, but in the fact that while we imagine it so, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining" (Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181]). Even when we learn its true distance, we still imagine it near, since the image expresses the way our body is affected by the sun. Error is not a positive thing added to an idea, such as an act of misjudgment; it is an idea that is true as far as it goes but incomplete, taken for complete.

The escape from inadequacy begins with what Spinoza calls common notions. Some things are common to all bodies and are equally in the part and in the whole, and these "can only be conceived adequately" (Prop. 38 [p. 183]), since whatever idea we have of them, from whatever

part of our body, is complete. From such notions, and from the adequate ideas of the properties of things that follow from them, reason proceeds. The second scholium to Prop. 40 [p. 189] then sets out the doctrine of the three kinds of knowledge. The first kind, "opinion, or imagination," comprises knowledge "from random experience," built up from singular things perceived through the senses "in a mutilated, confused way and without order for the intellect," and knowledge from signs, as when we hear or read words and recollect the things they signify. The second kind, "reason," proceeds from common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. The third, "intuitive knowledge," "proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."

Spinoza illustrates the three with a single example. Given three numbers, one is to find a fourth that is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants multiply the second by the third and divide by the first, either because they remember what they were told without demonstration, or because they have often found it so with simple numbers, or because they know the demonstration in Euclid. "But in the simplest numbers none of this is needed. For example, given the numbers 1, 2, 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6," and this more clearly, because from the ratio we see at a glance between the first and the second, we infer the fourth itself. The first kind of knowledge is the only cause of falsity; the second and third are necessarily true (Prop. 41 [p. 189]), and they alone teach us to distinguish the true from the false (Prop. 42 [p. 191]).

Two further theses complete the account. The first is that truth is its own standard. "He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing" (Prop. 43 [p. 191]), for "just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false" (Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]). Spinoza is answering the sceptic's demand for a criterion of truth outside the true idea, which would need a further criterion, and so to infinity. The second is that "it is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity" (Prop. 44, Cor. 2 [p. 197]): reason regards things as necessary, not as contingent, and so as following from the eternal nature of God. Part II ends this line of argument with a claim that may seem breathtaking: "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God" (Prop. 47 [p. 199]). Why then do men not have so clear a knowledge of God as of the common notions? Because they cannot imagine God as they imagine bodies, and because "they have joined the name *God* to the images of things which they are accustomed to see." "And indeed most errors consist in this alone, that we do not apply names to things correctly" (Prop. 47, Schol. [p. 199]).

Will and intellect

Part II ends with two propositions about the will and the longest scholium of the Part. They deny that there is in the mind any absolute or free will, identify each volition with the affirmation or negation that an idea involves, and conclude that "will and intellect are one and the same." The polemical target is Descartes' theory of judgment and error, and the uses Spinoza draws from the doctrine at the end of the scholium sketch the program of the rest of the book. An essay before Prop. 48 [p. 207] introduces them.

Questions the reader will meet

Several features of Part II regularly mislead readers, and it may help to name them in advance.

The first is the word "idea." For Spinoza an idea is an act of thinking that involves affirmation, not a picture or a mental image, and it is not necessarily conscious. The idea that constitutes the

human mind is the idea of the body, but we are not aware of most of what happens in our bodies; Spinoza's claim that whatever happens in the body is "perceived" by the mind (Prop. 12 [p. 141]) uses "perceive" in a sense in which having an idea of something does not mean noticing it. The theory of consciousness that would make this intelligible is one of the least developed parts of the *Ethics*, and the reader should not expect to find it worked out.

The second concerns the other attributes. If each thing is expressed in infinitely many attributes, and there is an idea of each expression, why does the human mind know only the body? Spinoza's reply to Tschirnhaus, which refers back to the scholium to Prop. 7, is that those infinitely many ideas do not constitute one mind but infinitely many, having no connection with one another (Letter 66 [p. 633]). The human mind is the idea of the body, and of nothing else (Prop. 13 [p. 141]).

The third concerns the identity of mind and body. Part III states the outcome of Part II in the words of the scholium to Prop. 7: "the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension" (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]). But how can a mode of extension and a mode of thought be one thing, if neither can be conceived or explained through the other? Della Rocca has argued that the answer lies in the "referential opacity" of explanatory contexts in Spinoza, which lets one and the same thing be explained under one attribute and not under another (1996, ch. 7). Others take the identity less strictly, as a correspondence between two series of modes. The question is important because Spinoza's whole account of the affects depends on it. Appendix C [p. 663] takes up both this question and that of the other attributes.

The fourth is the relation between adequacy and truth. Every idea is true insofar as it is related to God, since in God's intellect it is part of a complete idea; it is inadequate in us because our mind has only a part of that idea. Inadequacy is a matter of what a mind contains, and the same idea can be adequate in God and inadequate in us. This is why Spinoza can say both that all ideas are true and that most of ours are confused.

A last difficulty is the scope of Part II's claims about the human mind. The propositions about imagination and memory describe the mind insofar as it is determined from outside, and they paint a bleak picture. The propositions about common notions and the third kind of knowledge describe the mind insofar as it is determined from within, and they paint a hopeful one. Both are true of every human mind; the question the rest of the *Ethics* asks is how the proportion between them can be changed.

The place of Part II in the whole

The doctrines of Part II carry the rest of the book. Part III will define the affects as affections of the body together with the ideas of those affections, and its account of the passions will rest on the theory of inadequate ideas worked out here. The denial of mind-body interaction allows Spinoza to treat human emotions as natural things, to be understood by their causes like lines, planes and bodies. Part IV's distinction between being led by reason and being led by the affects is the practical form of the distinction between the second kind of knowledge and the first. And Part V's account of the mind's freedom and eternity returns to three propositions of this Part: to Prop. 8 [p. 133] and its corollary on the ideas of things insofar as they are contained in God's attributes, to the third kind of knowledge of Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189], and to the doctrine that reason perceives things under a species of eternity (Prop. 44, Cor. 2 [p. 197]).

The text begins with the Preface, a single sentence that narrows the field from everything that

follows from God to what concerns the human mind, and then with the definitions. As in Part I, they are short and worth reading twice; several of them, above all those of idea and of adequate idea, are not what the reader expects.

Praefatio

[G II 84] Transeo iam ad ea explicanda, quae ex Dei, sive entis aeterni et infiniti essentia necessario debuerunt sequi. Non quidem omnia (infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi P. 1. prop. 16. demonstravimus), sed ea solummodo, quae nos ad *mentis humanae* eiusque summae beatitudinis cognitionem quasi manu ducere possunt.

Definitiones

I. Per *corpus* intelligo modum, qui Dei essentiam, quatenus ut res extensa consideratur, certo et determinato modo exprimit. Vide P. 1. prop. 25. coroll.

II. Ad *essentiam* alicuius rei id pertinere dico, quo dato res necessario ponitur et quo sublato res necessario tollitur; vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.

III. Per *ideam* intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format, propterea quod res est cogitans.

Explicatio. Dico potius conceptum, quam perceptionem, quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur, mentem ab obiecto pati. At conceptus actionem mentis exprimere videtur.

[G II 85] IV. Per *ideam adaequatam* intelligo ideam, quae, quatenus in se sine relatione ad obiectum consideratur, omnes verae ideae proprietates sive denominationes intrinsecas habet.

Explicatio. Dico intrinsecas, ut illam secludam, quae extrinseca est, nempe convenientiam

Preface

I pass now to explaining the things that must necessarily have followed from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being. Not all of them, indeed (for we have demonstrated, Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65], that infinitely many things must follow from it in infinitely many ways), but only those that can lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the *human mind* and its highest blessedness.[113]

Definitions

I. By *body* I understand a mode[114] which expresses God's essence, insofar as he is considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate way. See Part I, Cor. of Prop. 25 [p. 77].
Cited in 2L2D [p. 151], 2L3D [p. 151], 3P2D [p. 235]

II. I say that there pertains to the *essence* of a thing that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing, and which in turn without the thing,[115] can neither be nor be conceived.
Cited in 2P10D [p. 135], 2P37D [p. 183], 2P49D [p. 209]

III. By *idea* I understand a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.
Cited in 2P48S [p. 207]

Explanation. I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind.[116]

IV. By *adequate idea* I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations,[117] of a true idea.
Cited in 4P62D [p. 431], 5P17D [p. 489]

Explanation. I say intrinsic, so as to exclude the one that is extrinsic, namely the agreement of

[113] *summae beatitudinis*. What blessedness is, and that it 'is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself', is the subject of the end of Part V (Part V, Prop. 42 [p. 523]).
[114] A body is a mode, not a substance. For Descartes extension 'constitutes the nature of corporeal substance' (*substantiae corporeae naturam constituit*; *Principles* I.53, AT VIII-1 25); for Spinoza it is an attribute of God, and each body one of its modes (Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]).
[115] The reciprocal clause (*et vice versa*) is Spinoza's addition to the usual definition, which said only that the essence of a thing is that without which it can neither be nor be conceived. He explains the addition in Prop. 10, Cor., Schol. [p. 137]: singular things can neither be nor be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence.
[116] The point returns against those who take an idea to be 'something mute, like a picture on a panel' (Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]; compare Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 211]). In the definition of attribute (Part I, Def. 4 [p. 25]) the intellect *percipit* ('perceives'); there the Dutch version of 1677 has *bevat*, glossed *Concipere* (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 346).
[117] A scholastic term: an intrinsic denomination is a predicate a thing has in itself, an extrinsic one a predicate it has only by relation to something else. The relation in question is named in the Explanation. To Tschirnhaus Spinoza wrote: 'Inter ideam veram et adaequatam nullam aliam differentiam agnosco, quam quod nomen veri respiciat tantummodo convenientiam ideae cum suo ideato, nomen adaequati autem naturam ideae in se ipsa' ('I recognize no other difference between a true and an adequate idea than that the word true looks only to the agreement of the idea with its object, the word adequate to the nature of the idea in itself'; Letter 60, VVL[3] III 199–200).

ideae cum suo ideato.

V. *Duratio* est indefinita existendi continuatio.

Explicatio. Dico indefinitam, quia per ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest, neque etiam a causa efficiente, quae scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.

VI. Per *realitatem* et *perfectionem* idem intelligo.

VII. Per *res singulares* intelligo res, quae finitae sunt et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individua[bm] in una actione ita concurrant, ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.

Axiomata

I. Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam, hoc est, ex naturae ordine tam fieri potest, ut hic et ille homo existat, quam ut non existat.

II. Homo cogitat.[bn]

III. Modi cogitandi, ut amor, cupiditas, vel quicumque nomine affectus animi insigniuntur, non dantur nisi in eodem individuo detur idea rei amatae, desideratae, etc. At idea dari potest, quamvis nullus alius detur cogitandi modus.

[G II 86] IV. Nos corpus quoddam multis modis affici sentimus.

V. Nullas res singulares[bo] praeter corpora et cogitandi modos sentimus, nec percipimus.
Postulata vide post prop. 13.

[bm] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of bezonderen' ('or particulars'), glossed *Singularia* in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 85; Textgestaltung II 357).

[bn] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of anders, wy weten dat wy denken' ('or otherwise, we know that we think'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 85; Textgestaltung II 357), where he also notes that the Dutch translator's marginal Latin terms here are misplaced.

[bo] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of niets van de genatuurde natuur' ('or nothing of *Natura naturata*'), with *Natura naturata* in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 86; Textgestaltung II 357).

the idea with its object.

V. *Duration* is an indefinite continuation of existing.[118]

Explanation. I say indefinite, because it can by no means be determined through the very nature of the existing thing, nor even by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.

VI. By *reality* and *perfection* I understand the same thing.[119]
Cited in 4Pref [p. 351], 5P35D [p. 513], 5P40D [p. 521]

VII. By *singular things* I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if several individuals so concur in one action that all are together the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.[120]

Axioms

I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man exists, or that he does not exist.
Cited in 2P10D [p. 135], 2P11D [p. 139], 2P30D [p. 177]

II. Man thinks.[121]
Cited in 2P11D [p. 139]

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the name of affects of the mind,[122] are not given unless there is in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But an idea can be given though no other mode of thinking is given.
Cited in 2P11D [p. 139], 2P49D [p. 209]

IV. We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways.
Cited in 2P13D [p. 141]

V. We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking.
For the postulates, see after Prop. 13 [p. 141].
Cited in 2P13D [p. 141]

[118] Contrast eternity (Part I, Def. 8 [p. 27]), which cannot be explained by duration even if the duration is conceived without beginning or end. The *Cogitata Metaphysica* had defined duration as 'attributum, sub quo rerum creatarum existentiam, prout in sua actualitate perseverant, concipimus' ('the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality'; I.4, G I 244).
[119] The Preface to Part IV returns to this definition and explains it: we refer all individuals in nature to one most general genus, the notion of being, and compare them in reality or perfection under it (Part IV, Pref. [p. 351]).
[120] The composite individual is defined in the physics that follows Prop. 13 (Definition after Ax. 2 [p. 153]).
[121] Put as an axiom, and in the third person, where Descartes reached his first certainty in the first person: 'Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum' ('I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind'; *Meditations* II, AT VII 25). Compare the earlier form preserved in Dutch (note to the Latin).
[122] *affectus animi*. The affects are defined in Part III, Def. 3 [p. 231].

Propositiones

Propositio I

Cogitatio *attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res cogitans.*

Demonstratio. Singulares cogitationes sive haec et illa cogitatio modi sunt, qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimunt (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.). Competit ergo Deo (per defin. 5. P. 1.) attributum, cuius conceptum singulares omnes cogitationes involvunt, per quod etiam concipiuntur. Est igitur cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, quod Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit (vide defin. 6. P. 1.), sive Deus est res cogitans. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Patet etiam haec propositio ex hoc, quod nos possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere. Nam quo plura ens cogitans potest cogitare, eo plus realitatis sive perfectionis idem continere concipimus. Ergo ens, quod infinita infinitis modis cogitare potest, est necessario virtute cogitandi infinitum. Cum itaque ad solam cogitationem attendendo ens infinitum concipiamus, est necessario (per defin. 4.et 6. P. 1.) cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, ut volebamus.

Propositio II

Extensio *attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res extensa.*

[G II 87] Demonstratio. Huius eodem modo procedit, ac demonstratio praeced. prop.

Propositio III

In Deo datur necessario idea tam eius essentiae, quam omnium, quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.

Demonstratio. Deus enim (per prop. 1. huius) infinita infinitis modis cogitare, sive (quod idem est per prop. 16. P. 1.) ideam suae essentiae et omnium, quae necessario ex ea sequuntur, formare potest. Atqui omne id, quod in Dei potestate est, necessario est (per prop. 35. P. 1.). Ergo datur necessario talis idea, et (per prop. 15. P. 1.) non nisi in Deo. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Vulgus per Dei potentiam intelligit Dei liberam voluntatem et ius in omnia quae sunt, quaeque propterea communiter ut contingentia considerantur. Deum enim potestatem omnia destruendi habere dicunt et in nihilum redigendi. Dei porro potentiam cum potentia

Propositions

Proposition I

Thought *is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.*
Cited in 2P2D [p. 125], 2P3D [p. 125], 2P20D [p. 167]

Demonstration. Singular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express God's nature in a certain and determinate way (by Cor. of Prop. 25, Part I [p. 77]). There pertains to God, therefore (by Def. 5, Part I [p. 25]), an attribute whose concept all singular thoughts involve, and through which they are also conceived. Thought, therefore, is one of God's infinite attributes, which expresses God's eternal and infinite essence (see Def. 6, Part I [p. 27]), or God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition is also evident from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality or perfection we conceive it to contain. Therefore a being that can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways is necessarily infinite in its power of thinking. Since, therefore, attending only to thought, we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (by Defs. 4 [p. 25] and 6, Part I [p. 27]) one of God's infinite attributes, as we wished.

Proposition II

Extension *is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.*

Demonstration. The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding proposition [p. 125].

Proposition III

In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from his essence.[123]
Cited in 2P5D [p. 127], 2P9CD [p. 135], 2P20D [p. 167], 2P24D [p. 171], 5P22D [p. 503], 5P35D [p. 513]

Demonstration. For God (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 125]) can think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways, or (what is the same, by Prop. 16, Part I [p. 65]) can form the idea of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from it. But all that is in God's power[124] necessarily is (by Prop. 35, Part I [p. 91]). Therefore there is necessarily such an idea, and (by Prop. 15, Part I [p. 49]) only in God. Q.E.D.

Scholium. By God's power the common people understand God's free will and his right over all things that are, which are therefore commonly considered as contingent. For they say that God has the power to destroy all things and reduce them to nothing. Further, they very often

[123] The idea of God was Spinoza's example of an infinite mode of thought in Part I, Prop. 21, Dem. [p. 73]; Prop. 4 [p. 127] shows that it is unique.
[124] *in Dei potestate*: on *potestas*, see the note on Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67].

regum saepissime comparant.
Sed hoc in coroll. 1. et 2. prop. 32. P. 1. refutavimus; et prop. 16. P. 1. ostendimus, Deum eadem necessitate agere, qua se ipsum intelligit; hoc est, sicuti ex necessitate divinae naturae sequitur (sicut omnes uno ore statuunt), ut Deus se ipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur, ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde prop. 34. P. 1. ostendimus, Dei potentiam nihil esse, praeterquam Dei actuosam essentiam; adeoque tam nobis impossibile est concipere, Deum non agere, quam Deum non esse.

Porro si haec ulterius persequi liberet, possem hic etiam ostendere,[bp] potentiam illam, quam vulgus Deo affingit, non tantum humanam esse (quod ostendit Deum hominem, vel instar hominis a vulgo concipi), sed etiam impotentiam involvere. Sed nolo de eadem re toties sermonem instituere.
Lectorem solummodo iterum atque iterum rogo, ut quae in P. 1. ex prop. 16. usque ad finem de hac re dicta sunt, semel atque iterum perpendat. Nam nemo ea quae volo percipere recte poterit, nisi magnopere caveat, ne Dei potentiam cum humana regum potentia vel iure confundat.

Propositio IV

[G II 88] *Idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest.*

Demonstratio. Intellectus infinitus nihil praeter Dei attributa eiusque affectiones comprehendit (per prop. 30. P. 1.). Atqui Deus est unicus (per coroll. 1. prop. 14. P. 1.). Ergo idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest. Q. E. D.

Propositio V

Esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, pro causa agnoscit et non, quatenus alio attributo explicatur; hoc est, tam Dei attributorum, quam rerum singularium ideae non ipsa ideata sive res perceptas pro causa efficiente agnoscunt, sed ipsum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans.[bq]

Demonstratio. Patet quidem ex prop. 3. huius. Ibi enim concludebamus, Deum ideam suae

[bp] The 1677 edition (OP p. 43) and Bartuschat repeat *ulterius* here. Gebhardt (G II 87; Textgestaltung II 357) corrects the second *ulterius* to *etiam*, from the Dutch version (*ik zou hier ook konnen tonen*); Meijer, Baensch and Appuhn delete it, which the Dutch *ook* ('also') forbids.

[bq] The Dutch version of 1677 gives the proposition in an earlier form: 'God, voor zo veel hy alleenlijk als een denkende zaak aangemerkt word, is oorzaak van 't vormelijk wezen der denkbeelden; maar niet voor zo veel hy door een andere toeëigening uitgedrukt en verklaart word: dat is, God alleen, voor zo veel hy een denkende zaak is, en niet de voorwerpen der denkbeelden, zijn de werkende oorzaak van alle denkbeelden, zo wel die Gods toeëigeningen, als die de bezondere dingen uitdrukken' ('God, insofar as he is considered only as a thinking thing, is the cause of the formal being of ideas, but not insofar as he is expressed and explained by another attribute; that is, God alone, insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not the objects of the ideas, is the efficient cause of all ideas, both those that express God's attributes and those that express singular things'). Gebhardt gives it in his Textgestaltung (II 357–358), not in his text.

compare God's power with the power of kings.
But we have refuted this in Cors. 1 [p. 85] and 2 of Prop. 32, Part I [p. 85]; and in Prop. 16, Part I [p. 65] we have shown that God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself; that is, just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all maintain with one voice) that God understands himself, with the same necessity it also follows that God does infinitely many things in infinitely many ways. Next, in Prop. 34, Part I [p. 91] we have shown that God's power is nothing but God's active essence;[125] and so it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as that God does not exist.
Further, if it pleased me to pursue this matter further, I could also show here that the power which the common people ascribe to God is not only human (which shows that God is conceived by the common people as a man, or like a man), but also involves lack of power. But I do not wish to speak about the same thing so often.
I only ask the reader again and again to weigh, once and again, what has been said on this matter in Part I from Prop. 16 [p. 65] to the end. For no one will be able to perceive rightly the things I intend unless he takes great care not to confuse God's power with the human power or right of kings.

Proposition IV

The idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be unique.

Demonstration. The infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God's attributes and his affections (by Prop. 30, Part I [p. 83]). But God is unique (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 14, Part I [p. 47]). Therefore the idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be unique. Q.E.D.

Proposition V

The formal being of ideas[126] *admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of God's attributes and of singular things admit as their efficient cause not the objects themselves, or the things perceived, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.*

Demonstration. This is evident from Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 125]. For there we concluded

[125] *actuosam essentiam*: *actuosus*, 'full of activity', a rare word, chosen to say that God's essence is itself activity, not a capacity that may or may not be exercised.
[126] *esse formale idearum*: the being an idea has in its own right, as a mode of thinking, as distinct from its objective being, the being of what it represents (see the note on *formaliter* and *obiective* at Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]). The proposition denies that the object of an idea is its cause.

essentiae et omnium, quae ex ea necessario sequuntur, formare posse ex hoc solo, nempe quod Deus est res cogitans, et non ex eo, quod sit suae ideae obiectum. Quare esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans, pro causa agnoscit.
Sed aliter hoc modo demonstratur. Esse formale idearum modus est cogitandi (ut per se notum), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.) modus, qui Dei naturam, quatenus est res cogitans, certo modo exprimit, adeoque (per prop. 10. P. 1.) nullius alterius attributi Dei conceptum involvit, et consequenter (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) nullius alterius attributi, nisi cogitationis, est effectus. Adeoque esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio VI

[G II 89] *Cuiuscumque attributi modi Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cuius modi sunt, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent.*

Demonstratio. Unumquodque enim attributum per se absque alio concipitur (per prop. 10. P. 1.). Quare uniuscuiusque attributi modi conceptum sui attributi, non autem alterius involvunt; adeoque (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cuius modi sunt, et non, quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod esse formale rerum, quae modi non sunt cogitandi, non sequitur ideo ex divina natura, quia res prius cognovit; sed eodem modo eademque necessitate res ideatae ex suis attributis consequuntur et concluduntur, ac ideas ex attributo cogitationis consequi ostendimus.

Propositio VII

Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum.

Demonstratio. Patet ex axiom. 4. P. 1. Nam cuiuscumque causati idea a cognitione causae, cuius est effectus, dependet.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod Dei cogitandi potentia aequalis est ipsius actuali agendi

that God can form the idea of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from it from this alone, namely that God is a thinking thing, and not from his being the object of his idea. So the formal being of ideas admits God as a cause insofar as he is a thinking thing.
But it is demonstrated otherwise in this way. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 25, Part I [p. 77]), a mode which expresses God's nature, insofar as he is a thinking thing, in a certain way, and so (by Prop. 10, Part I [p. 39]) involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by Ax. 4, Part I [p. 29]) is the effect of no other attribute except thought. And so the formal being of ideas admits God as a cause insofar as he is considered only as a thinking thing, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition VI

The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other.
Cited in 2P9D [p. 135], 2L3D [p. 151], 2P45D [p. 197], 3P2D [p. 235], 3P11S [p. 249], 4P7D [p. 365], 4P29D [p. 389]
Cited in Letters 64 [p. 629]

Demonstration. For each attribute is conceived through itself without any other (by Prop. 10, Part I [p. 39]). So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but not of another; and so (by Ax. 4, Part I [p. 29]) they have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that the formal being of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from the divine nature because God first knew the things;[127] rather, the things that are the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their own attributes in the same way and with the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.
Cited in 2P36D [p. 181], 5P1D [p. 473]

Proposition VII

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.[128]
Cited in 2P8D [p. 133], 2P9D [p. 135], 2P9CD [p. 135], 2P15D [p. 159], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P20D [p. 167], 2P24D [p. 171], 2P25D [p. 171], 2P26D [p. 173], 3P11D [p. 247], 3P12D [p. 251], 5P1D [p. 473]

Demonstration. This is evident from Ax. 4, Part I [p. 29]. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.[129]

Corollary. From this it follows that God's power of thinking is equal to his actual power of

[127] The order of explanation in which things are what they are because they exist first, objectively, in God's intellect is the one Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67] described on the hypothesis that intellect belongs to God's nature. Here it is set aside: bodies follow from extension as ideas follow from thought.
[128] The doctrine is usually called Spinoza's 'parallelism'; the word is the commentators', not his. M. Della Rocca warns that it should not be taken to exclude what the Scholium [p. 131] asserts, that a mode of extension and its idea are one and the same thing (*Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza*, 1996, p. 19).
[129] As Della Rocca observes, the axiom gives only that wherever there is an idea of an effect there is an idea of its cause on which it depends; that there is an idea of every thing at all needs Prop. 3 [p. 125] (1996, pp. 22–23).

potentiae; hoc est, quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo obiective.

[G II 90] Scholium. Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus; nempe, quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiae essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet; et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae iam sub hoc, iam sub illo attributo comprehenditur.
Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa; quod quidam Hebraeorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt, Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Ex. gr. circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis, quae etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res, quae per diversa attributa explicatur.
Et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis, sive sub attributo cogitationis, sive sub alio quocumque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem, hoc est, easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus.
Nec ulla alia de causa[br] dixi, quod Deus sit causa ideae ex. gr. circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans, et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa, nisi quia esse formale ideae circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum, tanquam causam proximam, et ille iterum per alium, et sic in infinitum, potest percipi, ita ut, quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturae sive causarum connexionem, per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus; et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturae per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet, et idem de aliis attributis intelligo.

Quare rerum, ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa, quatenus infinitis constat attributis; nec impraesentiarum haec clarius possum explicare.

[br] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'te voren' ('before'): 'nor did I say before for any other reason'. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 90; Textgestaltung II 358).

acting; that is, whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature, all of it follows objectively in God, in the same order and with the same connection, from the idea of God.

Cited in 2P32D [p. 179], 2P36D [p. 181], 2P38D [p. 183], 2P39D [p. 183], 3P28D [p. 269], 5P1D [p. 473]

Scholium. Before we proceed further, we must recall here what we have shown above:[130] namely, that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently that the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that.

So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways;[131] which some of the Hebrews seem to have seen as if through a cloud, those, namely, who maintain that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same.[132] For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes.

And therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, that is, that the same things follow one another.

Nor did I say for any other reason that God is the cause of the idea of, for example, a circle insofar only as he is a thinking thing, and of the circle insofar only as he is an extended thing, than this: that the formal being of the idea of the circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that one again through another, and so on to infinity; so that as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of thought alone; and insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone; and I understand the same of the other attributes.

So God is really the cause of things as they are in themselves[133] insofar as he consists of infinite attributes; and for the present I cannot explain these matters more clearly.

Cited in 2P8D [p. 133], 2P12S [p. 141], 2P21S [p. 167], 3P2S [p. 235]

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[130] In Part I, Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 39] and Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]. The phrase 'as constituting an essence of substance' repeats the definition of attribute (Part I, Def. 4 [p. 25]).

[131] *duobus modis*. The word could be read technically, 'in two modes'; Della Rocca argues that on that reading the 'one and the same thing' would have no place in Spinoza's ontology, being neither a mode of extension nor a mode of thought, and reads 'ways' (1996, pp. 119–120).

[132] Maimonides: כבר ידעת פרסום זה המאמר אשר אמרוהו הפילוסופים באלוה ית׳, והוא אמרם שהוא השכל והמשכיל והמושכל,׳ ושאלו השלשה ענינים בו ית׳ הם ענין אחד, אין רבוי בו׳ ('You already know how well known is the saying of the philosophers about God, may he be exalted, that he is the intellect, the one who understands, and what is understood, and that these three are in him one thing, with no multiplicity in it'; מורה נבוכים (*Guide of the Perplexed*) I.68). So both H. A. Wolfson (*The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1934, II 24–27) and M. Gueroult (*Spinoza II: L'âme*, 1974, p. 85 n. 74). Gueroult explains the reserve of 'as if through a cloud': for those philosophers the identity is that of the intellect with its inner objects, founded on the identity of God's essence and his intellect, which Spinoza rejects; for Spinoza it is that of an idea with a thing of another attribute.

[133] Tschirnhaus asked why, if each thing is expressed in infinitely many attributes, the human mind perceives only extension and thought. Spinoza's reply refers back to this scholium: 'quamvis unaquaeque res infinitis modis expressa sit in infinito Dei intellectu, illae tamen infinitae ideae, quibus exprimitur, unam eandemque rei singularis mentem constituere nequeunt; sed infinitas' ('although each thing is expressed in infinitely many ways in God's infinite intellect, the infinitely many ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinitely many'; Letter 66 [p. 633], G IV 280; VVL[3] III 207–208).

Propositio VIII

Ideae rerum singularium sive modorum non existentium ita debent comprehendi in Dei infinita idea, ac rerum singularium sive modorum essentiae formales in Dei attributis continentur.

[G II 91] Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex praeced., sed intelligitur clarius ex praeced. schol.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod, quamdiu res singulares non existunt, nisi quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, earum esse obiectivum sive ideae non existunt, nisi quatenus infinita Dei idea existit; et ubi res singulares dicuntur existere, non tantum quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, sed quatenus etiam durare dicuntur, earum ideae etiam existentiam, per quam durare dicuntur, involvent.

Scholium. Si quis ad uberiorem huius rei explicationem exemplum desideret, nullum sane dare potero, quod rem, de qua hic loquor, utpote unicam adaequate explicet; conabor tamen rem, ut fieri potest,[bs] illustrare.
Nempe circulus talis est naturae, ut omnium linearum rectarum in eodem sese invicem secantium rectangula sub segmentis sint inter se aequalia. Quare in circulo infinita inter se aequalia rectangula continentur.
Attamen nullum eorum potest dici existere, nisi quatenus circulus existit, nec etiam alicuius horum rectangulorum idea potest dici existere, nisi quatenus in circuli idea comprehenditur. Concipiantur iam ex infinitis illis duo tantum, nempe E et D existere. Sane eorum etiam ideae iam non tantum existunt, quatenus solummodo in circuli idea comprehenduntur; sed etiam quatenus illorum rectangulorum existentiam involvunt, quo fit, ut a reliquis reliquorum rectangulorum ideis distinguantur.

[bs] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'met een voorbeelt' ('by an example'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 91; Textgestaltung II 358).

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 629], 65 [p. 633], 66 [p. 633]

Proposition VIII

The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God's infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God's attributes.[134]

Cited in 3P11S [p. 249]

Demonstration. This proposition is evident from the preceding one [p. 129], but it is understood more clearly from the preceding scholium [p. 131].

Corollary. From this it follows that, as long as singular things do not exist except insofar as they are comprehended in God's attributes, their objective being, or ideas, do not exist except insofar as God's infinite idea exists; and when singular things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are comprehended in God's attributes, but insofar also as they are said to endure, their ideas also will involve existence, through which they are said to endure.

Cited in 2P9D [p. 135], 2P11D [p. 139], 2P15D [p. 159], 2P45D [p. 197], 3P11S [p. 249], 5P21D [p. 503], 5P23D [p. 503]

Scholium. If anyone desires an example for a fuller explanation of this matter, I shall certainly not be able to give one that adequately explains the thing I am speaking of here, since it is unique. I shall nevertheless try to illustrate the matter as far as possible.

Namely, the circle is of such a nature that the rectangles formed from the segments of all the straight lines intersecting one another in it are equal to one another.[135] So in a circle there are contained infinitely many rectangles equal to one another.

Yet none of them can be said to exist except insofar as the circle exists, nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist except insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Now conceive that of those infinitely many only two exist, namely E and D. Certainly their ideas also now exist not only insofar as they are merely comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles, which brings it about that they are distinguished from the other ideas of the other rectangles.

Cited in 2P9D [p. 135], 3P11S [p. 249]

[134] The essences of things that do not now exist are contained in the attributes, and their ideas in the idea of God. The doctrine returns in Part V, where there is in God 'an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity' (Part V, Prop. 22 [p. 503]).

[135] Euclid III.35: ἐὰν ἐν κύκλῳ δύο εὐθεῖαι τέμνωσιν ἀλλήλας, τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς μιᾶς τμημάτων περιεχόμενον ὀρθογώνιον ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας τμημάτων περιεχομένῳ ὀρθογωνίῳ ('if in a circle two straight lines cut one another, the rectangle contained by the segments of the one is equal to the rectangle contained by the segments of the other'; *Elements* III.35, Heiberg). Spinoza's *rectangula sub segmentis* has troubled editors: Meijer, Baensch and Appuhn emend to *facta ex* (or *a*) *segmentis*; Gebhardt keeps the text and reconstructs a fuller first wording from the Dutch (Textgestaltung II 358).

Propositio IX

Idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur, cuius etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alia tertia affectus est, et sic in infinitum.

[G II 92] Demonstratio. Idea rei singularis actu existentis modus singularis cogitandi est et a reliquis distinctus (per coroll. et schol. prop. 8. huius); adeoque (per prop. 6. huius) Deum, quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (per prop. 28. P. 1.) quatenus est res absolute cogitans, sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur,[bt] et huius etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alio affectus est, et sic in infinitum.

Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (per prop. 7. huius) idem est, ac ordo et connexio causarum. Ergo unius singularis ideae alia idea sive Deus, quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa, et huius etiam, quatenus alia affectus est, et sic in infinitum. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Quicquid in singulari cuiuscumque ideae obiecto contingit, eius datur in Deo cognitio, quatenus tantum eiusdem obiecti ideam habet.

Demonstratio. Quicquid in obiecto cuiuscumque ideae contingit, eius datur in Deo idea (per prop. 3. huius), non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (per prop. praeced.), sed (per prop. 7. huius) ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum. Erit ergo cognitio eius, quod in singulari aliquo obiecto contingit, in Deo, quatenus tantum eiusdem obiecti habet ideam. Q. E. D.

Propositio X

Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiae, sive substantia formam hominis non constituit.

Demonstratio. Esse enim substantiae involvit necessariam existentiam (per prop. 7. P. 1.). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertineret[bu] esse substantiae, data ergo substantia daretur necessario homo (per defin. 2. huius), et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (per axiom. 1. huius) est absurdum. Ergo etc. Q. E. D.

[bt] Gebhardt (G II 92; Textgestaltung II 359) inserts *definito* here and *definito cogitandi modo* after the second *alio*, from the Dutch version (*met een andere bepaalde wijze van denken*, glossed *Modus definitus cogitandi*); the 1677 edition (OP p. 48) and Bartuschat lack them. The Dutch version also has, in its first redaction, 'van 't welk God ook oorzaak is', whence *et huius etiam Deus est causa*, which Van Vloten–Land supplied for the bare *et hujus etiam* of the 1677 edition and which Gebhardt and Bartuschat print.

[bu] The 1677 edition (OP p. 48) reads *pertinet*, and the Dutch version *behoort*. Gebhardt (G II 92; Textgestaltung II 359), with Meijer and Baensch, corrects to *pertineret*, to match *daretur*; so also Bartuschat.

Proposition IX

The idea of a singular thing actually existing has God for its cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing actually existing, of which God is also the cause insofar as he is affected by another, third idea, and so on to infinity.
Cited in 2P9CD [p. 135], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P20D [p. 167], 2P24D [p. 171], 2P25D [p. 171], 3P1D [p. 233]

Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing actually existing is a singular mode of thinking, distinct from the others (by Cor. [p. 133] and Schol. of Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 133]); and so (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 129]) it has God for its cause insofar as he is only a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. 28, Part I [p. 79]) insofar as he is a thing thinking absolutely, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another mode of thinking; and of this too God is the cause insofar as he is affected by another, and so on to infinity.
But the order and connection of ideas (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore the cause of one singular idea is another idea, or God insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea, and of this too, insofar as he is affected by another, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Whatever happens in the singular object of any idea, there is knowledge of it in God only insofar as he has the idea of that object.
Cited in 2P12D [p. 141], 2P13D [p. 141], 2P30D [p. 177], 3P10D [p. 247]

Demonstration. Whatever happens in the object of any idea, there is an idea of it in God (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 125]), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing (by the preceding Prop. [p. 135]); but (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore knowledge of what happens in some singular object will be in God only insofar as he has the idea of that object. Q.E.D.

Proposition X

The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.[136]
Cited in 2P10C [p. 137]

Demonstration. For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by Prop. 7, Part I [p. 33]). So if the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, then, substance being given, man would necessarily be given (by Def. 2 of this Part [p. 121]), and consequently man would exist necessarily, which (by Ax. 1 of this Part [p. 123]) is absurd. Therefore etc. Q.E.D.

[136] *forma*, in the scholastic sense, that which makes a thing what it is. Against Descartes, for whom the human mind is a thinking substance; for Spinoza the human being is constituted by modes of God's attributes (Cor. [p. 137]).

[G II 93] Scholium. Demonstratur etiam haec propositio ex prop. 5. P. 1. nempe quod duae eiusdem naturae substantiae non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id, quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substantiae. Patet praeterea haec propositio ex reliquis substantiae proprietatibus, videlicet, quod substantia sit sua natura infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc., ut facile unusquisque videre potest.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus. Nam esse substantiae[bv] (per prop. praeced.) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (per prop. 15. P. 1.) aliquid quod in Deo est, et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest, sive (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.) affectio sive modus, qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.

Scholium. Omnes sane concedere debent, nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est, quod Deus omnium rerum, tam earum essentiae, quam earum existentiae, unica est causa, hoc est, Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri (ut aiunt), sed etiam secundum esse.
At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicuius rei pertinere dicunt, sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere, vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt, vel, quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cuius rei causam fuisse credo, quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam, quam ante omnia contemplari debebant, quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam,[bw] et res, quae sensuum obiecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt. Unde factum est, ut, dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint, quam de divina natura, et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint, quam de primis suis figmentis, quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant, utpote quae ad cognitionem divinae naturae nihil iuvare poterant; adeoque nihil mirum, si sibi passim contradixerint.

Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit,[bx] causam reddere, cur non dixerim, id ad essentiam alicuius rei pertinere, sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest, nimirum, quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi; et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet; sed id necessario essentiam alicuius rei constituere dixi, quo dato res ponitur et quo sublato res tollitur, vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa id, quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.

[bv] The 1677 edition (OP p. 49) runs the demonstration on without a heading; Gebhardt (G II 93; Textgestaltung II 359) inserts *Demonstratio* here, after the Dutch version's *Betoging*.

[bw] quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam] *transcr.* quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est ordine cognitionis, ultimam. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 93; Textgestaltung II 359), Van Vloten–Land and Bartuschat, and as the Dutch version confirms ('om dat zy zo wel in ordening van kennis, als in ordening van natuur de voorgang heeft, in ordening van kennis de leste'); the 1677 edition, which the transcription follows, has the comma after 'cognitionis'.

[bx] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'niet zo zeer hen tegen te spreken, als wel' ('not so much to contradict them as'): 'my intention was not so much to contradict them as to give the reason'. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 94; Textgestaltung II 359).

Scholium. This proposition is also demonstrated from Prop. 5, Part I [p. 31], namely that there are not two substances of the same nature. Now since several men can exist, that which constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. This proposition is evident, moreover, from the other properties of substance, namely that substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as anyone can easily see.

Corollary. From this it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of God's attributes. For the being of substance (by the preceding Prop. [p. 135]) does not pertain to the essence of man. It is therefore (by Prop. 15, Part I [p. 49]) something which is in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God, or (by Cor. of Prop. 25, Part I [p. 77]) an affection or mode which expresses God's nature in a certain and determinate way.
Cited in 2P11D [p. 139], 4P29D [p. 389]

Scholium. Everyone, surely, must grant that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For it is acknowledged by all that God is the only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is the cause of things not only according to their coming to be (as they say), but also according to their being.[137]
But meanwhile most people say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived; and so they believe either that the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things, or that created things can be or be conceived without God, or, what is more certain, they are not sufficiently consistent with themselves. The cause of this, I believe, was that they did not keep to the order of philosophizing.[138] For the divine nature, which they ought to have contemplated before all things, since it is prior both in knowledge and in nature, they believed to be last in the order of knowledge, and the things that are called objects of the senses to be prior to all. Hence it came about that, while they contemplated natural things, there was nothing they thought about less than the divine nature, and when afterwards they applied their minds to contemplating the divine nature, there was nothing they could think about less than their first fictions, on which they had built the knowledge of natural things, since these could be of no help to the knowledge of the divine nature; and so it is no wonder if they have contradicted themselves everywhere.
But I let this go. For my intention here was only to give the reason why I did not say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived: namely, because singular things cannot be or be conceived without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence. Rather, I said that that necessarily constitutes the essence of a thing which, being given, the thing is posited, and which, being taken away, the thing is taken away;

[137] *secundum fieri ... secundum esse*: the scholastic distinction between a cause of a thing's coming to be and a cause of its being; compare *causa essendi* in Part I, Prop. 24, Cor. [p. 77].
[138] The *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* asks that 'our mind, in order to reproduce the pattern of nature completely, should produce all its ideas from the idea that represents the origin and source of the whole of nature' (*debeat omnes suas ideas producere ab ea, quae refert originem et fontem totius naturae*; §42, G II 17). Descartes had reached God only in the Third Meditation, after the senses had been doubted and the thinking self found.

Propositio XI

[G II 94] *Primum, quod actuale mentis humanae esse constituit, nihil aliud est, quam idea rei alicuius singularis actu existentis.*

Demonstratio. Essentia hominis (per coroll. prop. praeced.) a certis Dei attributorum modis constituitur; nempe (per axiom. 2 huius) a modis cogitandi, quorum omnium (per axiom. 3. huius) idea natura prior est, et ea data reliqui modi (quibus scilicet idea natura prior est) in eodem debent esse individuo (per axiom. 3. huius).[by] Atque adeo idea primum est, quod humanae mentis esse constituit.

At non idea rei non existentis; nam tum (per coroll. prop. 8. huius) ipsa idea non posset dici existere. Erit ergo idea rei actu existentis. At non rei infinitae. Res namque infinita (per prop. 21. et 22. P. 1.)[bz] debet semper necessario existere. Atqui hoc (per axiom. 1. huius) est absurdum. Ergo primum, quod esse humanae mentis actuale constituit, est idea rei singularis actu existentis. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei. Ac proinde cum dicimus, mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Deus, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam humanae mentis explicatur, sive quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam; et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere, non tantum, quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit, sed quatenus simul cum mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus mentem humanam rem ex parte sive inadaequate percipere.

[G II 95] Scholium. Hic sine dubio lectores haerebunt, multaque comminiscentur, quae moram iniiciant; et hac de causa ipsos rogo, ut lento gradu mecum pergant, nec de his iudicium ferant, donec omnia perlegerint.

[by] The 1677 edition (OP p. 50) and the Dutch version cite *Axiom. 4.*; Van Vloten–Land correct to *per idem Axioma*, and Gebhardt (G II 94; Textgestaltung II 359–360) and Bartuschat print *Axiom. 3.*, the axiom that fits. W. Meijer rejected the correction.

[bz] The 1677 edition (OP p. 50) and the Dutch version cite *Prop. 21. & 23.*; Van Vloten–Land, Gebhardt (G II 94; Textgestaltung II 360) and Bartuschat read *22*.

or that without which the thing, and in turn which without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

Proposition XI

The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing.

Cited in 2P12D [p. 141], 2P13D [p. 141], 2P20D [p. 167], 2P48D [p. 207], 3P2D [p. 235], 3P3D [p. 241], 3P10D [p. 247], 3GDAEx [p. 339], 4P37D [p. 397], 5P9D [p. 481], 5P38D [p. 517]

Demonstration. The essence of man (by the Cor. of the preceding Prop. [p. 137]) is constituted by certain modes of God's attributes, namely (by Ax. 2 of this Part [p. 123]) by modes of thinking, of all of which (by Ax. 3 of this Part [p. 123]) the idea is prior in nature, and, the idea being given, the other modes (to which, that is, the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by Ax. 3 of this Part [p. 123]). And so an idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of a human mind.

But not the idea of a thing that does not exist; for then (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 133]) the idea itself could not be said to exist. It will therefore be the idea of a thing actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by Props. 21 [p. 73] and 22, Part I [p. 75]) must always exist necessarily. But this (by Ax. 1 of this Part [p. 123]) is absurd. Therefore the first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is the idea of a singular thing actually existing. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God.[139] And therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has, together with the human mind, the idea of another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially, or inadequately.[140]

Cited in 2P12D [p. 141], 2P13D [p. 141], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P22D [p. 169], 2P23D [p. 169], 2P24D [p. 171], 2P30D [p. 177], 2P34D [p. 179], 2P38D [p. 183], 2P39D [p. 183], 2P40D [p. 185], 2P43D [p. 191], 2P43S [p. 191], 3P1D [p. 233], 3P28D [p. 269], 5P36D [p. 515]

Scholium. Here, no doubt, readers will come to a halt and think of many things that give them pause; and for this reason I ask them to proceed slowly with me, and not to pass judgment on these matters until they have read through everything.

[139] Compare the end of Part V: our mind, insofar as it understands, 'is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on to infinity; so that all together constitute God's eternal and infinite intellect' (Part V, Prop. 40, Schol. [p. 521]).

[140] The first account of inadequate knowledge: an idea in the human mind is inadequate when God has it not only insofar as he constitutes this mind but insofar as he also has the idea of something else, which this mind does not contain. The account is applied in Props. 24–31 [p. 171].

Propositio XII

Quicquid in obiecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, id ab humana mente debet percipi, sive eius rei dabitur in mente necessario idea: hoc est, si obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere, quod a mente non percipiatur.[ca]

Demonstratio. Quicquid enim in obiecto cuiuscumque ideae contingit, eius rei datur necessario in Deo cognitio (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), quatenus eiusdem obiecti idea affectus consideratur, hoc est (per prop. 11. huius), quatenus mentem alicuius rei constituit. Quicquid igitur in obiecto ideae humanam mentem constituentis contingit, eius datur necessario in Deo cognitio, quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) eius rei cognitio erit necessario in mente, sive mens id percipit. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec propositio patet etiam et clarius intelligitur ex schol. prop. 7. huius, quod vide.

Propositio XIII

[G II 96] *Obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, sive certus extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud.*

Demonstratio. Si enim corpus non esset humanae mentis obiectum, ideae affectionum corporis non essent in Deo (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), quatenus mentem nostram, sed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11 huius), ideae affectionum corporis non essent in nostra mente. Atqui (per axiom. 4. huius) ideas affectionum corporis habemus. Ergo obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, idque (per prop. 11. huius) actu existens.

Deinde, si praeter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis obiectum, cum nihil (per prop. 36. P. 1.) existat, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (per prop. 12 huius)[cb] necessario alicuius eius effectus idea in mente nostra dari. Atqui (per axiom. 5. huius) nulla eius idea datur. Ergo obiectum nostrae mentis est corpus existens, et nihil aliud. Q. E. D.

[ca] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of zonder dat daar af een denkbeelt in de ziel is' ('or without there being an idea of it in the mind'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 95; Textgestaltung II 360).

[cb] The 1677 edition (OP p. 52) and the earlier editions, including Van Vloten–Land, read *Prop. 11.*; the Dutch version has *de twaalfde*, and Gebhardt (G II 96; Textgestaltung II 360) and Bartuschat read *12*.

Proposition XII

Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body that is not perceived by the mind.

Cited in 2P13D [p. 141], 2P14D [p. 159], 2P17D [p. 161], 2P17CD [p. 161], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P21D [p. 167], 2P22D [p. 169], 2P38D [p. 183], 3P2S [p. 235], 4P7D [p. 365], 5P4D [p. 475]

Demonstration. For whatever happens in the object of any idea, there is necessarily knowledge of it in God (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]) insofar as he is considered to be affected by the idea of that object, that is (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), insofar as he constitutes the mind of some thing. Whatever happens, therefore, in the object of the idea constituting the human mind, there is necessarily knowledge of it in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), knowledge of the thing will necessarily be in the mind, or the mind perceives it. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition is also evident, and is understood more clearly, from Schol. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 131], which see.

Proposition XIII

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else.

Cited in 2A5 [p. 123], 2P15D [p. 159], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P21D [p. 167], 2P21S [p. 167], 2P23D [p. 169], 2P24D [p. 171], 2P26D [p. 173], 2P29D [p. 175], 2P38D [p. 183], 2P39D [p. 183], 3Post1 [p. 233], 3P3D [p. 241], 3P10D [p. 247], 3P17S [p. 255], 3P51D [p. 295], 3GDAEx [p. 339], 4P39D [p. 405], 5P23D [p. 503], 5P29D [p. 507]

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 629]

Demonstration. For if a body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]) insofar as he constitutes our mind, but insofar as he constitutes the mind of another thing; that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in our mind. But (by Ax. 4 of this Part [p. 123]) we have ideas of the affections of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, and it (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) actually existing.

Next, if besides a body there were also something else that was the object of the mind, then, since nothing exists (by Prop. 36, Part I [p. 93]) from which some effect does not follow, there would necessarily (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 141]) have to be in our mind an idea of some effect of it. But (by Ax. 5 of this Part [p. 123]) there is no idea of it. Therefore the object of our mind is an

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur *hominem mente et corpore constare, et corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere.*

Scholium. Ex his non tantum intelligimus, mentem humanam unitam esse corpori, sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adaequate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit, nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adaequate cognoscat.

Nam ea, quae hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt, nec magis ad homines, quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quae omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt. Nam cuiuscumque rei datur necessario in Deo idea, cuius Deus est causa, eodem modo, ac humani corporis ideae:[cc] atque adeo, quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cuiuscumque rei idea necessario dicendum est.

Attamen nec etiam negare possumus, ideas inter se ut ipsa obiecta differre, unamque alia praestantiorem esse, plusque realitatis continere, prout obiectum unius obiecto alterius praestantius est, plusque realitatis continet; ac propterea ad determinandum, quid mens humana reliquis intersit, quidque reliquis praestet, necesse nobis est, eius obiecti, ut diximus, hoc est, corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum, nec id ad ea quae demonstrare volo necesse est.

Hoc tamen in genere dico, quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo eius mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum; et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent, et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo eius mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his praestantiam unius mentis prae aliis cognoscere possumus; deinde causam etiam videre, cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem, et alia plura, quae in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operae pretium esse duxi, haec ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est, pauca de *natura corporum* praemittere.

[cc] The 1677 edition (OP p. 52) reads *idea*; Gebhardt (G II 96; Textgestaltung II 360), with the Dutch version (*als van het denkbeelt*), Meijer, Baensch and Appuhn, corrects to *ideae*; so also Bartuschat.

existing body, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that *man consists of a mind and a body, and that the human body exists as we feel it.*

Cited in 2P17S [p. 161]

Scholium. From these things we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body.[141] But no one will be able to understand it adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of our body.

For the things we have shown so far are very general and pertain no more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate.[142] For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body; and so whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must necessarily be said of the idea of any thing.

But still, we cannot deny either that ideas differ among themselves as the objects themselves do, and that one is more excellent than another and contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent than the object of the other and contains more reality; and therefore, to determine how the human mind differs from the others and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. I can neither explain this here, nor is it necessary for the things I wish to demonstrate.

I say this, however, in general: that the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once; and the more the actions of one body depend on itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in acting, the more its mind is capable of understanding distinctly.[143] And from these things we can know the excellence of one mind over others, and also see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things which I shall deduce from these in what follows. For this reason I have thought it worth while to explain and demonstrate these very things more accurately, for which it is necessary to premise a few things concerning *the nature of bodies*.

Cited in 3P57D [p. 307]

[141] For Descartes the union of two substances, taught by nature: 'me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum et quasi permixtum' ('I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it'; *Meditations* VI, AT VII 81). For Spinoza the union is that of an idea with its object; the Preface to Part V attacks Descartes' account of it through the pineal gland (Part V, Pref. [p. 469]).

[142] *animata*, 'ensouled'. The claim follows from the generality of the preceding propositions: since there is an idea in God of every thing, every thing has, in Spinoza's terms, a mind, though minds differ as their bodies differ in excellence (next sentences).

[143] M. Della Rocca notes an asymmetry here: to know the degree of reality of a mind we must know that of its body, but not conversely, although parallelism by itself is symmetrical (*Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza*, 1996, pp. 21–22).

The Physical Digression

At this point the numbered propositions of Part II stop, and a short treatise on bodies takes their place: axioms, lemmas and postulates about motion and rest, about composite bodies, and about the human body. A reader may well wonder why a Part on the mind should turn to physics. The answer lies in the scholium to Prop. 13 [p. 143], which has just drawn the consequence of the preceding propositions: the human mind is the idea of the human body, and what has been shown of it holds of the idea of any thing, for all individuals are "animate," though in different degrees. What distinguishes one mind from another can therefore be learned only from what distinguishes its body: "the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once." To make use of this, Spinoza needs some account of bodies, and he gives one, briefly and, as he says, not as a treatise on body for its own sake (Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155]). The pages that follow are compressed and unadorned, and their purpose is easy to lose sight of; it may help to see in advance what they contain and what the rest of the *Ethics* takes from them.

The plan of the digression

The section has two axioms, three lemmas with a corollary, three more axioms and a definition, four more lemmas with a scholium, and six postulates about the human body. It has no propositions of its own and is often called the "physical digression," though it is not a digression in the argument; the propositions that follow it depend on it throughout. It falls into three parts. The first concerns the simplest bodies, which differ from one another only in motion and rest; the second, composite bodies, or individuals, and the conditions under which they keep their nature; the third, the human body in particular. The order is the order of the *Ethics* as a whole, which proceeds from what is general to what concerns human beings, and from simple things to complex ones.

The simplest bodies

"All bodies are either in motion or at rest," and "each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly" (Axioms 1–2 [p. 151]). On these two axioms Spinoza builds three lemmas. "Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance" (Lemma 1 [p. 151]): there is only one substance, and extension is indivisible, so whatever makes one body this body and not another must be a difference in its modes. "All bodies agree in certain things" (Lemma 2 [p. 151]), namely that they involve the concept of one attribute and that they can move more slowly or more quickly, or be at rest. And a body in motion or at rest "must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity" (Lemma 3 [p. 151]), the physical counterpart of Part I, Prop. 28 [p. 79].

The corollary to Lemma 3 states a principle of persistence: "a body in motion moves until it is determined to rest by another body, and … a body at rest also remains at rest until it is determined to motion by another" (Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151]). Descartes had made the same principle his first law of nature: each thing, "quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseveret" ("as far as is in it, always perseveres in the same state," *Principles* II.37). The phrase *quantum in se est* will

return, applied to all things, in the proposition of Part III that states the striving of each thing to persevere in its being (Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]). The principle of inertia, in other words, is the physical form of the doctrine on which Spinoza's whole psychology rests.

A second group of axioms follows. The first states that "all the ways in which a body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body," so that the same body is moved differently by different bodies, and different bodies are moved differently by the same body (Axiom 1 [p. 153]). This axiom will be cited more often than anything else in the digression, since it is the ground of the doctrine that our ideas of external bodies involve the nature of our own body as well as theirs (Prop. 16 [p. 159]). The second is the law of reflection, with a diagram in the first edition: a body in motion that strikes another at rest which it cannot move is reflected, and the angle of reflection equals the angle of incidence (Axiom 2 [p. 153]).

Spinoza took a serious interest in the physics of his day. In a letter to Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, he corrected a misunderstanding: he had not said that almost all of Descartes' rules of motion were false; it was Christiaan Huygens who thought so, and he himself held only the sixth of Descartes' rules to be false, adding that he thought Huygens mistaken about it too (Letter 32 [p. 611]; VVL[3] III 122). The digression does not enter into such questions. It takes from physics only what the theory of the mind will need.

Composite bodies

The second part concerns composite bodies, and its central notion is the definition placed after the second group of axioms. "When a number of bodies, of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or, if they move with the same or with different degrees of speed, so that they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio, we shall say that those bodies are *united with one another*, and that all together compose *one body, or individual*, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies" (Definition [p. 153]). The form of an individual is thus not a substantial form, as in the scholastic philosophy, nor a mere aggregate of parts, but a pattern: a fixed ratio of motion and rest among the parts. An axiom adds that parts which lie upon one another over large surfaces are harder to displace, and on this Spinoza bases the distinction between hard, soft and fluid bodies (Axiom 3 [p. 153]).

Lemmas 4–7 [p. 153] draw the consequences for identity through change. If some of the bodies composing an individual are separated from it, and as many others of the same nature take their place, the individual "will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form" (Lemma 4 [p. 153]). It keeps its nature if its parts grow or shrink in proportion, so that they keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another (Lemma 5 [p. 155]); if they turn their motions in another direction while continuing to communicate them in the same ratio (Lemma 6 [p. 155]); and whether the whole moves or is at rest, "provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before" (Lemma 7 [p. 155]). What makes a body the same body over time is not the persistence of its matter, which is continually replaced, but the persistence of the ratio by which its parts are united.

The doctrine has a famous application in Part IV. There Spinoza defines the good and the bad for the human body by the same ratio: "Those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved are good; and on the contrary, those are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a

different ratio of motion and rest to one another" (Part IV, Prop. 39 [p. 405]). The scholium draws a startling consequence. A body dies when its parts take on a different ratio of motion and rest, and this can happen while the blood still circulates. "For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse." Spinoza tells of a Spanish poet who, after an illness, so forgot his past life that he did not believe the plays he had written were his own, and asks what we should say of infants, whose nature an old man can hardly believe was ever his (Part IV, Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 405]). The identity of a human being is the identity of a pattern, and patterns can be lost before matter falls apart.

The whole of nature as one individual

The scholium to Lemma 7 builds a hierarchy on these foundations. An individual composed of the simplest bodies can be affected in many ways and keep its nature. An individual composed of individuals of different natures can be affected in many more ways, since each of its parts can move more slowly or more quickly without change of its nature. A third kind of individual, composed of these, can be affected in still more ways; "and if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinitely many ways, without any change of the whole individual" (Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155]).

The same picture appears in a letter to Oldenburg of 1665 (Letter 32 [p. 611]). A worm living in the blood would take each particle of blood for a whole and could not know how all the parts are governed by the nature of the blood as a whole; we are in the same position with respect to the universe, and "every body, insofar as it exists modified in a certain way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe" (VVL^3 III 120–121). Letter 64 [p. 629] names, as the mediate infinite mode of extension, "the face of the whole universe, which, although it varies in infinite ways, nevertheless remains always the same" (VVL^3 III 206), and refers the reader to this very scholium. The end of the scholium to Lemma 7 thus connects the physics of Part II with the metaphysics of Part I: the whole of nature, considered under the attribute of extension, is one individual whose form is preserved through all the changes of its parts, and this individual is the mediate infinite mode of extension.

The human body

The postulates bring the account down to the human body. "The *human body* is composed of very many individuals (of different natures), each of which is highly composite" (Postulate 1 [p. 157]). Some of these are fluid, some soft and some hard (Postulate 2 [p. 157]). The human body is affected by external bodies in very many ways (Postulate 3 [p. 157]); it "needs, in order to be preserved, very many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated" (Postulate 4 [p. 157]); and it "can move external bodies in very many ways, and arrange them in very many ways" (Postulate 6 [p. 157]).

Each of these postulates has work to do. The complexity of the human body explains why its mind is capable of perceiving many things at once, and why it can form ideas of what many bodies have in common. The need for other bodies is the physical root of the doctrine of Part IV that nothing is more useful to a human being than other human beings. And the fifth postulate prepares the theory of memory and imagination: "When a fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body so that it frequently strikes another, soft part, it changes the surface of that part and impresses on it, as it were, certain traces of the external body that drives it" (Postulate 5 [p. 157]). These traces explain how the mind can imagine as present things that

are absent (Prop. 17 [p. 161]), and how one image recalls another with which it was once joined (Prop. 18 [p. 163]). Spinoza's physiology was that of his time, and the details do not matter. What matters is the principle: memory and imagination are the mind's awareness of changes in its body, and they follow the order of those changes, not the order of the intellect.

What the digression makes possible

On these few premises Props. 14–31 [p. 159] build an account of sense perception, imagination, memory and the association of ideas, and of why the human mind's knowledge of its own body, of external bodies and of itself is, in the common order of nature, inadequate. But the digression also contains the seed of the remedy. Lemma 2 [p. 151] says that all bodies agree in certain things, and these common properties, which are "equally in the part and in the whole," can only be conceived adequately (Prop. 38 [p. 183]). The same holds of what is common and proper to the human body and to the external bodies by which it is usually affected (Prop. 39 [p. 183]). These are the common notions on which reason is built. The physics of the digression thus supplies both the explanation of our confusion and the foundation of our knowledge.

Later Parts return to the digression more than once. Part III restates two of its postulates in its own: the human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, a postulate which, Spinoza says, "rests on Post. 1 and Lemmas 5 and 7" (Part III, Post. 1 [p. 233]); and it can undergo many changes and still retain the traces of objects (Part III, Post. 2 [p. 233]). Part IV defines good and evil for the body by the ratio of motion and rest, as we have seen. Part V's account of the eternity of the mind ends with the thesis that "he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal" (Part V, Prop. 39 [p. 519]), which returns to the principle stated in the scholium to Prop. 13: minds differ as their bodies differ in what they can do and suffer.

How to read it

The digression should be read as a sketch. Spinoza says so himself: if it had been his intention to treat of body expressly, he would have had to explain and demonstrate these matters more fully, but he brings them forward only because he can easily deduce from them what he has decided to demonstrate (Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155]). The reader need not decide whether the physics is correct, and should not expect from it the precision of Descartes' or Huygens' laws of collision. Its function is to supply a notion of the individual that does not depend on substance, a principle of persistence, and a theory of bodily traces, and these the later Parts use.

The Dutch version of 1677 preserves a slightly fuller form of these pages. In the scholium to Lemma 7 Spinoza says that he would have had to explain and demonstrate these matters more fully had it been his intention to treat expressly "of matter, or" of body, "and in particular"; the Latin drops the words. In the demonstration of Lemma 6 the Dutch adds a cross-reference to the definition before Lemma 4, which the Latin gives instead in the demonstration of Lemma 7, where the Dutch has "this also is evident." Gebhardt takes these to be the traces of Spinoza's later revision.

When the text resumes, the axioms, lemmas and postulates follow one another with little comment, and a first reading need not master them all. The propositions that follow draw above all on the postulates about the human body and on the first axiom after Lemma 3 [p. 153]: all the ways in which a body is affected by another follow from the nature of the affected body and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body. The account of composite individuals

returns later. Part III restates two of the postulates in its own (Part III, Post. 1 [p. 233]), and in Part IV the preservation of the ratio of motion and rest among the parts of the human body becomes the measure of what is good or evil for it (Part IV, Prop. 39 [p. 405]).

[G II 97] Axioma I. Omnia corpora vel moventur, vel quiescunt.

Axioma II. Unumquodque corpus iam tardius, iam celerius movetur.

Lemma I. Corpora ratione motus et quietis, celeritatis et tarditatis, et non ratione substantiae ab invicem distinguuntur.

Demonstratio. Primam partem huius per se notam suppono. At, quod ratione substantiae non distinguantur corpora, patet tam ex prop. 5. quam 8. P. 1.; sed clarius ex iis, quae in schol. prop. 15. P. 1. dicta sunt.

[G II 98] Lemma II. Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt.

Demonstratio. In his enim omnia corpora conveniunt, quod unius eiusdemque attributi conceptum involvunt (per defin. 1. huius); deinde, quod iam tardius, iam celerius, et absolute iam moveri, iam quiescere possunt.

Lemma III. Corpus motum vel quiescens ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum.

Demonstratio. Corpora (per defin. 1. huius) res singulares sunt, quae (per lem. 1.) ratione motus et quietis ab invicem distinguuntur; adeoque (per prop. 28. P. 1.) unumquodque ad motum vel quietem necessario determinari debuit ab alia re singulari, nempe (per prop. 6. huius) ab alio corpore, quod (per axiom. 1.) etiam vel movetur, vel quiescit. At hoc etiam (per eandem rationem) moveri, vel quiescere non potuit, nisi ab alio ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuisset, et hoc iterum (per eandem rationem) ab alio, et sic in infinitum. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur corpus motum tamdiu moveri, donec ab alio corpore ad quiescendum determinetur; et corpus quiescens tamdiu etiam quiescere, donec ab alio ad motum determinetur. Quod etiam per se notum est.
Nam cum suppono, corpus ex. gr. A quiescere, nec ad alia corpora mota attendo, nihil de corpore A dicere potero, nisi quod quiescat. Quod si postea contingat, ut corpus A moveatur, id sane evenire non potuit ex eo, quod quiescebat; ex eo enim nil aliud sequi poterat, quam ut corpus A quiesceret. Si contra supponatur A moveri, quotiescumque ad A tantum attendimus, nihil de eodem affirmare poterimus, nisi quod moveatur. Quod si postea contingat, ut A quiescat, id

Axiom I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
Cited in 2L3D [p. 151]

Axiom II. Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly.

Lemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.
Cited in 2L3D [p. 151], 2L4D [p. 155]

Demonstration. The first part of this I suppose to be self-evident. But that bodies are not distinguished by reason of substance is evident both from Prop. 5 [p. 31] and from Prop. 8 of Part I [p. 35]; but more clearly from what was said in Schol. of Prop. 15, Part I [p. 49].

Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain things.
Cited in 2P37 [p. 183], 2P38C [p. 183], 5P4D [p. 475]

Demonstration. For all bodies agree in this, that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by Def. 1 of this Part [p. 121]); and next, that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and absolutely, now move, now be at rest.[144]

Lemma III. A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity.
Cited in 3P51D [p. 295], 3P57D [p. 307]

Demonstration. Bodies (by Def. 1 of this Part [p. 121]) are singular things, which (by Lemma 1 [p. 151]) are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest; and so (by Prop. 28, Part I [p. 79]) each must necessarily have been determined to motion or rest by another singular thing, namely (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 129]) by another body, which (by Ax. 1 [p. 151]) is also either in motion or at rest. But this too (by the same reasoning) could not have been in motion or at rest unless it had been determined to motion or rest by another, and this again (by the same reasoning) by another, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that a body in motion moves until it is determined to rest by another body, and that a body at rest also remains at rest until it is determined to motion by another.[145] This is also self-evident.
For when I suppose that a body, for example A, is at rest, and do not attend to other bodies in motion, I shall be able to say nothing about body A except that it is at rest. If afterwards it happens that body A moves, that certainly could not come about from the fact that it was at rest; for from that nothing else could follow than that body A should be at rest. If, on the contrary, A is supposed to move, then as often as we attend only to A, we shall be able to affirm nothing of

[144] What all bodies have in common will be the ground of the 'common notions', which are adequately known (Props. 37–38 [p. 183], which cite this lemma).
[145] Descartes' first law of nature: 'unamquamque rem, quatenus est simplex et indivisa, manere, quantum in se est, in eodem semper statu, nec unquam mutari nisi a causis externis' ('each thing, insofar as it is simple and undivided, remains, as far as is in it, always in the same state, and is never changed except by external causes'; *Principles* II.37, AT VIII-1 62). The phrase *quantum in se est* returns in Spinoza's *conatus* (Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]).

sane evenire etiam non potuit ex motu, quem habebat; ex motu enim nihil aliud sequi poterat, quam ut A moveretur. Contingit itaque a re, quae non erat in A, nempe a causa externa, a qua ad quiescendum determinatum fuit.[cd]

[G II 99] Axioma I. Omnes modi, quibus corpus aliquod ab alio afficitur corpore, ex natura corporis affecti et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur; ita ut unum idemque corpus diversimode moveatur pro diversitate naturae corporum moventium, et contra ut diversa corpora ab uno eodemque corpore diversimode moveantur.

Axioma II. Cum corpus motum alteri quiescenti, quod dimovere nequit, impingit, reflectitur, ut moveri pergat, et angulus lineae motus reflectionis cum plano corporis quiescentis, cui impegit, aequalis erit angulo, quem linea motus incidentiae cum eodem plano efficit.[ce]

Atque haec de corporibus simplicissimis, quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur, iam ad composita ascendamus.[cf]

Definitio. Cum corpora aliquot eiusdem aut diversae magnitudinis a reliquis ita coercentur, ut invicem incumbant, vel si eodem aut diversis celeritatis gradibus moventur, ut motus suos invicem certa quadam ratione communicent, illa *corpora invicem unita* dicemus, et omnia simul *unum corpus, sive individuum* componere, quod a reliquis per hanc corporum unionem distinguitur.

[G II 100] Axioma III. Quo partes individui vel corporis compositi secundum maiores vel minores superficies sibi invicem incumbunt, eo difficilius vel facilius cogi possunt, ut situm suum mutent, et consequenter eo difficilius vel facilius effici potest,[cg] ut ipsum individuum aliam figuram induat. Atque hinc corpora, quorum partes secundum magnas superficies invicem incumbunt, *dura*, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, *mollia*, et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, *fluida*[ch] vocabo.

Lemma IV. Si corporis sive individui, quod ex pluribus corporibus componitur, quaedam corpora

[cd] Gebhardt (G II 99; Textgestaltung II 360) inserts *Corpus motum A* before *ad quiescendum*, from the Dutch version (*van de welke het bewoge lighaam A tot te rusten is bepaalt*, with the marginal glosses *Corpus motum*, *Ad quiescendum*, *Determinatum*); the 1677 edition (OP p. 55) lacks it.

[ce] The 1677 edition (OP p. 55) prints a diagram beside this axiom: a line striking a plane and reflected at the same angle.

[cf] simplicissimis, quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur, iam ad composita ascendamus] *transcr. simplicissimis, quae scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur, iam ad composita* ascendamus. Italics overrun removed; the 1677 edition (OP p. 55) sets the sentence in roman.

[cg] The 1677 edition (OP p. 56) has the second pair in the reverse order, *eò facilius, vel difficilius*. Gebhardt (G II 100; Textgestaltung II 360) inverts it from the Dutch version (*zwarelijker of lichtelijker*) to match the first, as Meijer and Baensch had proposed without the Dutch.

[ch] *dura*, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, *mollia*, et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, *fluida*] *transcr. dura, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, mollia, et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, fluida*. Italics restricted to the three terms, as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 56).

it except that it moves. If afterwards it happens that A is at rest, that certainly could not come about from the motion it had either; for from the motion nothing else could follow than that A should move. It happens therefore from a thing which was not in A, namely from an external cause, by which it was determined to rest.

Axiom I. All the ways in which a body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the body affected[146] and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body; so that one and the same body is moved in different ways according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it, and, conversely, different bodies are moved in different ways by one and the same body.
Cited in 2P16D [p. 159], 2P24D [p. 171], 3P17S [p. 255], 3P51D [p. 295], 3P57D [p. 307]

Axiom II. When a body in motion strikes another at rest which it cannot move, it is reflected so as to continue moving, and the angle of the line of the motion of reflection with the plane of the body at rest which it struck will be equal to the angle which the line of the motion of incidence makes with the same plane.

So much, then, for the simplest bodies, which are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness; let us now ascend to composite bodies.
Cited in 2P17CD [p. 161]

Definition. When a number of bodies, of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or, if they move with the same or with different degrees of speed, so that they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio,[147] we shall say that those bodies are *united with one another*, and that all together compose *one body, or individual*, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies.
Cited in 2L4D [p. 155], 2P24D [p. 171], 4P39D [p. 405]

Axiom III. The greater or smaller the surfaces by which the parts of an individual, or composite body, lie upon one another, the more difficult or the easier it is to compel them to change their position, and consequently the more difficult or the easier it is to bring it about that the individual itself takes on another shape. And from this I shall call bodies whose parts lie upon one another over large surfaces *hard*, those whose parts lie upon one another over small surfaces *soft*, and those whose parts move among themselves *fluid*.

Lemma IV. If from a body, or individual, which is composed of several bodies, certain bodies

[146] The axiom is used in Prop. 16 [p. 159]: the idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the external body as well as that of our own.
[147] *certa quadam ratione*. The form of a composite individual is a pattern of communicated motion, not a substantial form; Lemmas 4–7 [p. 153] show that it can persist through the replacement, growth and movement of its parts. The 1677 edition prints the definition in italic.

segregentur, et simul totidem alia eiusdem naturae eorum loco succedant, retinebit individuum suam naturam, uti antea, absque ulla eius formae mutatione.

Demonstratio. Corpora enim (per lem. 1.) ratione substantiae non distinguuntur; id autem, quod formam individui constituit, in corporum unione (per defin. praeced.) consistit.[ci] Atqui haec (per hypothesin), tametsi corporum continua fiat mutatio, retinetur. Retinebit ergo individuum tam ratione substantiae, quam modi, suam naturam, uti ante. Q. E. D.

Lemma V. Si partes individuum componentes, maiores minoresve evadant, ea tamen proportione, ut omnes eandem, ut antea, ad invicem motus et quietis rationem servent, retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam, ut antea, absque ulla formae mutatione.

[G II 101] Demonstratio. Huius eadem est, ac praeced. lem.

Lemma VI. Si corpora quaedam individuum componentia motum, quem versus unam partem habent, aliam versus flectere cogantur, at ita, ut motus suos continuare possint, atque invicem eadem, qua antea,[cj] ratione communicare; retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam absque ulla formae mutatione.

Demonstratio. Per se patet. Id enim omne retinere supponitur, quod in eiusdem definitione formam ipsius constituere diximus.[ck]

Lemma VII. Retinet praeterea individuum sic compositum suam naturam, sive id secundum totum moveatur, sive quiescat, sive versus hanc, sive versus illam partem moveatur, dummodo unaquaeque pars motum suum retineat, eumque, uti antea, reliquis communicet.

Demonstratio. Patet ex ipsius definitione,[cl] quam vide ante lem. 4.

Scholium. His itaque videmus, qua ratione individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, eius nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque individuum concepimus, quod non, nisi ex corporibus, quae solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur, hoc est, quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur.
Quod si iam aliud concipiamus ex pluribus diversae naturae individuis compositum, idem pluri-

[ci] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'alleenlijk' ('only'): 'consists only in a union of bodies'. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 100; Textgestaltung II 360).
[cj] invicem eadem, qua antea] *transcr.* invicem eadam, qua antea. Gebhardt (G II 101) prints 'eadam', a misprint not in his corrigenda, which Bartuschat and the transcription reproduce; the 1677 edition (OP p. 57) reads 'eâdem'.
[ck] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'Bezie de Bepaling voor 't vierde Voorbewijs' ('See the Definition before the fourth Lemma'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 101; Textgestaltung II 360); he takes the omission in the Latin to be deliberate, since the Latin gives the cross-reference in the demonstration of Lemma 7 [p. 155] instead.
[cl] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'ook' ('also'): 'This is also evident'. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 101; Textgestaltung II 360–361).

are separated, and at the same time as many other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form.
Cited in 2L5D [p. 155], 2L7D [p. 155], 2P24D [p. 171], 4P39D [p. 405]

Demonstration. For bodies (by Lemma 1 [p. 151]) are not distinguished by reason of substance; and that which constitutes the form of an individual consists in a union of bodies (by the preceding Def. [p. 153]). But this (by hypothesis), although a continual change of bodies takes place, is retained. The individual will therefore retain its nature, both in respect of substance and in respect of mode, as before. Q.E.D.

Lemma V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or smaller, but in such proportion that all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, as before, without any change of form.
Cited in 3Post1 [p. 233]

Demonstration. The demonstration of this is the same as that of the preceding lemma [p. 153].

Lemma VI. If certain bodies composing an individual are compelled to turn aside the motion they have towards one part towards another, but in such a way that they can continue their motions and communicate them to one another in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature without any change of form.

Demonstration. This is self-evident. For it is supposed to retain all that which, in its definition, we said constitutes its form.

Lemma VII. Further, an individual so composed retains its nature whether it moves as a whole or is at rest, or moves towards this part or towards that, provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before.
Cited in 2L7S [p. 155], 3Post1 [p. 233]

Demonstration. This is evident from its definition, which see before Lemma 4 [p. 153].

Scholium. By this, therefore, we see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways and yet keep its nature. And up to now we have conceived an individual composed only of bodies that are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is, composed of the simplest bodies.
But if we now conceive another, composed of several individuals of different natures, we shall

bus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. Nam quandoquidem eius unaquaeque pars ex pluribus corporibus est composita, poterit ergo (per lem. praeced.) unaquaeque pars, absque ulla ipsius naturae mutatione iam tardius, iam celerius moveri, et consequenter motus suos citius vel tardius reliquis communicare.
Quod si praeterea tertium individuorum genus ex his secundis compositum, concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse reperiemus absque ulla eius formae mutatione. Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse individuum, cuius partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant absque ulla totius individui mutatione.

Atque haec si animus fuisset, de corpore ex professo agere,[cm] prolixius explicare et demonstrare debuissem. Sed iam dixi me aliud velle, nec alia de causa haec adferre, quam quia ex ipsis ea, quae demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.

Postulata

[G II 102] I. *Corpus humanum* componitur ex plurimis (diversae naturae) individuis, quorum unumquodque valde compositum est.

II. Individuorum, ex quibus corpus humanum componitur, quaedam *fluida, quaedam mollia* et quaedam denique *dura* sunt.

III. Individua corpus humanum componentia, et consequenter ipsum humanum corpus a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur.

IV. Corpus humanum indiget, ut conservetur, plurimis aliis corporibus, a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur.

V. Cum corporis humani pars fluida a corpore externo determinatur, ut in aliam mollem saepe impingat, eius planum mutat et veluti quaedam corporis externi impellentis vestigia eidem imprimit.

[G II 103] VI. Corpus humanum potest corpora externa plurimis modis movere plurimisque modis disponere.

[cm] The Dutch version of 1677 adds 'van de stoffe of' ('of matter, or') before *de corpore* and 'en bezonderlijk' ('and in particular') after *ex professo*: 'had it been my intention to treat expressly and in particular of matter, or of body'. Gebhardt prints both in his text (G II 102; Textgestaltung II 361).

find that it can be affected in many other ways, and yet keep its nature. For since each part of it is composed of several bodies, each part will therefore be able (by the preceding lemma [p. 155]), without any change of its nature, to move now more slowly, now more quickly, and consequently to communicate its motions to the others now more quickly, now more slowly.

And if we conceive further a third kind of individuals, composed of these second ones, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways without any change of its form. And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinitely many ways, without any change of the whole individual.[148]

And if it had been my intention to treat of body expressly, I should have had to explain and demonstrate these things more fully. But I have already said that I intend something else, and that I bring these things forward for no other reason than that I can easily deduce from them the things I have decided to demonstrate.

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 631]

Postulates

I. The *human body* is composed of very many individuals (of different natures), each of which is highly composite.

Cited in 2P15D [p. 159], 2P24D [p. 171], 3Post1 [p. 233], 3P17S [p. 255]

II. Of the individuals of which the human body is composed, some are *fluid*, some *soft*, and some, finally, *hard*.

III. The individuals composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in very many ways.

Cited in 2P14D [p. 159], 2P28D [p. 173], 3P51D [p. 295], 4P39D [p. 405]

IV. The human body needs, in order to be preserved, very many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated.

Cited in 2P19D [p. 165], 4P18S [p. 377], 4P39D [p. 405]

V. When a fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body so that it frequently strikes another, soft part, it changes the surface of that part and impresses on it, as it were, certain traces of the external body that drives it.[149]

Cited in 2P17CD [p. 161], 3Post2 [p. 233]

VI. The human body can move external bodies in very many ways, and arrange them in very many ways.

Cited in 2P14D [p. 159], 4P39D [p. 405]

[148] Compare Letter 64 [p. 629], where the mediate infinite mode of extension is 'facies totius Universi, quae quamvis infinitis modis variet, manet tamen semper eadem' ('the face of the whole universe, which, although it varies in infinitely many ways, nevertheless remains always the same'; VVL[3] III 206), and Letter 32 [p. 611], where each body, 'quatenus certo modo modificatum existit', is to be considered 'ut partem totius universi' ('insofar as it exists modified in a certain way ... as a part of the whole universe'; VVL[3] III 121).

[149] *vestigia*. The traces are the bodily basis of imagination and memory: see Prop. 17, Cor. [p. 161] and Prop. 18 [p. 163].

Propositio XIV

Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, quo eius corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.

Demonstratio. Corpus enim humanum (per postul. 3. et 6.) plurimis modis a corporibus externis afficitur, disponiturque ad corpora externa plurimis modis afficiendum. At omnia, quae in corpore humano contingunt (per prop. 12. huius), mens humana percipere debet. Est ergo mens humana apta ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior.[cn] Q. E. D.

Propositio XV

Idea, quae esse formale humanae mentis constituit, non est simplex, sed ex plurimis ideis composita.

Demonstratio. Idea, quae esse formale humanae mentis constituit, est idea corporis (per prop. 13. huius), quod (per postul. 1.) ex plurimis valde compositis individuis componitur. At cuiuscumque individui corpus componentis datur necessario (per coroll. prop. 8. huius) in Deo idea. Ergo (per prop. 7. huius) idea corporis humani ex plurimis hisce partium componentium ideis est composita. Q. E. D.

Propositio XVI

Idea cuiuscumque modi, quo corpus humanum a corporibus externis afficitur, involvere debet naturam corporis humani et simul naturam corporis externi.

[G II 104] Demonstratio. Omnes enim modi, quibus corpus aliquod afficitur, ex natura corporis affecti, et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur (per axiom. 1. post coroll. lem. 3.). Quare eorum idea (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) utriusque corporis naturam necessario involvet. Adeoque idea cuiuscumque modi, quo corpus humanum a corpore externo afficitur, corporis humani, et corporis externi naturam involvit. Q. E. D.

Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur primo, mentem humanam plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura percipere.

Corollarium II. Sequitur secundo, quod ideae, quas corporum externorum habemus, magis nostri corporis constitutionem, quam corporum externorum naturam indicant; quod in

[cn] The 1677 edition (OP p. 59) ends the sentence *et eò aptior, &c.*; the Dutch version completes it: 'als het menschelijk lighaam bequamer is' ('as the human body is more capable'). Gebhardt prints the Dutch in his text in place of *&c.* (G II 103; Textgestaltung II 361), and the transcription, which leaves out his Dutch, has neither.

Proposition XIV

The human mind is capable of perceiving very many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in more ways.

Cited in 3P11D [p. 247], 4P38D [p. 405]

Demonstration. For the human body (by Posts. 3 [p. 157] and 6 [p. 157]) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is disposed to affect external bodies in very many ways. But all things that happen in the human body (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 141]) the human mind must perceive. The human mind is therefore capable of perceiving very many things, and is the more capable. Q.E.D.

Proposition XV

The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas.

Cited in 3P3D [p. 241]

Demonstration. The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of a body (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), which (by Post. 1 [p. 157]) is composed of very many highly composite individuals. But of each individual composing the body there is necessarily (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 133]) an idea in God. Therefore (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) the idea of the human body is composed of these very many ideas of the component parts. Q.E.D.

Proposition XVI

The idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body.

Cited in 2P17D [p. 161], 2P18S [p. 165], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P23D [p. 169], 2P25D [p. 171], 2P26D [p. 173], 2P27D [p. 173], 2P28D [p. 173], 2P38D [p. 183], 2P39D [p. 183], 3P27D [p. 267], 4P5D [p. 363]

Demonstration. For all the modes in which a body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. 1 after the Cor. of Lemma 3 [p. 153]). So the idea of them (by Ax. 4, Part I [p. 29]) will necessarily involve the nature of each body. And so the idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. From this it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies together with the nature of its own body.

Cited in 2P17D [p. 161], 2P26D [p. 173], 2P47D [p. 199]

Corollary II. It follows, second, that the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies; which I have explained by

appendice partis primae multis exemplis explicui.

Propositio XVII

Si humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam corporis alicuius externi involvit, mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut sibi praesens contemplabitur, donec corpus afficiatur affectu, qui eiusdem corporis existentiam vel praesentiam secludat.

Demonstratio. Patet. Nam quamdiu corpus humanum sic affectum est, tamdiu mens humana (per prop. 12. huius) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur, hoc est (per prop. praeced.), ideam habebit modi actu existentis, quae naturam corporis externi involvit, hoc est, ideam, quae existentiam, vel praesentiam naturae corporis externi non secludit, sed ponit. Adeoque mens (per coroll. 1. praeced.) corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut praesens contemplabitur, donec afficiatur etc. Q. E. D.

[G II 105] Corollarium. Mens corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec praesentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit, velut praesentia essent.

Demonstratio. Dum corpora externa corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant, ut in molliores saepe impingant, earum plana (per postul. 5.) mutant. Unde fit (vide axiom. 2. post coroll. lem. 3.) ut inde alio modo reflectantur, quam antea solebant, et ut etiam postea iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo, eodem modo reflectantur, ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsae sunt, et consequenter, ut corpus humanum, dum sic reflexae moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo mens (per prop. 12. huius) iterum cogitabit, hoc est (per prop. 17. huius) mens iterum corpus externum ut praesens contemplabitur; et hoc toties, quoties corporis humani partes fluidae spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent.

Quare quamvis corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, mens tamen eadem toties ut praesentia contemplabitur, quoties haec corporis actio repetetur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Videmus itaque, qui fieri potest, ut ea, quae non sunt veluti praesentia contemplemur, ut saepe fit. Et fieri potest, ut hoc aliis de causis contingat. Sed mihi hic sufficit ostendisse unam,

many examples in the Appendix of Part I [p. 101].[150]

Cited in 2P17S [p. 161], 3P14D [p. 253], 3P18D [p. 257], 3GDAEx [p. 339], 4P1S [p. 359], 4P9D [p. 367], 5P34D [p. 513]

Proposition XVII

If the human body is affected in a mode that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body.

Cited in 2P17CD [p. 161], 2P19D [p. 165], 2P44S [p. 195], 2P47D [p. 199], 3P11S [p. 249], 3P12D [p. 251], 3P13D [p. 251], 3P18D [p. 257], 3P18S1 [p. 257], 3P19D [p. 259], 3P25D [p. 265], 3P28D [p. 269], 3P56D [p. 305], 4P1S [p. 359], 4P9D [p. 367], 5P7D [p. 481]

Demonstration. This is evident. For as long as the human body is so affected, the human mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 141]) will contemplate this affection of the body, that is (by the preceding Prop. [p. 159]), it will have the idea of a mode actually existing, an idea which involves the nature of the external body, that is, an idea which does not exclude but posits the existence or presence of the nature of the external body. And so the mind (by Cor. 1 of the preceding Prop. [p. 159]) will contemplate the external body as actually existing, or as present, until it is affected, etc. Q.E.D.

Corollary. The mind will be able to contemplate external bodies by which the human body has once been affected, even though they do not exist and are not present, as if they were present.

Cited in 2P17S [p. 161], 2P18D [p. 163], 2P40S1 [p. 185], 2P44S [p. 195], 2P49S [p. 211], 3P18D [p. 257], 3P25D [p. 265], 3P30S [p. 271], 3P47S [p. 291], 4P13D [p. 371]

Demonstration. While external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that these often strike the softer parts, they change the surfaces of those parts (by Post. 5 [p. 157]). From this it comes about (see Ax. 2 after the Cor. of Lemma 3 [p. 153]) that the fluid parts are reflected from them in another way than they used to be before, and that also afterwards, meeting the same new surfaces by their own spontaneous motion, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven towards those surfaces by the external bodies; and consequently that, while they continue to move, so reflected, they affect the human body in the same way, which the mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 141]) will think of again; that is (by Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]), the mind will again contemplate the external body as present; and this as often as the fluid parts of the human body meet the same surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. So although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected do not exist, the mind will nevertheless contemplate them as present as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.

Scholium. We see, then, how it can come about that we contemplate things that are not as if they were present, as often happens. And it can come about that this happens from other causes.

[150] In the third part of the Appendix [p. 107]: good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and confusion are judged 'according to the disposition of the brain'.

per quam rem sic possim explicare,[co] ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem; nec tamen credo, me a vera longe aberrare, quandoquidem omnia illa quae sumpsi postulata vix quicquam continent, quod non constet experientia, de qua nobis non licet dubitare, postquam ostendimus corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere (vide coroll. post prop. 13. huius).

Praeterea (ex coroll. praeced. et coroll. 2. prop. 16. huius) clare intelligimus, quaenam sit differentia inter ideam ex. gr. Petri, quae essentiam mentis ipsius Petri constituit, et inter ideam ipsius Petri, quae in alio homine, puta in Paulo, est. Illa enim essentiam corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat, nec existentiam involvit nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; haec autem magis constitutionem corporis Pauli, quam Petri naturam indicat,[cp] et ideo durante illa corporis Pauli constitutione mens Pauli, quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi praesentem contemplabitur.

Porro, ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant, *rerum imagines* vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem *imaginari* dicemus.

Atque hic, ut, quid sit *error*, indicare incipiam, notetis velim,[cq] *mentis imaginationes*[cr] in se spectatas nihil erroris continere, sive mentem ex eo, quod imaginatur, non errare; sed tantum quatenus consideratur, carere idea, quae existentiam illarum rerum, quas sibi praesentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens, dum res non existentes ut sibi praesentes imaginatur, simul sciret, res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suae naturae, non vitio tribueret; praesertim si haec imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet, hoc est (per defin. 7. P. 1.) si haec mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.

Propositio XVIII

[G II 106] *Si corpus humanum a duobus, vel pluribus corporibus simul affectum fuerit semel, ubi mens postea eorum aliquod imaginabitur, statim et aliorum recordabitur.*

Demonstratio. Mens (per coroll. praeced.) corpus aliquod ea de causa imaginatur, quia scilicet humanum corpus a corporis externi vestigiis eodem modo afficitur disponiturque, ac affectum

[co] The 1677 edition (OP p. 61) and the older editions read *possem*; Van Vloten–Land correct to *possim* for the sequence of tenses, and Gebhardt (G II 105; Textgestaltung II 361) follows them.
[cp] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'bezie de tweede Toegift van de zestiende Voorstelling in dat deel' ('see the second Corollary of the sixteenth Proposition in that Part'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 106; Textgestaltung II 361). Here and below the Dutch calls Paul 'Jan'.
[cq] The 1677 edition (OP p. 62) reads *noteris velim*, in the singular; Bruder, Van Vloten–Land, Gebhardt (G II 106) and Bartuschat print *notetis*, without comment in Gebhardt's Textgestaltung.
[cr] *error*, indicare incipiam, notetis velim, *mentis imaginationes*] *transcr. error, indicare incipiam, notetis velim, mentis imaginationes*. Italics overrun restricted to the two terms; the 1677 edition (OP p. 62) has no italics here.

But it is enough for me here to have shown one by which I can explain the thing as if I had shown it through its true cause; and yet I do not believe that I am far from the true one, since all the postulates I have assumed contain hardly anything that is not established by experience, which we may not doubt after we have shown that the human body exists as we feel it (see the Cor. after Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 143]).

Further (from the preceding Cor. [p. 161] and Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]) we understand clearly what the difference is between the idea of, for example, Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's own mind, and the idea of Peter himself which is in another man, say in Paul. For the former directly explains the essence of Peter's own body, and does not involve existence except as long as Peter exists; but the latter indicates the constitution of Paul's body more than the nature of Peter, and so, while that constitution of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will contemplate Peter as present to it, even though Peter does not exist.

Further, to retain the customary words, we shall call the affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us *images of things*, even though they do not reproduce the figures of things.[151] And when the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we shall say that it *imagines*.

And here, to begin to indicate what *error* is, I would have you note that the *imaginations of the mind*, considered in themselves, contain no error,[152] or that the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as present to it. For if the mind, while it imagined non-existent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things did not really exist, it would surely attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice; especially if this faculty of imagining depended on its nature alone, that is (by Def. 7, Part I [p. 27]), if this faculty of the mind of imagining were free.

Cited in 2P26CD [p. 173], 2P35S [p. 181], 2P40S1 [p. 185], 2P49S [p. 211], 3Post2 [p. 233], 3P11S [p. 249], 3P12D [p. 251], 3P27D [p. 267], 3P56D [p. 305], 4P9D [p. 367], 5P21D [p. 503], 5P34D [p. 513]

Proposition XVIII

If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.

Cited in 2P40S1 [p. 185], 2P44S [p. 195], 3P11S [p. 249], 3P14D [p. 253], 3P52D [p. 299], 4P13D [p. 371], 5P1D [p. 473], 5P10S [p. 483], 5P12D [p. 487], 5P13D [p. 487]

Demonstration. The mind (by the preceding Cor. [p. 161]) imagines some body for this reason, that the human body is affected and disposed by the traces of an external body in the

[151] An image, for Spinoza, is a bodily affection, not a picture: 'images of things' keeps the customary phrase while denying that images resemble what they represent. To imagine is to contemplate bodies by means of such affections. Ideas, in turn, are not pictures either: see Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 211].

[152] The account of error begun here is completed in Props. 33–35 [p. 179]: falsity consists in a privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve, and there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.

est, cum quaedam eius partes ab ipso corpore externo fuerunt impulsae. Sed (per hypothesin) corpus tum ita fuit dispositum, ut mens duo simul corpora imaginaretur. Ergo iam etiam duo simul imaginabitur, atque mens ubi alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hinc clare intelligimus, quid sit *memoria*. Est enim nihil aliud, quam quaedam concatenatio idearum, naturam rerum, quae extra corpus humanum sunt, involventium, quae in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani.

Dico primo concatenationem esse illarum tantum idearum, quae naturam rerum, quae extra corpus humanum sunt, involvunt; non autem idearum, quae earundem rerum naturam explicant. Sunt enim revera (per prop. 16. huius) ideae affectionum corporis humani, quae tam huius, quam corporum externorum naturam involvunt. Dico secundo hanc concatenationem fieri secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani, ut ipsam distinguerem a concatenatione idearum, quae fit secundum ordinem intellectus, quo res per primas suas causas mens percipit, et qui in omnibus hominibus idem est.

Atque hinc porro clare intelligimus, cur mens ex cogitatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat, quae nullam cum priore habet similitudinem; ut, ex. gr. ex cogitatione vocis pomi homo Romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet,[cs] qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem, nec aliquid commune, nisi quod eiusdem hominis corpus ab his duobus affectum saepe fuit, hoc est, quod ipse homo saepe vocem pomum audivit, dum ipsum fructum videret; et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet, prout rerum imagines uniuscuiusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit.
Nam miles ex. gr. visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis, et inde in cogitationem belli, etc. incidet. At rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri, etc. incidet; et sic unusquisque, prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc vel alio modo iungere et concatenare, ex una in hanc vel in aliam incidet cogitationem.

Propositio XIX

[G II 107] *Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus corpus afficitur.*

[G II 108] Demonstratio. Mens enim humana est ipsa idea sive cognitio corporis humani (per

[cs] The 1677 edition (OP p. 63) reads *incidit*; Gebhardt (G II 107; Textgestaltung II 361), with Leopold and Appuhn, corrects to *incidet*, after the Dutch version's *zal vallen* and the futures that follow.

same way as it was affected when certain of its parts were driven by the external body itself. But (by hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once. Therefore it will now also imagine two at once, and when the mind imagines either of them, it will immediately recollect the other too. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From this we understand clearly what *memory* is. For it is nothing other than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body, a concatenation which takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body.

I say, first, that it is a concatenation only of those ideas which involve the nature of things which are outside the human body, not of ideas which explain the nature of those same things. For they are in fact (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]) ideas of affections of the human body, which involve the nature both of this body and of the external bodies. I say, second, that this concatenation takes place according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body, in order to distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas which takes place according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men.[153]

And from this, further, we understand clearly why the mind passes immediately from the thought of one thing into the thought of another which has no likeness to the first; as, for example, a Roman will pass immediately from the thought of the word *pomum* into the thought of the fruit, which has no likeness to that articulate sound, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the same man has often been affected by these two, that is, that the man himself often heard the word *pomum* while he saw the fruit;[154] and so each one will pass from one thought into another according as habit has ordered the images of things in his body.

For a soldier, for example, having seen the traces of a horse in the sand, will pass immediately from the thought of the horse into the thought of a horseman, and from there into the thought of war, etc. But a farmer will pass from the thought of the horse into the thought of a plough, of a field, etc.; and so each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and concatenate the images of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought into this or that other.

Cited in 2P40S2 [p. 189], 3P11S [p. 249], 3P52D [p. 299], 3DA4Ex [p. 321], 4P13D [p. 371], 5P21D [p. 503]

Proposition XIX

The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through the ideas of affections by which the body is affected.

Cited in 2P23D [p. 169], 2P29C [p. 175], 2P43S [p. 191], 2P47D [p. 199], 3P30D [p. 271], 3P53D [p. 301]

Demonstration. For the human mind is the very idea, or knowledge, of the human body (by

[153] The contrast between the order of the affections of the body and the order of the intellect returns in the remedies of Part V: as long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, 'we have the power of ordering and concatenating the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect' (Part V, Prop. 10 [p. 483]).

[154] Association by contiguity, as in Hobbes' 'Trayne of Imaginations': 'as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses' (*Leviathan*, 1651, ch. 3).

prop. 13. huius), quae (per prop. 9. huius) in Deo quidem est, quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur; vel quia (per postul. 4.) corpus humanum plurimis corporibus indiget, a quibus continuo quasi regeneratur, et ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per prop. 7. huius) ac ordo et connexio causarum, erit haec idea in Deo, quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus consideratur. Deus itaque ideam corporis humani habet, sive corpus humanum cognoscit, quatenus plurimis aliis ideis affectus est, et non quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) mens humana corpus humanum non cognoscit.

At ideae affectionum corporis in Deo sunt, quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit, sive mens humana easdem affectiones percipit (per prop. 12. huius), et consequenter (per prop. 16. huius) ipsum corpus humanum, idque (per prop. 17. huius) ut actu existens. Percipit ergo eatenus tantum mens humana ipsum humanum corpus. Q. E. D.

Propositio XX

Mentis humanae datur etiam in Deo idea, sive cognitio, quae in Deo eodem modo sequitur et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea sive cognitio corporis humani.

Demonstratio. Cogitatio attributum Dei est (per prop. 1. huius); adeoque (per prop. 3. huius) tam eius, quam omnium eius affectionum, et consequenter (per prop. 11. huius) mentis etiam humanae debet necessario in Deo dari idea. Deinde haec mentis idea sive cognitio non sequitur in Deo dari, quatenus infinitus; sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus est (per prop. 9. huius). Sed ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio causarum (per prop. 7. huius). Sequitur ergo haec mentis idea, sive cognitio in Deo, et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea sive cognitio corporis. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXI

[G II 109] *Haec mentis idea eodem modo unita est menti, ac ipsa mens unita est corpori.*

Demonstratio. Mentem unitam esse corpori ex eo ostendimus, quod scilicet corpus mentis sit obiectum (vide prop. 12. et 13. huius); adeoque per eandem illam rationem idea mentis cum suo obiecto, hoc est, cum ipsa mente eodem modo unita esse debet, ac ipsa mens unita est corpori. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec prop. longe clarius intelligitur ex dictis in schol. prop. 7. huius. Ibi enim ostendimus corporis ideam, et corpus, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) mentem et corpus unum et idem esse individuum, quod iam sub cogitationis, iam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Quare mentis idea et ipsa mens una eademque est res, quae sub uno eodemque attributo, nempe

Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), which (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]) is indeed in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing; or, since (by Post. 4 [p. 157]) the human body needs very many bodies by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated, and the order and connection of ideas is the same (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) as the order and connection of causes, this idea will be in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by the ideas of very many singular things. God, therefore, has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, insofar as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), the human mind does not know the human body.

But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those affections (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 141]), and consequently (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]) the human body itself, and (by Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]) as actually existing. Only to that extent, therefore, does the human mind perceive the human body itself. Q.E.D.

Proposition XX

There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body.
Cited in 2P22D [p. 169], 2P23D [p. 169], 2P43D [p. 191]

Demonstration. Thought is an attribute of God (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 125]); and so (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 125]) there must necessarily be in God an idea both of thought and of all its affections, and consequently (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) of the human mind too. Next, this idea, or knowledge, of the mind does not follow to be in God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]). This idea, or knowledge, of the mind therefore follows in God, and is related to God, in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXI

This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.
Cited in 2P22D [p. 169], 4P8D [p. 367], 5P3D [p. 475]

Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (see Props. 12 [p. 141] and 13 of this Part [p. 141]); and so, by that same reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind itself, in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition is understood far more clearly from what was said in Schol. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 131]. For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), the mind and the body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. So

cogitationis, concipitur. Mentis, inquam, idea et ipsa mens in Deo eadem necessitate ex eadem cogitandi potentia sequuntur dari.

Nam revera idea mentis, hoc est, idea ideae nihil aliud est, quam forma ideae, quatenus haec ut modus cogitandi absque relatione ad obiectum consideratur. Simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit se id scire, et simul scit se scire quod scit, et sic in infinitum. Sed de his postea.

Propositio XXII

Mens humana non tantum corporis affectiones, sed etiam harum affectionum ideas percipit.

Demonstratio. Affectionum idearum ideae in Deo eodem modo sequuntur et ad Deum eodem modo referuntur, ac ipsae affectionum ideae; quod eodem modo demonstratur, ac prop. 20. huius. At ideae affectionum corporis in mente humana sunt (per prop. 12. huius), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) in Deo, quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit. Ergo harum idearum ideae in Deo erunt, quatenus humanae mentis cognitionem, sive ideam habet, hoc est (per prop. 21. huius) in ipsa mente humana, quae propterea non tantum corporis affectiones, sed earum etiam ideas percipit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIII

[G II 110] *Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.*

Demonstratio. Mentis idea sive cognitio (per prop. 20. huius) in Deo eodem modo sequitur et ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac corporis idea sive cognitio. At quoniam (per prop. 19. huius) mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) quoniam cognitio corporis humani ad Deum non refertur, quatenus humanae mentis naturam constituit; ergo nec cognitio mentis ad Deum refertur, quatenus essentiam mentis humanae constituit; atque adeo (per idem coroll. prop. 11. huius.) mens humana eatenus se ipsam non cognoscit.

Deinde affectionum, quibus corpus afficitur, ideae naturam ipsius corporis humani involvunt

the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely thought. The idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself follow to be in God from the same power of thinking by the same necessity.
For in fact the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of the idea, is nothing other than the form of the idea[155] insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its object. For as soon as someone knows something, by that very fact he knows that he knows it, and at the same time he knows that he knows that he knows, and so on to infinity. But of these matters later.
Cited in 2P43S [p. 191], 4P8D [p. 367], 5P3D [p. 475]

Proposition XXII

The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections.
Cited in 2P23D [p. 169], 2P47D [p. 199], 4P8D [p. 367]

Demonstration. The ideas of the ideas of the affections follow in God in the same way, and are related to God in the same way, as the ideas of the affections themselves; which is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 167]. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in the human mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 141]), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God insofar as he has the knowledge, or idea, of the human mind, that is (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 167]), in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the affections of the body, but also their ideas. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIII

The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.[156]
Cited in 2P29C [p. 175], 2P47D [p. 199], 3P9D [p. 245], 3P30D [p. 271], 3P53D [p. 301], 3DA1Ex [p. 319]

Demonstration. The idea, or knowledge, of the mind (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 167]) follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea, or knowledge, of the body. But since (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 165]) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), since the knowledge of the human body is not related to God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, neither is the knowledge of the mind related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and so (by the same Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) the human mind to that extent does not know itself.
Next, the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected involve the nature of the human

[155] The *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* had used the same notions: to understand Peter's essence it is not necessary to understand the idea of Peter, 'et multo minus ideam ideae Petri; quod idem est, ac si dicerem, non esse opus, ut sciam, quod sciam me scire' ('and much less the idea of the idea of Peter; which is the same as if I said that it is not necessary, in order to know, that I know that I know'; §34). The matter is taken up again in Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191], on truth as its own standard.
[156] A reversal of Descartes, whose Second Meditation is titled 'De natura mentis humanae: quod ipsa sit notior quam corpus' ('Of the nature of the human mind: that it is better known than the body'; AT VII 23). For Spinoza the mind knows itself only through the ideas of its body's affections, and so no better than it knows the body (Prop. 19 [p. 165]).

(per prop. 16. huius), hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) cum natura mentis conveniunt. Quare harum idearum cognitio cognitionem mentis necessario involvet. At (per prop. praeced.) harum idearum cognitio in ipsa humana mente est. Ergo mens humana eatenus tantum se ipsam novit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIV

Mens humana partium corpus humanum componentium adaequatam cognitionem non involvit.

Demonstratio. Partes corpus humanum componentes ad essentiam ipsius corporis non pertinent, nisi quatenus motus suos certa quadam ratione invicem communicant (vide defin. post coroll. lem. 3.), et non quatenus ut individua absque relatione ad humanum corpus considerari possunt. Sunt enim partes humani corporis (per postul. 1.) valde composita individua, quorum partes (per lem. 4.) a corpore humano servata omnino eiusdem natura et forma segregari possunt, motusque suos (vide axiom. 1. post lem. 3.) aliis corporibus alia ratione communicare.

Adeoque (per prop. 3. huius) cuiuscumque partis idea sive cognitio in Deo erit, et quidem (per prop. 9. huius) quatenus affectus consideratur alia idea rei singularis, quae res singularis ipsa parte ordine naturae prior est (per prop. 7. huius). Quod idem praeterea etiam de quacumque parte ipsius individui corpus humanum componentis est dicendum.

Adeoque cuiuscumque partis corpus humanum componentis cognitio in Deo est, quatenus plurimis rerum ideis affectus est, et non quatenus corporis humani tantum habet ideam, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) ideam, quae humanae mentis naturam constituit. Atque adeo (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) humana mens partium corpus humanum componentium adaequatam cognitionem non involvit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXV

[G II 111] *Idea cuiuscumque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.*

Demonstratio. Ideam affectionis corporis humani eatenus corporis externi naturam involvere ostendimus (vide prop.16. huius), quatenus externum ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo determinat. At quatenus externum corpus individuum est, quod ad corpus humanum non refertur, eius idea sive cognitio in Deo est (per prop. 9. huius), quatenus Deus affectus consideratur alterius rei idea, quae (per prop. 7. huius) ipso corpore externo prior est natura. Quare corporis externi adaequata cognitio in Deo non est, quatenus ideam affectionis humani corporis habet, sive idea affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit. Q. E. D.

body itself (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]), that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), they agree with the nature of the mind. So the knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve the knowledge of the mind. But (by the preceding Prop. [p. 169]) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore the human mind knows itself only to that extent. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIV

The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
Cited in 2P28D [p. 173], 2P36D [p. 181]

Demonstration. The parts composing the human body do not pertain to the essence of the body itself except insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio (see the Def. after the Cor. of Lemma 3 [p. 153]), and not insofar as they can be considered as individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body (by Post. 1 [p. 157]) are highly composite individuals, whose parts (by Lemma 4 [p. 153]) can be separated from the human body while it entirely keeps its nature and form, and can communicate their motions (see Ax. 1 after Lemma 3 [p. 153]) to other bodies in another ratio.
And so (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 125]) the idea, or knowledge, of each part will be in God, and indeed (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]) insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing, which singular thing is prior in the order of nature to the part itself (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]). The same, moreover, is to be said of any part of the individual itself composing the human body.
And so the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God insofar as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind. And therefore (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) the human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXV

The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body.
Cited in 2P26CD [p. 173], 2P27D [p. 173], 2P28D [p. 173], 2P29C [p. 175], 2P38D [p. 183]

Demonstration. We have shown that the idea of an affection of the human body involves the nature of an external body insofar as the external body determines the human body itself in a certain way (see Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]). But insofar as the external body is an individual that is not related to the human body, its idea, or knowledge, is in God (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]) insofar as God is considered to be affected by the idea of another thing, which (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) is prior in nature to the external body itself. So adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God insofar as he has the idea of the affection of the human body; or, the idea of an affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXVI

[G II 112] *Mens humana nullum corpus externum ut actu existens percipit, nisi per ideas affectionum sui corporis.*

Demonstratio. Si a corpore aliquo externo corpus humanum nullo modo affectum est, ergo (per prop. 7. huius) nec idea corporis humani, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) nec mens humana idea existentiae illius corporis ullo etiam modo affecta est, sive existentiam illius corporis externi ullo modo percipit. At quatenus corpus humanum a corpore aliquo externo aliquo modo afficitur, eatenus (per prop. 16. huius cum coroll. 1. eiusdem) corpus externum percipit. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Quatenus mens humana corpus externum imaginatur, eatenus adaequatam eius cognitionem non habet.

Demonstratio. Cum mens humana per ideas affectionum sui corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus (vide schol. prop. 17. huius); nec mens alia ratione (per prop. praeced.) corpora externa ut actu existentia imaginari potest. Atque adeo (per prop. 25. huius) quatenus mens corpora externa imaginatur, eorum adaequatam cognitionem non habet. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVII

Idea cuiuscumque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam ipsius humani corporis cognitionem non involvit.

Demonstratio. Quaelibet idea cuiuscumque affectionis humani corporis eatenus naturam corporis humani involvit, quatenus ipsum humanum corpus certo quodam modo affici consideratur (vide prop. 16. huius). At quatenus corpus humanum individuum est, quod multis aliis modis affici potest, eius idea etc. Vide demonstr. prop. 25. huius.

Propositio XXVIII

[G II 113] *Ideae affectionum corporis humani, quatenus ad humanam mentem tantum referuntur, non sunt clarae et distinctae, sed confusae.*

Demonstratio. Ideae enim affectionum corporis humani, tam corporum externorum, quam ipsius humani corporis naturam involvunt (per prop. 16. huius); nec tantum corporis humani, sed eius etiam partium naturam involvere debent. Affectiones namque modi sunt (per postul. 3.), quibus partes corporis humani, et consequenter totum corpus afficitur.

At (per prop. 24. et 25. huius) corporum externorum adaequata cognitio, ut et partium corpus humanum componentium in Deo non est, quatenus humana mente, sed quatenus aliis ideis

Proposition XXVI

The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.

Cited in 2P26CD [p. 173], 2P29C [p. 175], 5P21D [p. 503], 5P29D [p. 507]

Demonstration. If the human body is in no way affected by some external body, then (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) neither is the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), neither is the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of that body; or, it does not perceive the existence of that external body in any way. But insofar as the human body is affected in some way by some external body, to that extent (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159] with its Cor. 1 [p. 159]) the mind perceives the external body. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Insofar as the human mind imagines an external body, it does not have adequate knowledge of it.

Demonstration. When the human mind contemplates external bodies through the ideas of the affections of its own body, we then say that it imagines (see Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]); nor can the mind (by the preceding Prop. [p. 173]) imagine external bodies as actually existing in any other way. And so (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 171]), insofar as the mind imagines external bodies, it does not have adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVII

The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Cited in 2P29D [p. 175], 2P29C [p. 175], 2P38D [p. 183]

Demonstration. Any idea of any affection of the human body involves the nature of the human body to the extent that the human body itself is considered to be affected in a certain way (see Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]). But insofar as the human body is an individual that can be affected in many other ways, its idea etc. See the demonstration of Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 171].

Proposition XXVIII

The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Cited in 2P29C [p. 175], 2P36D [p. 181]

Demonstration. For the ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body itself (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]); and they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts. For the affections are modes (by Post. 3 [p. 157]) in which the parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body, are affected.

But (by Props. 24 [p. 171] and 25 of this Part [p. 171]) adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God insofar as he is considered to

affectus consideratur.[ct] Sunt ergo hae affectionum ideae, quatenus ad solam humanam mentem referuntur, veluti consequentiae absque praemissis, hoc est (ut per se notum) ideae confusae. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Idea, quae naturam mentis humanae constituit, demonstratur eodem modo non esse in se sola considerata clara et distincta; ut etiam idea mentis humanae, et ideae idearum affectionum corporis humani,[cu] quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, quod unusquisque facile videre potest.

Propositio XXIX

Idea ideae cuiuscumque affectionis corporis humani adaequatam humanae mentis cognitionem non involvit.

Demonstratio. Idea enim affectionis corporis humani (per prop. 27. huius) adaequatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit, sive eius naturam adaequate non exprimit, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) cum natura mentis non convenit adaequate. Adeoque (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) huius ideae idea adaequate humanae mentis naturam non exprimit, sive adaequatam eius cognitionem non involvit. Q. E. D.

[G II 114] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, mentem humanam, quoties ex communi naturae ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius, nec sui corporis, nec corporum externorum adaequatam, sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem.
Nam mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus ideas affectionum corporis percipit (per prop. 23. huius). Corpus autem suum (per prop. 19. huius) non percipit, nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas, per quas etiam tantum (per prop. 26. huius) corpora externa percipit. Atque adeo, quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (per prop. 29. huius), nec sui corporis (per prop. 27. huius), nec corporum externorum (per prop. 25. huius) habet adaequatam cognitionem, sed tantum (per prop. 28. huius cum eius schol.) mutilatam, et confusam. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Dico expresse, quod mens nec sui ipsius, nec sui corporis, nec corporum externorum adaequatam, sed confusam tantum, cognitionem[cv] habeat, quoties ex communi naturae ordine

[ct] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dat is (volgens de dartiende Voorstelling van dit deel), deeze Kennis is niet in God, voor zo veel hy de natuur van de menschelijke ziel stelt' ('that is (by the thirteenth Proposition of this Part), this knowledge is not in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 113; Textgestaltung II 362).
[cu] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'te weten dat zy verwart zijn' ('namely, that they are confused'), glossed *Confusae* in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 113; Textgestaltung II 363), and defends the scholium, which Saisset left out and Meijer, Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern thought a marginal gloss, as present in both redactions.
[cv] Gebhardt (G II 114; Textgestaltung II 363) inserts *et mutilatam* after *confusam tantum*, from the Dutch version (*een verwarde en verminkte kennis*, glossed *Confusa ac mutilata cognitio*) and as in the Corollary; the 1677 edition and Bartuschat lack it.

be affected by the human mind, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by other ideas. These ideas of affections, therefore, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are like consequences without premises,[157] that is (as is self-evident), confused ideas. Q.E.D.

Scholium. That the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind, considered in itself alone, is not clear and distinct is demonstrated in the same way; as also that the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the mind, are not clear and distinct; which anyone can easily see.

Cited in 2P29C [p. 175]

Proposition XXIX

The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Cited in 2P29C [p. 175], 4P64D [p. 433]

Demonstration. For the idea of an affection of the human body (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 173]) does not involve adequate knowledge of the body itself, or does not express its nature adequately, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), does not agree adequately with the nature of the mind. And so (by Ax. 6, Part I [p. 29]) the idea of this idea does not express the nature of the human mind adequately, or does not involve adequate knowledge of it. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that the human mind, whenever it perceives things from the common order of nature, has neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies an adequate knowledge, but only a confused and mutilated one.

For the mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 169]). And it does not perceive its own body (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 165]) except through these very ideas of affections, through which alone also (by Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 173]) it perceives external bodies. And so, insofar as it has these ideas, it has an adequate knowledge neither of itself (by Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 175]), nor of its own body (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 173]), nor of external bodies (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 171]), but only (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 173] with its Schol. [p. 175]) a mutilated and confused one. Q.E.D.

Cited in 2P40S2 [p. 189], 3P3D [p. 241]

Scholium. I say expressly that the mind has an adequate knowledge neither of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused one, whenever it perceives things from

[157] An inadequate idea is one whose causes are not in the mind that has it: it is had as a conclusion is had without the premises from which it follows. Adequate knowledge, by contrast, is knowledge through causes (Part I, Ax. 4 [p. 29]).

res percipit, hoc est, quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum, et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet, quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum. Quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.

Propositio XXX

Nos de duratione nostri corporis nullam nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus.

Demonstratio. Nostri corporis duratio ab eius essentia non dependet (per axiom. 1. huius), nec etiam ab absoluta Dei natura (per prop. 21. P. 1.). Sed (per prop. 28. P. 1.) ad existendum et operandum determinatur a talibus causis,[cw] quae etiam ab aliis determinatae sunt ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione, et hae iterum ab aliis, et sic in infinitum. Nostri igitur corporis duratio a communi naturae ordine et rerum constitutione pendet.

Qua autem ratione constitutae sint, eius rei adaequata cognitio datur in Deo, quatenus earum omnium ideas, et non quatenus tantum humani corporis ideam habet (per coroll. prop. 9. huius). Quare cognitio durationis nostri corporis est in Deo admodum inadaequata, quatenus tantum naturam mentis humanae constituere consideratur, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) haec cognitio est in nostra mente admodum inadaequata. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXI

[G II 115] *Nos de duratione rerum singularium, quae extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus.*

Demonstratio. Unaquaeque enim res singularis, sicuti humanum corpus, ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione; et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum (per prop. 28. P. 1.). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in praeced. prop. demonstraverimus, nos de duratione nostri corporis non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere; ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum, quod scilicet eius non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adaequatam cognitionem habere possumus (per prop. praeced.), et hoc est id, quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum. Vide schol. 1. prop. 33. P. 1. Nam (per prop. 29. P. 1.) praeter hoc nullum datur contingens.

[cw] The Dutch version of 1677 has 'van zodanige andere oorzaken' ('by such other causes'); Gebhardt prints *andere* in his text (G II 115; Textgestaltung II 363).

the common order of nature, that is, whenever it is determined externally, namely from the fortuitous encounter with things, to contemplate this or that, and not whenever it is determined internally, namely from the fact that it contemplates several things at once, to understanding their agreements, differences and oppositions. For whenever it is disposed internally, in this or another way, then it contemplates things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show below.[158]

Proposition XXX

We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.
Cited in 2P31D [p. 177]

Demonstration. The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (by Ax. 1 of this Part [p. 123]), nor on the absolute nature of God either (by Prop. 21, Part I [p. 73]). But (by Prop. 28, Part I [p. 79]) it is determined to exist and to operate by such causes as are also determined by others to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner, and these again by others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature and on the constitution of things.
But adequate knowledge of the manner in which things are constituted is in God insofar as he has the ideas of them all, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the human body (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 135]). So the knowledge of the duration of our body is very inadequate in God insofar as he is considered only to constitute the nature of the human mind, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXI

We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things that are outside us.
Cited in 2P31C [p. 177], 4P62S [p. 431]

Demonstration. For each singular thing, like the human body, must be determined by another singular thing to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner, and this again by another, and so on to infinity (by Prop. 28, Part I [p. 79]). But since from this common property of singular things we have demonstrated in the preceding Prop. [p. 177] that we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body, the same will have to be concluded about the duration of singular things, namely that we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of it. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration (by the preceding Prop. [p. 177]), and that is what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption. See Schol. 1 of Prop. 33, Part I [p. 87]. For (by Prop. 29, Part I [p. 81]) apart from this there is

[158] The contrast between external and internal determination prepares the theory of the common notions, which are adequate because they concern what is common to all things, or to the human body and the external bodies that affect it (Props. 37–39 [p. 183]), and the three kinds of knowledge of Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189].

Propositio XXXII

[G II 116] *Omnes ideae, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt.*

Demonstratio. Omnes enim ideae, quae in Deo sunt, cum suis ideatis omnino conveniunt[cx] (per coroll. prop. 7. huius); adeoque (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) omnes verae sunt. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXIII

Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur.

Demonstratio. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, modum positivum cogitandi, qui formam erroris, sive falsitatis constituat. Hic cogitandi modus non potest esse in Deo (per prop. praeced.); extra Deum autem etiam nec esse, nec concipi potest (per prop. 15. P. 1.). Atque adeo nihil potest dari positivum in ideis, propter quod falsae dicuntur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXIV

Omnis idea, quae in nobis est absoluta sive adaequata et perfecta, vera est.

Demonstratio. Cum dicimus, dari in nobis ideam adaequatam et perfectam, nihil aliud dicimus (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) quam quod in Deo, quatenus nostrae mentis essentiam constituit, detur idea adaequata et perfecta, et consequenter (per prop. 32. huius) nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod talis idea sit vera. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXV

Falsitas consistit in cognitionis privatione, quam ideae inadaequatae sive mutilatae et confusae involvunt.

[G II 117] Demonstratio. Nihil in ideis positivum datur, quod falsitatis formam constituat (per

[cx] Gebhardt (G II 116; Textgestaltung II 363) inserts *Objectis et* before *ideatis*, from the Dutch version (*met hun Voorwerpen en gedachte zaken*, glossed *Objecta*, *Ideatum*); the 1677 edition and Bartuschat lack it.

nothing contingent.[159]
Cited in 3DA15Ex [p. 325]

Proposition XXXII

All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.
Cited in 2P33D [p. 179], 2P34D [p. 179], 2P36D [p. 181], 4P1D [p. 359], 5P17D [p. 489]

Demonstration. For all ideas that are in God agree entirely with their objects (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]); and so (by Ax. 6, Part I [p. 29]) they are all true. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXIII

There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.
Cited in 2P35D [p. 179], 4P1D [p. 359]

Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, a positive mode of thinking which constitutes the form of error, or of falsity.[160] This mode of thinking cannot be in God (by the preceding Prop. [p. 179]); and outside God it can neither be nor be conceived (by Prop. 15, Part I [p. 49]). And so there can be nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXIV

Every idea which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.
Cited in 2P41D [p. 189], 2P43D [p. 191]

Demonstration. When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we are saying nothing else (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) than that there is an adequate and perfect idea in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our mind, and consequently (by Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 179]) we are saying nothing else than that such an idea is true. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXV

Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge[161] *which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.*
Cited in 2P41D [p. 189], 2P43S [p. 191], 2P49S [p. 211], 4P1D [p. 359]

Demonstration. There is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity (by

[159] Contingency is relative to our knowledge, as in Part I, Prop. 33, Schol. 1 [p. 87]; Part IV defines the contingent and the possible accordingly (Part IV, Defs. 3 [p. 355] and 4 [p. 355]).
[160] *formam erroris*, Descartes' phrase: for him the privation 'quae formam erroris constituit' lies in the misuse of free choice, 'in ipsa operatione, quatenus a me procedit' ('in the operation itself, insofar as it proceeds from me'; *Meditations* IV, AT VII 60). See Prop. 35 [p. 179] and Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 209].
[161] Descartes too calls error 'non ... pura negatio, sed privatio, sive carentia cujusdam cognitionis' ('not a pure negation, but a privation, or lack, of some knowledge'; *Meditations* IV, AT VII 55), but places it in the will's judging beyond what the intellect perceives. Spinoza keeps the privation and, having denied a will distinct from ideas (Prop. 49 [p. 209]), locates it in inadequate ideas themselves.

prop. 33. huius). At falsitas in absoluta privatione consistere nequit[cy] (mentes enim, non corpora errare nec falli dicuntur), neque etiam in absoluta ignorantia; diversa enim sunt ignorare et errare; quare in cognitionis privatione, quam rerum inadaequata cognitio sive ideae inadaequatae et confusae involvunt, consistit. Q. E. D.

Scholium. In schol. prop. 17. huius explicui, qua ratione error in cognitionis privatione consistit. Sed ad uberiorem huius rei explicationem exemplum dabo.
Nempe falluntur homines, quod se liberos esse putant;[cz] quae opinio in hoc solo consistit, quod suarum actionum sint conscii et ignari causarum a quibus determinantur. Haec ergo est eorum libertatis idea, quod suarum actionum nullam cognoscant causam. Nam quod aiunt, humanas actiones a voluntate pendere, verba sunt, quorum nullam habent ideam. Quid enim voluntas sit et quomodo moveat corpus, ignorant omnes; qui aliud iactant, et animae sedes et habitacula fingunt,[da] vel risum vel nauseam movere solent.

Sic cum solem intuemur, eum ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur; qui error in hac sola imaginatione non consistit, sed in eo, quod dum ipsum sic imaginamur, veram eius distantiam et huius imaginationis causam ignoramus. Nam tametsi postea cognoscamus, eundem ultra sescentos terrae diametros a nobis distare, ipsum nihilominus prope adesse imaginabimur; non enim solem adeo propinquum imaginamur, propterea quod veram eius distantiam ignoramus, sed propterea, quod affectio nostri corporis essentiam solis involvit, quatenus ipsum corpus ab eodem afficitur.

Propositio XXXVI

Ideae inadaequatae et confusae eadem necessitate consequuntur, ac adaequatae sive clarae ac distinctae ideae.

[G II 118] Demonstratio. Ideae omnes in Deo sunt (per prop. 15. P. 1.) et quatenus ad Deum referuntur, sunt verae (per prop. 32. huius) et (per coroll. prop. 7. huius) adaequatae; adeoque nullae inadaequatae nec confusae sunt, nisi quatenus ad singularem alicuius mentem referuntur. Qua de re vide prop. 24. et 28. huius). Adeoque omnes tam adaequatae, quam inadaequatae eadem necessitate (per coroll. prop. 6. huius) consequuntur. Q. E. D.

[cy] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'van kennis' ('of knowledge'): 'in an absolute privation of knowledge'. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 117; Textgestaltung II 363).
[cz] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dat is, zy achten dat zy vrywilliglijk iets konnen doen, of laten' ('that is, they think that they can voluntarily do or omit something'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 117; Textgestaltung II 363).
[da] The 1677 edition (OP p. 73) has *animae sedes, & habitacula*, without the first *et*; Gebhardt (G II 117; Textgestaltung II 363), with Leopold and after the Dutch version (*en zetels en woningen*), supplies it.

Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 179]). But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for it is minds, not bodies, that are said to err and be deceived), nor yet in absolute ignorance; for to be ignorant and to err are different. So it consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate knowledge of things, or inadequate and confused ideas, involve. Q.E.D.

Scholium. In Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161] I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge. But for a fuller explanation of this matter I shall give an example.
Namely, men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.[162] This, therefore, is their idea of freedom: that they know no cause of their actions. For when they say that human actions depend on the will, these are words of which they have no idea. For what the will is, and how it moves the body, they are all ignorant; those who boast otherwise, and feign seats and dwelling places of the soul,[163] usually provoke either laughter or disgust.
So when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us;[164] an error which does not consist in this imagining alone, but in the fact that while we imagine it so, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining. For even if we afterwards come to know that it is more than six hundred diameters of the earth away from us, we shall nonetheless imagine it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our body is affected by it.
Cited in 2P43S [p. 191], 2P49S [p. 211], 3DA27Ex [p. 329], 4P1S [p. 359], 5P5D [p. 479]

Proposition XXXVI

Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas.

Demonstration. All ideas are in God (by Prop. 15, Part I [p. 49]), and insofar as they are related to God they are true (by Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 179]) and (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) adequate; and so there are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of someone. (On this see Props. 24 [p. 171] and 28 of this Part [p. 173].) And so all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow with the same necessity (by Cor. of Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 129]). Q.E.D.

[162] As in the Appendix to Part I [p. 101], and again in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235].
[163] Aimed at Descartes' pineal gland, discussed at length in the Preface to Part V [p. 469].
[164] An old example. Aristotle: φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης ('the sun appears a foot across, though it is believed to be larger than the inhabited world'; *De anima* III.3, 428b3–4). Descartes finds in himself 'duas diversas solis ideas' ('two different ideas of the sun'), one from the senses, 'per quam mihi valde parvus apparet' ('by which it appears very small to me'), the other from astronomy, by which it is shown to be several times larger than the earth (*Meditations* III, AT VII 39). Spinoza adds that the first appearance persists after the second is known.

Propositio XXXVII

Id quod omnibus commune (de his vide supra lem. 2.), quodque aeque in parte ac in toto est, nullius rei singularis essentiam constituit.

Demonstratio. Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, id essentiam alicuius rei singularis constituere, nempe essentiam B. Ergo (per defin. 2 huius) id sine B non poterit esse, neque concipi. Atqui hoc est contra hypothesin. Ergo id ad essentiam B non pertinet, nec alterius rei singularis essentiam constituit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXVIII

Illa quae omnibus communia, quaeque aeque in parte ac in toto sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adaequate.

Demonstratio. Sit A aliquid, quod omnibus corporibus commune, quodque aeque in parte cuiuscumque corporis ac in toto est. Dico A non posse concipi, nisi adaequate. Nam eius idea (per coroll. prop. 7. huius) erit necessario in Deo adaequata, tam quatenus ideam corporis humani, quam quatenus ideas habet eiusdem affectionum, quae (per prop. 16., 25. et 27. huius) tam corporis humani, quam corporum externorum naturam ex parte involvunt, hoc est (per prop. 12. et 13. huius) haec idea erit necessario in Deo adaequata, quatenus mentem humanam constituit, sive quatenus ideas habet, quae in mente humana sunt. Mens igitur (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) A necessario adaequate percipit, idque tam quatenus se, quam quatenus suum vel quodcumque externum corpus percipit; nec A alio modo potest concipi. Q. E. D.

[G II 119] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, dari quasdam ideas sive notiones omnibus hominibus communes. Nam (per lem. 2.) omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quae (per prop. praeced.) ab omnibus debent adaequate sive clare et distincte percipi.

Propositio XXXIX

Id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis, a quibus corpus humanum affici solet, commune est, et proprium, quodque in cuiuscumque horum parte[db] *aeque ac in toto est, eius etiam idea erit in mente adaequata.*

Demonstratio. Sit A id quod corpori humano et quibusdam corporibus externis commune

[db] The 1677 edition (OP p. 75) has the words in a confused order: *Id, quod Corpori humano, & quibusdam corporibus externis, a quibus Corpus humanum affici solet, quodque in cujuscunque horum parte aeque, ac in toto commune est, & proprium, ejus etiam idea erit in Mente adaequata*. Gebhardt (G II 119; Textgestaltung II 363), after the Dutch version and the order of the demonstration, transposes *commune est, et proprium*, as do Baensch, Meijer, Appuhn and Halpern.

Proposition XXXVII

That which is common to all things (on which see Lemma 2 [p. 151] above), and which is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.

Cited in 2P44C2D [p. 197]

Demonstration. If you deny this, conceive, if it can be done, that it constitutes the essence of some singular thing, namely the essence of B. Then (by Def. 2 of this Part [p. 121]) it will not be able to be or be conceived without B. But this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not pertain to the essence of B, nor does it constitute the essence of any other singular thing. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXVIII

Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.[165]

Cited in 2P38C [p. 183], 2P44C2D [p. 197], 2P46D [p. 199], 5P4D [p. 475], 5P7D [p. 481]

Demonstration. Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and that is equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) will necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of its affections, which (by Props. 16 [p. 159], 25 [p. 171] and 27 of this Part [p. 173]) involve in part the nature both of the human body and of external bodies; that is (by Props. 12 [p. 141] and 13 of this Part [p. 141]), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human mind, or insofar as he has the ideas which are in the human mind. The mind therefore (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) necessarily perceives A adequately, and that both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own or any external body; nor can A be conceived in any other way. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men. For (by Lemma 2 [p. 151]) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by the preceding Prop. [p. 183]) must be perceived by all adequately, or clearly and distinctly.

Cited in 2P40S2 [p. 189], 3P3D [p. 241]

Proposition XXXIX

Of that which is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and which is equally in the part of each of these and in the whole, there will also be an adequate idea in the mind.

Cited in 2P40S2 [p. 189]

Demonstration. Let A be that which is common and proper to the human body and to

[165] The theory of the 'common notions' (named in Cor. [p. 183] and Prop. 40, Schol. 1 [p. 185]). Spinoza had used the term for axioms in the old sense (see the note on Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35]); here they become ideas of what is common to all bodies, or to the human body and those that affect it (Prop. 39 [p. 183]), and are adequate in every mind because nothing in them depends on what the mind lacks.

est et proprium, quodque aeque in humano corpore ac in iisdem corporibus externis, et quod denique aeque in cuiuscumque corporis externi parte ac in toto est. Ipsius A dabitur in Deo idea adaequata (per coroll. prop. 7. huius) tam quatenus ideam corporis humani, quam quatenus positorum corporum externorum ideas habet.
Ponatur iam humanum corpus a corpore externo affici per id quod cum eo habet commune, hoc est, ab A. Huius affectionis idea proprietatem A involvet (per prop. 16. huius); atque adeo (per idem coroll. prop. 7. huius) idea huius affectionis, quatenus proprietatem A involvit, erit in Deo adaequata, quatenus idea corporis humani affectus est, hoc est (per prop. 13. huius) quatenus mentis humanae naturam constituit. Adeoque (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) haec idea est etiam in mente humana adaequata. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod mens eo aptior est ad plura adaequate percipiendum, quo eius corpus plura habet cum aliis corporibus communia.

Propositio XL

[G II 120] *Quaecumque ideae in mente sequuntur ex ideis, quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, sunt etiam adaequatae.*

Demonstratio. Patet. Nam cum dicimus, in mente humana ideam sequi ex ideis, quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, nihil aliud dicimus (per coroll. prop. 11. huius) quam quod in ipso divino intellectu detur idea, cuius Deus est causa, non quatenus infinitus est, nec quatenus plurimarum rerum singularium ideis affectus est; sed quatenus tantum humanae mentis essentiam constituit.[dc]

Scholium I. His causam notionum,[dd] quae *communes* vocantur quaeque ratiocinii nostri fundamenta sunt, explicui. Sed aliae quorundam axiomatum sive notionum causae dantur, quas hac nostra methodo explicare e re foret. Ex iis namque constaret, quaenam notiones prae reliquis utiliores, quaenam vero vix ullius usus essent; deinde quaenam communes,[de] et quaenam iis tantum, qui praeiudiciis non laborant, clarae et distinctae; et quaenam denique male fundatae sint.
Praeterea constaret, unde notiones illae, quas *secundas* vocant, et consequenter axiomata, quae in iisdem fundantur, suam duxerunt originem, et alia, quae circa haec aliquando meditatus sum. Sed quoniam haec alii dicavi tractatui, et etiam, ne propter nimiam huius rei prolixitatem fastidium crearem, hac re hic supersedere decrevi.

[dc] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'en dieshalven moet het evenmatig wezen' ('and therefore it must be adequate'), glossed *Adaequata* in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 120; Textgestaltung II 363).
[dd] The 1677 edition and the Dutch version head this scholium simply *Scholium* (Dutch *Byvoegsel*), and the next *Scholium II*. Since Spinoza later cites both together as 'Schol. Prop. 40.' (G II 140, 228), Gebhardt concludes that he divided one scholium in two (Textgestaltung II 364).
[de] deinde quaenam communes] *transcr.* deinde quaeriam communes. The transcription reads 'quaeriam'; the 1677 edition (OP p. 76) and Gebhardt (G II 120) read 'quaenam'.

certain external bodies, and which is equally in the human body and in those external bodies, and which, finally, is equally in the part of each external body and in the whole. There will be in God an adequate idea of A (by Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) both insofar as he has the idea of the human body and insofar as he has the ideas of the external bodies supposed.
Suppose now that the human body is affected by an external body through what it has in common with it, that is, by A. The idea of this affection will involve the property A (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 159]); and so (by the same Cor. of Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 129]) the idea of this affection, insofar as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God insofar as he is affected by the idea of the human body, that is (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 141]), insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. And so (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately, the more its body has in common with other bodies.
Cited in 2P40S2 [p. 189]

Proposition XL

Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it are also adequate.
Cited in 2P40S2 [p. 189], 4P26D [p. 385], 4P52D [p. 419], 5P4S [p. 477], 5P31D [p. 509]

Demonstration. This is evident. For when we say that an idea follows in the human mind from ideas which are adequate in it, we are saying nothing else (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]) than that there is in the divine intellect itself an idea of which God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected by the ideas of very many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human mind.

Scholium I. With these things I have explained the cause of the notions which are called *common*, and which are the foundations of our reasoning. But there are other causes of certain axioms, or notions, which it would be to the purpose to explain by this method of ours. For from them it would be established which notions are more useful than the rest, and which are of hardly any use; next, which are common, and which are clear and distinct only to those who do not labour under prejudices; and which, finally, are ill founded.
Further, it would be established from what source those notions which they call *second* notions,[166] and consequently the axioms that are founded on them, have taken their origin, and other things which I have at some time thought about in this connection. But since I have devoted these matters to another treatise,[167] and also so as not to create tedium by too great a prolixity on this subject, I have decided to pass over this matter here.

[166] *notiones secundas*: in scholastic logic, 'second intentions', concepts of concepts, such as genus, species, predicate, as distinct from first intentions, concepts of things.
[167] Which treatise is not known. M. Gueroult suggests perhaps an improved and completed version of the unfinished *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (*Spinoza II: L'âme*, 1974, p. 364).

Attamen ne quid horum omittam, quod scitu necessarium sit, causas breviter addam, ex quibus *termini transcendentales* dicti suam duxerunt originem, ut ens, res, aliquid. Hi termini ex hoc oriuntur, quod scilicet humanum corpus, quandoquidem limitatum est, tantum est capax certi imaginum numeri (quid imago sit explicui in schol. prop. 17. huius) in se distincte simul formandi; qui si excedatur, hae imagines confundi incipient, et si hic imaginum numerus, quarum corpus est capax, ut eas in se simul distincte formet, longe excedatur, omnes inter se plane confundentur. Cum hoc ita se habeat, patet ex coroll. prop. 17. et prop. 18. huius, quod mens humana tot corpora distincte simul imaginari poterit, quot in ipsius corpore imagines possunt simul formari. At ubi imagines in corpore plane confunduntur, mens etiam omnia corpora confuse sine ulla distinctione imaginabitur et quasi sub uno attributo comprehendet, nempe sub attributo entis, rei, etc.

Potest hoc etiam ex eo deduci, quod imagines non semper aeque vigeant, et ex aliis causis his analogis, quas hic explicare non est opus; nam ad nostrum, ad quem collimamus, scopum unam tantum sufficit considerare. Nam omnes huc redeunt, quod hi termini ideas significent summo gradu confusas.

Ex similibus deinde causis ortae sunt notiones illae, quas *universales* vocant, ut homo, equus, canis etc., videlicet, quia[df] in corpore humano tot imagines, ex gr. hominum formantur simul, ut vim imaginandi, non quidem penitus, sed eo usque tamen superent, ut singulorum parvas differentias (videlicet uniuscuiusque colorem, magnitudinem etc.) eorumque determinatum numerum mens imaginari nequeat, et id tantum, in quo omnes, quatenus corpus ab iisdem afficitur, conveniunt, distincte imaginetur; nam ab eo corpus maxime, scilicet ab unoquoque singulari,[dg] affectum fuit; atque hoc nomine hominis exprimit, hocque de infinitis singularibus praedicat. Nam singularium determinatum numerum, ut diximus, imaginari nequit.

Sed notandum, has notiones non ab omnibus eodem modo formari, sed apud unumquemque variare pro ratione rei, a qua corpus affectum saepius fuit, quamque facilius mens imaginatur vel recordatur. Ex. gr. qui saepius cum admiratione hominum staturam contemplati sunt, sub nomine hominis intelligent[dh] animal erectae staturae; qui vero aliud assueti sunt contemplari, aliam hominum communem imaginem formabunt, nempe, hominem esse animal risibile, animal bipes, sine plumis, animal rationale; et sic de reliquis unusquisque pro dispositione sui corporis rerum universales imagines formabit. Quare non mirum est, quod inter philosophos, qui res naturales per solas rerum imagines explicare voluerunt, tot sint ortae controversiae.

[df] ut homo, equus, canis etc., videlicet, quia] *transcr.* ut homo, equus, canis etc. Videlicet quia. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 121; Textgestaltung II 364), after the Dutch version ('paert, hont enz. te weten') and Leopold; the 1677 edition (OP p. 77), which the transcription follows, ends the sentence after 'etc.'.

[dg] nam ab eo corpus maxime, scilicet ab unoquoque singulari] *transcr.* nam ab eo corpus, maxime scilicet ab unoquoque singulari. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 121; Textgestaltung II 364), after the Dutch version and Leopold; the 1677 edition, which the transcription follows, has 'corpus, maxime scilicet'.

[dh] The 1677 edition (OP p. 77) reads *intelliget*; Gebhardt (G II 121; Textgestaltung II 364) prints *intelligent*, which the plural subject requires.

Nevertheless, so as to omit nothing of these matters that is necessary to know, I shall add briefly the causes from which the terms called *transcendental*, such as being, thing, something,[168] have taken their origin. These terms arise from this, that the human body, since it is limited, is capable of forming in itself distinctly at the same time only a certain number of images (what an image is I have explained in Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]); and if this number is exceeded, these images will begin to be confused; and if this number of images which the body is capable of forming in itself distinctly at the same time is far exceeded, they will all be completely confused with one another. Since this is so, it is evident from Cor. of Prop. 17 [p. 161] and Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 163] that the human mind will be able to imagine distinctly at the same time as many bodies as there are images that can be formed at the same time in its body. But when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind too will imagine all bodies confusedly, without any distinction, and will comprehend them as it were under one attribute, namely under the attribute of being, thing, etc.

This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other causes analogous to these, which there is no need to explain here; for to our purpose, at which we aim, it is enough to consider only one. For they all come back to this, that these terms signify ideas confused in the highest degree.

From similar causes, next, have arisen those notions which they call *universal*, such as man, horse, dog, etc., namely because so many images, for example of men, are formed at the same time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining, not indeed completely, but still to the point that the mind cannot imagine the small differences of the individuals (namely the colour, size, etc. of each) and their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only that in which all agree, insofar as the body is affected by them; for by that the body has been affected most, namely by each individual; and this it expresses by the name man, and predicates it of infinitely many individuals. For, as we have said, it cannot imagine the determinate number of the individuals. But it is to be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same way, but vary in each according to the thing by which the body has more often been affected, and which the mind imagines or recollects more easily. For example, those who have more often contemplated the stature of men with wonder will understand by the name man an animal of erect stature; but those who are accustomed to contemplate something else will form another common image of men, namely that man is an animal capable of laughter, a featherless biped, a rational animal;[169] and so of the rest, each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his body. So it is no wonder that so many controversies have arisen among the philosophers who wished to explain natural things through mere images of things.

Cited in 3P55S [p. 303]

[168] The scholastic transcendentals, predicates that apply to every being and cut across the categories. Suárez: 'Solent communiter sex transcendentia numerari, ens, res, aliquid, unum, verum, bonum' ('six transcendentals are commonly counted: being, thing, something, one, true, good'; *Disputationes metaphysicae* III.2). Spinoza had treated the 'termini vulgo transcendentales dicti' in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (I.6, G I 245) as modes of thinking; here he gives them a physiological genealogy.

[169] Traditional definitions of man: *animal rationale*, the standard definition by genus and difference; *risibile*, the stock example of a property (*proprium*) in the logic of the predicables; 'featherless biped', the definition ascribed to Plato, which Diogenes the Cynic is said to have answered with a plucked cock: Πλάτωνος ὁρισαμένου, Ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον δίπουν ἄπτερον ('when Plato had defined: Man is a two-footed, featherless animal'; Diogenes Laertius VI.40).

[G II 122] Scholium II. Ex omnibus supra dictis clare apparet, nos multa percipere, et notiones universales formare 1. ex singularibus nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum repraesentatis (vide coroll. prop. 29. huius); et ideo tales perceptiones *cognitionem ab experientia vaga* vocare consuevi. 2. Ex signis, ex. gr. ex eo, quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur, et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis, per quas res imaginamur. Vide schol. prop. 18. huius. Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum *cognitionem primi generis, opinionem, vel imaginationem* in posterum vocabo.

3. Denique ex eo, quod notiones communes rerumque proprietatum ideas adaequatas habemus. Vide coroll. prop. 38. et 39. cum eius coroll. et prop. 40. huius. Atque hunc *rationem, et secundi generis cognitionem* vocabo. Praeter haec duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium quod *scientiam intuitivam* vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum.
Haec omnia unius rei exemplo explicabo. Dantur ex. gr. tres numeri ad quartum obtinendum, qui sit ad tertium, ut secundus ad primum. Non dubitant mercatores secundum in tertium ducere et productum per primum dividere; quia scilicet ea, quae a magistro absque ulla demonstratione audiverunt, nondum tradiderunt oblivioni, vel quia id saepe in numeris simplicissimis experti sunt, vel ex vi demonstr. prop. 19. libr. 7. Euclid.,[di] nempe ex communi proprietate proportionalium. At in numeris simplicissimis nihil horum opus est. Ex. gr. datis numeris 1, 2, 3 nemo non videt, quartum numerum proportionalem esse 6, atque hoc multo clarius, quia ex ipsa ratione, quam primum ad secundum habere uno intuitu videmus, ipsum quartum concludimus.

Propositio XLI

Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera.

[G II 123] Demonstratio. Ad primi generis cognitionem illas omnes ideas diximus in praeced.

[di] prop. 19. libr. 7. Euclid.] *transcr.* prop. 19. libr. 7. element. Euclid. 'element.' is not in the 1677 edition (OP p. 78) or Gebhardt (G II 122: 'Prop. 19. lib. 7. Euclid.').

Scholium II. From all that has been said above it is clearly evident that we perceive many things and form universal notions 1. from singulars represented to us through the senses in a mutilated, confused way and without order for the intellect (see Cor. of Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 175]); and for that reason I have been accustomed to call such perceptions *knowledge from random experience*.[170] 2. From signs, for example from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things and form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine the things (see Schol. of Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 165]). Both these ways of contemplating things I shall henceforth call *knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination*.
3. Finally, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see Cor. of Prop. 38 [p. 183], and Prop. 39 [p. 183] with its Cor. [p. 185], and Prop. 40 of this Part [p. 185]). And this I shall call *reason, and knowledge of the second kind*. Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I shall show in what follows, another, third kind, which we shall call *intuitive knowledge*.[171] And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall explain all these by the example of one thing. Suppose, for example, three numbers are given in order to obtain a fourth which is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first, either because they have not yet forgotten what they heard from their teacher without any demonstration, or because they have often found it so in the simplest numbers, or from the force of the demonstration of Prop. 19, Book VII of Euclid,[172] namely from the common property of proportionals. But in the simplest numbers none of this is needed. For example, given the numbers 1, 2, 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6, and this much more clearly, because from the very ratio which we see at a glance the first to have to the second, we infer the fourth itself.

Cited in 2P41D [p. 189], 2P42D [p. 191], 2P47S [p. 199], 3P1D [p. 233], 3P56D [p. 305], 3P58D [p. 309], 4P26D [p. 385], 4P27D [p. 387], 5P7D [p. 481], 5P10D [p. 483], 5P12D [p. 487], 5P25D [p. 505], 5P28D [p. 507], 5P31D [p. 509], 5P36S [p. 515]

Proposition XLI

Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, but knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Cited in 2P44D [p. 195], 2P44C2D [p. 197], 4P27D [p. 387], 4P35D [p. 393], 4P62D [p. 431]

Demonstration. We have said in the preceding Scholium [p. 189] that to knowledge of the

[170] *experientia vaga*, the phrase of the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, which counted four modes of perception: from hearsay or signs, from random experience ('ab experientia vaga, hoc est, ab experientia, quae non determinatur ab intellectu'), from an inadequate inference of a thing's essence from another, and from a thing's essence alone or its proximate cause (§19). The *Short Treatise* has three, and the same example of the rule of three (II.1, G I 54). Here the first two of the Treatise's modes are combined into one kind.

[171] *scientia intuitiva*. Its power over the affects and its relation to the intellectual love of God are the subject of Part V, Props. 25–36 [p. 505].

[172] ἐὰν τέσσαρες ἀριθμοὶ ἀνάλογον ὦσιν, ὁ ἐκ πρώτου καὶ τετάρτου γενόμενος ἀριθμὸς ἴσος ἔσται τῷ ἐκ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου γενομένῳ ἀριθμῷ ('if four numbers are proportional, the number produced from the first and fourth will be equal to the number produced from the second and third'; *Elements* VII.19, Heiberg). The *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* uses the same example and the same reference (§23; G II 12).

schol. pertinere, quae sunt inadaequatae, et confusae; atque adeo (per prop. 35. huius) haec cognitio unica est falsitatis causa. Deinde ad cognitionem secundi et tertii illas pertinere diximus, quae sunt adaequatae; adeoque (per prop. 34. huius) est necessario vera. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLII

Secundi et tertii, et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.

Demonstratio. Haec prop. per se patet. Qui enim inter verum, et falsum scit distinguere, debet adaequatam veri, et falsi habere ideam, hoc est (per schol. 2. prop. 40. huius) verum, et falsum secundo, aut tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.

Propositio XLIII

Qui veram habet ideam, simul scit se veram habere ideam, nec de rei veritate potest dubitare.

Demonstratio. Idea vera in nobis est illa, quae in Deo, quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur, est adaequata (per coroll. prop. 11. huius). Ponamus itaque, dari in Deo, quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur, ideam adaequatam A. Huius ideae debet necessario dari etiam in Deo idea, quae ad Deum eodem modo refertur, ac idea A (per prop. 20. huius, cuius demonstratio universalis est[dj]). At idea A ad Deum referri supponitur, quatenus per naturam mentis humanae explicatur; ergo etiam idea ideae A ad Deum eodem modo debet referri, hoc est (per idem coroll. prop. 11. huius) haec adaequata idea ideae A erit in ipsa mente, quae ideam adaequatam A habet; adeoque qui adaequatam habet ideam, sive (per prop. 34. huius) qui vere rem cognoscit, debet simul suae cognitionis adaequatam habere ideam, sive veram cognitionem, hoc est (ut per se manifestum) debet simul esse certus. Q. E. D.

[G II 124] Scholium. In schol. prop. 21. huius explicui, quid sit idea ideae. Sed notandum, praeced. prop. per se satis esse manifestam. Nam nemo, qui veram habet ideam, ignorat veram ideam summam certitudinem involvere. Veram namque habere ideam, nihil aliud significat, quam perfecte, sive optime rem cognoscere; nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest, nisi putet, ideam quid mutum instar picturae in tabula, et non modum cogitandi esse, nempe ipsum intelligere. Et

[dj] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'en tot alle denkbeelden toegepast kan worden' ('and can be applied to all ideas'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 123; Textgestaltung II 364).

first kind belong all those ideas which are inadequate and confused; and therefore (by Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 179]) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. Next, we have said that to knowledge of the second and third kinds belong those which are adequate; and therefore (by Prop. 34 of this Part [p. 179]) it is necessarily true. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLII

Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For he who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and the false, that is (by Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of this Part [p. 189]), he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

Proposition XLIII

He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea,[173] *and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.*

Cited in 2P43S [p. 191], 2P49S [p. 209], 3P58D [p. 309], 4P27D [p. 387], 4P52D [p. 419], 4P56D [p. 421], 4P62D [p. 431], 5P27D [p. 507]

Demonstration. A true idea in us is one which is adequate in God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]). Let us suppose, then, that there is in God, insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea A. Of this idea there must necessarily also be in God an idea which is related to God in the same way as idea A (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 167], whose demonstration is universal). But idea A is supposed to be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind; therefore the idea of idea A must also be related to God in the same way; that is (by the same Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), this adequate idea of idea A will be in the mind itself which has the adequate idea A. And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by Prop. 34 of this Part [p. 179]) who knows a thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge; that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be certain. Q.E.D.

Scholium. In the Scholium of Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 167] I have explained what the idea of an idea is. But it should be noted that the preceding Proposition [p. 191] is manifest enough through itself. For no one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea signifies nothing other than to know a thing perfectly, or in the best way; and indeed no one can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like

[173] Spinoza's answer to the demand for a criterion of truth. The *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* had put it so: 'ad certitudinem veritatis nullo alio signo sit opus, quam veram habere ideam' ('for the certainty of truth no other sign is needed than to have a true idea', §35), and 'veritas nullo egeat signo' ('truth needs no sign', §36). The Demonstration gives the ground: the certainty is the idea of the idea, which is not a second thing added to the idea but the same idea considered as a mode of thinking (Prop. 21, Schol. [p. 167]).

quaeso, quis scire potest, se rem aliquam intelligere, nisi prius rem intelligat? hoc est, quis potest scire, se de aliqua re certum esse, nisi prius de ea re certus sit?

Deinde quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest, quod norma sit veritatis? Sane sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est.

Atque his me ad has quaestiones respondisse puto; nempe, si idea vera,[dk] quatenus tantum dicitur cum suo ideato convenire, a falsa distinguitur, nihil ergo realitatis, aut perfectionis idea vera habet prae falsa (quandoquidem per solam denominationem extrinsecam[dl] distinguuntur), et consequenter neque etiam homo,[dm] qui veras, prae illo, qui falsas tantum ideas habet?[dn] Deinde unde fit, ut homines falsas habeant ideas? Et denique, unde aliquis certo scire potest,[do] se ideas habere, quae cum suis[dp] ideatis conveniant? Ad has, inquam, quaestiones me iam respondisse puto.
Nam quod ad differentiam inter ideam veram et falsam attinet, constat ex prop. 35. huius illam ad hanc sese habere, ut ens ad non-ens; falsitatis autem causas a prop. 19. usque ad 35. cum eius schol. clarissime ostendi. Ex quibus etiam apparet, quid homo, qui veras habet ideas, homini, qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit.[dq]

Quod denique ultimum attinet, nempe, undenam homo scire potest se habere ideam, quae[dr] cum suo ideato conveniat, id modo satis superque ostendi ex hoc solo oriri, quod ideam habet, quae cum suo ideato convenit, sive quod veritas sui sit norma. His adde, quod mens nostra, quatenus res vere percipit, pars est infiniti Dei intellectus (per coroll. prop. 11 huius); adeoque tam necesse est, ut mentis clarae et distinctae ideae verae sint, ac Dei ideae.

[dk] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'niet voor zo veel 't een wijze van denken, maar' ('not insofar as it is a mode of thinking, but'), glossed *Modus cogitandi* in the margin. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 364).
[dl] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'en niet door d'innerlijke afnoeming' ('and not by the intrinsic denomination'), glossed *Interna denominatio*. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365).
[dm] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of menschelijke ziel' ('or human mind'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365).
[dn] The 1677 edition (OP p. 80) and the Dutch version close the sentence with a period. Gebhardt (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365) prints a question mark, as Leopold proposed and as Appuhn reads; the sentence states the first of the three questions.
[do] certo scire potest] *transcr.* certo seire potest. Transcription slip; the 1677 edition (OP p. 80) and Gebhardt (G II 124) read 'scire'.
[dp] The Dutch version of 1677 has 'met hun voorwerpen, of gedachte zaken' ('with their objects, or thought things'), glossed *Objecta*, *Ideata*. Gebhardt prints 'voorwerpen Objecta of' before *ideatis* (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365); compare Prop. 32, Dem. [p. 179], where he puts the same Dutch into Latin.
[dq] quid homo, qui veras habet ideas, homini, qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit] *transcr.* quid inter hominem qui veras habet ideas et hominem qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit. As in the 1677 edition (OP p. 80) and Gebhardt (G II 124); the transcription has the normalized 'quid inter hominem ... et hominem ... intersit'.
[dr] The Dutch version of 1677 has 'met zijn voorwerp, of met de gedachte zaak' ('with its object, or with the thought thing'), glossed *Objectum*, *Ideatum*; and again, a line below (after *quod ideam habet, quae*), 'met zijn voorwerp, of'. Gebhardt prints 'met zijn voorwerp Objectum, of' and 'met zijn voorwerp, of' before *cum suo ideato* in his text (G II 124; Textgestaltung II 365).

a picture on a panel,[174] and not a mode of thinking, namely understanding itself. And, I ask, who can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands the thing? That is, who can know that he is certain about some thing unless he is first certain about that thing?
Next, what can there be clearer and more certain than a true idea, to be the standard of truth? Indeed, just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false.[175]
And with this I think I have answered these questions. Namely: if a true idea is distinguished from a false one only insofar as it is said to agree with its object, does a true idea then have no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished only by an extrinsic denomination[176]), and consequently does a man who has true ideas have none over one who has only false ones? Next, how does it happen that men have false ideas? And finally, whence can someone know for certain that he has ideas which agree with their objects? To these questions, I say, I think I have already answered.
For as regards the difference between a true and a false idea, it is established from Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 179] that the former is related to the latter as being to not-being. And the causes of falsity I have shown most clearly from Prop. 19 [p. 165] up to 35, with its Scholium [p. 181]. From which it is also apparent what difference there is between a man who has true ideas and a man who has only false ones.
As regards, finally, the last question, namely, whence a man can know that he has an idea which agrees with its object, I have just shown more than enough that this arises solely from the fact that he has an idea which agrees with its object, or that truth is its own standard. Add to this that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]); and so it is as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true as that God's ideas are.

Cited in 2P49S [p. 209], 4P27D [p. 387], 4P62D [p. 431]

[174] The image returns in the Scholium of Prop. 49 [p. 211], against those who regard ideas 'like mute pictures on a panel' and so do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Compare the explanation of Def. 3 [p. 121], where *conceptus* is preferred to *perceptio* because it expresses an action of the mind.

[175] *veritas norma sui et falsi est*. Spinoza gives the same answer, in nearly the same words, to Albert Burgh, who had asked how he knew his philosophy to be the best: 'Nam ego non praesumo, me optimam invenisse philosophiam, sed veram me intelligere scio. Quomodo autem id sciam, si roges, respondebo, eodem modo ac tu scis, tres angulos trianguli aequales esse duobus rectis ... est enim verum index sui et falsi' ('For I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, but I know that I understand the true one. If you ask how I know this, I shall answer: in the same way as you know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ... for the true is the index of itself and of the false'; Letter 76). There is no criterion outside true ideas by which they could be tested; the false is known as false only by the true.

[176] A denomination is extrinsic when it is taken from something outside the thing, as agreement with the object is taken from the object. The explanation of Def. 4 [p. 121] excludes it from the adequate idea, which has all the 'intrinsic denominations' of a true idea; the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* says that a true thought is distinguished from a false one 'non tantum per denominationem extrinsecam, sed maxime per intrinsecam' ('not only by an extrinsic denomination, but chiefly by an intrinsic one', §69; G II 26). The objection supposes that truth is nothing but agreement; Spinoza's reply (Prop. 35 [p. 179]) is that the true idea has positive being which the false one lacks.

Propositio XLIV

[G II 125] *De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias contemplari.*

Demonstratio. De natura rationis est res vere percipere (per prop. 41. huius), nempe (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) ut in se sunt, hoc est (per prop. 29. P. 1.) non ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias. Q. E. D.

Corollarium I. Hinc sequitur, a sola imaginatione pendere, quod res tam respectu praeteriti, quam futuri, ut contingentes contemplemur.

Scholium. Qua autem ratione hoc fiat, paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (prop. 17. huius cum eius coroll.) mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi praesentes imaginari, nisi causae occurrant, quae earum praesentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (prop. 18. huius) ostendimus, quod, si corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur, hoc est, ambo ut sibi praesentia contemplabitur, nisi causae occurrant, quae eorum praesentem existentiam secludant. Praeterea nemo dubitat, quin etiam tempus imaginemur, nempe ex eo, quod corpora alia aliis tardius vel celerius, vel aeque celeriter[ds] moveri imaginemur.

Ponamus itaque puerum, qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum et vespertina Simeonem, atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum. Ex prop. 18. huius patet, quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem caeli, quam die praecedenti viderit, partem percurrentem sive diem integrum, et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur, hoc est, Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur; et contra, si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus praeteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore praeterito imaginando; atque haec eo constantius, quo saepius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit.
Quod si aliquando contingat, ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Iacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino iam Simeonem, iam Iacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur. Fluctuabitur itaque eius imaginatio, et cum futuro tempore vespertino iam hunc, iam illum imaginabitur, hoc est, neutrum certo; sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque haec imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit, si imaginatio rerum sit, quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus praeteritum vel praesens contemplamur, et consequenter res tam ad tempus praesens, quam ad praeteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.

[ds] The 1677 edition (OP p. 81) prints *vel aeque celerius* and corrects it to *aeque celeriter* in its list of errata (*Sphalmata corrigenda*, p. 81 l. 26). Gebhardt (G II 125; Textgestaltung II 365) and Bartuschat read *celeriter*.

Proposition XLIV

It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary.
Cited in 2P44C2D [p. 197]

Demonstration. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 189]), namely (by Ax. 6 of Part I [p. 29]) as they are in themselves, that is (by Prop. 29 of Part I [p. 81]), not as contingent but as necessary. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. From this it follows that it depends on the imagination alone that we contemplate things as contingent, with respect to the past as well as the future.

Scholium. How this comes about I shall explain in a few words. We have shown above (Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161] with its Cor. [p. 161]) that the mind, even though things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines them as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Next (Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 163]) we have shown that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also, that is, it will contemplate both as present to itself, unless causes occur which exclude their present existence. Moreover, no one doubts that we also imagine time,[177] namely from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or equally quickly.

Let us suppose, then, a boy who yesterday, for the first time, saw Peter in the morning, Paul at noon and Simeon in the evening, and today again saw Peter in the morning. From Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 163] it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will immediately imagine the sun traversing the same part of the sky as he saw it traverse on the preceding day, or the whole day, and Peter together with the morning time, Paul with noon and Simeon with the evening; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simeon with relation to future time. And on the other hand, if he sees Simeon in the evening, he will refer Paul and Peter to past time, namely by imagining them together with past time; and he will do this the more constantly, the more often he has seen them in this same order.

But if it should ever happen that on some other evening he sees James instead of Simeon, then on the following morning he will imagine with the evening time now Simeon, now James, but not both together. For he is supposed to have seen only one of them in the evening, not both together. His imagination will therefore fluctuate,[178] and with the future evening time he will imagine now this one, now that one, that is, neither of them with certainty; but he will contemplate each as contingently future. And this fluctuation of the imagination will be the same if the imagination is of things which we contemplate in the same way with relation to past or present time; and consequently we shall imagine things related to present time, as well as to past or future time, as contingent.

[177] Time belongs to the imagination: it arises from comparing motions. Letter 12 [p. 541] calls time, measure and number 'aids of the imagination' (see the note on Prop. 45, Schol. [p. 197]).

[178] *fluctuabitur*. Part III builds on this: the 'fluctuation of mind' (*animi fluctuatio*) that arises from two contrary affects 'is related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination (see Schol. Prop. 44, Part II)' (Part III, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 255]). Contingency, on this account, is not in things but in the imagination's fluctuating between images.

[G II 126] Corollarium II. De natura rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere.

Demonstratio. De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut contingentes contemplari (per prop. praeced.). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (per prop. 41. huius)[dt] vere, hoc est (per axiom. 6. P. 1.) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per prop. 16. P. 1.) haec rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei aeternae naturae necessitas. Ergo de natura rationis est res sub hac aeternitatis specie contemplari. Adde, quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per prop. 38. huius) quae illa explicant, quae omnibus communia sunt, quaeque (per prop. 37. huius) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant; quaeque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione, sed sub quadam aeternitatis specie debent concipi. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLV

[G II 127] *Unaquaeque cuiuscumque corporis, vel rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.*

Demonstratio. Idea rei singularis actu existentis ipsius rei tam essentiam, quam existentiam necessario involvit (per coroll. prop. 8. huius). At res singulares (per prop. 15. P. 1.) non possunt sine Deo concipi; sed quia (per prop. 6. huius) Deum pro causa habent, quatenus sub attributo consideratur, cuius res ipsae modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideae (per axiom. 4. P. 1.) ipsarum attributi conceptum, hoc est (per defin. 6. P. 1.) Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem, hoc est, existentiam, quatenus abstracte concipitur et tanquam quaedam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existentiae, quae rebus singularibus tribuitur, propterea quod ex aeterna necessitate Dei naturae infinita infinitis modis sequuntur. Vide prop. 16. P. 1. Loquor, inquam, de ipsa existentia rerum singularium, quatenus in Deo sunt.
Nam etsi unaquaeque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum; vis tamen,

[dt] The 1677 edition (OP p. 82) prints *per Prop. 4. hujus* and corrects it to *per Prop. 41. hujus* in its list of errata in the references (*Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda*, p. 82 l. 21). Gebhardt (G II 126) and Bartuschat read *41*.

Cited in 2P49S [p. 209], 3P17S [p. 255], 3P18D [p. 257], 3P18S1 [p. 257], 4P62S [p. 431]

Corollary II. It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity.[179]
Cited in 4P62D [p. 431], 5P29D [p. 507]

Demonstration. For it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary and not as contingent (by the preceding Prop. [p. 195]). And it perceives this necessity of things truly (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 189]), that is (by Ax. 6 of Part I [p. 29]), as it is in itself. But (by Prop. 16 of Part I [p. 65]) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God's eternal nature. Therefore it is of the nature of reason to contemplate things under this species of eternity. Add that the foundations of reason are notions (by Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 183]) which explain those things that are common to all, and which (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 183]) explain the essence of no singular thing; and which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLV

Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Cited in 2P46D [p. 199], 2P47D [p. 199], 5P20S [p. 491], 5P29S [p. 509]

Demonstration. The idea of a singular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the essence and the existence of the thing itself (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 133]). But singular things (by Prop. 15 of Part I [p. 49]) cannot be conceived without God; but because (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 129]) they have God for a cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which the things themselves are modes, their ideas must necessarily (by Ax. 4 of Part I [p. 29]) involve the concept of their attribute, that is (by Def. 6 of Part I [p. 27]), the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Scholium. By existence I do not understand here duration, that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity.[180] For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature. See Prop. 16 of Part I [p. 65]. I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God.
For even though each is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the

[179] *sub quadam aeternitatis specie*: the first occurrence of the formula that governs the second half of Part V (Prop. 22 [p. 503], Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503], Props. 29–31 [p. 507], Prop. 36 [p. 515]). *Species* is 'look, aspect, form' as well as 'kind'; 'species' is kept so as not to choose between them. Spinoza qualifies it here with *quadam* ('a certain'), and again at the end of the Demonstration; Part V drops the qualifier (*sub aeternitatis specie*, *sub specie aeternitatis*). The Demonstration gives two grounds: reason perceives things as necessary, and that necessity is the necessity of God's eternal nature; and the common notions on which reason rests contain no reference to time.

[180] Duration measured, as by time. Letter 12 [p. 541], to Lodewijk Meyer: 'ex eo, quod durationem et quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur tempus et mensura' ('from the fact that we can determine duration and quantity as we please, namely when we conceive the latter abstracted from substance and separate the former from the way in which it flows from eternal things, there arise time and measure'); time, measure and number are therefore 'nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining'. On duration see Def. 5 [p. 123].

qua unaquaeque in existendo perseverat, ex aeterna necessitate naturae Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide coroll. prop. 24. P. 1.

Propositio XLVI

Cognitio aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei, quam unaquaeque idea involvit, est adaequata et perfecta.

Demonstratio. Demonstratio praeced. prop. universalis est, et sive res ut pars, sive ut totum consideretur, eius idea sive totius sit sive partis (per prop. praeced.), Dei aeternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id quod cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei dat, omnibus commune et aeque in parte, ac in toto est, adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) erit haec cognitio adaequata. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLVII

[G II 128] *Mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.*

Demonstratio. Mens humana ideas habet[du] (per prop. 22. huius) ex quibus (per prop. 23. huius) se suumque corpus (per prop. 19. huius) et (per coroll. 1. prop. 16.[dv] et per prop. 17. huius) corpora externa ut actu existentia percipit; adeoque (per prop. 45. et 46. huius) cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei habet adaequatam. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hinc videmus, Dei infinitam essentiam eiusque aeternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur, nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere, quae adaequate cognoscamus, atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare, de quo diximus in schol. 2. prop. 40. huius, et de cuius praestantia et utilitate in P. 5. erit nobis dicendi locus.
Quod autem homines non aeque claram Dei, ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit, quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora, et quod nomen Deus iunxerunt imaginibus rerum, quas videre solent;[dw] quod homines vix vitare possunt, quia continuo a corporibus externis

[du] Mens humana ideas habet] *transcr.* mens humana ideas habet. Capital as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 84) and Gebhardt (G II 128).
[dv] The 1677 edition (OP p. 84) cites *per Coroll. Prop. 16.*; Proposition 16 has two corollaries. Van Vloten–Land make the reference precise, and Gebhardt (G II 128; Textgestaltung II 365) follows them; Bartuschat keeps the 1677 reading.
[dw] The 1677 edition (OP p. 84) has a comma here; the Dutch version begins a new clause (*'t welk de menschen...*). Gebhardt (G II 128; Textgestaltung II 365) prints a semicolon, as Leopold proposed, so that *quod* is relative ('which'), not causal.

force by which each perseveres in existing[181] follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. On this see Cor. of Prop. 24 of Part I [p. 77].
Cited in 5P29S [p. 509]

Proposition XLVI

The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.
Cited in 2P47D [p. 199], 5P18D [p. 491], 5P31D [p. 509]

Demonstration. The demonstration of the preceding Proposition [p. 197] is universal, and whether a thing is considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or of a part, will (by the preceding Prop. [p. 197]) involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. Therefore that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; and so (by Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 183]) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLVII

The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Cited in 4P36D [p. 397], 4P36S [p. 397], 4P37D [p. 397], 5P18D [p. 491]

Demonstration. The human mind has ideas (by Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 169]) from which (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 169]) it perceives itself, and its own body (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 165]), and (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 16 [p. 159] and by Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]) external bodies as actually existing; and so (by Props. 45 [p. 197] and 46 of this Part [p. 199]) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From this we see that God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge very many things which we know adequately, and so form that third kind of knowledge[182] of which we spoke in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of this Part [p. 189], and of whose excellence and usefulness there will be occasion to speak in Part V [p. 469].
That men do not have as clear a knowledge of God as they have of the common notions comes from this: that they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and that they have joined the name *God* to the images of things[183] which they are accustomed to see; which men can hardly avoid,

[181] *vis, qua unaquaeque in existendo perseverat*: an anticipation of the *conatus* of Part III, the striving by which each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being (Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]), and which is nothing but its actual essence (Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243]). The cited Corollary had said that God is the cause not only of things' beginning to exist but also of their persevering in existing. The two orders of determination are distinguished here: each thing is determined to exist by another finite thing (Part I, Prop. 28 [p. 79]), but the force of its existing is God's.
[182] Intuitive knowledge proceeds 'from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things' (Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]); Props. 45–47 have shown that every mind has that starting point. Its 'excellence and usefulness' are the subject of Part V, Props. 25–36 [p. 505].
[183] On the images men form of God see the Appendix to Part I [p. 101] and Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 49]; on words joined to images, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 165] and Prop. 40, Schol. 1 [p. 185]. The distinction between words and ideas is drawn in the Scholium of Prop. 49 [p. 211].

afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt, quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait, lineas, quae ex centro circuli ad eiusdem circumferentiam ducuntur, esse inaequales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit, quam mathematici.

Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare, quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros, qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare,[dx] quem nuper audivi clamantem, suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini, quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur.

Atque hinc pleraeque oriuntur controversiae, nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant, vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant,[dy] ita ut, quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.

[dx] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'hoewel zijn woorden ongerijmt waren' ('although his words were absurd'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 128; Textgestaltung II 365); Leopold proposed the Latin *quamquam eius verba absurda essent*.
[dy] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 85) and Gebhardt (G II 129). The Dutch version has 'hebben zy of de zelfde gedachten, of zy denken op verscheide dingen' ('either they have the same thoughts, or they are thinking about different things'), whence Leopold's *vel de diversis rebus cogitant*, which Appuhn and Bartuschat print; Gebhardt gives it only in the Textgestaltung (II 365). The sense is the same: either the disputants mean the same thing in different words, or they are not talking about the same thing.

because they are continually affected by external bodies. And indeed most errors consist in this alone, that we do not apply names to things correctly. For when someone says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he certainly understands by a circle, at least at that moment, something other than mathematicians do.

So when men err in calculating, they have some numbers in their mind and others on the paper. And so if you look to their mind, they certainly do not err; they seem to err, however, because we think that they have in their mind the numbers which are on the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe that they err at all; just as I did not believe that a man was in error whom I recently heard shouting that his courtyard had flown into his neighbour's hen,[184] because what he had in mind seemed to me plain enough.

And from this arise most controversies: namely, because men do not explain their mind correctly, or because they interpret another's mind badly. For in truth, while they contradict one another most, they think either the same things or different things, so that what they think are errors and absurdities in the other are not.

Cited in 2P49S [p. 211], 4P36D [p. 397], 5P10D [p. 483], 5P20S [p. 491], 5P36S [p. 515]

[184] He meant that the neighbour's hen had flown into his yard. *Mens* here, as in the sentences before and after, is what someone has in mind: his meaning. The words were absurd (as the Dutch version adds), but there was no error, since the error would have to be in the mind.

Will and Intellect

Part II ends with two propositions about the will and the longest scholium of the Part. They draw the consequence of everything said about ideas. They are also polemical, directed at a doctrine of the will which Spinoza expects his reader to know and does not set out, and they are easier to follow with that doctrine in view. Prop. 48 [p. 207] denies that there is in the mind any absolute or free will: the mind is a determinate mode of thinking, and so (Part I, Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67]; Prop. 28 [p. 79]) each volition is determined by a cause, which is determined by another, and so to infinity. Prop. 49 [p. 209] says what a volition is: nothing but the affirmation or negation that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. Its corollary is the thesis the whole scholium defends: "will and intellect are one and the same."

Descartes' theory of judgment

The opponent is Descartes, though Spinoza does not name him here. In the fourth *Meditation* Descartes explains error by the relation of two faculties. The intellect is finite; the will is not. "Sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius maioris ideam apprehendam" ("It is only the will, or freedom of choice, that I experience in myself as so great that I apprehend the idea of none greater"), and it is chiefly by the will that I bear the image and likeness of God (AT VII 57). Error comes from this disproportion: "cum latius pateat voluntas quam intellectus, illam non intra eosdem limites contineo, sed etiam ad illa quae non intelligo extendo" ("since the will extends more widely than the intellect, I do not keep it within the same limits, but extend it also to things I do not understand", AT VII 58). The *Principles* make the doctrine systematic. There are only two modes of thinking, the perception of the intellect and the operation of the will, and affirming and denying belong to the second (I.32); judgment needs the will as well as the intellect, for the intellect only presents and the will assents (I.34); the will "can be called in a certain way infinite" (I.35); and its freedom is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions innate in us, as we found when, even supposing an all-powerful deceiver, we could still refrain from believing what was not certain (I.39; AT VIII-1 17–20). The remedy for error follows: withhold assent wherever perception is not clear and distinct.

The theory did more than explain error. It allowed Descartes to hold that God, who gave us both faculties, is not the cause of our mistakes. The intellect is finite but contains no falsity; the will is as perfect as a will can be; error arises only from our use of the will, when we affirm or deny what we do not clearly perceive, and then "libertate arbitrii non recte utor" ("I do not use my freedom of choice rightly"), and am at fault even if I happen to hit on the truth (AT VII 59–60). The responsibility for error, and with it the possibility of avoiding error, rests on the freedom of the will. Spinoza's denial of that freedom therefore had to supply another account both of what error is and of how it is overcome.

Spinoza's reply

Spinoza's reply has two parts. The first is that there is no faculty of willing over and above singular volitions. Faculties of understanding, desiring, loving and willing are either wholly fictitious or "metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are accustomed to form from particulars", so that the will is related to this or that volition as stoneness to this or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul

(Prop. 48, Schol. [p. 207]). He had put it the same way to Oldenburg years before: "voluntas differt ab hac et illa volitione, eodem modo ac albedo ab hoc et illo albo, sive humanitas ab hoc et illo homine" ("the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as whiteness from this or that white thing, or humanity from this or that man"), and it is as impossible to conceive the will as the cause of a volition as humanity as the cause of Peter and Paul (Letter 2; VVL[3] III 6). The second part is that a singular volition is not something added to an idea. The demonstration of Prop. 49 takes the affirmation that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. It cannot be or be conceived without the idea of the triangle, and the idea of the triangle cannot be or be conceived without it; by the definition of essence (Def. 2 [p. 121]) the affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea and is nothing besides it. The idea is not "something mute, like a picture on a panel" (Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]) waiting for the will to say yes to it. It is itself an act of affirming. The Cartesian division of judgment between a presenting intellect and an assenting will disappears.

Images, words and ideas

Before answering objections, the scholium to Prop. 49 asks the reader to make two distinctions, which Spinoza thinks most people neglect: between an idea and the images of things that we imagine, and between ideas and the words by which we signify things. "Because these three, namely images, words and ideas, are by many either altogether confused, or not distinguished accurately enough, or finally not cautiously enough, they have been altogether ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which it is absolutely necessary to know, both for speculation and for arranging life wisely" (Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 209]).

Each confusion produces a characteristic mistake. Those who think that ideas consist in images formed in us by the encounter of bodies conclude that where we can form no image there is no idea, only a fiction made by the free choice of the will; "they look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel," and do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Those who confuse words with ideas think they can will contrary to what they perceive, because by words alone they can affirm or deny the contrary. But to affirm something in words is not to affirm it in thought. Words and images are bodily motions, and "do not at all involve the concept of thought"; an idea, which is a mode of thinking, "consists neither in the image of some thing nor in words." The appearance of a will that can assent or refuse at pleasure comes, on this account, from treating the verbal expression of a judgment, or the image that accompanies it, as if it were the judgment itself.

Two senses of "will"

"Will" in this sense means the faculty of affirming and denying, "not desire", as the scholium to Prop. 48 is careful to say. In Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245] the word returns with another sense: the striving by which each thing perseveres in its being is called will "when it is related to the mind alone", and appetite when it is related to mind and body together. The two uses do not conflict, but the reader should keep them apart.

The four objections

The scholium to Prop. 49 then answers four objections. That the will extends further than the intellect is true, Spinoza replies, if "intellect" means only clear and distinct ideas; it does not

extend further than our perceptions, and the "infinity" of the will is only the universality of an abstract idea, which is said equally of one, of many and of infinitely many individuals. That we can suspend judgment is denied: to suspend judgment is to perceive that one does not perceive the thing adequately, so that suspension is itself a perception. A boy who imagined a winged horse and perceived nothing else would contemplate the horse as present and could not doubt its existence; to perceive a winged horse is to affirm wings of a horse. That all affirmations seem equal in reality, while ideas differ in perfection, confuses the affirmation abstractly conceived, which is the same in all ideas as a universal is the same in its instances, with singular affirmations, which differ as their ideas differ; and a true and a false affirmation are related as being to not-being. The third reply ends with the warning that we are easily deceived "when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real beings."

Buridan's ass

The fourth objection is the ass of Buridan. If man does not act from freedom of the will, what will happen when he is in equilibrium, like Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? The dilemma is older than the name attached to it. Aristotle, discussing why the earth stays at the centre, mentions the argument about "τοῦ πεινῶντος καὶ διψῶντος σφόδρα μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐδωδίμων καὶ ποτῶν ἴσον ἀπέχοντος (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον ἠρεμεῖν ἀναγκαῖον)" ("the man who is very hungry and thirsty, and equally so, and is equally distant from food and drink, for he too must stay where he is", *De caelo* II.13, 295b31–34). Spinoza's answer is to grant the conclusion: such a man, perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst and food and drink equally distant, will die of hunger and thirst; and whether he should be counted a man or an ass, he does not know, any more than he knows how to count a man who hangs himself, or children, fools and madmen. The answer is the reverse of the one given under Spinoza's name in 1663, in the *Metaphysical Thoughts* appended to his exposition of Descartes' *Principles*: "si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus in tali aequilibrio positum, homo non pro re cogitante, sed pro turpissimo asino erit habendus, si fame et siti pereat" ("for if we put a man in place of the ass, placed in such an equilibrium, the man would be considered not a thinking thing but the most shameful ass, if he perished of hunger and thirst", II.12; VVL² III 230). But that book expounded Descartes, and Lodewijk Meyer's preface had warned the reader that its author did not share the Cartesian view of the will: he thought he could demonstrate "voluntatem ab intellectu non distingui, multo minus ea, quam illi Cartesius adscribit, pollere libertate; quin imo ipsam affirmandi et negandi facultatem prorsus fictitiam" ("that the will is not distinct from the intellect, much less endowed with the freedom Descartes ascribes to it; indeed, that the faculty of affirming and denying is wholly fictitious", VVL² III 112). Prop. 49 and its scholium are that demonstration.

Error and responsibility without free will

What replaces Descartes' remedy for error? If we cannot suspend judgment at will, we cannot avoid error by restraining the will; and Spinoza does not think we can. To suspend judgment is itself to perceive that we do not perceive the thing adequately. What we can do is have better ideas. A false idea is not corrected by an act of refusal but by an idea that excludes it, as the boy's image of a winged horse is undone only when he perceives something that excludes its existence. The improvement of the intellect, which Spinoza had made the subject of an early work, the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, takes the place of the discipline of the will, and the *Ethics* itself is meant to be such an improvement. The same structure returns in Part V, where

"the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone" (Part V, Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]).

A natural objection is that without free will there can be neither praise nor blame, neither merit nor sin, and Spinoza's correspondents pressed it on him. His answer, in a late letter to Oldenburg, is that men can be excusable and still lack blessedness and suffer in many ways. "A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but nonetheless it must be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of a dog is indeed to be excused, and yet he is rightly strangled. And he, finally, who cannot govern his desires and restrain them by fear of the laws, although he too is to be excused on account of his weakness, cannot enjoy peace of mind and the knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes" (Letter 78; VVL[3] III 237). The denial of free will does not abolish the difference between the wise and the foolish, or between what is good for us and what is bad; it changes the way we regard it. That change of regard is the subject of the last section of the scholium.

The uses of the doctrine

The last section of the scholium turns to the uses of the doctrine. It teaches that we act by God's decree alone and share in the divine nature, the more so the more perfect our actions and the more we understand God, and that our highest happiness consists in the knowledge of God alone; so that those who expect to be rewarded for virtue, as if for the utmost servitude, are far from a true estimate of it, since virtue and the service of God are themselves happiness and the highest freedom. It teaches us to bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind, since everything follows from God's eternal decree as necessarily as the properties of a triangle from its essence. It teaches us to hate, despise, mock and envy no one, and to help others from the guidance of reason alone, not from womanish compassion, partiality or superstition. And it teaches how citizens are to be governed: not so that they may be slaves, but so that they may freely do what is best. Each of these is the program of a later Part: the ethics of reason in Part IV, the freedom and blessedness of the mind in Part V, the state in Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401] and, at length, in the unfinished *Political Treatise*. The cross-reference for the third read "in the third Part" in the 1677 edition; Gebhardt corrects it to the fourth, taking it for a survival from the time when the work was divided into three parts.

The text resumes with Prop. 48 and its scholium on faculties. The scholium to Prop. 49 announces its own plan: first, some points needed for a fuller explanation of the proposition, chiefly the distinction between ideas on the one hand and images and words on the other; then the replies to the objections, taken in order and numbered; and last the advantages of the doctrine, also numbered. With it Part II ends, and Part III begins its account of the affects.

Propositio XLVIII

[G II 129] *In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas, sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum.*

Demonstratio. Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per prop. 11. huius), adeoque (per coroll. 2. prop. 17. P. 1.) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera, sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest; sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per prop. 28. P. 1.) determinari debet a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum ab alia, etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi, etc. Unde sequitur, has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias, vel nihil esse praeter entia metaphysica sive universalia, quae ex particularibus formare solemus; adeo ut intellectus, et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam, vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant, ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem, vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem, cur homines se liberos esse putent, explicuimus in app. P. 1.

Verum, antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum, me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem, inquam, intelligo, qua mens, quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat, et non cupiditatem, qua mens res appetit vel aversatur.

At postquam demonstravimus, has facultates notiones esse universales, quae a singularibus, ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum iam est, an ipsae volitiones aliquid sint praeter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum, inquam, est, an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur praeter illam, quam idea, quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide seq. prop., ut et defin. 3. huius, ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines, quales in fundo oculi, et, si placet, in medio cerebro formantur, sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.[dz]

[dz] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of het voorwerpelijk wezen van een zaak, voor zo veel 't alleenlijk in denking bestaat' ('or the objective being of a thing, insofar as it exists only in thinking'), glossed *Esse objectivum*. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 130; Textgestaltung II 366); Leopold proposed the Latin *sive esse obiectivum rei, quatenus tantum in cogitatione existit*.

Proposition XLVIII

In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will; but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.

Cited in 2P49D [p. 209], 2P49CD [p. 209], 3DA6Ex [p. 321]

Demonstration. The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 139]), and so (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 17 of Part I [p. 67]) it cannot be the free cause of its own actions, or cannot have an absolute faculty of willing and not willing; but it must be determined to will this or that (by Prop. 28 of Part I [p. 79]) by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. In this same way it is demonstrated that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. From this it follows that these and similar faculties are either altogether fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are accustomed to form from particulars; so that intellect and will are related to this or that idea, or to this or that volition, in the same way as stoneness is related to this or that stone,[185] or man to Peter and Paul. The cause why men think themselves free, however, we have explained in the Appendix of Part I [p. 101].

But before I go further, it should be noted here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, and not desire;[186] I understand, I say, the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or what is false, and not the desire by which the mind wants things or is averse to them.

But now that we have demonstrated that these faculties are universal notions, which are not distinguished from the singulars from which we form them, we must inquire whether the volitions themselves are anything besides the very ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any other affirmation and negation besides that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves (on which see the following Proposition [p. 209], and also Def. 3 of this Part [p. 121], so that thought does not fall into pictures[187]). For by ideas I do not understand images such as are formed at the back of the eye and, if you like, in the middle of the brain,[188] but concepts of

[185] Universals formed from particulars were explained in Prop. 40, Schol. 1 [p. 185]. Spinoza had made the same point to Oldenburg: 'voluntas differt ab hac et illa volitione, eodem modo ac albedo ab hoc et illo albo, sive humanitas ab hoc et illo homine' ('the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as whiteness from this or that white thing, or humanity from this or that man'), so that it is as impossible to conceive the will as the cause of this or that volition as to conceive humanity as the cause of Peter and Paul (Letter 2). The faculties of the scholastic and Cartesian psychology are, on this account, beings of reason.

[186] Descartes counted affirming and denying, together with desiring and being averse, among the 'modes of willing' (*Principles* I.32). Spinoza separates them: the will of Props. 48–49 is the faculty of judgment. In Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245] the word has another use, for the striving of each thing to persevere in its being 'when it is related to the mind alone', and desire is there defined as appetite together with consciousness of it. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 365–366) records W. Meijer's proposal to emend this sentence and Baensch's view that it preserves the distinction of will and desire from the *Short Treatise*; he rejects both, observing that the Dutch version has the same text and that Part III itself distinguishes *voluntas* from *cupiditas*.

[187] Compare Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]: no one can doubt that a true idea involves certainty 'unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a panel'. The explanation of Def. 3 [p. 121] had preferred *conceptus* to *perceptio* because a concept expresses an action of the mind.

[188] The images are Descartes'. In the *Passions of the Soul* light reflected from an animal 'en peint deux images, une en chacun de nos yeux' ('paints two images of it, one in each of our eyes'), which are joined, by way of the optic nerves and the animal spirits, in the small gland 'qui est au milieu du cerveau' ('which is in the middle of the brain'), where the soul exercises its functions (arts. 31, 35). *Si placet* ('if you like') marks Spinoza's distance from the doctrine, which he criticizes in the Preface to Part V [p. 469].

Propositio XLIX

[G II 130] *In mente nulla datur volitio sive affirmatio et negatio praeter illam, quam idea, quatenus idea est, involvit.*

Demonstratio. In mente (per prop. praeced.) nulla datur absoluta facultas volendi et nolendi, sed tantum singulares volitiones, nempe haec et illa affirmatio, et haec et illa negatio. Concipiamus itaque singularem aliquam volitionem, nempe modum cogitandi, quo mens affirmat, tres angulos trianguli aequales esse duobus rectis. Haec affirmatio conceptum, sive ideam trianguli involvit, hoc est, sine idea trianguli non potest concipi. Idem enim est, si dicam, quod A conceptum B debeat involvere, ac quod A sine B non possit concipi. Deinde haec affirmatio (per axiom. 3. huius) non potest etiam sine idea trianguli esse. Haec ergo affirmatio sine idea trianguli nec esse, nec concipi potest. Porro haec trianguli idea hanc eandem affirmationem involvere debet, nempe, quod tres eius anguli aequentur duobus rectis. Quare et vice versa haec trianguli idea sine hac affirmatione nec esse nec concipi potest; adeoque (per defin. 2. huius) haec affirmatio ad essentiam ideae trianguli pertinet, nec aliud praeter ipsam est. Et quod de hac volitione diximus (quandoquidem eam ad libitum sumpsimus), dicendum etiam est de quacumque volitione, nempe, quod praeter ideam nihil sit. Q. E. D.

[G II 131] Corollarium. Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.

Demonstratio. Voluntas et intellectus nihil praeter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt (per prop. 48. huius et eiusdem schol.). At singularis volitio et idea (per prop. praeced.) unum et idem sunt. Ergo voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt. Q. E. D.

Scholium. His causam, quae communiter erroris esse statuitur, sustulimus. Supra autem ostendimus, falsitatem in sola privatione, quam ideae mutilatae, et confusae involvunt, consistere. Quare idea falsa, quatenus falsa est, certitudinem non involvit. Cum itaque dicimus, hominem in falsis acquiescere, nec de iis dubitare, non ideo ipsum certum esse, sed tantum non dubi-

thought.
Cited in 2P49CD [p. 209]

Proposition XLIX

There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, besides that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves.
Cited in 2P48S [p. 207], 2P49CD [p. 209], 2P49S [p. 209], 3P2S [p. 235]

Demonstration. There is in the mind (by the preceding Prop. [p. 207]) no absolute faculty of willing and not willing, but only singular volitions, namely this and that affirmation, and this and that negation. Let us conceive, then, some singular volition, namely the mode of thinking by which the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the concept, or idea, of the triangle, that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. For it is the same whether I say that A must involve the concept of B, or that A cannot be conceived without B. Next, this affirmation (by Ax. 3 of this Part [p. 123]) also cannot be without the idea of the triangle. This affirmation, therefore, can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of the triangle. Further, this idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Therefore, conversely, this idea of the triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation; and so (by Def. 2 of this Part [p. 121]) this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle,[189] and is nothing besides it. And what we have said of this volition (since we took it at random) must also be said of any volition, namely that it is nothing besides the idea. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Will and intellect are one and the same.[190]

Demonstration. Will and intellect are nothing besides the singular volitions and ideas themselves (by Prop. 48 of this Part [p. 207] and its Scholium [p. 207]). But a singular volition and idea (by the preceding Prop. [p. 209]) are one and the same. Therefore will and intellect are one and the same. Q.E.D.

Scholium. With this we have removed what is commonly held to be the cause of error.[191] We have shown above, moreover, that falsity consists only in the privation which mutilated and confused ideas involve.[192] Therefore a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. So when we say that a man acquiesces in what is false and does not doubt it, we do not on that

[189] The demonstration establishes both halves of the reciprocal definition of essence in Def. 2 [p. 121]: the affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea, and the idea can neither be nor be conceived without the affirmation. The fourth sentence states the equivalence, used throughout, between involving a concept and not being conceivable without it (compare Part I, Ax. 4 [p. 29]).
[190] Against the Cartesian division of judgment between the intellect, which perceives, and the will, which assents (*Principles* I.32–35; *Meditations* IV, AT VII 56–58). See the essay before Prop. 48 [p. 207]. Part I had already referred will and intellect, even infinite, to *natura naturata* (Part I, Prop. 31 [p. 83]) and denied that the will is a free cause (Prop. 32 [p. 85]).
[191] Descartes' explanation in the fourth *Meditation*: error arises because 'latius pateat voluntas quam intellectus' ('the will extends more widely than the intellect') and I extend it to things I do not understand (AT VII 58). If will and intellect are one, there is no such disproportion; error is explained instead by the privation in inadequate ideas (Prop. 35 [p. 179]).
[192] *Supra ostendimus*: in Prop. 35 [p. 179].

tare dicimus, vel quod in falsis acquiescit, quia nullae causae dantur, quae efficiant, ut ipsius imaginatio fluctuetur.[ea] Qua de re vide schol. prop. 44. huius. Quantumvis igitur homo falsis adhaerere supponatur,[eb] nunquam tamen ipsum certum esse dicemus. Nam per certitudinem quid positivum intelligimus (vide prop. 43. huius cum eiusdem schol.), non vero dubitationis privationem. At per certitudinis privationem falsitatem intelligimus.

Sed ad uberiorem explicationem praeced. prop. quaedam monenda supersunt. Superest deinde, ut ad obiectiones, quae in nostram hanc doctrinam obiici possunt, respondeam; et denique, ut omnem amoveam scrupulum, operae pretium esse duxi, huius doctrinae quasdam utilitates indicare. Quasdam, inquam; nam praecipuae ex iis, quae in P. 5. dicemus, melius intelligentur.

Incipio igitur a primo, lectoresque moneo, ut accurate distinguant inter ideam sive mentis conceptum, et inter imagines rerum, quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est, ut distinguant inter ideas, et verba, quibus res significamus. Nam quia haec tria, imagines scilicet, verba et ideae a multis vel plane confunduntur, vel non satis accurate, vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam, scitu prorsus necessariam, tam ad speculationem,[ec] quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam, plane ignorarunt.

Quippe qui putant ideas consistere in imaginibus, quae in nobis ex corporum occursu formantur, sibi persuadent, ideas illas rerum,[ed] quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas, sed tantum figmenta, quae ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas, aspiciunt, et hoc praeiudicio praeoccupati non vident, ideam, quatenus idea est, affirmationem aut negationem involvere. Deinde qui verba confundunt cum idea, vel cum ipsa affirmatione, quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id, quod sentiunt, velle; quando aliquid solis verbis contra id, quod sentiunt, affirmant aut negant. Haec autem praeiudicia exuere facile is poterit, qui ad naturam cogitationis attendit, quae extensionis conceptum minime involvit; atque adeo clare intelliget, ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicuius imagine, neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt.

[G II 132] Atque haec pauca de his monuisse sufficiat, quare ad praedictas *obiectiones* transeo. Harum prima est, quod constare putant, voluntatem latius se extendere, quam intellectum;

[ea] The 1677 edition (OP p. 87) prints *fluctuatur*, for which the Dutch version notes *Fluctuat* in the margin; Paulus and the later editions correct to *fluctuetur*, and Gebhardt (G II 131; Textgestaltung II 366) follows. The Dutch version then adds: 'of die hem daar af doen twijffelen' ('or which make him doubt of it'). Gebhardt prints it in his text.

[eb] The Dutch version of 1677 has 'Onderstel dan dat een mensch by iets, dat valsch is, zo hardnekkiglijk blijft, dat men hem geensins daar an kan doen twijffelen' ('Suppose, then, that a man holds so obstinately to something false that he can in no way be made to doubt it'). Gebhardt prints the last clause, 'dat men hem geensins daar aan kan doen twijffelen', in his text (G II 131; Textgestaltung II 366); Leopold proposed the Latin *tam pertinaciter* and *ut nullo modo ad dubitandum de his adigi possit*.

[ec] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'en van de wetenschappen' ('and for the sciences'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 132; Textgestaltung II 366).

[ed] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'die geen speur in onze harssenen konnen maken, of' ('which can make no trace in our brain, or'); it lacks *similem* in the following clause. Gebhardt prints the addition in his text (G II 132; Textgestaltung II 366); Leopold proposed the Latin *quae nullum vestigium in cerebro nostro facere possunt sive*.

account say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there are no causes which bring it about that his imagination fluctuates. On this see the Scholium of Prop. 44 of this Part [p. 195]. However much, therefore, a man may be supposed to adhere to what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive (see Prop. 43 of this Part [p. 191] with its Scholium [p. 191]), not the privation of doubt. But by the privation of certainty we understand falsity.

But for a fuller explanation of the preceding Proposition [p. 209] some things remain to be pointed out. It remains, next, for me to reply to the objections which can be raised against this doctrine of ours; and finally, to remove every scruple, I have thought it worthwhile to indicate certain advantages of this doctrine. Certain advantages, I say; for the chief ones will be better understood from what we shall say in Part V [p. 469].

I begin, then, with the first, and I warn my readers to distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. Next, it is necessary that they distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. For because these three, namely images, words and ideas, are by many either altogether confused, or not distinguished accurately enough, or finally not cautiously enough, they have been altogether ignorant of this doctrine of the will, which it is absolutely necessary to know, both for speculation and for arranging life wisely.

Indeed, those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us from the encounter of bodies persuade themselves that those ideas of things of which we can form no similar image are not ideas, but only fictions which we feign from the free choice of the will; they look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel, and, preoccupied by this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Next, those who confuse words with the idea, or with the very affirmation which the idea involves, think that they can will contrary to what they feel, when by words alone they affirm or deny something contrary to what they feel. But anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of extension, will easily be able to put off these prejudices; and so he will understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of some thing nor in words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted by bodily motions alone,[193] which do not at all involve the concept of thought.

Let it suffice to have pointed out these few things about these matters; so I pass to the *objections* mentioned above. The first of them is that they think it established that the will extends more

[193] Images are affections of the body (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 161]), and words are joined to them by the association of bodily affections (Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 165]). Since no mode of extension involves the concept of thought (Prop. 6 [p. 129]), neither images nor words can constitute an idea; this is the ground for distinguishing the three.

atque adeo ab eodem diversam esse. Ratio autem, cur putant, voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum, est, quia se experiri aiunt, se non maiore assentiendi sive affirmandi et negandi facultate indigere ad infinitis aliis rebus, quas non percipimus, assentiendum, quam iam habemus; at quidem maiore facultate intelligendi. Distinguitur ergo voluntas ab intellectu, quod finitus hic sit, illa autem infinita.

Secundo nobis obiici potest, quod experientia nihil clarius videatur docere, quam quod nostrum iudicium possumus suspendere, ne rebus, quas percipimus, assentiamur; quod hinc etiam confirmatur, quod nemo dicitur decipi, quatenus aliquid percipit, sed tantum, quatenus assentitur aut dissentitur. Ex. gr. qui equum alatum fingit, non ideo concedit dari equum alatum, hoc est, non ideo decipitur, nisi simul concedat, dari equum alatum. Nihil igitur clarius videtur docere experientia, quam quod voluntas sive facultas assentiendi libera sit et a facultate intelligendi diversa.

Tertio obiici potest, quod una affirmatio non plus realitatis videtur continere, quam alia, hoc est, non maiore potentia indigere videmur ad affirmandum, verum esse id quod verum est, quam ad aliquid quod falsum est verum esse affirmandum. At[ee] unam ideam plus realitatis sive perfectionis, quam aliam habere percipimus; quantum enim obiecta alia aliis praestantiora, tantum etiam eorum ideae aliae aliis perfectiores sunt; ex quibus etiam constare videtur differentia inter voluntatem et intellectum.
Quarto obiici potest: si homo non operatur ex libertate voluntatis, quid ergo fiet, si in aequilibrio sit, ut Buridani asina? Famene, et siti peribit? Quod si concedam, viderer asinam vel hominis statuam, non hominem concipere; si autem negem, ergo se ipsum determinabit, et consequenter eundi facultatem et faciendi quicquid velit, habet. Praeter haec alia forsan possunt obiici; sed quia inculcare non teneor, quid unusquisque somniare potest, ad has obiectiones tantum respondere curabo, idque quam potero breviter.

Et quidem ad primam dico, me concedere, voluntatem latius se extendere, quam intellectum, si per intellectum claras tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant; sed nego voluntatem latius se

[ee] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'met de denkbeelden is 't anders gestelt: want' ('with ideas it is otherwise, for'), glossed *Ideae*. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 133; Textgestaltung II 366).

widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from it. And the reason why they think that the will extends more widely than the intellect is that they say they experience that they do not need a greater faculty of assenting, or of affirming and denying, than we already have, in order to assent to infinitely many other things which we do not perceive; but that we do need a greater faculty of understanding. The will is therefore distinguished from the intellect in that the latter is finite and the former infinite.[194]

Second, it can be objected to us that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspend our judgment[195] so as not to assent to things which we perceive; and this is confirmed also by the fact that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. For example, he who feigns a winged horse does not on that account grant that there is a winged horse, that is, he is not on that account deceived, unless at the same time he grants that there is a winged horse. Experience seems, therefore, to teach nothing more clearly than that the will, or faculty of assenting, is free, and different from the faculty of understanding.

Third, it can be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, that is, we do not seem to need greater power to affirm that what is true is true than to affirm that something which is false is true. But we perceive that one idea has more reality, or perfection, than another; for in proportion as some objects are more excellent than others, so also some of their ideas are more perfect than others; and from this also the difference between will and intellect seems to be established.

Fourth, it can be objected: if man does not operate from freedom of the will, what then will happen if he is in equilibrium, like Buridan's ass?[196] Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I grant this, I would seem to conceive an ass, or a statue of a man, not a man; but if I deny it, then he will determine himself, and consequently has the faculty of going, and of doing whatever he wills. Besides these, other things can perhaps be objected; but since I am not bound to go over whatever anyone can dream up, I shall take care to reply only to these objections, and that as briefly as I can.

And indeed to the first I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will extends

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[194] Descartes, *Principles* I.35: the perception of the intellect extends only to the few things presented to it and is always very finite, but 'voluntas vero infinita quodammodo dici potest' ('the will can be called in a certain way infinite'), since we notice nothing that could be the object of another will, even God's, to which ours does not also extend (AT VIII-1 18). In the fourth *Meditation* the will is the faculty in which Descartes finds the image of God in himself: 'sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius maioris ideam apprehendam' ('it is only the will, or freedom of choice, that I experience in myself as so great that I apprehend the idea of none greater', AT VII 57).

[195] Descartes, *Principles* I.39: the freedom of the will is so manifest that it must be counted among the first and most common innate notions; it showed itself when, supposing a most powerful deceiver, 'hanc in nobis libertatem esse experiebamur, ut possemus ab iis credendis abstinere, quae non plane certa erant et explorata' ('we experienced that there was in us this freedom, that we could refrain from believing those things which were not plainly certain and examined', AT VIII-1 19–20).

[196] *ut Buridani asina*: a she-ass, as in the *Metaphysical Thoughts*, where Spinoza, expounding the Cartesian view, had drawn the opposite conclusion: 'si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus in tali aequilibrio positum, homo non pro re cogitante, sed pro turpissimo asino erit habendus, si fame et siti pereat' ('if we put a man in place of the ass, placed in such an equilibrium, the man would be considered not a thinking thing but the most shameful ass, if he perished of hunger and thirst', II.12). Meyer's preface to that book had warned that its author did not hold the Cartesian doctrine of the will. On the older form of the dilemma see the note on the reply below.

extendere, quam perceptiones sive concipiendi facultatem. Nec sane video, cur facultas volendi potius dicenda est infinita, quam sentiendi facultas; sicut enim infinita (unum tamen post aliud; nam infinita simul affirmare non possumus) eadem volendi facultate possumus affirmare, sic etiam infinita corpora (unum nempe post aliud[ef]) eadem sentiendi facultate possumus sentire sive percipere. Quod si dicant, infinita dari, quae percipere non possumus? regero, nos ea ipsa nulla cogitatione, et consequenter nulla volendi facultate posse assequi. At dicunt, si Deus vellet efficere, ut ea etiam perciperemus, maiorem quidem facultatem percipiendi deberet nobis dare, sed non maiorem, quam dedit, volendi facultatem; quod idem est, ac si dicerent, quod si Deus velit efficere, ut infinita alia entia intelligeremus, necesse quidem esset, ut nobis daret maiorem intellectum; sed non universaliorem entis ideam, quam dedit, ad eadem infinita entia amplectendum. Ostendimus enim voluntatem ens esse universale sive ideam, qua omnes singulares volitiones, hoc est, id quod iis omnibus commune est, explicamus. Cum itaque hanc omnium volitionum communem sive universalem ideam facultatem[eg] esse credant, minime mirum, si hanc facultatem ultra limites intellectus in infinitum se extendere dicant. Universale enim aeque de uno, ac de pluribus ac de infinitis individuis dicitur.

Ad secundam obiectionem respondeo negando, nos liberam habere potestatem iudicium suspendendi. Nam cum dicimus, aliquem iudicium suspendere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod videt, se rem non adaequate percipere. Est igitur iudicii suspensio revera perceptio, et non libera voluntas. Quod ut clare intelligatur, concipiamus puerum equum alatum imaginantem,[eh] nec aliud quicquam percipientem. Quandoquidem haec imaginatio equi existentiam involvit (per coroll. prop. 17. huius) nec puer quicquam percipit, quod equi existentiam tollat (ille necessario equum ut praesentem contemplabitur), nec de eius existentia poterit dubitare, quamvis de eadem non sit certus. Atque hoc quotidie in somnis experimur, nec credo aliquem esse, qui putet, se, dum somniat, liberam habere potestatem suspendendi de iis, quae somniat, iudicium, efficiendique ut ea, quae se videre somniat, non somniet; et nihilominus contingit, ut etiam in somnis iudicium suspendamus, nempe cum somniamus, nos somniare.

Porro concedo neminem decipi, quatenus percipit, hoc est, mentis imaginationes in se consideratas nihil erroris involvere concedo (vide schol. prop. 17. huius); sed nego, hominem nihil affirmare, quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere, quam alas de equo affirmare? Si enim mens praeter equum alatum nihil aliud perciperet, eundem sibi praesentem contemplaretur, nec causam haberet ullam dubitandi de eiusdem existentia, nec ullam dissentiendi facultatem, nisi imaginatio equi alati iuncta sit ideae, quae existentiam eiusdem equi tollit,

[ef] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'en niet te gelijk, 't welk onmogelijk is' ('and not at the same time, which is impossible'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 133; Textgestaltung II 366).

[eg] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'van onze ziel' ('of our mind'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 134; Textgestaltung II 366–367). The Dutch sentence differs further ('deze algemene willing van alles, of dit algemeen denkbeelt van wil', 'this universal volition of all things, or this universal idea of will'), from which Gebhardt infers an earlier form of the Latin.

[eh] The 1677 edition (OP p. 90) reads *puerum, equum imaginantem*, and the Dutch version likewise has only *een paert*. Gebhardt (G II 134; Textgestaltung II 367) inserts *alatum*, as W. Meijer, Leopold, Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern had proposed: the passage answers the second objection, which used the winged horse, and the reply below returns to it; and only of a winged horse does it matter that the imaginer is a boy, who does not know, as an adult does, what excludes its existence. Gebhardt grants that the 1677 text reproduces Spinoza's manuscript.

more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving. Nor indeed do I see why the faculty of willing should be called infinite rather than the faculty of sensing; for just as we can affirm infinitely many things by the same faculty of willing (one after another, however, for we cannot affirm infinitely many things at once), so also we can sense, or perceive, infinitely many bodies (one after another, that is) by the same faculty of sensing. If they say that there are infinitely many things which we cannot perceive, I reply that we can reach them by no thought, and consequently by no faculty of willing. But, they say, if God willed to bring it about that we perceived these too, he would indeed have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has given. This is the same as if they said that if God willed to bring it about that we understood infinitely many other beings, it would indeed be necessary that he give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal idea of being than he has given, in order to embrace those same infinitely many beings. For we have shown that the will is a universal being, or idea, by which we explain all singular volitions, that is, that which is common to them all. Since, therefore, they believe that this common, or universal, idea of all volitions is a faculty, it is not at all surprising if they say that this faculty extends itself beyond the limits of the intellect to infinity. For a universal is said equally of one, of many and of infinitely many individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying that we have a free power of suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we say nothing other than that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension of judgment, therefore, is in truth a perception, and not free will. That this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a boy imagining a winged horse and perceiving nothing else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by Cor. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]), and the boy perceives nothing which excludes the existence of the horse, he will necessarily contemplate the horse as present, nor will he be able to doubt its existence, although he is not certain of it.[197] And this we experience daily in dreams; nor do I believe that there is anyone who thinks that, while he is dreaming, he has a free power of suspending judgment about what he dreams, and of bringing it about that he does not dream what he dreams that he sees; and nevertheless it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, namely when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives, that is, I grant that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error (see Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 161]); but I deny that a man affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what else is perceiving a winged horse than affirming wings of a horse? For if the mind perceived nothing else besides the winged horse, it would contemplate it as present to itself, and would have no cause to doubt its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting, unless the imagination of the winged horse is

[197] Not doubting is not certainty: the distinction just drawn at the beginning of the Scholium. The boy's imagination is not in error in itself (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 161]); what would make him doubt is another idea that excludes the horse's existence, as in Prop. 44, Schol. [p. 195].

vel quod percipit, ideam equi alati, quam habet, esse inadaequatam, atque tum vel eiusdem equi existentiam necessario negabit, vel de eadem necessario dubitabit.

Atque his puto me ad tertiam etiam obiectionem respondisse, nempe quod voluntas universale quid sit, quod de omnibus ideis praedicatur, quodque id tantum significat, quod omnibus ideis commune est, nempe affirmationem, cuius propterea adaequata essentia,[ei] quatenus sic abstracte concipitur, debet esse in unaquaque idea, et hac ratione tantum in omnibus eadem;[ej] sed non quatenus consideratur essentiam ideae constituere; nam eatenus singulares affirmationes aeque inter se differunt, ac ipsae ideae. Ex. gr. affirmatio, quam idea circuli ab illa, quam idea trianguli involvit, aeque differt, ac idea circuli ab idea trianguli. Deinde absolute nego, nos aequali cogitandi potentia indigere ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod verum est, quam ad affirmandum, verum esse id, quod falsum est. Nam hae duae affirmationes, si mentem spectes,[ek] se habent ad invicem, ut ens ad non-ens; nihil enim in ideis positivum est, quod falsitatis formam constituit. Vide prop. 35. huius cum eius schol. et schol. prop. 47. huius. Quare hic apprime venit notandum, quam facile decipimur, quando universalia cum singularibus et entia rationis et abstracta cum realibus confundimus.

Quod denique ad quartam obiectionem attinet, dico, me omnino concedere, quod homo in tali aequilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit, quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum, qui aeque ab eo distant), fame et siti peribit. Si me rogant, an talis homo non potius asinus, quam homo sit aestimandus? dico me nescire, ut etiam nescio, quanti aestimandus sit ille, qui se pensilem facit, et quanti aestimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani etc.

[G II 135] Superest tandem indicare, quantum huius doctrinae cognitio ad usum vitae conferat, quod facile ex his animadvertemus. Nempe I. Quatenus docet nos ex solo Dei nutu agere, divinaeque naturae esse participes, et eo magis quo perfectiores actiones agimus et quo magis magisque Deum intelligimus. Haec ergo doctrina, praeterquam quod animum omnimode quietum reddit, hoc etiam habet, quod nos docet, in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitudo consistit, nempe in sola Dei cognitione, ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur, quae amor et pietas suadent. Unde clare intelligimus, quantum illi a vera virtutis aestimatione aberrant, qui pro virtute et optimis actionibus, tanquam pro summa servitute, summis praemiis a Deo decorari exspectant, quasi ipsa virtus Deique servitus[el] non esset ipsa felicitas et summa libertas.

[ei] Gebhardt (G II 135; Textgestaltung II 367) begins a new sentence at *Cuius*, after the Dutch version, which also read the clause differently: 'En dieshalven moet des zelfs wezentheit … in yder denkbeelt evenmatig zijn' ('and therefore its essence must be adequate in each idea'), that is, *cuius propterea essentia … debet esse adaequata in unaquaque idea*. The punctuation here follows the 1677 edition (OP p. 91).

[ej] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'gelijk de bepaling van de mensch geheel en gelijkelijk aan yder bezonder mensch toegepast moet worden. Op deze wijze dan konnen wy bevatten dat de wil altijt in alle denkbeelden de zelfde is' ('just as the definition of man must be applied wholly and equally to each particular man. In this way, then, we can grasp that the will is always the same in all ideas'), glossed *Definitio*, *Voluntas*, *Ideae*. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 135; Textgestaltung II 367); in the Dutch the subject of what follows is therefore the will, not the essence.

[ek] The Dutch version of 1677 has 'alleenlijk' ('only') before *mentem* and adds after it 'en niet op de worden' ('and not to the words'). Gebhardt prints both in his text (G II 135; Textgestaltung II 367).

[el] The 1677 edition (OP p. 92) prints *Deoque servitus*; Van Vloten–Land correct it, and Gebhardt (G II 136; Textgestaltung II 367) and Bartuschat read *Deique*.

joined to an idea which excludes the existence of the same horse, or it perceives that the idea of the winged horse which it has is inadequate; and then it will either necessarily deny the existence of the horse, or necessarily doubt it.

And with this I think I have also replied to the third objection: namely, that the will is something universal, which is predicated of all ideas, and which signifies only what is common to all ideas, namely affirmation, whose adequate essence, therefore, insofar as it is thus conceived abstractly, must be in each idea, and only in this respect the same in all; but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the essence of the idea, for in that respect singular affirmations differ from one another as much as the ideas themselves do. For example, the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle. Next, I absolutely deny that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm that what is true is true as to affirm that what is false is true. For these two affirmations, if you look to the mind,[198] are related to one another as being to not-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity. See Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 179] with its Scholium [p. 181], and the Scholium of Prop. 47 of this Part [p. 199]. Therefore it is especially to be noted here how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with singulars, and beings of reason and abstractions with real beings.

Finally, as regards the fourth objection, I say that I entirely grant that a man placed in such an equilibrium (namely, one who perceives nothing else but thirst and hunger, and such food and such drink, which are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst.[199] If they ask me whether such a man is not to be reckoned an ass rather than a man, I say that I do not know; just as I also do not know at what to reckon one who hangs himself, or at what to reckon children, fools, madmen, etc.

It remains, finally, to indicate how much the knowledge of this doctrine contributes to the conduct of life, which we shall easily see from the following. Namely: I. Insofar as it teaches that we act by God's bidding alone, and are sharers in the divine nature, and the more so, the more perfect the actions we do and the more and more we understand God. This doctrine, then, besides making the mind entirely at peace, has this also, that it teaches us in what our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists: namely in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are led to do only those things which love and piety urge.[200] From this we understand clearly how far they stray from the true estimate of virtue who, for virtue and the best actions, as if for the utmost servitude, expect to be honoured by God with the highest rewards, as if virtue itself and servitude

[198] *si mentem spectes*: as in Prop. 47, Schol. [p. 199], the mind is what the person has in mind, as distinct from the words used. Whoever 'affirms' a falsehood in words may have in mind something true, or nothing.

[199] The case is Aristotle's, who mentions, among arguments from equilibrium, that of 'τοῦ πεινῶντος καὶ διψῶντος σφόδρα μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐδωδίμων καὶ ποτῶν ἴσον ἀπέχοντος (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον ἠρεμεῖν ἀναγκαῖον)' ('the man who is very hungry and thirsty, and equally so, and equally distant from food and drink: for he too must stay where he is', *De caelo* II.13, 295b31–34). Spinoza's description of the man follows it closely. He accepts the conclusion: a man who perceived nothing else would not move, since nothing would determine him to one side; the objection has force only for one who supposes that a will undetermined by causes could break the tie.

[200] *pietas*: defined in Part IV as 'the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason' (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]). The word is the traditional one, but the sense is Spinoza's own: not religious observance, but the desire to do good that arises from reason. On blessedness as the constant and eternal love of God see Part V, Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515].

II. Quatenus docet, quomodo circa res fortunae, sive quae in nostra potestate non sunt, hoc est, circa res, quae ex nostra natura non sequuntur, nos gerere debeamus; nempe utramque fortunae faciem aequo animo exspectare et ferre; nimirum quia omnia ab aeterno Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur, ac ex essentia trianguli sequitur, quod tres eius anguli sunt aequales duobus rectis.
III. Confert haec doctrina ad vitam socialem, quatenus docet neminem odio habere, contemnere, irridere, nemini irasci, invidere. Praeterea quatenus docet, ut unusquisque suis sit contentus et proximo auxilio;[em] non ex muliebri misericordia, partialitate, neque superstitione, sed ex solo rationis ductu, prout scilicet tempus et res postulat, ut in quarta parte ostendam.[en]

IV. Denique confert etiam haec doctrina non parum ad communem societatem, quatenus docet, qua ratione cives gubernandi sint et ducendi, nempe non ut serviant, sed ut libere ea quae optima sunt, agant. Atque his, quae in hoc schol. agere constitueram, absolvi et eo finem huic nostrae secundae parti impono, in qua puto me naturam mentis humanae eiusque proprietates satis prolixe, et quantum rei difficultas fert, clare explicuisse, atque talia tradidisse, ex quibus multa praeclara, maxime utilia et cognitu necessaria concludi possunt, ut partim ex sequentibus[eo] constabit.

[em] et proximo auxilio;] *transcr.* et proximo in auxilium;. The 1677 edition (OP p. 92) and Gebhardt (G II 136) read 'proximo auxilio' ('a help to his neighbour'); the transcription has the normalized 'in auxilium'.
[en] The 1677 edition (OP p. 92), the Dutch version, and the editions and translations before Gebhardt read *in Tertia Parte*. The discussion is in Part IV (G II 232 ff., 247 ff.: Props. 35–37 and 50), as Baensch pointed out; Gebhardt (G II 136; Textgestaltung II 367) takes the reference for a survival from the time when the work was divided into three Parts and corrects it to *Quarta*, and so Bartuschat.
[eo] ut partim ex sequentibus] *transcr.* ut panim ex sequentibus. Transcription slip; the 1677 edition (OP p. 92) and Gebhardt (G II 136) read 'partim'.

to God were not happiness itself and the highest freedom.[201]

II. Insofar as it teaches how we must conduct ourselves with respect to matters of fortune, or things which are not in our power, that is, things which do not follow from our nature: namely, to expect and to bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind; because all things follow from God's eternal decree with the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

III. This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no one, to envy no one. Further, insofar as it teaches that each should be content with his own and a help to his neighbour, not from womanish compassion,[202] partiality or superstition, but from the guidance of reason alone, namely as the time and the matter require, as I shall show in Part IV [p. 393].

IV. Finally, this doctrine also contributes not a little to the common society, insofar as it teaches in what way citizens are to be governed and led: namely, not so that they may be slaves, but so that they may freely do the things which are best.[203] And with this I have completed what I had resolved to treat in this Scholium, and with it I put an end to this our Second Part, in which I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties at sufficient length and, as far as the difficulty of the matter allows, clearly; and have set out things from which many excellent things, highly useful and necessary to know, can be concluded, as will be established partly from what follows.

Cited in 3DA15Ex [p. 325]

[201] The closing proposition of the *Ethics* says the same: 'beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus' ('blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself', Part V, Prop. 42 [p. 523]).

[202] The phrase *muliebris misericordia* recurs in Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]. Pity (*commiseratio*), which differs from compassion only as the single affect from the habit (Def. Aff. 18, Exp. [p. 327]), is in one who lives by the guidance of reason bad and useless in itself (Part IV, Prop. 50 [p. 417]); its Scholium repeats this list: one who knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature will find nothing worthy of hatred, mockery or contempt, and will pity no one.

[203] Compare the *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 20: the end of the state is not to turn men from rational beings into beasts or automata, but that they may use their reason freely; 'finis ergo reipublicae revera libertas est' ('the end of the state, therefore, is in truth freedom').

Ethices Pars Tertia
De Origine et Natura Affectuum

Third Part of the Ethics
Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects

Introduction to the Third Part

The third Part bears the title *De origine et natura affectuum*, "Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects." It is the hinge of the *Ethics*. Parts I and II have established what God is and what the human mind is; Parts IV and V will treat human bondage and human freedom. Between them Spinoza needs an account of what moves us: why we love and hate, hope and fear, envy, pity and despise, and why we so often see the better and follow the worse. Part III supplies it. It is the longest Part of the book after Part IV, the richest in observation of ordinary life, and the one in which Spinoza's naturalism is most consistently and most provocatively applied. A reader who has found the first two Parts remote from human concerns will find in the third the reason for them: the metaphysics of substance and the theory of ideas were built so that the passions could be understood as natural things.

A dominion within a dominion

The method is announced in the Preface, with deliberate provocation. "Most of those who have written about the *affects* and about men's *way of living* seem to treat not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion" (Preface [p. 229]). They believe that man disturbs the order of nature rather than follows it, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined by nothing but himself. They attribute human weakness and inconstancy not to the common power of nature but to some vice of human nature, which they "weep over, laugh at, despise, or, as usually happens, detest," and the one who can censure the weakness of the human mind most eloquently or most cleverly "is regarded as if he were divine."

Against them Spinoza sets a single principle. "Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a vice of nature; for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form into another, are always and everywhere the same." There must therefore be one way of understanding things of every kind, through the universal laws of nature. Hatred, anger and envy "follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other singular things," and have causes through which they are understood and properties "as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing." And so: "I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies." The *Political Treatise* puts the same resolve more personally: "I have taken pains not to laugh at, nor weep over, nor detest

human actions, but to understand them" (*sedulo curavi, humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere*; TP I.4).

The geometrical treatment of the passions is easily misunderstood. Spinoza does not mean that feelings are to be measured, or that human beings are machines. He means that the affects are effects of definite causes, related to one another by definite laws, and that a knowledge of these causes and laws is possible and is worth having for its own sake. The phrase "as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing by the mere contemplation of which we are delighted" is the key. A mathematician is not indignant at the properties of a triangle; a student of the affects should not be indignant at the properties of envy. The attitude is not indifference, and it is not cynicism. It is the condition of any remedy.

Descartes and the passions

One predecessor is named, and only to be dismissed. Descartes, "although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions," had tried to explain the passions through their first causes and to show the way by which the mind can have absolute dominion over them; "but in my opinion he showed nothing but the acumen of his great ingenuity, as I shall demonstrate in its place" (Preface [p. 229]). The *Passions of the Soul* (1649) had in fact claimed this in the heading of one of its articles: there is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions (art. 50). The "place" in which Spinoza demonstrates the contrary turns out to be the Preface to Part V.

Part III owes Descartes more than the Preface admits. Its procedure, a small number of primary affects from which all the others are derived by combination and by the variety of their objects, is Descartes' procedure, though the list is different. Descartes recognized six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness (*Passions*, art. 69). Spinoza recognizes three, desire, joy and sadness (Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]); love and hatred are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 251]), and wonder is not an affect at all, but a distraction of the mind that has no positive cause (Def. Aff. 4, Expl. [p. 321]).

The difference lies deeper than the list. For Descartes a passion is something the soul undergoes because of the body, an effect in the soul of motions in the body transmitted through the pineal gland, and the remedy is for the will, which is free, to take control of the passions by joining them to other thoughts and by forming "firm and determinate judgments concerning the knowledge of good and evil" (*Passions*, arts. 45, 48). Spinoza has already removed both terms of that remedy. The mind and the body are one thing conceived under two attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]), so neither can act on the other (Prop. 2 [p. 235]); and there is no free will, only volitions that are the affirmations involved in ideas (Part II, Prop. 49 [p. 209]). If the passions are to be mastered, it cannot be by the will acting on the body; it must be in some other way.

Mind and body once more

The long scholium to Prop. 2 [p. 235] argues against mind-body interaction from experience as well as from reason, and it is one of the most vivid passages in the book. Spinoza doubts that his readers will weigh the matter with an equal mind unless he confirms it by experience, "so firmly are they persuaded that the body now moves, now is at rest, at the mind's bidding alone." But experience teaches nothing of the kind. "No one has so far known the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions," not to mention that many things are observed in animals which far surpass human ingenuity, "and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in

their sleep which they would not dare to do awake; which shows well enough that the body itself, from the laws of its own nature alone, can do many things at which its mind wonders." No one knows how the mind could move the body, or how much motion it could give it. When men say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, "they do not know what they are saying, and do nothing but confess, in fine-sounding words, that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action."

The objection from speech is answered in the same way. People think that it is in the mind's power alone to speak or to keep silent. But if experience had not taught us that we do many things we afterwards regret, and that "when we are torn by contrary affects, we see the better and follow the worse," nothing would prevent us from believing that we do everything freely. "So the infant believes that it freely wants milk, the angry boy that he wants vengeance, and the timid one flight. The drunk, again, believes that he says from a free decree of the mind what afterwards, when sober, he would wish he had kept silent about." The conclusion returns to Part II: "the decree of the mind and the appetite and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a *decree* when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained through it, and a *determination* when it is considered under the attribute of extension." And so those "who believe that they speak or are silent or do anything from a free decree of the mind dream with their eyes open" (Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]).

The phrase "no one has so far known the structure of the body" is sometimes quoted as a general remark about human ignorance, but in context it is an argument. If we do not know what the body can do by its own laws, we have no reason to suppose that anything the body does requires the intervention of the mind. The body's achievements, from the instincts of animals to the acts of sleepwalkers, show how far mechanism can go without any mental command.

Action and passion

Since action and passion cannot be defined by the will, they have to be redefined, and the definitions at the head of the Part do this without mentioning the will at all. An adequate cause is one "whose effect can be perceived clearly and distinctly through it," an inadequate or partial cause one "whose effect cannot be understood through it alone" (Def. 1 [p. 231]). "I say that we *act* when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause," and that we are acted on when something happens in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause (Def. 2 [p. 231]). An affect is defined as "affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections"; if we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, the affect is an action, otherwise a passion (Def. 3 [p. 231]).

The first three propositions draw the consequences. "Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things" (Prop. 1 [p. 233]), and "the actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone" (Prop. 3 [p. 241]). Activity and passivity are therefore matters of knowledge. To be active is to be the complete explanation of what happens in one; to be passive is to be only part of the explanation, the rest lying in external causes. This is the foundation of everything Part V will say about the power of the intellect over the affects, and it is perhaps the most important single idea of the Part. Freedom will not consist in a will that escapes causes, but in being oneself the adequate cause of what one does, and that will be a matter of understanding.

The striving to persevere

The centre of the Part is the doctrine of striving, worked out in Props. 4–9 [p. 241]. "No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause" (Prop. 4 [p. 241]), since "the definition of any thing affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it" (Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 241]): attending only to the thing itself, we find nothing in it that could destroy it. Things are of contrary natures insofar as one can destroy the other (Prop. 5 [p. 243]). Then comes the central proposition: "Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Prop. 6 [p. 243]). The demonstration ties the doctrine to Part I. Singular things are modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way, "that is ... things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God by which God is and acts"; nothing has in itself anything by which it could be destroyed; "and so, as far as it can and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being" (Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 243]). The striving is "nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself" (Prop. 7 [p. 243]), and it involves no finite time, but an indefinite one (Prop. 8 [p. 245]).

The Latin word is *conatus*, and its sense should be understood carefully. It is not a separate drive that a thing has in addition to its nature, nor a desire for some future state, but the thing's own power of acting, considered as resisting whatever would destroy it. A stone at rest, a body in motion, a plant, an animal and a human being all strive in this sense. The phrase "as far as it is in itself" (*quantum in se est*) repeats the language in which Descartes had stated the principle of inertia (*Principles* II.37), and the physical digression of Part II had given the same principle for bodies (Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151]). What Part III adds is the application of this principle to the mind, and so to the whole of human life.

In a human being the striving takes several names. "This striving, when it is related to the mind alone, is called *will*; but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called *appetite*, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation" (Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]). Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is appetite together with consciousness of it. And then comes a sentence that reverses the order assumed by most moral philosophy: "we strive for, will, want and desire nothing because we judge it to be good; but on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it." Values are not perceived and then pursued. They are the shadows cast by our desires.

Jonathan Bennett remarks that Spinoza's "substantive morality will be based on a strong individual egoism," and that the argument for it, running through Props. 4–6, "deserves to be tracked patiently" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, § 54, p. 231). Whether the argument succeeds, and whether it shows that everything strives to persevere in its being or only that nothing destroys itself, has been much discussed. The reader should notice at least that the doctrine is meant to apply to everything, not only to living things, and that it is derived from the metaphysics of Part I, not from observation of human behaviour.

Joy, sadness and desire

From the doctrine of striving Spinoza derives the primary affects. "Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting of our body, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of thinking of our mind" (Prop. 11 [p. 247]). The mind can pass to a greater or a lesser perfection, and these passages are the affects of joy and sadness: "By *joy*, therefore, I shall understand in what follows *the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection*. By *sadness*, however, *the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection*" (Prop.

11, Schol. [p. 247]). Joy related to mind and body together is called pleasure or cheerfulness, sadness pain or melancholy, according as one part of the body or the whole is affected. Desire has been defined in the scholium to Prop. 9, "and apart from these three I acknowledge no other primary affect; for I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three."

Joy and sadness, so defined, are transitions, not states. A man who was born with a greater perfection would not feel joy at it; joy is the feeling of becoming more powerful. This dynamic conception explains much of what follows. Since the mind strives to persevere and to increase its power of acting, it "strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body's power of acting" (Prop. 12 [p. 249]), and when it imagines what diminishes the body's power, it strives to recollect things that exclude their existence (Prop. 13 [p. 251]). From this follow love and hatred: "love is nothing but joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred nothing but sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 251]). A lover strives to have present and to preserve what he loves, a hater to remove and destroy what he hates.

The mechanics of the passions

The rest of the Part, Props. 14–57 [p. 253], derives the variety of the affects from these few principles, and it does so with a combination of rigour and observation that has no parallel in earlier philosophy. Three mechanisms do most of the work.

The first is association. If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is afterwards affected by one, it will also be affected by the other (Prop. 14 [p. 253]), and so anything can be the accidental cause of joy, sadness or desire (Prop. 15 [p. 253]). We love or hate a thing merely because it resembles something that usually affects us with joy or sadness, "even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects" (Prop. 16 [p. 255]). When one thing affects us with both joy and sadness, we love and hate it at once, and this state is called "fluctuation of mind," which "is therefore related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination" (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 255]). Hope and fear arise from the image of a thing of whose outcome we are in doubt: "hope is nothing but an inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are in doubt; fear, on the other hand, an inconstant sadness, arising also from the image of a doubtful thing" (Prop. 18, Schol. 2 [p. 259]).

The second mechanism is the transmission of affects through the objects of love and hatred. We rejoice when we imagine that what we love is preserved and are saddened when we imagine it destroyed; we love whatever affects what we love with joy, and hate whatever affects it with sadness; and the reverse holds for what we hate (Props. 19–26 [p. 259]). The affects thus spread through a network of relations, and much of the misery Spinoza describes arises from the fact that the objects of our love can be possessed by others, lost, or changed.

The third and most original mechanism is the imitation of affects. "From the fact that we imagine a thing like us, towards which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect" (Prop. 27 [p. 267]). The proposition is derived from the theory of Part II: the image of an external body like ours involves the nature of our body as well as its, and so an affection like the one we imagine in the other. From imitation Spinoza derives pity, which is the imitation of sadness, and emulation, the imitation of desire (Prop. 27, Schol. [p. 267]); the striving to please others, which is called ambition when it is pursued to our own harm or another's, and otherwise courtesy (Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 271]); and, by a further step, the desire that everyone should love what we love and hate what we hate. "So we see that each by

nature wants the others to live according to his temperament; and while all want this alike, they are alike an obstacle to one another, and while all want to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another" (Prop. 31, Schol. [p. 275]). From the same property of human nature that makes men compassionate, Spinoza adds, it follows that they are envious and ambitious; and experience confirms it, especially in children, who "laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry," and desire whatever they see others delight in (Prop. 32, Schol. [p. 275]).

Several of the later propositions are among the most quoted in the book. "Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love" (Prop. 43 [p. 289]), and hatred completely conquered by love passes into a love greater than if hatred had not preceded it (Prop. 44 [p. 289]). "Good" and "evil" are defined, in the scholium to Prop. 39 [p. 283], by reference to joy and sadness: by good Spinoza understands here "every kind of joy, and whatever, further, leads to it," and by evil every kind of sadness, so that "each judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better, what worse." Different men can be affected differently by the same object, and the same man differently at different times (Prop. 51 [p. 295]). There are as many species of each affect as there are species of objects by which we are affected (Prop. 56 [p. 305]), and "each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other" (Prop. 57 [p. 307]). The scholium to this last proposition notes that the affects of the animals differ from ours as their natures differ, since "we can by no means doubt that the brutes feel, now that we know the origin of the mind," and that "there is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunkard, for example, is led, and the gladness which a philosopher possesses" (Prop. 57, Schol. [p. 309]).

The active affects

The last two propositions turn from the passions to the affects that are actions. "Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act" (Prop. 58 [p. 309]), and among the affects related to the mind insofar as it acts there are none but those related to joy or desire (Prop. 59 [p. 311]); sadness, which diminishes the mind's power of acting, can never be an action. The actions that follow from the affects related to the mind insofar as it understands Spinoza relates to strength of character, *fortitudo*, which he divides into tenacity (*animositas*) and nobility (*generositas*): "by tenacity I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to preserve his being. By nobility, however, I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship" (Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]). Temperance, sobriety and presence of mind in dangers are species of tenacity; modesty and clemency are species of nobility. These two words will carry much of the ethics of Part IV.

The same scholium sums up the condition that the Part has described. From what has been shown, "it is evident that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds, we fluctuate, ignorant of our outcome and fate." The image is the most memorable in the Part, and it states the problem to which Parts IV and V are the answer.

The definitions of the affects

The Part ends with a recapitulation: forty-eight definitions of the affects, with explanations, and a general definition of the affect that is a passion of the mind. The definitions follow a classification of their own, and several of them correct what the scholia had said; an essay before

them introduces their plan.

Questions the reader will meet

Several features of Part III need care.

The first is the vocabulary. "Affect" (*affectus*) is not the same as emotion. It includes desire, which is not a feeling in the ordinary sense, and it is defined by a change in the body's power of acting together with the idea of that change; so it is both bodily and mental. "Passion" is not intense feeling but being acted on, being only the partial cause of what happens in one. "Joy" (*laetitia*) and "sadness" (*tristitia*) are broader than their English names suggest; they cover every increase or decrease of power that the mind undergoes, from physical pleasure to intellectual delight, and from a toothache to grief.

The second concerns perfection. Joy is the passage to a greater perfection, and perfection is the same as reality (Part II, Def. 6 [p. 123]). To be more perfect is to be more powerful, to be able to do and to undergo more, and not to be better in a moral sense. The doctrine that we judge things good because we desire them should be read in the same light. It does not say that whatever anyone desires is good. Part IV will define the good as what we certainly know to be useful to us, and will distinguish between what the passions lead us to desire and what reason does.

The third concerns egoism. If every thing strives to persevere in its being, and the human mind seeks only what increases its power, it may seem that Spinoza's psychology leaves no room for concern for others. But the imitation of the affects, which makes us share the joys and sorrows of those we take to be like us, is derived from the same principles, and Part III already names nobility, the desire to aid others and join them to oneself in friendship, as one of the two species of strength of character. Part IV will argue that nothing is more useful to a human being than other human beings who live by reason. Whether this amounts to a genuine concern for others or an enlightened self-interest is a question that readers have answered in different ways.

The fourth concerns teleology. The Appendix to Part I attacked final causes, and Part III speaks constantly of what we strive for and desire. The striving of Prop. 6 is not a striving toward a goal in the sense the Appendix rejects; it is the actual essence of the thing, and the things it leads us to do follow from it as effects from a cause. Bennett describes the Part as an attempt to move from a Spinozist "appetite," a push, to something that functions like genuine teleology, a pull (§ 54, p. 231). How far Spinoza succeeds, and how far he needs to, is a question for the reader to keep in mind.

The place of Part III in the whole

The account of the affects is what makes the rest of the *Ethics* possible. Part IV will ask how strong the affects are and why they so often overcome our knowledge, and it will rest its answer on the principle that "an affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained" (Part IV, Prop. 7 [p. 365]). It will also ask which affects agree with reason and which are opposed to it, using the definitions at the end of this Part as its terms. Part V will propose remedies for the passions, and every one of them depends on the theory worked out here: that an affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it, that the mind can order and connect the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and that the intellectual love of God arises from the third kind of knowledge as other loves arise from their causes. The derivations of Part III were offered

as explanations of human life as it is. They are also the material from which Spinoza will build an account of how it can be changed.

The text begins with the Preface, the declaration of method quoted above. The definitions and postulates that follow are few, and the first propositions are abstract; the scholia, from the second onwards, are where the Part's observation of human life begins.

Praefatio

[G II 137] Plerique qui de *affectibus* et *hominum vivendi ratione* scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus, quae communes naturae leges sequuntur, sed de rebus, quae extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura, veluti imperium in imperio, concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi, ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, nec aliunde, quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanae deinde impotentiae et inconstantiae causam non communi naturae potentiae, sed nescio cui naturae humanae vitio tribuunt, quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur; et qui humanae mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur.

Non defuerunt tamen viri praestantissimi (quorum labori et industriae nos multum debere fatemur), qui de recta vivendi ratione praeclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiae consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires, et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo, quod sciam, determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum *Cartesium*, licet[ep] etiam crediderit, mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare, simulque viam ostendere studuisse, qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium; sed mea quidem sententia nihil praeter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo, qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt, quam intelligere.

His sine dubio mirum videbitur, quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar, et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea, quae rationi repugnare, quaeque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea haec est ratio. Nihil in natura fit, quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque eius virtus et agendi potentia, hoc est, naturae leges et regulae, secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eaedem, atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcumque naturam intelligendi, nempe per leges et regulas naturae universales. Affectus itaque odii, irae, invidiae etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturae necessitate et virtute consequuntur, ac reliqua singularia; ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt, per quas intelliguntur, certasque pro-

[ep] *Cartesium*, licet] *transcr.* Cartesium, licet. Italics: the transcription opens the emphasis at 'Cartesium' and closes it only after 'affectuum' in the last sentence. The 1677 edition (OP pp. 93–94) sets the Preface in italic with 'Cartesium' in roman, i.e. emphasized.

Preface

Most of those who have written about the *affects* and about men's *way of living* seem to treat not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed, they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion.[204] For they believe that man disturbs the order of nature rather than follows it, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined by nothing other than himself. Next, they attribute the cause of human lack of power and inconstancy not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore weep over, laugh at, despise, or, as usually happens, detest; and he who knows how to censure the lack of power of the human mind more eloquently or more cleverly is regarded as if he were divine.

There have not been lacking, however, very eminent men (to whose labour and industry we confess that we owe much) who have written many excellent things about the right way of living and have given mortals counsels full of prudence; but no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and powers of the affects, and what, on the other hand, the mind can do in moderating them. I know, indeed, that the most celebrated Descartes, although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, nevertheless tried to explain human affects through their first causes, and at the same time to show the way by which the mind can have absolute dominion over the affects;[205] but in my opinion he showed nothing but the acumen of his great ingenuity, as I shall demonstrate in its place. For I want to return to those who prefer to detest or laugh at the affects and actions of men rather than to understand them.[206]

To them it will doubtless seem strange that I undertake to treat men's vices and follies in the geometrical manner, and that I wish to demonstrate by sure reasoning things which they proclaim to be contrary to reason, vain, absurd and horrible. But my reasoning is this. Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a vice of nature; for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting[207] are everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form into another, are always and everywhere the same; and so there must also be one and the same way of understanding the nature of things of any kind whatever, namely through the universal laws and rules of nature. The affects, therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the

[204] *veluti imperium in imperio*. The *Political Treatise* repeats the charge in the same words: 'At plerique, ignaros naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi, credunt, et homines in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipiunt' ('But most believe that the ignorant disturb the order of nature rather than follow it, and conceive men in nature as a dominion within a dominion', II.6), and goes on to name the reason: they hold that the human mind is not produced by natural causes but created immediately by God, and so independent of other things that it has absolute power to determine itself.

[205] The *Passions of the Soul* (1649), art. 50: 'Qu'il n'y a point d'ame si faible qu'elle ne puisse, étant bien conduite, acquérir un pouvoir absolu sur ses passions' ('That there is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions'). The demonstration promised here is in the Preface to Part V [p. 469], which examines Descartes' account of the pineal gland and concludes that it explains nothing.

[206] Compare the *Political Treatise*, I.4: 'sedulo curavi, humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere' ('I have taken pains not to laugh at, nor weep over, nor detest human actions, but to understand them'), so as to consider the affects 'non ut humanae naturae vitia, sed ut proprietates' ('not as vices of human nature but as properties') and to investigate them 'eadem animi libertate, qua res mathematicas solemus' ('with the same freedom of mind with which we usually treat mathematical things').

[207] *virtus* in its older sense of efficacy, as in Part I, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 43], and in the next sentence ('the same necessity and virtue of nature'). Part IV, Def. 8 [p. 357] will identify virtue with power.

prietates habent, cognitione nostra aeque dignas ac proprietates cuiuscumque alterius rei cuius sola contemplatione delectamur. De *affectuum* itaque[eq] *natura et viribus* ac *mentis in eosdem potentia* eadem methodo agam qua in praecedentibus de *Deo* et *mente* egi, et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde, ac si quaestio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.

Definitiones

[G II 139] I. *Causam adaequatam* appello eam, cuius effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. *Inadaequatam* autem seu *partialem* illam voco, cuius effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit.

II. Nos tum *agere* dico cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cuius adaequata sumus causa hoc est (per defin. praeced.) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos *pati* dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cuius nos non nisi partialis sumus causa.

III. Per *affectum* intelligo[er] corporis affectiones, quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur, et simul harum affectionum ideas.

Explicatio. Si itaque alicuius harum affectionum adaequata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum *actionem* intelligo; alias *passionem.*

[eq] De *affectuum* itaque] *transcr.* De affectuum* itaque. Italics (see the note on 'Cartesium').
[er] W. Meijer proposed reading *Affectus* (plural), and Appuhn adopts it. Gebhardt (G II 139; Textgestaltung II 368) keeps the singular: Spinoza puts the defined term in the singular in such definitions (compare Part I, Def. 5 [p. 25], *Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones*), the complex of affections being the affect; the Dutch version also has the singular (*By Hartstocht*).

same necessity and virtue of nature as other singular things; and accordingly they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing by the mere contemplation of which we are delighted. I shall treat, therefore, of *the nature and powers of the affects*, and of *the power of the mind over them*, by the same method by which I treated of *God* and the *mind* in the preceding Parts, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies.

Cited in 4P57S [p. 423]

Definitions

I. I call that an *adequate cause* whose effect can be perceived clearly and distinctly through it.[208] But I call that *inadequate*, or *partial*, whose effect cannot be understood through it alone.

Cited in 3D2 [p. 231], 3P1D [p. 233], 4P2D [p. 361], 4P5D [p. 363], 4P23D [p. 383], 4P33D [p. 391], 5P31D [p. 509]

II. I say that we *act* when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is (by the preceding Def. [p. 231]), when something follows from our nature, in us or outside us, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are *acted on* when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.[209]

Cited in 3P1D [p. 233], 4P2D [p. 361], 4P5D [p. 363], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P23D [p. 383], 4P33D [p. 391], 4P35D [p. 393], 4P35C1 [p. 395], 4P52D [p. 419], 4P59D [p. 427], 4P61D [p. 431], 4P64D [p. 433]

III. By *affect* I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections.[210]

Cited in 3P14D [p. 253]

Explanation. If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then by the affect I understand an *action*; otherwise a *passion*.[211]

[208] The definition joins Part I, Ax. 4 [p. 29] (knowledge of an effect depends on and involves knowledge of its cause) to the adequate idea of Part II, Def. 4 [p. 121]. A cause is adequate when the effect can be understood through it alone; partial when the effect also requires other causes to be understood. Everything Part III says of action and passion rests on this distinction.

[209] Descartes begins the *Passions of the Soul* from the received view: 'tout ce qui se fait, ou qui arrive de nouveau, est generalement appellé par les Philosophes une Passion au regard du sujet auquel il arrive, et une Action au regard de celuy qui fait qu'il arrive' ('whatever is done or happens anew is generally called by the philosophers a passion with respect to the subject to which it happens, and an action with respect to that which makes it happen', art. 1). Spinoza defines both in terms of adequate causation. Acting does not require a will, and being acted on admits of degrees, as one is more or less completely the cause of what happens.

[210] An affect is not only a feeling: it is a change in the body's power of acting together with the idea of that change, as the mind is the idea of the body (Part II, Prop. 13 [p. 141]). *Affectus* is to be kept distinct from *affectio* (see the note on Part I, Def. 5 [p. 25]): every affect is an affection, but not every affection changes the power of acting (Post. 1 [p. 233]). The General Definition at the end of the Part (Gen. Def. [p. 339]) defines the affect that is a passion from the side of the mind alone.

[211] So there are active affects as well as passions; they are the subject of Props. 58–59 [p. 309]. This is the reason for 'affect' rather than 'passion' or 'emotion' as the general term.

Postulata

[G II 139] I. Corpus humanum potest multis affici modis, quibus ipsius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, et etiam aliis qui eiusdem agendi potentiam nec maiorem nec minorem reddunt.

Hoc postulatum seu axioma nititur postul. 1.[es] et lem. 5. et 7., quae vide post prop. 13. P. 2.

II. Corpus humanum multas pati potest mutationes, et nihilominus retinere obiectorum impressiones seu vestigia (de quibus vide postul. 5. P. 2.), et consequenter easdem rerum imagines; quarum defin. vide schol. prop. 17.[et] P. 2.

Propositiones

Propositio I

[G II 140] *Mens nostra quaedam agit, quaedam vero patitur; nempe quatenus adaequatas habet ideas, eatenus quaedam necessario agit, et quatenus ideas habet inadaequatas, eatenus necessario quaedam patitur.*

Demonstratio. Cuiuscumque humanae mentis ideae aliae adaequatae sunt,[eu] aliae autem mutilatae et confusae (per schol. prop. 40. P. 2.).[ev,ew] Ideae autem, quae in alicuius mente sunt adaequatae, sunt in Deo adaequatae, quatenus eiusdem mentis essentiam constituit (per coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.), et quae deinde inadaequatae sunt in mente, sunt etiam in Deo (per idem coroll.) adaequatae, non quatenus eiusdem solummodo mentis essentiam, sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet. Deinde ex data quacumque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet (per prop. 36. P. 1.), cuius effectus Deus causa est adaequata (vide defin. 1. huius), non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus data illa idea affectus consideratur (vide prop. 9. P. 2.). At eius effectus, cuius Deus est causa, quatenus affectus est idea, quae in alicuius mente est adaequata, illa eadem mens est causa adaequata (per coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.). Ergo mens nostra (per defin. 2. huius) quatenus ideas habet adaequatas, quaedam necessario agit; quod erat primum. Deinde quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea, quae in Deo est adaequata, non quatenus mentem unius

[es] nititur postul. 1.] *transcr.* nitituraxiom. 1. The 1677 edition (OP p. 95) and Gebhardt (G II 139) read 'nititur Postulato 1.'; the transcription has 'axiom.', run together with 'nititur'.

[et] quarum defin. vide schol. prop. 17.] *transcr.* quarum defin. vide in schol. prop. 17. The 1677 edition (OP p. 96) and Gebhardt (G II 140) have no 'in'.

[eu] aliae adaequatae sunt] *transcr.* aliae adaequataesunt. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).

[ev] (per schol. prop. 40. P. 2.)] *transcr.* (per schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 96) and Gebhardt (G II 140; Textgestaltung II 368) read 'per Schol. Prop. 40.' without a number; '2.' is the correction of Leopold, Baensch, Meijer and Appuhn, which the transcription follows.

[ew] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 96) and Gebhardt (G II 140); Leopold, Baensch, W. Meijer and Appuhn read *Schol. 2.*, as does the transcription. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 368) explains that Spinoza first wrote the two scholia of Part II, Prop. 40 as one and divided them later (Textgestaltung II 364, on G II 120); the reference was written to the undivided scholium and, in sense, means both.

Postulates

I. The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in others which render its power of acting neither greater nor less.

This postulate, or axiom, rests on Post. 1 [p. 157] and Lemmas 5 [p. 155] and 7 [p. 155], which see after Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 141].

Cited in 3P12D [p. 251], 3P15D [p. 253]

II. The human body can undergo many changes and nevertheless retain the impressions, or traces, of objects (on which see Post. 5 of Part II [p. 157]), and consequently the same images of things; for the definition of which see the Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161].

Propositions

Proposition I

Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things.

Cited in 3P3D [p. 241], 3P56D [p. 305], 3P58D [p. 309], 3P59D [p. 311], 4P23D [p. 383], 4P28D [p. 387], 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. Of each human mind some ideas are adequate, others mutilated and confused (by the Schol. of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]). But the ideas which are adequate in someone's mind are adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of that mind (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]); and those which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in God (by the same Corollary), not insofar as he contains in himself the essence of that mind only, but also insofar as he contains in himself the minds of other things at the same time. Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by Prop. 36 of Part I [p. 93]), of which effect God is the adequate cause (see Def. 1 of this Part [p. 231]), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered as affected by that given idea (see Prop. 9 of Part II [p. 135]). But of that effect of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in someone's mind, that same mind is the adequate cause (by Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]). Therefore our mind (by Def. 2 of this Part [p. 231]), insofar as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts in

hominis tantum, sed quatenus aliarum rerum mentes simul cum eiusdem hominis mente in se habet, eius (per idem coroll. prop. 11 P. 2.) illius hominis mens non est causa adaequata, sed partialis. Ac proinde (per defin. 2. huius) mens quatenus ideas inadaequatas habet, quaedam necessario patitur; quod erat secundum. Ergo mens nostra etc. Q. E. D.

[G II 141] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur mentem eo pluribus passionibus esse obnoxiam, quo plures ideas inadaequatas habet, et contra eo plura agere, quo plures habet adaequatas.

Propositio II

Nec corpus mentem ad cogitandum, nec mens corpus ad motum, neque ad quietem, nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.

Demonstratio. Omnes cogitandi modi Deum, quatenus res est cogitans et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur, pro causa habent (per prop. 6. P. 2.). Id ergo, quod mentem ad cogitandum determinat, modus cogitandi est, et non extensionis, hoc est (per defin. 1. P. 2.) non est corpus; quod erat primum. Corporis deinde motus et quies ab alio oriri debet corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et absolute quicquid in corpore oritur, id a Deo oriri debuit, quatenus aliquo extensionis modo et non quatenus aliquo cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (per eandem prop. 6. P. 2.), hoc est, a mente, quae (per prop. 11. P. 2.) modus cogitandi est, oriri non potest; quod erat secundum. Ergo nec corpus mentem etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec clarius intelliguntur ex iis, quae in schol. prop. 7. P. 2. dicta sunt, quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit, quae iam sub cogitationis, iam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit, ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit, sive natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur, consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum mentis. Quod etiam patet ex modo, quo prop. 12. P. 2. demonstravimus.

At quamvis haec ita se habeant, ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo, nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad haec aequo animo perpendendum; adeo firmiter persuasi sunt, corpus ex solo mentis nutu iam moveri, iam quiescere, plurimaque agere, quae a sola mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent. Etenim quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem hucusque experientia docuit, quid corpus ex solis

some things; which was the first point. Next, whatever necessarily follows from an idea which is adequate in God, not insofar as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but insofar as he has in himself the minds of other things together with the mind of that man, of that (by the same Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II) the man's mind is not the adequate cause, but a partial cause. And therefore (by Def. 2 of this Part [p. 231]) the mind, insofar as it has inadequate ideas, is necessarily acted on in some things; which was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is subject to more passions the more inadequate ideas it has, and, on the other hand, acts more the more adequate ideas it has.

Proposition II

The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion,[212] *or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).*

Cited in 5P1D [p. 473]

Demonstration. All modes of thinking have God for their cause insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by another attribute (by Prop. 6 of Part II [p. 129]). What determines the mind to thinking, therefore, is a mode of thinking and not of extension, that is (by Def. 1 of Part II [p. 121]), it is not a body; which was the first point. Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another; and absolutely, whatever arises in a body must have arisen from God insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension, and not insofar as he is considered as affected by some mode of thinking (by the same Prop. 6 of Part II); that is, it cannot arise from the mind, which (by Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]) is a mode of thinking; which was the second point. Therefore neither can the body determine the mind, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. These things are understood more clearly from what was said in the Scholium of Prop. 7 of Part II [p. 131], namely that the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. Hence it comes about that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or under that; and consequently that the order of actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of actions and passions of the mind. This is also evident from the way in which we demonstrated Prop. 12 of Part II [p. 141].

But although these things are so, so that no reason for doubting remains, I hardly believe that men can be induced to weigh them with an equal mind unless I confirm the matter by experience; so firmly are they persuaded that the body now moves, now is at rest, at the mind's bidding alone, and does a great many things which depend only on the will of the mind and its art of thinking things out. For what the body can do, no one has so far determined;[213] that is, experience has

[212] The denial of interaction between mind and body. It follows from the causal independence of the attributes (Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129]) and, as the Scholium says, is better understood from their identity: the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived under two attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]). Descartes' account of their interaction through the pineal gland is examined in the Preface to Part V [p. 469].

[213] *quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit*. The argument from ignorance turns the usual one around: we do not know enough about the body to say that its actions need a mind to direct them. It agrees with Part II, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]: the more a body is capable of doing many things at once, the more its mind is capable of perceiving many things at once; to know the excellence of a mind, one must know that of its body.

legibus naturae quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque corporis fabricam tam accurate novit, ut omnes eius functiones potuerit explicare, ut iam taceam quod in brutis plura observentur, quae humanam sagacitatem longe superant, et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant, quae vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit, ipsum corpus ex solis suae naturae legibus multa posse, quae ipsius mens admiratur. Deinde nemo scit, qua ratione quibusve mediis mens moveat corpus, neque quot motus gradus possit corpori tribuere, quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat. Unde sequitur, cum homines dicunt, hanc vel illam actionem corporis oriri a mente, quae imperium in corpus habet, eos nescire, quid dicant, nec aliud agere, quam speciosis verbis fateri, se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare.

At dicent, sive sciant sive nesciant, quibus mediis mens moveat corpus, se tamen experiri, quod nisi mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, corpus iners esset; deinde se experiri, in sola mentis potestate esse, tam loqui quam tacere, et alia multa, quae proinde a mentis decreto pendere credunt. Sed quod ad primum attinet, ipsos rogo, num experientia non etiam doceat, quod si contra corpus iners sit, mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum corpus somno quiescit, mens simul cum ipso sopita manet, nec potestatem habet, veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi. Deinde omnes expertos esse credo, mentem non semper aeque aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem obiecto;[ex] sed prout corpus aptius est, ut in eo huius vel illius obiecti imago excitetur, ita mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud obiectum contemplandum. At dicent ex solis legibus naturae, quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse, ut causae aedificiorum, picturarum rerumque huiusmodi, quae sola humana arte fiunt, possint deduci, nec corpus humanum, nisi a mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod aedificandum. Verum ego iam ostendi, ipsos nescire, quid corpus possit, quidve ex sola ipsius naturae contemplatione possit deduci, ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis naturae legibus fieri, quae nunquam credidissent posse fieri, nisi ex mentis directione, ut sunt ea, quae somnambuli in somnis agunt, quaeque ipsi, dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam corporis humani fabricam, quae artificio longissime superat omnes, quae humana arte fabricatae sunt, ut iam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura sub quovis attributo considerata infinita sequi.

Quod porro ad secundum attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanae haberent, si aeque in hominis potestate esset tam tacere, quam loqui. At experientia satis superque docet, homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam, nec[ey] minus posse, quam appetitus moderari suos. Unde factum, ut plerique credant, nos ea tantum libere agere, quae leviter petimus, quia

[ex] The 1677 edition (OP p. 98) reads *de eodem subjecto*; the Dutch version has *op een zelfde voorwerp*, with *Objectum* in the margin. Gebhardt (G II 142; Textgestaltung II 368–369) corrects to *objecto*, as Baensch had conjectured, since no relation of inherence is meant; Appuhn and Halpern keep *subjecto*.

[ey] quam linguam, nec] *transcr.* quam linguam1), nec. The transcription keeps the marker '1)' of a footnote of an earlier edition (the source of the phrase), without the note.

so far taught no one what the body can do from the laws of nature alone, insofar as nature is considered only as corporeal, and what it cannot do unless it is determined by the mind. For no one has so far known the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions, not to mention that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep which they would not dare to do awake; which shows well enough that the body itself, from the laws of its own nature alone, can do many things at which its mind wonders. Next, no one knows in what way, or by what means, the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give to the body, and with what speed it can move it. From this it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and do nothing but confess, in fine-sounding words, that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action, and do not wonder at it.

But they will say that, whether or not they know by what means the mind moves the body, they nevertheless experience that unless the human mind were fit for thinking things out, the body would be inactive; and next, that they experience that it is in the power of the mind alone both to speak and to be silent, and many other things, which they therefore believe depend on the mind's decree. But as regards the first, I ask them whether experience does not also teach that if, on the other hand, the body is inactive, the mind is at the same time unfit for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind remains asleep together with it, and does not have the power of thinking things out, as it does when awake. Next, I believe everyone has experienced that the mind is not always equally fit for thinking about the same object, but that as the body is more fit for the image of this or that object to be aroused in it, so the mind is more fit to contemplate this or that object. But they will say that it cannot be that the causes of buildings, pictures and things of this kind, which are made by human art alone, could be deduced from the laws of nature alone, insofar as it is considered only as corporeal; nor would the human body, unless it were determined and guided by the mind, be able to build a temple. But I have already shown that they do not know what the body can do, or what can be deduced from the contemplation of its nature alone, and that they experience a great many things happening from the laws of nature alone which they would never have believed could happen except by the direction of the mind, such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, at which they themselves wonder when they are awake. I add here the very structure of the human body, which in artfulness far surpasses all the things constructed by human art; not to mention that I have shown above that infinitely many things follow from nature,[214] under whatever attribute it is considered.

As regards the second, human affairs would certainly go much more happily if it were equally in man's power to be silent as to speak. But experience teaches more than enough that men have nothing less in their power than their tongue, and can do nothing less than moderate their appetites. That is why most believe that we do freely only those things which we seek lightly,

[214] Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65].

earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei, cuius frequenter recordamur; sed illa minime, quae magno cum affectu petimus et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit. Verumenimvero nisi experti essent, nos plura agere quorum postea poenitet, nosque saepe, quando scilicet contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil[ez] impediret, quominus crederent nos omnia libere agere. Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui, quae postea sobrius vellet tacuisse. Sic delirans, garrula, puer et huius farinae plurimi ex libero mentis decreto credunt loqui, cum tamen loquendi impetum, quem habent, continere nequeant, ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare, quam ratio doceat, quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant, quia suarum actionum sunt conscii et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari; et praeterea quod mentis decreta nihil sint praeter ipsos appetitus, quae propterea varia sunt pro varia corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur, et qui praeterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint, nesciunt; qui autem nullo, facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur.

Quae omnia profecto clare ostendunt, mentis tam decretum, quam appetitum et corporis determinationem simul esse natura, vel potius unam eandemque rem, quam, quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, *decretum* appellamus, et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, *determinationem* vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex iam dicendis patebit. Nam aliud est, quod hic apprime notari vellem, nempe quod nos nihil ex mentis decreto agere possumus, nisi eius recordemur. Ex. gr. non possumus verbum loqui, nisi eiusdem recordemur. Deinde in libera mentis potestate non est, rei alicuius recordari vel eiusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in mentis potestate esse creditur, quod rem, cuius recordamur, vel tacere vel loqui ex solo mentis decreto possumus. Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero mentis decreto loqui, nec tamen loquimur, vel si loquimur, id ex corporis spontaneo motu fit. Somniamus deinde, nos quaedam homines celare, idque eodem mentis decreto, quo, dum vigilamus, ea quae scimus tacemus. Somniamus denique, nos ex mentis decreto quaedam agere, quae, dum vigilamus, non audemus; atque adeo pervelim scire, an in mente duo decretorum genera dentur, phantasticorum unum et liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est, hoc mentis decretum, quod liberum esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui, nec aliud esse praeter

[ez]deteriora sequi, nihil] *transcr.* deteriora sequi2), nihil. The transcription keeps the marker '2)' of a footnote of an earlier edition (Ovid, Met. VII.20–21), without the note.

because the appetite for these things can easily be reduced by the memory of another thing which we frequently recollect; but by no means those things which we seek with a great affect, one which cannot be calmed by the memory of another thing. But in truth, if they had not experienced that we do many things which we afterwards regret, and that often, namely when we are torn by contrary affects, we see the better and follow the worse,[215] nothing would prevent them from believing that we do all things freely. So the infant believes that it freely wants milk, the angry boy that he wants vengeance, and the timid one flight. The drunk, again, believes that he says from a free decree of the mind what afterwards, when sober, he would wish he had kept silent about. So the delirious man, the chattering woman, the child and very many of this stamp believe that they speak from a free decree of the mind, although they cannot contain the impulse to speak which they have; so that experience itself teaches no less clearly than reason that men believe themselves free for this reason only, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined;[216] and, moreover, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary according to the varying disposition of the body. For each moderates everything from his own affect, and those who, besides, are torn by contrary affects do not know what they want; while those who are torn by none are driven this way and that by the slightest impulse.

All these things certainly show clearly that both the decree of the mind and the appetite and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a *decree* when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained through it, and a *determination* when it is considered under the attribute of extension[217] and deduced from the laws of motion and rest; which will be still more clearly evident from what is to be said now. For there is something else which I should like to be especially noted here, namely that we can do nothing from a decree of the mind unless we recollect it. For example, we cannot speak a word unless we recollect it. Next, it is not in the free power of the mind to recollect a thing or to forget it. That is why it is believed that only this is in the power of the mind: that we can, from the mind's decree alone, either be silent about or speak of a thing which we recollect. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free decree of the mind, and yet we do not speak, or, if we do speak, it happens from a spontaneous motion of the body. We dream, next, that we conceal certain things from men, and that by the same decree of the mind by which, while awake, we are silent about the things we know. We dream, finally, that we do from a decree of the mind certain things which we do not dare to do while awake; and so I should very much like to know whether there are in the mind two kinds of decrees, the fantastic and the free. But if

[215] Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII.20–21, where Medea, in love with Jason, says: 'video meliora proboque, / deteriora sequor' ('I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse'). Spinoza quotes the line again in the Preface to Part IV [p. 351] and in Part IV, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 375].

[216] The diagnosis of the Appendix to Part I [p. 101] and of Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181]. Letter 58 [p. 623], to Schuller, gives the same examples in nearly the same words ('Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle, et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui, quae postea sobrius tacuisse vellet'), with *garrulus* where the *Ethics* has the feminine *garrula*, and adds the stone which, set in motion and conscious of its effort, would believe itself free.

[217] One thing under two attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]): there is no causal relation between the decision and the bodily movement, because they are not two things. The decree, as an affirmation involved in an idea (Part II, Prop. 49 [p. 209]), is as necessary as any other idea.

illam affirmationem, quam idea, quatenus idea est, necessario involvit. Vide prop. 49. P. 2. Atque adeo haec mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur, ac ideae rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt, se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.

Propositio III

[G II 144] *Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis oriuntur, passiones autem a solis inadaequatis pendent.*

[G II 145] Demonstratio. Primum, quod mentis essentiam constituit, nihil aliud est, quam idea corporis actu existentis (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.), quae (per prop. 15. P. 2.) ex multis aliis componitur, quarum quaedam (per coroll. prop. 38. P. 2.) sunt adaequatae, quaedam autem inadaequatae (per coroll. prop. 29. P. 2.). Quicquid ergo ex mentis natura sequitur et cuius mens causa est proxima, per quam id debet intelligi, necessario ex idea adaequata vel inadaequata sequi debet. At quatenus mens (per prop. 1. huius) ideas habet inadaequatas, eatenus necessario patitur. Ergo mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis sequuntur, et mens propterea tantum patitur quia ideas habet inadaequatas. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Videmus itaque passiones ad mentem non referri, nisi quatenus aliquid habet, quod negationem involvit, sive quatenus consideratur ut naturae pars,[fa] quae per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi; et hac ratione ostendere possem, passiones eodem modo ad res singulares, ac ad mentem referri, nec alia ratione posse percipi. Sed meum institutum est, de sola mente humana agere.

Propositio IV

Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui.

Demonstratio. Haec propositio per se patet. Definitio enim cuiuscumque rei ipsius rei essen-

[fa] The 1677 edition (OP p. 101) has *quatenus consideratur naturae pars*; Halpern adds *ut*, as Spinoza's usage requires, and Gebhardt (G II 145; Textgestaltung II 369) follows.

one does not wish to go so far in madness, it must necessarily be granted that this decree of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguished from the imagination itself, or memory, and is nothing but that affirmation which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves. See Prop. 49 of Part II [p. 209]. And so these decrees of the mind arise in the mind with the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing. Those, therefore, who believe that they speak or are silent or do anything from a free decree of the mind dream with their eyes open.

Proposition III

The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.

Cited in 3P9D [p. 245], 3P56D [p. 305], 3GDAEx [p. 339], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P24D [p. 383], 4P28D [p. 387], 4P35D [p. 393], 4P35C2 [p. 395], 4P51D [p. 417], 4P52D [p. 419], 4P59D [p. 427], 4P61D [p. 431], 4P63D [p. 433], 4P64D [p. 433], 5P3D [p. 475], 5P4S [p. 477], 5P18D [p. 491], 5P20S [p. 491], 5P36D [p. 515], 5P40D [p. 521], 5P40C [p. 521], 5P42D [p. 523]

Demonstration. The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of a body actually existing (by Props. 11 [p. 139] and 13 of Part II [p. 141]), which (by Prop. 15 of Part II [p. 159]) is composed of many other ideas, of which some (by Cor. of Prop. 38 of Part II [p. 183]) are adequate, others inadequate (by Cor. of Prop. 29 of Part II [p. 175]). Whatever, therefore, follows from the nature of the mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate or an inadequate idea. But insofar as the mind (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 233]) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on. Therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate ideas alone, and the mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

Scholium. We see, therefore, that passions are not related to the mind except insofar as it has something which involves negation, or insofar as it is considered as a part of nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself without others;[218] and in this way I could show that passions are related to singular things in the same way as to the mind, and cannot be perceived in any other way. But my purpose is to treat only of the human mind.

Cited in 4P32D [p. 391], 4P59D [p. 427], 5P40D [p. 521]

Proposition IV

No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause.[219]

Cited in 3P5D [p. 243], 3P6D [p. 243], 3P8D [p. 245], 3P11S [p. 249], 4P1D [p. 359], 4P4D [p. 361], 4P18S [p. 377], 4P20D [p. 381], 4P30D [p. 389]

Demonstration. This Proposition is evident through itself. For the definition of any thing

[218] Part IV builds on this: 'we are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others' (Part IV, Prop. 2 [p. 361]), and it cannot be that a man is not a part of nature, so that he is necessarily always subject to passions (Part IV, Prop. 4 [p. 361] and its Corollary).

[219] The argument of the Demonstration moves from what the definition of a thing contains to what the thing itself can do. Part IV draws the consequence for suicide: no one neglects to preserve his being, or kills himself, 'from the necessity of his own nature', but only 'compelled by external causes' (Part IV, Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 381]).

tiam affirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere. Q. E. D.

Propositio V

Res eatenus contrariae sunt naturae, hoc est, eatenus in eodem subiecto esse nequeunt, quatenus una alteram potest destruere.

[G II 146] Demonstratio. Si enim inter se convenire vel in eodem subiecto simul esse possent, posset ergo in eodem subiecto aliquid dari, quod ipsum posset destruere, quod (per prop. praeced.) est absurdum. Ergo res etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio VI

Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.

Demonstratio. Res enim singulares modi sunt, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.), hoc est (per prop. 34. P. 1.) res, quae Dei potentiam qua Deus est et agit, certo et determinato modo exprimunt. Neque ulla res aliquid in se habet, a quo possit destrui, sive quod eius existentiam tollat (per prop. 4. huius); sed contra ei omni, quod eiusdem existentiam potest tollere, opponitur (per prop. praeced.). Adeoque quantum potest et in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. Q. E. D.

Propositio VII

Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.

Demonstratio. Ex data cuiuscumque rei essentia quaedam necessario sequuntur (per prop.

affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it; or it posits the essence of the thing, but does not take it away. So while we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it which could destroy it. Q.E.D.

Proposition V

Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.

Cited in 3P6D [p. 243], 3P10D [p. 247], 3P37D [p. 281], 4P7D [p. 365], 4P30D [p. 389]

Demonstration. For if they could agree with one another, or be in the same subject at the same time, then something could be in the same subject which could destroy it, which (by the preceding Prop. [p. 241]) is absurd. Therefore things, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition VI

Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.[220]

Cited in 3P7D [p. 243], 3P12D [p. 251], 3P44S [p. 289], 4P4D [p. 361], 4P20D [p. 381], 4P25D [p. 385], 4P26D [p. 385], 4P31D [p. 389], 4P60D [p. 429], 4P64D [p. 433]

Demonstration. For singular things are modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by Cor. of Prop. 25 of Part I [p. 77]), that is (by Prop. 34 of Part I [p. 91]), things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God by which God is and acts.[221] And no thing has in itself anything by which it could be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 241]); on the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by the preceding Prop. [p. 243]). And so, as far as it can and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being. Q.E.D.

Proposition VII

The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.

Cited in 3P9D [p. 245], 3P10D [p. 247], 3P37D [p. 281], 3P54D [p. 301], 4D8 [p. 357], 4P4D [p. 361], 4P5D [p. 363], 4P8D [p. 367], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P18D [p. 377], 4P18S [p. 377], 4P20D [p. 381], 4P21D [p. 381], 4P22D [p. 383], 4P25D [p. 385], 4P26D [p. 385], 4P32D [p. 391], 4P33D [p. 391], 4P53D [p. 419], 4P60D [p. 429], 4P64D [p. 433], 5A2 [p. 473], 5P8D [p. 481], 5P9D [p. 481], 5P25D [p. 505]

Cited in Letters 64 [p. 629]

Demonstration. From the given essence of any thing certain things necessarily follow (by

[220] The doctrine of the *conatus*, the centre of Part III. *Quantum in se est* is the phrase of Descartes' first law of nature, that each thing 'quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseveret' ('as far as is in it, always perseveres in the same state', *Principles* II.37, AT VIII-1 62), which Spinoza had stated for bodies in Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151]. Here it is extended to every thing under every attribute, and it was anticipated in Part II, Prop. 45, Schol. [p. 197]: the force by which each thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature.

[221] The first step grounds the striving of finite things in the power of God, which is his essence (Part I, Prop. 34 [p. 91]): each thing is a certain and determinate portion of that power. The striving is thus not a tendency added to the thing but its share in the power by which God exists and acts.

36. P. 1.), nec res aliud possunt, quam id quod ex determinata earum natura necessario sequitur (per prop. 29. P. 1.). Quare cuiuscumque rei potentia sive conatus, quo ipsa vel sola vel cum aliis quidquam agit, vel agere conatur, hoc est (per prop. 6. huius) potentia sive conatus, quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei datam sive actualem essentiam. Q. E. D.

Propositio VIII

[G II 147] *Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.*

Demonstratio. Si enim tempus limitatum involveret, quod rei durationem determinaret, tum ex sola ipsa potentia, qua res existit, sequeretur, quod res post limitatum illud tempus non posset existere, sed quod deberet destrui. Atqui hoc (per prop. 4. huius) est absurdum. Ergo conatus, quo res existit, nullum tempus definitum involvit, sed contra, quoniam (per eandem prop. 4. huius) si a nulla externa causa destruatur, eadem potentia, qua iam existit, existere perget semper, ergo hic conatus tempus indefinitum involvit. Q. E. D.

Propositio IX

Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione, et huius sui conatus est conscia.

Demonstratio. Mentis essentia ex ideis adaequatis et inadaequatis constituitur (ut in prop. 3. huius ostendimus), adeoque (per prop. 7. huius) tam quatenus has, quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur; idque (per prop. 8. huius) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem mens (per prop. 23. P. 2.) per ideas affectionum corporis necessario sui sit conscia, est ergo (per prop. 7. huius) mens sui conatus conscia. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hic conatus cum ad mentem solam refertur, *voluntas* appellatur; sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur *appetitus*, qui proinde[fb] nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia, ex cuius natura ea, quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur; atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla[fc] est differentia, nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur, quatenus sui appetitus sunt

[fb] *appetitus*, qui proinde] *transcr.* appetitus, qui proinde. Italics: the transcription closes the emphasis only after 'cupiditatem' in the next sentence; the 1677 edition (OP pp. 103–104) italicizes the defined terms.

[fc] inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla] *transcr.* inter appetitum et cupiditatem* nulla. Italics (see the previous note); 'appetitum' and 'cupiditatem' are in roman in the 1677 edition.

Prop. 36 of Part I [p. 93]), and things can do nothing but what necessarily follows from their determinate nature (by Prop. 29 of Part I [p. 81]). Therefore the power of any thing, or the striving by which it, either alone or with others, does anything or strives to do anything, that is (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 243]), the power, or striving, by which it strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself.[222] Q.E.D.

Proposition VIII

The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

Cited in 3P9D [p. 245]

Demonstration. For if it involved a limited time, which would determine the duration of the thing, then it would follow from the very power alone by which the thing exists that the thing could not exist after that limited time, but would have to be destroyed. But this (by Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 241]) is absurd. Therefore the striving by which a thing exists involves no definite time; on the contrary, since (by the same Prop. 4 of this Part) if it is destroyed by no external cause, it will always continue to exist by the same power by which it now exists, this striving involves an indefinite time.[223] Q.E.D.

Proposition IX

The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this striving of its own.

Cited in 3P12D [p. 251], 3P13D [p. 251], 3P58D [p. 309]

Demonstration. The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 241]), and so (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 243]) it strives to persevere in its being both insofar as it has the former and insofar as it has the latter; and that (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 245]) for an indefinite duration. But since the mind (by Prop. 23 of Part II [p. 169]) is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the affections of the body, the mind is therefore (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 243]) conscious of its striving. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This striving, when it is related to the mind alone, is called *will*;[224] but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called *appetite*, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation; and so man is determined to do those things. Next, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious

[222] As God's power is his essence (Part I, Prop. 34 [p. 91]), so the power of each thing is its actual essence. What a thing is and what it does are not two things: its essence is a power of producing effects, and its striving to persevere is that same power considered as it meets the things that oppose it.

[223] Compare the definition of duration as 'the indefinite continuation of existing' (Part II, Def. 5 [p. 123]). The limit of a thing's duration comes from outside it.

[224] Not the will of Part II, Prop. 48, Schol. [p. 207], the faculty of affirming and denying, which Spinoza there distinguished from desire. 'Will' here names the *conatus* considered under the attribute of thought alone; 'appetite' names the same striving considered as belonging to the whole man, mind and body.

conscii; et propterea sic definiri potest, nempe, *cupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia*.[fd] Constat itaque ex his omnibus, nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere, quia id bonum esse iudicamus; sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse iudicare, quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus.

Propositio X

[G II 148] *Idea, quae corporis nostri existentiam secludit, in nostra mente dari nequit, sed eidem est contraria.*

Demonstratio. Quicquid corpus nostrum potest destruere, in eodem dari nequit (per prop. 5. huius). Adeoque neque eius rei idea potest in Deo dari, quatenus nostri corporis ideam habet (per coroll. prop. 9. P. 2.), hoc est (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.) eius rei idea in nostra mente dari nequit; sed contra, quoniam (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.) primum, quod mentis essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et praecipuum nostrae mentis conatus est (per prop. 7. huius) corporis nostri existentiam affirmare. Atque adeo idea, quae corporis nostri existentiam negat, nostrae menti est contraria etc.[fe] Q. E. D.

Propositio XI

Quicquid corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet, eiusdem rei idea mentis nostrae cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet.

Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex prop. 7. P. 2. vel etiam ex prop. 14. P. 2.

Scholium. Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes, et iam ad maiorem, iam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quae quidem passiones nobis explicant *affectus laetitiae* et *tristitiae*. Per *laetitiam* itaque in sequentibus intelligam *passionem, qua mens ad maiorem perfectionem transit*. Per *tristitiam* autem *passionem, qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem*. Porro affectum laetitiae ad mentem et corpus simul relatum *titillationem* vel *hilaritatem* voco; tristitiae autem *dolorem* vel *melancholiam*.[ff] Sed notandum, titillationem et dolorem ad hominem

[fd] nempe, *cupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia*.] *transcr.* nempecupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia. Word division and italics as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 104), which sets the definition in italic.

[fe] W. Meijer and Baensch, in their second editions, would delete *etc.*, and Appuhn omits it without comment. Gebhardt (G II 148; Textgestaltung II 369) keeps it: the Dutch version confirms it, and the summary at the end of the Demonstration does not restate the whole Proposition.

[ff] *titillationem* vel *hilaritatem* voco; tristitiae autem *dolorem* vel *melancholiam*.] *transcr.* titillationem vel hilaritatem voco; tristitiae autem dolorem velmelancholiam. Word division ('velmelancholiam') and italics as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 105).

of their appetite; and so it can be defined thus: *desire is appetite together with consciousness of it*. From all these things, then, it is established that we strive for, will, want and desire nothing because we judge it to be good; but on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it.[225]

Cited in 3P11S [p. 247], 3P27C3D [p. 269], 3P28D [p. 269], 3P37D [p. 281], 3P39S [p. 283], 3P55C2D [p. 303], 3P56D [p. 305], 3P57D [p. 307], 3P58D [p. 309], 3DA1Ex [p. 319], 4P19D [p. 379], 4P26D [p. 385]

Proposition X

An idea which excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.

Cited in 3P11S [p. 247], 4P20S [p. 381]

Demonstration. Whatever can destroy our body cannot be in it (by Prop. 5 of this Part [p. 243]). And so the idea of that thing cannot be in God insofar as he has the idea of our body (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of Part II [p. 135]); that is (by Props. 11 [p. 139] and 13 of Part II [p. 141]), the idea of that thing cannot be in our mind. On the contrary, since (by Props. 11 [p. 139] and 13 of Part II [p. 141]) the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of a body actually existing, the first and principal thing in the striving of our mind is (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 243]) to affirm the existence of our body. And so an idea which denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XI

Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting of our body, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of thinking of our mind.

Cited in 3P12D [p. 251], 3P34D [p. 277], 3P57D [p. 307], 3P59D [p. 311], 4P41D [p. 407], 4P42D [p. 407]

Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Prop. 7 of Part II [p. 129], or also from Prop. 14 of Part II [p. 159].

Scholium. We see, then, that the mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection; and these passions explain to us the *affects of joy* and *sadness*. By *joy*, therefore, I shall understand in what follows *the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection*.[226] By *sadness*, however, *the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection*.
Further, the affect of joy related to the mind and body together I call *pleasure* or *cheerfulness*; that of sadness, *pain* or *melancholy*. But it should be noted that pleasure and pain are related to a man

[225] The traditional order, in which the will is moved by the good the intellect apprehends, is reversed. Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 283] draws the consequence for the words: 'by good I understand here every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies a longing', and recalls this Scholium. Compare the account of how men form the notions of good and evil in the Appendix to Part I [p. 101], and the definitions of good and evil at the beginning of Part IV (Part IV, Def. 1 [p. 355]).

[226] Joy and sadness are transitions, not states: the Definitions of the Affects insist that joy is 'the passage' to greater perfection, not perfection itself, since a man born with that perfection would possess it without the affect of joy ('Dico transitionem', Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]). 'Pleasure' and 'pain', the older English renderings, suggest sensations, which is too narrow; Spinoza keeps those words for joy and sadness related to one part of the body (*titillatio*, *dolor*). Joy is defined here as a passion; there is also an active joy (Prop. 58 [p. 309]).

referri, quando una eius pars prae reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam, quando omnes pariter sunt affectae.
Quid deinde *cupiditas* sit in schol. prop. 9. huius partis explicui et praeter hos tres[fg] nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium; nam[fh] reliquos ex his tribus oriri in seqq. ostendam. Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius prop. 10. huius explicare, ut clarius intelligatur, qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria.[fi]

[G II 149] In schol. prop. 17. P. 2. ostendimus, ideam quae mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere, quamdiu ipsum corpus existit. Deinde ex iis quae in coroll. prop. 8. P. 2. et in eiusdem schol. ostendimus, sequitur, praesentem nostrae mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere, quod sc. mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam, qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide prop. 17. et 18. P. 2. cum eius schol.), quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur, mentis praesentem existentiam eiusque imaginandi potentiam tolli, simulatque mens praesentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa, cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per prop. 4. huius), nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per prop. 6. P. 2.) causa, cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est, quia corpus existere incepit (quare, per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit); sed (per prop. 8. P. 2.)[fj] hoc ab alia idea oritur, quae nostri corporis, et consequenter nostrae mentis praesentem existentiam secludit; quaeque adeo ideae, quae nostrae mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.

Propositio XII

[G II 150] *Mens quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur, quae corporis agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant.*

[fg] explicui et praeter hos tres] *transcr.* explicui et *praeter hos tres. Italics: the transcription sets 'praeter hos tres ... contraria' in italic, which neither the 1677 edition (OP p. 105) nor the sense supports.

[fh] The 1677 edition (OP p. 105) has no *nam* in the text but adds it in its list of errata (*Sphalmata corrigenda*, p. 105 l. 12); the Dutch version has *want*. Gebhardt (G II 149; Textgestaltung II 369) prints it; Van Vloten–Land had rejected the insertion.

[fi] qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria.] *transcr.* qua ratione idea ideae sit contraria. Italics (see the previous note).

[fj] Van Vloten–Land doubted the reference and proposed *Prop. 17.*, and Appuhn and Halpern follow them; Baensch changed it to *Prop. 6.* in his second edition. Gebhardt (G II 149; Textgestaltung II 369) keeps *Prop. 8.*, which the Dutch version also has: Prop. 17 concerns the mind's relation to other bodies, not to its own, while only Prop. 8 teaches that the ideas of things that do not exist must be derived from the infinite idea of God, which has nothing in common with the temporal existence of our body and mind.

when one part of him is affected more than the rest; cheerfulness and melancholy, when all parts are equally affected.[227]

Next, what *desire* is I have explained in the Scholium of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245], and apart from these three I acknowledge no other primary affect;[228] for I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three. But before I go further, I should like to explain Prop. 10 of this Part [p. 247] more fully here, so that it may be understood more clearly in what way one idea is contrary to another.

In the Scholium of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161] we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body for as long as the body itself exists. Next, from what we have shown in the Cor. of Prop. 8 of Part II [p. 133] and in its Scholium [p. 133], it follows that the present existence of our mind depends only on this, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the mind by which it imagines things and recollects them also depends on this, that it involves the actual existence of the body (see Props. 17 [p. 161] and 18 of Part II [p. 163], with its Scholium [p. 165]). From this it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are taken away[229] as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body cannot be the mind itself (by Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 241]), nor also that the body ceases to be. For (by Prop. 6 of Part II [p. 129]) the cause why the mind affirms the existence of the body is not that the body has begun to exist (so, by the same reasoning, it does not cease to affirm the existence of its body because the body ceases to be); but (by Prop. 8 of Part II [p. 133]) this arises from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea which constitutes the essence of our mind.

Cited in 3P15D [p. 253], 3P15CD [p. 253], 3P19D [p. 259], 3P20D [p. 259], 3P21D [p. 261], 3P23D [p. 263], 3P34D [p. 277], 3P35D [p. 277], 3P37D [p. 281], 3P38D [p. 281], 3P53D [p. 301], 3P55D [p. 301], 3P55C2D [p. 303], 3P56D [p. 305], 3P57D [p. 307], 3P59D [p. 311], 3DA3Ex [p. 319], 3DA4Ex [p. 321], 4P8D [p. 367], 4P18D [p. 377], 4P29D [p. 389], 4P30D [p. 389], 4P41D [p. 407], 4P42D [p. 407], 4P43D [p. 409], 4P44D [p. 409], 4P51D2 [p. 417]

Proposition XII

The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body's power of acting.

[227] *Titillatio* (literally 'tickling') and *hilaritas*. The distinction matters in Part IV: cheerfulness cannot be excessive and is always good, melancholy always bad (Part IV, Prop. 42 [p. 407]); pleasure can be excessive and bad, and pain can be good insofar as pleasure is bad (Part IV, Prop. 43 [p. 409]).

[228] Descartes had counted six primitive passions: 'l'admiration, l'amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse' ('wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness', *Passions of the Soul*, art. 69). For Spinoza love and hatred are joy and sadness with the idea of an external cause (Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 251]), and wonder is not an affect (Def. Aff. 4, Expl. [p. 321]).

[229] The duration of the mind is tied to that of the body, and with it the imagination and memory (Part V, Prop. 21 [p. 503]). What of the mind is not so tied, Part V will argue, is the idea that expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity (Part V, Props. 22–23 [p. 503]).

Demonstratio. Quamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam corporis alicuius externi involvit, tamdiu mens humana idem corpus ut praesens contemplabitur (per prop. 17. P. 2.); et consequenter (per prop. 7. P. 2.) quamdiu mens humana aliquod externum corpus[fk] ut praesens contemplatur, hoc est (per eiusdem prop. 17 schol.)[fl] imaginatur, tamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam eiusdem corporis externi involvit. Atque adeo quamdiu mens ea imaginatur, quae corporis nostri agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant, tamdiu corpus affectum est modis, qui eiusdem agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant (vide postul. 1. huius); et consequenter (per prop. 11. huius) tamdiu mentis cogitandi potentia augetur vel iuvatur. Ac proinde (per prop. 6. vel 9. huius) mens quantum potest, eadem imaginari conatur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XIII

Cum mens ea imaginatur, quae corporis agendi potentiam minuunt vel coercent, conatur, quantum potest, rerum recordari, quae horum existentiam secludunt.

Demonstratio. Quamdiu mens quicquam tale imaginatur, tamdiu mentis et corporis potentia minuitur vel coercetur (ut in praeced. prop. demonstravimus), et nihilominus id tamdiu imaginabitur, donec mens aliud imaginetur, quod huius praesentem existentiam secludat (per prop. 17. P. 2.), hoc est (ut modo ostendimus) mentis et corporis potentia tamdiu minuitur vel coercetur, donec mens aliud imaginetur, quod huius existentiam secludit, quodque adeo mens (per prop. 9. huius) quantum potest, imaginari vel recordari conabitur. Q. E. D.

[G II 151] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod mens ea imaginari aversatur, quae ipsius et corporis potentiam minuunt vel coercent.

Scholium. Ex his clare intelligimus quid *amor* quidque *odium* sit. Nempe amor nihil aliud est, quam laetitia concomitante idea causae externae et odium nihil aliud quam tristitia concomitante idea causae externae. Videmus deinde quod ille, qui amat, necessario conatur rem, quam amat, praesentem habere et conservare; et contra qui odit, rem, quam odio habet, amovere et destruere conatur. Sed de his omnibus in seqq. prolixius.

[fk] quamdiu mens humana aliquod externum corpus] *transcr.* quamdiu mens aliquod externum corpus. The 1677 edition (OP p. 106) and Gebhardt (G II 150) read 'Mens humana'; the transcription omits 'humana'.

[fl] The 1677 edition (OP p. 106) has *per ejusdem Prop. Schol.*, the Dutch version *volgens het Byvoegsel van de zelfde Voorstelling*. Van Vloten–Land insert *17.*, rightly, since the reference is to the Scholium of Prop. 17, not of Prop. 7; Gebhardt (G II 150; Textgestaltung II 369) follows.

Cited in 3P13D [p. 251], 3P15CD [p. 253], 3P19D [p. 259], 3P25D [p. 265], 3P28D [p. 269], 3P33D [p. 277], 3P42D [p. 287], 3P52S [p. 299], 4P60D [p. 429]

Demonstration. As long as the human body is affected in a way which involves the nature of some external body, so long will the human mind contemplate that body as present (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]); and consequently (by Prop. 7 of Part II [p. 129]), as long as the human mind contemplates some external body as present, that is (by the Schol. of the same Prop. 17 [p. 161]), imagines it, so long is the human body affected in a way which involves the nature of that external body. And so, as long as the mind imagines those things which increase or aid our body's power of acting, so long is the body affected in ways which increase or aid its power of acting (see Post. 1 of this Part [p. 233]); and consequently (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]) so long is the mind's power of thinking increased or aided. And therefore (by Prop. 6 [p. 243] or 9 of this Part [p. 245]) the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things. Q.E.D.

Proposition XIII

When the mind imagines those things which diminish or restrain the body's power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things which exclude their existence.

Cited in 3P20D [p. 259], 3P23D [p. 263], 3P25D [p. 265], 3P27C3D [p. 269], 3P28D [p. 269], 3DA29Ex [p. 331]

Demonstration. As long as the mind imagines anything of this kind, so long is the power of mind and body diminished or restrained (as we have demonstrated in the preceding Prop. [p. 249]); and nevertheless it will go on imagining it until the mind imagines something else which excludes its present existence (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]); that is (as we have just shown), the power of mind and body is diminished or restrained until the mind imagines something else which excludes the existence of this thing; and this, therefore, the mind (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]) will strive, as far as it can, to imagine or recollect. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this it follows that the mind is averse to imagining those things which diminish or restrain its power and the body's.

Cited in 3P15CD [p. 253], 3P38D [p. 281]

Scholium. From this we understand clearly what *love* and *hatred* are. Namely, love is nothing but joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause,[230] and hatred nothing but sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We see, next, that one who loves necessarily strives to have present and to preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand one who hates strives to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But of all these things more fully in what follows.

Cited in 3P15CD [p. 253], 3P17D [p. 255], 3P19D [p. 259], 3P20D [p. 259], 3P22D [p. 261], 3P28D [p. 269], 3P29D [p. 271], 3P30S [p. 271], 3P33D [p. 277], 3P34D [p. 277], 3P35D [p. 277], 3P38D [p. 281], 3P39D [p. 283],

[230] Descartes had defined love as an emotion of the soul, caused by the movement of the spirits, 'qui l'incite à se joindre de volonté aux objets qui paraissent luy estre convenables' ('which incites it to join itself by will to objects which appear to be agreeable to it', *Passions of the Soul*, art. 79). In the Definitions of the Affects [p. 321] Spinoza says that the definition of those who make love 'the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved' expresses a property of love, not its essence, and that by 'will' he does not mean a free decree. Love is a kind of joy; the striving to keep the beloved present (next sentence) follows from it.

Propositio XIV

Si mens duobus affectibus simul affecta semel fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero.

Demonstratio. Si corpus humanum a duobus corporibus simul affectum semel fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginatur, statim et alterius recordabitur (per prop. 18. P. 2.). At mentis imaginationes magis nostri corporis affectus,[fm] quam corporum externorum naturam indicant (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.). Ergo si corpus et consequenter mens (vide defin. 3. huius) duobus affectibus semel affecta fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero. Q. E. D.

Propositio XV

Res quaecumque potest esse per accidens causa laetitiae, tristitiae vel cupiditatis.

Demonstratio. Ponatur mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet, qui eius agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit et altero, qui eandem vel auget vel minuit (vide postul. 1. huius). Ex praeced. prop. patet, quod ubi mens postea illo a sua vera causa, quae (per hypothesin) per se eius cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero, qui ipsius cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) laetitia vel tristitia afficietur; atque adeo illa res non per se, sed per accidens causa erit laetitiae vel tristitiae. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest, rem illam posse per accidens causam esse cupiditatis. Q. E. D.

[G II 152] Corollarium. Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae, cuius ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus.

Demonstratio. Nam ex hoc solo fit (per prop. 14. huius), ut mens hanc rem postea imaginando affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae afficiatur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) ut mentis et corporis potentia augeatur vel minuatur etc. Et consequenter (per prop. 12. huius) ut mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel (per coroll. prop. 13. huius) aversetur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ut eandem amet vel odio habeat. Q. E. D.

[fm] The Dutch version has *de gesteltheit van onz lighaam* (*Constitutio*), the wording of Part II, Prop. 16, Cor. 2. Gebhardt (G II 151; Textgestaltung II 370) takes *affectus* for Spinoza's later change, made to fit what is to be proved, and rejects W. Meijer's suggestion that it is a misprint for *affectiones*.

3P40D [p. 285], 3P44D [p. 289], 3P45D [p. 291], 3P48D [p. 293], 3P49D [p. 293], 3P55C2D [p. 303], 3DA7Ex [p. 323], 4P57D [p. 423]

Proposition XIV

If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.[231]

Cited in 3P15D [p. 253], 3P15CD [p. 253], 3P16D [p. 255]

Demonstration. If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also (by Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163]). But the imaginations of the mind indicate the affects of our body more than the nature of external bodies (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]). Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (see Def. 3 of this Part [p. 231]), has once been affected by two affects, then when it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other. Q.E.D.

Proposition XV

Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of joy, sadness or desire.

Cited in 3P16D [p. 255], 3P36D [p. 279], 3P50D [p. 295], 3P52S [p. 299]

Demonstration. Let the mind be supposed to be affected by two affects at the same time, one which neither increases nor diminishes its power of acting, and the other which either increases or diminishes it (see Post. 1 of this Part [p. 233]). From the preceding Prop. [p. 253] it is evident that when the mind is afterwards affected by the former through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself neither increases nor diminishes its power of thinking, it will immediately be affected also by the latter, which increases or diminishes its power of thinking, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), it will be affected with joy or sadness; and so that thing will be the cause of joy or sadness not through itself but accidentally. And in this same way it can easily be shown that that thing can accidentally be the cause of desire. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From the mere fact that we have contemplated some thing with an affect of joy or sadness of which it is not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it.

Cited in 3P16D [p. 255], 3P35D [p. 277], 3P35S [p. 277], 3P41 [p. 287], 3P50S [p. 295], 3P52S [p. 299]

Demonstration. For from this alone it comes about (by Prop. 14 of this Part [p. 253]) that the mind, afterwards imagining this thing, is affected with an affect of joy or sadness, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), that the power of mind and body is increased or diminished, etc. And consequently (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]) that the mind desires to imagine it, or (by Cor. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) is averse to imagining it, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), that it loves it or hates it. Q.E.D.

[231] The association of affects, built on the association of images and memory in Part II, Prop. 18 [p. 163] and its Scholium. With Props. 15–16 it explains why we love and hate things that are not in themselves causes of our joy or sadness.

Scholium. Hinc intelligimus, qui fieri potest, ut quaedam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita; sed tantum ex *sympathia* (ut aiunt) et *antipathia*. Atque huc referenda etiam ea obiecta, quae nos laetitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo, quod aliquid simile habent obiectis, quae nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent, ut in seq. prop. ostendam. Scio equidem auctores, qui primi haec nomina sympathiae et antipathiae introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates; sed nihilominus credo nobis licere, per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.

Propositio XVI

Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile obiecto, quod mentem laetitia vel tristitia afficere solet, quamvis id, in quo res obiecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus.

[G II 153] Demonstratio. Id quod simile est obiecto, in ipso obiecto (per hypothesin) cum affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae contemplati sumus atque adeo (per prop. 14. huius) cum mens eius imagine afficietur, statim etiam hoc vel illo afficietur affectu, et consequenter res, quam hoc idem habere percipimus, erit (per prop. 15. huius) per accidens laetitiae vel tristitiae causa. Adeoque (per praeced. coroll.) quamvis id, in quo obiecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum causa efficiens, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus. Q. E. D.

Propositio XVII

Si rem,[fn] *quae nos tristitiae affectu afficere solet, aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri, quae nos aeque magno laetitiae affectu solet afficere, eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus.*

Demonstratio. Est enim (per hypothesin) haec res per se tristitiae causa, et (per schol. prop. 13. huius) quatenus eandem hoc affectu imaginamur, eandem odio habemus; et quatenus praeterea aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quae nos aeque magno laetitiae affectu afficere solet, aeque magno laetitiae conamine amabimus (per prop. praeced.). Atque adeo eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec mentis constitutio quae scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur, animi

[fn] The 1677 edition (OP p. 109) has *Si res*; the Dutch version has *Indien wy ons inbeelden dat de zaak* ('If we imagine that the thing'). Van Vloten–Land, on Camerer's suggestion, correct to *rem*, and Gebhardt (G II 153; Textgestaltung II 370) follows; Land had earlier thought the change not strictly necessary, given similar slips of construction elsewhere in Spinoza.

Scholium. From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate certain things without any cause known to us, but only from *sympathy* (as they say) and *antipathy*. And to this must be referred also those objects which affect us with joy or sadness from the mere fact that they have something similar to objects which usually affect us with the same affects, as I shall show in the following Prop. [p. 255] I know, indeed, that the authors who first introduced these names of sympathy and antipathy wished to signify by them certain occult qualities of things;[232] but nevertheless I believe that we may also understand by them qualities which are known, or manifest.

Cited in 3DA9 [p. 323]

Proposition XVI

From the mere fact that we imagine some thing to have something similar to an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sadness, we shall love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.

Cited in 3P15S [p. 255], 3P17D [p. 255], 3P41 [p. 287], 3P46D [p. 291], 4P34D [p. 393]

Demonstration. That which is similar to the object, we have contemplated (by hypothesis) in the object itself with an affect of joy or sadness; and so (by Prop. 14 of this Part [p. 253]) when the mind is affected by its image, it will immediately be affected also with this or that affect; and consequently the thing which we perceive to have this same feature will (by Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 253]) be accidentally the cause of joy or sadness. And so (by the preceding Cor. [p. 253]), even though that in which it is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we shall nevertheless love it or hate it. Q.E.D.

Proposition XVII

If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of sadness has something similar to another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.

Cited in 3P17S [p. 255]

Demonstration. For (by hypothesis) this thing is through itself a cause of sadness, and (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) insofar as we imagine it with this affect, we hate it; and insofar as we imagine, besides, that it has something similar to another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall love it with an equally great effort of joy (by the preceding Prop. [p. 255]). And so we shall hate it and at the same time love it. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This constitution of the mind, which arises from two contrary affects, is called

[232] Occult qualities were powers not manifest to the senses and admitted without further explanation, such as the attraction of the magnet. Descartes had claimed to explain all such effects mechanically: no one who considers his principles will think that there are 'nulla sympathiae vel antipathiae miracula tam stupenda' ('any wonders of sympathy or antipathy so astonishing') that their reason cannot be deduced from the figure, size, position and motion of the particles of matter (*Principles* IV.187, AT VIII-1 314–315). Spinoza keeps the words and gives them a known cause: the association of affects.

vocatur fluctuatio, quae proinde affectum respicit, ut dubitatio imaginationem (vide schol. prop. 44. P. 2.); nec animi fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt, nisi secundum maius et minus. Sed notandum, me in prop. praeced. has animi fluctuationes ex causis deduxisse, quae per se unius et per accidens alterius affectus sunt causa. Quod ideo feci, quia sic facilius ex praecedentibus deduci poterant; at non, quod negem, animi fluctuationes plerumque oriri ab obiecto, quod utriusque affectus sit efficiens causa. Nam corpus humanum (per postul. 1. P. 2.) ex plurimis diversae naturae individuis componitur, atque adeo (per axiom. 1. post lem. 3. quod vide post prop. 13. P. 2.) ab uno eodemque corpore plurimis diversisque modis potest affici; et contra, quia una eademque res multis modis potest affici, multis ergo etiam diversisque modis unam eandemque corporis partem afficere poterit. Ex quibus facile concipere possumus, unum idemque obiectum posse esse causam multorum contrariorumque affectuum.

Propositio XVIII

[G II 154] *Homo ex imagine rei praeteritae aut futurae eodem laetitiae et tristitiae affectu afficitur, ac ex imagine rei praesentis.*

Demonstratio. Quamdiu homo rei alicuius imagine affectus est, rem ut praesentem, tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (per prop. 17. P. 2. cum eiusdem coroll.), nec ipsam ut praeteritam aut futuram imaginatur, nisi quatenus eius imago iuncta est imagini temporis praeteriti aut futuri (vide schol. prop. 44. P. 2.). Quare rei imago in se sola considerata eadem est, sive ad tempus futurum vel praeteritum, sive ad praesens referatur, hoc est (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.) corporis constitutio seu affectus idem est, sive imago sit rei praeteritae vel futurae, sive praesentis. Atque adeo affectus laetitiae et tristitiae idem est, sive imago sit rei praeteritae aut futurae, sive praesentis. Q. E. D.

Scholium I. Rem eatenus[fo] *praeteritam* aut *futuram* hic voco, quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur. Ex. gr. quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos laesit aut laedet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur, eatenus eius existentiam affirmamus, hoc est, corpus nullo affectu afficitur, qui rei existentiam secludat; atque adeo (per prop. 17. P. 2.) corpus eiusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur, ac si res ipsa praesens adesset. Verumenimvero quia plerumque fit, ut ii qui plura sunt experti fluctuent, quamdiu rem ut futuram vel praeteritam contemplantur, deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (vide schol. prop. 44. P. 2.), hinc fit, ut affectus, qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes, sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur, donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.

[fo] The 1677 edition heads this simply *Scholium*; the Dutch version has *Eerste Byvoegsel* ('First Scholium'). Because the Scholium is cited elsewhere without a number, Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 370) thinks the two scholia to this Proposition were originally one and divided later, like the scholium to Part II, Prop. 40.

fluctuation of mind, which is therefore related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination[233] (see Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II [p. 195]); and fluctuation of mind and doubt do not differ from one another except in respect of more and less. But it should be noted that in the preceding Prop. [p. 255] I deduced these fluctuations of mind from causes which are through themselves the cause of one affect and accidentally the cause of the other. I did this because they could thus be deduced more easily from what preceded; not because I deny that fluctuations of mind usually arise from an object which is the efficient cause of both affects. For the human body (by Post. 1 of Part II [p. 157]) is composed of very many individuals of different natures, and so (by Ax. 1 after Lemma 3 [p. 153], which see after Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 141]) it can be affected in very many different ways by one and the same body; and on the other hand, because one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it will also be able to affect one and the same part of the body in many different ways. From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many contrary affects.

Cited in 3P31D [p. 273]

Proposition XVIII

A man is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy and sadness as by the image of a present thing.

Cited in 3DA15Ex [p. 325], 4P9S [p. 367], 4P12D [p. 371]

Demonstration. As long as a man is affected by the image of some thing, he will contemplate the thing as present, even though it does not exist (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161] with its Cor. [p. 161]), and he does not imagine it as past or future except insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II [p. 195]). Therefore the image of the thing, considered in itself alone, is the same whether it is referred to future or past time or to the present; that is (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]), the constitution, or affect, of the body is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. And so the affect of joy and sadness is the same whether the image is of a past or future thing or of a present one. Q.E.D.

Scholium I. I call a thing *past* or *future* here insofar as we have been affected by it or shall be affected by it. For example, insofar as we have seen it or shall see it, it has refreshed us or will refresh us, it has harmed us or will harm us, etc. For insofar as we imagine it in this way, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no affect which excludes the existence of the thing; and so (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]) the body is affected by the image of this thing in the same way as if the thing itself were present. But because it usually happens that those who have experienced more things fluctuate as long as they contemplate a thing as future or past, and are generally in doubt about its outcome (see Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II [p. 195]), it comes about that the affects which arise from like images of things are not so constant, but are generally

[233] The wavering of the imagination between images (Part II, Prop. 44, Schol. [p. 195]) is doubt; the same wavering between contrary affects is fluctuation of mind. Spinoza returns to it often: love and hatred of the same thing (Prop. 31 [p. 273]), jealousy (Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 277]), and the many fluctuations that have no names (Def. Aff. 48, Expl. [p. 337]).

[G II 155] Scholium II. Ex modo dictis intelligimus, quid sit *spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium* et *conscientiae morsus*. Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans laetitia orta ex imagine rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu dubitamus; metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubiae imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe fit securitas[fp] et ex metu desperatio; nempe laetitia vel tristitia orta ex imagine rei, quam metuimus vel speravimus. Gaudium deinde est laetitia orta ex imagine rei praeteritae, de cuius eventu dubitavimus.[fq] Conscientiae denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio.

Propositio XIX

Qui id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur; si autem conservari,[fr] *laetabitur.*

Demonstratio. Mens quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur, quae corporis agendi potentiam augent vel iuvant (per prop. 12. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius)[fs] ea quae amat. At imaginatio ab iis iuvatur, quae rei existentiam ponunt, et contra coercetur iis quae rei existentiam secludunt (per prop. 17. P. 2.). Ergo rerum imagines, quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt,[ft] mentis conatum, quo rem amatam imaginari conatur, iuvant, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) laetitia mentem afficiunt; et quae contra rei amatae existentiam secludunt, eundem mentis conatum coercent, hoc est (per idem schol.) tristitia mentem afficiunt. Qui itaque id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur, etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XX

[G II 156] *Qui id quod odio habet destrui imaginatur, laetabitur.*

Demonstratio. Mens (per prop. 13. huius) ea imaginari conatur, quae rerum existentiam,

[fp] ex spe fit securitas] *transcr.* ex spe fitsecuritas. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).

[fq] The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) reads *dubitamus*; Gebhardt (G II 155) prints *dubitavimus*, the past tense the sense requires, without comment in his Textgestaltung.

[fr] si autem conservari] *transcr.* si contra autem conservari. The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) and Gebhardt (G II 155) have no 'contra'.

[fs] The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) has *per Schol. ejusdem Prop.*, the Dutch version *volgens het Byvoegsel van der zelfder Voorstelling*. Only the Scholium of Prop. 13 can be meant; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct accordingly, and Gebhardt (G II 155; Textgestaltung II 370) follows.

[ft] imagines, quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt] *transcr.* imagines, quae rei existentiam ponunt. The 1677 edition (OP p. 111) and Gebhardt (G II 155) read 'rei amatae'; the transcription omits 'amatae'.

disturbed by the images of other things, until men become more certain of the thing's outcome.
Cited in 3P50D [p. 295], 3DA15Ex [p. 325], 4D6 [p. 357]

Scholium II. From what has just been said we understand what *hope*, *fear*, *confidence*, *despair*, *gladness* and *remorse* are. For hope is nothing but an inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are in doubt;[234] fear, on the other hand, an inconstant sadness, arising also from the image of a doubtful thing. Further, if the doubt is removed from these affects, hope becomes confidence and fear despair; namely, a joy or sadness arising from the image of a thing which we feared or hoped for. Gladness, next, is joy arising from the image of a past thing of whose outcome we were in doubt. Remorse, finally, is the sadness opposed to gladness.[235]
Cited in 3P50S [p. 295], 3DA13 [p. 323], 4D6 [p. 357]

Proposition XIX

He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but if he imagines that it is preserved, he will rejoice.
Cited in 3P21D [p. 261], 3P36CD [p. 279], 3P42D [p. 287], 3DA13Ex [p. 325], 5P19D [p. 491]

Demonstration. The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body's power of acting (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]), that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), the things it loves. But the imagination is aided by those things which posit the existence of a thing, and on the other hand is restrained by those which exclude the existence of a thing (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]). Therefore the images of things which posit the existence of the thing loved aid the striving of the mind by which it strives to imagine the thing loved, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), they affect the mind with joy; and those which, on the other hand, exclude the existence of the thing loved restrain that same striving of the mind, that is (by the same Scholium), they affect the mind with sadness. He, therefore, who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XX

He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.
Cited in 3P23D [p. 263], 3P28D [p. 269], 3DA11Ex [p. 323], 3DA13Ex [p. 325]

Demonstration. The mind (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) strives to imagine those things

[234] Hope and fear always go together, since doubt is common to both (Def. Aff. 13, Expl. [p. 325]), and they cannot be good in themselves (Part IV, Prop. 47 [p. 415]). The Definitions of the Affects restate this group as Defs. 12–17.
[235] *Conscientiae morsus*, literally 'bite of conscience'. It is not moral remorse but the sadness of a past outcome that went against our hope (Def. Aff. 17 [p. 325]), close to what English calls disappointment.

quibus corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur, secludunt, hoc est (per schol. eiusdem prop.) ea imaginari conatur; quae rerum quas odio habet, existentiam secludunt. Atque adeo rei imago, quae existentiam eius quod mens odio habet secludit, hunc mentis conatum iuvat, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) mentem laetitia afficit. Qui itaque id quod odio habet destrui imaginatur, laetabitur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXI

Qui id quod amat laetitia vel tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetitia etiam vel tristitia afficietur; et uterque hic affectus maior aut minor erit in amante, prout uterque maior aut minor est in re amata.

Demonstratio. Rerum imagines (ut in prop. 19. huius demonstravimus) quae rei amatae existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum, quo ipsam rem amatam imaginari conatur, iuvant. Sed laetitia existentiam rei laetae ponit, et eo magis, quo laetitiae affectus maior est; est enim (per schol. prop. 11. huius) transitio ad maiorem perfectionem. Ergo imago laetitiae rei amatae in amante ipsius mentis conatum iuvat, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) amantem laetitia afficit, et eo maiore quo maior hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Quod erat primum. Deinde quatenus res aliqua tristitia afficitur, eatenus destruitur, et eo magis, quo maiore afficitur tristitia (per idem schol. prop. 11. huius); adeoque (per prop. 19. huius) qui id quod amat tristitia affici imaginatur, tristitia etiam afficietur, et eo maiore quo maior hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXII

[G II 157] *Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem, quam amamus, amore erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem afficere, econtra odio etiam contra ipsum afficiemur.*

Demonstratio. Qui rem, quam amamus, laetitia vel tristitia afficit, ille nos laetitia vel tristitia etiam afficit, si nimirum rem amatam laetitia illa vel tristitia affectam imaginamur (per praeced. prop.). At haec laetitia vel tristitia in nobis supponitur dari concomitante idea causae externae. Ergo (per schol. prop. 13. huius) si aliquem imaginamur laetitia vel tristitia afficere rem, quam amamus, erga eundem amore vel odio afficiemur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Prop. 21. nobis explicat quid sit commiseratio quam definire possumus quod sit tristitia orta ex alterius damno. Quo autem nomine appellanda sit laetitia, quae ex alterius bono

which exclude the existence of things by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained, that is (by the Schol. of the same Prop. [p. 251]), it strives to imagine those things which exclude the existence of things it hates. And so the image of a thing which excludes the existence of what the mind hates aids this striving of the mind, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), it affects the mind with joy. He, therefore, who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXI

He who imagines that what he loves is affected with joy or sadness will also be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or less in the lover as it is greater or less in the thing loved.

Cited in 3P22D [p. 261], 3P22S [p. 261], 3P25D [p. 265], 3P26D [p. 265], 3P27C1D [p. 267], 3P38D [p. 281], 3P45D [p. 291]

Demonstration. The images of things which posit the existence of the thing loved (as we have demonstrated in Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 259]) aid the striving of the mind by which it strives to imagine the thing loved itself. But joy posits the existence of the thing that rejoices, and the more so, the greater the affect of joy is; for it is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]) a passage to a greater perfection. Therefore the image of the joy of the thing loved aids the striving of the lover's mind, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), it affects the lover with joy, and the more so, the greater this affect was in the thing loved. This was the first point. Next, insofar as a thing is affected with sadness, it is to that extent destroyed, and the more so, the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]); and so (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 259]) he who imagines that what he loves is affected with sadness will also be affected with sadness, and the more so, the greater this affect was in the thing loved. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXII

If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with sadness, we shall, on the contrary, also be affected with hatred towards him.

Cited in 3P24D [p. 263], 3P27C1D [p. 267]

Demonstration. He who affects a thing we love with joy or sadness also affects us with joy or sadness, namely if we imagine the thing loved to be affected with that joy or sadness (by the preceding Prop. [p. 261]). But this joy or sadness is supposed to be in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Therefore (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), if we imagine someone to affect with joy or sadness a thing we love, we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Prop. 21 [p. 261] explains to us what *pity* is, which we can define as sadness arising from another's harm. But by what name we should call the joy which arises from another's good,

oritur, nescio. Porro amorem erga illum, qui alteri benefecit, favorem, et contra odium erga[fu] illum, qui alteri malefecit, indignationem appellabimus. Denique notandum nos non tantum misereri rei, quam amavimus (ut in prop. 21. ostendimus), sed etiam eius, quam antea nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, modo eam nobis similem iudicemus (ut infra ostendam); atque adeo ei etiam favere, qui simili benefecit et contra in eum indignari, qui simili damnum intulit.

Propositio XXIII

Qui id quod odio habet, tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetabitur; si contra idem laetitia affectum esse imaginetur, contristabitur; et uterque hic affectus maior aut minor erit, prout eius contrarius maior aut minor est in eo, quod odio habet.

[G II 158] Demonstratio. Quatenus res odiosa tristitia afficitur, eatenus destruitur, et eo magis quo maiore tristitia afficitur (per schol. prop. 11. huius). Qui igitur (per prop. 20. huius) rem, quam odio habet, tristitia affici imaginatur, laetitia contra afficietur; et eo maiore, quo maiore tristitia rem odiosam affectam esse imaginatur. Quod erat primum. Deinde laetitia existentiam rei laetae ponit (per idem schol. prop. 11. huius), et eo magis, quo maior laetitia concipitur. Si quis eum, quem odio habet, laetitia affectum imaginatur, haec imaginatio (per prop. 13. huius) eiusdem conatum coercebit, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) is, qui odio habet, tristitia afficietur etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec laetitia vix solida et absque ullo animi conflictu esse potest. Nam (ut statim in prop. 27. huius ostendam) quatenus rem sibi similem tristitiae affectu affici imaginatur, eatenus contristari debet; et contra, si eandem laetitia affici imaginetur. Sed hic ad solum odium attendimus.

Propositio XXIV

Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem, quam odio habemus, odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem rem afficere, amore erga ipsum afficiemur.

Demonstratio. Demonstratur eodem modo haec prop. ac prop. 22. huius, quam vide.

Scholium. Hi et similes odii affectus ad invidiam referuntur, quae propterea nihil aliud est, quam ipsum odium, quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere, ut malo alterius gaudeat,

[fu] et contra odium erga] *transcr.* et contraodium erga. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).

I do not know.[236] Further, love towards one who has done good to another we shall call *favour*, and on the other hand hatred towards one who has done evil to another we shall call *indignation*. Finally, it should be noted that we pity not only a thing we have loved (as we have shown in Prop. 21 [p. 261]), but also one towards which we have previously had no affect, provided that we judge it to be like us (as I shall show below); and so we also favour one who has done good to someone like us, and on the other hand are indignant with one who has done harm to someone like us.
Cited in 3P27S [p. 267], 3P27C3S [p. 269], 3DA18 [p. 325], 3DA20Ex [p. 327]

Proposition XXIII

He who imagines that what he hates is affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened; and each of these affects will be greater or less as its contrary is greater or less in what he hates.
Cited in 3P26D [p. 265], 3P27D [p. 267], 3P27C2D [p. 269], 3P35D [p. 277], 3P38D [p. 281]

Demonstration. Insofar as a hated thing is affected with sadness, it is to that extent destroyed, and the more so, the greater the sadness with which it is affected (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]). He, therefore, who (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 259]) imagines that the thing he hates is affected with sadness will, on the contrary, be affected with joy; and the more so, the greater the sadness with which he imagines the hated thing to be affected. This was the first point. Next, joy posits the existence of the thing that rejoices (by the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part), and the more so, the greater the joy is conceived to be. If someone imagines the one he hates to be affected with joy, this imagination (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) will restrain his striving, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), he who hates will be affected with sadness, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This joy can hardly be solid and without any conflict of mind. For (as I shall show presently in Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]), insofar as he imagines a thing like himself to be affected with an affect of sadness, he must to that extent be saddened; and the contrary, if he imagines it to be affected with joy. But here we attend only to hatred.

Proposition XXIV

If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with hatred towards him also. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect that same thing with sadness, we shall be affected with love towards him.
Cited in 3P35S [p. 277]

Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 261], which see.

Scholium. These and similar affects of hatred are related to *envy*, which is therefore nothing but hatred itself, insofar as it is considered to dispose a man so that he rejoices in another's ill and,

[236] Pity, favour and indignation return in the Definitions of the Affects [p. 325] (Defs. 18–20); the joy at another's good remains without a name. 'As I shall show below': Prop. 27 [p. 267].

et contra ut eiusdem bono contristetur.

Propositio XXV

[G II 159] *Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur, quod nos vel rem amatam laetitia afficere imaginamur; et contra id omne negare, quod nos vel rem amatam tristitia afficere imaginamur.*

Demonstratio. Quod rem amatam laetitia vel tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos laetitia vel tristitia afficit (per prop. 21. huius). At mens (per prop. 12. huius) ea quae nos laetitia afficiunt, quantum potest, conatur imaginari, hoc est (per prop. 17. P. 2. et eius coroll.) ut praesentia contemplari; et contra (per prop. 13. huius) quae nos tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere. Ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur, quod nos vel rem amatam laetitia afficere imaginamur, et contra. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVI

Id omne de re, quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur, quod ipsam tristitia afficere imaginamur, et id contra negare, quod ipsam laetitia afficere imaginamur.

Demonstratio. Sequitur haec prop. ex prop. 23. ut praec. ex prop. 21. huius.

Scholium. His videmus, facile contingere, ut homo de se deque re amata plus iusto, et contra de re quam odit minus iusto sentiat; quae quidem imaginatio, quando ipsum hominem respicit, qui de se plus iusto sentit, superbia vocatur et species delirii est, quia homo oculis apertis somniat, se omnia illa posse, quae sola imaginatione assequitur, quaeque propterea veluti realia contemplatur, iisque exultat, quamdiu ea imaginari non potest, quae horum existentiam secludunt et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. Est igitur superbia laetitia ex eo orta, quod homo de se plus iusto sentit. Deinde laetitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo de alio plus iusto sentit, existimatio vocatur; et illa denique despectus,[fv,fw] quae ex eo oritur, quod de alio minus iusto sentit.

[fv] et illa denique despectus] *transcr.* et illa deniquedespectus. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).
[fw] *Illa* takes up *laetitia*: scorn, too, is a joy. W. Meijer proposed *et despectus denique tristitia, quae*, on the ground that scorn belongs to sadness, and Leopold and Halpern agree. Gebhardt (G II 160; Textgestaltung II 370) rejects the conjecture, with Baensch and Appuhn: scorn is an affect of hatred, but Prop. 20 [p. 259] teaches that joy can arise from hatred.

on the other hand, is saddened by his good.[237]
Cited in 3P55S [p. 303], 3P55C2D [p. 303], 3DA24Ex [p. 327]

Proposition XXV

We strive to affirm of ourselves and of the thing loved whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy; and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with sadness.
Cited in 3P30S [p. 271], 3P40S [p. 285], 3P41S [p. 287], 3P50S [p. 295], 4P49D [p. 415]

Demonstration. What we imagine to affect the thing loved with joy or sadness affects us with joy or sadness (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 261]). But the mind (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]) strives, as far as it can, to imagine the things which affect us with joy, that is (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161] and its Cor. [p. 161]), to contemplate them as present; and, on the other hand (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), to exclude the existence of the things which affect us with sadness. Therefore we strive to affirm of ourselves and of the thing loved whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy, and the contrary. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVI

We strive to affirm of a thing we hate whatever we imagine to affect it with sadness, and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect it with joy.
Cited in 3P40C2D [p. 285], 3P43D [p. 289]

Demonstration. This Proposition follows from Prop. 23 [p. 263], as the preceding one follows from Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 261].

Scholium. From these things we see that it easily happens that a man thinks more highly of himself and of the thing loved than is just, and, on the other hand, less highly than is just of the thing he hates. When this imagination concerns the man himself who thinks more highly of himself than is just, it is called *pride*, and it is a species of madness, because the man dreams with his eyes open[238] that he can do all those things which he attains by imagination alone, and which he therefore contemplates as real, and exults in them, as long as he cannot imagine those things which exclude their existence and determine his own power of acting. Pride, therefore, is joy arising from the fact that a man thinks more highly of himself than is just. Next, the joy which arises from a man's thinking more highly of another than is just is called *overestimation*; and finally that which arises from his thinking less highly of another than is just, *scorn*.
Cited in 3DA22Ex [p. 327], 3DA28Ex [p. 329]

[237] Envy proper, among equals, arises from imitation: Prop. 32, Schol. [p. 275] shows that men pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well. See also Def. Aff. 23 [p. 327].
[238] The phrase with which Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235] ended, there of those who believe that they act from a free decree of the mind. Pride, overestimation and scorn return as Defs. Aff. 21, 22 and 28 [p. 327].

Propositio XXVII

[G II 160] *Ex eo, quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.*

Demonstratio. Rerum imagines sunt corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideae corpora externa veluti nobis praesentia repraesentant (per schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), hoc est (per prop. 16. P. 2.) quarum ideae naturam nostri corporis et simul praesentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturae nostri corporis, tum idea corporis externi, quod imaginamur, affectionem nostri corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi; et consequenter, si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, haec imaginatio affectionem nostri corporis[fx] huic affectui similem exprimet. Adeoque ex hoc, quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (per prop. 23. huius) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili.[fy] Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio (de qua vide schol. prop. 22. huius); sed ad cupiditatem relata aemulatio, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam alicuius rei cupiditas, quae in nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.

Corollarium I. Si aliquem, quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur laetitia afficere rem nobis similem, amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem tristitia afficere, odio erga ipsum afficiemur.[fz]

[G II 161] Demonstratio. Hoc eodem modo[ga] ex prop. praec. demonstratur ac prop. 22. huius ex prop. 21.

Corollarium II. Rem cuius nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo, quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit.

[fx] The 1677 edition (OP p. 116) prints *nostri Corpus*, an evident slip, which Gebhardt (G II 160) and Bartuschat reproduce; the transcription reads *corporis*, as the construction requires.

[fy] W. Meijer observed that the last sentence (*Quod si … simili*) is no part of the demonstration, which ends with *afficimur*; he would put *Q. E. D.* there and move the sentence to a second scholium, and Leopold, Baensch and Halpern agree; Bartuschat puts *Q. E. D.* after *afficimur*. Gebhardt (G II 160; Textgestaltung II 370–371) keeps the order of the 1677 edition, which the Dutch version confirms: Spinoza added to the demonstration, as if in a note, something that does not strictly belong to it.

[fz] The 1677 edition (OP p. 116) has *contra Odio erga ipsum afficiemur*, repeating *contra*; Bartuschat keeps it. Halpern thought it could be deleted, and Gebhardt (G II 160; Textgestaltung II 371) deletes it, since the Dutch version has *in tegendeel* only once.

[ga] The 1677 edition (OP p. 116) has *Haec*, perhaps a feminine referring to the *propositio* Spinoza had in mind; the Dutch version has *Dit word … betoogt*. W. Meijer corrects to *Hoc*, followed by Baensch and Appuhn, and Gebhardt (G II 161; Textgestaltung II 371) accepts the correction.

Proposition XXVII

From the fact that we imagine a thing like us, towards which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.[239]

Cited in 3P23S [p. 263], 3P27C1D [p. 267], 3P27C3D [p. 269], 3P29D [p. 271], 3P30D [p. 271], 3P31D [p. 273], 3P32D [p. 275], 3P40D [p. 285], 3P47D [p. 291], 3P49S [p. 295], 3P52S [p. 299], 3P53C [p. 301], 3DA33Ex [p. 333], 3DA44Ex [p. 337], 4P50S [p. 417], 4P68S [p. 443]

Demonstration. The images of things are affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies to us as present (by Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]), that is (by Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]), whose ideas involve the nature of our body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, the nature of the external body is like the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body we imagine will involve an affection of our body like the affection of the external body; and consequently, if we imagine someone like us to be affected with some affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body like this affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to be affected with some affect, we are affected with a like affect together with it. But if we hate a thing like us, to that extent (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 263]) we shall be affected with a contrary affect together with it, not a like one. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This imitation of the affects, when it is related to sadness, is called *pity* (on which see the Schol. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 261]); but when related to desire it is called *emulation*,[240] which is therefore nothing but the desire for some thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same desire.

Cited in 3DA18 [p. 325], 3DA33Ex [p. 333]

Corollary I. If we imagine that someone towards whom we have had no affect affects with joy a thing like us, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with sadness, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Cited in 3P32D [p. 275], 3DA20Ex [p. 327]

Demonstration. This is demonstrated from the preceding Prop. [p. 267] in the same way as Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 261] from Prop. 21 [p. 261].

Corollary II. We cannot hate a thing we pity from the fact that its misery affects us with sadness.

[239] The imitation of the affects (*affectuum imitatio*, Schol.), from which Spinoza derives pity, emulation, ambition, the desire to please, envy, and much of social life. It is not a sentiment of fellow-feeling chosen by the mind but a consequence of the body's nature: the Demonstration rests on the resemblance between our body and the body of the one we imagine. Part IV builds on it (Part IV, Props. 35–37 [p. 393]), and limits it: pity, in one who lives by the guidance of reason, is bad and useless in itself (Part IV, Prop. 50 [p. 417]).

[240] See Def. Aff. 33 [p. 333] and its Explanation.

Demonstratio. Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (per prop. 23. huius) ex ipsius tristitia laetaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.

Corollarium III. Rem, cuius nos miseret, a miseria, quantum possumus, liberare conabimur.

Demonstratio. Id quod rem, cuius nos miseret, tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam tristitia afficit (per prop. praeced.); adeoque omne id, quod eius rei existentiam tollit, sive quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (per prop. 13. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 9. huius) id destruere appetemus, sive ad id destruendum determinabimur; atque adeo rem, cuius miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur, quod rei, in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia[gb] vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. Ceterum de amore et odio erga illum, qui rei, quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide schol. prop. 22. huius.

Propositio XXVIII

Id omne, quod ad laetitiam conducere imaginamur, conamur promovere, ut fiat; quod vero eidem repugnare sive ad tristitiam conducere imaginamur, amovere vel destruere conamur.

[G II 162] Demonstratio. Quod ad laetitiam conducere imaginamur, quantum possumus, imaginari conamur (per prop. 12. huius), hoc est (per prop. 17. P. 2.) id, quantum possumus, conabimur ut praesens sive ut actu existens contemplari. Sed mentis conatus seu potentia in cogitando aequalis, et simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu potentia in agendo (ut clare sequitur ex coroll. prop. 7. et coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.). Ergo ut id existat, absolute conamur, sive (quod per schol. prop. 9. huius idem est) appetimus et intendimus; quod erat primum. Deinde si id, quod tristitiae causam esse credimus, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) si id, quod odio habemus destrui imaginamur, laetabimur (per prop. 20. huius). Adeoque idem (per primam huius partem) conabimur destruere sive (per prop. 13. huius) a nobis amovere, ne ipsum ut praesens contemplemur; quod erat secundum. Ergo id omne, quod ad laetitiam etc. Q. E. D.

[gb] nos miseret, benevolentia] *transcr.* nos miseret,benevolentia. Spacing (the transcription runs the words together).

Demonstration. For if we could hate it from that fact, then (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 263]) we would rejoice in its sadness, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary III. A thing we pity we shall strive, as far as we can, to free from its misery.
Cited in 4P50D [p. 417]

Demonstration. That which affects with sadness a thing we pity affects us also with a like sadness (by the preceding Prop. [p. 267]); and so we shall strive to think up whatever takes away the existence of that thing, or destroys it (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), that is (by Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]), we shall want to destroy it, or shall be determined to destroy it; and so we shall strive to free the thing we pity from its misery. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This will, or appetite, to do good, which arises from our pitying the thing on which we want to confer a benefit, is called *benevolence*,[241] which is therefore nothing but a desire arising from pity. As for love and hatred towards one who has done good or evil to a thing we imagine to be like us, see the Schol. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 261].
Cited in 3DA35 [p. 333]

Proposition XXVIII

We strive to promote the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy; but whatever we imagine is opposed to it, or leads to sadness, we strive to remove or destroy.

Cited in 3P29D [p. 271], 3P31C [p. 273], 3P32D [p. 275], 3P35D [p. 277], 3P36D [p. 279], 3P38D [p. 281], 3P39D [p. 283], 3P39S [p. 283], 3P50S [p. 295], 3P51S [p. 297], 3P55S [p. 303], 4P19D [p. 379], 4P37S2 [p. 401], 5P19D [p. 491]

Demonstration. What we imagine leads to joy we strive, as far as we can, to imagine (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]), that is (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]), we shall strive, as far as we can, to contemplate it as present, or as actually existing. But the mind's striving, or power in thinking, is equal to, and simultaneous in nature with, the body's striving, or power in acting (as follows clearly from Cor. of Prop. 7 [p. 129] and Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]). Therefore we strive absolutely that it should exist, or (which by Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245] is the same) we want it and aim at it; which was the first point. Next, if we imagine that what we believe to be the cause of sadness, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), what we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 259]). And so (by the first part of this Demonstration) we shall strive to destroy it, or (by Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) to remove it from us, so that we do not contemplate it as present; which was the second point. Therefore whatever we imagine leads to joy, etc. Q.E.D.

[241] Def. Aff. 35 [p. 333] refers back to this Scholium.

Propositio XXIX

Nos id omne etiam agere conabimur, quod homines[gc] *cum laetitia*[gd] *aspicere imaginamur, et contra id agere aversabimur, quod homines aversari imaginamur.*

Demonstratio. Ex eo, quod imaginamur homines aliquid amare vel odio habere, nos idem amabimus vel odio habebimus (per prop. 27. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) eo ipso eius rei praesentia laetabimur vel contristabimur; adeoque (per praeced. prop.) id omne, quod homines amare sive cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur, conabimur agere etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hic conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi, ea sola de causa, ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur *ambitio* praesertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur, ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quaedam agamus vel omittamus; alias *humanitas* appellari solet. Deinde laetitiam, qua alterius actionem, qua nos conatus est delectari, imaginamur, *laudem* voco;[ge] tristitiam vero, qua contra eiusdem actionem aversamur, *vituperium* voco.

Propositio XXX

[G II 163] *Si quis aliquid egit, quod reliquos laetitia afficere imaginatur, is laetitia concomitante idea sui, tamquam causa, afficietur, sive se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit, quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur.*

Demonstratio. Qui se reliquos laetitia vel tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (per prop. 27. huius) laetitia vel tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (per prop. 19. et 23. P. 2.) sui sit conscius per affectiones, quibus ad agendum determinatur, ergo qui aliquid egit, quod ipse imaginatur, reliquos laetitia afficere, laetitia cum conscientia sui tamquam causa afficietur, sive se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur, et contra. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Cum amor (per schol. prop. 13. huius) sit laetitia concomitante idea causae externae, et odium tristitia concomitante etiam idea causae externae, erit ergo haec laetitia et tristitia amoris et odii species. Sed quia amor et odium ad obiecta externa referuntur, ideo hos affectus

[gc] Here the 1677 edition (OP p. 118) has a footnote: 'N.B. Intellige hic, & in seqq. homines, quos nullo affectu prosequuti sumus' ('N.B. Understand here and in what follows men towards whom we have had no affect'). The Dutch version has, for *nullo affectu*, *geen trek, noch afkeer* ('neither inclination nor aversion'; Textgestaltung II 371). The transcription prints the note in the text of the Proposition.

[gd] quod homines cum laetitia] *transcr.* quod homines [NB. Intellige hic et in seqq. homines, quos nullo affectu prosecuti sumus] cum laetitia. The transcription runs Spinoza's note on 'homines' into the text of the Proposition; in the 1677 edition (OP p. 118) it is a footnote, 'N.B. Intellige hic, & in seqq. homines, quos nullo affectu prosequuti sumus'. It is given in a textual note.

[ge] imaginamur, *laudem* voco] *transcr.* imaginamur, l a u d e m voco. The transcription renders the emphasis by letter-spacing.

Proposition XXIX

We shall also strive to do whatever we imagine men to look on with joy,[242] *and, on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men to be averse to.*

Cited in 3P33D [p. 277], 3P43D [p. 289]

Demonstration. From the fact that we imagine men to love or hate something, we shall love or hate the same thing (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]), that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), we shall thereby rejoice or be saddened at the presence of that thing; and so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 269]) we shall strive to do whatever we imagine men to love, or to look on with joy, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This striving to do something, and also to omit something, solely in order to please men, is called *ambition*, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the multitude that we do or omit certain things to our own harm or another's; otherwise it is usually called *courtesy*.[243] Next, the joy with which we imagine an action of another by which he has striven to please us I call *praise*; the sadness, on the other hand, with which we are averse to his action I call *blame*.

Cited in 3P31S [p. 275], 3P53C [p. 301], 3DA48Ex [p. 337], 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Proposition XXX

If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he imagines affects others with sadness, he will, on the contrary, contemplate himself with sadness.

Cited in 3P34D [p. 277], 3P40S [p. 285], 3P41S [p. 287], 3P43D [p. 289]

Demonstration. He who imagines that he affects others with joy or sadness will thereby (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]) be affected with joy or sadness. But since man (by Props. 19 [p. 165] and 23 of Part II [p. 169]) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act, he who has done something which he imagines affects others with joy will be affected with joy together with the consciousness of himself as cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy; and the contrary. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Since love (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred sadness accompanied also by the idea of an external cause, this joy and sadness will be species of love and hatred. But because love and hatred are related

[242] Spinoza's own footnote to 'men' in the 1677 edition: 'N.B. Understand here and in what follows men towards whom we have had no affect' (see the textual note). The restriction is that of Prop. 27 [p. 267]: the imitation of affects works independently of love and hatred, which can reverse it.

[243] *Humanitas*, which the Definitions of the Affects identify with *modestia*, the desire to do what pleases men and to refrain from what displeases them (Def. Aff. 43 [p. 337]); ambition is there the immoderate desire for glory (Def. Aff. 44 [p. 337]).

aliis nominibus significabimus; nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae externae *gloriam*[gf] et tristitiam huic contrariam *pudorem* appellabimus; intellige, quando laetitia vel tristitia ex eo oritur, quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit. Alias laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae[gg] *acquiescentiam in se ipso*, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam *poenitentiam*[gh] vocabo. Deinde quia (per coroll. prop. 17. P. 2.) fieri potest, ut laetitia, qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit, et (per prop. 25. huius) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari, quod se laetitia afficere imaginatur, facile ergo fieri potest, ut gloriosus superbus sit, et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur, quando omnibus molestus est.

Propositio XXXI

[G II 164] *Si aliquem imaginamur amare vel cupere vel odio habere aliquid, quod ipsi amamus, cupimus vel odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id, quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur, vel contra,*[gi] *tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.*

Demonstratio. Ex eo solo, quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (per prop. 27. huius). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus.[gj] Accedit ergo amori nova causa, a qua fovetur; atque adeo id, quod amamus hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo, quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (per eandem prop.). At si supponamus, nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur sive (vide schol. prop. 17. huius) animi fluctuationem patiemur. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc et ex prop. 28. huius sequitur, unumquemque, quantum potest, conari ut unusquisque id quod ipse amat amet, et quod ipse odit odio etiam habeat; unde illud poetae:[gk]

[gf] nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae externae *gloriam*] *transcr.* nempe laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae *gloriam*. The 1677 edition (OP p. 119) and Gebhardt (G II 163; Textgestaltung II 371–372) read 'causae externae' here; Gebhardt corrects only the second 'externae' (of self-contentment) to 'internae'. The transcription has 'internae' in both places.

[gg] The 1677 edition (OP p. 119) and the older editions and translations read *causae externae* here as well as in the preceding sentence; the Dutch version has *van het denkbeelt van een innerlijke oorzaak verzelt*. Gebhardt (G II 163; Textgestaltung II 371–372) corrects to *internae*, as Camerer had proposed, against Land, who kept *externae* and thought that if this were changed the preceding *externae* would have to be changed too; Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Leopold read *internae*, W. Meijer omits the word, and Lantzenberg keeps *externae*. The antithesis requires *externae* for glory and shame and *internae* for self-contentment and repentance.

[gh] *acquiescentiam in se ipso*, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam *poenitentiam*] *transcr. acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam poenitentiam*. Italics: only the names of the affects are emphasized.

[gi] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'dat hy 't geen bemint 't welk wy haten' ('that he loves what we hate'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 164; Textgestaltung II 372).

[gj] The list of errata of the 1677 edition (*Sphalmata corrigenda*, p. 120 l. 12) asks for *supponimur* ('we are supposed to love it'); Bruder and Van Vloten–Land reject the correction, appealing to the Dutch *wy onderstellen dat wy*, and Baensch, Appuhn and Gebhardt (G II 164; Textgestaltung II 372) keep *supponimus*.

[gk] Ovidii amor. l. II. eleg. 19. v. 4., 5. [Bruder]

to external objects, we shall signify these affects by other names: namely, joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause we shall call *glory*, and the sadness contrary to it *shame*, understand, when the joy or sadness arises from a man's believing that he is praised or blamed. Otherwise, joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause I shall call *self-contentment*,[244] and the sadness contrary to it *repentance*. Next, because (by Cor. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]) it can happen that the joy with which someone imagines that he affects others is only imaginary, and (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 265]) each strives to imagine of himself whatever he imagines affects him with joy, it can easily happen that the vainglorious man is proud and imagines himself to be pleasing to all when he is a nuisance to all.

Cited in 3P34D [p. 277], 3P35D [p. 277], 3P40S [p. 285], 3P41S [p. 287], 3P42D [p. 287], 3DA29Ex [p. 331], 3DA31Ex [p. 331]

Proposition XXXI

If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something which we ourselves love, desire or hate, we shall thereby love it, etc., more constantly. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the contrary, then we shall suffer fluctuation of mind.

Cited in 3P35D [p. 277], 3DA44Ex [p. 337], 4P34S [p. 393], 4P37D2 [p. 399], 5P20D [p. 491]

Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone to love something, we shall thereby love the same thing (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]). But we suppose that we love it without this. A new cause of love is therefore added, by which it is fostered; and so we shall thereby love what we love more constantly. Next, from the fact that we imagine someone to be averse to something, we shall be averse to it (by the same Proposition). But if we suppose that we love that very thing at the same time, we shall therefore at the same time love and be averse to it, or (see Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 255]) we shall suffer fluctuation of mind. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From this and from Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269] it follows that each strives, as far as he can, that everyone should love what he loves and hate what he hates; whence that line of the poet:[245]

[244] Glory and shame are joy and sadness whose cause lies in the praise or blame of others, and so they are species of love and hatred. Self-contentment and repentance have their cause in oneself: the man contemplates himself and his own power of acting (Defs. Aff. 25–27 [p. 327]). Gebhardt points to the later passage where Spinoza speaks of the affects 'quos idea rei internae comitatur, tanquam causa' ('which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as cause'), before defining these affects (Def. Aff. 24, Expl. [p. 327]). Self-contentment that arises from reason is 'the highest thing we can hope for' (Part IV, Prop. 52, Schol. [p. 419]).

[245] Ovid, *Amores* II.19.5 and 4, quoted in reverse order. The poet asks a careless husband to guard his wife, since what is permitted gives no pleasure: 'Ferreus est, siquis, quod sinit alter, amat. / Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes'. Spinoza makes the lines illustrate the wish that others love what we love, though Ovid's point is closer to that of Prop. 32 [p. 275].

Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.

Scholium. Hic conatus efficiendi, ut unusquisque probet id, quod ipse amat vel odio habet, revera est *ambitio* (vide schol. prop. 29. huius); atque adeo videmus, unumquemque ex natura appetere, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento, et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.

Propositio XXXII

[G II 165] *Si aliquem re aliqua, qua unus solus potiri potest, gaudere imaginamur, conabimur efficere ne ille illa re potiatur.*

Demonstratio. Ex eo solo, quod aliquem re aliqua gaudere imaginamur, (per prop. 27. huius cum eiusdem coroll. 1.) rem illam amabimus, eaque gaudere cupiemus. At (per hypothesin) huic laetitiae obstare imaginamur, quod ille eadem hac re gaudeat. Ergo (per prop. 28. huius) ne ille eadem potiatur, conabimur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Videmus itaque cum hominum natura plerumque ita comparatum, esse ut eorum, quibus male est, misereantur, et quibus bene est, invideant, et (per prop. praeced.) eo maiore odio, quo rem, qua alium potiri imaginantur, magis amant. Videmus deinde, ex eadem naturae humanae proprietate, ex qua sequitur homines esse misericordes, sequi etiam eosdem esse invidos et ambitiosos. Denique si ipsam experientiam consulere velimus, ipsam haec omnia docere experiemur; praesertim si ad priores nostrae aetatis annos attenderimus. Nam pueros, quia eorum corpus continuo veluti in aequilibrio est, ex hoc solo ridere vel flere experimur, quod alios ridere vel flere vident; et quicquid praeterea vident alios facere, id imitari statim cupiunt, et omnia denique sibi cupiunt, quibus alios delectari imaginantur; nimirum quia rerum imagines, uti diximus, sunt ipsae humani corporis affectiones, sive modi, quibus corpus humanum a causis externis afficitur, disponiturque ad hoc vel illud agendum.

Propositio XXXIII

Cum rem nobis similem amamus, conamur, quantum possumus, efficere ut nos contra amet.

As lovers, let us hope alike and fear alike;
He is made of iron who loves what another allows.

Cited in 4P37D2 [p. 399]

Scholium. This striving to bring it about that everyone should approve what one loves or hates is in truth *ambition* (see Schol. of Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 271]); and so we see that each by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament; and while all want this alike, they are alike an obstacle to one another, and while all want to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another.

Cited in 4App19 [p. 455], 5P4S [p. 477]

Proposition XXXII

If we imagine that someone enjoys some thing which only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it.

Cited in 3P32S [p. 275], 3DA33Ex [p. 333], 4P34D [p. 393]

Demonstration. From the mere fact that we imagine someone to enjoy some thing (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267] with its Cor. 1 [p. 267]), we shall love that thing and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine that the fact that he enjoys this same thing stands in the way of this joy. Therefore (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) we shall strive that he should not possess it. Q.E.D.

Scholium. We see, then, that the nature of men is generally so constituted that they pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well, and (by the preceding Prop. [p. 275]) with a hatred the greater, the more they love the thing they imagine another to possess. We see, next, that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are compassionate, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious.[246] Finally, if we are willing to consult experience itself, we shall find that it teaches all these things, especially if we attend to the first years of our life. For we find that children, because their body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry; and whatever else they see others do, they immediately desire to imitate it; and finally they desire for themselves all the things in which they imagine others take delight; namely, because, as we have said, the images of things are the very affections of the human body, or modes by which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed to do this or that.

Cited in 3P55S [p. 303], 3DA24Ex [p. 327], 3DA33Ex [p. 333], 4P34D [p. 393]

Proposition XXXIII

When we love a thing like us, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return.

Cited in 3P34D [p. 277], 3P38D [p. 281], 3P42D [p. 287]

[246] The same mechanism, the imitation of the affects (Prop. 27 [p. 267]), produces pity and envy. Spinoza does not set a benevolent and a selfish part of human nature against each other; both follow from one property, which is why reason, not pity, must ground the help one gives others (Part IV, Prop. 50 [p. 417]).

Demonstratio. Rem, quam amamus, prae reliquis, quantum possumus, imaginari conamur (per prop. 12. huius). Si igitur res nobis sit similis, ipsam prae reliquis laetitia afficere conabimur (per prop. 29. huius), sive conabimur, quantum possumus, efficere, ut res amata laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ut nos contra amet. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXIV

[G II 166] *Quo maiore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.*

Demonstratio. Nos (per prop. praeced.) conamur, quantum possumus, ut res amata nos contra amet hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ut res amata laetitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam maiore laetitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus iuvatur hoc est (per prop. 11. huius cum eius schol.) eo maiore laetitia afficimur. At cum ex eo laetemur, quod alium nobis similem laetitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum laetitia contemplamur (per prop. 30. huius). Ergo quo maiore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo maiore laetitia nosmet contemplabimur, sive (per schol. prop. 30. huius) eo magis gloriabimur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXV

Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo amicitiae, quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi iungere, odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur, et illi alteri invidebit.

Demonstratio. Quo quis maiore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (per praeced. prop.), hoc est (per schol. prop. 30. huius) laetabitur; adeoque (per prop. 28. huius) conabitur, quantum potest, imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam, qui quidem conatus sive appetitus fomentatur, si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (per prop. 31. huius). At hic conatus sive appetitus ab ipsius rei amatae imagine concomitante imagine illius, quem res amata sibi iungit, coerceri supponitur. Ergo (per schol. prop. 11. huius) eo ipso tristitia afficietur concomitante idea rei amatae, tamquam causa, et simul imagine alterius, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) odio erga rem amatam afficietur, et simul erga illum alterum (per coroll. prop. 15. huius), cui propterea (per prop. 23. huius) quod re amata delectatur, invidebit. Q. E. D.

[G II 167] Scholium. Hoc odium erga rem amatam invidiae iunctum *zelotypia* vocatur, quae

Demonstration. We strive, as far as we can, to imagine a thing we love before others (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]). If, therefore, the thing is like us, we shall strive to affect it with joy before others (by Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 271]), or we shall strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that the thing loved is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), that it loves us in return. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXIV

The greater the affect with which we imagine a thing we love to be affected towards us, the more we shall exult in glory.

Cited in 3P35D [p. 277], 3P42D [p. 287], 3P49S [p. 295]

Demonstration. We strive (by the preceding Prop. [p. 275]), as far as we can, that the thing loved should love us in return, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), that the thing loved should be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us. The greater, therefore, the joy with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the more this striving is aided, that is (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247] with its Schol. [p. 247]), the greater the joy with which we are affected. But when we rejoice that we have affected with joy another like us, then we contemplate ourselves with joy (by Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]). Therefore the greater the affect with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected towards us, the greater the joy with which we shall contemplate ourselves, or (by Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]) the more we shall exult in glory. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXV

If someone imagines that a thing he loves joins another to itself with the same bond of friendship, or a closer one, than that by which he alone possessed it, he will be affected with hatred towards the thing loved, and will envy that other.

Demonstration. The greater the love with which someone imagines the thing loved to be affected towards him, the more he will exult in glory (by the preceding Prop. [p. 277]), that is (by Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]), the more he will rejoice; and so (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine the thing loved bound to him as closely as possible; and this striving, or appetite, is fostered if he imagines that another desires the same thing for himself (by Prop. 31 of this Part [p. 273]). But this striving, or appetite, is supposed to be restrained by the image of the thing loved accompanied by the image of him whom the thing loved joins to itself. Therefore (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]) he will thereby be affected with sadness, accompanied by the idea of the thing loved as cause and at the same time by the image of the other, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), he will be affected with hatred towards the thing loved, and at the same time towards that other (by Cor. of Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 253]), whom (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 263]) he will envy because that other takes delight in the thing loved. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This hatred towards a thing loved, joined with envy, is called *jealousy*,[247] which is

[247] A fluctuation of mind (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 255]). The Definitions of the Affects pass over jealousy and the other fluctuations, since they are compounds of affects already defined (Def. Aff. 48, Expl. [p. 337]).

proinde nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui invidetur. Praeterea hoc odium erga rem amatam maius erit pro ratione laetitiae, qua zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatae amore solebat affici, et etiam pro ratione affectus quo erga illum, quem sibi rem amatam iungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (per prop. 24. huius) odio habebit, quia ipsam id, quod ipse odio habet, laetitia afficere imaginatur; et etiam (per coroll. prop. 15. huius) ex eo, quod rei amatae imaginem imagini eius, quem odit, iungere cogitur, quae ratio plerumque locum habet in amore erga feminam. Qui enim imaginatur mulierem, quam amat, alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo, quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur, sed etiam quia rei amatae imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius iungere cogitur, eandem aversatur. Ad quod denique accedit, quod zelotypus non eodem vultu, quem res amata ei praebere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut iam ostendam.

Propositio XXXVI

Qui rei, qua semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est.

Demonstratio. Quicquid homo simul cum re, quae ipsum delectavit, vidit, id omne (per prop. 15. huius) erit per accidens laetitiae causa; adeoque (per prop. 28. huius) omni eo simul cum re, quae ipsum delectavit, potiri cupiet, sive re cum omnibus iisdem circumstantiis potiri cupiet, ac cum primo eadem delectatus est. Q. E. D.

[G II 168] Corollarium. Si itaque unam ex iis circumstantiis deficere compererit, amans contristabitur.

Demonstratio. Nam quatenus aliquam circumstantiam deficere comperit, eatenus aliquid imaginatur, quod eius rei existentiam secludit. Cum autem eius rei sive circumstantiae (per prop. praeced.) sit prae amore cupidus, ergo (per prop. 19. huius) quatenus eandem deficere imaginatur, contristabitur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec tristitia, quatenus absentiam eius, quod amamus, respicit, *desiderium* vocatur.

therefore nothing but a fluctuation of mind arising from love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of another who is envied. Moreover, this hatred towards the thing loved will be greater in proportion to the joy with which the jealous man used to be affected by the reciprocal love of the thing loved, and also in proportion to the affect with which he was affected towards him whom he imagines the thing loved to join to itself. For if he hated him, he will thereby hate the thing loved (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 263]), because he imagines that it affects with joy what he himself hates; and also (by Cor. of Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 253]) from the fact that he is compelled to join the image of the thing loved to the image of him whom he hates; which reason generally has place in love towards a woman. For he who imagines that the woman he loves gives herself to another will not only be saddened because his own appetite is restrained, but will also be averse to her because he is compelled to join the image of the thing loved to the private parts and excretions of the other. To which, finally, is added that the jealous man is not received by the thing loved with the same countenance that it used to show him; for this reason also the lover is saddened, as I shall now show.

Cited in 5P20D [p. 491]

Proposition XXXVI

He who recollects a thing in which he once took delight desires to possess it with the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it.

Cited in 3P36CD [p. 279]

Demonstration. Whatever a man has seen together with the thing that delighted him will (by Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 253]) be accidentally a cause of joy; and so (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) he will desire to possess all of it together with the thing that delighted him, or he will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it. Q.E.D.

Corollary. If, therefore, he finds that one of those circumstances is lacking, the lover will be saddened.

Demonstration. For insofar as he finds that some circumstance is lacking, he imagines something which excludes the existence of that thing. But since (by the preceding Prop. [p. 279]) he desires that thing, or circumstance, from love, he will therefore (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 259]) be saddened insofar as he imagines it to be lacking. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This sadness, insofar as it concerns the absence of what we love, is called *longing*.[248]

[248] *Desiderium*. Def. Aff. 32 [p. 333] defines it as a desire, fostered by the memory of the thing and restrained by the memory of other things that exclude its existence; the Explanation adds that longing 'is in truth a sadness', but is classed with the desires because its name seems to refer to desire.

Propositio XXXVII

Cupiditas, quae prae tristitia vel laetitia praeque odio vel amore oritur, eo est maior, quo affectus maior est.

Demonstratio. Tristitia hominis agendi potentiam (per schol. prop. 11. huius) minuit vel coercet, hoc est (per prop. 7. huius) conatum quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, minuit vel coercet; adeoque (per prop. 5. huius) huic conatui est contraria; et quicquid homo tristitia affectus conatur, est tristitiam amovere. At (per tristitiae defin.) quo tristitia maior est, eo maiori parti hominis agendi potentiae necesse est opponi. Ergo quo maior tristitia est, eo maiore agendi potentia conabitur homo contra tristitiam amovere, hoc est (per schol. prop. 9. huius) eo maiore cupiditate sive appetitu conabitur tristitiam amovere. Deinde quoniam laetitia (per idem schol. prop. 11. huius) hominis agendi potentiam auget vel iuvat, facile eadem via demonstratur, quod homo laetitia affectus nihil aliud cupit, quam eandem conservare, idque eo maiore cupiditate quo laetitia maior erit. Denique quoniam odium et amor sunt ipsi tristitiae vel laetitiae affectus,[gl] sequitur eodem modo, quod conatus, appetitus sive cupiditas, quae prae odio vel amore oritur, maior erit pro ratione odii et amoris. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXVIII

[G II 169] *Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit, ita ut amor plane aboleatur, eandem maiore odio ex pari causa prosequetur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset, et eo maiore, quo amor antea maior fuerat.*

Demonstratio. Nam si quis rem, quam amat, odio habere incipit, plures eius appetitus coercentur, quam si eandem non amavisset. Amor namque laetitia est (per schol. prop. 13. huius), quam homo, quantum potest (per prop. 28. huius) conservare conatur; idque (per idem schol.) rem amatam ut praesentem contemplando, eandemque (per prop. 21. huius) laetitia, quantum potest, afficiendo, qui quidem conatus (per prop. praeced.) eo est maior, quo amor maior est, ut et conatus efficiendi, ut res amata ipsum contra amet (vide prop. 33. huius). At hi conatus odio erga rem amatam coercentur (per coroll. prop. 13. et per prop. 23. huius). Ergo amans (per schol. prop. 11. huius) hac etiam de causa tristitia afficietur, et eo maiore quo amor maior fuerat, hoc est, praeter tristitiam, quae odii fuit causa, alia ex eo oritur quod rem amavit, et consequenter maiore tristitiae affectu rem amatam contemplabitur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) maiore odio prosequetur, quam si eandem non amavisset, et eo maiore, quo amor maior fuerat. Q. E. D.

[gl] The 1677 edition (OP p. 125) has *Laetitiae, vel Tristitiae affectus*; the Dutch version has *hartstochten van droefheit en blijschap*. Gebhardt (G II 169; Textgestaltung II 372) transposes to match *odium et amor*, as W. Meijer and Baensch had asked in their second editions and Appuhn does.

Proposition XXXVII

The desire which arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is the greater, the greater the affect is.

Cited in 3P38D [p. 281], 3P39D [p. 283], 3P43D [p. 289], 3P44D [p. 289], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P37D2 [p. 399], 4P44D [p. 409]

Demonstration. Sadness diminishes or restrains a man's power of acting (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), that is (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 243]), it diminishes or restrains the striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being; and so (by Prop. 5 of this Part [p. 243]) it is contrary to this striving; and whatever a man affected with sadness strives for is to remove the sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater the sadness is, the greater the part of the man's power of acting to which it is necessarily opposed. Therefore the greater the sadness is, the greater the power of acting with which the man will strive, on the other hand, to remove the sadness, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]), the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the sadness. Next, since joy (by the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part) increases or aids a man's power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that a man affected with joy desires nothing but to preserve it, and that with a desire the greater, the greater the joy will be. Finally, since hatred and love are themselves affects of sadness or joy, it follows in the same way that the striving, appetite or desire which arises from hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the hatred and love. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXVIII

If someone begins to hate a thing he loved, so that the love is completely destroyed, he will, from an equal cause, hate it with a greater hatred than if he had never loved it, and with a hatred the greater, the greater the love had been before.

Cited in 3P44D [p. 289]

Demonstration. For if someone begins to hate a thing he loves, more of his appetites are restrained than if he had not loved it. For love is a joy (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), which a man strives to preserve as far as he can (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]); and that (by the same Scholium) by contemplating the thing loved as present, and (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 261]) by affecting it with joy as far as he can; and this striving (by the preceding Prop. [p. 281]) is the greater, the greater the love is, as is also the striving to bring it about that the thing loved loves him in return (see Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 275]). But these strivings are restrained by hatred towards the thing loved (by Cor. of Prop. 13 [p. 251] and by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 263]). Therefore the lover (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]) will for this reason also be affected with sadness, and the more so, the greater the love had been; that is, besides the sadness which was the cause of the hatred, another arises from the fact that he loved the thing; and consequently he will contemplate the thing loved with a greater affect of sadness, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this

Propositio XXXIX

Qui aliquem odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur, nisi ex eo maius sibi malum oriri timeat; et contra, qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.

[G II 170] Demonstratio. Aliquem odio habere est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) aliquem ut tristitiae causam imaginari; adeoque (per prop. 28. huius) is, qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius sive (quod idem est) maius malum sibi timeat, idque se vitare posse credit non inferendo ei, quem odit, malum quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (per eandem prop. 28. huius) abstinere cupiet; idque (per prop. 37. huius) maiore conatu, quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea praevalebit, ut volebamus. Secundae partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit. Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Per *bonum* hic intelligo omne genus laetitiae et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit, et praecipue id, quod desiderio qualecumque illud sit, satisfacit; per *malum* autem omne tristitiae genus et praecipue id, quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in schol. prop. 9. huius) ostendimus, nos nihil cupere, quia id bonum esse iudicamus, sed contra id bonum vocamus, quod cupimus; et consequenter id, quod aversamur malum appellamus. Quare unusquisque ex suo affectu iudicat seu aestimat, quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid peius et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit. Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, eius autem inopiam pessimum iudicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil aeque ac gloriam cupit, et contra nihil aeque ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil iucundius, quam alterius infelicitas, et nihil molestius, quam aliena felicitas; ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse iudicat.

Ceterum hic affectus, quo homo ita disponitur, ut id quod vult nolit, vel ut id quod non vult velit, *timor* vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum, quod futurum iudicat, minore vitandum. Vide prop. 28. huius. Sed si malum, quod timet, pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali, ita ut quid potius velit nesciat, tum metus vocatur *consternatio*

Part [p. 251]), he will hate it with a greater hatred than if he had not loved it, and with a hatred the greater, the greater the love had been. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXIX

He who hates someone will strive to do him evil, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from it; and, on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive, by the same law, to do him good.

Cited in 3P40S [p. 285], 3P40C2D [p. 285], 3P41S [p. 287], 3DA34 [p. 333], 3DA36 [p. 335], 4P34D [p. 393], 4P37S2 [p. 401], 4P45D [p. 411], 4P45C1 [p. 411], 4P45C2 [p. 411]

Demonstration. To hate someone is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) to imagine someone as a cause of sadness; and so (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) he who hates someone will strive to remove or destroy him. But if he fears from this something sadder, or (which is the same) a greater evil to himself, and believes that he can avoid it by not inflicting on the one he hates the evil he was planning, he will desire (by the same Prop. 28 of this Part) to abstain from inflicting the evil; and that (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 281]) with a greater striving than that by which he was held to inflict the evil, which will therefore prevail, as we maintained. The demonstration of the second part proceeds in the same way. Therefore he who hates someone, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. By *good* I understand here every kind of joy,[249] and whatever, further, leads to it, and especially what satisfies a longing, whatever it may be; by *evil*, every kind of sadness, and especially what frustrates a longing. For we have shown above (in Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary call good what we desire; and consequently what we are averse to we call evil. So each judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better, what worse, and finally what best or what worst. So the greedy man judges an abundance of money best and its lack worst. The ambitious man, again, desires nothing so much as glory, and on the other hand fears nothing so much as shame. To the envious man, next, nothing is more pleasant than another's unhappiness, and nothing more troublesome than another's happiness; and so each, from his own affect, judges a thing good or evil, useful or useless.

But this affect by which a man is so disposed that he does not will what he wills, or wills what he does not will, is called *timidity*,[250] which is therefore nothing but fear insofar as a man is disposed by it to avoid an evil which he judges to be future by a lesser one. See Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]. But if the evil he fears is shame, then the timidity is called shamefacedness. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is restrained by timidity regarding another evil, so that he does

[249] The definition is relative to the affects, and so to each man's temperament, as the examples show. Part IV will define good and evil from the standpoint of reason: good is 'what we certainly know to be useful to us' (Part IV, Def. 1 [p. 355]), and the Preface to Part IV explains that good and evil indicate nothing positive in things but are modes of thinking, notions formed by comparing things with one another and with a model of human nature (Preface to Part IV [p. 351]).

[250] *Timor*, distinguished from *metus* (fear); see Def. Aff. 39 [p. 335]. On shamefacedness (*verecundia*), the fear of shame, see Def. Aff. 31, Expl. [p. 331]; on consternation, which the Definitions derive differently, from wonder at the evil feared, Def. Aff. 42 [p. 335] and its Explanation.

praecipue si utrumque malum, quod timetur, ex maximis sit.

Propositio XL

[G II 171] *Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit.*

Demonstratio. Qui aliquem odio affectum imaginatur, eo ipso etiam odio afficietur (per prop. 27. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) tristitia concomitante idea causae externae. At ipse (per hypothesin) nullam huius tristitiae causam imaginatur praeter illum, qui ipsum odio habet. Ergo ex hoc, quod se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, tristitia afficietur concomitante idea eius, qui ipsum odio habet, sive (per idem schol.) eundem odio habebit. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Quod si se iustam odii causam praebuisse imaginatur, tum (per prop. 30. huius et eiusdem schol.) pudore afficietur. Sed hoc (per prop. 25. huius) raro contingit. Praeterea haec odii reciprocatio oriri etiam potest ex eo, quod odium sequatur conatus malum inferendi ei, qui odio habetur (per prop. 39. huius). Qui igitur se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, eundem alicuius mali sive tristitiae causam imaginabitur; atque adeo tristitia afficietur, seu metu concomitante idea eius, qui ipsum odio habet, tamquam causa, hoc est, odio contra afficietur, ut supra.

Corollarium I. Qui, quem amat, odio erga se affectum imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Nam quatenus imaginatur, ab eodem se odio haberi, determinatur (per prop. praeced.) ad eundem contra odio habendum. At (per hypothesin) ipsum nihilominus amat. Ergo odio et amore simul conflictabitur.

[G II 172] Corollarium II. Si aliquis imaginatur, ab aliquo, quem antea nullo affectu prosecutus est, malum aliquod prae odio sibi illatum esse, statim idem malum eidem referre conabitur.

Demonstratio. Qui aliquem odio erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eum contra (per praeced. prop.) odio habebit et (per prop. 26. huius) id omne comminisci conabitur, quod eundem possit tristitia afficere; atque id eidem (per prop. 39. huius) inferre studebit. At (per hypothesin) primum, quod huiusmodi imaginatur, est malum sibi illatum. Ergo idem statim eidem inferre conabitur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Conatus malum inferendi ei, quem odimus, *ira* vocatur; conatus autem malum

not know which he would rather will, then the fear is called *consternation*, especially if both of the evils feared are among the greatest.

Cited in 3P51S [p. 297], 3DA39 [p. 335], 3DA42Ex [p. 335], 4P70D [p. 445]

Proposition XL

He who imagines that he is hated by someone, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate him in return.

Cited in 3P40C1 [p. 285], 3P40C2D [p. 285], 3P41D [p. 287], 3P43D [p. 289], 3P45D [p. 291], 3P49S [p. 295], 4P34D [p. 393]

Demonstration. He who imagines someone to be affected with hatred will thereby also be affected with hatred (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]), that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But he himself (by hypothesis) imagines no cause of this sadness except the one who hates him. Therefore from the fact that he imagines that he is hated by someone, he will be affected with sadness accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him, or (by the same Scholium) he will hate him. Q.E.D.

Scholium. But if he imagines that he has given just cause for the hatred, then (by Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271] and its Scholium [p. 271]) he will be affected with shame. But this (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 265]) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred is followed by a striving to inflict evil on the one who is hated (by Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 283]). He, therefore, who imagines that he is hated by someone will imagine him as the cause of some evil, or sadness; and so he will be affected with sadness, or fear, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him as cause; that is, he will be affected with hatred in return, as above.

Cited in 3P41D [p. 287], 3P41S [p. 287], 4P34D [p. 393]

Corollary I. He who imagines that one he loves is affected with hatred towards him will be torn by hatred and love together. For insofar as he imagines that he is hated by him, he is determined (by the preceding Prop. [p. 285]) to hate him in return. But (by hypothesis) he nevertheless loves him. Therefore he will be torn by hatred and love together.

Cited in 3P41C [p. 287]

Corollary II. If someone imagines that some evil has been done to him from hatred by someone towards whom he previously had no affect, he will immediately strive to return the same evil to him.

Cited in 3DA37 [p. 335], 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Demonstration. He who imagines someone to be affected with hatred towards him will hate him in return (by the preceding Prop. [p. 285]), and (by Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 265]) will strive to think up everything which can affect him with sadness, and will be eager (by Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 283]) to inflict it on him. But (by hypothesis) the first thing of this kind that he imagines is the evil done to himself. Therefore he will immediately strive to inflict the same on him. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The striving to inflict evil on one we hate is called *anger*; but the striving to return

nobis illatum referendi *vindicta* appellatur.

Propositio XLI

Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur, nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit (quod per coroll. prop. 15. et per prop. 16. huius fieri potest), eundem contra amabit.

Demonstratio. Haec propositio eadem via demonstratur ac praeced., cuius etiam schol. vide.

Scholium. Quod si se iustam amoris causam praebuisse crediderit, gloriabitur (per prop. 30. huius cum eiusdem schol.); quod quidem (per prop. 25. huius) frequentius contingit, et cuius contrarium evenire diximus, quando aliquis ab aliquo se odio haberi imaginatur (vide schol. prop. praeced.). Porro hic reciprocus amor, et consequenter (per prop. 39. huius) conatus benefaciendi ei, qui nos amat, quique (per eandem prop. 39. huius) nobis benefacere conatur, *gratia* seu *gratitudo* vocatur. Atque adeo apparet, homines longe paratiores esse ad vindictam, quam ad referendum beneficium.

[G II 173] Corollarium. Qui ab eo, quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Quod eadem via, qua primum propositionis praecedentis coroll.[gm] demonstratur.[gn]

Scholium. Quod si odium praevaluerit, ei, a quo amatur, malum inferre conabitur, qui quidem affectus *crudelitas* appellatur, praecipue si illum, qui amat, nullam odii communem causam praebuisse creditur.

Propositio XLII

Qui in aliquem amore aut spe gloriae motus beneficium contulit, contristabitur, si viderit, beneficium ingrato animo accipi.

Demonstratio. Qui rem aliquam sibi similem amat, conatur, quantum potest, efficere ut ab ipsa contra ametur (per prop. 33. huius). Qui igitur prae amore in aliquem beneficium contulit, id facit desiderio,[go] quo tenetur, ut contra ametur, hoc est (per prop. 34. huius) spe gloriae

[gm] The 1677 edition (OP p. 129) has *primum praecedentis Coroll.*, the Dutch version *d'eerste Toegift van de voorgaande Voorstelling*. Gebhardt (G II 173; Textgestaltung II 372) adds *Propositionis*, as Baensch and W. Meijer had proposed.

[gn] qua primum propositionis praecedentis coroll. demonstratur] *transcr.* qua coroll. 1. prop. praeced. demonstratur. Wording as in Gebhardt (G II 173), who adds 'Propositionis' to the 1677 edition's 'primum praecedentis Coroll.' (OP p. 129); the transcription abbreviates and reorders.

[go] Baensch, and W. Meijer in his second edition, would correct *facit* to *fecit* for the sequence of tenses, and Appuhn writes *fecit*. Gebhardt (G II 173; Textgestaltung II 372–373) keeps *facit*: conferring the benefit is a single act, in the perfect, the longing a lasting motive; the Dutch has *De geen, die … weldaat bewijst, doet zulks*.

an evil done to us is called *vengeance*.
Cited in 3DA37 [p. 335]

Proposition XLI

If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe that he has given any cause for it (which can happen by Cor. of Prop. 15 [p. 253] and by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 255]), he will love him in return.
Cited in 3P43D [p. 289]

Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one [p. 285]; see also its Scholium [p. 285].

Scholium. But if he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will exult in glory (by Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271] with its Scholium [p. 271]); which indeed (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 265]) happens more frequently, and the contrary of which, we said, happens when someone imagines that he is hated by someone (see the Schol. of the preceding Prop. [p. 285]). Further, this reciprocal love, and consequently (by Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 283]) the striving to do good to one who loves us, and who (by the same Prop. 39 of this Part) strives to do good to us, is called *thankfulness*, or *gratitude*. And so it is evident that men are far readier for vengeance than for returning a benefit.
Cited in 3DA34 [p. 333], 4P49D [p. 415], 4P57S [p. 423]

Corollary. He who imagines that he is loved by one he hates will be torn by hatred and love together. This is demonstrated in the same way as the first Corollary of the preceding Proposition [p. 285].

Scholium. But if hatred prevails, he will strive to inflict evil on the one by whom he is loved; and this affect is called *cruelty*, especially if it is believed that the one who loves has given no common cause for hatred.

Proposition XLII

He who has conferred a benefit on someone, moved by love or by hope of glory, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with an ungrateful spirit.
Cited in 4P70D [p. 445]

Demonstration. He who loves a thing like himself strives, as far as he can, to bring it about that he is loved by it in return (by Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 275]). He, therefore, who has conferred a benefit on someone from love does it from the longing by which he is held, to be loved in

sive (per schol. prop. 30. huius) laetitiae; adeoque (per prop. 12. huius) hanc gloriae causam, quantum potest, imaginari, sive ut actu existentem contemplari conabitur. At (per hypothesin) aliud imaginatur, quod eiusdem causae existentiam secludit. Ergo (per prop. 19. huius) eo ipso contristabitur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLIII

Odium reciproco odio augetur, et amore contra deleri potest.

Demonstratio. Qui eum, quem odit, odio contra erga se[gp] affectum esse imaginatur, eo ipso (per prop. 40. huius) novum odium oritur durante (per hypothesin) adhuc primo. Sed si contra eundem amore erga se affectum esse imaginetur, quatenus hoc imaginatur, eatenus (per prop. 30. huius) se ipsum cum laetitia contemplatur, et eatenus (per prop. 29. huius) eidem placere conabitur, hoc est (per prop. 41. huius)[gq] eatenus conatur ipsum odio non habere nullaque tristitia afficere; qui quidem conatus (per prop. 37. huius) maior vel minor erit pro ratione affectus, ex quo oritur. Atque adeo si maior fuerit illo, qui ex odio oritur, et quo rem, quam odit (per prop. 26. huius) tristitia afficere conatur, ei praevalebit, et odium ex animo delebit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLIV

[G II 174] *Odium, quod amore plane vincitur, in amorem transit; et amor propterea maior est, quam si odium non praecessisset.*

Demonstratio. Eodem modo procedit, ac prop. 38. huius. Nam qui rem, quam odit, sive quam cum tristitia contemplari solebat, amare incipit, eo ipso, quod amat, laetatur et huic laetitiae, quam amor involvit (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 13. huius), illa etiam accedit, quae ex eo oritur, quod conatus amovendi tristitiam, quam odium involvit[gr] (ut in prop. 37. huius ostendimus), prorsus iuvatur, concomitante idea eius, quem odio habuit, tamquam causa.

Scholium. Quamvis res ita se habeat, nemo tamen conabitur rem aliquam odio habere vel tristitia affici, ut maiore hac laetitia fruatur; hoc est, nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet, nec aegrotare desiderabit spe convalescendi. Nam unusquisque suum esse

[gp] quem odit, odio contra erga se] *transcr.* quem odit, contra odio erga se. Word order as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 129) and Gebhardt (G II 173), 'Odio contrà'.

[gq] The 1677 edition (OP p. 130) and the older editions have *Prop. 40.*; Valentin Schmidt and Auerbach correct to *41.*, followed by Van Vloten–Land, and Gebhardt (G II 174; Textgestaltung II 373) prints *41.*

[gr] Baensch, followed by Appuhn, would read *quem* (the striving which hatred involves) for *quam*, since Prop. 37 does not show that hatred involves sadness. Gebhardt (G II 174; Textgestaltung II 373), with Halpern, keeps *quam*, which parallels *laetitiae, quam amor involvit* in the same sentence.

return, that is (by Prop. 34 of this Part [p. 277]), from hope of glory, or (by Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]) of joy; and so (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine this cause of glory, or to contemplate it as actually existing. But (by hypothesis) he imagines something else which excludes the existence of this cause. Therefore (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 259]) he will thereby be saddened. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLIII

Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love.[251]
Cited in 3P49S [p. 295], 4P46D [p. 413]

Demonstration. He who imagines that the one he hates is affected with hatred towards him in return thereby (by Prop. 40 of this Part [p. 285]) has a new hatred arise, while (by hypothesis) the first still lasts. But if, on the other hand, he imagines that the same person is affected with love towards him, then insofar as he imagines this, he contemplates himself with joy (by Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]), and to that extent (by Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 271]) he will strive to please him, that is (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 287]), to that extent he strives not to hate him and to affect him with no sadness; and this striving (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 281]) will be greater or less in proportion to the affect from which it arises. And so, if it is greater than that which arises from hatred, and by which he strives (by Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 265]) to affect the thing he hates with sadness, it will prevail over it and destroy the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLIV

Hatred which is completely conquered by love passes into love; and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it.
Cited in 4P46D [p. 413]

Demonstration. It proceeds in the same way as Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 281]. For he who begins to love a thing he hates, or which he used to contemplate with sadness, rejoices from the very fact that he loves; and to this joy which love involves (see its definition in the Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) there is also added the joy which arises from the fact that the striving to remove the sadness which hatred involves (as we have shown in Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 281]) is entirely aided, accompanied by the idea of the one he hated as cause.

Scholium. Although this is so, no one will strive to hate a thing, or to be affected with sadness, in order to enjoy this greater joy; that is, no one will desire to suffer harm in the hope of recovering from it, nor long to be ill in the hope of getting well. For each will always strive to preserve his

[251] The ground of the rule of life of Part IV, Prop. 46 [p. 413]: one who lives by the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay another's hatred, anger and contempt towards him with love, or nobility. Its Scholium adds that he who wishes to avenge injuries by reciprocal hatred lives miserably.

conservare et tristitiam, quantum potest, amovere semper conabitur. Quod si contra concipi posset, hominem posse cupere aliquem odio habere, ut eum postea maiore amore prosequatur, tum eundem odio habere semper desiderabit. Nam quo odium maius fuerit, eo amor erit maior, atque adeo desiderabit semper, ut odium magis magisque augeatur, et eadem de causa homo magis ac magis aegrotare conabitur, ut maiore laetitia ex restauranda valetudine postea fruatur; atque adeo semper aegrotare conabitur, quod (per prop. 6. huius) est absurdum.

Propositio XLV

[G II 175] *Si quis aliquem sibi similem odio in rem sibi similem, quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.*

Demonstratio. Nam res amata eum, qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (per prop. 40. huius). Adeoque amans, qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam odio, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) tristitia affectam esse imaginatur, et consequenter (per prop. 21. huius) contristatur, idque concomitante idea eius, qui rem amatam odit, tamquam causa, hoc est (per schol. prop. 13. huius) ipsum odio habebit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLVI

Si quis ab aliquo cuiusdam classis,[gs] *sive nationis a sua diversae, laetitia vel tristitia affectus fuerit, concomitante eius idea sub nomine universali classis vel nationis tamquam causa, is non tantum illum, sed omnes eiusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.*

Demonstratio. Huius rei demonstratio patet ex prop. 16. huius partis.

Propositio XLVII

Laetitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod scilicet rem, quam odimus, destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia.

Demonstratio. Patet ex prop. 27. huius. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem tristitia affici imaginamur, eatenus contristamur.

Scholium. Potest haec propositio etiam demonstrari ex coroll. prop. 17. P. 2. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut praesentem contemplamur,[gt] corpusque eodem modo afficitur. Quare quatenus rei memoria viget, eatenus homo determinatur

[gs] The 1677 edition (OP p. 131) has *cujusdem classis* in the text; its list of errata, citing the word as *cujusdam*, asks for *ejusdem*, and the Dutch version has *van een zelfde stant*. Land rightly asks for *cujusdam*, since *a sua diversae* must also refer to *classis*; Gebhardt (G II 175; Textgestaltung II 373) prints it. Paulus, who overlooked the errata, had *cujusdam*; the other editions *ejusdem*.

[gt] The 1677 edition (OP p. 132) has *eandem tantùm*; the Dutch version has *zo aanschouwen wy echter de zelfde als tegenwoordig*. Gebhardt (G II 176; Textgestaltung II 373) reads *tamen*, as Leopold proposed, followed by Baensch, W. Meijer, Appuhn and Halpern.

being and to remove sadness as far as he can. But if, on the contrary, it could be conceived that a man could desire to hate someone in order to love him the more afterwards, then he would always desire to hate him. For the greater the hatred had been, the greater the love will be; and so he would always desire that the hatred should be increased more and more; and for the same reason a man would strive to be more and more ill, in order to enjoy a greater joy afterwards from the restoring of his health; and so he would always strive to be ill, which (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 243]) is absurd.

Proposition XLV

If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred towards a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate him.

Demonstration. For the thing loved hates in return the one who hates it (by Prop. 40 of this Part [p. 285]). And so the lover, who imagines that someone hates the thing loved, thereby imagines that the thing loved is affected with hatred, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), with sadness; and consequently (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 261]) he is saddened, and that accompanied by the idea of the one who hates the thing loved as cause, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]), he will hate him. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLVI

If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, accompanied by the idea of him under the universal name of the class or nation as cause, he will love or hate not only him, but all of the same class or nation.[252]

Demonstration. The demonstration of this is evident from Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 255].

Proposition XLVII

The joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed or affected with some other evil does not arise without some sadness of mind.

Demonstration. This is evident from Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]. For insofar as we imagine a thing like us to be affected with sadness, we are saddened.

Scholium. This Proposition can also be demonstrated from the Cor. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]. For whenever we recollect a thing, even though it does not actually exist, we nevertheless contemplate it as present, and the body is affected in the same way. So insofar as the

[252] An account of prejudice against groups, derived from the association of affects (Prop. 16 [p. 255]) and from the universal notions the imagination forms when it can no longer keep individuals apart (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 [p. 185]). The *Theological-Political Treatise* describes the hatred between the Hebrews and other nations in these terms: the Jews 'se ab omnibus nationibus ita separaverunt, ut omnium odium in se converterint' ('so separated themselves from all nations that they turned the hatred of all upon themselves', ch. 3), and the Hebrews' love of their country was joined with a hatred of other nations fostered by daily worship (ch. 17).

ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quae determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine, coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum, quae huius existentiam secludunt, sed non tollitur. Atque adeo homo eatenus tantum laetatur, quatenus haec determinatio coercetur; et hinc fit, ut haec laetitia, quae ex rei, quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur, quoties eiusdem rei recordamur. Nam, uti diximus, quando eiusdem rei imago excitatur, quia haec ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum, qua eandem contemplari solebat, cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia eiusdem rei imagini alias iunxit, quae eiusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo haec ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur, et homo de novo laetatur, et hoc toties, quoties haec repetitio fit. Atque haec eadem est causa, cur homines laetantur, quoties alicuius iam praeteriti mali recordantur, et cur pericula, a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur, et ad id metuendum determinantur, quae determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis, quam huius periculi ideae iunxerunt, cum ab eodem liberati sunt, quaeque eos de novo securos reddit; atque adeo de novo laetantur.

Propositio XLVIII

[G II 176] *Amor et odium ex. gr. erga Petrum destruitur, si tristitia, quam hoc, et laetitia, quam ille involvit, ideae alterius causae iungatur; et eatenus uterque diminuitur, quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam.*

Demonstratio. Patet ex sola amoris et odii definitione, quam vide in schol. prop. 13. huius. Nam propter hoc solum laetitia vocatur amor, et tristitia odium erga Petrum, quia scilicet Petrus huius vel illius affectus causa[gu] esse consideratur. Hoc itaque prorsus vel ex parte sublato affectus quoque erga Petrum prorsus vel ex parte diminuitur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLIX

[G II 177] *Amor et odium erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, maior ex pari causa uterque debet esse, quam erga necessariam.*

Demonstratio. Res, quam liberam esse imaginamur, debet (per defin. 7. P. 1.) per se absque aliis percipi. Si igitur eandem laetitiae vel tristitiae causam esse imaginemur, eo ipso (per schol. prop. 13. huius) eandem amabimus vel odio habebimus, idque (per prop. praeced.) summo amore vel odio, qui ex dato affectu oriri potest. Sed si rem, quae eiusdem affectus est causa, ut necessariam imaginemur, tum (per eandem defin. 7. P. 1.) ipsam non solam, sed cum aliis eiusdem

[gu] The 1677 edition (OP p. 132) has *effectûs*; the Dutch version has *d'oorzaak van deze, of die hartstocht* (*Affectus*). Gebhardt (G II 176; Textgestaltung II 373) corrects to *affectûs*, as Stern had conjectured, followed by Leopold, Baensch, Lantzenberg and Appuhn.

memory of the thing is vivid, the man is determined to contemplate it with sadness; and this determination, while the image of the thing still remains, is indeed restrained by the memory of those things which exclude its existence, but is not taken away. And so the man rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained; and hence it comes about that this joy which arises from the evil of the thing we hate is repeated as often as we recollect that thing. For, as we have said, when the image of that thing is aroused, because it involves the existence of the thing itself, it determines the man to contemplate the thing with the same sadness with which he used to contemplate it when it existed. But because he has joined to the image of the thing other images which exclude its existence, this determination to sadness is immediately restrained, and the man rejoices anew; and this as often as the repetition occurs. And this is the same cause why men rejoice whenever they recollect some evil already past, and why they enjoy telling of the dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine some danger, they contemplate it as if still future, and are determined to fear it; and this determination is restrained anew by the idea of freedom which they joined to the idea of this danger when they were freed from it, and which makes them confident anew; and so they rejoice anew.

Cited in 3DA11Ex [p. 323], 3DA32Ex [p. 333]

Proposition XLVIII

Love and hatred, for example towards Peter, are destroyed if the sadness which the latter involves, and the joy which the former involves, are joined to the idea of another cause; and each is diminished insofar as we imagine that Peter was not the only cause of either.

Cited in 3P49D [p. 293], 5P6D [p. 479], 5P9D [p. 481]

Demonstration. This is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred, which see in the Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]. For joy is called love, and sadness hatred, towards Peter only because Peter is considered to be the cause of this or that affect. So when this is taken away, entirely or in part, the affect towards Peter is also diminished, entirely or in part. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLIX

Love and hatred towards a thing we imagine to be free must both, from an equal cause, be greater than towards a necessary thing.[253]

Cited in 3P51S [p. 297], 5P5D [p. 479]

Demonstration. A thing which we imagine to be free must (by Def. 7 of Part I [p. 27]) be perceived through itself without others. If, therefore, we imagine it to be the cause of joy or sadness, we shall thereby (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) love or hate it, and that (by the preceding Prop. [p. 293]) with the greatest love or hatred which can arise from the given affect. But if we imagine the thing which is the cause of this affect as necessary, then (by the same

[253] The belief in freedom intensifies the affects; the knowledge of necessity moderates them. Part V makes this a remedy: the affect towards a thing we imagine simply, not as necessary, possible or contingent, is the greatest (Part V, Prop. 5 [p. 479]), and insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects (Part V, Prop. 6 [p. 479]).

affectus causam esse imaginabimur; atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) amor et odium erga ipsam minor erit. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hinc sequitur homines, quia se liberos esse existimant, maiore amore vel odio se invicem prosequi, quam alia; ad quod accedit affectuum imitatio, de qua vide prop. 27., 34., 40. et 43. huius.

Propositio L

Res quaecumque potest esse per accidens spei aut metus causa.

Demonstratio. Haec propositio eadem via demonstratur, qua prop. 15. huius, quam vide una cum schol. prop. 18. huius.[gv,gw]

Scholium. Res, quae per accidens spei aut metus sunt causae, *bona* aut *mala omina* vocantur. Deinde quatenus haec eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa, eatenus (per defin. spei et metus, quam vide in schol. 2. prop. 18. huius) laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt causa, et consequenter (per coroll. prop. 15. huius) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus, et (per prop. 28. huius) tamquam media ad ea, quae speramus, adhibere, vel tamquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. Praeterea ex prop. 25. huius sequitur, nos natura ita esse constitutos, ut ea quae speramus facile, quae autem timemus, difficile credamus, et ut de iis plus minusve iusto sentiamus. Atque ex his ortae sunt superstitiones, quibus homines ubique conflictantur.

Ceterum non puto operae esse pretium, animi hic ostendere fluctuationes, quae ex spe et metu oriuntur; quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur, non dari spem sine metu, neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus); et praeterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus, eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus. Atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.

Propositio LI

[G II 178] *Diversi homines ab uno eodemque obiecto diversimode affici possunt, et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque obiecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.*

Demonstratio. Corpus humanum (per postul. 3. P. 2.) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti; atque adeo (per axiom. 1. quod est post lem. 3. quod vide post prop. 13. P. 2.) ab uno eodemque obiecto possunt

[gv] quam vide una cum schol. prop. 18. huius] *transcr.* quam vide una cum schol. 2. prop. 18. huius. The 1677 edition (OP p. 133) has 'Schol. Propositionis 18.' without a number; '2.' is Leopold's correction, which Gebhardt's Textgestaltung (II 373–374) rejects.

[gw] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 133). Leopold reads *Schol. 2.*, followed by Baensch, W. Meijer, Appuhn and Halpern, and the transcription follows them. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 373–374) rejects the correction: the reference is to the two scholia of Prop. 18, originally one (see the note on Prop. 18, Schol. 1 [p. 257]), since the mere definition of hope and fear in the second does not ground Prop. 50 without the account of wavering in the first; the abbreviation should be read as plural. (The scan of Gebhardt's text used here reads *Schol. 2.* at G II 177.)

Def. 7 of Part I) we shall imagine it to be the cause of this affect not alone but with others; and so (by the preceding Prop.) love and hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From this it follows that men, because they think themselves free, pursue one another with greater love or hatred than they do other things; to which is added the imitation of the affects, on which see Props. 27 [p. 267], 34 [p. 277], 40 [p. 285] and 43 of this Part [p. 289].

Proposition L

Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of hope or fear.

Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 253], which see together with the Scholium of Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 257].

Scholium. Things which are accidentally causes of hope or fear are called *good* or *bad omens*. Next, insofar as these same omens are causes of hope or fear, they are to that extent (by the definition of hope and fear, which see in the Schol. 2 of Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 259]) causes of joy or sadness; and consequently (by Cor. of Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 253]) we love or hate them to that extent, and (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) strive to use them as means to the things we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Moreover, it follows from Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 265] that we are so constituted by nature that we easily believe the things we hope for, but with difficulty those we fear, and that we think more or less highly of them than is just. And from these have arisen the superstitions by which men are everywhere troubled.[254]
But I do not think it worth the effort to show here the fluctuations of mind which arise from hope and fear; since it follows from the mere definition of these affects that there is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope (as we shall explain more fully in its place); and moreover, since insofar as we hope for or fear something, we love or hate it. And so whatever we have said of love and hatred, anyone can easily apply to hope and fear.

Proposition LI

Different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times.
Cited in 4P33D [p. 391]

Demonstration. The human body (by Post. 3 of Part II [p. 157]) is affected by external bodies in very many ways. Two men, therefore, can be affected in different ways at the same time; and so (by Ax. 1 [p. 153], which is after Lemma 3 [p. 151], which see after Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 141])

[254] The Preface to the *Theological-Political Treatise* begins from the same point: 'Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur' ('If men could manage all their affairs by sure counsel, or if fortune were always favourable to them, they would be held by no superstition'); because they fluctuate miserably between hope and fear, they are ready to believe anything. Compare the Appendix to Part I [p. 101].

diversimode affici. Deinde (per idem postul.) corpus humanum potest iam hoc, iam alio modo esse affectum; et consequenter (per idem axiom.) ab uno eodemque obiecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Videmus itaque fieri posse, ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat; et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat; et ut unus idemque homo iam amet, quod antea oderit, et ut iam audeat, quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu iudicat, quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid peius sit (vide schol. prop. 39. huius), sequitur homines tam iudicio, quam affectu variare posse;[gx] et hinc[gy] fit, ut, cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur, et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Ex. gr. illum ego intrepidum vocabo, qui malum contemnit, quod ego timere soleo; et si praeterea ad hoc attendam, quod eius cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit, et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali, a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo. Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur, qui malum timet, quod ego contemnere soleo, et si insuper ad hoc attendam, quod eius cupiditas coercetur timore mali, quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam, et sic unusquisque iudicabit.

Denique ex hac hominis natura et iudicii inconstantia, ut et quod homo saepe ex solo affectu de rebus iudicat, et quod res, quas ad laetitiam vel tristitiam facere credit, quasque propterea (per prop. 28. huius) ut fiant, promovere vel amovere conatur, saepe non nisi imaginariae sint, ut iam taceam alia, quae in P. 2. ostendimus, de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse saepe in causa esse, tam ut contristetur, quam ut laetetur, sive ut tam tristitia, quam laetitia, afficiatur, concomitante idea sui tamquam causa. Atque adeo facile intelligimus, quid poenitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit.[gz] Nempe poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui, et acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia concomitante idea sui tamquam causa, et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt, quia homines se liberos esse credunt. Vide prop. 49. huius.

Propositio LII

[G II 179] *Obiectum, quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus, vel quod nihil habere imaginamur, nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur, ac illud, quod aliquid singulare habere*

[gx] Here the 1677 edition (OP p. 135) has a footnote: 'N.B. Posse hoc fieri, tametsi Mens humana pars esset divini intellectus, ostendimus in Schol. p. 17. p. 2.' ('N.B. That this can happen, even though the human mind were part of the divine intellect, we have shown in the Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II'); the Dutch version also has the seventeenth Proposition. Van Vloten–Land, with reason, read *Prop. 13.*, as do Stern, Baensch and Gebhardt (G II 179; Textgestaltung II 374); Van Vloten–Land also consider *Coroll. Prop. 11.*, which Lantzenberg, Appuhn and Halpern read. The transcription prints the note in the text.

[gy] variare posse; et hinc] *transcr.* variare posse; [NB. Posse hoc fieri, tametsi mens humana pars esset divini intellectus, ostendimus in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.] et hinc. The transcription runs Spinoza's footnote into the text; in the 1677 edition (OP p. 135) and Gebhardt (G II 179) it is a footnote. It is given in a textual note.

[gz] The 1677 edition (OP p. 135) has *Acquiescentia in se ipsâ* here and in the next sentence; the Dutch version gives as its Latin term only *Acquiescentia in se*. Van Vloten–Land restore *ipso*, the form found elsewhere, and Gebhardt (G II 179; Textgestaltung II 374) follows. (In the fourth sentence the 1677 edition misprints *timidius* for *timidus*.)

they can be affected in different ways by one and the same object. Next (by the same Postulate), the human body can be affected now in this way, now in another; and consequently (by the same Axiom) it can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times. Q.E.D.

Scholium. We see, then, that it can happen that what one man loves another hates; that what one man fears another does not fear; and that one and the same man now loves what he previously hated, and now dares what he previously feared, etc. Next, because each judges from his own affect what is good, what evil, what better and what worse (see Schol. of Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 283]), it follows that men can vary as much in judgment as in affect;[255] and hence it comes about that, when we compare some with others, they are distinguished by us only by the difference of their affects, and that we call some fearless, others timid, others by another name. For example, I shall call him fearless who despises an evil which I usually fear; and if, besides, I attend to the fact that his desire to inflict evil on one he hates and to do good to one he loves is not restrained by timidity regarding an evil by which I am usually held back, I shall call him daring. Next, he will seem timid to me who fears an evil which I usually despise; and if, moreover, I attend to the fact that his desire is restrained by timidity regarding an evil which cannot hold me back, I shall say that he is cowardly; and so each will judge.

Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of his judgment, and also from the fact that man often judges of things from his affect alone, and that the things which he believes make for joy or sadness, and which he therefore (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) strives to promote or remove, are often only imaginary, not to mention the other things we have shown in Part II about the uncertainty of things, we easily conceive that a man can often be the cause both of his being saddened and of his rejoicing, or of his being affected both with sadness and with joy, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. And so we easily understand what repentance and what self-contentment are. Namely, repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself, and self-contentment is joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause; and these affects are very violent, because men believe themselves free. See Prop. 49 of this Part [p. 293].

Cited in 3DA27Ex [p. 329], 3DA42Ex [p. 335]

Proposition LII

An object which we have previously seen together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, we shall not contemplate for as long as one which we imagine to have

[255] Spinoza's footnote here (see the textual note): 'N.B. That this can happen, even though the human mind is a part of the divine intellect, we have shown in the Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part II' (the 1677 edition has Prop. 17). The mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God (Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]), yet its ideas can be inadequate, because God has them insofar as he has the ideas of other things as well.

imaginamur.

[G II 180] Demonstratio. Simulatque obiectum, quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (per prop. 18. P. 2., cuius etiam schol. vide), et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio obiecti, quod nihil habere imaginamur, nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus, nos nihil in eo contemplari, quod antea cum aliis non viderimus. Verum cum supponimus, nos in obiecto aliquo aliquid singulare, quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod mens, dum illud obiectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat, in cuius contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest. Atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo obiectum etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio, quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur *admiratio*, quae si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur, *consternatio* dicitur,[ha] quia mali admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet, ut de aliis cogitare non valeat, quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id, quod admiramur, sit hominis alicuius prudentia, industria vel aliquid huiusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur *veneratio*; alias *horror*, si[hb] hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur. Deinde, si hominis, quem amamus, prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso (per prop. 12. huius) maior erit, et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi iunctum *devotionem* vocamus. Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affectus admirationi iunctos; atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus, quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet, affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu, quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione.

Admirationi opponitur *contemptus* cuius tamen causa haec plerumque est, quod scilicet ex eo, quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere etc. videmus, vel ex eo, quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet similis rebus, quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus etc. (per prop. 15 cum eius coroll. et prop. 27. huius) determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei praesentia vel accuratiore contemplatione id omne de eadem negare cogamur, quod causa admirationis, amoris, metus etc. esse potest, tum mens ex ipsa rei praesentia magis ad ea cogitandum, quae in obiecto non sunt quam quae in ipso sunt, determinata manet; cum tamen contra ex obiecti praesentia id praecipue cogitare soleat, quod in obiecto est. Porro sicut devotio ex rei, quam amamus, admiratione; sic *irrisio* ex rei, quam odimus vel metuimus, contemptu oritur, et *dedignatio* ex stultitiae contemptu, sicuti veneratio

[ha] vocatur *admiratio*, quae si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur, *consternatio* dicitur] *transcr.* vocatur *admiratio, quae si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur, consternatio* dicitur. Italics: only the names of the affects are emphasized.
[hb] vocatur *veneratio*; alias *horror*, si] *transcr.* vocatur *veneratio; alias horror* si. Italics (see the previous note).

something singular.
Cited in 3P55C2S [p. 305], 3DA4 [p. 321], 3DA10Ex [p. 323]

Demonstration. As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen with others, we immediately recollect the others too (by Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163], whose Scholium [p. 165] see also), and so from the contemplation of one we immediately fall into the contemplation of another. And the reasoning is the same for an object which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many. For we thereby suppose that we contemplate nothing in it which we have not previously seen with others. But when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular which we have never seen before, we are saying nothing but that the mind, while it contemplates that object, has in itself no other into whose contemplation it can fall from the contemplation of that one. And so it is determined to contemplate only that object. Therefore an object, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This affection of the mind, or imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it alone occupies the mind, is called *wonder*;[256] which, if it is moved by an object we fear, is called *consternation*, because wonder at an evil holds a man so suspended in the contemplation of it alone that he is not able to think of other things by which he could avoid that evil. But if what we wonder at is some man's prudence, industry or something of this kind, then, because we thereby contemplate the man as far surpassing us, the wonder is called *veneration*; otherwise *horror*, if we wonder at a man's anger, envy, etc. Next, if we wonder at the prudence, industry, etc., of a man we love, the love will thereby (by Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 249]) be greater, and this love joined to wonder, or veneration, we call *devotion*. And in this way we can also conceive hatred, hope, confidence and other affects joined to wonder; and so we shall be able to deduce more affects than are usually indicated by the accepted words. From this it is evident that the names of the affects have been invented more from their common use than from an accurate knowledge of them.[257]

To wonder is opposed *contempt*,[258] whose cause, however, is generally this: from the fact that we see someone wonder at, love, fear, etc., some thing, or from the fact that some thing at first sight appears like things we wonder at, love, fear, etc., we are determined (by Prop. 15 [p. 253] with its Cor. [p. 253] and Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]) to wonder at, love, fear, etc., that same thing. But if, from the presence of the thing itself or from a more accurate contemplation of it, we are compelled to deny of it everything which can be a cause of wonder, love, fear, etc., then the mind remains determined by the very presence of the thing to think more of what is not in the object than of what is in it; whereas, on the contrary, from the presence of an object it usually thinks chiefly of what is in the object. Further, as devotion arises from wonder at a thing we love, so *mockery* arises from contempt of a thing we hate or fear, and *disdain* from contempt

[256] For Descartes wonder (*admiration*) is 'la première de toutes les passions' ('the first of all the passions'), because it can arise before we know whether the object is agreeable to us or not (*Passions of the Soul*, art. 53). Spinoza does not count it among the affects at all: it is an imagination like any other, distinguished only by the absence of other images to connect it with, and so a distraction of the mind with no positive cause (Def. Aff. 4, Expl. [p. 321]). The affects joined to wonder and to its opposite, contempt, are named in Defs. Aff. 4–11 [p. 321].

[257] The same remark closes the Definitions of the Affects, where many fluctuations of mind are passed over because they have no names (Def. Aff. 48, Expl. [p. 337]); on the origin of words in the imagination, see Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 1 [p. 185].

[258] See Def. Aff. 5 [p. 321] (contempt) and Def. Aff. 11 [p. 323] (mockery).

ex admiratione prudentiae. Possumus denique amorem, spem, gloriam et alios affectus iunctos contemptui concipere, atque inde alios praeterea affectus deducere, quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.

Propositio LIII

[G II 181] *Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, laetatur; et eo magis, quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.*

Demonstratio. Homo se ipsum non cognoscit, nisi per affectiones sui corporis earumque ideas (per prop. 19. et 23. P. 2.). Cum ergo fit, ut mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad maiorem perfectionem transire, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) laetitia affici supponitur, et eo maiore quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Haec laetitia magis magisque fovetur, quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur, eo maiore laetitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur, idque concomitante idea sui (per schol. prop. 29. huius). Atque adeo (per prop. 27 huius) ipse maiore laetitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. Q. E. D.

Propositio LIV

[G II 182] *Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur, quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.*

Demonstratio. Mentis conatus sive potentia est ipsa ipsius mentis essentia (per prop. 7. huius). Mentis autem essentia (ut per se notum) id tantum, quod mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id, quod non est neque potest. Adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur, quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive ponit. Q. E. D.

Propositio LV

Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.

Demonstratio. Mentis essentia id tantum, quod mens est et potest, affirmat, sive de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari, quae ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per prop. praeced.). Cum itaque dicimus, quod mens, dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod, dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur, quod ipsius agendi poten-

of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Finally, we can conceive love, hope, glory and other affects joined to contempt, and from these deduce yet other affects, which we are also not accustomed to distinguish from the others by any particular word.

Cited in 3P55C2S [p. 305], 3DA4 [p. 321], 3DA5 [p. 321], 3DA11Ex [p. 323], 3DA42Ex [p. 335]

Proposition LIII

When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting, it rejoices;[259] *and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.*

Cited in 3P55S [p. 303], 3P58D [p. 309], 3DA27Ex [p. 329], 5P15D [p. 489]

Demonstration. A man does not know himself except through the affections of his body and their ideas (by Props. 19 [p. 165] and 23 of Part II [p. 169]). When, therefore, it happens that the mind can contemplate itself, it is thereby supposed to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), to be affected with joy, and the more so, the more distinctly it can imagine itself and its power of acting. Q.E.D.

Corollary. This joy is fostered more and more, the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater the joy with which he imagines others to be affected by him, and that accompanied by the idea of himself (by Schol. of Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 271]). And so (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267]) he himself is affected with a greater joy accompanied by the idea of himself. Q.E.D.

Cited in 3P55C1 [p. 303], 4P52S [p. 419]

Proposition LIV

The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting.

Cited in 3P55D [p. 301], 3DA27Ex [p. 329], 3DA29Ex [p. 331]

Demonstration. The striving, or power, of the mind is the very essence of the mind (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 243]). But the essence of the mind (as is self-evident) affirms only what the mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do. And so it strives to imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting. Q.E.D.

Proposition LV

When the mind imagines its lack of power, it is thereby saddened.

Cited in 3DA27Ex [p. 329], 4P53D [p. 419]

Demonstration. The essence of the mind affirms only what the mind is and can do, or it is of the nature of the mind to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting (by the preceding Prop. [p. 301]). When, therefore, we say that the mind, while it contemplates itself, imagines its lack of power, we are saying nothing but that, while the mind strives to imagine

[259] The origin of self-contentment (*acquiescentia in se ipso*, Prop. 55, Schol. [p. 303]). When it arises from reason, Part IV calls it the highest thing we can hope for (Part IV, Prop. 52 [p. 419] and Schol.).

tiam ponit, hic eius conatus coercetur, sive (per schol. prop. 11. huius) quod ipsa contristatur. Q. E. D.

Corollarium I. Haec tristitia magis ac magis fovetur,[hc] si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac coroll. prop. 53.[hd] huius.

Scholium. Haec tristitia concomitante idea nostrae imbecillitatis *humilitas* appellatur; laetitia autem, quae ex contemplatione nostri oritur, *philautia* vel *acquiescentia in se ipso* vocatur. Et quoniam haec toties repetitur, quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit, ut unusquisque facta sua narrare, suique tam corporis, quam animi vires ostentare gestiat, et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur, homines natura esse invidos (vide schol. prop. 24. et schol. prop. 32. huius) sive ob suorum aequalium imbecillitatem gaudere, et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur, toties laetitia (per prop. 53. huius) afficitur, et eo maiore, quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur, hoc est (per illa quae in schol. 1. prop. 40. P. 2. dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest.

Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit, quando aliquid in se contemplatur, quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id, quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit; et contra contristabitur, si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per prop. 28. huius) amovere conabitur, idque suorum aequalium actiones perperam interpretando, vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam, ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiae stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet, quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.

[G II 183] Corollarium II. Nemo virtutem alicui nisi aequali invidet.

Demonstratio. Invidia est ipsum odium (vide schol. prop. 24. huius) sive (per schol. prop. 13. huius) tristitia hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) affectio, qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (per schol. prop. 9. huius) nihil agere conatur, neque cupit, nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest. Ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem praedicari cupiet, quae naturae alterius est propria et suae aliena. Adeoque eius cupiditas coerceri, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. huius) ipse contristari nequit ex eo, quod

[hc] Land, following the Dutch translator Gorter, proposed to number this Corollary and the one after the Scholium as I and II, as the transcription does. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 374) observes that they are not two corollaries of one thing: this one belongs to the Proposition, the other to the Scholium.

[hd] eodem modo demonstratur ac coroll. prop. 53.] *transcr.* eodem modo demonstratur accoroll. prop. 53. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).

something which posits its power of acting, this striving of it is restrained, or (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]) that it is saddened. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. This sadness is fostered more and more if he imagines himself to be blamed by others; which is demonstrated in the same way as the Cor. of Prop. 53 of this Part [p. 301].
Cited in 4P52S [p. 419]

Scholium. This sadness, accompanied by the idea of our weakness, is called *humility*;[260] but the joy which arises from the contemplation of ourselves is called *self-love* or *self-contentment*. And since this is repeated as often as a man contemplates his virtues, or his power of acting, it also comes about that everyone is eager to tell of his deeds and to show off his powers, both of body and of mind, and that men for this reason are troublesome to one another. From this it follows again that men are by nature envious (see Schol. of Prop. 24 [p. 263] and Schol. of Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 275]), or are glad of the weakness of their equals and, on the other hand, saddened by their virtue. For whenever someone imagines his own actions, he is affected with joy (by Prop. 53 of this Part [p. 301]), and with a joy the greater, the more perfection he imagines his actions to express, and the more distinctly he imagines them, that is (by what was said in Schol. 1 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 185]), the more he can distinguish them from others and contemplate them as singular things.
Therefore each will rejoice most in the contemplation of himself when he contemplates something in himself which he denies of the others. But if he refers what he affirms of himself to the universal idea of man or of animal, he will not rejoice so much; and, on the other hand, he will be saddened if he imagines that his actions, compared with those of others, are weaker; and this sadness (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 269]) he will strive to remove, either by misinterpreting the actions of his equals or by embellishing his own as much as he can. It is evident, therefore, that men are by nature inclined to hatred and envy, to which their very education contributes. For parents usually spur their children to virtue only by the goad of honour and envy.[261] But perhaps a doubt remains, because we not infrequently wonder at men's virtues and venerate the men themselves. To remove it, then, I shall add the following corollary.
Cited in 3DA27Ex [p. 329], 4P34D [p. 393], 4P57S [p. 423]

Corollary II. No one envies anyone's virtue unless he is his equal.

Demonstration. Envy is hatred itself (see Schol. of Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 263]), or (by Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251]) sadness, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), an affection by which a man's power of acting, or striving, is restrained. But a man (by Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]) strives to do and desires nothing but what can follow from his given nature. Therefore a man will desire no power of acting, or (which is the same) virtue, to be predicated of himself which is proper to another's nature and foreign to his own. And so his desire cannot

[260] Humility is not a virtue, since it does not arise from reason (Part IV, Prop. 53 [p. 419]); see also Def. Aff. 26 [p. 329].
[261] An education by honour and envy appeals to the passions. Part IV distinguishes the desire to please men that is determined by reason, which belongs to morality, from the one that arises from affect, which is ambition (Part IV, Appendix, ch. 25 [p. 457]).

aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur, et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit; at quidem suo aequali qui cum ipso eiusdem naturae supponitur. Q. E. D.

[G II 184] Scholium. Cum igitur supra in schol. prop. 52. huius dixerimus, nos hominem venerari ex eo, quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa prop. patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse, et non ut nostrae naturae communes imaginamur; adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.

Propositio LVI

Laetitiae, tristitiae et cupiditatis, et consequenter uniuscuiusque affectus, qui ex his componitur, ut animi fluctuationis, vel qui ab his derivatur, nempe amoris, odii, spei, metus etc. tot species dantur, quot sunt species obiectorum, a quibus afficimur.

Demonstratio. Laetitia et tristitia, et consequenter affectus, qui ex his componuntur vel ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (per schol. prop. 11. huius); nos autem (per prop. 1. huius) necessario patimur, quatenus ideas habemus inadaequatas; et quatenus easdem habemus (per prop. 3. huius), eatenus tantum patimur, hoc est (vide schol. prop. 40. P. 2.)[he] eatenus tantum necessario patimur, quatenus imaginamur, sive (vide prop. 17. P. 2. cum eius schol.) quatenus afficimur affectu, qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscuiusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari, ut obiecti a quo afficimur, natura exprimatur. Nempe laetitia, quae ex obiecto ex. gr. A oritur, naturam ipsius obiecti A, et laetitia, quae ex obiecto B oritur, ipsius obiecti B naturam involvit; atque adeo hi duo laetitiae affectus natura sunt diversi, quia ex causis diversae naturae oriuntur. Sic etiam tristitiae affectus, qui ex uno obiecto oritur, diversus natura est a tristitia, quae ab alia causa oritur; quod etiam de amore, odio, spe, metu, animi fluctuatione etc. intelligendum est, ac proinde laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris, odii etc. tot species necessario dantur, quot sunt species obiectorum, a quibus afficimur.

At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscuiusque essentia seu natura, quatenus ex data quacumque eius constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum. Vide schol. prop. 9. huius. Ergo, prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris, odii etc. specie afficitur, hoc est prout eius natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita eius cupiditas alia atque alia esse[hf] et natura unius a natura alterius cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est, quantum affectus, a quibus unaquaeque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species cupiditatis, quot sunt species laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris etc. et consequenter (per iam ostensa) quot sunt obiectorum species, a

[he](vide schol. prop. 40. P. 2.)] *transcr.* (vide schol. 1. prop. 40. P. 2.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 140), Gebhardt (G II 184) and Bartuschat have 'Schol. Prop. 40.' without a number.

[hf]The construction (*cupiditas ... esse ... necesse est*) is a slip of Spinoza's, which the 1677 edition prints and Gebhardt (G II 185; Textgestaltung II 374) keeps.

be restrained, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), he cannot be saddened, by the fact that he contemplates some virtue in someone unlike himself, and consequently he will not be able to envy him either; but he can indeed envy his equal, who is supposed to be of the same nature as himself. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Since, therefore, we said above, in the Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part [p. 299], that we venerate a man because we wonder at his prudence, strength of character, etc., this happens (as is evident from the Proposition [p. 297] itself) because we imagine these virtues to be in him singularly, and not as common to our nature; and so we shall not envy him them any more than we envy trees their height or lions their strength, etc.

Proposition LVI

There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of each affect which is composed of these, like fluctuation of mind, or which is derived from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

Cited in 3P56S [p. 307], 4P33D [p. 391]

Demonstration. Joy and sadness, and consequently the affects which are composed of them or derived from them, are passions (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]); but we (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 233]) are necessarily acted on insofar as we have inadequate ideas; and only insofar as we have them (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 241]) are we acted on, that is (see the Schol. of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]), we are necessarily acted on only insofar as we imagine, or (see Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161] with its Schol. [p. 161]) insofar as we are affected with an affect which involves the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. The nature of each passion, therefore, must necessarily be so explained that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. Namely, the joy which arises from object A, for example, involves the nature of object A itself, and the joy which arises from object B involves the nature of object B itself; and so these two affects of joy are different in nature, because they arise from causes of a different nature. So also the affect of sadness which arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness which arises from another cause; which is also to be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, fluctuation of mind, etc.; and therefore there are necessarily as many species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

But desire is the very essence, or nature, of each man insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given constitution of it, to do something. See Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]. Therefore, as each is affected by external causes with this or that species of joy, sadness, love, hatred, etc., that is, as his nature is constituted in this or that way, so his desire must be different and different, and the nature of one desire must differ from the nature of another as much as the affects from which each arises differ from one another. There are, therefore, as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love, etc., and consequently (by what has already been

quibus afficimur. Q. E. D.

[G II 185] Scholium. Inter affectuum species, quae (per prop. praeced.) perplurimae esse debent, insignes sunt *luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia* et *ambitio*, quae non nisi[hg] amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones, quae huius utriusque affectus naturam explicant per obiecta, ad quae referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus, quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriae immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. Praeterea hi affectus, quatenus eos per solum obiectum, ad quod referuntur, ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam temperantia, quam luxuriae, et sobrietas, quam ebrietati, et denique castitas, quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt; sed animi indicant potentiam, quae hos affectus moderatur.
Ceterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot obiectorum species), nec, si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus, nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit, uniuscuiusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit, inquam, nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere, ut determinare possimus, qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum, ex. gr. inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem,[hh] nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare non est opus.[hi]

Propositio LVII

[G II 186] *Quilibet uniuscuiusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.*

Demonstratio. Haec propositio patet ex axiom. 1., quod vide post lem. 3. schol. prop. 13. P. 2.[hj] At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus.

Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, laetitiam vel tristitiam referuntur, ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscuiusque natura seu essentia (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 9. huius); ergo uniuscuiusque individui cupiditas a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat, quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Laetitia deinde et tristitia passiones sunt, quibus uniuscuiusque potentia seu conatus in suo esse perseverandi augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur (per prop. 11 huius et eius schol.). At per conatum in suo

[hg] et *ambitio*, quae non nisi] *transcr.* et *ambitio, quae non nisi. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the Scholium.
[hh] inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem] *transcr.* inter amorem erga liberos et amorem erga uxorem. The 1677 edition (OP p. 142) and Gebhardt (G II 186) repeat 'inter'.
[hi] ulterius indagare non est opus.] *transcr.* ulterius indagare non est opus. Italics (see the previous note).
[hj] quod vide post lem. 3. schol. prop. 13. P. 2.] *transcr.* quod vide post lem. 3. prop. 13. P. 2. The 1677 edition (OP p. 142) and Gebhardt (G II 186) read 'post Lem. 3. Schol. Prop. 13.'; the transcription omits 'Schol.'.

shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Among the species of affects, which (by the preceding Prop. [p. 305]) must be very many, notable are *gluttony*, *drunkenness*, *lust*, *greed* and *ambition*, which are only notions of love or desire that explain the nature of each of these two affects through the objects to which they are related. For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, greed and ambition we understand nothing but an immoderate love or desire of feasting, drinking, sexual union, riches and glory. Moreover, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from others only through the object to which they are related, have no contraries. For temperance, which we usually oppose to gluttony, sobriety, which we oppose to drunkenness, and finally chastity, which we oppose to lust, are not affects, or passions, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates these affects.[262]
But I cannot explain the remaining species of affects here (because there are as many as there are species of objects), nor, if I could, is it necessary. For for our purpose, namely to determine the powers of the affects and the power of the mind over them, it is enough for us to have a general definition of each affect. It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can determine what kind of power, and how great, the mind has in moderating and restraining the affects. Although, therefore, there is a great difference between this and that affect of love, hatred or desire, for example between love towards children and love towards a wife, it is nevertheless not necessary for us to know these differences, and to investigate further the nature and origin of the affects.
Cited in 3DA48Ex [p. 337]

Proposition LVII

Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
Cited in 3P57S [p. 309]

Demonstration. This Proposition is evident from Ax. 1 [p. 153], which see after Lemma 3 [p. 151], after the Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 143]. But nevertheless we shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primary affects.

All the affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But desire is the very nature, or essence, of each (see its definition in the Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]); therefore the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other. Joy and sadness, next, are passions by which the power, or striving, of each to persevere in its being is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247] and its Schol. [p. 247]). But

[262] The traditional virtues of moderation are not opposite passions but the mind's power over passions, the subject of Part V. The last proposition of the *Ethics* turns this around: 'we do not enjoy blessedness because we restrain our lusts; but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts' (Part V, Prop. 42 [p. 523]).

esse perseverandi, quatenus ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, appetitum et cupiditatem intelligimus (vide schol. prop. 9. huius); ergo laetitia et tristitia est ipsa cupiditas sive appetitus quatenus a causis externis augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur, hoc est (per idem schol.) est ipsa cuiusque natura. Atque adeo uniuscuiusque laetitia vel tristitia a laetitia vel tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat, quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt; et consequenter quilibet uniuscuiusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q. E. D.

[G II 187] Scholium. Hinc sequitur affectus animalium, quae irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus, postquam mentis novimus originem), ab affectibus hominum tantum differre, quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina, hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat; vita tamen illa, qua unumquodque est contentum, et gaudium nihil aliud est, quam idea seu anima eiusdem individui; atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.
Denique ex praec. prop. sequitur, non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium, quo ebrius ex. gr. ducitur, et inter gaudium, quo potitur philosophus,[hk] quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque haec de affectibus, qui ad hominem referuntur, quatenus patitur. Superest, ut pauca addam de iis, qui ad eundem referuntur, quatenus agit.

Propositio LVIII

Praeter laetitiam et cupiditatem quae passiones sunt, alii laetitiae et cupiditatis affectus dantur, qui ad nos, quatenus agimus, referuntur.

Demonstratio. Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, laetatur (per prop. 53. huius). Mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur, quando veram sive adaequatam ideam concipit (per prop. 43. P. 2.). At mens quasdam ideas adaequatas concipit (per schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.). Ergo eatenus etiam laetatur, quatenus ideas adaequatas concipit, hoc est (per prop. 1. huius) quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (per prop. 9. huius). At per conatum cupiditatem

[hk] et inter gaudium, quo potitur philosophus] *transcr.* et gaudium, quo potitur philosophus. The 1677 edition (OP p. 143) and Gebhardt (G II 187) repeat 'inter'.

by the striving to persevere in its being, insofar as it is related to the mind and body together, we understand appetite and desire (see Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]); therefore joy and sadness are the very desire, or appetite, insofar as it is increased or diminished, aided or restrained by external causes, that is (by the same Scholium), they are the very nature of each. And so the joy or sadness of each also differs from the joy or sadness of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other; and consequently each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From this it follows that the affects of the animals which are called irrational (for we can by no means doubt that the brutes feel, now that we know the origin of the mind[263]) differ from the affects of men as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both the horse and the man are indeed carried away by the lust to procreate; but the former by an equine lust, the latter by a human one. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fish and birds must be different and different. Although, therefore, each individual lives content with the nature of which it consists, and rejoices in it, yet that life with which each is content, and its gladness, are nothing but the idea, or soul, of that individual; and so the gladness of one differs in nature from the gladness of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.
Finally, from the preceding Proposition [p. 307] it follows that there is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunkard, for example, is led, and the gladness which a philosopher possesses, which I wanted to point out here in passing. So much for the affects which are related to man insofar as he is acted on. It remains for me to add a few things about those which are related to him insofar as he acts.

Cited in 4P37S1 [p. 399]

Proposition LVIII

Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act.[264]

Cited in 3P59D [p. 311]

Demonstration. When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices (by Prop. 53 of this Part [p. 301]). But the mind necessarily contemplates itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by Prop. 43 of Part II [p. 191]). But the mind conceives some adequate ideas (by Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]). Therefore it also rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 233]), insofar as it acts. Next, the mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being (by

[263] Since every individual is animate, though in different degrees (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]), animals have minds and affects of their own. Descartes, in the *Passions of the Soul*, had said that the beasts have the same movements of the spirits and of the gland that excite the passions in us, 'encore qu'elles n'aient point de raison, ni peut-estre aussi aucune pensée' ('although they have no reason, nor perhaps any thought either', art. 50). Spinoza does not draw a humane conclusion from the difference of natures: we have the same right over animals as they have over us (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]).

[264] The active affects, which arise from adequate ideas (Prop. 1 [p. 233]). They prepare Part IV's thesis that to every action to which we are determined by an affect which is a passion we can be determined by reason without it (Part IV, Prop. 59 [p. 427]). There is no active sadness (Prop. 59 [p. 311]).

intelligimus (per eiusdem schol.). Ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus, sive (per prop. 1. huius) quatenus agimus. Q. E. D.

Propositio LIX

[G II 188] *Inter omnes affectus, qui ad mentem, quatenus agit, referuntur, nulli sunt, quam*[hl] *qui ad laetitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur.*

Demonstratio. Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, laetitiam vel tristitiam referuntur, ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus, quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur[hm] (per prop. 11. huius et eius schol.); adeoque mens quatenus contristatur, eatenus eius intelligendi, hoc est eius agendi potentia (per prop. 1. huius) minuitur vel coercetur. Adeoque nulli tristitiae affectus ad mentem referri possunt, quatenus agit, sed tantum affectus laetitiae et cupiditatis, qui (per prop. praeced.) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Omnes actiones, quae sequuntur ex affectibus, qui ad mentem referuntur, quatenus intelligit, ad *fortitudinem* refero quam in *animositatem* et *generositatem* distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem, qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo, qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines iuvare et sibi amicitia iungere. Eas itaque actiones, quae solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem, et quae alterius etiam utile intendunt, ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis praesentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt.
Atque his puto me praecipuos affectus animique fluctuationes, quae ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum, nempe cupiditatis, laetitiae et tristitiae oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet, nos a causis externis multis modis agitari, nosque perinde ut maris undae a contrariis ventis agitatae, fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. At dixi, me praecipuos tantum,[hn] non omnes, qui dari possunt, animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via, qua supra, procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse iunctum poenitentiae, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex iam dictis clare constare credo, affectus tot modis, alii cum aliis, posse componi,[ho] indeque tot variationes oriri, ut nullo numero definiri queant.

[hl] referuntur, nulli sunt, quam] *transcr.* referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam. The 1677 edition (OP p. 144), Gebhardt (G II 188) and Bartuschat have no 'alii'.

[hm] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 144): 'that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or restrained', with *quòd* as a conjunction. The Dutch version has *het geen, dat het vermogen van de ziel om te denken vermindert, of intoomt* ('that which diminishes or restrains the mind's power of thinking'), and Gebhardt (G II 188; Textgestaltung II 374–375) corrects the verbs to *minuit, vel coërcet*, as in Prop. 11; Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn keep the 1677 text, Halpern follows Saisset's *id, quo*. The text here follows the 1677 edition, since the scan of Gebhardt's page does not show whether he also changed *potentia*; the sense is the same.

[hn] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'hartstochten' ('affects'). Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 189).

[ho] affectus tot modis, alii cum aliis, posse componi] *transcr.* affectus tot modis, alios cum aliis, posse componi. The 1677 edition (OP p. 145), Gebhardt (G II 189) and Bartuschat read 'alii cum aliis', the fixed phrase, in the nominative.

Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245]). But by striving we understand desire (by the Schol. of the same Prop. [p. 245]). Therefore desire is related to us also insofar as we understand, or (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 233]) insofar as we act. Q.E.D.

Proposition LIX

Among all the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none but those which are related to joy or desire.

Cited in 4P34D [p. 393], 4P51D [p. 417], 4P63D [p. 433], 4P63CD [p. 433], 5P10S [p. 483], 5P18D [p. 491], 5P18S [p. 491], 5P42D [p. 523]

Demonstration. All the affects are related to desire, joy or sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But by sadness we understand that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or restrained (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247] and its Schol. [p. 247]); and so, insofar as the mind is saddened, its power of understanding, that is, its power of acting (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 233]), is diminished or restrained. And so no affects of sadness can be related to the mind insofar as it acts, but only affects of joy and desire, which (by the preceding Prop. [p. 309]) are also related to the mind to that extent. Q.E.D.

Scholium. All the actions which follow from the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it understands I relate to *strength of character*, which I divide into *tenacity* and *nobility*.[265] For by tenacity I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to preserve his being. By nobility, however, I understand the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which aim only at the agent's advantage I relate to tenacity, and those which aim also at the advantage of another I relate to nobility. Temperance, therefore, sobriety, presence of mind in dangers, etc., are species of tenacity; but modesty, clemency, etc., are species of nobility.

And with this I think I have explained, and shown through their first causes, the principal affects and fluctuations of mind which arise from the composition of the three primary affects, namely desire, joy and sadness. From this it is evident that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds, we fluctuate,[266] ignorant of our outcome and fate. But I have said that I have shown only the principal conflicts of mind, not all that there can be. For by proceeding in the same way as above we can easily show that love is joined to repentance, disdain, shame, etc. Indeed, I believe it is clearly established for everyone from what has already been said that the affects can be compounded with one another in so many

[265] *Fortitudo*, *animositas*, *generositas*. The active affects are the virtues of Part IV: the free man's virtue 'is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them' (Part IV, Prop. 69 [p. 445]), and he repays hatred with love, or nobility (Part IV, Prop. 46 [p. 413]). Temperance and sobriety, which Prop. 56, Schol. [p. 307] denied were affects, reappear here as species of tenacity: powers of the mind, not passions.

[266] *fluctuari*: the image gives the literal sense of the 'fluctuation of mind' defined in Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 255], and it is the picture of human bondage that Part IV will analyse (Preface to Part IV [p. 351]).

Sed ad meum institutum praecipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit; nam reliqui, quos omisi, plus curiositatis, quam utilitatis haberent.

Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat, quod scilicet saepissime contingit, dum re, quam appetebamus, fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem, a qua aliter determinatur, et aliae rerum imagines in eo excitantur, et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Ex. gr. cum aliquid, quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui, nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore iam aliter disposito eiusdem cibi imago, quia ipse praesens adest, fomentetur, et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit, et consequenter cibi, quem appetebamus, praesentia odiosa erit, et hoc est quod *fastidium* et *taedium* vocamus. Ceterum corporis affectiones externas, quae in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de *affectuum definitionibus* quaedam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam, et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.

ways, and that so many variations arise from this, that they cannot be determined by any number. But for my purpose it is enough to have enumerated only the principal ones; for the rest, which I have omitted, would be more a matter of curiosity than of use.

Yet this remains to be noted about love: it very often happens that, while we are enjoying the thing we wanted, the body acquires from that enjoyment a new constitution, by which it is determined differently, and other images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine something which usually delights us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy it, namely to eat it. But while we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is constituted differently. If, therefore, now that the body is differently disposed, the image of the same food is fostered, because the food itself is present, and consequently also the striving, or desire, to eat it, this new constitution will be opposed to this desire, or striving; and consequently the presence of the food we wanted will be hateful; and this is what we call *disgust* and *weariness*. As for the external affections of the body which are observed in the affects, such as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, etc.,[267] I have neglected them, because they are related to the body alone, without any relation to the mind. Finally, some things must be noted about the *definitions of the affects*, which I shall therefore repeat here in order, inserting among them what is to be observed in each.

Cited in 4P46D [p. 413], 4P69D [p. 445], 4P69S [p. 445], 4P73S [p. 449]

[267] Descartes had devoted a series of articles of the *Passions of the Soul* to these 'signes extérieurs' of the passions: changes of colour, trembling, languor, fainting, laughter, tears, sighs (arts. 112–135).

The Definitions of the Affects

Part III ends by going over its ground a second time. The affects have been defined one by one in the scholia, as the demonstrations reached them: joy and sadness in the scholium to Prop. 11 [p. 247], love and hatred in that to Prop. 13 [p. 251], hope and fear in the second scholium to Prop. 18 [p. 259], and so on through envy, ambition, glory and jealousy. Spinoza now repeats the definitions "in order", forty-eight of them, and adds to each what needs to be observed about it. A General Definition of the affect that is a passion of the mind closes the Part. Because the definitions follow a classification of their own, and because several of them correct what the scholia said, they are best read with their plan and their changes in view.

The decision to do so is announced at the end of the scholium to Prop. 59 [p. 311]: "Finally, some things must be noted about the *definitions of the affects*, which I shall therefore repeat here in order, inserting among them what is to be observed in each." Two motives seem to be at work. The first is practical. The affects were defined in the order in which the demonstrations reached them, scattered through fifty-nine propositions, and a reader who wants to know what Spinoza means by envy or by humility needs to find the definition quickly; Part IV, which judges the affects one by one, needs a list of terms to refer to. The second is theoretical. The propositions derived the affects from their causes; the definitions now classify them by their nature, and the classification shows that the derivation is complete, that every affect the language names can be placed by its relation to desire, joy and sadness.

The order of the definitions

The order is not that of the propositions but of a classification. The three primary affects come first: desire, joy and sadness (Defs. 1–3). Wonder and contempt follow (4–5); wonder, Spinoza explains, is not an affect at all, and is mentioned only because usage gives other names to affects derived from the primary ones when they are related to objects we wonder at. Then come the affects of joy and sadness with an external cause: love and hatred, and their species (6–11); those that concern a doubtful or a decided outcome, hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness and remorse (12–17); those that arise from the good or ill of others, pity, favour and indignation, overestimation and scorn, envy and compassion (18–24). Next are the joys and sadnesses whose idea is of an internal cause, oneself: self-contentment and humility, repentance, pride and self-abasement, glory and shame (25–31). The rest are kinds of desire, from longing and emulation to anger, vengeance and cruelty, timidity, daring and cowardice, and finally courtesy, ambition, gluttony, drunkenness, greed and lust (32–48). Each affect is placed by its relation to the three primary ones and by the kind of object or idea that accompanies it, as the scholium to Prop. 56 [p. 307] said it must be: the affects have as many species as there are species of objects, and a general definition of each is enough for the purpose of the work.

Earlier catalogues

A catalogue of the passions with short definitions was not a new genre. Descartes' *Passions of the Soul* had derived a long list of particular passions from its six primitive ones, and Hobbes, in the sixth chapter of *Leviathan* (1651), had defined the passions one after another in a few words each: "For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE." Spinoza's definitions resemble Hobbes's in their brevity and in their reduction of the passions to a few elementary

motions; they differ from both predecessors in what the elements are and in the use made of the list. For Descartes, the classification of the passions served a doctrine of how the free will can govern them. For Spinoza it serves a doctrine of how understanding transforms them.

The difference shows clearly in a single word. The virtue Descartes valued above all he called *générosité*, which "makes a man esteem himself as highly as he can legitimately esteem himself," and consists partly in knowing that nothing truly belongs to him "but this free disposition of his volitions," and partly in a firm and constant resolution to use it well (*Passions*, art. 153). Spinoza takes over the Latin form of the word, *generositas*, and gives it an entirely different sense: "the desire by which each strives, from the dictate of reason alone, to aid other men and join them to himself in friendship" (Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]). The Cartesian virtue is a relation of the self to its own free will; the Spinozist one is a desire, born of reason, directed at others. The translation renders Spinoza's word as "nobility", which keeps the two apart.

Corrections and sharpenings

The repetition is not mechanical. Several definitions are corrected or sharpened. The first is the most important. The scholium to Prop. 9 [p. 245] had defined desire as "appetite together with consciousness of it". The new definition reads: "Desire is the very essence of man insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something." The explanation gives two reasons for the change. Since there is no real difference between appetite and desire, whether or not a man is conscious of his appetite, defining one by the other would be a tautology; and a definition was wanted that would comprehend all the strivings of human nature, which are called appetite, will, desire or impulse. And the phrase "from any given affection of it" is added so that the definition contains the cause of the consciousness: a man is conscious of himself only through the affections of his body (Part II, Prop. 23 [p. 169]). In the same way, joy is now said to be the passage to a greater perfection, not the perfection itself: if a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy. Love is defined again as joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and Spinoza takes the opportunity to reject the definition of love as the lover's will to join himself to the thing loved, which states a property of love and not its essence (Def. 6, Expl. [p. 321]).

New distinctions

Other explanations add distinctions that the propositions passed over. Repentance is now defined as sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decree of the mind; its intensity comes from the belief in freedom. Pride is distinguished from overestimation, and the customary opposition of pride and humility is examined (Defs. 28–29). Pity (*commiseratio*) is said to differ from *misericordia* only in that one regards the single affect and the other the habit; *misericordia* is then redefined, 'against the meaning of the word', as the love that rejoices in another's good, the opposite of envy (Defs. 18 and 24). Spinoza also admits where the Latin language fails him. Some affects have no names, others have names that are used loosely; and he warns, once for all, that his purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose ordinary meaning is not wholly at odds with the one he intends (Def. 20, Expl. [p. 327]).

What the explanations observe

The explanations are also where Spinoza allows himself remarks of a kind the propositions rarely contain, observations about how the affects behave and about how the words for them are used. Several are worth reading for their own sake.

Wonder is excluded from the affects because the imagination of a new thing, "considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others"; the mind is held in the contemplation of it only because it is not yet linked to other images, so that nothing leads the mind on to something else (Def. Aff. 4, Expl. [p. 321]). Wonder is thus a gap in the chain of association, not a positive feeling, and Spinoza keeps the word only because usage gives special names to the affects derived from the primary ones when their objects are things we wonder at, as devotion is "love towards one whom we wonder at" (Def. Aff. 10 [p. 323]).

Hope and fear are shown to be inseparable. "There is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope." He who hangs on hope and is in doubt about the outcome imagines something that excludes the thing he hopes for, and so to that extent is saddened and fears; he who fears imagines something that excludes the thing he hates, and so rejoices and hopes (Def. Aff. 13, Expl. [p. 325]). The point will matter in Part IV, where hope and fear are both judged to be signs of a mind lacking in knowledge.

Repentance and its opposite are traced, in part, to upbringing. It is not surprising, the explanation of Def. 27 says, that acts which custom calls wrong are followed by sadness and those it calls right by joy, since "this depends chiefly on education": parents, by reproaching the one and praising the other, have joined sadness to the first and joy to the second (Def. Aff. 27, Expl. [p. 329]). The observation is brief, but it contains a whole account of moral feeling as learned association.

The explanation of ambition observes that it is "a desire by which all the affects … are fostered and strengthened; and for this reason this affect can hardly be overcome," and quotes Cicero: "Every best man … is led most by glory. Even the philosophers inscribe their names on the books which they write on despising glory" (Def. Aff. 44, Expl. [p. 337]). And the last explanation notes that the five affects of immoderate appetite, ambition, gluttony, drunkenness, greed and lust, have no contraries among the affects: temperance, sobriety and chastity "indicate a power of the mind, not a passion," and a greedy or timid man who abstains from food or drink is not on that account moved by an affect contrary to gluttony (Def. Aff. 48, Expl. [p. 337]).

The General Definition

The General Definition gathers the account into a single formula: "An affect, which is called a *passion of the mind*, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, when it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than of that" (General Definition [p. 339]). The Latin for "passion of the mind" is *animi pathema*, a Greek word in Latin dress. Each phrase is explained. It is a confused idea, because the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate ideas (Prop. 3 [p. 241]). It affirms of the body a greater or lesser force of existing, because the mind is the idea of the body and the affect expresses a change in the body's power of acting. "Than before" does not mean that the mind compares its present state with its past one; it means that the idea which constitutes the affect affirms something of the body that involves more or less reality than before. And the last clause adds the desire that every affect brings with it.

The bridge to Part IV

The catalogue is the bridge to Part IV. There Spinoza will ask how strong the affects are, and which of them agree with reason and which are opposed to it: pity is bad in one who lives by reason (Part IV, Prop. 50 [p. 417]), humility and repentance are not virtues (Props. 53–54 [p. 419]), cheerfulness cannot be excessive (Prop. 42 [p. 407]), hatred can never be good (Prop. 45 [p. 411]). That inquiry presupposes what the definitions provide, a complete map of the affects reduced to three, each with its definite cause. The derivations of Part III were offered as explanations of human life as it is; the definitions fix the terms in which Part IV will judge it.

As the text continues, the definitions can be read straight through or kept at hand for reference. The explanations attached to them are where the corrections and the new distinctions are made, and they repay closer attention than the definitions themselves.

Affectuum Definitiones

[G II 190] I. *Cupiditas* est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus ex data quacumque eius affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.

Explicatio. Diximus supra in schol. prop. 9. huius partis, *cupiditatem* esse appetitum cum eiusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam, quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum, quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem schol. etiam monui, me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius, sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque; atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui, sed eandem ita definire studui, ut omnes humanae naturae conatus, quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere, cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam, quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum; sed ex hac definitione (per prop. 23. P. 2.) non sequeretur, quod mens possit suae cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut huius conscientiae causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem prop.) addere "quatenus ex data quacumque eius affectione determinata etc.".

Nam per affectionem humanae essentiae quamcumque eiusdem essentiae constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata,[hp] sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis, sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur, sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscumque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia eiusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt, ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.

[G II 191] II. *Laetitia* est hominis transitio a minore ad maiorem perfectionem.

III. *Tristitia* est hominis transitio a maiore ad minorem perfectionem.

Explicatio. Dico transitionem. Nam laetitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione, ad quam transit, nasceretur, eiusdem absque laetitiae affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex tristitiae affectu, qui huic est contrarius. Nam quod tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest, quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit, quatenus alicuius perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus, quod tristitia in privatione maioris perfectionis consistat; nam privatio nihil est. Tristitiae autem affectus actus est, qui propterea nullus alius esse potest, quam actus transeundi

[hp] The Dutch version of 1677 adds: 'of van buiten aangekomen' ('or come from outside'), which the Latin evidently dropped. Gebhardt prints it in his text (G II 190; Textgestaltung II 375); Leopold proposed the Latin *sive adventicia*.

Definitions of the Affects

I. *Desire* is the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something.

Cited in 4P15D [p. 373], 4P18D [p. 377], 4P19D [p. 379], 4P21D [p. 381], 4P37D [p. 397], 4P59D [p. 427], 4P61D [p. 431], 5P26D [p. 505], 5P28D [p. 507]

Explanation. We said above, in the Schol. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 245], that *desire* is appetite together with consciousness of it; and that appetite is the very essence of man, insofar as it is determined to do those things which serve his preservation. But in the same Scholium I also pointed out that in truth I acknowledge no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man is conscious of his appetite or not, the appetite remains one and the same; and so, lest I should seem to commit a tautology, I did not want to explain desire by appetite, but took care to define it so as to comprehend together all the strivings of human nature[268] which we signify by the name of appetite, will, desire or impulse. For I could have said that desire is the very essence of man insofar as it is conceived to be determined to do something; but from this definition (by Prop. 23 of Part II [p. 169]) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire, or appetite. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same Proposition) to add 'insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, etc.'.

For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it is innate, or whether it is conceived through the attribute of thought alone, or through the attribute of extension alone, or finally whether it is related to both at once. Here, therefore, by the name of desire I understand any strivings, impulses, appetites and volitions of a man, which vary according to the varying constitution of the same man, and are not seldom so opposed to one another that the man is pulled in different directions and does not know where to turn.

II. *Joy* is a man's passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.

Cited in 5P17D [p. 489], 5P27D [p. 507]

III. *Sadness* is a man's passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.

Cited in 4P64D [p. 433], 5P17D [p. 489]

Explanation. I say 'passage'. For joy is not perfection itself. For if a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy; which appears more clearly from the affect of sadness, which is contrary to it. For no one can deny that sadness consists in the passage to a lesser perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself, since a man cannot be saddened insofar as he participates in some perfection. Nor can we say that sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection; for privation is nothing.[269] But the affect of sadness is an act, which therefore can be no other than the act of passing to a lesser perfection, that is, the act

[268] The definition of Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245] is revised for two reasons: to avoid defining desire by appetite, from which it does not really differ, and to include in the definition the cause of the consciousness of desire, namely the affections of the body through which alone the mind knows itself (Part II, Prop. 23 [p. 169]).

[269] So sadness cannot be the mere lack of a perfection one does not have; it is a positive act of the mind, the passage itself. Compare the account of falsity as privation in Part II, Prop. 35 [p. 179].

ad minorem perfectionem, hoc est, actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur. Vide schol. prop. 11. huius. Ceterum definitiones *hilaritatis, titillationis, melancholiae* et *doloris* omitto, quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species.

IV. *Admiratio* est rei alicuius imaginatio, in qua mens defixa propterea manet, quia haec singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide prop. 52. cum eiusdem schol.[hq]

Explicatio. In schol. prop. 18. P. 2. ostendimus, quaenam sit causa, cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat, videlicet, quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatae et ita ordinatae sunt, ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit, quando rei imago nova est; sed mens in eiusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur, donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novae imaginatio in se considerata eiusdem naturae est, ac reliquae, et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero, nec causam video, cur id facerem, quandoquidem haec mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva, quae mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur, sed tantum ex eo, quod causa, cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. *Tres* igitur (ut in schol. prop. 11. huius monui) tantum *affectus primitivos* seu primarios agnosco, nempe *laetitiae, tristitiae* et *cupiditatis*, nec alia de causa[hr] verba de admiratione feci, quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus, qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad obiecta, quae admiramur, referuntur; quae quidem ratio me ex aequo movet, ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adiungam.[hs]

[G II 192] V. *Contemptus* est rei alicuius imaginatio, quae mentem adeo parum tangit, ut ipsa mens ex rei praesentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum, quae in ipsa re non sunt, quam quae in ipsa sunt. Vide schol. prop. 52. huius.

Definitiones *venerationis* et *dedignationis* missas hic facio, quia nulli, quod sciam, affectus ex his nomen trahunt.

VI. *Amor* est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae.

Explicatio. Haec definitio satis clare amoris essentiam explicat. Illa vero auctorum, qui definiunt amorem esse voluntatem amantis se iungendi rei amatae, non amoris essentiam, sed eius proprietatem exprimit; et quia amoris essentia non satis ab auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque eius proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt, et hinc factum, ut eorum definitio-

[hq] The reference is supplied by the 1677 edition's list of errata in the references (*Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda*, p. 147 l. 24: *connexionem → connexionē. Vide Prop. 52. cum ejusd. Schol.*). Van Vloten–Land add *hujus*, evidently after the Dutch version (Textgestaltung II 375).

[hr] et *cupiditatis*, nec alia de causa] *transcr.* et *cupiditatis nec alia de causa. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the Explanation.

[hs] ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adiungam.] *transcr.* ut etiam contemptus defininitionem his adiungam. Transcription slip ('defininitionem') and italics; the 1677 edition (OP p. 148) and Gebhardt (G II 192) read 'definitionem'.

by which a man's power of acting is diminished or restrained. See the Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]. For the rest, I omit the definitions of *cheerfulness*, *pleasure*, *melancholy* and *pain*, because they are related chiefly to the body, and are only species of joy or sadness.

IV. *Wonder* is an imagination of some thing in which the mind remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with the others. See Prop. 52 [p. 297] with its Scholium [p. 299].

Explanation. In the Schol. of Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 165] we have shown what the cause is why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, immediately falls into the thought of another: namely, because the images of those things are linked together and so ordered that one follows another; which cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new; but the mind will be held in the contemplation of that thing until it is determined by other causes to think of other things. The imagination of a new thing, therefore, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the others; and for this reason I do not number wonder among the affects,[270] nor do I see a cause why I should, since this distraction of the mind does not arise from any positive cause which distracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause is lacking by which the mind is determined, from the contemplation of one thing, to think of others. I acknowledge, therefore (as I pointed out in the Schol. of Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 247]), only *three primitive*, or primary, *affects*, namely those of *joy*, *sadness* and *desire*; nor have I spoken of wonder for any other reason than that it has become customary to indicate certain affects which are derived from the three primitive ones by other names when they are related to objects we wonder at; which reason equally moves me to add to these the definition of contempt as well.

Cited in 4P59D [p. 427]

V. *Contempt* is an imagination of some thing which touches the mind so little that the mind itself is moved by the presence of the thing to imagine what is not in the thing rather than what is in it. See the Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part [p. 299].

I pass over here the definitions of *veneration* and *disdain*, because no affects, so far as I know, take their name from them.

VI. *Love* is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Cited in 4P34S [p. 393], 4P44D [p. 409], 4P57D [p. 423], 5P2D [p. 475], 5P15D [p. 489], 5P17C [p. 489], 5P32C [p. 511]

Explanation. This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough. But that of the authors who define love as the will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved[271] expresses not the essence of love but a property of it; and because the essence of love was not sufficiently perceived by these authors, they could not have any clear concept of its property either, and hence

[270] Against Descartes, for whom wonder is the first of the passions (see the note on Prop. 52, Schol. [p. 299]).

[271] Descartes among them: love is an emotion of the soul 'qui l'incite à se joindre de volonté aux objets qui paraissent luy estre convenables' (*Passions of the Soul*, art. 79; see the note on Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 251]).

nem admodum obscuram esse omnes iudicaverint. Verum notandum, cum dico, proprietatem esse in amante, se voluntate iungere rei amatae, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus prop. 48. P. 2.), nec etiam cupiditatem sese iungendi rei amatae, quando abest, vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest; potest namque amor[ht] absque hac aut illa cupiditate concipi; sed per voluntatem me acquiescentiam intelligere, quae est in amante ob rei amatae praesentiam, a qua laetitia amantis corroboratur aut saltem fovetur.

[G II 193] VII. *Odium* est tristitia concomitante idea causae externae.

Explicatio. Quae hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in praecedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide praeterea schol. prop. 13. huius.[hu]

VIII. *Propensio* est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est laetitiae.

IX. *Aversio* est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est tristitiae. De his vide schol. prop. 15. huius.

X. *Devotio* est amor erga eum, quem admiramur.

Explicatio. Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate, ostendimus prop. 52. huius. Si igitur contingat, ut id quod admiramur saepe imaginemur,[hv] idem admirari desinemus; atque adeo videmus, devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare.

XI. *Irrisio* est laetitia orta ex eo, quod aliquid, quod contemnimus in re, quam odimus, inesse imaginamur.[hw]

Explicatio. Quatenus rem, quam odimus, contemnimus, eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide schol. prop. 52. huius), et eatenus (per prop. 20. huius) laetamur. Sed quoniam supponimus, hominem id quod irridet, odio tamen habere, sequitur, hanc laetitiam solidam non esse. Vide schol. prop. 47. huius.

[G II 194] XII. *Spes* est inconstans laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.

XIII. *Metus* est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu aliqua-

[ht] vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest; potest namque amor] *transcr.* vel perseverandi in ipsius praesentia quando adest (potest namque amor. The transcription opens a parenthesis that it never closes; punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 193).

[hu] The 1677 edition (OP p. 148) has *Prop. 11.*, as does the Dutch version (*d'elfde Voorstelling*); Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to *13.*, and Gebhardt (G II 193; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.

[hv] The 1677 edition (OP p. 149) has *imaginamur*; Gfroerer, Bruder, Riedel, Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn correct to *imaginemur*, and Gebhardt (G II 193; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.

[hw] The 1677 edition (OP p. 149) has *ei inesse imaginamur*; the Dutch version has no equivalent of *ei*. Gebhardt (G II 193; Textgestaltung II 375) deletes it, as Leopold proposed, followed by W. Meijer and Appuhn: the punctuation of the manuscript was probably unclear, and the corrector inserted the misleading *ei*. Bartuschat keeps it.

it has come about that everyone has judged their definition to be very obscure. But it should be noted that when I say that it is a property in the lover that he joins himself by will to the thing loved, I do not understand by will a consent, or deliberation of the mind, or free decree (for we have demonstrated in Prop. 48 of Part II [p. 207] that this is a fiction), nor even a desire to join oneself to the thing loved when it is absent, or to persevere in its presence when it is present; for love can be conceived without the one or the other of these desires; but by will I understand the contentment which is in the lover on account of the presence of the thing loved, by which the joy of the lover is strengthened, or at least fostered.

VII. *Hatred* is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
Cited in 4P34D [p. 393], 5P2D [p. 475], 5P17C [p. 489], 5P18D [p. 491]

Explanation. What is to be noted here is easily perceived from what was said in the Explanation of the preceding Definition. See, besides, the Schol. of Prop. 13 of this Part [p. 251].

VIII. *Inclination* is joy accompanied by the idea of some thing which is accidentally the cause of joy.

IX. *Aversion* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing which is accidentally the cause of sadness. On these see the Schol. of Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 255].

X. *Devotion* is love towards one whom we wonder at.

Explanation. We have shown in Prop. 52 of this Part [p. 297] that wonder arises from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that we often imagine what we wonder at, we shall cease to wonder at it; and so we see that the affect of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.

XI. *Mockery* is joy arising from our imagining that something we despise is in a thing we hate.

Explanation. Insofar as we despise a thing we hate, we deny existence of it (see the Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part [p. 299]), and to that extent (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 259]) we rejoice. But since we suppose that a man nevertheless hates what he mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid. See the Schol. of Prop. 47 of this Part [p. 291].

XII. *Hope* is an inconstant joy arising from the idea of a future or past thing of whose outcome we are to some extent in doubt.

XIII. *Fear* is an inconstant sadness arising from the idea of a future or past thing of whose outcome

tenus dubitamus. Vide de his schol. 2. prop. 18. huius.

Explicatio. Ex his definitionibus sequitur, non dari spem sine metu, neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur, quod rei futurae existentiam secludit; atque adeo eatenus contristari (per prop. 19. huius) et consequenter, dum spe pendet, metuere, ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est, hoc est, de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur, quod eiusdem rei existentiam secludit; atque adeo (per prop. 20. huius) laetatur, et consequenter eatenus spem habet, ne eveniat.

XIV. *Securitas* est laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

XV. *Desperatio* est tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Explicatio. Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio, quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit, quia homo rem praeteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut praesentem contemplatur; vel quia alia imaginatur, quae existentiam earum rerum secludunt, quae ipsi dubium iniiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per coroll. prop. 31. P. 2.) nunquam possumus esse certi; fieri tamen potest, ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide schol. prop. 49. P. 2.) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere; atque adeo fieri potest, ut ex imagine rei praeteritae aut futurae eodem laetitiae vel tristitiae affectu afficiamur ac ex rei praesentis imagine, ut in prop. 18 huius demonstravimus, quam cum eiusdem scholiis vide.[hx]

[G II 195] XVI. *Gaudium* est laetitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit.[hy]

XVII. *Conscientiae morsus* est tristitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit.

XVIII. *Commiseratio* est tristitia concomitante idea mali, quod alteri, quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide schol. prop. 22. et schol. prop. 27. huius.

[hx] quam cum eiusdem scholiis vide] *transcr.* quam cum eiusdem schol. 2. vide. The 1677 edition (OP p. 151) has 'cum ejusdem Scholio'; Gebhardt (G II 195; Textgestaltung II 375) reads 'Scholiis', since both scholia to Prop. 18, originally one, are meant. The transcription has 'schol. 2.'.

[hy] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 151) and Gebhardt (G II 195), in the same words as the definition of remorse that follows. Bartuschat reads *praeter metum* ('contrary to fear'), which fits gladness better; but *praeter spem*, 'contrary to expectation', can cover a good outcome as well as a bad one.

we are to some extent in doubt. See on these the Schol. 2 of Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 259].
Cited in 4P47D [p. 415], 4P63D [p. 433]

Explanation. From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear, nor fear without hope. For he who hangs on hope and is in doubt about the outcome of a thing is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of the future thing; and so to that extent to be saddened (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 259]), and consequently, while he hangs on hope, to fear that the thing will not happen.[272] But he who, on the other hand, is in fear, that is, is in doubt about the outcome of a thing he hates, also imagines something which excludes the existence of that thing; and so (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 259]) he rejoices, and consequently to that extent has hope that it will not happen.
Cited in 4P47D [p. 415]

XIV. *Confidence* is joy arising from the idea of a future or past thing about which the cause of doubting has been removed.

XV. *Despair* is sadness arising from the idea of a future or past thing about which the cause of doubting has been removed.

Explanation. Confidence, therefore, arises from hope, and despair from fear, when the cause of doubting about the outcome of a thing is removed; which happens because a man imagines that the past or future thing is there and contemplates it as present; or because he imagines other things which exclude the existence of those things which were causing him to doubt. For although we can never be certain about the outcome of singular things (by Cor. of Prop. 31 of Part II [p. 177]), it can nevertheless happen that we do not doubt about their outcome. For we have shown (see the Schol. of Prop. 49 of Part II [p. 209]) that it is one thing not to doubt about a thing, another to have certainty of it; and so it can happen that we are affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy or sadness as by the image of a present thing, as we have demonstrated in Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 257], which see together with its Scholia [p. 257].

XVI. *Gladness* is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing which has turned out contrary to expectation.

XVII. *Remorse* is sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which has turned out contrary to expectation.

XVIII. *Pity* is sadness accompanied by the idea of an evil which has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us. See the Schol. of Prop. 22 [p. 261] and the Schol. of Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267].
Cited in 4P50D [p. 417]

[272] *metuere, ut res eveniat*: after verbs of fearing, *ut* means 'that ... not'; so also *spem habet, ne eveniat*, 'has hope that it will not happen'.

Explicatio. Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia, nisi forte, quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem eius habitum.

XIX. *Favor* est amor erga aliquem, qui alteri benefecit.

XX. *Indignatio* est odium erga aliquem, qui alteri malefecit.

Explicatio. Haec nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est, verborum significationem, sed rerum naturam explicare, easque iis vocabulis indicare, quorum significatio, quam ex usu habent, a significatione, qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Ceterum horum affectuum causam vide in coroll. 1. prop. 27. et schol. prop. 22. huius.[hz]

XXI. *Existimatio* est de aliquo prae amore plus iusto sentire.

XXII. *Despectus* est de aliquo prae odio minus iusto sentire.

[G II 196] Explicatio. Est itaque existimatio, amoris et despectus odii effectus sive proprietas; atque adeo potest *existimatio* etiam definiri, quod sit amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de re amata plus iusto sentiat, et contra *despectus*, quod sit odium,[ia] quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de eo quem odio habet, minus iusto sentiat. Vide de his schol. prop. 26. huius.[ib]

XXIII. *Invidia* est odium, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur, et contra ut ex alterius malo gaudeat.

Explicatio. Invidiae opponitur communiter misericordia, quae proinde invita vocabuli significatione sic definiri potest:

XXIV. *Misericordia* est amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex bono alterius gaudeat, et contra ut ex alterius malo contristetur.

Explicatio. Ceterum de invidia vide schol. prop. 24. et schol. prop. 32. huius. Atque hi affectus laetitiae et tristitiae sunt, quos idea rei externae comitatur tamquam causa per se vel per accidens. Hinc ad alios transeo, quos idea rei internae comitatur tamquam causa.

XXV. *Acquiescentia in se ipso* est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi poten-

[hz] The 1677 edition (OP p. 151) has *Scholiis*; the Dutch version has *het Byvoegsel* (*Scholium*). Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to the singular, in keeping with the present form of the Scholium of Prop. 22, and Gebhardt (G II 195; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.

[ia] et contra *despectus*, quod sit odium] *transcr.* et contra *despectus, quod sit odium. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the Explanation.

[ib] schol. prop. 26. huius.] *transcr.* schol. prop. 26. huius. Italics (see the previous note).

Explanation. Between pity and compassion there seems to be no difference, except perhaps that pity regards the single affect, compassion the habit of it.

XIX. *Favour* is love towards someone who has done good to another.
Cited in 4P51D [p. 417], 4P51D2 [p. 417]

XX. *Indignation* is hatred towards someone who has done evil to another.
Cited in 4P51S [p. 417]

Explanation. I know that these names mean something else in common usage. But my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose meaning from usage is not wholly at odds with the meaning in which I wish to use them; which it is enough to have pointed out once. As for the cause of these affects, see Cor. 1 of Prop. 27 [p. 267] and the Schol. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 261].

XXI. *Overestimation* is thinking more highly of someone than is just, out of love.
Cited in 4P48D [p. 415]

XXII. *Scorn* is thinking less highly of someone than is just, out of hatred.
Cited in 4P48D [p. 415]

Explanation. Overestimation, therefore, is an effect, or property, of love, and scorn of hatred; and so *overestimation* can also be defined as love insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly of the thing loved than is just; and, on the other hand, *scorn* as hatred insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks less highly than is just of the one he hates. See on these the Schol. of Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 265].

XXIII. *Envy* is hatred insofar as it so affects a man that he is saddened by another's happiness and, on the other hand, rejoices in another's ill.
Cited in 5P20D [p. 491]

Explanation. To envy is commonly opposed compassion, which can therefore, against the meaning of the word,[273] be defined thus:

XXIV. *Compassion* is love insofar as it so affects a man that he rejoices in another's good and, on the other hand, is saddened by another's ill.

Explanation. As for envy, see the Schol. of Prop. 24 [p. 263] and the Schol. of Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 275]. And these are the affects of joy and sadness which are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as cause, through itself or accidentally. From here I pass to the others, which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as cause.

XXV. *Self-contentment* is joy arising from a man's contemplating himself and his power of acting.

[273] *Misericordia*, which Def. 18, Expl. [p. 327] distinguished from pity (*commiseratio*) only as a habit from a single affect, is here redefined as the contrary of envy: love that rejoices in another's good and is saddened by his ill. 'Compassion' keeps the link with pity; the joy at another's good, for which Prop. 22, Schol. [p. 261] found no name, is now included in it.

tiam contemplatur.

XXVI. *Humilitas* est tristitia orta ex eo, quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur.

Explicatio. Acquiescentia in se ipso humilitati opponitur, quatenus per eandem intelligimus laetitiam, quae ex eo oritur, quod nostram agendi potentiam contemplamur. Sed quatenus per ipsam etiam intelligimus laetitiam concomitante idea alicuius facti, quod nos ex mentis libero decreto fecisse credimus, tum poenitentiae opponitur, quae a nobis sic definitur:

[G II 197] XXVII. *Poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius facti, quod nos ex libero mentis decreto fecisse credimus.*

Explicatio. Horum affectuum causas ostendimus in schol. prop. 51. huius et prop. 53., 54. et 55. huius eiusque schol. De libero autem mentis decreto vide schol. prop. 35. P. 2. Sed hic praeterea notandum venit, mirum non esse, quod omnes omnino actus, qui ex consuetudine *pravi* vocantur, sequatur tristitia, et illos, qui *recti* dicuntur, laetitia. Nam hoc ab educatione potissimum pendere, facile ex supra dictis intelligimus. Parentes nimirum illos exprobrando liberosque propter eosdem saepe obiurgando, hos contra suadendo et laudando effecerunt, ut tristitiae commotiones illis, laetitiae vero his iungerentur. Quod ipsa etiam experientia comprobatur. Nam consuetudo et religio non est omnibus eadem; sed contra, quae apud alios sacra, apud alios profana, et quae apud alios honesta, apud alios turpia sunt. Prout igitur unusquisque educatus est, ita facti alicuius poenitet vel eodem gloriatur.

XXVIII. *Superbia* est de se prae amore sui plus iusto sentire.

Explicatio. Differt igitur superbia ab existimatione, quod haec ad obiectum externum, superbia autem ad ipsum hominem de se plus iusto sentientem referatur. Ceterum ut existimatio amoris sic *superbia* philautiae effectus vel proprietas est, quae propterea etiam definiri potest, quod sit amor sui sive acquiescentia in se ipso, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut de se plus iusto sentiat. Vide schol. prop. 26. huius. Huic affectui non datur contrarius. Nam nemo de se prae odio sui minus iusto sentit; imo nemo de se minus iusto sentit, quatenus imaginatur, se hoc vel illud non posse. Nam quicquid homo imaginatur se non posse, id necessario imaginatur, et hac imaginatione ita disponitur, ut id agere revera non possit, quod se non posse imaginatur. Quamdiu enim imaginatur se hoc vel illud non posse, tamdiu ad agendum non est determinatus; et consequenter tamdiu impossibile ei est, ut id agat.

Cited in 4P52D [p. 419], 5P27D [p. 507], 5P32D [p. 511], 5P36S [p. 515]

XXVI. *Humility* is sadness arising from a man's contemplating his lack of power, or weakness.
Cited in 4P53D [p. 419]

Explanation. Self-contentment is opposed to humility insofar as we understand by it the joy which arises from our contemplating our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it joy accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decree of the mind, it is opposed to repentance, which is defined by us thus:

XXVII. *Repentance* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decree of the mind.[274]
Cited in 4P54D [p. 421]

Explanation. We have shown the causes of these affects in the Schol. of Prop. 51 of this Part [p. 297] and in Props. 53 [p. 301], 54 [p. 301] and 55 of this Part [p. 301] and its Scholium [p. 303]. On the free decree of the mind, see the Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part II [p. 181]. But here it should be noted besides that it is not surprising that all acts whatever which are by custom called *wrong* are followed by sadness, and those which are called *right* by joy. For we easily understand from what has been said above that this depends chiefly on education. Parents, namely, by reproaching the former and often scolding their children for them, and on the other hand by recommending and praising the latter, have brought it about that commotions of sadness were joined to the former and of joy to the latter. This is also confirmed by experience itself. For custom and religion are not the same for all; on the contrary, what is sacred among some is profane among others, and what is honourable among some is base among others. According, therefore, as each has been educated, so he repents of a deed or glories in it.[275]

XXVIII. *Pride* is thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of self-love.
Cited in 4P49D [p. 415], 4P55D [p. 421], 4P57D [p. 423]

Explanation. Pride, therefore, differs from overestimation in that the latter is related to an external object, while pride is related to the man himself, who thinks more highly of himself than is just. For the rest, as overestimation is an effect or property of love, so *pride* is an effect or property of self-love, and can therefore also be defined as love of oneself, or self-contentment, insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly of himself than is just. See the Schol. of Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 265]. There is no contrary to this affect. For no one thinks less highly of himself than is just out of hatred of himself; indeed, no one thinks less highly of himself than is just insofar as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a man imagines he cannot do, he imagines necessarily, and by this imagination he is so disposed that he really cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For as long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, so long

[274] The belief in a free decree belongs to the definition: hence the violence of repentance and of self-contentment (Prop. 51, Schol. [p. 297]). Repentance is not a virtue; he who repents of a deed is twice wretched, or lacking in power (Part IV, Prop. 54 [p. 421]).
[275] Moral feelings are formed by education through the association of affects (Prop. 14 [p. 253]), which explains their variety from one people to another. This does not make good and evil arbitrary for Spinoza: Part IV defines them by what is truly useful, as known by reason (Part IV, Defs. 1–2 [p. 355]).

Verumenimvero si ad illa attendamus, quae a sola opinione pendent, concipere poterimus fieri posse, ut homo de se minus iusto sentiat. Fieri enim potest, ut aliquis, dum tristis imbecillitatem contemplatur suam, imaginetur, se ab omnibus contemni; idque, dum reliqui nihil minus cogitant, quam ipsum contemnere. Potest praeterea homo de se minus iusto sentire, si aliquid de se in praesenti neget cum relatione ad futurum tempus, cuius est incertus; ut quod neget, se nihil[ic] certi posse concipere nihilque nisi prava vel turpia posse cupere vel agere etc. Possumus deinde dicere, aliquem de se minus iusto sentire, cum videmus, ipsum ex nimio pudoris metu ea non audere, quae alii ipsi aequales audent. Hunc igitur affectum possumus superbiae opponere, quem *abiectionem* vocabo. Nam ut ex acquiescentia in se ipso superbia, sic ex humilitate abiectio oritur; quae proinde a nobis sic definitur:

[G II 198] XXIX. *Abiectio* est de se prae tristitia minus iusto sentire.

Explicatio. Solemus tamen saepe superbiae humilitatem opponere; sed tum magis ad utriusque effectus, quam naturam attendimus. Solemus namque illum *superbum* vocare, qui nimis gloriatur (vide schol. prop. 30. huius), qui non nisi virtutes suas et aliorum non nisi vitia narrat, qui omnibus praeferri vult, et qui denique ea gravitate et ornatu incedit, quo solent alii, qui longe supra ipsum sunt positi. Contra illum *humilem* vocamus, qui saepius erubescit, qui sua vitia fatetur et aliorum virtutes narrat, qui omnibus cedit, et qui denique submisso capite ambulat et se ornare negligit. Ceterum hi affectus, nempe humilitas et abiectio, rarissimi sunt. Nam natura humana in se considerata contra eosdem, quantum potest nititur (vide prop. 13. et 54. huius);[id] et ideo qui maxime creduntur abiecti et humiles esse, maxime plerumque ambitiosi et invidi sunt.

[G II 199] XXX. *Gloria* est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios laudare imaginamur.

XXXI. *Pudor* est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius actionis, quam alios vituperare[ie] imaginamur.

Explicatio. De his vide schol. prop. 30. huius. Sed hic notanda est differentia, quae est inter pudorem et verecundiam. Est enim *pudor* tristitia, quae sequitur factum cuius pudet; *verecundia* autem est metus seu timor pudoris,[if] quo homo continetur, ne aliquid turpe committat.

[ic] ut quod neget, se nihil] *transcr.* ut quod negetm, se nihil. Transcription slip; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 198) read 'neget'.

[id] The 1677 edition (OP p. 155) has *Prop. 15. & 34.* in the text, and its list of errata asks for *15. and 54.*, as the Dutch version has; Gfroerer, Bruder and Saisset follow. Valentin Schmidt, Auerbach, Land and Van Vloten–Land rightly correct to *13. and 54.*, and Gebhardt (G II 199; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.

[ie] idea alicuius actionis, quam alios vituperare] *transcr.* idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios vituperare. The 1677 edition (OP p. 155), Gebhardt (G II 199) and Bartuschat have no 'nostrae' in the definition of shame (unlike that of glory).

[if] *verecundia* autem est metus seu timor pudoris] *transcr. verecundia* autem metus seu timor pudoris. The 1677 edition (OP p. 155), Gebhardt (G II 199) and Bartuschat read 'est'.

is he not determined to do it; and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it.
But if we attend to those things which depend on opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive that it can happen that a man thinks less highly of himself than is just. For it can happen that someone, while he sadly contemplates his weakness, imagines that he is despised by all, and that while the others think of nothing less than of despising him. Moreover, a man can think less highly of himself than is just if in the present he denies something of himself with relation to a future time of which he is uncertain; as if he denies that he can conceive anything certain, or that he can desire or do anything but what is wrong or base, etc. We can say, next, that someone thinks less highly of himself than is just when we see that, from an excessive fear of shame, he does not dare the things which others equal to him dare. This affect, then, we can oppose to pride; I shall call it *self-abasement*. For as pride arises from self-contentment, so self-abasement arises from humility; and it is therefore defined by us thus:

XXIX. *Self-abasement* is thinking less highly of oneself than is just, out of sadness.
Cited in 4P55D [p. 421]

Explanation. We are nevertheless accustomed often to oppose humility to pride; but then we attend more to the effects of the two than to their nature. For we usually call him *proud* who glories too much (see the Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]), who tells of nothing but his own virtues and others' vices, who wants to be preferred to all, and who, finally, goes about with the gravity and finery usual for others who are placed far above him. On the other hand, we call him *humble* who blushes rather often, who confesses his own vices and tells of others' virtues, who yields to all, and who, finally, walks with head bowed and neglects to adorn himself. For the rest, these affects, namely humility and self-abasement, are very rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see Props. 13 [p. 251] and 54 of this Part [p. 301]); and so those who are most believed to be self-abased and humble are generally most ambitious and envious.

XXX. *Glory* is joy accompanied by the idea of some action of ours which we imagine others to praise.
Cited in 4P49D [p. 415], 4P58D [p. 425], 5P36S [p. 515]

XXXI. *Shame* is sadness accompanied by the idea of some action which we imagine others to blame.

Explanation. On these see the Schol. of Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 271]. But here the difference between shame and shamefacedness should be noted. For *shame* is the sadness which follows a deed of which one is ashamed; *shamefacedness*, however, is the fear, or timidity, of shame, by

Verecundiae opponi solet *impudentia*, quae revera[ig] affectus non est, ut suo loco ostendam; sed affectuum nomina (ut iam monui) magis eorum usum, quam naturam respiciunt. Atque his laetitiae et tristitiae affectus,[ih,ii] quos explicare proposueram, absolvi. Pergo itaque ad illos, quos ad cupiditatem refero.[ij]

XXXII. *Desiderium* est cupiditas sive appetitus re aliqua potiundi, quae eiusdem rei memoria fovetur, et simul aliarum rerum memoria, quae eiusdem rei appetendae existentiam secludunt, coercetur.

Explicatio. Cum alicuius rei recordamur, ut iam saepe diximus, eo ipso disponimur ad eandem eodem affectu contemplandum, ac si res praesens adesset; sed haec dispositio seu conatus, dum vigilamus, plerumque cohibetur ab imaginibus rerum, quae existentiam eius, cuius recordamur, secludunt. Quando itaque rei meminimus, quae nos aliquo laetitiae genere afficit, eo ipso conamur eandem cum eodem laetitiae affectu ut praesentem contemplari; qui quidem conatus statim cohibetur memoria rerum, quae illius existentiam secludunt. Quare desiderium revera tristitia est, quae laetitiae opponitur illi, quae ex absentia rei, quam odimus, oritur, de qua vide schol. prop. 47. huius. Sed quia nomen desiderium cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad cupiditatis affectus refero.

[G II 200] XXXIII. *Aemulatio* est alicuius rei cupiditas, quae nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.

Explicatio. Qui fugit, quia alios fugere, vel qui timet, quia alios timere videt, vel etiam ille, qui ex eo, quod aliquem manum suam combussisse videt, manum ad se contrahit corpusque movet, quasi ipsius manus combureretur, eum imitari quidem alterius affectum, sed non eundem aemulari dicemus; non quia aliam aemulationis, aliam imitationis novimus causam, sed quia usu factum est, ut illum tantum vocemus aemulum, qui id, quod honestum, utile vel iucundum esse iudicamus, imitatur. Ceterum de aemulationis causa vide prop. 27. huius cum eius schol. Cur autem huic affectui plerumque iuncta sit invidia, de eo vide prop. 32. huius cum eiusdem schol.

XXXIV. *Gratia* seu *gratitudo* est cupiditas seu amoris studium, quo ei benefacere conamur, qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit. Vide prop. 39. cum schol. prop. 41. huius.

XXXV. *Benevolentia* est cupiditas benefaciendi ei, cuius nos miseret. Vide schol. prop. 27. huius.[ik]

[ig] opponi solet *impudentia*, quae revera] *transcr.* opponi solet *impudentia, quae revera. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis over the next sentences.

[ih] Atque his laetitiae et tristitiae affectus] *transcr.* Atque his laetitiae *et* tristitiae affectus. Italics (see the previous note).

[ii] The 1677 edition (OP p. 155) has *hi*, which Paulus already corrected to *his*; Gebhardt (G II 199; Textgestaltung II 375) follows.

[ij] quos ad cupiditatem refero.] *transcr.* quos ad cupiditatem* refero. Italics (see the previous note).

[ik] Vide schol. prop. 27. huius.] *transcr.* Vide schol. ad coroll. 3. prop. 27. huius. The 1677 edition (OP p. 156), Gebhardt (G II 200) and Bartuschat read 'Vide Schol. Prop. 27. hujus'; the transcription adds 'ad coroll. 3.', which identifies the Scholium meant (to Cor. 3).

which a man is held back from committing something base. To shamefacedness *shamelessness* is usually opposed, which in truth is not an affect, as I shall show in its place;[276] but the names of the affects (as I have already pointed out) regard their usage more than their nature. And with these I have completed the affects of joy and sadness which I had proposed to explain. I proceed, therefore, to those which I relate to desire.

XXXII. *Longing* is the desire, or appetite, to possess some thing, which is fostered by the memory of that thing and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing wanted.

Explanation. When we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we are thereby disposed to contemplate it with the same affect as if the thing were present; but this disposition, or striving, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of what we recollect. When, therefore, we remember a thing which affects us with some kind of joy, we thereby strive to contemplate it as present with the same affect of joy; and this striving is immediately checked by the memory of things which exclude its existence. Longing, therefore, is in truth a sadness, which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of a thing we hate, on which see the Schol. of Prop. 47 of this Part [p. 291]. But because the name *desiderium* seems to refer to desire, I relate this affect to the affects of desire.

XXXIII. *Emulation* is the desire for some thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others to have the same desire.

Explanation. He who flees because he sees others flee, or who fears because he sees others fear, or even he who, because he sees that someone has burned his hand, draws back his own hand and moves his body as if his own hand were being burned, we shall say imitates the other's affect, but not that he emulates it; not because we know one cause of emulation and another of imitation, but because it has become customary to call him only an emulator who imitates what we judge to be honourable, useful or pleasant. For the rest, on the cause of emulation see Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 267] with its Scholium [p. 267]. Why envy is generally joined to this affect, see Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 275] with its Scholium [p. 275].

XXXIV. *Thankfulness*, or *gratitude*, is the desire, or eagerness of love, by which we strive to do good to one who has conferred a benefit on us from a like affect of love. See Prop. 39 [p. 283] with the Schol. of Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 287].
Cited in 4P71D [p. 447]

XXXV. *Benevolence* is the desire to do good to one we pity. See the Schol. of Prop. 27 of this

[276] The promise is not explicitly kept. The nearest passage is Part IV, Prop. 58, Schol. [p. 427]: a man who is ashamed of a deed, though he is sad, is more perfect than the shameless man, who has no desire to live honourably.

XXXVI. *Ira* est cupiditas, qua ex odio incitamur ad illi quem odimus malum inferendum. Vide prop. 39. huius.

[G II 201] XXXVII. *Vindicta* est cupiditas, qua ex reciproco odio concitamur ad malum inferendum ei, qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit. Vide coroll. 2. prop. 40. huius cum eiusdem schol.

XXXVIII. *Crudelitas* seu *saevitia* est cupiditas, qua aliquis concitatur ad malum inferendum ei, quem amamus,[il] vel cuius nos miseret.

Explicatio. Crudelitati opponitur *clementia*, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.[im]

XXXIX. *Timor* est cupiditas maius quod metuimus malum minore vitandi. Vide schol. prop. 39. huius.

XL. *Audacia* est cupiditas, qua aliquis incitatur ad aliquid agendum cum periculo, quod eius aequales subire metuunt.

XLI. *Pusillanimitas* dicitur de eo, cuius cupiditas coercetur timore periculi, quod eius aequales subire audent.

Explicatio. Est igitur pusillanimitas nihil aliud, quam metus alicuius mali quod plerique non solent metuere; quare ipsam ad cupiditatis affectus non refero. Eandem tamen hic explicare volui, quia quatenus ad cupiditatem attendimus, affectui audaciae revera opponitur.

XLII. *Consternatio* dicitur de eo, cuius cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali, quod timet.

Explicatio. Est itaque consternatio pusillanimitatis species. Sed quia consternatio ex duplici timore oritur, ideo commodius definiri potest, quod sit metus, qui hominem stupefactum aut fluctuantem ita continet, ut is malum amovere non possit. Dico stupefactum, quatenus eius cupiditatem malum amovendi admiratione coerceri intelligimus. Fluctuantem autem dico, quatenus concipimus eandem cupiditatem coerceri timore alterius mali, quod ipsum aeque cruciat; unde fit ut quodnam ex duobus avertat, nesciat. De his vide schol. prop. 39. et schol. prop. 52. huius. Ceterum de pusillanimitate et audacia vide schol. prop. 51. huius.

[il] W. Meijer translated as if the text had *ei, quem amat, vel cujus eum miseret*, declared the definition false and proposed *concitamur*; Baensch adopts *concitamur*, to bring the definition into line with Prop. 41, Cor., Schol. [p. 287]. Gebhardt (G II 201; Textgestaltung II 376) keeps the text: the change of person is deliberate, since Spinoza calls the intention of someone to do harm cruel only where it meets our love or our pity (otherwise the jailer's or the executioner's action would also be cruel); Appuhn keeps the text.

[im] opponitur *clementia*, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.] *transcr.* opponitur *clementia, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur.* Italics: only the name of the affect is emphasized.

Part [p. 269].

XXXVI. *Anger* is the desire by which we are spurred, from hatred, to inflict evil on one we hate. See Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 283].

XXXVII. *Vengeance* is the desire by which we are roused, from reciprocal hatred, to inflict evil on one who, from a like affect, has done us harm. See Cor. 2 of Prop. 40 of this Part [p. 285] with its Scholium [p. 285].

XXXVIII. *Cruelty*, or *savagery*, is the desire by which someone is roused to inflict evil on one whom we love or whom we pity.

Explanation. To cruelty is opposed *clemency*, which is not a passion, but a power of the mind by which a man moderates anger and vengeance.

XXXIX. *Timidity* is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser one. See the Schol. of Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 283].

XL. *Daring* is the desire by which someone is spurred to do something with a danger which his equals fear to face.
Cited in 4P69D [p. 445]

XLI. *Cowardice* is said of one whose desire is restrained by the timidity of a danger which his equals dare to face.
Cited in 4P69D [p. 445]

Explanation. Cowardice, therefore, is nothing but the fear of some evil which most men are not accustomed to fear; that is why I do not relate it to the affects of desire. But I wanted to explain it here because, insofar as we attend to desire, it is really opposed to the affect of daring.

XLII. *Consternation* is said of one whose desire to avoid an evil is restrained by wonder at the evil he fears.

Explanation. Consternation, therefore, is a species of cowardice. But because consternation arises from a twofold timidity, it can more conveniently be defined as a fear which holds a man stupefied or fluctuating so that he cannot remove the evil. I say *stupefied* insofar as we understand his desire to remove the evil to be restrained by wonder. I say *fluctuating*, however, insofar as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the timidity of another evil which torments him equally, so that he does not know which of the two to avert. On these see the Schol. of Prop. 39 [p. 283] and the Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part [p. 299]. For the rest, on cowardice and daring

[G II 202] XLIII. *Humanitas* seu *modestia* est cupiditas ea faciendi quae hominibus placent, et omittendi quae displicent.

XLIV. *Ambitio* est immodica gloriae cupiditas.

Explicatio. Ambitio est cupiditas, qua omnes affectus (per prop. 27. et 31. huius) foventur et corroborantur; et ideo hic affectus vix superari potest. Nam quamdiu homo aliqua cupiditate tenetur, hac simul necessario tenetur. "Optimus quisque, inquit Cicero,[in] maxime gloria ducitur. Philosophi etiam libris, quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt" etc.

XLV. *Luxuria* est immoderata convivandi cupiditas vel etiam amor.

XLVI. *Ebrietas* est immoderata potandi cupiditas et amor.

XLVII. *Avaritia* est immoderata divitiarum cupiditas et amor.

XLVIII. *Libido* est etiam cupiditas et amor in commiscendis corporibus.

Explicatio. Sive haec coeundi cupiditas moderata sit sive non sit, libido appellari solet. Porro hi quinque affectus (ut in schol. prop. 56. huius monui) contrarios non habent. Nam modestia species est ambitionis, de qua vide schol. prop. 29. huius. Temperantiam deinde, sobrietatem et castitatem mentis potentiam, non autem passionem indicare, iam etiam monui. Et tametsi fieri potest ut homo avarus, ambitiosus vel timidus a nimio cibo, potu et coitu abstineat, avaritia tamen, ambitio et timor luxuriae, ebrietati vel libidini[io] non sunt contrarii. Nam avarus in cibum et potum alienum se ingurgitare[ip] plerumque desiderat. Ambitiosus autem, modo speret fore clam, in nulla re sibi temperabit, et si inter ebrios vivat et libidinosos, ideo quia ambitiosus est, proclivior erit ad eadem vitia. Timidus denique id quod non vult, facit. Nam quamvis mortis vitandae causa divitias in mare proiiciat, manet tamen avarus; et si libidinosus tristis est, quod sibi morem gerere nequeat, non desinit propterea libidinosus esse. Et absolute hi affectus non tam ipsos actus convivandi, potandi etc. respiciunt, quam ipsum appetitum et amorem. Nihil igitur his affectibus opponi potest praeter generositatem et animositatem, de quibus in seqq.

[G II 203] Definitiones *zelotypiae* et reliquarum animi fluctuationum silentio praetermitto, tam quia ex compositione affectuum, quos iam definivimus, oriuntur, quam quia pleraeque nomina non habent, quod ostendit ad usum vitae sufficere, easdem in genere tantummodo noscere. Ceterum ex definitionibus affectuum, quos explicuimus, liquet eos *omnes* a *cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia* oriri,[iq] seu potius nihil praeter hos tres esse, quorum unusquisque variis

[in] Vid. Cic. pro Archia cap. 11. Conf. Tuscul. disp. l. 1., cap. 15. [Bruder]

[io] The 1677 edition (OP p. 158) and the editions before Van Vloten–Land read *castitati*, as does the Dutch version (*kuisheit*). Land and Van Vloten–Land, after Schmidt, Saisset, Auerbach and Pollock, correct to *libidini*, followed by W. Meijer, Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Leopold, and Gebhardt (G II 203; Textgestaltung II 376).

[ip] The 1677 edition has *ingurgitare*; Gebhardt (G II 203; Textgestaltung II 376) reads *se ingurgitare*, as Leopold proposed.

[iq] a *cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia* oriri,] *transcr.* a *cupiditate, laetitia vel tristitia oriri,. Italics: the transcription extends the emphasis to the end of the passage.

see the Schol. of Prop. 51 of this Part [p. 297].

XLIII. *Courtesy*, or *modesty*, is the desire to do what pleases men and to omit what displeases them.

XLIV. *Ambition* is an immoderate desire for glory.

Explanation. Ambition is a desire by which all the affects (by Props. 27 [p. 267] and 31 of this Part [p. 273]) are fostered and strengthened; and for this reason this affect can hardly be overcome. For as long as a man is held by any desire, he is necessarily held by this one at the same time. 'Every best man', says Cicero,[277] 'is led most by glory. Even the philosophers inscribe their names on the books which they write on despising glory', etc.

XLV. *Gluttony* is an immoderate desire, or also love, of feasting.

XLVI. *Drunkenness* is an immoderate desire and love of drinking.

XLVII. *Greed* is an immoderate desire and love of riches.

XLVIII. *Lust* is also a desire and love in the joining of bodies.

Explanation. Whether this desire for sexual union is moderate or not, it is usually called lust. Further, these five affects (as I pointed out in the Schol. of Prop. 56 of this Part [p. 307]) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition, on which see the Schol. of Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 271]. Next, I have also already pointed out that temperance, sobriety and chastity indicate a power of the mind, not a passion. And although it can happen that a greedy, ambitious or timid man abstains from too much food, drink and sexual union, greed, ambition and timidity are nevertheless not contrary to gluttony, drunkenness or lust. For the greedy man generally longs to gorge himself on another's food and drink. The ambitious man, again, provided he hopes it will be secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives among drunkards and the lustful, he will, precisely because he is ambitious, be more inclined to the same vices. The timid man, finally, does what he does not will. For although he throws his riches into the sea to avoid death, he remains greedy; and if the lustful man is sad that he cannot indulge himself, he does not on that account cease to be lustful. And absolutely, these affects regard not so much the acts themselves of feasting, drinking, etc., as the appetite and love itself. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these affects except nobility and tenacity, of which in what follows.

I pass over in silence the definitions of *jealousy* and the other fluctuations of mind, both because they arise from the composition of affects we have already defined and because most of them have no names, which shows that for the conduct of life it is enough to know them only in general. For the rest, it is clear from the definitions of the affects we have explained that they *all* arise from *desire, joy or sadness*, or rather are nothing but these three, each of which is usually called by

[277] Cicero, *Pro Archia* 26: 'trahimur omnes studio laudis, et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur. ipsi illi philosophi etiam in eis libellis quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt nomen suum inscribunt' ('we are all drawn by the desire for praise, and every best man is led most by glory. Those very philosophers inscribe their names even on the little books they write on despising glory'). The same remark is in the *Tusculan Disputations* I.34.

nominibus appellari solet propter varias eorum relationes et denominationes extrinsecas. Si iam ad hos primitivos et ad eam, quae de natura mentis supra diximus, attendere velimus, affectus, quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, sic definire poterimus.[ir]

Affectuum Generalis Definitio

[G II 203] Affectus, qui *animi pathema* dicitur, est confusa idea, qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat, et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius, quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur.

[G II 204] Explicatio. Dico primo affectum seu passionem animi esse "confusam ideam". Nam mentem eatenus tantum pati ostendimus (vide prop. 3 huius), quatenus ideas inadaequatas sive confusas habet. Dico deinde "qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis existendi vim quam antea affirmat". Omnes enim corporum ideae, quas habemus, magis nostri corporis actualem constitutionem (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.), quam corporis externi naturam indicant; at haec, quae affectus formam constituit, corporis vel alicuius eius partis constitutionem indicare vel exprimere debet, quam ipsum corpus vel aliqua eius pars habet, ex eo, quod ipsius agendi potentia sive existendi vis augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur.

Sed notandum cum dico "maiorem vel minorem existendi vim, quam antea", me non intelligere, quod mens praesentem corporis constitutionem cum praeterita comparat, sed quod idea, quae affectus formam constituit, aliquid de corpore affirmat, quod plus minusve realitatis revera involvit, quam antea. Et quia essentia mentis in hoc consistit (per prop. 11. et 13. P. 2.), quod sui corporis actualem existentiam affirmat, et nos per perfectionem ipsam rei essentiam intelligimus; sequitur ergo, quod mens ad maiorem minoremve perfectionem transit, quando ei aliquid de suo corpore vel aliqua eius parte affirmare contingit, quod plus minusve realitatis involvit, quam antea. Cum igitur supra dixerim mentis cogitandi potentiam augeri vel minui, nihil aliud intelligere volui, quam quod mens ideam sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis formaverit, quae plus minusve realitatis exprimit, quam de suo corpore affirmaverat. Nam idearum praestantia et actualis cogitandi potentia ex obiecti praestantia aestimatur. Addidi denique "et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius quam ad aliud cogitandum determinatur",[is] ut praeter laetitiae et tristitiae naturam, quam prima definitionis pars explicat, cupiditatis etiam naturam exprimerem.

[ir] sic definire poterimus.] *transcr.* sic definire poterimus. Italics (see the previous note).

[is] ad hoc potius quam ad aliud cogitandum determinatur"] *transcr.* ad hoc potius quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur". The 1677 edition (OP p. 160) and Gebhardt (G II 204) read 'aliud' in this quotation of the definition (the definition itself has 'illud').

various names on account of their various relations and extrinsic denominations.[278] If we now wish to attend to these primitive affects and to what we said above about the nature of the mind, we shall be able to define the affects, insofar as they are related to the mind alone, as follows.

General Definition of the Affects

An affect, which is called a *passion of the mind*,[279] is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, and by which, when it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than of that.

Cited in 4P7D [p. 365], 4P7C [p. 365], 4P8D [p. 367], 4P9D [p. 367], 4P14D [p. 373], 5P3D [p. 475], 5P4C [p. 477], 5P17D [p. 489], 5P34D [p. 513], 5P40C [p. 521]

Explanation. I say first that an affect, or passion of the mind, is 'a confused idea'. For we have shown that the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or confused, ideas (see Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 241]). I say next 'by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before'. For all the ideas of bodies which we have indicate the actual constitution of our body (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]) more than the nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form of the affect, must indicate or express the constitution of the body, or of some part of it, which the body itself, or some part of it, has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.

But it should be noted that when I say 'a greater or lesser force of existing than before', I do not understand that the mind compares the present constitution of the body with a past one,[280] but that the idea which constitutes the form of the affect affirms something of the body which really involves more or less reality than before. And because the essence of the mind consists in this (by Props. 11 [p. 139] and 13 of Part II [p. 141]), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something of its body, or of some part of it, which involves more or less reality than before. When, therefore, I said above that the mind's power of thinking is increased or diminished, I wanted to understand nothing but that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or of some part of it, which expresses more or less reality than it had affirmed of its body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking are estimated from the excellence of the object.[281] I added, finally, 'and by which, when it is given, the mind itself is determined to think of this rather than of anything else', so as to express, besides the nature of joy and sadness, which the first part of the definition explains,

[278] The names of the affects are taken from the objects and circumstances to which they are related, not from their nature, which is in every case desire, joy or sadness. On extrinsic denomination see the note on Part II, Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191].

[279] *animi pathema*: from the Greek πάθημα ('something undergone'). The General Definition defines only the affect that is a passion, from the side of the mind; the active affects (Props. 58–59 [p. 309]) arise from adequate ideas. Its first part gives the nature of joy and sadness, the last clause that of desire (Explanation, last sentence).

[280] The comparison 'than before' is not made by the mind; the idea itself affirms more or less reality. Joy and sadness are therefore not judgments about one's condition but the very passage of the mind, as the idea of the body, to more or less perfection (Def. 3, Expl. [p. 319]).

[281] The principle of Part II, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]: ideas differ among themselves as their objects do, and one is more excellent than another as its object is more excellent.

the nature of desire as well.

Ethices Pars Quarta
De Servitute Humana seu de Affectuum Viribus

Fourth Part of the Ethics
Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects

Introduction to the Fourth Part

The fourth Part is called *De servitute humana, seu de affectuum viribus*, "Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects." Its first sentence defines the bondage: "Man's lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects I call *bondage*." A man subject to the affects is not under his own control (*sui iuris*) but under that of fortune, so that he is often compelled, "although he sees the better for himself, still to follow the worse" (Preface [p. 351]). The words are Medea's in Ovid, already quoted in the scholium to Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235], and they state the problem of the Part. Part III explained how the affects arise; Part IV asks how strong they are, why knowledge of the good is so often powerless against them, and what in them is good or bad. Part V will then show what the mind can do against them.

Part IV is the longest Part of the *Ethics*, and in some ways the most varied. It contains a theory of value, an analysis of the weakness of reason, an ethics of self-preservation that turns out to be an ethics of community, a brief political philosophy, a judgment on each of the principal affects, the portrait of a free man, and an Appendix that restates the whole in continuous prose. Readers who come to it looking for the ethics promised by the title of the book find much of it here. But they should be prepared for an ethics unlike most others: one without free will, without obligation in the usual sense, without any good independent of human striving, and yet with a definite and demanding picture of how to live.

The Preface: perfection, good and evil

Before beginning, the Preface does something that might seem to undo the Appendix to Part I [p. 101]. There Spinoza had argued that good and bad, perfect and imperfect, order and confusion are notions men form from their own appetites and project onto nature. The Preface agrees, and gives a history of the words. "If someone has decided to make something and has finished it, he will call his thing perfect"; a house is called imperfect while it is still being built, and perfect when it has been brought to the end its author intended. That seems to have been the "first meaning" of the words. But once men began to form universal ideas and to devise models of houses, buildings and towers, each called perfect what agreed with the universal idea he had formed, and imperfect what agreed less with it, even when the builder thought it finished. Men then applied the same models to natural things, believing that nature, "which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end," looks to these models and sets them before itself (Preface [p. 351]).

But nature does not act for an end. "That eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists"; as it exists for the sake of no end, so it acts for the sake of no end. What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite whose causes are unknown, as habitation is the final cause of a house only in the sense that a man, imagining the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build one. Perfection and imperfection are therefore "only modes of thinking," notions we form by comparing individuals of the same kind with one another. Good and evil likewise "indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from the fact that we compare things with one another." One and the same thing can be good, bad and indifferent at once: "music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who mourns, and neither good nor bad for one who is deaf" (Preface [p. 353]).

Yet Spinoza decides to keep the words. "For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words in the sense I have indicated." Good will mean "that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which we set before ourselves," and evil what we certainly know prevents us from resembling it; and men will be called more or less perfect as they come nearer to the model or are further from it. Perfection, finally, is not a change from one essence to another, "for a horse, for example, is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if into an insect," but an increase or decrease in a thing's power of acting. By perfection in general Spinoza understands reality, "the essence of any thing insofar as it exists and operates in a certain way, without any regard to its duration"; no thing is more perfect because it lasts longer.

The Preface is short, but it resolves a tension the reader may have felt since Part I. If good and evil are only modes of thinking, how can there be an ethics? Spinoza's answer is that ethics does not need goods that exist in nature independently of us. It needs only a model of human nature, an idea of a human being whose power of acting is greater than ours, and the knowledge of what brings us nearer to it. The model is not an end that nature pursues. It is an idea we form, and use, because we compare, and because the comparison is useful.

Definitions and the single axiom

The definitions translate these notions into the vocabulary of utility. "By *good* I shall understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us" (Def. 1 [p. 355]), and by evil "that which we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good" (Def. 2 [p. 355]). The word "certainly" matters: Part IV is concerned with what reason knows to be good, not with what the passions take to be so. Two definitions bring back, with explicit epistemic definitions, the words "contingent" and "possible" that Part I had banished from nature. Singular things are called contingent "insofar as, when we attend only to their essence, we find nothing which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it," and possible "insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether these are determined to produce them" (Defs. 3–4 [p. 355]). The definitions do not reintroduce contingency into things; they name ways in which a mind ignorant of the whole order of causes must think of them. "By the *end for the sake of which we do something* I understand appetite" (Def. 7 [p. 357]). And "by *virtue* and *power* I understand the same thing," so that virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is "the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone" (Def. 8 [p. 357]). Virtue is not obedience, and not a disposition to follow rules; it is power, the power of acting from one's own nature.

The Part has a single axiom, and it is grim: "There is no singular thing in the nature of things than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. But given any one, there is another more powerful by which the given one can be destroyed" (Axiom [p. 357]). Everything finite can be destroyed by something else, and the first group of propositions draws the consequences for human beings.

Human weakness

"We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others" (Prop. 2 [p. 361]). "The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes" (Prop. 3 [p. 361]). It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature and should undergo no changes except those of which he is the adequate cause (Prop. 4 [p. 361]), and so "man is necessarily always subject to passions" (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]). The force of a passion is defined not by our own power but by the power of its external cause compared with ours (Prop. 5 [p. 363]), and it can surpass all our other actions, "so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man" (Prop. 6 [p. 365]). From this comes the principle on which the rest of the argument turns: "An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained" (Prop. 7 [p. 365]).

The next propositions explain why knowledge is so often defeated. "The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it" (Prop. 8 [p. 367]). It follows that "the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect" (Prop. 14 [p. 373]). Knowledge does not stand outside the affects and command them; it can act on them only by being itself an affect, and then it is subject to the same laws of strength and weakness as any other. A desire that arises from true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished by many other desires (Prop. 15 [p. 373]), especially by desires for things pleasant in the present when the knowledge concerns the future (Prop. 16 [p. 375]), and still more easily when it concerns things we regard as contingent (Prop. 17 [p. 375]). The intermediate propositions on affects toward future, past, necessary and contingent things (Props. 9–13 [p. 367]) supply the mechanism: an image of something present is stronger than an image of something future, and an image of something necessary stronger than one of something contingent.

The scholium to Prop. 17 draws the moral and quotes two witnesses. "With these I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason." Hence the poet's saying, "*I see and approve the better, I follow the worse*," and Ecclesiastes: "*He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.*" Spinoza adds at once that he does not say this in order to conclude that ignorance is better than knowledge. "It is necessary to know both the power and the lack of power of our nature, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects and what it cannot do" (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 375]). The analysis of weakness is the first step toward strength.

The dictates of reason

Then the tone changes. The scholium to Prop. 18 [p. 377] sets out "the dictates of reason" in advance of their demonstration, "so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone." "Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it demands, therefore, that each man love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, and want everything which really

leads man to a greater perfection, and, absolutely, that each strive to preserve his own being as far as it is in him." Since virtue is acting from the laws of one's own nature, "the foundation of virtue is the very striving to preserve one's own being, and ... happiness consists in a man's being able to preserve his being." Virtue is to be wanted for its own sake, and there is nothing more excellent for whose sake it ought to be wanted. Those who kill themselves "lack power of mind and are completely conquered by external causes opposed to their nature."

The scholium then turns from the individual to others. We can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves, and of the things outside us none is more useful than those that agree entirely with our nature. "To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man; nothing, I say, can men wish for that is more excellent for preserving their being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body." From this it follows that men who are governed by reason "want nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men." Spinoza explains that he has set out these dictates in advance because some believe that the principle that everyone is bound to seek his own advantage is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety, and he wants to show briefly that the contrary is true.

Props. 19–37 [p. 379] demonstrate these claims. "The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue" (Prop. 20 [p. 381]). "The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue" (Prop. 22, Cor. [p. 383]). To act absolutely from virtue is "to act, to live, to preserve our being (these three signify the same) from the guidance of reason, and that from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage" (Prop. 24 [p. 383]). Reason then defines what our advantage really is. "Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding" (Prop. 26 [p. 385]), and "we know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding" (Prop. 27 [p. 387]). And so: "The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God" (Prop. 28 [p. 387]).

Agreement and the state

The ethics of self-preservation becomes an ethics of community through the notion of agreement in nature. "Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good" (Prop. 31 [p. 389]). Insofar as men are subject to passions they do not agree in nature, and can be contrary to one another (Props. 32–34 [p. 391]). "Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature" (Prop. 35 [p. 393]), and so "there is no singular thing in the nature of things which is more useful to man than a man who lives from the guidance of reason" (Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395]). The paradox is stated in the second corollary: "When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another" (Prop. 35, Cor. 2 [p. 395]). The scholium appeals to experience, which testifies so often to this truth "that it is in almost everyone's mouth that man is a God to man." Men rarely live by reason, and are for the most part envious and troublesome to one another; but they can hardly lead a solitary life, and far more benefits than harms arise from their common society. "Let the satirists, then, laugh at human affairs as much as they like, let the theologians detest them, and let the melancholy praise as much as they can an uncultivated and rustic life, and despise men and admire the beasts"; men will still find that they can provide what they need much more easily by mutual help (Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 395]).

"The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally"

(Prop. 36 [p. 397]), since the knowledge of God is not diminished by being shared. "The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men, and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has" (Prop. 37 [p. 397]). The first scholium to Prop. 37 defines religion, piety and honourableness in these terms: whatever we desire and do insofar as we have the idea of God is religion; "the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason I call *piety*"; the desire to join others to oneself in friendship is honourableness. It also contains one of the most uncomfortable sentences in the book: the principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to form close ties with men, but not with beasts, so that "the law against slaughtering beasts is founded more on empty superstition and womanish compassion than on sound reason" (Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]).

The second scholium sketches a political philosophy. "Each one exists by the highest right of nature," and so by the highest right of nature each judges what is good and evil, looks to his own advantage, and avenges himself. If men lived by reason, each could exercise this right without harm to others. But because they are subject to affects that far surpass their power, they are drawn in different directions while they need one another's help, and so, in order to live harmoniously, they must give up their natural right and make one another confident that they will do nothing to harm another (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]). This is done by the principle of Prop. 7: an affect is restrained only by a stronger affect, and so society can be established if it claims for itself the right of avenging injuries and of judging good and evil, and has the power to make laws backed by threats. In such a civil state, and only there, sin, merit, justice and injustice have a meaning: sin is disobedience punished by the right of the state, merit is obedience, and justice and injustice concern what common consent has decided belongs to each. "From which it is evident that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which explain the nature of the mind." The theory is close to Hobbes's in its starting point, the natural right of each and the fear that makes men give it up. Its conclusion, which the *Theological-Political Treatise* develops, is different: "the end of the state, therefore, is really freedom" (*Finis ergo Reipublicae revera libertas est*; TTP ch. 20).

The evaluation of the affects

The rest of the Part evaluates. What disposes the human body to be affected in many ways and to affect other bodies in many ways is useful (Prop. 38 [p. 405]), and what preserves the ratio of motion and rest among its parts is good (Prop. 39 [p. 405]). "Joy is not directly evil, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil" (Prop. 41 [p. 407]). "Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good" (Prop. 42 [p. 407]); pleasure, which affects one part of the body more than the rest, can be excessive (Prop. 43 [p. 409]). Love and desire can be excessive too, when they are attached to one object to the exclusion of others. "Hatred can never be good" (Prop. 45 [p. 411]), and "he who lives from the guidance of reason strives as far as he can to repay another's hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him with love in return, or nobility" (Prop. 46 [p. 413]).

The judgments on the affects that ordinary morality admires are severe. "The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves" (Prop. 47 [p. 415]). "Pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless" (Prop. 50 [p. 417]), though Spinoza adds that "he who is moved neither by reason nor by pity to help others is rightly called inhuman" (Prop. 50, Schol. [p. 417]). "Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason" (Prop. 53 [p. 419]). "Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power" (Prop. 54 [p. 421]). Against these

stands the self-contentment that arises from reason, which "is the greatest there can be" (Prop. 52 [p. 419]), and its scholium calls it "the highest thing we can hope for."

The judgments are tempered by a realism that is easy to miss. The scholium to Prop. 54 grants that since men rarely live by reason, humility and repentance, and hope and fear as well, "bring more advantage than harm; and so, since men must err, it is better that they err in that direction. For if men lacking in power of mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united and held together? The mob is a terror, unless it is afraid." It is no wonder, Spinoza adds, that the prophets, who looked to the common advantage and not to that of a few, commended humility, repentance and reverence so greatly (Prop. 54, Schol. [p. 421]). The ethics of reason is for those who can live by it; for the rest, Spinoza allows, the passions that ordinary morality cultivates do useful work.

Reason as a guide to action

The last group of propositions before the free man shows that reason can do everything the passions do, and better. "To all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason without it" (Prop. 59 [p. 427]). "He who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason" (Prop. 63 [p. 433]), and "by a desire which arises from reason we follow the good directly and flee evil indirectly" (Prop. 63, Cor. [p. 433]). "The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge" (Prop. 64 [p. 433]). Reason prefers a greater future good to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil to a greater future one (Prop. 66 [p. 435]), since it regards things under a species of eternity and is not affected more by the image of a present thing than by that of a future one. The scholium to Prop. 66 contrasts the man led by affect or opinion, who "whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant," with the man led by reason, who "complies with no one's wishes but his own"; Spinoza calls the first a slave, the second free.

The free man and the Appendix

The last seven propositions describe the free man, and an essay before them introduces his portrait. An Appendix of thirty-two chapters follows, in which Spinoza collects what the Part has taught about the right way of living, which had been demonstrated piecemeal, and brings it under main headings in continuous prose.

Questions the reader will meet

Part IV raises more objections from first-time readers than any other part of the book, and some of them deserve an answer in advance.

The first is the charge of egoism. Spinoza says that virtue is seeking one's own advantage, and that no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another. But the advantage reason seeks is understanding, and the highest good is the knowledge of God, which is common to all and diminished by no one's possession of it. The man who lives by reason wants for others what he wants for himself, not as a sacrifice but because the reason that guides him is the same in them. Whether this is an ethics of enlightened self-interest or a genuine overcoming of the opposition between self and others is a question readers have answered differently, but it is not the crude egoism the first sentences of the scholium to Prop. 18 may suggest.

The second concerns obligation. There is no free will, and good and evil are modes of thinking;

how then can Spinoza say what we "ought" to do? When Spinoza speaks of the "dictates" of reason he means what reason prescribes in the sense of what follows from the nature of a being that understands. The ethics of Part IV describes what a more powerful human being does, and what brings us nearer to being one. It addresses readers as beings who can understand, and whose understanding, once acquired, will act in them as an affect.

The third concerns the model of human nature. The Preface introduces it as an idea we form because we compare things, and Part I attacked the projection of models onto nature. Is the model of Part IV a relapse into the teleology of the Appendix? Spinoza's answer is that the model is a human idea, used by human beings, and that he never claims that nature aims at it. It is useful because the mind that has it is moved by it, and because it measures what really increases our power.

The fourth concerns the strength of reason. Part IV says that true knowledge as such cannot restrain any affect, and that men are necessarily always subject to passions. How then can reason guide life at all? The answer is that knowledge is not only true but also, in us, an affect, and that affects arising from reason are related to what is common to things and so are always present to the mind, while the passions depend on what is changing and absent. Part V will develop this answer into its remedies. Part IV prepares it by showing what reason would choose if it were strong enough.

The place of Part IV in the whole

Part IV is the practical centre of the *Ethics*. It takes the theory of the affects from Part III and turns it into an account of how to live; it takes the theory of reason from Part II and turns it into a picture of the free man; and it takes the metaphysics of Part I, with its denial of final causes and of free will, and shows that an ethics can be built without either. Part V will add what Part IV leaves open: what the mind can actually do against the passions, and in what the freedom and blessedness of the mind consist. The closing scholium of Part IV already points there, referring everything said about the true freedom of man to strength of character, to tenacity and nobility.

The text begins with the Preface on perfection and imperfection, good and evil. It is one of Spinoza's clearest pieces of prose, and the definitions and the single axiom that follow it should be read in its light.

Praefatio

[G II 205] Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus *servitutem* voco. Homo enim affectibus obnoxius sui iuris non est, sed fortunae, in cuius potestate ita est, ut saepe coactus sit, quamquam meliora sibi videat, deteriora tamen sequi.[it] Huius rei causam, et quid praeterea affectus boni vel mali habent, in hac parte demonstrare proposui. Sed antequam incipiam, pauca de *perfectione* et *imperfectione*, deque *bono* et *malo*[iu] praefari lubet.

Qui rem aliquam facere constituit eamque perfecit, rem suam perfectam esse non tantum ipse, sed etiam unusquisque, qui mentem auctoris illius operis et scopum recte noverit aut se novisse crediderit, dicet. Ex. gr. si quis aliquod opus (quod suppono nondum esse peractum) viderit, noveritque scopum auctoris illius operis esse domum aedificare, is domum imperfectam esse dicet, et contra perfectam, simulatque opus ad finem, quem eius auctor eidem dare constituerat, perductum viderit. Verum si quis opus aliquod videt, cuius simile nunquam viderat, nec mentem opificis novit, is sane scire non poterit, opusne illud perfectum, an imperfectum sit. Atque haec videtur *prima* fuisse horum vocabulorum *significatio*.

Sed postquam homines ideas universales formare, et domuum, aedificiorum, turrium etc. exemplaria excogitare, et alia rerum exemplaria aliis praeferre inceperunt, factum est, ut unusquisque id perfectum vocaret, quod cum universali idea, quam eiusmodi rei formaverat, videret convenire,[iv] et id contra imperfectum, quod cum concepto suo exemplari minus convenire videret, quamquam ex opificis sententia consummatum plane esset. Nec alia videtur esse ratio, cur res naturales etiam, quae scilicet humana manu non sunt factae, perfectas aut imperfectas vulgo appellent; solent namque homines tam rerum naturalium, quam artificialium ideas formare universales, quas rerum veluti exemplaria habent et quas naturam (quam nihil nisi alicuius finis causa agere existimant) intueri credunt sibique exemplaria proponere. Cum itaque aliquid in natura fieri vident, quod cum concepto exemplari, quod rei eiusmodi habent, minus convenit, ipsam naturam tum defecisse vel peccavisse, remque illam imperfectam reliquisse credunt. Videmus itaque homines consuevisse, res naturales perfectas aut imperfectas vocare magis ex praeiudicio, quam ex earum vera cognitione.

Ostendimus enim in primae partis appendice naturam propter finem non agere; aeternum namque illud et infinitum ens, quod Deum seu naturam appellamus, eadem, qua existit necessitate agit. Ex qua enim naturae necessitate existit, ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus (prop. 16. P. 1.).[iw] Ratio igitur seu causa, cur Deus seu natura agit et cur existit, una eademque est. Ut ergo nullius

[it] Vid. Ovid. metam. l. VII. v. 20. 21. [Bruder]

[iu] *perfectione* et *imperfectione*, deque *bono* et *malo*] *transcr. perfectione* et *imperfectione, deque bono* et *malo*. Italics: the emphasis is misplaced in the transcription.

[iv] The 1677 edition (OP p. 162) has *viderat*; Van Vloten–Land, after Schmidt, Auerbach and Saisset, correct to *videret*, and Gebhardt (G II 206; Textgestaltung II 376) follows.

[iw] ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus (prop. 16. P. 1.).] *transcr.* ex eadem ipsum agere ostendimus. Vide prop.16. P. 1. As in Gebhardt (G II 206), 'ostendimus (Prop. 16. p. 1.)'; the transcription has a separate sentence 'Vide prop. 16. P. 1.'.

Man's lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects I call *bondage*. For a man who is subject to the affects is not under his own control,[282] but under that of fortune, in whose power he is to such an extent that he is often compelled, although he sees the better for himself, still to follow the worse.[283] The cause of this, and what, besides, the affects have that is good or evil, I have proposed to demonstrate in this Part. But before I begin, I should like to say a few things first about *perfection* and *imperfection*, and about *good* and *evil*.

If someone has decided to make something and has finished it, he will call his thing perfect; and so will anyone who rightly knows, or believes he knows, the mind and aim of the author of that work. For example, if someone sees a work (which I suppose not yet to be completed) and knows that the aim of its author is to build a house, he will say that the house is imperfect; and on the other hand perfect, as soon as he sees that the work has been brought to the end which its author had decided to give it. But if someone sees a work whose like he had never seen, and does not know the mind of the maker, he will certainly not be able to know whether that work is perfect or imperfect. And this seems to have been the *first meaning* of these words.

But after men began to form universal ideas, and to think out models of houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer some models of things to others, it came about that each called perfect what he saw agree with the universal idea he had formed of a thing of this kind, and imperfect, on the other hand, what he saw agree less with the model he had conceived, even though in the opinion of the maker it had been entirely finished. Nor does there seem to be any other reason why men commonly call natural things too, which have not been made by human hand, perfect or imperfect; for men are accustomed to form universal ideas of natural things as well as of artificial ones, which they hold as models of things, and which they believe nature (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to and sets before itself as models. When, therefore, they see something happen in nature which agrees less with the model they have conceived of a thing of this kind, they believe that nature itself has then failed or erred, and left that thing imperfect. We see, therefore, that men have been accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of them.

For we have shown in the Appendix of the first Part [p. 101] that nature does not act for the sake of an end; for that eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature,[284] acts by the same necessity by which it exists. For we have shown that it acts by the same necessity of nature by which it exists (Prop. 16 of Part I [p. 65]). The reason, therefore, or cause, why God, or nature,

[282] *sui iuris non est*: literally, 'is not of his own right', a legal expression for one who is not subject to another's power. The *Political Treatise* defines it: each is under another's right as long as he is in another's power, and under his own right insofar as he can repel all force and avenge an injury done to him as he judges fit, and absolutely, insofar as he can live according to his own temperament (II.9); and 'the mind is entirely under its own right insofar as it can use reason rightly', so that those are most under their own right 'qui maxime ratione pollent, quique maxime eadem ducuntur' ('who are most powerful in reason and are most guided by it', II.11).

[283] Medea's words in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII.20–21, already quoted in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235] and quoted again in Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 375].

[284] *Deum seu naturam*: the phrase occurs here for the first time in the *Ethics*, twice in a few lines, and again in Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 361]. The 'or' (*seu*) introduces an equivalent description, as throughout (see the note on Part I, Def. 1 [p. 25]); the thought is that of Part I, Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 81], where nature as *natura naturans* is God. The Dutch version of 1677 omits *seu naturam* in both places, saying only 'which we call God' (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 377).

finis causa existit, nullius etiam finis causa agit; sed ut existendi, sic et agendi principium vel finem habet nullum.

Causa autem, quae finalis dicitur, nihil est praeter ipsum humanum appetitum, quatenus is alicuius rei veluti principium seu causa primaria consideratur. Ex. gr. cum dicimus habitationem causam fuisse finalem huius aut illius domus, nihil tum sane intelligimus aliud, quam quod homo ex eo, quod vitae domesticae commoda imaginatus est, appetitum habuit aedificandi domum. Quare habitatio, quatenus ut finalis causa consideratur, nihil est praeter hunc singularem appetitum, qui revera causa est efficiens, quae ut prima consideratur, quia homines suorum appetituum causas communiter ignorant. Sunt namque, ut iam saepe dixi, suarum quidem actionum et appetituum conscii, sed ignari causarum, a quibus ad aliquid appetendum determinantur. Quod praeterea vulgo aiunt, naturam aliquando deficere vel peccare, resque imperfectas producere, inter commenta numero, de quibus in app. P. 1. egi.
Perfectio igitur et imperfectio revera modi solummodo cogitandi sunt, nempe notiones, quas fingere solemus ex eo, quod eiusdem speciei aut generis individua ad invicem comparamus. Et hac de causa supra (def. 6. P. 2.) dixi me per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligere; solemus enim omnia naturae individua ad unum genus, quod generalissimum appellatur, revocare; nempe ad notionem entis, quae ad omnia absolute naturae individua pertinet. Quatenus itaque naturae individua ad hoc genus revocamus, et ad invicem comparamus, et alia plus entitatis seu realitatis, quam alia habere comperimus, eatenus alia aliis perfectiora esse dicimus; et quatenus iisdem aliquid tribuimus, quod negationem involvit, ut terminus, finis, impotentia etc., eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus,[ix] quia nostram mentem non aeque afficiunt, ac illa, quae perfecta vocamus, et non quod ipsis aliquid, quod suum sit, deficiat vel quod natura peccaverit. Nihil enim naturae alicuius rei competit, nisi id quod ex necessitate naturae causae efficientis sequitur; et quicquid ex necessitate naturae causae efficientis sequitur, id necessario fit.

[G II 208] Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus, in se scilicet consideratis, indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos seu notiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus. Nam una eademque res potest eodem tempore bona et mala, et etiam indifferens esse. Ex. gr. musica bona est melancholico, mala lugenti; surdo autem neque bona neque mala. Verum quamvis se res ita habeat, nobis tamen haec vocabula retinenda sunt.

Nam quia ideam hominis, tamquam naturae humanae exemplar, quod intueamur, formare cupimus, nobis ex usu erit, haec eadem vocabula eo, quo dixi, sensu retinere. Per bonum itaque in

[ix] eatenus ipsa imperfecta appellamus] *transcr.* eatenus ipsa imperfectaappellamus. Word division (the transcription runs the words together).

acts and why it exists is one and the same. As, therefore, it exists for the sake of no end, so it also acts for the sake of no end; but as it has no principle or end of existing, so it has none of acting either.

But what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself,[285] insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, we certainly understand nothing but that a man, because he imagined the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So habitation, insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing but this singular appetite, which is really an efficient cause, which is considered as first because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites. For they are, as I have often said, conscious of their actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to want something. As for what they commonly say, that nature sometimes fails or errs and produces imperfect things, I number this among the fictions which I treated in the Appendix of Part I [p. 101].

Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are in truth only modes of thinking, namely notions which we are accustomed to feign from the fact that we compare individuals of the same species or genus with one another. And for this reason I said above (Def. 6 of Part II [p. 123]) that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing; for we are accustomed to refer all the individuals of nature to one genus, which is called the most general, namely to the notion of being,[286] which pertains absolutely to all the individuals of nature. Insofar, therefore, as we refer the individuals of nature to this genus, and compare them with one another, and find that some have more being, or reality, than others, to that extent we say that some are more perfect than others; and insofar as we attribute to them something which involves negation, such as limit, end, lack of power, etc., to that extent we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind as much as those which we call perfect, and not because they lack something which is theirs, or because nature has erred. For nothing belongs to the nature of any thing except what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause; and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily happens.

As for good and evil, they too indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from the fact that we compare things with one another. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who mourns, and neither good nor bad for one who is deaf. But although this is so, we must nevertheless retain these words.

For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to,[287] it will be useful to us to retain these same words in the sense I have indicated. By good,

[285] So Def. 7 [p. 357]: 'by the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite.' The final cause is not abolished in human action but reinterpreted as an efficient cause mistaken for a first one, because its own causes are unknown.

[286] Aristotle had denied that being is a genus: 'οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἓν εἶναι γένος οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὄν' ('it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things', *Metaphysics* B.3, 998b20–22). Spinoza is not taking a side in that dispute; he describes a habit of thought, the comparison of all things in terms of more or less being.

[287] *exemplar*: the word the previous paragraph used for the universal ideas men compare things with. The model is admitted as a useful notion, not as a form in nature. Spinoza does not mention it again; it is usually identified with the free man of Props. 67–73 [p. 443], who lives by the 'dictates of reason' of Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377], though the identification has been disputed (Appendix H [p. 686]).

seqq. intelligam id, quod certo scimus medium esse, ut ad exemplar humanae naturae, quod nobis proponimus, magis magisque accedamus; per malum autem id, quod certo scimus impedire, quominus idem exemplar referamus. Deinde homines perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus, quatenus ad hoc idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt.

Nam apprime notandum est, cum dico, aliquem a minore ad maiorem perfectionem transire, et contra, me non intelligere quod ex una essentia seu forma in aliam mutatur (equus namque ex. gr. tam destruitur, si in hominem, quam si in insectum mutetur); sed quod eius agendi potentiam, quatenus haec per ipsius naturam intelligitur, augeri vel minui concipimus. Denique per perfectionem in genere realitatem,[iy] uti dixi, intelligam, hoc est rei cuiuscumque essentiam, quatenus certo modo existit et operatur, nulla ipsius durationis habita ratione. Nam nulla res singularis potest ideo dici perfectior, quia plus temporis in existendo perseveravit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit, quandoquidem rerum essentia nullum certum et determinatum existendi tempus involvit; sed res quaecumque, sive ea perfectior sit sive minus, eadem vi, qua existere incipit, semper in existendo perseverare poterit, ita ut omnes hac in re aequales sint.

Definitiones

[G II 209] I. Per *bonum* id intelligam, quod certo scimus nobis esse utile.

II. Per *malum* autem id, quod certo scimus impedire, quominus boni alicuius simus compotes.
De his praecedentem vide praefationem sub finem.

III. Res singulares voco *contingentes, quatenus, dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus, quod earum existentiam necessario ponat, vel quod ipsam necessario secludat.*

IV. Easdem res singulares voco *possibiles, quatenus, dum ad causas, ex quibus produci debent, attendimus, nescimus, an ipsae determinatae sint ad easdem producendum.*
In schol. 1. prop. 33. P. 1. inter possibile et contingens nullam feci differentiam, quia ibi non opus erat haec accurate distinguere.

V. Per *contrarios affectus* in seqq. intelligam eos, qui hominem diversum trahunt, quamvis eiusdem

[iy] Denique per perfectionem in genere realitatem] *transcr.* Deinde perperfectionem in genere realitatem. The 1677 edition (OP p. 164), Gebhardt (G II 209) and Bartuschat read 'Denique per perfectionem'; the transcription has 'Deinde perperfectionem'.

therefore, I shall understand in what follows that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which we set before ourselves; by evil, that which we certainly know prevents us from resembling that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or more imperfect insofar as they come nearer to or are further from this same model.

For it should be especially noted that when I say that someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, and the contrary, I do not understand that he is changed from one essence, or form, into another (for a horse, for example, is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if into an insect); but that we conceive his power of acting, insofar as it is understood through his nature, to be increased or diminished.[288] Finally, by perfection in general I shall understand reality, as I have said, that is, the essence of any thing insofar as it exists and operates in a certain way, without any regard to its duration. For no singular thing can be called more perfect because it has persevered in existing for a longer time; for the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing; but any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist, so that in this respect all are equal.

Cited in 4D2 [p. 355], 4P39D [p. 405], 4P59D2 [p. 429], 4P65D [p. 435]

Definitions

I. By *good* I shall understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us.[289]

Cited in 4P8D [p. 367], 4P26D [p. 385], 4P28D [p. 387]

II. By *evil*, however, that which we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good.

On these, see the preceding Preface [p. 351] towards the end.

Cited in 4P8D [p. 367]

III. I call singular things *contingent* insofar as, when we attend only to their essence, we find nothing which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it.

Cited in 4P12D [p. 371], 4P13D [p. 371]

IV. I call the same singular things *possible* insofar as, when we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether these are determined to produce them.

In Schol. 1 of Prop. 33 of Part I [p. 87] I made no difference between the possible and the contingent, because there was no need there to distinguish them accurately.[290]

Cited in 4P12D [p. 371]

V. By *contrary affects* I shall understand in what follows those which draw a man in different

[288] Becoming more perfect is not becoming something else but being more fully what one is. This is the passage to greater perfection that defines joy (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]; Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]).

[289] *certo scimus*: the definitions of Part IV are given from the standpoint of reason, as the Preface explained. In Part III, Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 283] good was whatever each judged good from his own affect.

[290] There a thing was called contingent 'only on account of a defect of our knowledge'. The distinction now drawn locates the defect: contingency concerns what we know of a thing's essence, possibility what we know of its causes. Both remain relative to our knowledge; the difference matters for the strength of the affects (Props. 11–13 [p. 369]).

sint generis, ut luxuries et avaritia, quae amoris sunt species; nec natura, sed per accidens sunt contrarii.

[G II 210] VI. Quid per *affectum erga rem futuram, praesentem* et *praeteritam* intelligam, explicui in schol. 1. et 2. prop. 18. P. 3., quod vide.

Sed venit hic praeterea notandum, quod ut loci, sic etiam temporis, distantiam non nisi usque ad certum quendam limitem possumus distincte imaginari, hoc est, sicut omnia illa obiecta, quae ultra ducentos pedes a nobis distant, seu quorum distantia a loco, in quo sumus, illam superat, quam distincte imaginamur, aeque longe[iz] a nobis distare, et perinde ac si in eodem plano essent, imaginari solemus; sic etiam obiecta, quorum existendi tempus longiore a praesenti intervallo abesse imaginamur, quam quod distincte imaginari solemus, omnia aeque longe a praesenti distare imaginamur et ad unum quasi temporis momentum referimus.

VII. Per *finem, cuius causa aliquid facimus, appetitum intelligo.*

VIII. Per *virtutem* et *potentiam* idem intelligo, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) virtus, quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus potestatem habet quaedam efficiendi, quae per solas ipsius naturae leges possunt intelligi.

Axioma

Axiomata

[G II 210] Nulla res singularis in rerum natura datur, qua potentior et fortior non detur alia. Sed quacumque data datur alia potentior, a qua illa data potest destrui.

[iz] The 1677 edition (OP p. 166) has *aequè a nobis distare*; the Dutch version has *even verre van ons af te zijn*. Leopold rightly asks for *aequè longè*, as in the second half of the sentence; W. Meijer and Appuhn insert *longe*, and Gebhardt (G II 210; Textgestaltung II 377) prints it.

directions, even though they are of the same genus, like gluttony and greed, which are species of love; and they are contrary not by nature but accidentally.

VI. What I understand by an *affect towards a future, present and past thing* I have explained in Schols. 1 [p. 257] and 2 of Prop. 18 of Part III [p. 259], which see.

But it should be noted here besides that, as with distance of place, so also with distance of time, we can imagine distinctly only up to a certain limit; that is, just as we usually imagine all those objects which are more than two hundred feet away from us, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we imagine distinctly, to be equally far from us, and as if they were in the same plane, so also we imagine all objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by a longer interval than we usually imagine distinctly to be equally far from the present, and we refer them as it were to one moment of time.

Cited in 4P10S [p. 369]

VII. By the *end for the sake of which we do something* I understand appetite.

VIII. By *virtue* and *power* I understand the same thing;[291] that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.

Cited in 4P18S [p. 377], 4P20D [p. 381], 4P22D [p. 383], 4P23D [p. 383], 4P24D [p. 383], 4P35C2 [p. 395], 4P56D [p. 421], 5P25D [p. 505], 5P42D [p. 523]

Axiom

Axioms

There is no singular thing in the nature of things than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. But given any one, there is another more powerful by which the given one can be destroyed.[292]

Cited in 4P3D [p. 361], 4P7D [p. 365], 5P37S [p. 517]

[291] The definition gives *virtus* its root sense of strength or efficacy, the sense it had in Part I, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 43], Part II, Prop. 1, Schol. [p. 125] and the Preface to Part III [p. 229] ('its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same'), and which Part III, Prop. 55, Cor. 2, Dem. [p. 303] stated outright ('power of acting, or (which is the same) virtue'); it joins it to the doctrine that a thing's power is its actual essence (Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243]). Virtue is acting from the laws of one's own nature, that is, being the adequate cause of what one does; hence the more each seeks his own advantage, the more virtue he has (Prop. 20 [p. 381]).

[292] Part IV has a single axiom, but it seems once to have had more. The 1677 edition cites 'Axiom. 1. hujus' in Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 365] and 'Axiom. 3. hujus' in Prop. 31, Dem. [p. 389], and corrects both to 'Axioma hujus' in its errata, which the Dutch version follows. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 377, 380) concludes that Spinoza first wrote at least three axioms and struck the others before the Dutch translation was made; the third, cited in Prop. 31, must have said that what is indifferent does not by its nature serve the preservation of our nature.

Propositiones

Propositio I

[G II 211] *Nihil, quod idea falsa positivum habet, tollitur praesentia veri, quatenus verum.*

Demonstratio. Falsitas in sola privatione cognitionis, quam ideae inadaequatae involvunt, consistit (per prop. 35. P. 2.), nec ipsae aliquid habent positivum, propter quod falsae dicuntur (per prop. 33. P. 2.); sed contra, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt (per prop. 32. P. 2.). Si igitur id quod idea falsa positivum habet, praesentia veri, quatenus verum est, tolleretur, tolleretur ergo idea vera a se ipsa, quod (per prop. 4. P. 3.) est absurdum. Ergo nihil, quod idea etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Intelligitur haec propositio clarius ex coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2. Nam imaginatio idea est, quae magis[ja] corporis humani praesentem constitutionem, quam corporis externi naturam indicat, non quidem distincte, sed confuse; unde fit, ut mens errare dicatur. Ex. gr. cum solem intuemur, eundem ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur; in quo tamdiu fallimur, quamdiu veram eius distantiam ignoramus; sed cognita eiusdem distantia[jb] tollitur quidem error, sed non imaginatio, hoc est, idea solis, quae eiusdem naturam eatenus tantum explicat, quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur; adeoque quamvis veram eiusdem distantiam noscamus, ipsum nihilominus prope nobis adesse imaginabimur.

Nam ut in schol. prop. 35. P. 2. diximus, non ea de causa solem adeo propinquum imaginamur, quia eius veram distantiam ignoramus, sed quia mens eatenus magnitudinem solis concipit, quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur. Sic cum solis radii aquae superficiei incidentes ad nostros oculos reflectuntur, eundem perinde, ac si in aqua esset, imaginamur; tametsi verum eius locum noverimus. Et sic reliquae imaginationes, quibus mens fallitur, sive eae naturalem corporis constitutionem, sive quod eiusdem agendi potentiam augeri vel minui indicant, vero non sunt contrariae, nec eiusdem praesentia evanescunt. Fit quidem, cum falso aliquod malum timemus, ut timor evanescat audito vero nuntio; sed contra etiam fit, cum malum quod certe venturum est, timemus, ut timor etiam evanescat audito falso nuntio. Atque adeo imaginationes non praesentia veri, quatenus verum, evanescunt; sed quia aliae occurrunt iis fortiores, quae rerum, quas imaginamur, praesentem existentiam secludunt, ut prop. 17. P. 2. ostendimus.

[ja] Nam imaginatio idea est, quae magis] *transcr.* Nam imaginatio idea, est quae magis. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 211).

[jb] quamdiu veram eius distantiam ignoramus; sed cognita eiusdem distantia] *transcr.* quamdiu veram eius distantiam ignoramus. Cognita eiusdem distantia. The 1677 edition (OP p. 167), Gebhardt (G II 211) and Bartuschat read 'ignoramus; sed cognita'; the transcription omits 'sed' and begins a new sentence.

Propositions

Proposition I

Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true.
Cited in 4P14D [p. 373]

Demonstration. Falsity consists only in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (by Prop. 35 of Part II [p. 179]), nor do they have anything positive on account of which they are called false (by Prop. 33 of Part II [p. 179]); on the contrary, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by Prop. 32 of Part II [p. 179]). If, therefore, what a false idea has that is positive were removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, a true idea would be removed by itself, which (by Prop. 4 of Part III [p. 241]) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive which a false idea, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This Proposition is understood more clearly from Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]. For an imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external body, not distinctly, indeed, but confusedly; from which it comes about that the mind is said to err. For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us; in which we are deceived as long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is known, the error is indeed removed, but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only insofar as the body is affected by it; and so, although we know its true distance, we shall nevertheless imagine it as near us.

For as we said in the Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part II [p. 181], we do not imagine the sun so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the size of the sun insofar as the body is affected by it. So when the rays of the sun, falling on the surface of water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine it as if it were in the water, even though we know its true place. And so the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or that its power of acting is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the true, nor do they vanish by its presence. It does indeed happen, when we falsely fear some evil, that the fear vanishes on hearing true news;[293] but on the contrary it also happens, when we fear an evil which is certainly going to come, that the fear also vanishes on hearing false news. And so imaginations do not vanish by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true, but because others occur which are stronger than them and exclude the present existence of the things we imagine,[294] as we showed in Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161].

[293] *timor*, here in its ordinary sense, is rendered 'fear', as in a few other places of Part IV (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]; Prop. 63, Dem. [p. 433]; Prop. 63, Cor., Schol. [p. 433]); as the name of the affect defined in Part III, Def. Aff. 39 [p. 335] it is 'timidity', which Part III, Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 283] calls 'nothing but fear' of a certain kind. 'Fear' otherwise renders *metus* (Def. Aff. 13 [p. 323]).

[294] The principle of Part IV: truth as such does not dislodge an imagination or an affect; only a stronger contrary one does (Prop. 7 [p. 365]), and true knowledge can restrain an affect only insofar as it is itself considered as an affect (Prop. 14 [p. 373]). Part V asks what affects arise from knowledge and how strong they can be.

Propositio II

[G II 212] *Nos eatenus patimur, quatenus naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis non potest concipi.*

Demonstratio. Nos tum pati dicimur, cum aliquid in nobis oritur, cuius non nisi partialis sumus causa (per defin. 2. P. 3.), hoc est (per defin. 1. P. 3.) aliquid, quod ex solis legibus nostrae naturae deduci nequit. Patimur igitur, quatenus naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis nequit concipi. Q. E. D.

Propositio III

Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.

Demonstratio. Patet ex axiom. huius.[jc] Nam dato homine datur aliquid aliud, puta A potentius, et dato A datur deinde aliud, puta B, ipso A potentius et hoc in infinitum. Ac proinde potentia hominis potentia alterius rei definitur, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur. Q. E. D.

Propositio IV

Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adaequata sit causa.

[G II 213] Demonstratio. Potentia, qua res singulares, et consequenter homo suum esse conservat, est ipsa Dei sive naturae potentia (per coroll. prop. 24. P. 1.[jd]), non quatenus infinita est, sed quatenus per humanam actualem essentiam explicari potest (per prop. 7. P. 3.). Potentia itaque hominis, quatenus per ipsius actualem essentiam explicatur, pars est infinitae Dei seu naturae potentiae, hoc est (per prop. 34. P. 1.), essentiae. Quod erat primum.

Deinde si fieri posset,[je] ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes,[jf] nisi quae per solam ipsius hominis naturam possint intelligi, sequeretur (per prop. 4. et 6. P. 3.) ut non posset perire, sed ut semper necessario existeret. Atque hoc sequi deberet ex causa, cuius potentia finita aut infinita sit, nempe

[jc] Patet ex axiom. huius.] *transcr.* Patet ex axiom. huius partis. Gebhardt (G II 212) reads 'Patet ex Axiomate hujus', without 'partis'.

[jd] The 1677 edition (OP p. 169) has *p. 2.*, and so the Dutch; Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) reads *p. 1.* with Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder, Sigwart and Van Vloten–Land.

[je] The 1677 edition (OP p. 169) has *possit* throughout this sentence (*si fieri possit … nullas possit pati … ut non possit perire*) and *si fieri potest* in the sentence beginning *Ergo*; Van Vloten–Land correct to *posset*, as the unreal condition requires, and Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) follows.

[jf] Deinde si fieri posset, ut homo nullas posset pati mutationes] *transcr.* Deinde si fieri posset, ut homo nullas possit pati mutationes. Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) reads 'posset' here, as in the rest of the sentence, after Van Vloten–Land's correction of the 1677 'possit' to the irrealis; the transcription keeps one 'possit'.

Proposition II

We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others.

Demonstration. We are said to be acted on when something arises in us of which we are only a partial cause (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]), that is (by Def. 1 of Part III [p. 231]), something which cannot be deduced from the laws of our nature alone. We are acted on, therefore, insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others. Q.E.D.

Proposition III

The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

Cited in 4P4D [p. 361], 4P6D [p. 365], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P43D [p. 409], 4P69D [p. 445]

Demonstration. This is evident from the Axiom of this Part [p. 357]. For given a man, there is something else, say A, more powerful; and given A, there is then something else, say B, more powerful than A; and so to infinity. And therefore the power of a man is defined by the power of another thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.

Proposition IV

It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

Cited in 4P68S [p. 443]

Demonstration. The power by which singular things, and consequently man, preserve their being is the very power of God, or nature[295] (by Cor. of Prop. 24 of Part I [p. 77]), not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the actual essence of man (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]). The power of man, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God, or nature, that is (by Prop. 34 of Part I [p. 91]), of his essence. This was the first point.

Next, if it could happen that a man could undergo no changes except those which can be understood through the nature of man himself alone, it would follow (by Props. 4 [p. 241] and 6 of Part III [p. 243]) that he could not perish, but that he would always necessarily exist. And

[295] *Dei sive naturae*: with the two instances in the Preface [p. 351], the only places where the phrase occurs in the *Ethics*.

vel ex sola hominis potentia, qui scilicet potis esset, ut a se removeret reliquas mutationes, quae a causis externis oriri possent; vel infinita naturae potentia, a qua omnia singularia ita dirigerentur, ut homo nullas alias posset pati mutationes, nisi quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt. At primum (per prop. praeced. cuius demonstratio universalis est et ad omnes res singulares applicari potest) est absurdum.

Ergo si fieri posset, ut homo nullas pateretur mutationes, nisi quae per solam ipsius hominis naturam possent intelligi, et consequenter (sicut iam ostendimus) ut semper necessario existeret, id sequi deberet ex Dei infinita potentia; et consequenter (per prop. 16. P. 1.) ex necessitate divinae naturae, quatenus alicuius hominis idea affectus consideratur, totius naturae ordo, quatenus ipsa sub extensionis et cogitationis attributis concipitur, deduci deberet. Atque adeo (per prop. 21. P. 1.[jg]) sequeretur, ut homo esset infinitus, quod (per primam partem huius demonstrationis) est absurdum. Fieri itaque nequit, ut homo nullas alias patiatur mutationes, nisi quarum ipse adaequata sit causa. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, hominem necessario passionibus esse semper obnoxium, communemque naturae ordinem sequi et eidem parere, seseque eidem, quantum rerum natura exigit, accommodare.

Propositio V

[G II 214] *Vis et incrementum cuiuscumque passionis, eiusque in existendo perseverantia non definitur potentia, qua nos in existendo perseverare conamur, sed causae externae potentia cum nostra comparata.*

Demonstratio. Passionis essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam explicari (per defin. 1. et 2. P. 3.), hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), passionis potentia definiri nequit potentia, qua in nostro esse perseverare conamur; sed (ut prop. 16. P. 2. ostensum est) definiri necessario debet potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata. Q. E. D.

[jg] The 1677 edition (OP p. 169) has *p. 2.*, and so the Dutch; Gebhardt (G II 213; Textgestaltung II 377) reads *p. 1.* with Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land.

this would have to follow from a cause whose power is finite or infinite: namely, either from the power of man alone, who would then be able to remove from himself the other changes which could arise from external causes; or from the infinite power of nature, by which all singular things would be so directed that a man could undergo no other changes except those which serve his preservation. But the first (by the preceding Prop. [p. 361], whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things) is absurd.
Therefore if it could happen that a man underwent no changes except those which could be understood through the nature of man himself alone, and consequently (as we have just shown) that he always necessarily existed, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God; and consequently (by Prop. 16 of Part I [p. 65]) the order of the whole of nature, insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of extension and thought, would have to be deduced from the necessity of the divine nature insofar as it is considered as affected by the idea of some man.[296] And so (by Prop. 21 of Part I [p. 73]) it would follow that the man was infinite, which (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. It cannot happen, therefore, that a man should undergo no other changes except those of which he himself is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that man is necessarily always subject to passions, and that he follows the common order of nature and obeys it, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.[297]

Cited in 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Proposition V

The force and increase of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

Cited in 4P6D [p. 365], 4P7D [p. 365], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P43D [p. 409], 4P69D [p. 445], 5P8D [p. 481], 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (by Defs. 1 [p. 231] and 2 of Part III [p. 231]), that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in our being; but (as was shown in Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]) it must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.

[296] A man exempt from every harmful change would need either a power of his own able to repel all external causes, which Prop. 3 [p. 361] excludes, or a nature whose whole order was deduced from the idea of this one man. But what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is infinite (Part I, Prop. 21 [p. 73]), so the man would be infinite, against the first part of the demonstration.

[297] The thought returns in the last chapter of the Appendix to this Part (ch. 32 [p. 459]): we shall bear calmly what happens against our advantage if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that our power could not have reached so far as to avoid it, 'nosque partem totius naturae esse, cuius ordinem sequimur' ('and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow').

Propositio VI

Vis alicuius passionis seu affectus reliquas hominis actiones seu potentiam superare potest, ita ut affectus pertinaciter homini adhaereat.

Demonstratio. Vis et incrementum cuiuscumque passionis eiusque in existendo perseverantia definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata (per prop. praec.); adeoque (per prop. 3. huius) hominis potentiam superare potest etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio VII

Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest,[jh] *nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectu coercendo.*

Demonstratio. Affectus, quatenus ad mentem refertur, est idea qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat (per gener. aff. defin. quae reperitur sub finem P. 3.). Cum igitur mens aliquo affectu conflictatur, corpus afficitur simul affectione, qua eius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur.

Porro haec corporis affectio (per prop. 5. huius) vim a sua causa accipit perseverandi in suo esse; quae proinde nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi a causa corporea (per prop. 6. P. 2.), quae corpus afficiat affectione illi contraria (per prop. 5. P. 3.) et fortiore (per axiom. huius).[ji] Atque adeo (per prop. 12. P. 2.) mens afficitur idea affectionis fortioris[jj] et contrariae priori, hoc est (per gener. aff. defin.) mens afficietur affectu fortiori et contrario priori, qui scilicet prioris existentiam secludet vel tollet; ac proinde affectus nec tolli nec coerceri potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem. Q. E. D.

[G II 215] Corollarium. Affectus, quatenus ad mentem refertur, nec coerceri nec tolli potest nisi per ideam corporis affectionis contrariae et fortioris affectione, qua patimur. Nam affectus, quo patimur, nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum eodem fortiorem eique contrarium (per prop. praec.), hoc est (per gener. aff. defin.), nisi per ideam corporis affectionis fortioris[jk] et

[jh] The 1677 edition (OP p. 170) has *Affectus coërceri, nec tolli potest*; the editions since Paulus correct to *nec coerceri, nec tolli*, and Gebhardt (G II 214; Textgestaltung II 377) follows. Only Van Vloten–Land keep the 1677 text.

[ji] The 1677 edition (OP p. 171) has *per Axiom. 1. hujus*, corrected to *per Axioma hujus* in its errata, which the Dutch follows. Gebhardt (G II 215; Textgestaltung II 377) prints the corrected reference but takes the numeral as evidence that Part IV once had several axioms (see the note on the Axiom).

[jj] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 171). The Dutch has *zal aangedaan worden* ('will be affected'), and Leopold, followed by Appuhn and Gebhardt (G II 215; Textgestaltung II 377), reads *afficietur*, in line with the following *afficietur*, *secludet* and *tollet*.

[jk] The errata of the 1677 edition (*Sphalmata corrigenda*) change *affectionis* to *affectione*; the Dutch translates the uncorrected text. Gebhardt (G II 215; Textgestaltung II 377–378) keeps *affectionis*, as Van Vloten–Land and Appuhn do without comment: with *affectione*, *contrariae* would have nothing to agree with, and the Demonstration (*idea affectionis fortioris et contrariae priori*) confirms the text.

Proposition VI

The force of some passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man.[298]

Cited in 4P37S2 [p. 401], 4P43D [p. 409], 4P44D [p. 409], 4P60D [p. 429], 5P7D [p. 481]

Demonstration. The force and increase of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by the preceding Prop. [p. 363]); and so (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 361]) it can surpass the power of a man, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition VII

An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained.[299]

Cited in 4P7C [p. 365], 4P14D [p. 373], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P37S2 [p. 401], 4P69D [p. 445]

Demonstration. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, is an idea by which the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339], which is found at the end of Part III). When, therefore, the mind is troubled by some affect, the body is at the same time affected with an affection by which its power of acting is increased or diminished.

Further, this affection of the body (by Prop. 5 of this Part [p. 363]) receives from its cause the force of persevering in its being; which, therefore, can be neither restrained nor removed except by a corporeal cause (by Prop. 6 of Part II [p. 129]) which affects the body with an affection contrary to it (by Prop. 5 of Part III [p. 243]) and stronger (by the Axiom of this Part [p. 357]). And so (by Prop. 12 of Part II [p. 141]) the mind is affected by the idea of an affection stronger than and contrary to the former, that is (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]), the mind will be affected by an affect stronger than and contrary to the former, which will exclude or remove the existence of the former; and accordingly an affect can be neither removed nor restrained except by a contrary and stronger affect. Q.E.D.

Corollary. An affect, insofar as it is related to the mind, can be neither restrained nor removed except by the idea of an affection of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the affection by which we are acted on. For an affect by which we are acted on can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect stronger than it and contrary to it (by the preceding Prop. [p. 365]),

[298] Prop. 44, Schol. [p. 409] uses the same words of the man 'to whom one and the same affect stubbornly clings' (*quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhaereat*): the lover, the miser and the ambitious man, whose greed, ambition and lust are 'species of madness, although they are not numbered among diseases'.

[299] Descartes had written: 'Nos passions ne peuvent pas aussi directement estre excitées ni ostées par l'action de nostre volonté, mais elles peuvent l'estre indirectement par la représentation des choses qui ont coutume d'estre jointes avec les passions que nous voulons avoir, et qui sont contraires à celles que nous voulons rejeter' ('Our passions cannot be directly excited or removed by the action of our will either, but they can be indirectly, by the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we want to have and which are contrary to those we want to reject', *Passions of the Soul*, art. 45, AT XI 362–363). Spinoza keeps the indirectness and drops the will: the contrary representation does its work not because it is chosen but because it is itself a stronger affect. His criticism of Descartes' account of the mind's power over the passions is in the Preface to Part V [p. 469].

contrariae affectioni, qua patimur.

Propositio VIII

Cognitio boni et mali nihil aliud est, quam laetitiae vel tristitiae affectus, quatenus eius sumus conscii.

Demonstratio. Id bonum aut malum vocamus, quod nostro esse conservando prodest vel obest (per defin. 1. et 2. huius), hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet. Quatenus itaque (per defin. laetitiae et tristitiae, quas vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) rem aliquam nos laetitia vel tristitia afficere percipimus, eandem bonam aut malam vocamus; atque adeo boni et mali cognitio nihil aliud est, quam laetitiae[jl] vel tristitiae idea, quae ex ipso laetitiae vel tristitiae affectu necessario sequitur (per prop. 22. P. 2.).

At haec idea eodem modo unita est affectui, ac mens unita est corpori (per prop. 21. P. 2.), hoc est (ut in schol. eiusdem prop. ostensum), haec idea ab ipso affectu, sive (per gener. aff. defin.) ab idea corporis affectionis revera non distinguitur nisi solo conceptu. Ergo haec cognitio boni et mali nihil est aliud, quam ipse affectus, quatenus eiusdem sumus conscii. Q. E. D.

Propositio IX

[G II 216] *Affectus, cuius causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur.*

Demonstratio. Imaginatio est idea, qua mens rem ut praesentem contemplatur (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), quae tamen magis corporis humani constitutionem, quam rei externae naturam indicat (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.). Est igitur affectus (per gener. aff. defin.) imaginatio, quatenus corporis constitutionem indicat. At imaginatio (per prop. 17. P. 2.) intensior est, quamdiu nihil imaginamur, quod rei externae praesentem existentiam secludit. Ergo etiam affectus, cuius causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, intensior seu fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Cum supra in prop. 18. P. 3. dixerim, nos ex rei futurae vel praeteritae imagine eodem affectu affici, ac si res, quam imaginamur, praesens esset, expresse monui, id verum esse,

[jl] nihil aliud est, quam laetitiae] *transcr.* nihil aliud, est quam laetitiae. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 215).

that is (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]), except by the idea of an affection of the body stronger than and contrary to the affection by which we are acted on.

Proposition VIII

The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.[300]

Cited in 4P14D [p. 373], 4P15D [p. 373], 4P19D [p. 379], 4P29D [p. 389], 4P30D [p. 389], 4P63CD [p. 433], 4P64D [p. 433]

Demonstration. We call good or evil what is of use or hindrance to preserving our being (by Defs. 1 [p. 355] and 2 of this Part [p. 355]), that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Insofar, therefore, as we perceive that some thing affects us with joy or sadness (by the definitions of joy and sadness, which see in Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]), we call it good or evil; and so the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the idea of joy or sadness which necessarily follows from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by Prop. 22 of Part II [p. 169]).
But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body (by Prop. 21 of Part II [p. 167]), that is (as was shown in the Schol. of the same Prop. [p. 167]), this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]) from the idea of the affection of the body, except by concept alone. Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. Q.E.D.

Proposition IX

An affect whose cause we imagine as now present to us is stronger than if we imagined it not to be present.

Cited in 4P10D [p. 369], 4P11D [p. 369], 4P13D [p. 371], 5P7D [p. 481]

Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates a thing as present (see its definition in Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]), but which indicates the constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]). An affect, therefore (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]), is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the constitution of the body. But an imagination (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]) is more intense as long as we imagine nothing which excludes the present existence of the external thing. Therefore an affect too, whose cause we imagine as now present to us, is more intense, or stronger, than if we imagined it not to be present. Q.E.D.

Scholium. When I said above in Prop. 18 of Part III [p. 257] that we are affected by the image of a future or past thing with the same affect as if the thing we imagine were present, I expressly

[300] To know a thing as good is to be conscious of being affected with joy by it: the knowledge is the idea of the affect, and the idea of an idea is one with its object (Part II, Props. 21–22 [p. 167]). This completes Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]: 'we strive for, will, want and desire nothing because we judge it to be good; but on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it.' Since knowledge of good and evil is itself an affect, it can be overcome as affects are (Props. 14–17 [p. 373]).

quatenus ad solam ipsius rei imaginem attendimus (est enim eiusdem naturae, sive res ut praesentes imaginati simus,[jm] sive non simus); sed non negavi eandem debiliorem reddi, quando alias res nobis praesentes contemplamur, quae rei futurae praesentem existentiam secludunt, quod tum monere neglexi, quia in hac parte de affectuum viribus agere constitueram.

Corollarium. Imago rei futurae vel praeteritae, hoc est, rei, quam cum relatione ad tempus futurum vel praeteritum secluso praesenti contemplamur, ceteris paribus debilior est imagine rei praesentis, et consequenter affectus erga rem futuram vel praeteritam, ceteris paribus remissior est affectu erga rem praesentem.

Propositio X

[G II 217] *Erga rem futuram,*[jn] *quam cito affuturam imaginamur, intensius afficimur quam si eius existendi tempus longius a praesenti distare imaginaremur; et memoria rei, quam non diu praeteriisse imaginamur, intensius etiam afficimur, quam si eandem diu praeteriisse imaginaremur.*

Demonstratio. Quatenus enim rem cito affuturam, vel non diu praeteriisse imaginamur, eo ipso aliquid imaginamur, quod rei praesentiam minus secludit, quam si eiusdem futurum existendi tempus longius a praesenti distare, vel quod dudum praeterierit, imaginaremur (ut per se notum); adeoque (per praec. prop.) eatenus intensius erga eandem afficiemur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Ex iis, quae ad defin. 6. huius partis notavimus, sequitur nos erga obiecta, quae a praesenti longiore temporis intervallo distant, quam quod imaginando determinare possumus, quamvis ab invicem longo temporis intervallo distare intelligamus, aeque tamen remisse affici.

Propositio XI

Affectus erga rem, quam ut necessariam imaginamur, ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga possibilem vel contingentem, sive non necessariam.

Demonstratio. Quatenus rem aliquam necessariam esse imaginamur, eatenus eius existentiam affirmamus, et contra rei existentiam negamus, quatenus eandem non necessariam esse imagina-

[jm] The 1677 edition (OP p. 172) has only *sive res imaginati simus, sive non simus*; the Dutch has *'t zy d'ingebeelde zaak tegenwoordig is, of niet* ('whether the imagined thing is present or not'). Gebhardt (G II 216; Textgestaltung II 378) takes the Latin to be the remains of an earlier *sive res, quam imaginamur, praesens est, sive non est*, recast without carrying over the predicate, and supplies *ut praesentes*, as Meijer had proposed from the Dutch and as Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern print. Bartuschat reads *sive rem ut praesentem*.

[jn] Erga rem futuram,] *transcr.* Erga rem futuramm,. Misprint in the transcription; the 1677 edition (OP p. 173) and Gebhardt (G II 217) read 'futuram'.

warned that this is true insofar as we attend only to the image of the thing itself (for it is of the same nature whether we have imagined things as present or not); but I did not deny that the image is made weaker when we contemplate other things present to us which exclude the present existence of the future thing, which I neglected to point out then because I had decided to treat of the strength of the affects in this Part.

Corollary. The image of a future or past thing, that is, of a thing which we contemplate with relation to future or past time, the present being excluded, is weaker, other things being equal, than the image of a present thing; and consequently an affect towards a future or past thing is less intense, other things being equal, than an affect towards a present thing.
Cited in 4P12CD [p. 371], 4P16D [p. 375], 4P60S [p. 429]

Proposition X

We are affected more intensely towards a future thing which we imagine will soon be present than if we imagined its time of existing to be further distant from the present; and we are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago than if we imagined it to have passed long ago.
Cited in 4P12CD [p. 371]

Demonstration. For insofar as we imagine that a thing will soon be present, or has passed not long ago, by that very fact we imagine something which excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined its future time of existing to be further distant from the present, or that it had passed long ago (as is self-evident); and so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 367]) to that extent we shall be affected more intensely towards it. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From what we noted on Def. 6 of this Part [p. 357] it follows that we are affected equally faintly towards objects which are distant from the present by a longer interval of time than we can determine by imagining, even though we understand them to be distant from one another by a long interval of time.

Proposition XI

An affect towards a thing which we imagine as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a thing possible or contingent, or not necessary.[301]
Cited in 5P5D [p. 479]

Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine some thing to be necessary, to that extent we affirm its existence, and on the contrary we deny a thing's existence insofar as we imagine it not to

[301] Part V turns this into a remedy: 'insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them' (Part V, Prop. 6 [p. 479]). Sadness over a lost good is eased as soon as we consider that it could not have been kept (Schol. [p. 479]).

mur (per schol. 1. prop. 33. P. 1.); ac proinde (per prop. 9. huius) affectus erga rem necessariam ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga non necessariam. Q. E. D.

Propositio XII

[G II 218] *Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut possibilem imaginamur, ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga contingentem.*

Demonstratio. Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur, quae rei existentiam ponat (per defin. 3. huius); sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quaedam imaginamur, quae eiusdem praesentem existentiam secludunt. At quatenus rem in futurum possibilem esse imaginamur, eatenus quaedam imaginamur, quae eiusdem existentiam ponunt (per defin. 4. huius),[jo] hoc est (per prop. 18. P. 3.) quae spem vel metum fovent; atque adeo affectus erga rem possibilem vehementior est. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut contingentem imaginamur, multo remissior est, quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur.

Demonstratio. Affectus erga rem, quam in praesenti existere imaginamur, intensior est, quam si eandem ut futuram imaginaremur (per coroll. prop. 9. huius), et multo vehementior est, quam si tempus futurum a praesenti multum distare imaginaremur[jp] (per prop. 10. huius). Est itaque affectus erga rem, cuius existendi tempus longe a praesenti distare imaginamur, multo remissior, quam si eandem ut praesentem imaginaremur et nihilominus (per prop. praec.) intensior est quam si eandem rem ut contingentem imaginaremur. Atque adeo affectus erga rem contingentem multo remissior erit, quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XIII

[G II 219] *Affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere, ceteris paribus remissior est, quam affectus erga rem praeteritam.*

Demonstratio. Quatenus rem ut contingentem imaginamur, nulla alterius rei imagine afficimur, quae rei existentiam ponat (per defin. 3. huius). Sed contra (secundum hypothesin) quaedam imaginamur, quae eiusdem praesentem existentiam secludunt. Verum quatenus eandem cum relatione ad tempus praeteritum imaginamur, eatenus aliquid imaginari supponimur,

[jo] (per defin. 4. huius)] *transcr.* (per defin. 4 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 218).

[jp] The 1677 edition (OP p. 174) reads *et multo vehementior est, si tempus futurum a praesenti non multum distare imaginaremur*. The Dutch translates a text without *non* (*zo wy ons inbeelden dat de toekomende tijt verre van de tegenwoordige af is*) and adds the negation only in its list of corrections. Gebhardt (G II 218; Textgestaltung II 378–379) concludes that Spinoza's manuscript had no *non* but had lost *quam* before the second *si*: with *quam* the two conditional clauses are parallel and the next sentence (*Est itaque …*) follows from them. He prints *quam si … multum distare*, as here. The other editions, and Bartuschat, follow the 1677 edition.

be necessary (by Schol. 1 of Prop. 33 of Part I [p. 87]); and accordingly (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 367]) an affect towards a necessary thing is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a thing not necessary. Q.E.D.

Proposition XII

An affect towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a contingent thing.
Cited in 4P12CD [p. 371]

Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing which posits the thing's existence (by Def. 3 of this Part [p. 355]); on the contrary (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, to that extent we imagine certain things which posit its existence (by Def. 4 of this Part [p. 355]), that is (by Prop. 18 of Part III [p. 257]), which encourage hope or fear; and so an affect towards a possible thing is more vehement. Q.E.D.

Corollary. An affect towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as contingent, is much less intense than if we imagined the thing as now present to us.
Cited in 4P17D [p. 375]

Demonstration. An affect towards a thing which we imagine to exist at present is more intense than if we imagined it as future (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 369]), and much more vehement than if we imagined the future time to be far distant from the present (by Prop. 10 of this Part [p. 369]). The affect towards a thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is therefore much less intense than if we imagined it as present; and nevertheless (by the preceding Prop. [p. 371]) it is more intense than if we imagined the same thing as contingent. And so an affect towards a contingent thing will be much less intense than if we imagined the thing as now present to us. Q.E.D.

Proposition XIII

An affect towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present is, other things being equal, less intense than an affect towards a past thing.[302]

Demonstration. Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing which posits the thing's existence (by Def. 3 of this Part [p. 355]). On the contrary (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things which exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine it with relation to past time, to that extent we are supposed to imagine

[302] Props. 9–13 rank affects by the way their object is imagined: present over future or past, near over remote, necessary over possible, possible over contingent, past over contingent. The ranking is applied in Props. 15–17 [p. 373]: the desire that arises from knowledge of the good is weak because that knowledge mostly concerns the future (Prop. 16 [p. 375]) and contingent things (Prop. 17 [p. 375]).

quod ipsam ad memoriam redigit sive quod rei imaginem excitat (vide prop. 18. P. 2. cum eiusdem schol.), ac proinde eatenus efficit, ut ipsam ac si praesens esset contemplemur (per coroll. prop. 17. P. 2.). Atque adeo (per prop. 9. huius) affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere, ceteris paribus remissior erit, quam affectus erga rem praeteritam. Q. E. D.

Propositio XIV

Vera boni et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coercere potest; sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur.

Demonstratio. Affectus est idea, qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat (per gener. aff. defin.); atque adeo (per prop. 1. huius) nihil positivum habet, quod praesentia veri tolli possit; et consequenter vera boni et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coercere potest. At quatenus affectus est (vide prop. 8. huius), si fortior affectu coercendo sit, eatenus tantum (per prop. 7. huius) affectum coercere poterit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XV

[G II 220] *Cupiditas, quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, multis aliis cupiditatibus, quae ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur, oriuntur, restingui vel coerceri potest.*

Demonstratio. Ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec (per prop. 8. huius) affectus est, oritur necessario cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.), quae eo est maior, quo affectus, ex quo oritur, maior est (per prop. 37. P. 3.). Sed quia haec cupiditas (per hypothesin) ex eo, quod aliquid vere intelligimus, oritur, sequitur ergo ipsa in nobis, quatenus agimus (per prop. 3. P. 3.).[jq] Atque adeo per solam nostram essentiam debet intelligi (per defin. 2. P. 3.); et consequenter (per prop. 7. P. 3.) eius vis et incrementum sola humana potentia definiri debet.

Porro cupiditates, quae ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur, oriuntur,[jr] eo etiam maiores sunt, quo hi affectus vehementiores erunt; atque adeo earum vis et incrementum (per prop. 5. huius) potentia causarum externarum definiri debet, quae, si cum nostra comparetur, nostram potentiam indefinite superat (per prop. 3. huius). Atque adeo cupiditates, quae ex similibus affectibus oriuntur, vehementiores esse possunt illa, quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur; ac proinde (per prop. 7. huius) eandem coercere vel restinguere poterunt. Q. E. D.

[jq] So the 1677 edition, and the Dutch had the same. Van Vloten–Land, after Sigwart, change the reference to *Prop. 1.*, followed by Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern; Gebhardt (G II 220; Textgestaltung II 379) keeps *Prop. 3.*, whose identification of actions with adequate ideas is just what the argument needs.

[jr] quibus conflictamur, oriuntur] *transcr.* quibus conflictamur oriuntur. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 176) and Gebhardt (G II 220).

something which brings it back to memory, or which arouses the image of the thing (see Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163] with its Schol. [p. 165]), and which accordingly to that extent brings it about that we contemplate it as if it were present (by Cor. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]). And so (by Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 367]) an affect towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present will be, other things being equal, less intense than an affect towards a past thing. Q.E.D.

Proposition XIV

The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.[303]

Demonstration. An affect is an idea by which the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]); and so (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 359]) it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true; and consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]), if it is stronger than the affect to be restrained, to that extent only (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 365]) will it be able to restrain the affect. Q.E.D.

Proposition XV

A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires which arise from the affects by which we are troubled.
Cited in 4P16D [p. 375]

Demonstration. From the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]) is an affect, there necessarily arises a desire (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]), which is the greater, the greater the affect from which it arises (by Prop. 37 of Part III [p. 281]). But because this desire (by hypothesis) arises from the fact that we understand something truly, it follows in us insofar as we act (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]). And so it must be understood through our essence alone (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]); and consequently (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]) its force and increase must be defined by human power alone.
Further, the desires which arise from the affects by which we are troubled are also the greater, the more vehement these affects are; and so their force and increase (by Prop. 5 of this Part [p. 363]) must be defined by the power of external causes, which, if it is compared with ours, indefinitely surpasses our power (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 361]). And so the desires which arise from such affects can be more vehement than the one which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, and accordingly (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 365]) they will be able to restrain or extinguish it. Q.E.D.

[303] With Prop. 1 [p. 359] and Prop. 7 [p. 365]: truth as such has no force against an affect. But knowledge of good and evil is itself an affect (Prop. 8 [p. 367]), and as an affect it can be the stronger. Part V argues that 'the affects which arise from reason or are aroused by it are, if account is taken of time, more powerful than those which are related to singular things that we contemplate as absent' (Part V, Prop. 7 [p. 479]).

Propositio XVI

Cupiditas, quae ex cognitione boni et mali, quatenus haec cognitio futurum respicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate, quae in praesentia suaves sunt, coerceri vel restingui potest.

Demonstratio. Affectus erga rem, quam futuram imaginamur, remissior est, quam erga praesentem (per coroll. prop. 9. huius). At cupiditas, quae ex vera boni et mali cognitione oritur, tametsi haec cognitio circa res, quae in praesentia bonae sunt, versetur, restingui vel coerceri potest aliqua temeraria cupiditate (per prop. praeced. cuius demonstratio universalis est). Ergo cupiditas, quae ex eadem cognitione, quatenus haec futurum respicit, oritur, facilius coerceri vel restingui poterit etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XVII

[G II 221] *Cupiditas, quae oritur ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec circa res contingentes versatur, multo adhuc facilius coerceri potest cupiditate rerum, quae praesentes sunt.*

Demonstratio. Propositio haec eodem modo, ac prop. praeced. demonstratur ex coroll. prop. 12. huius.

Scholium. His me causam ostendisse credo, cur homines opinione magis, quam vera ratione commoveantur, et cur vera boni et mali cognitio animi commotiones excitet et saepe omni libidinis generi cedat. Unde illud poetae natum: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.[js] Quod idem etiam Ecclesiastes in mente habuisse videtur, cum dixit: Qui auget scientiam, auget dolorem.[jt]
Atque haec non eum in finem dico, ut inde concludam, praestabilius esse ignorare, quam scire, vel quod stulto intelligens in moderandis affectibus nihil intersit; sed ideo quia necesse est, nostrae naturae tam potentiam, quam impotentiam noscere,[ju] ut determinare possimus, quid ratio in moderandis affectibus possit et quid non possit; et in hac parte de sola humana impotentia me acturum dixi. Nam de rationis in affectus potentia separatim agere constitui.

[js] Vid. Ovid. metam. l. VII. v. 20. 21. [Bruder]
[jt] Vid. lib. Cohel. 1. 18. (cl. v. 17.) [Bruder]
[ju] The Dutch has the reverse order (*zo wel het onvermogen, als het vermogen van onze natuur*), and Leopold, followed by Baensch, Meijer (second edition), Appuhn and Halpern, would read *tam impotentiam, quam potentiam*. Gebhardt (G II 221; Textgestaltung II 379–380) keeps the 1677 order: the sentence goes on to speak first of the power (*quid ratio … possit*) and then of the lack of power (*quid non possit*).

Proposition XVI

A desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for things which are pleasant in the present.

Cited in 4P17D [p. 375], 4P62S [p. 431]

Demonstration. An affect towards a thing which we imagine as future is less intense than one towards a present thing (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of this Part [p. 369]). But a desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, even if this knowledge concerns things which are good in the present, can be extinguished or restrained by some rash desire (by the preceding Prop. [p. 373], whose demonstration is universal). Therefore a desire which arises from the same knowledge, insofar as this looks to the future, will be able to be restrained or extinguished more easily, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XVII

A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can be restrained still much more easily by a desire for things which are present.

Demonstration. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one [p. 375], from Cor. of Prop. 12 of this Part [p. 371].

Scholium. With these I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil arouses disturbances of the mind and often yields to every kind of lust. Hence the saying of the poet: *I see and approve the better, I follow the worse.*[304] Ecclesiastes too seems to have had the same thing in mind when he said: *He who increases knowledge increases pain.*[305]

I do not say these things in order to conclude from them that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or that there is no difference between a fool and a man of understanding in moderating the affects, but because it is necessary to know both the power and the lack of power of our nature, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects and what it cannot do; and I said that in this Part I would treat only of human lack of power. For I have decided to treat of the power of reason over the affects separately.[306]

Cited in 4P37S2 [p. 401]

[304] Medea in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII.20–21, already echoed in the first sentences of the Preface [p. 351] and in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235].

[305] Ecclesiastes 1:18: 'כִּי בְּרֹב חָכְמָה רָב־כָּעַס וְיוֹסִיף דַּעַת יוֹסִיף מַכְאוֹב' ('For in much wisdom is much vexation, and he who increases knowledge increases pain'). Spinoza's *dolorem* is nearer the Hebrew מַכְאוֹב ('pain') than the Vulgate's *laborem* (*qui addit scientiam, addit et laborem*). Bruder's note in the Latin also refers to the preceding verse.

[306] In Part V, *De potentia intellectus, seu de libertate humana* ('On the Power of the Intellect, or on Human Freedom'); see its Preface [p. 469].

Propositio XVIII

Cupiditas, quae ex laetitia oritur, ceteris paribus fortior est cupiditate, quae ex tristitia oritur.

Demonstratio. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia (per aff. defin. 1.) hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) conatus, quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur. Quare cupiditas, quae ex laetitia oritur, ipso laetitiae affectu (per defin. laetitiae, quam vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) iuvatur vel augetur; quae autem contra ex tristitia oritur, ipso tristitiae affectu (per idem schol.) minuitur vel coercetur. Atque adeo vis cupiditatis, quae ex laetitia oritur, potentia humana, simul et potentia causae externae, quae autem ex tristitia, sola humana potentia definiri debet; ac proinde hac illa fortior est. Q. E. D.

[G II 222] Scholium. His paucis humanae impotentiae et inconstantiae causas, et cur homines rationis praecepta non servent, explicui. Superest iam, ut ostendam, quid id sit, quod ratio[jv] nobis praescribit, et quinam affectus cum rationis humanae regulis conveniant, quinam contra iisdem contrarii sint. Sed antequam haec prolixo nostro geometrico ordine demonstrare incipiam, lubet ipsa *rationis dictamina* hic prius breviter ostendere, ut ea, quae sentio, facilius ab unoquoque percipiantur.

Cum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa, ut unusquisque seipsum amet, suum utile, quod revera utile est, quaerat, et id omne, quod hominem ad maiorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat, et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse, quantum in se est, conservare conetur. Quod quidem tam necessario verum est, quam quod totum sit sua parte maius (vide prop. 4. P. 3.).

Deinde quandoquidem virtus (per defin. 8. huius) nihil aliud est, quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere, et nemo suum esse (per prop. 7. P. 3.) conservare conetur, nisi ex propriae suae naturae legibus, hinc sequitur primo, virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum proprium esse conservandi, et felicitatem in eo consistere quod homo suum esse conservare potest. Secundo sequitur, virtutem propter se esse appetendam, nec quicquam, quod ipsa praestabilius aut quod utilius nobis sit, dari, cuius causa deberet appeti. Tertio denique sequitur, eos, qui se interficiunt, animo esse impotentes, eosque a causis externis suae naturae repugnantibus prorsus vinci.

[jv] quid id sit, quod ratio] *transcr.* quid id, sit quod ratio. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 178) and Gebhardt (G II 222).

Proposition XVIII

A desire which arises from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than a desire which arises from sadness.

Cited in 4P56S [p. 423], 4P66S [p. 437]

Demonstration. Desire is the very essence of man (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]), that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), the striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being. So a desire which arises from joy is aided or increased by the affect of joy itself (by the definition of joy, which see in Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]); but one which arises from sadness, on the contrary, is diminished or restrained by the affect of sadness itself (by the same Schol. [p. 247]). And so the force of a desire which arises from joy must be defined by human power and at the same time by the power of the external cause, whereas that of one which arises from sadness must be defined by human power alone; and accordingly the former is stronger than the latter. Q.E.D.

Scholium. With these few words I have explained the causes of human lack of power and inconstancy, and why men do not keep the precepts of reason. It remains now for me to show what it is that reason prescribes to us, and which affects agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the other hand, are contrary to them. But before I begin to demonstrate these things in our prolix geometrical order, I should like first to show briefly here the *dictates of reason* themselves,[307] so that what I think may be more easily grasped by everyone.

Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it demands, therefore, that each man love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, and want everything which really leads man to a greater perfection, and, absolutely, that each strive to preserve his own being as far as it is in him.[308] And this is indeed as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part[309] (see Prop. 4 of Part III [p. 241]).

Next, since virtue (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]) is nothing but acting from the laws of one's own nature, and no one strives to preserve his being (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]) except from the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the very striving to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in a man's being able to preserve his being. It follows, secondly, that virtue is to be wanted for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent than it, or more useful to us, for the sake of which it ought to be wanted. It follows, finally, thirdly, that those who kill themselves lack power of mind and are completely conquered by external causes opposed to their nature.[310]

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[307] *rationis dictamina*. What follows is stated informally and demonstrated in Props. 19–37 [p. 379]. Acting 'from the dictate of reason' (*ex rationis dictamine*) recurs through the rest of Part IV, down to the free man of Props. 67–73 [p. 443].

[308] Reason begins with self-love. The Stoics had also derived ethics from self-preservation: 'they say that an animal has its first impulse towards preserving itself' (Τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμὴν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό, Diogenes Laertius VII.85), and Zeno made the end 'to live in agreement with nature' (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, VII.87). For the Stoics, however, reason eventually supersedes the first impulse; for Spinoza the striving to persevere is the actual essence of a thing (Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243]), and reason only makes clear what it really requires.

[309] Euclid's common notion καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους μεῖζον ('and the whole is greater than the part', *Elements* I, Common Notion 8 in Heiberg's edition). Part III, Prop. 4 [p. 241], that nothing can be destroyed except by an external cause, has the demonstration 'This Proposition is evident through itself'.

[310] *animo esse impotentes*. Demonstrated in Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 381], which distinguishes the ways in which a man may be compelled to kill himself (among them Seneca, ordered by the tyrant to open his veins) and concludes that it is as impossible for a man to strive from the necessity of his own nature not to exist as for something to come from nothing.

Porro ex postul. 4. P. 2. sequitur, nos efficere nunquam posse, ut nihil extra nos indigeamus ad nostrum esse conservandum, et ut ita vivamus, ut nullum commercium cum rebus quae extra nos sunt, habeamus; et si praeterea nostram mentem spectemus, sane noster intellectus imperfectior esset, si mens sola esset, nec quicquam praeter se ipsam intelligeret. Multa igitur extra nos dantur, quae nobis utilia quaeque propterea appetenda sunt. Ex his nulla praestantiora excogitari possunt, quam ea quae cum nostra natura prorsus conveniunt.

Si enim duo ex. gr. eiusdem prorsus naturae individua invicem iunguntur, individuum componunt singulo duplo potentius. Homini igitur nihil homine utilius; nihil, inquam, homines praestantius ad suum esse conservandum optare possunt, quam quod omnes in omnibus ita conveniant, ut omnium mentes et corpora unam quasi mentem, unumque corpus componant, et omnes simul, quantum possunt, suum esse conservare conentur, omnesque simul omnium commune utile sibi quaerant.

Ex quibus sequitur, homines, qui ratione gubernantur, hoc est, homines qui ex ductu rationis suum utile quaerunt, nihil sibi appetere, quod reliquis hominibus non cupiant, atque adeo eosdem iustos, fidos atque honestos esse.

[G II 223] Haec illa rationis dictamina sunt, quae hic paucis ostendere proposueram, antequam eadem prolixiore ordine demonstrare inciperem, quod ea de causa feci, ut, si fieri posset, eorum attentionem mihi conciliarem, qui credunt, hoc principium, quod scilicet unusquisque suum utile quaerere tenetur, impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis esse fundamentum. Postquam igitur rem sese contra habere breviter ostenderim, pergo ad eandem eadem via, qua hucusque progressi sumus, demonstrandum.

Propositio XIX

Id unusquisque ex legibus suae naturae necessario appetit vel aversatur, quod bonum vel malum esse iudicat.

Demonstratio. Boni et mali cognitio est (per prop. 8. huius) ipse laetitiae vel tristitiae affectus quatenus eiusdem sumus conscii; ac proinde (per prop. 28. P. 3.) id unusquisque necessario appetit, quod bonum, et contra id aversatur, quod malum esse iudicat. Sed hic appetitus nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia seu natura (per defin. appetitus, quam vide in schol. prop. 9. P. 3. et aff. defin. 1.). Ergo unusquisque ex solis suae naturae legibus id necessario appetit vel aversatur etc. Q. E. D.

Further, from Post. 4 of Part II [p. 157] it follows that we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being, or that we live without any commerce with things which are outside us; and if, moreover, we consider our mind, our intellect would certainly be less perfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing except itself. There are, therefore, many things outside us which are useful to us, and which are therefore to be wanted. Of these none more excellent can be thought of than those which agree entirely with our nature.
For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one.[311] To man, therefore, nothing is more useful than man;[312] nothing, I say, can men wish for that is more excellent for preserving their being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should strive, as far as they can, to preserve their being, and that all together should seek for themselves the common advantage of all.
From this it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who seek their own advantage from the guidance of reason, want nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men, and so are just, faithful and honourable.[313]

These are those dictates of reason which I had proposed to show here in a few words before beginning to demonstrate them in a more prolix order, which I did in order to win, if possible, the attention of those who believe that this principle, that each is bound to seek his own advantage, is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety.[314] Having, therefore, shown briefly that the matter is the other way round, I go on to demonstrate it by the same way by which we have proceeded so far.

Cited in 4P37S1 [p. 399]

Proposition XIX

Each one, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily wants or is averse to what he judges to be good or evil.

Cited in 4P35D [p. 393], 4P37D [p. 397], 4P37S2 [p. 401], 4P46D [p. 413], 4P59D2 [p. 429]

Demonstration. The knowledge of good and evil is (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]) the affect of joy or sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it; and accordingly (by Prop. 28 of Part III [p. 269]) each one necessarily wants what he judges to be good, and on the contrary is averse to what he judges to be evil. But this appetite is nothing but the very essence, or nature, of man (by the definition of appetite, which see in Schol. of Prop. 9 of Part III [p. 245], and Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]). Therefore each one, from the laws of his own nature alone, necessarily wants or is averse to, etc. Q.E.D.

[311] On individuals composed of several bodies, see the definition [p. 153] and Lemmas 4–7 of the physical digression after Part II, Prop. 13; on agreement in nature, Props. 29–35 [p. 387].
[312] *Homini ... nihil homine utilius*. Demonstrated in Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395] for the man who lives by the guidance of reason; the Scholium there cites the common saying that 'man is a God to man'.
[313] Demonstrated in Prop. 37 [p. 397]: the good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men. Honourableness (*honestas*) is defined in its first Scholium [p. 399], justice in the second [p. 401].
[314] *impietatis, non autem virtutis et pietatis*. *Pietas* is defined in Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399] as 'the desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason', and is rendered 'piety' throughout (as in Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 217]); the Latin opposes it directly to the charge of *impietas*.

Propositio XX

[G II 224] *Quo magis unusquisque suum utile quaerere, hoc est, suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute praeditus est; et contra, quatenus unusquisque suum utile, hoc est, suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens.*

Demonstratio. Virtus est ipsa humana potentia, quae sola hominis essentia definitur (per defin. 8. huius), hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), quae solo conatu, quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, definitur. Quo ergo unusquisque magis suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute praeditus est, et consequenter[jw] (per prop. 4. et 6. P. 3.), quatenus aliquis suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Nemo igitur nisi a causis externis et suae naturae contrariis victus suum utile appetere sive suum esse conservare negligit. Nemo, inquam, ex necessitate suae naturae, sed a causis externis coactus alimenta aversatur vel se ipsum interficit, quod multis modis fieri potest.

Nempe interficit aliquis se ipsum coactus ab alio, qui eius dexteram, qua ensem casu prehenderat, contorquet et cogit versus cor ipsum gladium dirigere; vel quod ex mandato tyranni, ut Seneca, cogatur venas aperire suas, hoc est maius malum minore vitare cupiat; vel denique ex eo, quod causae latentes externae eius imaginationem ita disponunt et corpus ita afficiunt, ut id aliam naturam priori contrariam induat et cuius idea in mente dari nequit (per prop. 10. P. 3.). At quod homo ex necessitate suae naturae conetur non existere vel in aliam formam mutari, tam est impossibile, quam quod ex nihilo aliquid fiat, ut unusquisque mediocri meditatione videre potest.

Propositio XXI

[G II 225] *Nemo potest cupere beatum esse,*[jx] *bene agere et bene vivere, qui simul non cupiat esse, agere et vivere, hoc est, actu existere.*[jy]

Demonstratio. Huius propositionis demonstratio seu potius res ipsa per se patet, et etiam ex cupiditatis definitione.[jz] Est enim cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.) beate seu bene vivendi, agendi etc. ipsa hominis essentia, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.), conatus, quo unusquisque suum esse conservare

[jw] eo magis virtute praeditus est, et consequenter] *transcr.* eo magis virtute praeditus, est et consequenter. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 224).
[jx] Gfroerer corrects to *beatus esse*; Land rightly points out that the incongruity is Spinoza's usage (compare *cupio me esse clementem*), and Gebhardt (G II 225; Textgestaltung II 380) keeps the 1677 text.
[jy] agere et vivere, hoc est, actu existere] *transcr.* agere et viverem hoc estm actu existere. Misprints in the transcription ('viverem hoc estm'); the 1677 edition (OP p. 181) and Gebhardt (G II 225) read 'vivere, hoc est, actu existere'.
[jz] ex cupiditatis definitione] *transcr.* ex cupiditatis defininitione. Misprint in the transcription; the 1677 edition (OP p. 181) and Gebhardt (G II 225) read 'definitione'.

Proposition XX

The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue;[315] *and on the contrary, insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, to that extent he lacks power.*

Cited in 4P35C2 [p. 395], 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Demonstration. Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by the essence of man alone (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]), that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), which is defined by the striving alone by which man strives to persevere in his being. The more, therefore, each one strives, and is able, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue, and consequently (by Props. 4 [p. 241] and 6 of Part III [p. 243]), insofar as someone neglects to preserve his being, to that extent he lacks power. Q.E.D.

Scholium. No one, therefore, neglects to want his own advantage, or to preserve his being, unless he is conquered by external causes contrary to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, but only when compelled by external causes, is averse to food or kills himself, which can happen in many ways.

Namely, someone kills himself compelled by another, who twists the right hand in which he happened to have taken up a sword and compels him to direct the sword against his own heart; or because he is compelled by the command of a tyrant, as Seneca was, to open his veins,[316] that is, he desires to avoid a greater evil by a lesser; or finally because hidden external causes so dispose his imagination and so affect his body that it takes on another nature, contrary to the former, of which there cannot be an idea in the mind[317] (by Prop. 10 of Part III [p. 247]). But that a man should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist, or to be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something should come from nothing, as anyone can see with a little meditation.

Proposition XXI

No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live, that is, actually to exist.

Cited in 4P22C [p. 383]

Demonstration. The demonstration of this proposition, or rather the thing itself, is evident through itself, and also from the definition of desire. For the desire (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]) of living blessedly, or well, of acting, etc., is the very essence of man, that is (by Prop. 7 of Part

[315] The proposition follows from Def. 8 [p. 357], which made virtue the power of acting from one's own nature, and Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243], which made the striving to persevere the actual essence of a thing. It is qualified at once: acting absolutely from virtue is seeking one's own advantage 'from the guidance of reason' (Prop. 24 [p. 383]), and what reason shows to be most useful to a man is other men who live by reason (Prop. 35 [p. 393]).

[316] After the conspiracy of Piso, Nero ordered Seneca's death, though, Tacitus says, without evidence against him; Seneca and his wife opened their veins: 'eodem ictu brachia ferro exolvunt' ('with one stroke they cut open their arms', Tacitus, *Annals* XV.63; the whole account is XV.60–64).

[317] A change of nature short of death: Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 405] tells of a Spanish poet who after an illness did not believe that the stories and tragedies he had written were his, and says that a body can die without being turned into a corpse.

conatur. Ergo nemo potest cupere etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXII

Nulla virtus potest prior hac (nempe conatu sese conservandi) concipi.

Demonstratio. Conatus sese conservandi est ipsa rei essentia (per prop. 7. P. 3.). Si igitur aliqua virtus posset hac, nempe hoc conatu, prior concipi, conciperetur ergo (per defin. 8. huius)[ka] ipsa rei essentia se ipsa prior; quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nulla virtus etc. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum. Nam hoc principio nullum aliud potest prius concipi (per prop. praeced.), et absque ipso (per prop. 21. huius) nulla virtus potest concipi.

Propositio XXIII

Homo quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod ideas habet inadaequatas, non potest absolute dici ex virtute agere; sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit.

[G II 226] Demonstratio. Quatenus homo ad agendum determinatur ex eo, quod inadaequatas habet ideas, eatenus (per prop. 1. P. 3.) patitur, hoc est (per defin. 1. et 2. P. 3.) aliquid agit, quod per solam eius essentiam non potest percipi; hoc est (per defin. 8. huius), quod ex ipsius virtute non sequitur. At quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit, eatenus (per eandem prop. 1. P. 3.) agit, hoc est (per defin. 2. P. 3.) aliquid agit, quod per solam ipsius essentiam percipitur, sive (per defin. 8. huius) quod ex ipsius virtute adaequate sequitur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIV

Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud in nobis est, quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare (haec tria idem significant) idque ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi.[kb]

Demonstratio. Ex virtute absolute agere nihil aliud est (per defin. 8. huius), quam ex legibus

[ka](per defin. 8. huius)] *transcr.* (per defin. 8 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 225).
[kb]The 1677 edition (OP p. 182) lacks *idque*; the Dutch has *en dit uit de grontvest*. Gebhardt (G II 226; Textgestaltung II 380) supplies it, as in the Demonstration.

III [p. 243]), the striving by which each one strives to preserve his being. Therefore no one can desire, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXII

No virtue can be conceived prior to this one (namely, the striving to preserve oneself).
Cited in 4P22C [p. 383]

Demonstration. The striving to preserve oneself is the very essence of a thing (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]). If, therefore, some virtue could be conceived prior to this one, namely, to this striving, the very essence of the thing would then be conceived (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]) prior to itself, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.E.D.

Corollary. The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue.[318] For no other principle can be conceived prior to this one (by the preceding Prop. [p. 383]), and without it (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 381]) no virtue can be conceived.
Cited in 4P24D [p. 383], 4P25D [p. 385], 4P26D [p. 385], 4P56D [p. 421], 5P41D [p. 521]

Proposition XXIII

A man, insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands.
Cited in 4P28D [p. 387]

Demonstration. Insofar as a man is determined to act from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, to that extent (by Prop. 1 of Part III [p. 233]) he is acted on, that is (by Defs. 1 [p. 231] and 2 of Part III [p. 231]), he does something which cannot be perceived through his essence alone, that is (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]), which does not follow from his virtue. But insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he understands, to that extent (by the same Prop. 1 of Part III [p. 233]) he acts, that is (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]), he does something which is perceived through his essence alone, or (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]) which follows adequately from his virtue. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIV

To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve our being (these three signify the same) from the guidance of reason, and that from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage.
Cited in 4P36D [p. 397], 4P37D [p. 397], 4P56D [p. 421], 4P67D [p. 443], 4P72D [p. 447], 5P41D [p. 521]

Demonstration. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357])

[318] Part V returns to this Corollary: 'the first and only foundation of virtue, or of the principle of living rightly (by Cor. of Prop. 22 and by Prop. 24 of Part IV), is to seek one's own advantage', and in determining what reason dictates as useful, no account was taken of the eternity of the mind (Part V, Prop. 41, Dem. [p. 521]).

propriae naturae agere. At nos eatenus tantummodo agimus, quatenus intelligimus (per prop. 3. P. 3.). Ergo ex virtute agere nihil aliud in nobis est, quam ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum esse conservare idque (per coroll. prop. 22. huius) ex fundamento suum utile quaerendi. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXV

Nemo suum esse alterius rei causa conservare conatur.

Demonstratio. Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, sola ipsius rei essentia definitur (per prop. 7. P. 3.), eaque sola data, non autem ex alterius rei essentia necessario sequitur (per prop. 6. P. 3.), ut unusquisque suum esse conservare conetur. Patet praeterea haec propositio ex coroll. prop. 22. huius partis. Nam si homo alterius rei causa suum esse conservare conaretur, tum res illa primum esset virtutis fundamentum (ut per se notum), quod (per praedict. coroll.) est absurdum. Ergo nemo suum esse etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVI

[G II 227] *Quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere; nec mens quatenus ratione utitur, aliud sibi utile esse iudicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit.*

Demonstratio. Conatus sese conservandi nihil est praeter ipsius rei essentiam (per prop. 7. P. 3.), quae quatenus talis existit, vim habere concipitur ad perseverandum in existendo (per prop. 6. P. 3.), et ea agendum, quae ex data sua natura necessario sequuntur (vide defin. appetitus in schol. prop. 9. P. 3.). At rationis essentia nihil aliud est quam mens nostra quatenus clare et distincte intelligit (vide eius defin. in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.). Ergo (per prop. 40. P. 2.) quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est quam intelligere.

Deinde quoniam hic mentis conatus, quo mens quatenus ratiocinatur, suum esse conatur conservare, nihil aliud est quam intelligere (per primam partem huius), est ergo hic[kc] intelligendi conatus (per coroll. prop. 22. huius) primum et unicum virtutis fundamentum, nec alicuius finis causa (per prop. 25. huius) res intelligere conabimur; sed contra mens quatenus ratiocinatur, nihil sibi bonum esse concipere poterit, nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per defin. 1. huius). Q. E. D.

[kc] (per primam partem huius), est ergo hic] *transcr.* (per primam partem huius). Est ergo hic. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 227): the clause beginning 'Deinde quoniam' has its main verb in 'est ergo'.

but to act from the laws of one's own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]). Therefore to act from virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve our being from the guidance of reason, and that (by Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 383]) from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXV

No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing.
Cited in 4P26D [p. 385], 4P52S [p. 419]

Demonstration. The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is defined by the essence of the thing itself alone (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), and from this alone being given, and not from the essence of another thing, it necessarily follows (by Prop. 6 of Part III [p. 243]) that each one strives to preserve his being. This Proposition is evident, moreover, from Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 383]. For if a man strove to preserve his being for the sake of another thing, that thing would then be the first foundation of virtue (as is self-evident), which (by the aforesaid Cor. [p. 383]) is absurd. Therefore no one strives to preserve his being, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVI

Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; and the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding.[319]
Cited in 4P27D [p. 387], 4P28D [p. 387], 4P36D [p. 397], 4P37D [p. 397], 4P38D [p. 405], 4P40D [p. 407], 4P48D [p. 415], 4P53D [p. 419], 5P9D [p. 481], 5P10D [p. 483]

Demonstration. The striving to preserve oneself is nothing but the essence of the thing itself (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived to have a force for persevering in existing (by Prop. 6 of Part III [p. 243]) and for doing those things which necessarily follow from its given nature (see the definition of appetite in Schol. of Prop. 9 of Part III [p. 245]). But the essence of reason is nothing but our mind insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see its definition in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]). Therefore (by Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 185]) whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding.
Next, since this striving of the mind, by which the mind, insofar as it reasons, strives to preserve its being, is nothing but understanding (by the first part of this demonstration), this striving for understanding is (by Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 383]) the first and only foundation of virtue, and we shall not strive to understand things for the sake of some end (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 385]); but on the contrary the mind, insofar as it reasons, will be able to conceive nothing to be good for itself except what leads to understanding (by Def. 1 of this Part [p. 355]). Q.E.D.

[319] Understanding here is not a narrow pursuit: the Appendix to this Part makes perfecting the intellect, which is nothing but understanding God and his attributes and actions, the one thing in which man's highest happiness, or blessedness, consists, and the end of the man led by reason the adequate conception of himself and of everything that falls within his understanding (Appendix, ch. 4 [p. 451]).

Propositio XXVII

Nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse, nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit, vel quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus.

Demonstratio. Mens quatenus ratiocinatur, nihil aliud appetit quam intelligere, nec aliud sibi utile esse iudicat, nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit (per prop. praeced.). At mens (per prop. 41. et 43. P. 2., cuius etiam schol. vide) rerum certitudinem non habet, nisi quatenus ideas habet adaequatas, sive (quod per schol. prop. 40. P. 2. idem est[kd]) quatenus ratiocinatur. Ergo nihil certo scimus bonum esse, nisi id quod ad intelligendum revera conducit; et contra id malum, quod impedire potest quominus intelligamus. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVIII

[G II 228] *Summum mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et summa mentis virtus Deum cognoscere.*

Demonstratio. Summum, quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est, hoc est (per defin. 6. P. 1.) ens absolute infinitum, et sine quo (per prop. 15. P. 1.) nihil esse neque concipi potest. Adeoque (per prop. 26. et 27. huius) summum mentis utile sive (per defin. 1. huius) bonum est Dei cognitio.

Deinde mens quatenus intelligit, eatenus tantum agit (per prop. 1. et 3. P. 3.), et eatenus tantum (per prop. 23. huius) potest absolute dici, quod ex virtute agit. Est igitur mentis absoluta virtus intelligere. At summum, quod mens intelligere potest, Deus est (ut iam iam demonstravimus). Ergo mentis summa virtus est Deum intelligere seu cognoscere. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIX

Res quaecumque singularis, cuius natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nostram agendi potentiam nec iuvare nec coercere potest, et absolute res nulla potest nobis bona aut mala esse, nisi commune aliquid nobiscum habeat.

[kd] So the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 228). Baensch asks for *Schol. 2.*, and W. Meijer (second edition), Appuhn, Halpern and Van Vloten–Land's separate edition of the *Ethics* supply it. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 380) refers the citation, as at Part III, Prop. 1, Dem., to the scholium of Part II, Prop. 40 before it was divided in two, and resolves the abbreviation as *Scholios*.

Proposition XXVII

We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding.

Cited in 4P28D [p. 387], 4P38D [p. 405], 4P40D [p. 407], 4P48D [p. 415], 4P50D [p. 417], 5P9D [p. 481], 5P10D [p. 483]

Demonstration. The mind, insofar as it reasons, wants nothing but to understand, and judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding (by the preceding Prop. [p. 385]). But the mind (by Props. 41 [p. 189] and 43 of Part II [p. 191]; see also its Schol. [p. 191]) has certainty of things only insofar as it has adequate ideas, or (what by the Schol. of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189] is the same) insofar as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be certainly good except what really leads to understanding, and on the contrary we know that to be evil which can prevent us from understanding. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVIII

The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.[320]

Cited in 4P36D [p. 397], 5P20D [p. 491], 5P25D [p. 505], 5P27D [p. 507]

Demonstration. The highest thing which the mind can understand is God, that is (by Def. 6 of Part I [p. 27]), a being absolutely infinite, and without which (by Prop. 15 of Part I [p. 49]) nothing can either be or be conceived. And so (by Props. 26 [p. 385] and 27 of this Part [p. 387]) the highest advantage, or (by Def. 1 of this Part [p. 355]) good, of the mind is the knowledge of God.

Next, the mind acts only insofar as it understands (by Props. 1 [p. 233] and 3 of Part III [p. 241]), and only to that extent (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 383]) can it absolutely be said to act from virtue. The absolute virtue of the mind, therefore, is to understand. But the highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as we have just now demonstrated). Therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand, or know, God. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIX

Any singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can neither aid nor restrain our power of acting, and absolutely, nothing can be good or evil for us unless it has something in common with us.[321]

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[320] Maimonides had placed man's true perfection in the knowledge of God: 'והמין הרביעי הוא השלמות האנושי האמיתי, והוא – הגיע לאדם המעלות השכליות – רצוני לומר: ציור המושכלות ללמוד מהם דעות אמתיות באלהיות' ('The fourth kind is the true human perfection: that man attain the rational virtues, I mean the conception of intelligibles, so as to learn from them true opinions concerning divine things', מוֹרֶה נְבוּכִים, *Guide of the Perplexed* III.54, in Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew). For Spinoza the knowledge of God is not one perfection beside others but what all understanding depends on, since nothing can be or be conceived without God (Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 49]); Part V develops it into the intellectual love of God (Part V, Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511]).

[321] An application of Part I, Prop. 3 [p. 31]: 'things which have nothing in common with one another cannot be the cause of one another'. The demonstration adds that the thing must be conceived under the same attribute as human nature (Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129]).

Demonstratio. Cuiuscumque rei singularis, et consequenter (per coroll. prop. 10. P. 2.) hominis potentia, qua existit et operatur, non determinatur nisi ab alia re singulari (per prop. 28. P. 1.), cuius natura (per prop. 6. P. 2.) per idem attributum debet intelligi, per quod natura humana concipitur. Nostra igitur agendi potentia, quomodocumque ea concipiatur, determinari et consequenter iuvari vel coerceri potest potentia alterius rei singularis, quae aliquid commune nobiscum habet, et non potentia rei, cuius natura a nostra prorsus est diversa; et quia id bonum aut malum vocamus, quod causa est laetitiae aut tristitiae (per prop. 8. huius), hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) quod nostram agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, iuvat vel coercet; ergo res, cuius natura a nostra prorsus est diversa, nobis neque bona neque mala esse potest. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXX

[G II 229] *Res nulla per id, quod cum nostra natura commune habet, potest esse mala; sed quatenus nobis mala est, eatenus est nobis contraria.*

Demonstratio. Id malum vocamus, quod causa est tristitiae (per prop. 8. huius), hoc est (per eius defin., quam vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) quod nostram agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet. Si igitur res aliqua per id, quod nobiscum habet commune, nobis esset mala, posset ergo res id ipsum, quod nobiscum commune habet, minuere vel coercere; quod (per prop. 4. P. 3.) est absurdum. Nulla igitur res per id, quod nobiscum commune habet, potest nobis esse mala; sed contra quatenus mala est, hoc est (ut iam iam ostendimus) quatenus nostram agendi potentiam minuere vel coercere potest, eatenus (per prop. 5. P. 3.) nobis est contraria. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXI

Quatenus res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, eatenus necessario bona est.

Demonstratio. Quatenus enim res aliqua cum nostra natura convenit, non potest (per prop. praeced.) esse mala. Erit ergo necessario vel bona vel indifferens. Si hoc ponatur, nempe quod neque bona sit neque mala, nihil ergo (per axiom. 3. huius)[ke] ex ipsius natura[kf] sequetur, quod nostrae naturae conservationi inservit, hoc est (per hypothesin) quod ipsius rei naturae conservationi inservit. Sed hoc est absurdum (per prop. 6. P. 3.). Erit ergo, quatenus cum nostra natura

[ke] The 1677 edition (OP p. 186) prints *per Axiom 3. hujus*, corrected in its errata to *per Axioma hujus*, which the Dutch follows (*volgens de gemene Kundigheit van dit deel*). Schmidt and Auerbach proposed *Axiom. 3. p. 1.* (the transcription's reading), Saisset *Defin. 2. et 3. p. 4.*, Van Vloten–Land, followed by Baensch, Appuhn and Halpern, *Defin. 1. hujus*. Gebhardt (G II 230; Textgestaltung II 380) keeps *Axiom. 3. hujus*: none of the places proposed says what the argument needs, and Spinoza is referring to a third axiom of Part IV which he afterwards struck.

[kf] nihil ergo (per axiom. 3. huius) ex ipsius natura] *transcr.* nihil ergo (per axiom. 3. P. 1.) ex ipsius natura. The 1677 edition (OP p. 186) and Gebhardt (G II 230) read 'per Axiom. 3. hujus'; 'P. 1.' is the conjecture of Schmidt and Auerbach (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 380).

Cited in 4P31C [p. 391]

Demonstration. The power of any singular thing, and consequently (by Cor. of Prop. 10 of Part II [p. 137]) of man, by which it exists and operates, is determined only by another singular thing (by Prop. 28 of Part I [p. 79]), whose nature (by Prop. 6 of Part II [p. 129]) must be understood through the same attribute through which human nature is conceived. Our power of acting, therefore, however it is conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or restrained, by the power of another singular thing which has something in common with us, and not by the power of a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours; and since we call good or evil what is the cause of joy or sadness (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]), that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting, a thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can be neither good nor evil for us. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXX

No thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, to that extent it is contrary to us.

Cited in 4P31D [p. 389], 4P34D [p. 393], 4P34S [p. 393], 5P10D [p. 483], 5P38D [p. 517], 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. We call evil what is the cause of sadness (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]), that is (by its definition, which see in Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]), what diminishes or restrains our power of acting. If, therefore, some thing were evil for us through what it has in common with us, it could diminish or restrain that very thing which it has in common with us, which (by Prop. 4 of Part III [p. 241]) is absurd. No thing, therefore, can be evil for us through what it has in common with us; but on the contrary, insofar as it is evil, that is (as we have just shown), insofar as it can diminish or restrain our power of acting, to that extent (by Prop. 5 of Part III [p. 243]) it is contrary to us. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXI

Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good.

Cited in 4P31C [p. 391], 4P34S [p. 393]

Demonstration. For insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot (by the preceding Prop. [p. 389]) be evil. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. If the latter is supposed, namely that it is neither good nor evil, then (by Axiom 3 of this Part)[322] nothing will follow from its nature which serves the preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), which serves the preservation of the nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (by Prop. 6 of Part

[322] Part IV has only one axiom. The reference is to an axiom that Spinoza seems to have struck, which must have said that what is indifferent does not by its nature serve the preservation of ours; see the notes on the Axiom [p. 357] and to the Latin here.

convenit, necessario bona. Q. E. D.

[G II 230] Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo nobis est utilior seu magis bona, et contra quo res aliqua nobis est utilior, eatenus cum nostra natura magis convenit. Nam quatenus cum nostra natura non convenit, erit necessario a nostra natura diversa vel eidem contraria. Si diversa, tum (per prop. 29. huius) neque bona neque mala esse poterit; si autem contraria, erit ergo etiam ei contraria, quae cum nostra natura convenit, hoc est (per prop. praeced.) contraria bono seu mala. Nihil igitur nisi quatenus cum nostra natura convenit, potest esse bonum; atque adeo quo res aliqua magis cum nostra natura convenit, eo est utilior et contra. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXII

Quatenus homines passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt eatenus dici, quod natura conveniant.

Demonstratio. Quae natura convenire dicuntur, potentia convenire intelliguntur (per prop. 7. P. 3.); non autem impotentia seu negatione, et consequenter (vide schol. prop. 3. P. 3.[kg]) neque etiam passione. Quare homines quatenus passionibus sunt obnoxii, non possunt dici, quod natura conveniant. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Res etiam per se patet. Qui enim ait, album et nigrum in eo solummodo convenire, quod neutrum sit rubrum, is absolute affirmat album et nigrum nulla in re convenire. Sic etiam si quis ait, lapidem et hominem in hoc tantum convenire, quod uterque sit finitus, impotens vel quod ex necessitate suae naturae non existit, vel denique quod a potentia causarum externarum indefinite superatur, is omnino affirmat lapidem et hominem nulla in re convenire. Quae enim in sola negatione sive in eo, quod non habent, conveniunt, ea revera nulla in re conveniunt.

Propositio XXXIII

[G II 231] *Homines natura discrepare possunt, quatenus affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, et eatenus etiam unus idemque homo varius est et inconstans.*

Demonstratio. Affectuum natura seu essentia non potest per solam nostram essentiam seu naturam explicari (per defin. 1. et 2. P. 3.); sed potentia, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) natura causarum externarum cum nostra comparata definiri debet. Unde fit, ut uniuscuiusque affectus tot species dentur, quot sunt species obiectorum, a quibus afficimur (vide prop. 56. P. 3.), et ut homines ab uno eodemque obiecto diversimode afficiantur (vide prop. 51. P. 3.), atque eatenus natura discrepent, et denique ut unus idemque homo (per eandem prop. 51. P. 3.) erga idem obiectum diversimode afficiatur, atque eatenus varius sit etc. Q. E. D.

[kg] The 1677 edition (OP p. 186) has *p. 2.*; the Dutch has *het Byvoegsel van de darde Voorstelling in het darde deel*, and Van Vloten–Land correct to *p. 3.*, followed by Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Gebhardt (G II 230; Textgestaltung II 380).

III [p. 243]). It will therefore, insofar as it agrees with our nature, necessarily be good. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or the better, it is for us, and conversely, the more useful a thing is to us, the more it agrees with our nature. For insofar as it does not agree with our nature, it will necessarily be different from our nature or contrary to it. If different, then (by Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 387]) it will be able to be neither good nor evil; but if contrary, it will therefore also be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, that is (by the preceding Prop. [p. 389]), contrary to the good, or evil. Nothing, therefore, can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature; and so the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is, and conversely. Q.E.D.

Cited in 4P35D [p. 393], 4P35C1 [p. 395], 4P72D [p. 447]

Proposition XXXII

Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree in nature.

Demonstration. Things which are said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), but not in lack of power, or negation, and consequently (see Schol. of Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]) not in passion either. Therefore men, insofar as they are subject to passions, cannot be said to agree in nature. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The thing is also evident through itself. For he who says that white and black agree only in this, that neither is red, affirms absolutely that white and black agree in nothing. So also if someone says that a stone and a man agree only in this, that each is finite, lacking in power, or that it does not exist from the necessity of its nature, or finally that it is indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, he affirms entirely that a stone and a man agree in nothing. For things which agree only in a negation, or in what they do not have, really agree in nothing.

Proposition XXXIII

Men can differ in nature insofar as they are troubled by affects which are passions, and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconstant.

Cited in 4P35D [p. 393], 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Demonstration. The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature, alone (by Defs. 1 [p. 231] and 2 of Part III [p. 231]), but must be defined by the power, that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), the nature, of external causes compared with ours. Hence it comes about that there are as many species of each affect as there are species of objects by which we are affected (see Prop. 56 of Part III [p. 305]), and that men are affected in different ways by one and the same object (see Prop. 51 of Part III [p. 295]), and to that extent differ in nature, and finally that one and the same man (by the same Prop. 51 of Part III [p. 295]) is affected in different ways towards the same object, and to that extent is changeable, etc. Q.E.D.

Propositio XXXIV

Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt invicem esse contrarii.

Demonstratio. Homo, ex. gr. Petrus, potest esse causa, ut Paulus contristetur, propterea quod aliquid habet simile rei, quam Paulus odit (per prop. 16. P. 3.); vel propterea, quod Petrus solus re aliqua potitur, quam ipse Paulus etiam amat (vide prop. 32. P. 3. cum eiusdem schol.); vel ob alias causas (harum praecipuas vide in schol. prop. 55. P. 3.). Atque adeo inde fiet (per aff. defin. 7.) ut Paulus Petrum odio habeat, et consequenter facile fiet (per prop. 40. P. 3. cum eius schol.) ut Petrus Paulum contra odio habeat, atque adeo (per prop. 39. P. 3.) ut invicem malum inferre conentur, hoc est (per prop. 30. huius) ut invicem sint contrarii.

At affectus tristitiae semper passio est (per prop. 59. P. 3.); ergo homines, quatenus conflictantur affectibus, qui passiones sunt, possunt invicem esse contrarii. Q. E. D.

[G II 232] Scholium. Dixi, quod Paulus odio Petrum habeat, quia imaginatur, id eundem possidere, quod ipse Paulus etiam amat. Unde prima fronte videtur sequi, quod hi duo ex eo, quod idem amant, et consequenter ex eo, quod natura conveniunt,[kh] sibi invicem damno sint; atque adeo, si hoc verum est, falsae essent prop. 30. et 31. huius partis. Sed si rem aequa lance examinare velimus, haec omnia convenire omnino videbimus.
Nam hi duo non sunt invicem molesti, quatenus natura conveniunt, hoc est quatenus uterque idem amat; sed quatenus ab invicem discrepant. Nam quatenus uterque idem amat, eo ipso utriusque amor fovetur (per prop. 31. P. 3.), hoc est (per aff. defin. 6.) eo ipso utriusque laetitia fovetur. Quare longe abest, ut quatenus idem amant et natura conveniunt, invicem molesti sint. Sed huius rei causa, ut dixi, nulla alia est quam quia natura discrepare supponuntur.

Supponimus namque Petrum ideam habere rei amatae iam possessae, et Paulum contra ideam rei amatae amissae. Unde fit, ut hic tristitia, et ille contra laetitia afficiatur; atque eatenus invicem contrarii sint. Et ad hunc modum ostendere facile possumus reliquas odii causas ab hoc solo pendere, quod homines natura discrepant, et non ab eo, in quo conveniunt.

Propositio XXXV

Quatenus homines ex ductu rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum natura semper necessario conveniunt.

Demonstratio. Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi (per prop. 33. huius) et invicem contrarii (per prop. praeced.). Sed eatenus homines

[kh] videtur sequi, quod hi duo ex eo, quod idem amant, et consequenter ex eo, quod natura conveniunt,] *transcr.* videtur sequi; quod hi duo ex eo; quod idem amant et consequenter ex eo; quod natura conveniunt,. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 232).

Proposition XXXIV

Insofar as men are troubled by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.
Cited in 4P35D [p. 393], 4P36S [p. 397], 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Demonstration. A man, for example Peter, can be the cause of Paul's being saddened, because he has something like a thing which Paul hates (by Prop. 16 of Part III [p. 255]), or because Peter alone possesses something which Paul himself also loves (see Prop. 32 of Part III [p. 275] with its Schol. [p. 275]), or for other causes (for the chief of these see Schol. of Prop. 55 of Part III [p. 303]). And so from this it will come about (by Def. Aff. 7 [p. 323]) that Paul hates Peter, and consequently it will easily come about (by Prop. 40 of Part III [p. 285] with its Schol. [p. 285]) that Peter hates Paul in return, and so (by Prop. 39 of Part III [p. 283]) that they strive to do evil to one another, that is (by Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 389]), that they are contrary to one another. But the affect of sadness is always a passion (by Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]); therefore men, insofar as they are troubled by affects which are passions, can be contrary to one another. Q.E.D.

Scholium. I said that Paul hates Peter because he imagines that Peter possesses what Paul himself also loves. At first sight it seems to follow from this that these two, from the fact that they love the same thing, and consequently from the fact that they agree in nature, are harmful to one another; and so, if this is true, Props. 30 [p. 389] and 31 of this Part [p. 389] would be false. But if we are willing to examine the matter with a fair balance, we shall see that all these things agree entirely. For these two are not troublesome to one another insofar as they agree in nature, that is, insofar as each loves the same thing, but insofar as they differ from one another. For insofar as each loves the same thing, by that very fact the love of each is encouraged (by Prop. 31 of Part III [p. 273]), that is (by Def. Aff. 6 [p. 321]), by that very fact the joy of each is encouraged. So it is far from being the case that they are troublesome to one another insofar as they love the same thing and agree in nature. But the cause of this, as I have said, is nothing else but that they are supposed to differ in nature.
For we suppose that Peter has the idea of a loved thing already possessed, and Paul, on the contrary, the idea of a loved thing lost. Hence it comes about that the latter is affected with sadness and the former, on the contrary, with joy; and to that extent they are contrary to one another. And in this way we can easily show that the other causes of hatred depend only on the fact that men differ in nature, and not on that in which they agree.

Proposition XXXV

Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature.
Cited in 2P49S [p. 217], 4P35C1 [p. 395], 4P35C2 [p. 395], 4P36S [p. 397], 4P40D [p. 407], 4P71D [p. 447]

Demonstration. Insofar as men are troubled by affects which are passions, they can be different in nature (by Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 391]) and contrary to one another (by the preceding

tantum agere dicuntur, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt (per prop. 3. P. 3.); atque adeo quicquid ex humana natura, quatenus ratione definitur, sequitur, id (per defin. 2. P. 3.) per solam humanam naturam, tamquam per proximam suam causam, debet intelligi.

Sed quia unusquisque ex suae naturae legibus id appetit, quod bonum, et id amovere conatur, quod malum esse iudicat (per prop. 19. huius); et cum praeterea id, quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse iudicamus, necessario bonum aut malum sit (per prop. 41. P. 2.), ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt, quae humanae naturae, et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 31. huius) quae cum natura uniuscuiusque hominis conveniunt. Atque adeo homines etiam inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt. Q. E. D.

[G II 233] Corollarium I. Nihil singulare in rerum natura datur, quod homini sit utilius, quam homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est, quod cum sua natura maxime convenit (per coroll. prop. 31. huius), hoc est (ut per se notum) homo. At homo ex legibus suae naturae absolute agit, quando ex ductu rationis vivit (per defin. 2. P. 3.), et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convenit (per prop. praeced.). Ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo etc. Q. E. D.

Corollarium II. Cum maxime unusquisque homo suum sibi utile quaerit, tum maxime homines sunt sibi invicem utiles. Nam quo magis unusquisque suum utile quaerit et se conservare conatur, eo magis virtute praeditus est (per prop. 20. huius), sive quod idem est (per defin. 8. huius), eo maiore potentia praeditus est ad agendum ex suae naturae legibus, hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.) ad vivendum ex ductu rationis. At homines tum maxime natura conveniunt, cum ex ductu rationis vivunt (per prop. praeced.). Ergo (per praeced. coroll.) tum maxime homines erunt sibi invicem utiles, cum maxime unusquisque suum utile sibi quaerit. Q. E. D.

[G II 234] Scholium. Quae modo ostendimus, ipsa etiam experientia quotidie tot tamque luculentis testimoniis testatur, ut omnibus fere in ore sit, hominem homini Deum esse. Fit tamen raro, ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant; sed cum iis ita comparatum est, ut plerumque invidi atque invicem molesti sint. At nihilominus vitam solitariam vix transigere queunt, ita ut plerisque illa definitio, quod homo sit animal sociale, valde arriserit; et revera res ita se habet, ut ex hominum communi societate multo plura commoda oriantur, quam damna.

Rideant igitur, quantum velint, res humanas satyrici, easque detestentur theologi, et laudent, quantum possunt, melancholici vitam incultam et agrestem, hominesque contemnant et admi-

Prop. [p. 393]). But men are said to act only insofar as they live from the guidance of reason (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]); and so whatever follows from human nature insofar as it is defined by reason must (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]) be understood through human nature alone, as through its proximate cause.
But since each one, from the laws of his own nature, wants what he judges to be good and strives to remove what he judges to be evil (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 379]), and since, moreover, what we judge from the dictate of reason to be good or evil is necessarily good or evil (by Prop. 41 of Part II [p. 189]), men, insofar as they live from the guidance of reason, to that extent only necessarily do those things which are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each man, that is (by Cor. of Prop. 31 of this Part [p. 391]), which agree with the nature of each man. And so men also necessarily always agree with one another insofar as they live from the guidance of reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. There is no singular thing in the nature of things which is more useful to man than a man who lives from the guidance of reason. For what is most useful to man is what most agrees with his nature (by Cor. of Prop. 31 of this Part [p. 391]), that is (as is self-evident), man. But a man acts absolutely from the laws of his nature when he lives from the guidance of reason (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]), and only to that extent does he necessarily always agree with the nature of another man (by the preceding Prop. [p. 393]). Therefore among singular things there is nothing more useful to man than a man, etc. Q.E.D.
Cited in 4P35C2 [p. 395], 4P37D [p. 397], 4P37S2 [p. 401], 4P71D [p. 447]

Corollary II. When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another. For the more each one seeks his own advantage and strives to preserve himself, the more he is endowed with virtue (by Prop. 20 of this Part [p. 381]), or, what is the same (by Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]), the greater the power with which he is endowed for acting from the laws of his nature, that is (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), for living from the guidance of reason. But men most agree in nature when they live from the guidance of reason (by the preceding Prop. [p. 393]). Therefore (by the preceding Cor. [p. 395]) men will be most useful to one another when each most seeks his own advantage for himself. Q.E.D.

Scholium. What we have just shown, experience itself also testifies daily with so many and such clear testimonies that it is in almost everyone's mouth that man is a God to man.[323] Yet it rarely happens that men live from the guidance of reason; instead, they are so constituted that they are for the most part envious and troublesome to one another. But nevertheless they can hardly lead a solitary life, so that the definition that man is a social animal has pleased most people very much; and in truth the matter stands so that far more benefits than harms arise from the common society of men.
Let the satirists, then, laugh at human affairs as much as they like, let the theologians detest them,[324] and let the melancholy praise as much as they can an uncultivated and rustic life, and

[323] Hobbes had set the saying beside its opposite in the dedication of *De cive*: 'Profecto utrumque vere dictum est, homo homini deus, et homo homini lupus. Illud, si concives inter se; hoc, si civitates comparemus' ('Both sayings are certainly true: man is a God to man, and man is a wolf to man; the first if we compare citizens with one another, the second if we compare states').
[324] The same figures appear in the Preface to Part III [p. 229], where those who attribute human weakness to a vice of nature 'weep over it, laugh at it, despise it, or, as usually happens, detest it', and at the beginning of the *Political Treatise*: philosophers conceive men not as they are but as they would like them to be, 'unde factum est, ut plerumque pro Ethica Satyram scripserint' ('which is why they have mostly written satire instead of ethics', TP I.1).

rentur bruta; experientur tamen homines mutuo auxilio ea quibus indigent, multo facilius sibi parare, et non nisi iunctis viribus pericula, quae ubique imminent, vitare posse; ut iam taceam, quod multo praestabilius sit et cognitione nostra magis dignum, hominum quam brutorum facta contemplari. Sed de his alias prolixius.

Propositio XXXVI

Summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est, eoque omnes aeque gaudere possunt.

Demonstratio. Ex virtute agere est ex ductu rationis agere (per prop. 24. huius), et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere, est intelligere (per prop. 26. huius). Atque adeo (per prop. 28. huius) summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, est Deum cognoscere, hoc est (per prop. 47. P. 2. et eiusdem schol.), bonum quod omnibus hominibus commune est, et ab omnibus hominibus, quatenus eiusdem sunt naturae, possideri aeque potest. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Si quis autem roget: quid si summum bonum eorum, qui virtutem sectantur, non esset omnibus commune? an non inde, ut supra (vide prop. 34. huius) sequeretur, quod homines, qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, hoc est (per prop. 35. huius) homines, quatenus natura conveniunt, essent invicem contrarii? Is hoc sibi responsum habeat, non ex accidenti, sed ex ipsa natura rationis oriri, ut hominis summum bonum omnibus sit commune, nimirum, quia ex ipsa humana essentia, quatenus ratione definitur, deducitur; et quia homo nec esse nec concipi posset, si potestatem non haberet gaudendi hoc summo bono. Pertinet namque (per prop. 47. P. 2.) ad mentis humanae essentiam, adaequatam habere cognitionem aeternae et infinitae essentiae Dei.

Propositio XXXVII

[G II 235] *Bonum, quod unusquisque, qui sectatur virtutem, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet, et eo magis, quo maiorem Dei habuerit cognitionem.*

Demonstratio. Homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, sunt homini utilissimi (per coroll. 1. prop. 35. huius); atque adeo (per prop. 19. huius) ex ductu rationis conabimur necessario efficere, ut homines ex ductu rationis vivant. At bonum, quod unusquisque, qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, hoc est (per prop. 24. huius) qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, est intelligere (per

despise men and admire the beasts; men will nevertheless find that they can procure for themselves what they need much more easily by mutual help, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers which threaten everywhere; not to mention that it is much more excellent, and more worthy of our knowledge, to contemplate the deeds of men than those of beasts. But of these things elsewhere at greater length.

Cited in 4P37S2 [p. 401]

Proposition XXXVI

The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally.[325]

Cited in 4P37D2 [p. 399], 5P20D [p. 491]

Demonstration. To act from virtue is to act from the guidance of reason (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 383]), and whatever we strive to do from reason is to understand (by Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 385]). And so (by Prop. 28 of this Part [p. 387]) the highest good of those who follow virtue is to know God, that is (by Prop. 47 of Part II [p. 199] and its Schol. [p. 199]), a good which is common to all men and can be possessed equally by all men insofar as they are of the same nature. Q.E.D.

Scholium. But if someone asks: what if the highest good of those who follow virtue were not common to all? Would it not follow from this, as above (see Prop. 34 of this Part [p. 393]), that men who live from the guidance of reason, that is (by Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 393]), men insofar as they agree in nature, would be contrary to one another? Let him have this answer: that it arises not by accident but from the very nature of reason that man's highest good is common to all, namely because it is deduced from the very essence of man insofar as it is defined by reason, and because man could neither be nor be conceived if he did not have the power of enjoying this highest good. For it pertains (by Prop. 47 of Part II [p. 199]) to the essence of the human mind to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proposition XXXVII

The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men,[326] *and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has.*

Cited in 4P45D [p. 411], 4P45C1 [p. 411], 4P46D [p. 413], 4P50D [p. 417], 4P51D2 [p. 417], 4P68S [p. 443], 4P70D [p. 445], 4P71D [p. 447], 4P73D [p. 449], 4P73S [p. 449], 5P20D [p. 491]

Demonstration. Men, insofar as they live from the guidance of reason, are most useful to man (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 395]); and so (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 379]) we shall necessarily strive, from the guidance of reason, to bring it about that men live from the guidance of reason. But the good which each one who lives from the dictate of reason, that is

[325] Unlike the goods men fight over, this one is not diminished by being shared. Part V draws the consequence for the love of God: it 'cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or jealousy, but is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love' (Part V, Prop. 20 [p. 491]).

[326] The demonstration of what Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377] announced: men who are governed by reason 'want nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men'.

prop. 26. huius). Ergo bonum, quod unusquisque, qui virtutem sectatur, sibi appetit, reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet.

Deinde cupiditas, quatenus ad mentem refertur, est ipsa mentis essentia (per aff. defin. 1.); mentis autem essentia in cognitione consistit (per prop. 11. P. 2.) quae Dei cognitionem involvit (per prop. 47. P. 2.), et sine qua (per prop. 15. P. 1.) nec esse nec concipi potest. Adeoque quo mentis essentia maiorem Dei cognitionem involvit, eo cupiditas, qua is, qui virtutem sectatur, bonum, quod sibi appetit, alteri cupit, etiam maior erit. Q. E. D.

Aliter. Bonum, quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit, si viderit, alios idem amare (per prop. 31. P. 3.). Atque adeo (per coroll. eiusdem prop.) conabitur, ut reliqui idem ament. Et quia hoc bonum (per prop. praeced.) omnibus commune est, eoque omnes gaudere possunt, conabitur ergo (per eandem rationem) ut omnes eodem gaudeant, et (per prop. 37. P. 3.) eo magis, quo hoc bono magis fruetur. Q. E. D.

[G II 236] Scholium I. Qui ex solo affectu conatur, ut reliqui ament quod ipse amat, et ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, solo impetu[ki] agit, et ideo odiosus est, praecipue iis, quibus alia placent, quique propterea etiam student et eodem impetu conantur, ut reliqui contra ex ipsorum ingenio vivant. Deinde quoniam summum, quod homines ex affectu appetunt, bonum saepe tale est, ut unus tantum eius possit esse compos, hinc fit, ut qui amant, mente sibi non constent, et dum laudes rei, quam amant, narrare gaudent, timeant credi. At qui reliquos conatur ratione ducere, non impetu, sed humaniter et benigne agit et sibi mente maxime constat.

Porro quicquid cupimus et agimus, cuius causa sumus,[kj] quatenus Dei habemus ideam, sive quatenus Deum cognoscimus, ad *religionem* refero. Cupiditatem autem bene faciendi, quae eo ingeneratur, quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, *pietatem* voco. Cupiditatem deinde, qua homo, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, tenetur ut reliquos sibi amicitia iungat, *honestatem* voco, et id *honestum*, quod homines,[kk] qui ex ductu rationis vivunt, laudant, et id contra *turpe*, quod conciliandae[kl] amicitiae repugnat.
Praeter haec civitatis etiam quaenam sint fundamenta ostendi.[km] Differentia deinde inter veram

[ki] ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, solo impetu] *transcr.* ut reliqui ex suo ingenio vivant, solo impetu. The 1677 edition (OP p. 192) and Gebhardt (G II 236) read 'ex ipsius ingenio' (according to his temperament); the transcription has 'suo'.
[kj] The 1677 edition (OP p. 192) prints *causâ* ('for the sake of which'); the Dutch has *van 't welk wy oorzaak zijn* ('of which we are the cause'), and Van Vloten–Land and Gebhardt (G II 236; Textgestaltung II 380–381) read *causa*.
[kk] et id *honestum*, quod homines] *transcr.* et id *honestum, quod homines. The transcription opens an italic span at 'honestum' that runs to the end of the scholium; the defined terms 'honestum' and 'turpe' are set in italics like 'religionem', 'pietatem' and 'honestatem' (the 1677 edition has no italics here).
[kl] et id contra *turpe*, quod conciliandae] *transcr.* et id contra turpe, quod conciliandae. See the preceding emendation.
[km] W. Meijer, followed by Baensch and Appuhn, thought the sentence out of place and would move it to the end of the Scholium with *ostendam* for *ostendi*. Gebhardt (G II 236; Textgestaltung II 381) keeps it, as the Dutch does: the preceding sentences, besides their general validity, contain the foundations of the state, the refusal of any tyranny over opinion, reason as the rule of government, religion, piety and honourableness.

(by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 383]), who follows virtue, wants for himself is to understand (by Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 385]). Therefore the good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men.
Next, desire, insofar as it is related to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]); but the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]), which involves the knowledge of God (by Prop. 47 of Part II [p. 199]), and without which (by Prop. 15 of Part I [p. 49]) it can neither be nor be conceived. And so the more the essence of the mind involves knowledge of God, the greater also will be the desire by which one who follows virtue desires for another the good which he wants for himself. Q.E.D.

Alternatively. The good which a man wants for himself and loves he will love more constantly if he sees that others love the same thing (by Prop. 31 of Part III [p. 273]). And so (by Cor. of the same Prop. [p. 273]) he will strive that the others love the same thing. And because this good (by the preceding Prop. [p. 397]) is common to all, and all can enjoy it, he will therefore strive (for the same reason) that all may enjoy it, and (by Prop. 37 of Part III [p. 281]) the more so, the more he enjoys this good. Q.E.D.
Cited in 5P4S [p. 477]

Scholium I. He who strives, from affect alone, that others should love what he himself loves, and that others should live according to his temperament,[327] acts from impulse alone, and is therefore hateful, especially to those to whom other things are pleasing, and who therefore also strive eagerly, and with the same impulse, that others should live, on the contrary, according to their temperament. Next, since the highest good which men want from affect is often such that only one can possess it, it comes about that those who love are not at one with themselves in mind, and, while they rejoice to tell the praises of the thing they love, fear to be believed.[328] But he who strives to lead others by reason acts not by impulse but humanely and kindly, and is most at one with himself in mind.
Further, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I refer to *religion*.[329] The desire to do good which is generated in us by our living from the guidance of reason I call *piety*. The desire by which a man who lives from the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship I call *honourableness*, and I call that *honourable* which men who live from the guidance of reason praise, and that, on the contrary, *base* which is opposed to the forming of friendship.
Besides these things, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are. The difference,

[327] The affect is ambition as Part III, Prop. 31, Schol. [p. 275] describes it: 'each one by nature wants the others to live according to his temperament', and since all want this equally, they are equally an obstacle to one another.
[328] Because a listener who believed them would come to love the same thing, and a thing which only one can possess makes rivals (Part III, Prop. 32 [p. 275]).
[329] Religion, piety and honourableness are defined from the knowledge of God and the guidance of reason, without reference to revelation, worship or reward. Spinoza keeps the traditional words *religio* and *pietas* but gives them his own sense: piety here is not religious observance but the desire to do good that arises from living by reason. Part V holds to them even apart from the eternity of the mind: 'even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion' (Part V, Prop. 41 [p. 521]).

virtutem et impotentiam facile ex supra dictis percipitur: nempe quod vera virtus nihil aliud sit, quam ex solo rationis ductu vivere; atque adeo impotentia in hoc solo consistit, quod homo a rebus, quae extra ipsum sunt, duci se patiatur et ab iis ad ea agendum determinetur, quae rerum externarum communis constitutio, non autem ea, quae ipsa ipsius natura in se sola considerata postulat.

Atque haec illa sunt, quae in schol. prop. 18. huius partis demonstrare promisi,[kn] ex quibus apparet legem illam de non mactandis brutis[ko] magis vana superstitione et muliebri misericordia, quam sana ratione fundatam esse. Docet quidem ratio nostrum utile quaerendi necessitudinem cum hominibus iungere;[kp] sed non cum brutis aut rebus, quarum natura a natura humana est diversa, sed idem ius, quod illa in nos habent, nos in ea habere. Imo quia uniuscuiusque ius virtute seu potentia uniuscuiusque definitur, longe maius homines in bruta, quam haec in homines ius habent.

Nec tamen nego bruta sentire, sed nego, quod propterea non liceat nostrae utilitati consulere et iisdem ad libitum uti; eademque tractare, prout nobis magis convenit; quandoquidem nobiscum natura non conveniunt et eorum affectus ab affectibus humanis sunt natura diversi. Vide schol. prop. 57. P. 3. Superest, ut explicem, quid iustum, quid iniustum, quid peccatum et quid denique meritum sit. Sed de his vide sequens scholium.[kq]

[G II 237] Scholium II. In appendice partis primae explicare promisi,[kr] quid laus et vituperium, quid meritum et peccatum, quid iustum et iniustum sit. *Laudem* et *vituperium* quod attinet, in schol. prop. 29. P. 3. explicui; de reliquis autem hic iam erit dicendi locus. Sed prius pauca de *statu hominis naturali* et *civili* dicenda sunt.

Existit unusquisque summo naturae iure, et consequenter summo naturae iure unusquisque ea agit, quae ex suae naturae necessitate sequuntur; atque adeo summo naturae iure unusquisque iudicat, quid bonum, quid malum sit, suaeque utilitati ex suo ingenio consulit (vide prop. 19. et 20. huius), seseque vindicat (vide coroll. 2. prop. 40. P. 3.), et id quod amat conservare, et id quod odio habet destruere conatur (vide prop. 28. P. 3.).

Quod si homines ex ductu rationis viverent, potiretur unusquisque (per coroll. 1. prop. 35. huius)[ks] hoc suo iure absque ullo alterius damno. Sed quia affectibus sunt obnoxii (per coroll.

[kn] huius partis demonstrare promisi] *transcr.* huius partisdemonstrare promisi. Word division as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 192) and Gebhardt (G II 236).

[ko] W. Meijer would move the passage on killing animals (to *Vide schol. prop. 57. P. 3.*) to Prop. 39, and Baensch (second edition) took it for a later insertion. Gebhardt (G II 236–237; Textgestaltung II 381) keeps it where both the Latin and the Dutch have it: the community of reason joins men with men, not men with animals, so that right over animals belongs where the community of men is treated.

[kp] The 1677 edition has no punctuation here. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 381–382) takes *ratio nostrum utile quaerendi* together ('the principle of seeking our own advantage'), with *necessitudinem … iungere* ('to form close ties', as *consuetudines jungunt* in the *Political Treatise*) as its object; the Dutch and Saisset construe *nostrum utile quaerendi necessitudinem* ('the necessity of seeking our advantage') instead. The translation follows Gebhardt.

[kq] Sed de his vide sequens scholium.] *transcr.* Sed de his videsequens scholium. Word division as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 193) and Gebhardt (G II 237); the stray asterisk closed the italic span opened at 'honestum'.

[kr] In appendice partis primae explicare promisi] *transcr.* Inappendice partis primaeexplicare promisi. Word division as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 193) and Gebhardt (G II 237).

[ks] (per coroll. 1. prop. 35. huius)] *transcr.* (per coroll. 1. prop. 35 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 237).

next, between true virtue and lack of power is easily perceived from what has been said above: namely, that true virtue is nothing but living from the guidance of reason alone, and so lack of power consists in this alone, that a man allows himself to be led by things which are outside him, and is determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself alone, demands.

And these are the things I promised to demonstrate in Schol. of Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 377], from which it is evident that the law against slaughtering beasts is founded more on empty superstition and womanish compassion than on sound reason. The principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us, indeed, to form close ties with men, but not with beasts, or with things whose nature is different from human nature; it teaches that we have the same right against them that they have against us. Indeed, because the right of each is defined by the virtue, or power, of each,[330] men have far greater right against beasts than beasts against men.

Yet I do not deny that beasts feel; but I deny that it is therefore not permissible for us to consult our own advantage and to use them at our pleasure, and to treat them as best suits us, since they do not agree with us in nature and their affects are different in nature from human affects. See Schol. of Prop. 57 of Part III [p. 309]. It remains for me to explain what is just, what unjust, what sin, and finally what merit is. But on these see the following Scholium.

Cited in 4P45C2 [p. 411], 4P58D [p. 425], 4App15 [p. 453], 4App25 [p. 457], 5P4S [p. 477]

Scholium II. In the Appendix of the first Part [p. 101] I promised to explain what praise and blame, merit and sin, the just and the unjust are. Praise and blame I have explained in Schol. of Prop. 29 of Part III [p. 271]; of the rest this will now be the place to speak. But first a few things must be said about the *natural* and the *civil state* of man.

Each one exists by the highest right of nature,[331] and consequently by the highest right of nature each one does what follows from the necessity of his own nature; and so by the highest right of nature each one judges what is good and what is evil, and looks to his own advantage according to his own temperament (see Props. 19 [p. 379] and 20 of this Part [p. 381]), and avenges himself (see Cor. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part III [p. 285]), and strives to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he hates (see Prop. 28 of Part III [p. 269]).

If men lived from the guidance of reason, each would possess this right of his (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 395]) without any harm to another. But because they are subject to

[330] Right is power, as the *Political Treatise* puts it: 'each natural thing has as much right from nature as it has power to exist and to operate' (*unamquamque rem naturalem tantum juris ex natura habere, quantum potentiae habet ad existendum et operandum*, TP II.3).

[331] The doctrine is set out at length in the *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 16, and the *Political Treatise*, chs. 2–3: whatever each one, wise or ignorant, strives for and does, 'id summo naturae jure conari, et agere' ('he strives for and does by the highest right of nature', TP II.8). Asked how he differed from Hobbes, Spinoza answered: 'ego naturale Jus semper sartum tectum conservo' ('I always keep natural right intact'), the sovereign having right over the subjects only in proportion to the power by which it exceeds them (Letter 50, to Jarig Jelles).

prop. 4. huius), qui potentiam seu virtutem humanam longe superant (per prop. 6. huius), ideo saepe diversi trahuntur (per prop. 33. huius) atque sibi invicem sunt contrarii (per prop. 34. huius), mutuo dum auxilio indigent (per schol. prop. 35. huius). Ut igitur homines concorditer vivere et sibi auxilio esse possint, necesse est, ut iure suo naturali cedant et se invicem securos reddant, se nihil acturos, quod possit in alterius damnum cedere.

Qua autem ratione hoc fieri possit, ut scilicet homines, qui affectibus necessario sunt obnoxii (per coroll. prop. 4. huius) atque inconstantes et varii (per prop. 33. huius), possint se invicem securos reddere et fidem invicem habere, patet ex prop. 7. huius partis et prop. 39. P. 3. Nempe quod nullus affectus coerceri potest, nisi affectu fortiore et contrario affectui coercendo, et quod unusquisque ab inferendo damno abstinet timore maioris damni.

Hac igitur lege *societas* firmari poterit,[kt] si modo ipsa sibi vindicet ius, quod unusquisque habet, sese vindicandi et de bono et malo iudicandi; quaeque adeo potestatem habeat communem vivendi rationem praescribendi, legesque ferendi, easque non ratione, quae affectus coercere nequit (per schol. prop. 17. huius), sed minis firmandi. Haec autem societas legibus et potestate sese conservandi firmata *civitas* appellatur, et qui ipsius iure defenduntur *cives*.

Ex quibus facile intelligimus, nihil in statu naturali dari, quod ex omnium consensu bonum aut malum sit, quandoquidem unusquisque, qui in statu est naturali, suae tantummodo utilitati consulit, et ex suo ingenio, et quatenus suae utilitatis tantum habet rationem, quid bonum quidve malum sit, decernit, et nemini nisi sibi soli obtemperare lege ulla tenetur; atque adeo in statu naturali peccatum concipi nequit. At quidem in statu civili, ubi et communi consensu decernitur, quid bonum quidve malum sit, et unusquisque civitati obtemperare tenetur. Est itaque *peccatum* nihil aliud, quam inobedientia, quae propterea solo civitatis iure punitur; et contra obedientia civi *meritum* ducitur, quia eo ipso dignus iudicatur, qui civitatis commodis gaudeat.

Deinde in statu naturali nemo ex communi consensu alicuius rei est dominus, nec in natura aliquid datur, quod possit dici huius hominis esse et non illius; sed omnia omnium sunt, ac proinde in statu naturali nulla potest concipi voluntas unicuique suum tribuendi; aut alicui id, quod eius sit, eripiendi, hoc est, in statu naturali nihil fit, quod *iustum* aut *iniustum* possit dici; at quidem in statu civili, ubi ex communi consensu decernitur, quid huius quidve illius sit. Ex quibus apparet, iustum et iniustum, peccatum et meritum notiones esse extrinsecas, non autem attributa, quae mentis naturam explicent. Sed de his satis.

[kt] Tönnies proposed *formari*, as in a passage of the *Theological-Political Treatise*; Gebhardt (G II 238; Textgestaltung II 382) keeps *firmari*, which is not a slip, since the expression is repeated (*firmandi*, *firmata*) and the Dutch renders it each time by *bevestigen*.

affects (by Cor. of Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 363]), which far surpass human power, or virtue (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 365]), they are often drawn in different directions (by Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 391]) and are contrary to one another (by Prop. 34 of this Part [p. 393]), while they need one another's help (by Schol. of Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 395]). In order, therefore, that men may live harmoniously and be of help to one another, it is necessary that they give up their natural right and make one another confident that they will do nothing which could lead to harm to another.

But how this can come about, namely that men, who are necessarily subject to affects (by Cor. of Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 363]) and inconstant and changeable (by Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 391]), can make one another confident and have trust in one another, is evident from Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 365] and Prop. 39 of Part III [p. 283]: namely, that no affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than and contrary to the affect to be restrained, and that each one abstains from doing harm from fear of a greater harm.

By this law, therefore, a *society* can be established, provided that it claims for itself the right which each one has of avenging himself and of judging good and evil, and that it therefore has the power of prescribing a common rule of life and of making laws, and of enforcing them not by reason, which cannot restrain the affects (by Schol. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 375]), but by threats. This society, established by laws and by the power of preserving itself, is called a *state*, and those who are defended by its right are called *citizens*.

From this we easily understand that in the natural state there is nothing which is good or evil by the consent of all, since each one who is in the natural state looks only to his own advantage, and decides what is good and what evil according to his own temperament, and insofar as he takes account only of his own advantage, and is bound by no law to obey anyone but himself alone; and so in the natural state sin cannot be conceived. It is otherwise in the civil state, where it is decided by common consent what is good and what evil, and each one is bound to obey the state. *Sin*, therefore, is nothing but disobedience, which is for that reason punished only by the right of the state; and on the other hand obedience is counted as *merit* in a citizen, because by that very fact he is judged worthy to enjoy the advantages of the state.

Next, in the natural state no one is master of anything by common consent, nor is there anything in nature which can be said to be this man's and not that man's; but all things are everyone's; and accordingly in the natural state no will can be conceived of giving to each his own, or of taking from someone what is his; that is, in the natural state nothing is done which can be called *just* or *unjust*. It is otherwise in the civil state, where it is decided by common consent what is this man's and what is that man's. From which it is evident that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which explain the nature of the mind.[332] But enough of these things.

Cited in 4P45C2 [p. 411], 4P73D [p. 449], 4App15 [p. 453]

[332] Like the agreement of an idea with its object, which Part II, Def. 4, Expl. [p. 121] sets aside as extrinsic, they are relations to something outside the mind (here the laws and the common consent of a state), not properties of the mind itself.

Propositio XXXVIII

[G II 239] *Id quod corpus humanum ita disponit, ut pluribus modis possit affici, vel quod idem aptum reddit ad corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, homini est utile; et eo utilius, quo corpus ab eo aptius redditur, ut pluribus modis afficiatur, aliaque corpora afficiat; et contra id noxium est, quod corpus ad haec minus aptum reddit.*

Demonstratio. Quo corpus ad haec aptius redditur, eo mens aptior ad percipiendum redditur (per prop. 14. P. 2.); adeoque id, quod corpus hac ratione disponit aptumque ad haec reddit, est necessario bonum seu utile (per prop. 26. et 27. huius), et eo utilius, quo corpus ad haec aptius potest reddere; et contra (per eandem prop. 14. P. 2. inversam et prop. 26. et 27. huius) noxium, si corpus ad haec minus aptum reddat. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXIX

Quae efficiunt, ut motus et quietis ratio, quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, bona sunt; et ea contra mala, quae efficiunt, ut corporis humani partes aliam ad invicem motus et quietis habeant rationem.

Demonstratio. Corpus humanum indiget, ut conservetur, plurimis aliis corporibus (per postul. 4. P. 2.). At id, quod formam humani corporis constituit, in hoc consistit, quod eius partes motus suos certa quadam ratione sibi invicem communicent (per defin. ante lemm. 4. quam vide post prop. 13. P. 2.). Ergo quae efficiunt, ut motus et quietis ratio, quam corporis humani partes ad invicem habent, conservetur, eadem humani corporis formam conservant, et consequenter efficiunt (per postul. 3. et 6. P. 2.) ut corpus humanum multis modis affici, et ut idem corpora externa multis modis afficere possit; adeoque (per prop. praeced.) bona sunt.

Deinde quae efficiunt, ut corporis humani partes aliam motus et quietis rationem obtineant, eadem (per eandem defin. P. 2.) efficiunt, ut corpus humanum aliam formam induat, hoc est (ut per se notum, et in fine praef. huius partis monuimus) ut corpus humanum destruatur, et consequenter ut omnino ineptum reddatur, ne possit pluribus modis affici, ac proinde (per prop. praeced.) mala sunt. Q. E. D.

[G II 240] Scholium. Quantum haec menti obesse vel prodesse possunt in P. 5. explicabitur. Sed hic notandum, quod corpus tum mortem obire intelligam, quando eius partes ita disponuntur, ut aliam motus et quietis rationem ad invicem obtineant. Nam negare non audeo corpus humanum

Proposition XXXVIII

What so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is useful to man;[333] *and the more useful, the more capable it renders the body of being affected in many ways and of affecting other bodies; and on the contrary, that is harmful which renders the body less capable of these things.*

Cited in 4P39D [p. 405], 4P41D [p. 407], 4P42D [p. 407], 4P43D [p. 409], 4App27 [p. 457], 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. The more capable the body is rendered of these things, the more capable the mind is rendered of perceiving (by Prop. 14 of Part II [p. 159]); and so what disposes the body in this way and renders it capable of these things is necessarily good, or useful (by Props. 26 [p. 385] and 27 of this Part [p. 387]), and the more useful, the more capable it can render the body of these things; and on the contrary (by the same Prop. 14 of Part II [p. 159], inverted, and Props. 26 [p. 385] and 27 of this Part [p. 387]) it is harmful if it renders the body less capable of these things. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXIX

Those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved are good; and on the contrary, those are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different ratio of motion and rest to one another.

Cited in 4P42D [p. 407], 4App27 [p. 457]

Demonstration. The human body needs a great many other bodies in order to be preserved (by Post. 4 of Part II [p. 157]). But what constitutes the form of the human body consists in this, that its parts communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed ratio (by the Def. [p. 153] before Lemma 4 [p. 153], which see after Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 141]). Therefore those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved also preserve the form of the human body, and consequently bring it about (by Posts. 3 [p. 157] and 6 of Part II [p. 157]) that the human body can be affected in many ways, and that it can affect external bodies in many ways; and so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 405]) they are good.

Next, those things which bring it about that the parts of the human body obtain a different ratio of motion and rest bring it about (by the same Def. of Part II [p. 153]) that the human body takes on another form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we pointed out at the end of the Preface of this Part [p. 353]), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently that it is rendered entirely incapable of being affected in many ways; and accordingly (by the preceding Prop. [p. 405]) they are evil. Q.E.D.

Scholium. How far these things can harm or benefit the mind will be explained in Part V. But it should be noted here that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they obtain a different ratio of motion and rest to one another.[334] For I dare not deny that the

[333] The body's capacities matter for the mind (Part II, Prop. 14 [p. 159]), and Part V draws the last consequence: 'he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal' (Part V, Prop. 39 [p. 519]).

[334] Death is defined by the form of the body as the physical digression after Part II, Prop. 13 [p. 153] defines it, a fixed ratio in which the parts communicate their motions, and not by the cessation of the functions on account of which a body is thought to live. Identity through change is the subject of Lemmas 4–7 there.

retenta sanguinis circulatione et aliis, propter quae corpus vivere existimatur, posse nihilominus in aliam naturam a sua prorsus diversam mutari. Nam nulla ratio me cogit, ut statuam corpus non mori, nisi mutetur in cadaver; quin ipsa experientia aliud suadere videtur.

Fit namque aliquando, ut homo tales patiatur mutationes, ut non facile eundem illum esse dixerim, ut de quodam hispano poeta narrare audivi, qui morbo correptus fuerat et quamvis ex eo convaluerit, mansit tamen praeteritae suae vitae tam oblitus, ut fabulas et tragoedias, quas fecerat, suas non crediderit esse, et sane pro infante adulto haberi potuisset, si vernaculae etiam linguae fuisset oblitus. Et si hoc incredibile videtur, quid de infantibus dicemus, quorum naturam homo provectae aetatis a sua tam diversam esse credit, ut persuaderi non posset, se unquam infantem fuisse, nisi ex aliis de se coniecturam faceret? Sed ne superstitiosis materiam suppeditem movendi novas quaestiones, malo haec in medio relinquere.

Propositio XL

[G II 241] *Quae ad hominum communem societatem conducunt, sive quae efficiunt, ut homines concorditer vivant, utilia sunt, et illa contra mala, quae discordiam in civitatem inducunt.*

Demonstratio. Nam quae efficiunt ut homines concorditer vivant, simul efficiunt, ut ex ductu rationis vivant (per prop. 35. huius), atque adeo (per prop. 26. et 27. huius) bona sunt, et (per eandem rationem) illa contra mala sunt, quae discordias concitant. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLI

Laetitia directe mala non est, sed bona; tristitia autem contra directe est mala.

Demonstratio. Laetitia (per prop. 11. P. 3. cum eiusdem schol.) est affectus, quo corporis agendi potentia augetur vel iuvatur; tristitia autem contra est affectus, quo corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) laetitia directe bona est etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLII

Hilaritas excessum habere nequit, sed semper bona est, et contra melancholia semper mala.

Demonstratio. Hilaritas (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) est laetitia, quae, quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod corporis omnes partes pariter sint affectae, hoc est (per prop. 11. P. 3.) quod corporis agendi potentia augetur vel iuvatur, ita ut omnes eius partes eandem ad invicem motus et quietis rationem obtineant; atque adeo (per prop. 39. huius) hilaritas semper

human body, while the circulation of the blood and the other things on account of which the body is thought to live are retained, can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely different from its own. For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse; indeed experience itself seems to suggest otherwise.
For it sometimes happens that a man undergoes such changes that I should not easily say he was the same man, as I have heard told of a certain Spanish poet who had been seized by an illness and, although he recovered from it, remained so forgetful of his past life that he did not believe the stories and tragedies he had written were his own; and he could certainly have been taken for a grown-up infant if he had also forgotten his native language. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of advanced age believes their nature to be so different from his own that he could not be persuaded that he had ever been an infant, if he did not make a conjecture about himself from others. But so as not to give the superstitious material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave these matters undecided.
Cited in 5P38S [p. 517]

Proposition XL

Things which conduce to the common society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; and on the contrary, those are evil which introduce discord into the state.

Demonstration. For things which bring it about that men live harmoniously at the same time bring it about that they live from the guidance of reason (by Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 393]), and so (by Props. 26 [p. 385] and 27 of this Part [p. 387]) they are good; and (by the same reasoning) on the contrary those are evil which arouse discords. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLI

Joy is not directly evil, but good;[335] *sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil.*
Cited in 4P43D [p. 409], 4P45S2 [p. 411], 4P47D [p. 415], 4P50D [p. 417], 4P59D [p. 427]

Demonstration. Joy (by Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247] with its Schol. [p. 247]) is an affect by which the body's power of acting is increased or aided; sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body's power of acting is diminished or restrained; and so (by Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 405]) joy is directly good, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLII

Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good; and on the contrary, melancholy is always evil.

Demonstration. Cheerfulness (see its definition in Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]) is a joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this, that all the parts of the body are equally affected, that is (by Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]), that the body's power of acting is increased or aided in such a way that all its parts maintain the same ratio of motion and rest to

[335] 'Directly': in itself, as an increase of the power of acting. Props. 43 [p. 409] and 44 [p. 409] show how a joy can become evil through excess, and how a sadness can then be good by restraining it.

est bona, nec excessum habere potest.

At melancholia (cuius etiam defin. vide in eodem schol. prop. 11. P. 3.)[ku] est tristitia, quae quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod corporis agendi potentia absolute[kv] minuitur vel coercetur; adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) semper est mala. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLIII

[G II 242] *Titillatio excessum habere potest et mala esse; dolor autem eatenus potest esse bonus, quatenus titillatio seu laetitia est mala.*

Demonstratio. Titillatio est laetitia, quae, quatenus ad corpus refertur, in hoc consistit, quod una vel aliquot eius partes prae reliquis afficiuntur (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.),[kw] cuius affectus potentia tanta esse potest, ut reliquas corporis actiones superet (per prop. 6. huius), eique pertinaciter adhaereat, atque adeo impediat, quominus corpus aptum sit, ut plurimis aliis modis afficiatur; adeoque (per prop. 38. huius) mala esse potest. Deinde dolor, qui contra tristitia est, in se solo consideratus non potest esse bonus (per prop. 41. huius).

Verum quia eius vis et incrementum definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata (per prop. 5. huius), possumus ergo huius affectus infinitos virium concipere gradus et modos (per prop. 3. huius); atque adeo eundem talem concipere, qui titillationem possit coercere, ut excessum non habeat, et eatenus (per primam partem prop. huius) efficere, ne corpus minus aptum reddatur, ac proinde eatenus erit bonus. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLIV

Amor et cupiditas excessum habere possunt.

Demonstratio. Amor est laetitia (per aff. defin. 6.) concomitante idea causae externae. Titillatio igitur (per schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) concomitante idea causae externae amor est; atque adeo amor (per prop. praeced.) excessum habere potest. Deinde cupiditas eo est maior, quo affectus, ex quo oritur, maior est (per prop. 37. P. 3.). Quare ut affectus (per prop. 6. huius) reliquas hominis actiones superare potest, sic etiam cupiditas, quae ex eodem affectu oritur, reliquas cupiditates superare, ac proinde eundem excessum habere poterit, quem in praeced. prop. titillationem habere ostendimus. Q. E. D.

[G II 243] Scholium. Hilaritas, quam bonam esse dixi, concipitur facilius, quam observatur.

[ku](cuius etiam defin. vide in eodem schol. prop. 11. P. 3.)] *transcr.* (cuius etiam defin. vide in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 198) and Gebhardt (G II 242) read 'in eodem Schol.'; the transcription omits 'eodem'.

[kv]in hoc consistit, quod corporis agendi potentia absolute] *transcr.* in hoc solo consistit, quod corporis agendi potentia absolute. The 1677 edition (OP p. 198), Gebhardt (G II 242) and Bartuschat have no 'solo' here.

[kw](vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11. P. 3.)] *transcr.* (vide eius defin. in schol. prop. 11 P. 3.). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 242).

one another; and so (by Prop. 39 of this Part [p. 405]) cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive.
But melancholy (whose definition also see in the same Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]) is a sadness which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this, that the body's power of acting is absolutely diminished or restrained; and so (by Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 405]) it is always evil. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLIII

Pleasure can be excessive and be evil; but pain can be good insofar as pleasure, or joy, is evil.
Cited in 4P43D [p. 409], 4P44D [p. 409], 4P47D [p. 415], 4P59D [p. 427]

Demonstration. Pleasure is a joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this, that one or several of its parts are affected more than the rest (see its definition in Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]); the power of this affect can be so great that it surpasses the other actions of the body (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 365]) and clings stubbornly to it, and so prevents the body from being capable of being affected in very many other ways; and so (by Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 405]) it can be evil. Next, pain, which on the contrary is a sadness, cannot, considered in itself alone, be good (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 407]).
But because its force and increase are defined by the power of an external cause compared with ours (by Prop. 5 of this Part [p. 363]), we can therefore conceive infinite degrees and modes of the strength of this affect (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 361]); and so we can conceive it such that it can restrain pleasure so that it is not excessive, and to that extent (by the first part of this Prop. [p. 409]) bring it about that the body is not rendered less capable; and accordingly to that extent it will be good. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLIV

Love and desire can be excessive.

Demonstration. Love is joy (by Def. Aff. 6 [p. 321]) accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Pleasure, therefore (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]), accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love; and so love (by the preceding Prop. [p. 409]) can be excessive. Next, desire is the greater, the greater the affect from which it arises (by Prop. 37 of Part III [p. 281]). Hence, as an affect (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 365]) can surpass the other actions of a man, so also the desire which arises from that affect can surpass the other desires, and accordingly can have the same excess which we showed in the preceding Prop. [p. 409] that pleasure has. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Cheerfulness, which I said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the

Nam affectus, quibus quotidie conflictamur, referuntur plerumque ad aliquam corporis partem, quae prae reliquis afficitur, ac proinde affectus ut plurimum excessum habent, et mentem in sola unius obiecti contemplatione ita detinent, ut de aliis cogitare nequeat; et quamvis homines pluribus affectibus obnoxii sint, atque adeo rari reperiantur, qui semper uno eodemque affectu conflictentur, non desunt tamen, quibus unus idemque affectus pertinaciter adhaereat. Videmus enim homines aliquando ab uno obiecto ita affici, ut, quamvis praesens non sit, ipsum tamen coram habere credant, quod quando homini non dormienti accidit, eundem delirare dicimus vel insanire; nec minus insanire creduntur, qui amore ardent, quique noctes atque dies solam amasiam vel meretricem somniant, quia risum movere solent. At cum avarus de nulla alia re, quam de lucro vel de nummis cogitet, et ambitiosus de gloria etc., hi non creduntur delirare, quia molesti solent esse et odio digni aestimantur. Sed revera avaritia, ambitio, libido etc. delirii species sunt, quamvis inter morbos non numerentur.

Propositio XLV

Odium nunquam potest esse bonum.

Demonstratio. Hominem quem odimus destruere conamur (per prop. 39. P. 3.) hoc est (per prop. 37. huius) aliquid conamur quod malum est. Ergo etc. Q. E. D.

[G II 244] Scholium I. Nota me hic et in seqq. per odium illud tantum intelligere quod est erga homines.

Corollarium I. Invidia, irrisio, contemptus, ira, vindicta et reliqui affectus, qui ad odium referuntur vel ex eodem oriuntur, mali sunt, quod etiam ex prop. 39. P. 3. et prop. 37. huius patet.[kx]

Corollarium II. Quicquid ex eo, quod odio affecti sumus, appetimus, turpe et in civitate iniustum est. Quod etiam patet ex prop. 39. P. 3., et ex defin. turpis et iniusti, quas vide in schol. prop. 37. huius.[ky]

Scholium II. Inter *irrisionem* (quam in coroll. 1. malam esse dixi) et *risum* magnam agnosco differentiam. Nam risus, ut et iocus, mera est laetitia; adeoque modo excessum non habeat, per se bonus est (per prop. 41. huius). Nihil profecto nisi torva et tristis superstitio delectari prohibet. Nam qui magis decet famem et sitim extinguere, quam melancholiam expellere?

Mea haec est ratio et sic animum induxi meum. Nullum numen, nec alius nisi invidus, mea

[kx] et prop. 37. huius patet] *transcr.* et prop. 37 huius patet. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 244).

[ky] quas vide in schol. prop. 37. huius] *transcr.* quas vide in schol. 1. et 2. prop. 37. huius. The 1677 edition (OP p. 200), Gebhardt (G II 244) and Bartuschat read 'in Schol. Prop. 37. hujus', without the numbers.

affects by which we are daily troubled are generally related to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest, and so the affects are for the most part excessive, and so hold the mind in the contemplation of one object alone that it cannot think of others; and although men are subject to many affects, and so few are found who are always troubled by one and the same affect, still there are not lacking those to whom one and the same affect stubbornly clings.
For we see that men are sometimes so affected by one object that, although it is not present, they still believe they have it before them; and when this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or mad. Nor are those believed to be less mad who burn with love, and who dream night and day only of a mistress or a courtesan, because they usually provoke laughter. But when a greedy man thinks of nothing else but profit or money, and an ambitious man of glory, etc., they are not believed to be delirious, because they are usually troublesome and are thought worthy of hatred. But in truth greed, ambition, lust, etc., are species of madness, although they are not numbered among diseases.
Cited in 4P58S [p. 427], 4P60S [p. 429], 4App30 [p. 459]

Proposition XLV

Hatred can never be good.
Cited in 4P51S [p. 417]

Demonstration. We strive to destroy the man we hate (by Prop. 39 of Part III [p. 283]), that is (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]), we strive for something which is evil. Therefore, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium I. Note that here and in what follows I understand by hatred only hatred towards men.

Corollary I. Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, vengeance and the other affects which are related to hatred or arise from it are evil, which is also evident from Prop. 39 of Part III [p. 283] and Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397].
Cited in 4P45S2 [p. 411], 4P46D [p. 413], 4P59D2 [p. 429]

Corollary II. Whatever we want from the fact that we are affected with hatred is base, and in the state unjust. This is also evident from Prop. 39 of Part III [p. 283], and from the definitions of base and unjust, which see in the Scholia of Prop. 37 of this Part (Schol. 1 [p. 399], Schol. 2 [p. 401]).

Scholium II. Between *mockery* (which I said in Cor. 1 [p. 411] is evil) and *laughter* I recognize a great difference. For laughter, like jest, is pure joy; and so, provided it is not excessive, it is good in itself (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 407]). Nothing, certainly, but grim and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves. For why is it more fitting to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive out melancholy?
This is my reasoning, and so I have persuaded myself.[336] No deity, nor anyone else but an envious

[336] *Mea haec est ratio et sic animum induxi meum*: the words of Micio, the indulgent father in Terence's *Adelphoe* (line 68): 'Mea sic est ratio, et sic animum induco meum'.

impotentia et incommodo delectatur, nec nobis lacrimas, singultus, metum et alia huiusmodi, quae animi impotentis sunt signa, virtuti ducit; sed contra, quo maiore laetitia afficimur, eo ad maiorem perfectionem transimus, hoc est, eo nos magis de natura divina participare necesse est. Rebus itaque uti et iis, quantum fieri potest, delectari (non quidem ad nauseam usque, nam hoc delectari non est) viri est sapientis.

Viri, inquam, sapientis est moderato et suavi cibo et potu se reficere et recreare, ut et odoribus, plantarum virentium amoenitate, ornatu, musica, ludis exercitatoriis, theatris et aliis huiusmodi, quibus unusquisque absque ullo alterius damno uti potest.
Corpus namque humanum ex plurimis diversae naturae partibus componitur, quae continuo novo alimento indigent et vario, ut totum corpus ad omnia, quae ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, aeque aptum sit, et consequenter ut mens etiam aeque apta sit ad plura simul intelligendum. Hoc itaque vivendi institutum et cum nostris principiis et cum communi praxi optime convenit; quare si quae alia, haec vivendi ratio optima est et omnibus modis commendanda, nec opus est de his clarius, neque prolixius agere.

Propositio XLVI

[G II 245] *Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest, conatur alterius in ipsum odium, iram, contemptum etc. amore contra sive generositate compensare.*

Demonstratio. Omnes odii affectus mali sunt (per coroll. 1. praeced. prop.); adeoque qui ex ductu rationis vivit, quantum potest conabitur efficere, ne odii affectibus conflictetur (per prop. 19. huius), et consequenter (per prop. 37. huius) conabitur, ne etiam alius eosdem patiatur affectus. At odium odio reciproco augetur et amore contra extingui potest (per prop. 43. P. 3.), ita ut odium in amorem transeat (per prop. 44. P. 3.).

Ergo qui ex ductu rationis vivit, alterius odium etc. amore contra compensare conabitur, hoc est, generositate (cuius defin. vide in schol. prop. 59. P. 3.). Q. E. D.

Scholium. Qui iniurias reciproco odio vindicare vult, misere profecto vivit. At qui contra studet odium amore expugnare, ille sane laetus et secure pugnat; aeque facile pluribus hominibus ac uni resistit,[kz] et fortunae auxilio quam minime indiget. Quos vero vincit, ii laeti cedunt, non quidem ex defectu sed ex incremento virium. Quae omnia adeo clare ex solis amoris et intellectus definitionibus sequuntur, ut opus non sit eadem sigillatim demonstrare.

[kz] The 1677 edition (OP p. 201) has *aeque facile uni homini, ac pluribus*; the Dutch first translates this and then, in its list of corrections, turns it round (*veel menschen, als een enige*), which, as Leopold remarks, is certainly what Spinoza meant to write. Gebhardt (G II 245; Textgestaltung II 382) prints the corrected order.

man, takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune, or counts as virtue our tears, sobs, fear and other things of this kind, which are signs of a mind lacking in power; on the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, that is, the more we must participate in the divine nature. It is the part of a wise man, therefore, to use things and to take pleasure in them as far as possible (not, indeed, to the point of disgust, for that is not taking pleasure).

It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with ornament, music, sports, theatres and other things of this kind which anyone can use without any harm to another.

For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which continually need new and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things at once. This way of life, therefore, agrees best both with our principles and with common practice; so, if any other, this way of living is the best and is to be commended in every way; nor is there any need to treat of these things more clearly or at greater length.

Cited in 4App31 [p. 459]

Proposition XLVI

He who lives from the guidance of reason strives as far as he can to repay another's hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him with love in return, or nobility.[337]

Cited in 4P73S [p. 449], 5P10S [p. 483]

Demonstration. All affects of hatred are evil (by Cor. 1 of the preceding Prop. [p. 411]); and so he who lives from the guidance of reason will strive as far as he can to bring it about that he is not troubled by affects of hatred (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 379]), and consequently (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]) he will strive that no one else suffers these affects either. But hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and on the contrary can be extinguished by love (by Prop. 43 of Part III [p. 289]), so that hatred passes into love (by Prop. 44 of Part III [p. 289]).

Therefore he who lives from the guidance of reason will strive to repay another's hatred, etc., with love in return, that is, with nobility (whose definition see in Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]). Q.E.D.

Scholium. He who wants to avenge injuries by reciprocal hatred lives miserably indeed. But he who strives, on the contrary, to conquer hatred by love certainly fights joyfully and securely; he resists many men as easily as one, and needs the help of fortune least of all. Those whom he conquers yield joyfully, not from a lack but from an increase of their powers. All these things follow so clearly from the definitions of love and intellect alone that there is no need to demonstrate them one by one.

[337] The precept resembles the Gospel's 'diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos' ('love your enemies, do good to those who hate you', Matthew 5:44, Vulgate), but it is derived from the laws of the affects: hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred and can be extinguished by love (Part III, Props. 43–44 [p. 289]).

Propositio XLVII

Spei et metus affectus non possunt esse per se boni.

[G II 246] Demonstratio. Spei et metus affectus sine tristitia non dantur. Nam metus est (per aff. defin. 13.) tristitia, et spes (vide explicationem aff. defin. 12. et 13.) non datur sine metu. Ac proinde (per prop. 41. huius) hi affectus non possunt esse per se boni, sed tantum quatenus laetitiae excessum coercere possunt[la] (per prop. 43. huius). Q. E. D.

Scholium. Huc accedit, quod hi affectus cognitionis defectum et mentis impotentiam indicant; et hac de causa etiam securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiae morsus animi impotentis sunt signa. Nam quamvis securitas et gaudium affectus sint laetitiae, tristitiam tamen eosdem praecessisse supponunt, nempe spem et metum. Quo itaque magis ex ductu rationis vivere conamur, eo magis spe minus pendere et metu nosmet liberare, et fortunae, quantum possumus, imperare conamur, nostrasque actiones certo rationis consilio dirigere.

Propositio XLVIII

Affectus existimationis et despectus semper mali sunt.

Demonstratio. Hi enim affectus (per aff. defin. 21. et 22.) rationi repugnant; adeoque (per prop. 26. et 27. huius) mali sunt. Q. E. D.

Propositio XLIX

Existimatio facile hominem, qui existimatur, superbum reddit.

Demonstratio. Si videmus, aliquem de nobis plus iusto prae amore sentire, facile gloriabimur (per schol. prop. 41. P. 3.) sive laetitia afficiemur (per aff. defin. 30.[lb]), et id boni, quod de nobis praedicari audimus, facile credemus (per prop. 25. P. 3.). Atque adeo de nobis prae amore nostri plus iusto sentiemus, hoc est (per aff. defin. 28.[lc]) facile superbiemus. Q. E. D.

[la] The 1677 edition (OP p. 202) has *excessus*, which might be meant as *excessûs*; the Dutch has *d'overmaat*, and Gebhardt (G II 246; Textgestaltung II 382) reads *excessum*, as Halpern asks, comparing the phrase in Props. 42–43.

[lb] The 1677 edition (OP p. 202) has *per 29 Affect. Defin.*, and so the Dutch; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to *30.*, and Gebhardt (G II 246; Textgestaltung II 382–383) follows.

[lc] The 1677 edition has *per Def. 27. Affect.*, and so the Dutch; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to *28.*, and Gebhardt (G II 246; Textgestaltung II 383) follows. He infers from the two references, each one too low, that Spinoza added a definition of the affects after this demonstration was written.

Cited in 4App15 [p. 453], 5P10S [p. 483]

Proposition XLVII

The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves.

Demonstration. The affects of hope and fear are not given without sadness. For fear is (by Def. Aff. 13 [p. 323]) sadness, and hope (see the explanation of Defs. Aff. 12 and 13 [p. 325]) is not given without fear. And accordingly (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 407]) these affects cannot be good in themselves, but only insofar as they can restrain an excess of joy (by Prop. 43 of this Part [p. 409]). Q.E.D.

Scholium. Add to this that these affects indicate a lack of knowledge and a lack of power of the mind; and for this reason also confidence, despair, gladness and remorse are signs of a mind lacking in power. For although confidence and gladness are affects of joy, they still presuppose that a sadness has preceded them, namely hope and fear. The more, therefore, we strive to live from the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear, to command fortune as far as we can, and to direct our actions by the sure counsel of reason.

Proposition XLVIII

The affects of overestimation and scorn are always evil.

Demonstration. For these affects (by Defs. Aff. 21 [p. 327] and 22 [p. 327]) are opposed to reason; and so (by Props. 26 [p. 385] and 27 of this Part [p. 387]) they are evil. Q.E.D.

Proposition XLIX

Overestimation easily makes the man who is overestimated proud.

Demonstration. If we see that someone, out of love, thinks more highly of us than is just, we shall easily exult in glory (by Schol. of Prop. 41 of Part III [p. 287]), or be affected with joy (by Def. Aff. 30 [p. 331]), and we shall easily believe the good which we hear predicated of us (by Prop. 25 of Part III [p. 265]). And so, out of love of ourselves, we shall think more highly of ourselves than is just, that is (by Def. Aff. 28 [p. 329]), we shall easily become proud. Q.E.D.

Propositio L

[G II 247] *Commiseratio in homine, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala et inutilis est.*

Demonstratio. Commiseratio enim (per aff. defin. 18.) tristitia est, ac proinde (per prop. 41. huius) per se mala. Bonum autem, quod ex ea sequitur, quod scilicet hominem cuius nos miseret, a miseria liberare conamur (per coroll. 3. prop. 27. P. 3.), ex solo rationis dictamine facere cupimus (per prop. 37. huius), nec nisi ex solo rationis dictamine aliquid, quod certo scimus bonum esse, agere possumus (per prop. 27. huius). Atque adeo commiseratio in homine, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, per se mala est et inutilis. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod homo qui ex dictamine rationis vivit, conatur, quantum potest, efficere ne commiseratione tangatur.

Scholium. Qui recte novit, omnia ex naturae divinae necessitate sequi et secundum aeternas naturae leges et regulas fieri, is sane nihil reperiet, quod odio, risu aut contemptu dignum sit, nec cuiusquam miserebitur; sed quantum humana fert virtus, conabitur bene agere, ut aiunt, et laetari.
Huc accedit, quod is, qui commiserationis affectu facile tangitur et alterius miseria vel lacrimis movetur, saepe aliquid agit, cuius postea ipsum poenitet; tam quia ex affectu nihil agimus, quod certo scimus bonum esse, quam quia facile falsis lacrimis decipimur. Atque hic expresse loquor de homine, qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam qui nec ratione, nec commiseratione movetur, ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur; nam (per prop. 27. P. 3.) homini dissimilis esse videtur.[ld]

Propositio LI

[G II 248] *Favor rationi non repugnat, sed cum eadem convenire et ab eadem oriri potest.*

Demonstratio. Est enim favor amor erga illum, qui alteri benefecit (per aff. defin. 19.). Atque adeo ad mentem referri potest, quatenus haec agere dicitur (per prop. 59. P. 3.), hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.) quatenus intelligit; ac proinde cum ratione convenit etc. Q. E. D.

Aliter. Qui ex ductu rationis vivit, bonum, quod sibi appetit, alteri etiam cupit (per prop. 37. huius). Quare ex eo, quod ipse aliquem videt alteri benefacere, ipsius benefaciendi conatus iuvatur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 11. P. 3.) laetabitur,[le] idque (ex hypothesi) concomitante idea illius, qui alteri benefecit; ac proinde (per aff. defin. 19.) ei favet. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Indignatio, prout ipsa a nobis definitur (vide aff. defin. 20.), est necessario mala (per

[ld] Gebhardt (G II 247; Textgestaltung II 383) adds from the Dutch version, at the end of the Scholium, *of alle menschelijkheit uitgetrokken te hebben* ('or to have stripped off all humanity'), which is missing from the 1677 Latin.
[le] The 1677 edition (OP p. 204) has *per Prop. 11. p. 3.*, and so the Dutch; Van Vloten–Land correct to *per Schol. Prop. 11. p. 3.*, and Gebhardt (G II 248; Textgestaltung II 383) follows.

Proposition L

Pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless.

Demonstration. For pity (by Def. Aff. 18 [p. 325]) is sadness, and accordingly (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 407]) in itself evil. But the good which follows from it, namely that we strive to free the man we pity from his misery (by Cor. 3 of Prop. 27 of Part III [p. 269]), we desire to do from the dictate of reason alone (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]), and only from the dictate of reason alone can we do something which we certainly know to be good (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 387]). And so pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that a man who lives from the dictate of reason strives, as far as he can, not to be touched by pity.

Scholium. He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature and happen according to the eternal laws and rules of nature will certainly find nothing worthy of hatred, laughter or contempt, nor will he pity anyone; but as far as human virtue allows, he will strive to act well, as they say, and to rejoice.[338]
Add to this that he who is easily touched by the affect of pity, and moved by another's misery or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets, both because from affect we do nothing which we certainly know to be good, and because we are easily deceived by false tears. And here I speak expressly of a man who lives from the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor by pity to help others is rightly called inhuman. For (by Prop. 27 of Part III [p. 267]) he seems to be unlike a man.
Cited in 4P73S [p. 449]

Proposition LI

Favour is not opposed to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.

Demonstration. For favour is love towards one who has benefited another (by Def. Aff. 19 [p. 327]). And so it can be related to the mind insofar as the mind is said to act (by Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]), that is (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), insofar as it understands; and accordingly it agrees with reason, etc. Q.E.D.

Alternatively. He who lives from the guidance of reason desires for another also the good which he wants for himself (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]). Hence from the fact that he sees someone benefit another, his own striving to do good is aided, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 11 of Part III [p. 247]), he will rejoice, and that (by hypothesis) accompanied by the idea of the one who benefited another; and accordingly (by Def. Aff. 19 [p. 327]) he favours him. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Indignation, as it is defined by us (see Def. Aff. 20 [p. 327]), is necessarily evil (by

[338] *bene agere, ut aiunt, et laetari*. The saying recalls Ecclesiastes 3:12: 'יָדַעְתִּי כִּי אֵין טוֹב בָּם כִּי אִם־לִשְׂמוֹחַ וְלַעֲשׂוֹת טוֹב בְּחַיָּיו' ('I know that there is nothing better for them than to rejoice and to do good in their life'; Vulgate: *non esset melius nisi laetari, et facere bene in vita sua*).

prop. 45. huius). Sed notandum, quod quando summa potestas desiderio, quo tenetur, tutandae pacis, civem punit, qui alteri iniuriam fecit,[lf] eandem civi indignari non dico, quia non odio percita ad perdendum civem, sed pietate mota eundem punit.

Propositio LII

Acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oriri potest, et ea sola acquiescentia, quae ex ratione oritur, summa est quae potest dari.

Demonstratio. Acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur (per aff. defin. 25.). At vera hominis agendi potentia seu virtus est ipsa ratio (per prop. 3. P. 3.), quam homo clare et distincte contemplatur (per prop. 40. et 43. P. 2.). Ergo acquiescentia in se ipso ex ratione oritur.

Deinde nihil homo, dum se ipsum contemplatur, clare et distincte sive adaequate percipit, nisi ea quae ex ipsius agendi potentia sequuntur (per defin. 2. P. 3.), hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.), quae ex ipsius intelligendi potentia sequuntur. Adeoque ex sola hac contemplatione summa, quae dari potest, acquiescentia oritur. Q. E. D.

[G II 249] Scholium. Est revera acquiescentia in se ipso summum, quod sperare possumus. Nam (ut prop. 25. huius ostendimus) nemo suum esse alicuius finis causa conservare conatur; et quia haec acquiescentia magis magisque fovetur et corroboratur laudibus (per coroll. prop. 53. P. 3.), et contra (per coroll. prop. 55. P. 3.)[lg] vituperio magis magisque turbatur, ideo gloria maxime ducimur et vitam cum probro vix ferre possumus.

Propositio LIII

Humilitas virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur.

Demonstratio. Humilitas est tristitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur (per aff. defin. 26.). Quatenus autem homo se ipsum vera ratione cognoscit, eatenus suam essentiam intelligere supponitur, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) suam potentiam. Quare si homo, dum se ipsum contemplatur, aliquam suam impotentiam percipit, id non ex eo est, quod se intelligit, sed (ut prop. 55. P. 3. ostendimus)[lh] ex eo, quod ipsius agendi potentia coercetur.

[lf] civem punit, qui alteri iniuriam fecit] *transcr.* civem punit qui, alteri iniuriam fecit. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 204) and Gebhardt (G II 248).
[lg] (per coroll. prop. 55. P. 3.)] *transcr.* (per coroll. 1. prop. 55. P. 3.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 205) and Gebhardt (G II 249) read 'per Coroll. Prop. 55. p. 3.', without the number.
[lh] (ut prop. 55. P. 3. ostendimus)] *transcr.* (ut prop. 55. P. 3.ostendimus). Word division.

Prop. 45 of this Part [p. 411]). But it should be noted that when the sovereign power, from the desire by which it is bound to preserve peace, punishes a citizen who has done an injury to another, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it punishes him not because it is roused by hatred to destroy him, but because it is moved by piety.

Proposition LII

Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only that self-contentment which arises from reason is the greatest there can be.
Cited in 5P10S [p. 483]

Demonstration. Self-contentment is a joy arising from the fact that a man contemplates himself and his power of acting (by Def. Aff. 25 [p. 327]). But a man's true power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), which man contemplates clearly and distinctly (by Props. 40 [p. 185] and 43 of Part II [p. 191]). Therefore self-contentment arises from reason.
Next, a man, while he contemplates himself, perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except those things which follow from his power of acting (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]), that is (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), which follow from his power of understanding. And so from this contemplation alone arises the greatest self-contentment there can be. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Self-contentment is in truth the highest thing we can hope for.[339] For (as we showed in Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 385]) no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of some end; and because this self-contentment is more and more encouraged and strengthened by praise (by Cor. of Prop. 53 of Part III [p. 301]), and on the contrary (by Cor. of Prop. 55 of Part III [p. 303]) is more and more disturbed by blame, we are therefore led most by glory and can hardly bear a life in disgrace.
Cited in 4P58S [p. 425]

Proposition LIII

Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.
Cited in 4P54D [p. 421]

Demonstration. Humility is a sadness which arises from the fact that a man contemplates his lack of power (by Def. Aff. 26 [p. 329]). But insofar as a man knows himself by true reason, to that extent he is supposed to understand his essence, that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), his power. So if a man, while he contemplates himself, perceives some lack of power of his, this does not come from his understanding himself, but (as we showed in Prop. 55 of Part III [p. 301]) from his power of acting being restrained.

[339] Part V returns to the phrase: 'from this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be' (Part V, Prop. 27 [p. 507]). The Appendix to this Part identifies blessedness with 'the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God' (ch. 4 [p. 451]).

Quod si supponamus, hominem suam impotentiam concipere ex eo, quod aliquid se potentius intelligit, cuius cognitione suam agendi potentiam determinat, tum nihil aliud concipimus, quam quod homo se ipsum distincte intelligit sive (per prop. 26. huius),[li] quod ipsius agendi potentia iuvatur. Quare humilitas seu tristitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo suam impotentiam contemplatur, non ex vera contemplatione seu ratione oritur, nec virtus, sed passio est. Q. E. D.

Propositio LIV

[G II 250] *Poenitentia virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur, sed is, quem facti poenitet, bis miser seu impotens est.*

Demonstratio. Huius prima pars demonstratur ut praeced. prop. Secunda autem ex sola huius affectus definitione (vide aff. defin. 27.) patet. Nam primo prava cupiditate, dein tristitia vinci se patitur.

Scholium. Quia homines raro ex dictamine rationis vivunt, ideo hi duo affectus, nempe humilitas et poenitentia, et praeter hos spes et metus plus utilitatis, quam damni afferunt, atque adeo quandoquidem peccandum est, in istam partem potius peccandum. Nam si homines animo impotentes aeque omnes superbirent, nullius rei ipsos puderet, nec ipsi quicquam metuerent, qui vinculis coniungi constringique possent?[lj] Terret vulgus, nisi metuat.
Quare non mirum, quod prophetae qui non paucorum, sed communi utilitati consuluerunt, tantopere humilitatem, poenitentiam et reverentiam commendaverint. Et revera qui hisce affectibus sunt obnoxii, multo facilius, quam alii duci possunt, ut tandem ex ductu rationis vivant, hoc est ut liberi sint et beatorum vita fruantur.

Propositio LV

Maxima superbia vel abiectio est maxima sui ignorantia.

Demonstratio. Patet ex aff. defin. 28. et 29.

Propositio LVI

Maxima superbia vel abiectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat.

[G II 251] Demonstratio. Primum virtutis fundamentum est suum esse conservare (per coroll. prop. 22. huius) idque ex ductu rationis (per prop. 24. huius). Qui igitur se ipsum ignorat,

[li] The 1677 edition (OP p. 205) has no *sive*: *quod homo se ipsum distinctè intelligit, (per Prop. 26. hujus) quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur*. The Dutch has *of* before the reference, and Gebhardt (G II 249; Textgestaltung II 383–384), as Leopold asks, inserts *sive*, since the reference justifies only the equation of self-knowledge with an increase of power.
[lj] The 1677 edition (OP p. 206) has *quo vinculis*; the Dutch has *met welke banden* ('with what bonds'). Schmidt, Auerbach and Land take *quo* as an interrogative ablative; W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) read *qui*, as Appuhn prints, and Gebhardt (G II 250; Textgestaltung II 383–384) observes that this *qui* is Spinoza's usage elsewhere. He keeps the question mark, which the older editions after Paulus changed to a full stop.

But if we suppose that a man conceives his lack of power from the fact that he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his power of acting, then we conceive nothing else but that the man understands himself distinctly, or (by Prop. 26 of this Part [p. 385]) that his power of acting is aided. So humility, or the sadness which arises from the fact that a man contemplates his lack of power, does not arise from true contemplation, or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.

Proposition LIV

Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power.

Demonstration. The first part of this is demonstrated like the preceding Prop. [p. 419]; but the second is evident from the definition of this affect alone (see Def. Aff. 27 [p. 329]). For he allows himself to be conquered first by an evil desire, then by sadness.

Scholium. Because men rarely live from the dictate of reason, these two affects, namely humility and repentance, and besides these hope and fear, bring more advantage than harm; and so, since men must err, it is better that they err in that direction. For if men lacking in power of mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united and held together? The mob is a terror, unless it is afraid.[340]
So it is no wonder that the prophets, who looked to the common advantage and not to that of a few, commended humility, repentance and reverence so greatly. And in fact those who are subject to these affects can be led far more easily than others to live, in the end, from the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

Proposition LV

The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of oneself.
Cited in 4P56D [p. 421]

Demonstration. This is evident from Defs. Aff. 28 [p. 329] and 29 [p. 331].

Proposition LVI

The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest lack of power of mind.

Demonstration. The first foundation of virtue is to preserve one's being (by Cor. of Prop. 22 of this Part [p. 383]), and that from the guidance of reason (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 383]).

[340] *Terret vulgus, nisi metuat*: after Tacitus, *Annals* I.29, 'nihil in vulgo modicum; terrere ni paveant' ('there is no moderation in the mob: it terrifies unless it is afraid'). The *Political Treatise* quotes the saying among those who confine to the common people the vices that are in all mortals, and answers that nature is one and common to all (TP VII.27).

omnium virtutum fundamentum, et consequenter omnes virtutes ignorat.

Deinde ex virtute agere nihil aliud est, quam ex ductu rationis agere (per prop. 24. huius), et qui ex ductu rationis agit, scire necessario debet se ex ductu rationis agere (per prop. 43. P. 2.). Qui itaque se ipsum, et consequenter (ut iam iam ostendimus) omnes virtutes maxime ignorat, is minime ex virtute agit, hoc est (ut ex defin. 8. huius patet) maxime animo est impotens; atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) maxima superbia vel abiectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc clarissime sequitur,[lk] superbos et abiectos maxime affectibus esse obnoxios.

Scholium. Abiectio tamen facilius corrigi potest, quam superbia, quandoquidem haec laetitiae, illa autem tristitiae est affectus; atque adeo (per prop. 18. huius)[ll] haec illa fortior est.[lm]

Propositio LVII

Superbus parasitorum seu adulatorum praesentiam amat, generosorum autem odit.

Demonstratio. Superbia est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo de se plus iusto sentit (per aff. defin. 28. et 6.), quam opinionem homo superbus, quantum potest, fovere conabitur (vide schol. prop. 13. P. 3.). Adeoque superbi parasitorum[ln] vel adulatorum (horum definitiones omisi, quia nimis noti sunt) praesentiam amabunt, et generosorum, qui de ipsis, ut par est, sentiunt, fugient. Q. E. D.

[G II 252] Scholium. Nimis longum foret, hic omnia superbiae mala enumerare, quandoquidem omnibus affectibus obnoxii sunt superbi, sed nullis minus, quam affectibus amoris et misericordiae. Sed hic minime tacendum est, quod ille etiam superbus vocetur, qui de reliquis minus iusto sentit, atque adeo hoc sensu superbia definienda est, quod sit laetitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se supra reliquos esse putat. Et abiectio huic superbiae contraria definienda esset tristitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se infra reliquos esse credit.
At hoc posito facile concipimus, superbum necessario esse invidum (vide schol. prop. 55. P. 3.) et eos maxime odio habere, qui maxime ob virtutes laudantur, nec facile eorum odium amore aut beneficio vinci (vide schol. prop. 41. P. 3.), et eorum tantummodo praesentia delectari, qui animo eius impotenti morem gerunt et ex stulto insanum faciunt.

[lk] Hinc clarissime sequitur] *transcr.* Hinc clare sequitur. The 1677 edition (OP p. 207) and Gebhardt (G II 251) read 'clarissimè'.
[ll] (per prop. 18. huius)] *transcr.* (per prop. 18 huius). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 251).
[lm] The 1677 edition (OP p. 207) has *hâc illa*; the Dutch rightly has *deze leste ... sterker dan d'eerste*, in line with the preceding *haec ... illa*, and Van Vloten–Land, followed by Gebhardt (G II 251; Textgestaltung II 384), restore *haec illâ* ('the latter [pride] stronger than the former [self-abasement]').
[ln] The 1677 edition (OP p. 207) has *adeoque parasitorum, vel adulatorum praesentiam amabunt*, passing abruptly into the plural; Appuhn would read *amabit*, *de ipso*, *fugiet*. The Dutch has *De verwaanden* (glossed *Superbi*), and Gebhardt (G II 251; Textgestaltung II 384) supplies *superbi*.

He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently of all the virtues.
Next, to act from virtue is nothing but to act from the guidance of reason (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 383]), and he who acts from the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he acts from the guidance of reason (by Prop. 43 of Part II [p. 191]). He, therefore, who is most ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) of all the virtues, acts least from virtue, that is (as is evident from Def. 8 of this Part [p. 357]), is most lacking in power of mind; and so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 421]) the greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest lack of power of mind. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows most clearly that the proud and the self-abased are most subject to affects.

Scholium. Self-abasement, however, can be corrected more easily than pride, since pride is an affect of joy and self-abasement an affect of sadness; and so (by Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 377]) the former is stronger than the latter.

Proposition LVII

The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates that of the noble.

Demonstration. Pride is a joy arising from the fact that a man thinks more highly of himself than is just (by Defs. Aff. 28 [p. 329] and 6 [p. 321]), an opinion which the proud man will strive to encourage as far as he can (see Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part III [p. 251]). And so the proud will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (I have omitted their definitions because they are too well known), and will flee that of the noble, who think of them as is right. Q.E.D.

Scholium. It would take too long to enumerate here all the evils of pride, since the proud are subject to all affects, but to none less than the affects of love and compassion. But here it must by no means be passed over in silence that he too is called proud who thinks less of others than is just; and so in this sense pride is to be defined as a joy arising from the false opinion by which a man thinks he is above others. And the self-abasement contrary to this pride would be defined as a sadness arising from the false opinion by which a man believes he is below others.
But on this supposition we easily conceive that the proud man is necessarily envious (see Schol. of Prop. 55 of Part III [p. 303]), that he hates most those who are most praised for their virtues, that his hatred of them is not easily conquered by love or benefit (see Schol. of Prop. 41 of Part III [p. 287]), and that he takes pleasure only in the presence of those who humour his mind

Abiectio quamvis superbiae sit contraria, est tamen abiectus superbo proximus. Nam quandoquidem eius tristitia ex eo oritur, quod suam impotentiam ex aliorum potentia seu virtute iudicat, levabitur ergo eius tristitia, hoc est, laetabitur si eius imaginatio in alienis vitiis contemplandis occupetur, unde illud proverbium natum: Solamen miseris socios habuisse malorum; et contra eo magis contristabitur, quo se magis infra reliquos esse crediderit. Unde fit, ut nulli magis ad invidiam sint proni,[lo] quam abiecti, et ut isti maxime hominum facta observare conentur ad carpendum magis, quam ad eadem corrigendum, et ut tandem solam abiectionem laudent eaque glorientur, sed ita, ut tamen abiecti videantur.

Atque haec ex hoc affectu tam necessario sequuntur, quam ex natura trianguli, quod eius tres anguli aequales sint duobus rectis; et iam dixi me hos et similes affectus malos vocare, quatenus ad solam humanam utilitatem attendo. Sed naturae leges communem naturae ordinem, cuius homo pars est, respiciunt; quod hic in transitu monere volui, ne quis putaret me hic hominum vitia et absurda facta narrare, non autem rerum naturam et proprietates demonstrare voluisse.

Nam, ut in praef. P. 3. dixi, humanos affectus eorumque proprietates perinde considero, ac reliqua naturalia. Et sane humani affectus, si non humanam, naturae saltem potentiam et artificium non minus indicant, quam multa alia, quae admiramur quorumque contemplatione delectamur. Sed pergo de affectibus ea notare, quae hominibus utilitatem adferunt, vel quae iisdem damnum inferunt.

Propositio LVIII

[G II 253] *Gloria rationi non repugnat, sed ab ea oriri potest.*

Demonstratio. Patet ex aff. defin. 30. et ex defin. honesti, quam vide in schol. 1. prop. 37. huius.

Scholium. Vana quae dicitur gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso, quae sola vulgi opinione fovetur, eaque cessante cessat ipsa acquiescentia, hoc est (per schol. prop. 52. huius) summum bonum, quod unusquisque amat. Unde fit, ut qui vulgi opinione gloriatur, quotidiana cura anxius nitatur, faciat, experiatur, ut famam conservet.

Est namque vulgus varius et inconstans, atque adeo, nisi conservetur fama,[lp] cito abolescit; imo quia omnes vulgi captare applausus cupiunt, facile unusquisque alterius famam reprimit, ex quo, quandoquidem de summo, quod aestimatur, bono certatur, ingens libido oritur se invicem

[lo] The 1677 edition (OP p. 208) has no *magis*; the Dutch has *geen meerder*. Gfroerer, without knowing the Dutch, inserted *magis*, followed by Bruder, Van Vloten–Land and the translations, and Gebhardt (G II 252; Textgestaltung II 384) prints it.

[lp] The Dutch has *zo het niet waargenomen word*, which might answer to *nisi observetur* (so Leopold, and Bartuschat prints *observetur*); Gebhardt (G II 253; Textgestaltung II 384) keeps the 1677 *conservetur*, since Spinoza is unlikely to have changed the expression after *ut famam conservet*.

lacking in power and make a madman out of a fool.
Although self-abasement is contrary to pride, the self-abased man is still very near to the proud. For since his sadness arises from the fact that he judges his lack of power from the power, or virtue, of others, his sadness will therefore be relieved, that is, he will rejoice, if his imagination is occupied in contemplating the vices of others; hence the proverb: *It is a comfort to the wretched to have had companions in misfortune*; and on the contrary he will be the more saddened, the more he believes himself to be below others. Hence it comes about that no one is more prone to envy than the self-abased, that they strive most to observe men's deeds, to find fault with them rather than to correct them, and that finally they praise only self-abasement and glory in it, but in such a way that they still seem self-abased.
And these things follow from this affect as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and similar affects evil insofar as I attend only to human advantage. But the laws of nature concern the common order of nature, of which man is a part; I wished to point this out here in passing, so that no one should think that I wanted here to tell of the vices and absurd deeds of men, rather than to demonstrate the nature and properties of things.
For, as I said in the Preface of Part III [p. 229], I consider human affects and their properties just like other natural things.[341] And human affects certainly indicate, if not human power, at least the power and art of nature no less than many other things which we admire and in the contemplation of which we take pleasure. But I go on to note those things about the affects which bring advantage to men, or which inflict harm on them.
Cited in 4App22 [p. 455]

Proposition LVIII

Glory is not opposed to reason, but can arise from it.

Demonstration. This is evident from Def. Aff. 30 [p. 331] and from the definition of the honourable, which see in Schol. 1 of Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 399].

Scholium. What is called empty glory is a self-contentment which is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude, and when that ceases, the self-contentment itself ceases, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 52 of this Part [p. 419]), the highest good which each one loves. Hence it comes about that he who glories in the opinion of the multitude, anxious with daily care, strives, acts and tries in order to preserve his reputation.
For the multitude is changeable and inconstant, and so, unless a reputation is preserved, it quickly vanishes; indeed, because all desire to capture the applause of the multitude, each one readily represses the reputation of another; and from this, since the contest is over what is esteemed the

[341] The Preface had promised to consider human actions and appetites 'just as if it were a question of lines, planes or bodies'.

quocumque modo opprimendi, et qui tandem victor evadit, gloriatur magis, quod alteri obfuit, quam quod sibi profuit. Est igitur haec gloria seu acquiescentia revera vana, quia nulla est.

Quae de pudore notanda sunt, colliguntur facile ex iis, quae de misericordia et poenitentia diximus. Hoc tantum addo, quod ut commiseratio, sic etiam pudor, quamvis non sit virtus, bonus tamen est, quatenus indicat, homini, qui pudore suffunditur, cupiditatem inesse honeste vivendi, sicut dolor, qui eatenus bonus dicitur, quatenus indicat, partem laesam nondum esse putrefactam. Quare quamvis homo, quem facti alicuius pudet, revera sit tristis, est tamen perfectior impudenti, qui nullam habet honeste vivendi cupiditatem.

[G II 254] Atque haec sunt, quae de affectibus laetitiae et tristitiae notare susceperam. Ad cupiditates quod attinet, hae sane bonae aut malae sunt, quatenus ex bonis aut malis affectibus oriuntur. Sed omnes revera, quatenus ex affectibus, qui passiones sunt, in nobis ingenerantur, caecae sunt (ut facile colligitur ex iis, quae in schol. prop. 44. huius diximus), nec ullius usus essent, si homines facile duci possent, ut ex solo rationis dictamine viverent, ut iam paucis ostendam.

Propositio LIX

Ad omnes actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo a ratione determinari.

Demonstratio. Ex ratione agere nihil aliud est (per prop. 3. et defin. 2. P. 3.) quam ea agere, quae ex necessitate nostrae naturae in se sola consideratae sequuntur. At tristitia eatenus mala est, quatenus hanc agendi potentiam minuit vel coercet (per prop. 41. huius). Ergo ex hoc affectu ad nullam actionem possumus determinari, quam non possemus agere, si ratione duceremur.

Praeterea laetitia eatenus mala est,[lq] quatenus impedit, quominus homo ad agendum sit aptus (per prop. 41. et 43. huius) atque adeo eatenus etiam ad nullam actionem determinari possumus, quam non possemus agere, si ratione duceremur. Denique quatenus laetitia bona est, eatenus cum ratione convenit (consistit enim in eo, quod hominis agendi potentia augetur vel iuvatur), nec passio est nisi quatenus hominis agendi potentia non eo usque augetur, ut se suasque actiones adaequate concipiat (per prop. 3. P. 3. cum eius schol.). Quare si homo laetitia affectus ad tantam perfectionem duceretur, ut se suasque actiones adaequate conciperet, ad easdem actiones, ad quas iam ex affectibus, qui passiones sunt, determinatur, aptus, imo aptior esset.

At omnes affectus ad laetitiam, tristitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur (vide explicationem aff. defin. 4.), et cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.) nihil aliud est, quam ipse agendi conatus. Ergo ad omnes

[lq] The 1677 edition (OP p. 210) has *eatenus tantum mala est*, and the Dutch *alleenlijk* shows that Spinoza wrote it. W. Meijer (second edition), followed by Baensch and Appuhn, strikes the senseless *tantum*, and Gebhardt (G II 254; Textgestaltung II 384–385) omits it, while Halpern keeps it. Gebhardt defends the following reference to Props. 41 and 43 against Meijer's and Baensch's *43. et 44.*

highest good, there arises an immense lust to crush one another in any way whatever, and he who finally emerges victorious glories more in having harmed another than in having benefited himself. This glory, or self-contentment, is therefore truly empty, because it is nothing.

What should be noted about shame is easily gathered from what we have said about compassion and repentance. I add only this, that, like pity, shame, although it is not a virtue, is still good insofar as it indicates that the man who is suffused with shame has a desire to live honourably, just as pain is called good insofar as it indicates that the injured part is not yet putrefied. So although a man who is ashamed of some deed is in truth sad, he is still more perfect than the shameless man, who has no desire to live honourably.[342]

These are the things I had undertaken to note about the affects of joy and sadness. As for desires, they are certainly good or evil insofar as they arise from good or evil affects. But all of them, insofar as they are generated in us from affects which are passions, are in truth blind (as is easily gathered from what we said in Schol. of Prop. 44 of this Part [p. 409]), nor would they be of any use if men could easily be led to live from the dictate of reason alone, as I shall now show in a few words.

Proposition LIX

To all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason without it.[343]

Cited in 5P4S [p. 477]

Demonstration. To act from reason is nothing but (by Prop. 3 [p. 241] and Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]) to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. But sadness is evil insofar as it diminishes or restrains this power of acting (by Prop. 41 of this Part [p. 407]). Therefore from this affect we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason.

Further, joy is evil insofar as it prevents a man from being capable of acting (by Props. 41 [p. 407] and 43 of this Part [p. 409]); and so to that extent too we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason. Finally, insofar as joy is good, to that extent it agrees with reason (for it consists in this, that a man's power of acting is increased or aided), and it is a passion only insofar as a man's power of acting is not increased to the point where he conceives himself and his actions adequately (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241] with its Schol. [p. 241]). So if a man affected with joy were led to such perfection that he conceived himself and his actions adequately, he would be capable, indeed more capable, of the same actions to which he is now determined from affects which are passions.

But all affects are related to joy, sadness or desire (see the explanation of Def. Aff. 4 [p. 321]), and desire (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]) is nothing but the very striving to act. Therefore to all the

[342] The nearest the *Ethics* comes to the treatment of shamelessness promised in Part III, Def. Aff. 31, Expl. [p. 331].

[343] The same action can follow from a passion or from reason; what differs is its cause. Part V gives an example: the appetite by which each wants others to live according to his own temperament is, in a man not led by reason, the passion called ambition, and in one who lives from the dictate of reason, an action or virtue called piety, *pietas* (Part V, Prop. 4, Schol. [p. 477]).

actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, determinamur, possumus absque eo sola ratione duci. Q. E. D.

[G II 255] Aliter. Actio quaecumque eatenus dicitur mala, quatenus ex eo oritur, quod odio aut aliquo malo affectu affecti sumus (vide coroll. 1. prop. 45. huius). At nulla actio in se sola considerata bona aut mala est (ut in praef. huius ostendimus) sed una eademque actio iam bona, iam mala est. Ergo ad eandem actionem, quae iam mala est, sive quae ex aliquo malo affectu oritur, ratione duci possumus (per prop. 19. huius). Q. E. D.

Scholium. Explicantur haec clarius exemplo. Nempe verberandi actio quatenus physice consideratur, et ad hoc tantum attendimus, quod homo brachium tollit, manum claudit totumque brachium vi deorsum movet, virtus est, quae ex corporis humani fabrica concipitur. Si itaque homo ira vel odio commotus determinatur ad claudendam manum vel brachium movendum, id, ut in parte secunda ostendimus, fit quia una eademque actio potest iungi quibuscumque rerum imaginibus; atque adeo tam ex iis imaginibus rerum, quas confuse, quam quas clare et distincte concipimus, ad unam eandemque actionem determinari possumus.

Apparet itaque, quod omnis cupiditas, quae ex affectu, qui passio est, oritur, nullius esset usus, si homines ratione duci possent. Videamus iam, cur cupiditas quae ex affectu, qui passio est, oritur, caeca a nobis appellatur.

Propositio LX

Cupiditas, quae oritur ex laetitia vel tristitia, quae ad unam vel ad aliquot, non autem ad omnes corporis partes refertur, rationem utilitatis totius hominis non habet.

[G II 256] Demonstratio. Ponatur ex. gr. corporis pars A vi alicuius causae externae ita corroborari, ut reliquis praevaleat (per prop. 6. huius); haec pars vires suas amittere propterea non conabitur, ut reliquae corporis partes suo fungantur officio. Deberet enim vim seu potentiam habere vires suas amittendi; quod (per prop. 6. P. 3.) est absurdum.

Conabitur itaque illa pars, et consequenter (per prop. 7. et 12. P. 3.) mens etiam illum statum conservare; adeoque cupiditas, quae ex tali affectu laetitiae oritur, rationem totius non habet. Quod si contra supponatur pars A coerceri, ut reliquae praevaleant, eodem modo demonstratur, quod nec cupiditas, quae ex tristitia oritur, rationem totius habeat. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Cum itaque laetitia plerumque (per schol. prop. 44. huius) ad unam corporis partem referatur, cupimus ergo plerumque nostrum esse conservare nulla habita ratione integrae nostrae valetudinis. Ad quod accedit, quod cupiditates quibus maxime tenemur (per coroll. prop. 9.

actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be led by reason alone without it. Q.E.D.

Alternatively. Any action is called evil insofar as it arises from the fact that we are affected with hatred or some evil affect (see Cor. 1 of Prop. 45 of this Part [p. 411]). But no action, considered in itself alone, is good or evil (as we showed in the Preface of this Part [p. 353]), but one and the same action is now good, now evil. Therefore we can be led by reason (by Prop. 19 of this Part [p. 379]) to the same action which is now evil, or which arises from some evil affect. Q.E.D.

Scholium. These things are explained more clearly by an example. Namely, the action of striking, insofar as it is considered physically, and we attend only to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist and moves his whole arm forcefully downwards, is a virtue, which is conceived from the structure of the human body. If, therefore, a man moved by anger or hatred is determined to clench his fist or move his arm, this happens, as we showed in Part II, because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things whatever;[344] and so we can be determined to one and the same action as much from the images of things which we conceive confusedly as from those which we conceive clearly and distinctly.
It is evident, therefore, that every desire which arises from an affect which is a passion would be of no use if men could be led by reason. Let us now see why a desire which arises from an affect which is a passion is called blind by us.

Proposition LX

A desire which arises from a joy or sadness that is related to one or several, but not to all, of the parts of the body has no regard for the advantage of the whole man.

Demonstration. Suppose, for example, that part A of the body is so strengthened by the force of some external cause that it prevails over the others (by Prop. 6 of this Part [p. 365]); this part will not for that reason strive to lose its powers so that the other parts of the body may perform their function. For it would have to have a force, or power, of losing its powers, which (by Prop. 6 of Part III [p. 243]) is absurd.
That part will therefore strive, and consequently (by Props. 7 [p. 243] and 12 of Part III [p. 249]) the mind also will strive, to preserve that state; and so the desire which arises from such an affect of joy has no regard for the whole. But if, on the contrary, part A is supposed to be restrained, so that the others prevail, it is demonstrated in the same way that the desire which arises from sadness has no regard for the whole either. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Since, therefore, joy is generally related to one part of the body (by Schol. of Prop. 44 of this Part [p. 409]), we generally desire to preserve our being without any regard for our health as a whole. Add to this that the desires by which we are most held (by Cor. of Prop. 9 of

[344] By the association of images (Part II, Prop. 18 [p. 163] and its Schol. [p. 165]). Part V uses the same principle as a remedy: an affect separated from the thought of its external cause and joined to other thoughts destroys the love or hatred towards that cause (Part V, Prop. 2 [p. 475]).

huius), temporis tantum praesentis, non autem futuri habent rationem.

Propositio LXI

Cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit.

Demonstratio. Cupiditas (per aff. defin. 1.) absolute considerata est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus quocumque modo determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum. Adeoque cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.) quae in nobis ingeneratur, quatenus agimus, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus determinata concipitur ad agendum ea, quae per solam hominis essentiam adaequate concipiuntur (per defin. 2. P. 3.). Si itaque haec cupiditas excessum habere posset, posset ergo humana natura in se sola considerata se ipsam excedere, sive plus posset, quam potest, quod manifesta est contradictio. Ac proinde haec cupiditas excessum habere nequit. Q. E. D.

Propositio LXII

[G II 257] *Quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, aeque afficitur, sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis.*

Demonstratio. Quicquid mens ducente ratione concipit, id omne sub eadem aeternitatis seu necessitatis specie concipit (per coroll. 2. prop. 44. P. 2.), eademque certitudine afficitur (per prop. 43. P. 2. et eius schol.). Quare sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis, mens eadem necessitate rem concipit, eademque certitudine afficitur, et sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis, erit nihilominus aeque vera (per prop. 41. P. 2.), hoc est (per defin. 4. P. 2.) habebit nihilominus semper easdem ideae adaequatae proprietates. Atque adeo quatenus mens ex rationis dictamine res concipit, eodem modo afficitur, sive idea sit rei futurae vel praeteritae, sive praesentis. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Si nos de rerum duratione adaequatam cognitionem habere, earumque existendi tempora ratione determinare possemus, eodem affectu res futuras ac praesentes contemplaremur, et bonum, quod mens ut futurum conciperet, perinde ac praesens appeteret, et consequenter bonum praesens minus pro maiore bono futuro necessario negligeret, et quod in praesenti bonum esset, sed causa futuri alicuius mali, minime appeteret, ut mox demonstrabimus.

Sed nos de duratione rerum (per prop. 31. P. 2.) non nisi admodum inadaequatam cognitionem habere possumus, et rerum existendi tempora (per schol. prop. 44. P. 2.) sola imaginatione determinamus, quae non aeque afficitur imagine rei praesentis ac futurae. Unde fit, ut vera boni et mali cognitio, quam habemus, non nisi abstracta sive universalis sit, et iudicium, quod de rerum

this Part [p. 369]) have regard only for the present time, not for the future.
Cited in 4App30 [p. 459]

Proposition LXI

A desire which arises from reason cannot be excessive.
Cited in 4P63CD [p. 433], 5P4S [p. 477]

Demonstration. Desire (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]), considered absolutely, is the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined in any way to do something. And so a desire which arises from reason, that is (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), which is generated in us insofar as we act, is the very essence, or nature, of man insofar as it is conceived to be determined to do those things which are conceived adequately through the essence of man alone (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]). If, therefore, this desire could be excessive, human nature, considered in itself alone, could exceed itself, or could do more than it can, which is a manifest contradiction. And accordingly this desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

Proposition LXII

Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.
Cited in 4P66D [p. 435]

Demonstration. Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives all of it under the same species of eternity, or necessity (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 44 of Part II [p. 197]), and is affected with the same certainty (by Prop. 43 of Part II [p. 191] and its Schol. [p. 191]). So whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certainty; and whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one, it will nevertheless be equally true (by Prop. 41 of Part II [p. 189]), that is (by Def. 4 of Part II [p. 121]), it will nevertheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea. And so, insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected in the same way whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one. Q.E.D.

Scholium. If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine their times of existing by reason, we would contemplate future things with the same affect as present ones, and the mind would want the good which it conceived as future just as if it were present; and consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser present good for a greater future good, and would by no means want what was good in the present but the cause of some future evil, as we shall soon demonstrate.
But we can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (by Prop. 31 of Part II [p. 177]), and we determine the times of existing of things by the imagination alone (by Schol. of Prop. 44 of Part II [p. 195]), which is not equally affected by the image of a present and of a future thing. Hence it comes about that the true knowledge of good and evil which we have is

ordine et causarum nexu facimus, ut determinare possimus, quid nobis in praesenti bonum aut malum sit, sit potius imaginarium, quam reale. Atque adeo mirum non est, si cupiditas, quae ex boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec futurum prospicit, oritur, facilius rerum cupiditate, quae in praesentia suaves sunt, coerceri potest, de quo vide prop. 16. huius partis.[lr]

Propositio LXIII

[G II 258] *Qui metu ducitur et bonum, ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur.*

Demonstratio. Omnes affectus, qui ad mentem, quatenus agit, hoc est (per prop. 3. P. 3.), qui ad rationem referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam affectus laetitiae et cupiditatis (per prop. 59. P. 3.). Atque adeo (per aff. defin. 13.) qui metu ducitur et bonum timore mali agit, is ratione non ducitur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Superstitiosi, qui vitia exprobrare magis, quam virtutes docere norunt et qui homines non ratione ducere, sed metu ita continere student, ut malum potius fugiant, quam virtutes ament, nil aliud intendunt, quam ut reliqui aeque ac ipsi fiant miseri; et ideo non mirum, si plerumque molesti et odiosi sint hominibus.

Corollarium. Cupiditate, quae ex ratione oritur, bonum directe sequimur et malum indirecte fugimus.

Demonstratio. Nam cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, ex solo laetitiae affectu, quae passio non est, oriri potest (per prop. 59. P. 3.), hoc est, ex laetitia, quae excessum habere nequit (per prop. 61. huius), non autem ex tristitia. Ac proinde haec cupiditas (per prop. 8. huius) ex cognitione boni, non autem mali oritur atque adeo ex ductu rationis bonum directe appetimus, et eatenus tantum malum fugimus. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Explicatur hoc corollarium exemplo aegri et sani. Comedit aeger id, quod aversatur, timore mortis; sanus autem cibo gaudet et vita sic melius fruitur, quam si mortem timeret, eamque directe vitare cuperet. Sic iudex qui non odio aut ira etc., sed solo amore salutis publicae reum mortis damnat, sola ratione ducitur.

Propositio LXIV

[G II 259] *Cognitio mali cognitio est inadaequata.*

Demonstratio. Cognitio mali (per prop. 8. huius) est ipsa tristitia, quatenus eiusdem sumus conscii. Tristitia autem est transitio ad minorem perfectionem (per aff. defin. 3.) quae propterea per ipsam hominis essentiam intelligi nequit (per prop. 6. et 7. P. 3.). Ac proinde (per defin. 2. P.

[lr] The 1677 edition and the older editions have *Propositionem 18.*; Schmidt and Auerbach correct to 15, Van Vloten–Land rightly to 16, and Gebhardt (G II 258; Textgestaltung II 385) follows.

only abstract, or universal, and the judgment which we make about the order of things and the connection of causes, in order to determine what is good or evil for us in the present, is imaginary rather than real. And so it is no wonder if a desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this looks to the future, can be more easily restrained by a desire for things which are pleasant in the present; on which see Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 375].

Proposition LXIII

He who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason.
Cited in 4P67D [p. 443], 4P73D [p. 449], 4App31 [p. 459]

Demonstration. All the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, that is (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), which are related to reason, are none other than affects of joy and desire (by Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]). And so (by Def. Aff. 13 [p. 323]) he who is led by fear, and does good from fear of evil, is not led by reason. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The superstitious, who know how to reproach vices rather than to teach virtues, and who strive not to lead men by reason but to hold them in check by fear, so that they flee evil rather than love virtues, intend nothing else but that others should become as wretched as they are themselves; and so it is no wonder that they are generally troublesome and hateful to men.

Corollary. By a desire which arises from reason we follow the good directly and flee evil indirectly.
Cited in 4P65D [p. 435], 4P65C [p. 435], 4P67D [p. 443], 5P10S [p. 483]

Demonstration. For a desire which arises from reason can arise only from an affect of joy which is not a passion (by Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]), that is, from a joy which cannot be excessive (by Prop. 61 of this Part [p. 431]), and not from sadness. And accordingly this desire (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]) arises from the knowledge of good, not of evil; and so from the guidance of reason we want the good directly, and only to that extent flee evil. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This Corollary is explained by the example of the sick man and the healthy man. The sick man eats what he is averse to from fear of death; but the healthy man enjoys his food, and in this way enjoys life better than if he feared death and desired to avoid it directly. So a judge who condemns a guilty man to death not from hatred or anger, etc., but only from love of the public welfare, is led by reason alone.

Proposition LXIV

The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.

Demonstration. The knowledge of evil (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 367]) is sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. But sadness is a passage to a lesser perfection (by Def. Aff. 3 [p. 319]), which therefore cannot be understood through the very essence of man (by Props.

3.) passio est, quae (per prop. 3. P. 3.) ab ideis inadaequatis pendet, et consequenter (per prop. 29. P. 2.) eius cognitio, nempe mali cognitio, est inadaequata. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod si mens humana non nisi adaequatas haberet ideas, nullam mali formaret notionem.

Propositio LXV

De duobus bonis maius et de duobus malis minus ex rationis ductu sequemur.

Demonstratio. Bonum quod impedit, quominus maiore bono fruamur, est revera malum; malum enim et bonum (ut in praef. huius partis ostendimus) de rebus dicitur, quatenus easdem ad invicem comparamus, et (per eandem rationem) malum minus revera bonum est. Quare (per coroll. prop. 63. huius)[ls] ex rationis ductu bonum tantum maius et malum minus appetemus seu sequemur. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Malum minus pro maiore bono ex rationis ductu sequemur, et bonum minus, quod causa est maioris mali, negligemus. Nam malum quod hic dicitur minus, revera bonum est, et bonum contra malum; quare (per coroll. prop. 63. huius)[lt] illud appetemus, et hoc negligemus. Q. E. D.

Propositio LXVI

[G II 260] *Bonum maius futurum prae minore praesenti, et malum praesens minus prae maiore futuro*[lu] *ex rationis ductu appetemus.*[lv]

Demonstratio. Si mens rei futurae adaequatam posset habere cognitionem, eodem affectu

[ls] The 1677 edition (OP p. 215) has *per Coroll. Prop. praec.*, and so the Dutch; the reference can only be to the Corollary of Prop. 63. Since the same error recurs in the next Corollary, Gebhardt (G II 259; Textgestaltung II 385) infers that Prop. 64 was inserted later; it also interrupts the sequence.

[lt] Again *per Coroll. Prop. praec.* in the 1677 edition (OP p. 216) and the Dutch; here Schmidt, Auerbach and Van Vloten–Land had already corrected to Prop. 63 (Gebhardt, G II 260; Textgestaltung II 385).

[lu] The 1677 edition (OP p. 216) reads *et malum praesens minus, quod causa est futuri alicujus mali*, which makes reason want a present evil because it causes a future one. The Dutch translates *een minder tegenwoordig quaat, 't welk oorzaak is van enig toekomend groter goet*, and Gfroerer, Saisset and Pollock correct accordingly; Land objects that this thought belongs to the Corollary. Schmidt, Auerbach, Camerer and Land read *malum praesens minus prae majore futuro*, which gives the sense and restores the parallel, and Van Vloten–Land, Meijer, Baensch, Appuhn, Halpern and Gebhardt (G II 260; Textgestaltung II 385–386) print it. Gebhardt thinks that in the manuscript the beginning of the Corollary had already slipped into the Proposition. The transcription had Bruder's text, with *futura* for *futuri* and without *minus*.

[lv] et malum praesens minus prae maiore futuro ex rationis ductu appetemus] *transcr.* et malum praesens, quod causa est futura alicuius mali, ex rationis ductu appetemus. The transcription follows Bruder ('futura' for the 1677 'futuri') in the corrupt 1677 text 'malum praesens minus, quod causa est futuri alicujus mali', and drops 'minus'. Gebhardt (G II 260; Textgestaltung II 385–386) prints the correction of Schmidt, Camerer, Land and Van Vloten–Land, 'malum praesens minus prae majori futuro'.

6 [p. 243] and 7 of Part III [p. 243]). And accordingly (by Def. 2 of Part III [p. 231]) it is a passion, which (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]) depends on inadequate ideas, and consequently (by Prop. 29 of Part II [p. 175]) the knowledge of it, namely the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.[345]

Cited in 4P68D [p. 443]

Proposition LXV

Of two goods we shall follow, from the guidance of reason, the greater, and of two evils the lesser.

Cited in 4P66D [p. 435], 4P66C [p. 437]

Demonstration. A good which prevents us from enjoying a greater good is in truth an evil; for evil and good (as we showed in the Preface of this Part [p. 353]) are said of things insofar as we compare them with one another; and (for the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good. So (by Cor. of Prop. 63 of this Part [p. 433]) from the guidance of reason we shall want, or follow, only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From the guidance of reason we shall follow a lesser evil for the sake of a greater good, and neglect a lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here called lesser is in truth a good, and the good, on the contrary, an evil; so (by Cor. of Prop. 63 of this Part [p. 433]) we shall want the former and neglect the latter. Q.E.D.

Cited in 4P66C [p. 437]

Proposition LXVI

From the guidance of reason we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.

Cited in 4P66C [p. 437]

Demonstration. If the mind could have adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be

[345] Applied in Prop. 68 [p. 443]: if men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.

erga rem futuram ac erga praesentem afficeretur (per prop. 62. huius). Quare quatenus ad ipsam rationem attendimus, ut in hac propositione nos facere supponimus, res eadem est, sive maius bonum vel malum futurum, sive praesens supponatur. Ac proinde (per prop. 65. huius) bonum futurum maius prae minore praesenti etc. appetemus. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Malum praesens minus, quod est causa maioris futuri boni, ex rationis ductu appetemus, et bonum praesens minus, quod causa est maioris futuri mali, negligemus. Hoc coroll. se habet ad praeced. prop. ut coroll. prop. 65. ad ipsam prop. 65.

Scholium. Si igitur haec cum iis conferantur, quae in hac parte usque ad prop. 18. de affectuum viribus ostendimus, facile videbimus, quid homo, qui solo affectu seu opinione, homini, qui ratione ducitur, intersit. Ille enim, velit nolit, ea quae maxime ignorat, agit; hic autem nemini nisi sibi morem gerit, et ea tantum agit, quae in vita prima esse novit, quaeque propterea maxime cupit; et ideo illum *servum*, hunc autem *liberum* voco,[lw] de cuius ingenio et vivendi ratione pauca adhuc notare libet.

[lw] illum *servum*, hunc autem *liberum* voco] *transcr.* illum *servum, hunc autem liberum* voco. Italics confined to the two defined terms (the 1677 edition, OP p. 216, has none).

affected with the same affect towards a future thing as towards a present one (by Prop. 62 of this Part [p. 431]). So insofar as we attend to reason itself, as we suppose ourselves to do in this proposition, the thing is the same whether the greater good or evil is supposed to be future or present. And accordingly (by Prop. 65 of this Part [p. 435]) we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, etc. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From the guidance of reason we shall want a lesser present evil which is the cause of a greater future good, and neglect a lesser present good which is the cause of a greater future evil. This Corollary [p. 437] is related to the preceding Prop. [p. 435] as the Cor. of Prop. 65 [p. 435] is to Prop. 65 [p. 435] itself.

Scholium. If, therefore, these things are compared with those which we have shown in this Part up to Prop. 18 [p. 377] about the strength of the affects, we shall easily see the difference between a man who is led by affect alone, or opinion, and a man who is led by reason. For the former, whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant; but the latter complies with no one's wishes but his own, and does only those things which he knows to be most important in life, and which he therefore desires most; and so I call the former a *slave*, but the latter *free*;[346] about whose temperament and way of life I should like to note a few things more.

Cited in 4P73D [p. 449]

[346] *servum ... liberum*. The slave is the man in the bondage (*servitus*) of the Part's title; the free man is described in Props. 67–73 [p. 443]. Freedom was defined in Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27]: a thing is free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone.

The Free Man

The last seven propositions of Part IV describe a figure the Preface had announced: the "model of human nature" which we may look to (Preface [p. 353]). They are written differently from the rest of the Part. The preceding propositions measured the force of the affects and set out the dictates of reason one by one; these gather the results into the portrait of a single man, and it is worth being clear in advance about what kind of figure he is and in what sense he is called free.

Slave and free

The Scholium to Prop. 66 [p. 437] introduces him by contrast. The man led by affect alone, or opinion, "whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant"; the man led by reason "complies with no one's wishes but his own, and does only those things which he knows to be most important in life, and which he therefore desires most." Spinoza calls the first a slave and the second free. The word answers to the title of the Part, *De servitute humana*, and to the definition of freedom in Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27]: a thing is free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. Only God is free in the full sense. A man is free to the extent that what he does follows from his own nature, that is, to the extent that he is the adequate cause of his actions, and Part III has shown that this is the case insofar as he has adequate ideas (Part III, Prop. 3 [p. 241]). Freedom, for Spinoza, is a matter of degree, and it is the same thing as understanding.

This sense of freedom is easily misunderstood. It is not the absence of causes, since everything has a cause; it is not the ability to have done otherwise, since nothing could have been otherwise; and it is not doing whatever one wants, since the man led by his passions does what he wants and is a slave. The free man is free because his actions express his own nature rather than the pressure of external things on it, and because he knows what he is doing and why. The rest of the portrait spells out what such a man would be like.

Death

The portrait begins with death. "A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life" (Prop. 67 [p. 443]). The sentence answers a long tradition. Cicero had repeated the saying of Plato's Socrates that "tota enim philosophorum vita ... commentatio mortis est" ("the whole life of philosophers is a preparation for death," *Tusculan Disputations* I.74). Spinoza's demonstration is short: the free man is not led by fear (Prop. 63 [p. 433]), but desires the good directly (Prop. 63, Cor. [p. 433]), that is, to act, to live and to preserve his being. The thought of death belongs to fear, and the free man is not led by fear.

It may seem strange that a book which ends with an account of the eternity of the mind should forbid the thought of death. But there is no conflict. Part V will not console the reader with the prospect of a life after death; it will argue that something of the mind is eternal now, in the sense of Part I, Def. 8 [p. 27], and that "the more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death" (Part V, Prop. 38 [p. 517]). The free man thinks of life, not because he avoids an unpleasant subject, but because what he understands is the power by which things exist and act, not their destruction, which comes from outside.

Born free: the story of the first man

Prop. 68 [p. 443] then supposes men born free and concludes that they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free, since the knowledge of evil is inadequate (Prop. 64 [p. 433]) and good and evil are correlative. The Scholium at once declares the hypothesis false: it can be conceived only if we attend to human nature alone, or to God not as infinite but only as the cause of man's existence, and Prop. 4 [p. 361] showed that a man cannot but be a part of nature.

The Scholium then reads the story of the first man as an allegory of the doctrine. In it, Spinoza says, no other power of God is conceived than that by which he created man, a power that consulted only man's advantage. God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and as soon as he ate of it, "he would at once fear death rather than desire to live." Finding a wife who agreed entirely with his nature, he knew that nothing in nature could be more useful to him than she; "but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he at once began to imitate their affects ... and to lose his freedom, which the patriarchs afterwards recovered, led by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man is free" (Prop. 68, Schol. [p. 443]). The *Theological-Political Treatise* had read the command to Adam in the same way: God commanded him to do good from the love of good and not from fear of evil (ch. 4).

The reading is remarkable for what it does with each element of the story. The knowledge of good and evil is not a forbidden wisdom but the inadequate knowledge that comes with fear; the fall is not disobedience but the imitation of affects proper to another nature; and redemption is not a supernatural grace but the idea of God, which the reader of Part II has already learned that every human mind possesses (Part II, Prop. 47 [p. 199]). The phrase "led by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God" is characteristic of the way Spinoza uses religious language: he does not reject it, but tells the reader what, in his view, it really means.

Among others

The remaining propositions show the free man among others. "The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them" (Prop. 69 [p. 445]), and "to a free man, therefore, timely flight is ascribed to as great a tenacity as battle; or, the free man chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, as combat" (Prop. 69, Cor. [p. 445]). The point is not that cowardice is acceptable, but that courage is not recklessness: the same strength of character that makes a man stand firm when that is reasonable makes him withdraw when withdrawal is reasonable.

"A free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to decline their favours" (Prop. 70 [p. 445]), so as to follow his own reason rather than their appetite, and not to be hated for repaying less than they expect. But the scholium adds a qualification that shows how far Spinoza is from a lofty indifference to ordinary people: "although men are ignorant, they are still men, who in times of need can bring human help, than which nothing is more excellent," and so it is often necessary to accept their favours and thank them in their own way; and "caution must be exercised even in declining favours, so that we do not seem to despise them" (Prop. 70, Schol. [p. 445]). "Only free men are most grateful to one another" (Prop. 71 [p. 447]); the gratitude of men led by blind desire "is for the most part a bargain or a hunt for gain rather than thankfulness" (Prop. 71, Schol. [p. 447]).

Good faith

"A free man never acts deceptively, but always in good faith" (Prop. 72 [p. 447]). The scholium raises the hardest case. "What if a man could free himself by perfidy from a present danger of death? Would not reason, for preserving his being, entirely advise him to be perfidious?" The answer is that "if reason advises this, it therefore advises it to all men, and so reason entirely advises men to make no agreements to join their forces and to have common rights except deceptively, that is, not really to have common rights, which is absurd" (Prop. 72, Schol. [p. 447]).

The scholium has puzzled readers, because it seems to sit uneasily with the ethics of self-preservation. If virtue is seeking one's own advantage and preserving one's being, why should the free man not lie to save his life? Spinoza's answer turns on the universality of reason. What reason advises one man it advises to all, since reason is the same in all, and a policy of deceit when convenient, adopted by all, would destroy the trust on which common life depends. The argument resembles later arguments for the universalizability of moral principles, and readers have asked whether it is consistent with the rest of Part IV. But the scholium also says something about what the free man is. He does not calculate whether a lie would serve him on this occasion, because the reason that guides him does not take the point of view of this occasion. His good faith is not a rule he obeys but an expression of the kind of understanding he has.

Freedom in the state

"A man who is led by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone" (Prop. 73 [p. 449]). The proposition completes the movement of the Part from the individual to the community. It may seem paradoxical that a man should be freer under laws than without them, but it follows from everything Spinoza has said. The free man is not led by fear to obey the laws, and he desires to live by the rule of common life and common advantage, which the laws express; the state supplies the security and the help of others without which he could not live by reason at all. Solitude is not independence. It is exposure to the power of external causes without the help of those whose nature agrees most with one's own.

Strength of character

The closing Scholium refers everything said about "the *true freedom of man*" to strength of character, that is, to tenacity and nobility (Prop. 73, Schol. [p. 449]), and declines to demonstrate separately all its properties, "and much less that a strong man hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is least of all proud." These follow easily from the propositions that hatred is to be conquered by love and that each one led by reason desires for others the good he wants for himself. The strong man considers above all "that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature," and that whatever he finds troublesome and evil, impious, horrible, unjust and base arises from his conceiving things in a disturbed, mutilated and confused way; and so he strives above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, hatred, anger, envy, mockery and pride. The ethics of Part IV ends where Part V will begin, with the improvement of understanding.

Reading the portrait

Two things should be kept in view. First, the free man is a model, not a description of anyone. Men are necessarily always subject to passions (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]), and the Scholium to Prop. 68 calls the hypothesis of a man born free false. What the propositions describe is the direction in which a man becomes more perfect, that is, more powerful, as he comes to understand; the Preface had said that men are called more or less perfect insofar as they come nearer to the model or are further from it. The portrait is meant to be useful, as the Preface promised, not to be matched.

Second, the portrait is of a social being. The free man's freedom is not independence from others but agreement with them: he seeks his own advantage from the guidance of reason, and nothing is more useful to him than other men who live by reason (Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395]). That is why the series ends with the state, and why the virtues it describes are almost all virtues of common life: courage, gratitude, good faith, obedience to common law. The solitary sage of some ancient traditions has no place here.

The Appendix

An Appendix follows in which Spinoza collects what the Part has taught about the right way of living, which had been demonstrated piecemeal, and brings it under main headings in thirty-two short chapters of continuous prose. Its fourth chapter states the final end of a man led by reason: "In life, therefore, it is above all useful to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and in this one thing man's highest happiness, or blessedness, consists" (Appendix, ch. 4 [p. 451]). Other chapters treat friendship, the education of others to live by reason (ch. 9 [p. 453]), flattery, money and marriage, which "agrees with reason if the desire for bodily union is generated not from beauty alone but also from love of begetting children and educating them wisely," and if the love of each has as its cause "chiefly freedom of mind" (ch. 20 [p. 455]). The last chapter returns to the theme of human weakness with which the Part began, and turns it into a source of contentment: human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by external causes, but if we understand clearly that we are a part of the whole of nature whose order we follow, "that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be entirely content with it," since "insofar as we understand, we can want nothing but what is necessary" (ch. 32 [p. 459]).

As the text continues, the portrait runs from Prop. 67 to Prop. 73, and the Appendix follows. How far human power can go in attaining the freedom described here is the subject of Part V.

Propositio LXVII

[G II 261] *Homo liber de nulla re minus, quam de morte cogitat, et eius sapientia non mortis, sed vitae meditatio est.*

Demonstratio. Homo liber, hoc est, qui ex solo rationis dictamine vivit, mortis metu non ducitur (per prop. 63. huius), sed bonum directe cupit (per coroll. eiusdem prop.), hoc est (per prop. 24. huius) agere, vivere, suum esse conservare ex fundamento proprium utile quaerendi. Atque adeo nihil minus, quam de morte cogitat, sed eius sapientia vitae est meditatio. Q. E. D.

Propositio LXVIII

Si homines liberi nascerentur, nullum boni et mali formarent conceptum, quamdiu liberi essent.

Demonstratio. Illum liberum esse dixi, qui sola ducitur ratione. Qui itaque liber nascitur et liber manet, non nisi adaequatas ideas habet, ac proinde mali conceptum habet nullum (per coroll. prop. 64. huius), et consequenter (nam bonum et malum correlata sunt) neque boni. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Huius propositionis hypothesin falsam esse, nec posse concipi, nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam, seu potius ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus, sed quatenus tantummodo causa est, cur homo existat, patet ex prop. 4. huius partis. Atque hoc et alia, quae iam demonstravimus, videntur a Mose significari in illa primi hominis historia.

In ea enim nulla alia Dei potentia concipitur, quam illa, qua hominem creavit, hoc est, potentia, qua hominis solummodo utilitati consuluit, atque eatenus narratur, quod Deus homini libero prohibuerit, ne de arbore cognitionis boni et mali comederet, et quod, simulac de ea comederet, statim mortem metueret potius, quam vivere cuperet.
Deinde, quod inventa ab homine uxore, quae cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat, cognovit nihil posse in natura dari, quod ipsi posset illa esse utilius; sed quod, postquam bruta sibi similia esse credidit, statim eorum affectus imitari inceperit (vide prop. 27. P. 3.) et libertatem suam amittere, quam patriarchae postea recuperaverunt, ducti spiritu Christi, hoc est, Dei idea, a qua sola pendet, ut homo liber sit, et ut bonum quod sibi cupit, reliquis hominibus cupiat, ut supra (per prop. 37. huius) demonstravimus.

Proposition LXVII

A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life.[347]

Demonstration. A free man, that is, one who lives from the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear of death (by Prop. 63 of this Part [p. 433]), but desires the good directly (by Cor. of the same Prop. [p. 433]), that is (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 383]), to act, to live, to preserve his being from the foundation of seeking his own advantage. And so he thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation on life. Q.E.D.

Proposition LXVIII

If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.

Demonstration. I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas, and accordingly has no concept of evil (by Cor. of Prop. 64 of this Part [p. 435]), and consequently (for good and evil are correlative) none of good either. Q.E.D.

Scholium. It is evident from Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 361] that the hypothesis of this proposition is false and cannot be conceived except insofar as we attend to human nature alone, or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite, but only insofar as he is the cause of man's existing. And this, and other things which we have now demonstrated, seem to have been signified by Moses in that history of the first man.

For in it no other power of God is conceived than that by which he created man, that is, a power by which he consulted only man's advantage; and to that extent it is narrated that God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, he would at once fear death rather than desire to live.[348]

Next, it is narrated that when the man had found a wife who agreed entirely with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him than she;[349] but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he at once began to imitate their affects (see Prop. 27 of Part III [p. 267]) and to lose his freedom, which the patriarchs afterwards recovered, led by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man is free, and that he desires for other men the good which he desires for himself, as we have demonstrated above (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]).

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[347] The proposition inverts a philosophical commonplace: 'Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est' ('the whole life of philosophers, as the same man [Socrates] says, is a preparation for death', Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* I.74).

[348] Genesis 2:17: 'וּמֵעֵ֗ץ הַדַּ֙עַת֙ טוֹב֣ וָרָ֔ע לֹ֥א תֹאכַ֖ל מִמֶּ֑נּוּ כִּ֗י בְּי֛וֹם אֲכָלְךָ֥ מִמֶּ֖נּוּ מ֥וֹת תָּמֽוּת' ('but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for on the day that you eat of it you shall surely die'). Spinoza reads the threatened death as the fear of death. In the *Theological-Political Treatise* the command means that God commanded Adam 'bonum agere & quaerere sub ratione boni, & non quatenus contrarium est malo' ('to do and seek the good under the aspect of the good, and not insofar as it is the contrary of evil'), that is, from love of the good and not from fear of evil (ch. 4).

[349] Genesis 2:23: 'זֹ֣את הַפַּ֗עַם עֶ֚צֶם מֵֽעֲצָמַ֔י וּבָשָׂ֖ר מִבְּשָׂרִ֑י' ('this at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh'), read as agreement in nature (Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395]).

Propositio LXIX

[G II 262] *Hominis liberi virtus aeque magna cernitur in declinandis, quam in superandis periculis.*

Demonstratio. Affectus coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi affectu contrario et fortiore affectu coercendo (per prop. 7. huius).[lx] At caeca audacia et metus affectus sunt, qui aeque magni possunt concipi (per prop. 5. et 3. huius). Ergo aeque magna animi virtus seu fortitudo (huius defin. vide in schol. prop. 59. P. 3.) requiritur ad audaciam, quam ad metum coercendum, hoc est (per aff. defin. 40. et 41.) homo liber eadem animi virtute pericula declinat, qua eadem superare tentat. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Homini igitur libero aeque magnae animositati fuga in tempore, ac pugna ducitur; sive homo liber eadem animositate seu animi praesentia, qua certamen, fugam eligit.

Scholium. Quid animositas sit, vel quid per ipsam intelligam, in schol. prop. 59. P. 3. explicui. Per *periculum* autem id omne intelligo, quod potest esse causa alicuius mali, nempe tristitiae, odii, discordiae etc.

Propositio LXX

Homo liber qui inter ignaros vivit,[ly] *eorum, quantum potest, beneficia declinare studet.*

[G II 263] Demonstratio. Unusquisque ex suo ingenio iudicat, quid bonum sit (vide schol. prop. 39. P. 3.). Ignarus igitur, qui in aliquem beneficium contulit, id ex suo ingenio aestimabit, et si minoris ab eo, cui datum est, aestimari videt, contristabitur (per prop. 42. P. 3.).

At homo liber reliquos homines amicitia sibi iungere (per prop. 37. huius), nec paria hominibus beneficia ex eorum affectu referre, sed se et reliquos libero rationis iudicio ducere et ea tantum agere studet, quae ipse prima esse novit. Ergo homo liber, ne ignaris odio sit, et ne eorum appetitui, sed soli rationi obsequatur, eorum beneficia, quantum potest, declinare conabitur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Dico quantum potest. Nam quamvis homines ignari sint, sunt tamen homines, qui in necessitatibus humanum auxilium, quo nullum praestabilius est, adferre queunt. Atque adeo saepe fit, ut necesse sit ab iisdem beneficium accipere, et consequenter iisdem contra ex eorum ingenio congratulari. Ad quod accedit, quod etiam in declinandis beneficiis cautio esse debet, ne videamur eosdem contemnere, vel prae avaritia remunerationem timere, atque ita, dum eorum odium fugimus, eo ipso in eorum offensionem incurramus. Quare in declinandis beneficiis ratio utilis et honesti habenda est.

[lx] The 1677 edition has *per Prop. 9. hujus*, and so the Dutch; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to *7.*, and Gebhardt (G II 262; Textgestaltung II 386) follows.

[ly] The Dutch translator misread *ignavos* here and in the following *ignarus*, *ignaris*, *ignari* (*de bloden*, 'the timid'), and corrects to *onkundigen*, *onkundige* ('the ignorant') in the list of errors (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung II 386).

Proposition LXIX

The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them.

Demonstration. An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to and stronger than the affect to be restrained (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 365]). But blind daring and fear are affects which can be conceived to be equally great (by Props. 5 [p. 363] and 3 of this Part [p. 361]). Therefore an equally great virtue of mind, or strength of character (whose definition see in Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]), is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear, that is (by Defs. Aff. 40 [p. 335] and 41 [p. 335]), the free man declines dangers by the same virtue of mind by which he tries to overcome them. Q.E.D.

Corollary. To a free man, therefore, timely flight is ascribed to as great a tenacity as battle; or, the free man chooses flight with the same tenacity, or presence of mind, as combat.

Scholium. What tenacity is, or what I understand by it, I have explained in Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]. But by *danger* I understand everything which can be the cause of some evil, namely of sadness, hatred, discord, etc.

Proposition LXX

A free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to decline their favours.

Demonstration. Each one judges from his own temperament what is good (see Schol. of Prop. 39 of Part III [p. 283]). An ignorant man, therefore, who has conferred a favour on someone, will value it according to his own temperament, and if he sees that it is valued less by the one to whom it was given, he will be saddened (by Prop. 42 of Part III [p. 287]).
But the free man strives to join other men to himself in friendship (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]), and not to repay men with favours that are equal by the measure of their affect, but to lead himself and others by the free judgment of reason, and to do only those things which he himself knows to be most important. Therefore the free man, so as not to be hated by the ignorant, and so as to comply not with their appetite but with reason alone, will strive as far as he can to decline their favours. Q.E.D.

Scholium. I say *as far as he can*. For although men are ignorant, they are still men, who in times of need can bring human help, than which nothing is more excellent. And so it often happens that it is necessary to accept a favour from them, and consequently to thank them in return according to their temperament. Add to this that caution must be exercised even in declining favours, so that we do not seem to despise them, or to fear repayment out of greed, and so, while we flee their hatred, by that very fact incur their offence. So in declining favours account must be taken of what is useful and honourable.

Cited in 4App18 [p. 455]

Propositio LXXI

Soli homines liberi erga invicem gratissimi sunt.

Demonstratio. Soli homines liberi sibi invicem utilissimi sunt et maxima amicitiae necessitudine invicem iunguntur (per prop. 35. huius et eius coroll. 1.), parique amoris studio sibi invicem benefacere conantur (per prop. 37. huius). Adeoque (per aff. defin. 34.) soli homines liberi erga se invicem gratissimi sunt. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Gratia, quam homines, qui caeca cupiditate ducuntur, invicem habent, mercatura seu aucupium potius, quam gratia plerumque est. Porro ingratitudo affectus non est. Est tamen ingratitudo turpis, quia plerumque hominem nimio odio, ira vel superbia vel avaritia etc. affectum esse indicat.
Nam qui prae stultitia dona compensare nescit, ingratus non est, et multo minus ille, qui donis non movetur meretricis, ut ipsius libidini inserviat,[lz] nec furis, ut ipsius furta celet, vel alterius similis. Nam hic contra animum habere constantem ostendit, qui scilicet se nullis donis ad suam vel communem perniciem patitur corrumpi.

Propositio LXXII

[G II 264] *Homo liber nunquam dolo malo, sed semper cum fide agit.*

Demonstratio. Si liber homo quicquam dolo malo, quatenus liber est, ageret, id ex dictamine rationis ageret (nam eatenus tantum liber a nobis appellatur); atque adeo dolo malo agere virtus esset (per prop. 24. huius), et consequenter (per eandem prop.) unicuique ad suum esse conservandum consultius esset, dolo malo agere, hoc est (ut per se notum) hominibus consultius esset verbis solummodo convenire, re autem invicem esse contrarios; quod (per coroll. prop. 31. huius) est absurdum. Ergo homo liber etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Si iam quaeratur: "Quid si homo se perfidia a praesenti mortis periculo posset liberare, an non ratio suum esse conservandi omnino suadet ut perfidus sit?" respondebitur eodem modo: "Quod si ratio id suadeat, suadet ergo id omnibus hominibus, atque adeo ratio omnino suadet hominibus, ne nisi dolo malo paciscantur, vires coniungere et iura habere communia,[ma] hoc est, ne revera iura habeant communia, quod est absurdum."

[lz] Gebhardt (G II 264; Textgestaltung II 386) adds from the Dutch, after *libidini*, *en wulpsheit* ('and wantonness'); the Dutch has *aan de lust en wulpsheit der ontuchtigen*.
[ma] The Dutch implies *non nisi dolo malo paciscantur, vires conjungere, et jura habere communia* (three coordinate acts), which W. Meijer (second edition) proposes and Appuhn thinks admissible; Gebhardt (G II 264; Textgestaltung II 386) keeps the 1677 text, in which joining forces and having common rights are the content of the agreement, and suspects a mistranslation in the Dutch.

Proposition LXXI

Only free men are most grateful to one another.

Demonstration. Only free men are most useful to one another and are joined to one another by the closest bond of friendship (by Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 393] and its Cor. 1 [p. 395]), and strive to do good to one another with equal zeal of love (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]). And so (by Def. Aff. 34 [p. 333]) only free men are most grateful to one another. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The thankfulness which men led by blind desire have for one another is for the most part a bargain or a hunt for gain rather than thankfulness. Further, ingratitude is not an affect. Yet ingratitude is base, because it generally indicates that a man is affected with excessive hatred, anger, or pride, or greed, etc.

For he who from foolishness does not know how to repay gifts is not ungrateful, and much less he who is not moved by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, nor by those of a thief to conceal his thefts, or by those of anyone similar. For such a man, on the contrary, shows that he has a constant mind, namely one which does not allow itself to be corrupted by any gifts to its own or the common ruin.

Cited in 4App18 [p. 455]

Proposition LXXII

A free man never acts deceptively, but always in good faith.

Demonstration. If a free man, insofar as he is free, did anything deceptively, he would do it from the dictate of reason (for only to that extent do we call him free); and so to act deceptively would be a virtue (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 383]), and consequently (by the same Prop. [p. 383]) it would be more advisable for everyone, for preserving his being, to act deceptively, that is (as is self-evident), it would be more advisable for men to agree only in words, but in fact to be contrary to one another, which (by Cor. of Prop. 31 of this Part [p. 391]) is absurd. Therefore a free man, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. If it is now asked, 'What if a man could free himself by perfidy from a present danger of death? Would not reason, for preserving his being, entirely advise him to be perfidious?', the answer will be the same: 'If reason advises this, it therefore advises it to all men, and so reason entirely advises men to make no agreements to join their forces and to have common rights except deceptively, that is, not really to have common rights, which is absurd.'[350]

[350] The *Political Treatise* is more guarded about promises: 'Fides alicui data ... tamdiu rata manet, quamdiu ejus, qui fidem dedit, non mutatur voluntas' ('a promise given to someone remains valid as long as the will of the one who gave it does not change', TP II.12), since in the natural state each is his own judge whether keeping it will bring more harm than advantage. The Scholium here speaks of the man who lives by reason, who cannot want reason to advise deceit to all.

Propositio LXXIII

Homo, qui ratione ducitur, magis in civitate, ubi ex communi decreto vivit, quam in solitudine, ubi sibi soli obtemperat, liber est.

[G II 265] Demonstratio. Homo, qui ratione ducitur, non ducitur metu ad obtemperandum (per prop. 63. huius), sed quatenus suum esse ex rationis dictamine conservare conatur, hoc est (per schol. prop. 66. huius) quatenus libere vivere conatur, communis vitae et utilitatis rationem tenere (per prop. 37. huius), et consequenter (ut in schol. 2. prop. 37. huius ostendimus) ex communi civitatis decreto vivere cupit. Cupit ergo homo, qui ratione ducitur, ut liberius vivat, communia civitatis iura tenere. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec et similia, quae de *vera hominis libertate* ostendimus, ad fortitudinem, hoc est (per schol. prop. 59. P. 3.) ad animositatem et generositatem referuntur. Nec operae pretium duco, omnes fortitudinis proprietates hic separatim demonstrare, et multo minus, quod vir fortis neminem odio habeat, nemini irascatur, invideat, indignetur, neminem despiciat minimeque superbiat. Nam haec et omnia, quae ad *veram vitam* et *religionem* spectant, facile ex prop. 37. et 46. huius partis convincuntur; nempe quod odium amore contra vincendum sit, et quod unusquisque, qui ratione ducitur, bonum quod sibi appetit, reliquis etiam ut sit, cupiat.

Ad quod accedit id, quod in schol. prop. 50. huius partis et aliis in locis notavimus, quod scilicet vir fortis hoc apprime consideret, nempe quod omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae sequantur, ac proinde quicquid molestum et malum esse cogitat et quicquid praeterea impium, horrendum, iniustum et turpe videtur, ex eo oritur, quod res ipsas perturbate, mutilate et confuse concipit; et hac de causa apprime conatur res, ut in se sunt, concipere et verae cognitionis impedimenta amovere, ut sunt odium, ira, invidia, irrisio, superbia et reliqua huiusmodi, quae in praecedentibus notavimus; atque adeo, quantum potest, conatur, uti diximus, bene agere et laetari.

Quousque autem humana virtus ad haec consequenda se extendat et quid possit, in sequenti parte demonstrabo.

[G II 266] Appendix. Quae in hac parte de recta vivendi ratione tradidi, non sunt ita disposita, ut uno aspectu videri possint, sed disperse a me demonstrata sunt, prout scilicet unum ex alio facilius deducere potuerim. Eadem igitur hic recolligere et ad summa capita redigere proposui.

Caput I. Omnes nostri conatus seu cupiditates ex necessitate nostrae naturae ita sequuntur, ut vel per ipsam solam tamquam per proximam suam causam possint intelligi vel quatenus naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis individuis non potest adaequate concipi.

Caput II. Cupiditates, quae ex nostra natura ita sequuntur, ut per ipsam solam possit intelligi,[mb]

[mb] So Gebhardt (G II 266); the 1677 edition (OP p. 222) and Bartuschat have *possint*, as the plural subject requires.

Proposition LXXIII

A man who is led by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone.

Demonstration. A man who is led by reason is not led to obey by fear (by Prop. 63 of this Part [p. 433]); but insofar as he strives to preserve his being from the dictate of reason, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 66 of this Part [p. 437]), insofar as he strives to live freely, he desires to keep to the principle of common life and common advantage (by Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 397]), and consequently (as we showed in Schol. 2 of Prop. 37 of this Part [p. 401]) to live according to the common decree of the state. A man who is led by reason desires, therefore, in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state. Q.E.D.

Scholium. These and similar things which we have shown about the *true freedom of man* are related to strength of character, that is (by Schol. of Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]), to tenacity and nobility. Nor do I think it worthwhile to demonstrate here separately all the properties of strength of character, and much less that a strong man hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is least of all proud. For these things, and all that concern *true life* and *religion*, are easily proved from Props. 37 [p. 397] and 46 of this Part [p. 413]: namely, that hatred is to be conquered by love in return, and that each one who is led by reason desires for others also the good which he wants for himself.

Add to this what we noted in Schol. of Prop. 50 of this Part [p. 417] and in other places, namely that the strong man considers this above all, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and accordingly that whatever he thinks troublesome and evil, and whatever besides seems impious, horrible, unjust and base, arises from his conceiving things in a disturbed, mutilated and confused way; and for this reason he strives above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, mockery, pride and the rest of this kind which we noted in what precedes; and so, as far as he can, he strives, as we have said, to act well and to rejoice.

But how far human virtue extends in attaining these things, and what it can do, I shall demonstrate in the following Part.

Cited in 4App15 [p. 453]

Appendix. The things I have taught in this Part about the right way of living have not been so arranged that they could be seen at a glance, but have been demonstrated by me piecemeal, namely as I could more easily deduce one from another. I have proposed, therefore, to collect them here and to bring them under main headings.

Chapter I. All our strivings, or desires, follow from the necessity of our nature in such a way that they can be understood either through it alone, as through their proximate cause, or insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived adequately through itself without other individuals.[351]

Chapter II. Desires which follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood

[351] Summarizing Part III, Defs. 1–2 [p. 231] and Part IV, Prop. 2 [p. 361].

sunt illae quae ad mentem referuntur, quatenus haec ideis adaequatis constare concipitur; reliquae vero cupiditates ad mentem non referuntur, nisi quatenus res inadaequate concipit, et quarum vis et incrementum non humana, sed rerum, quae extra nos sunt, potentia definiri debet. Et ideo illae recte *actiones*, hae autem *passiones* vocantur.[mc] Illae namque nostram potentiam semper indicant, et hae contra nostram impotentiam et mutilatam cognitionem.

Caput III. Nostrae actiones, hoc est, cupiditates illae, quae hominis potentia seu ratione definiuntur, semper bonae sunt; reliquae autem tam bonae, quam malae possunt esse.

[G II 267] Caput IV. In vita itaque apprime utile est, intellectum seu rationem, quantum possumus, perficere, et in hoc uno summa hominis felicitas seu beatitudo consistit; quippe *beatitudo* nihil aliud est, quam ipsa animi acquiescentia, quae ex Dei intuitiva cognitione oritur. At intellectum perficere nihil etiam aliud est, quam Deum[md] Deique attributa et actiones, quae ex ipsius naturae necessitate consequuntur, intelligere. Quare hominis, qui ratione ducitur, finis ultimus, hoc est, summa cupiditas, qua reliquas omnes moderari studet, est illa, qua fertur ad se resque omnes, quae sub ipsius intelligentiam cadere possunt, adaequate concipiendum.

Caput V. Nulla igitur *vita rationalis* est sine intelligentia, et res eatenus tantum bonae sunt, quatenus hominem iuvant, ut mentis vita fruatur, quae *intelligentia* definitur. Quae autem contra impediunt, quominus homo rationem perficere et rationali vita frui possit, eas solummodo malas esse dicimus.

Caput VI. Sed quia omnia illa, quorum homo efficiens est causa, necessario bona sunt, nihil ergo mali homini evenire potest, nisi a causis externis; nempe quatenus pars est totius naturae, cuius legibus humana natura obtemperare, et cui infinitis modis pene sese accommodare cogitur.

[G II 268] Caput VII. Nec fieri potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars, et communem eius ordinem non sequatur; sed si inter talia individua versetur, quae cum ipsius hominis natura conveniunt, eo ipso hominis agendi potentia iuvabitur et fovebitur. At si contra inter talia sit, quae cum ipsius natura minime conveniunt, vix absque magna ipsius mutatione iisdem sese accommodare poterit.

Caput VIII. Quicquid in rerum natura datur, quod iudicamus *malum* esse, sive posse impedire, quominus existere et vita rationali frui queamus, id a nobis removere ea via, quae securior videtur, licet; et quicquid contra datur quod iudicamus *bonum* sive *utile* esse ad nostrum esse conservandum, et vita rationali fruendum, id ad nostrum usum capere et eo quocumque modo uti nobis licet. Et absolute id unicuique summo naturae iure facere licet, quod ad ipsius utilitatem conferre

[mc] illae recte *actiones*, hae autem *passiones* vocantur] *transcr.* illae recte *actiones, hae autem passiones* vocantur. Italics confined to the two defined terms.

[md] nihil etiam aliud est, quam Deum] *transcr.* nihil etiam aliud, est quam Deum. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 267).

through it alone are those which are related to the mind insofar as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; the other desires are not related to the mind except insofar as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase must be defined not by human power but by the power of things which are outside us. And so the former are rightly called *actions*, and the latter *passions*. For the former always indicate our power, and the latter, on the contrary, our lack of power and mutilated knowledge.

Chapter III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power, or reason, are always good; the others can be good as well as evil.

Chapter IV. In life, therefore, it is above all useful to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and in this one thing man's highest happiness, or blessedness, consists; for *blessedness* is nothing but the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God.[352] But to perfect the intellect is also nothing else but to understand God, and the attributes and actions of God which follow from the necessity of his nature. So the final end of a man who is led by reason, that is, the highest desire by which he strives to moderate all the others, is the one by which he is carried to conceive adequately himself and all the things which can fall within his understanding.

Chapter V. There is, therefore, no *rational life* without understanding, and things are good only insofar as they aid man to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined by *understanding*. Those things, on the contrary, which prevent man from being able to perfect his reason and to enjoy the rational life, those only we say are evil.

Chapter VI. But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can happen to man except from external causes, namely insofar as he is a part of the whole of nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is compelled to accommodate itself in almost infinite ways.

Chapter VII. And it cannot happen that man should not be a part of nature and not follow its common order;[353] but if he lives among such individuals as agree with man's nature, by that very fact his power of acting will be aided and encouraged. But if, on the contrary, he is among such as agree very little with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without a great change in himself.
Cited in 4App9 [p. 453]

Chapter VIII. Whatever there is in the nature of things which we judge to be *evil*, or able to prevent us from existing and enjoying the rational life, it is permissible for us to remove from ourselves by the way which seems safer; and whatever, on the contrary, there is which we judge to be *good*, or *useful*, for preserving our being and enjoying the rational life, it is permissible for us to take for our use and to use in any way whatever. And absolutely, it is permissible for each one,

[352] The only reference in Part IV to intuitive knowledge, the third kind of knowledge of Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]. Part V shows that the greatest contentment of mind arises from it (Part V, Prop. 27 [p. 507]), and that 'our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom' consists in a constant and eternal love towards God (Part V, Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]).
[353] Prop. 4 [p. 361] and its Corollary [p. 363]; on agreement in nature, Props. 29–31 [p. 387].

iudicat.

Caput IX. Nihil magis cum natura alicuius rei convenire potest, quam reliqua eiusdem speciei individua; adeoque (per cap. 7.) nihil homini ad suum esse conservandum et vita rationali fruendum utilius datur, quam *homo, qui ratione ducitur*. Deinde quia inter res singulares nihil novimus, quod homine, qui ratione ducitur, sit praestantius, nulla ergo re magis potest unusquisque ostendere, quantum arte et ingenio valeat, quam in hominibus ita educandis, ut tandem ex proprio rationis imperio vivant.

[G II 269] Caput X. Quatenus homines invidia aut aliquo odii affectu in se invicem feruntur, eatenus invicem contrarii sunt, et consequenter eo magis timendi, quo plus possunt, quam reliqua naturae individua.

Caput XI. Animi tamen non armis, sed *amore* et *generositate* vincuntur.

Caput XII. Hominibus apprime utile est, *consuetudines* iungere, seseque iis vinculis astringere, quibus aptius de se omnibus unum efficiant, et absolute ea agere, quae firmandis amicitiis inserviunt.

Caput XIII. Sed ad haec *ars* et *vigilantia* requiritur. Sunt enim homines varii (nam rari sunt, qui ex rationis praescripto vivunt), et tamen plerumque invidi et magis ad vindictam, quam ad misericordiam proclives. Unumquemque igitur ex ipsius ingenio ferre et sese continere, ne eorum affectus imitetur,[me] singularis animi potentiae opus est.

At qui contra homines carpere et vitia potius exprobrare, quam virtutes docere et hominum animos non firmare, sed frangere norunt, ii et sibi et reliquis molesti sunt. Unde multi prae nimia scilicet animi impatientia falsoque religionis studio inter bruta potius, quam inter homines vivere maluerunt; ut pueri vel adolescentes, qui parentum iurgia aequo animo ferre nequeunt, militatum confugiunt et incommoda belli et imperium tyrannidis prae domesticis commodis et paternis admonitionibus eligunt, et quidvis oneris sibi imponi patiuntur, dummodo parentes ulciscantur.

[G II 270] Caput XIV. Quamvis igitur homines omnia plerumque ex sua libidine moderentur, ex eorum tamen *communi societate* multo plura commoda, quam damna sequuntur. Quare satius est eorum iniurias aequo animo ferre et studium iis adhibere, quae concordiae et amicitiae conciliandae inserviunt.

Caput XV. Quae *concordiam* gignunt sunt illa, quae ad *iustitiam, aequitatem* et *honestatem*

[me] W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) propose *imitemur*. Gebhardt (G II 269; Textgestaltung II 387) keeps *imitetur*: the construction is faulty either way, the infinitives *ferre* and *sese continere* rendering too literally a modern-language construction with an impersonal subject, from which the subject of the *ne*-clause is to be understood; *imitemur* would require *nos continere*.

by the highest right of nature, to do what he judges to contribute to his advantage.[354]

Chapter IX. Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species; and so (by ch. 7 [p. 451]) nothing is more useful to man for preserving his being and enjoying the rational life than *a man who is led by reason*.[355] Next, because among singular things we know nothing more excellent than a man who is led by reason, there is no way in which each one can better show how much he is worth in skill and talent than by so educating men that they finally live under the rule of their own reason.

Chapter X. Insofar as men are carried against one another by envy or some affect of hatred, to that extent they are contrary to one another, and consequently are the more to be feared, the more they can do than the other individuals of nature.

Chapter XI. Minds, however, are conquered not by arms, but by *love* and *nobility*.[356]

Chapter XII. It is above all useful to men to form *close associations*, and to bind themselves by those bonds by which they may more aptly make one out of all of them, and absolutely to do those things which serve to strengthen friendships.

Chapter XIII. But for this *skill* and *watchfulness* are required. For men are changeable (for those who live by the prescription of reason are rare), and yet for the most part envious and more inclined to vengeance than to compassion. So to bear with each one according to his temperament, and to restrain oneself so as not to imitate their affects, is a work of singular power of mind.
But those who, on the contrary, know how to find fault with men, and to reproach vices rather than teach virtues,[357] and to break men's minds rather than strengthen them, are troublesome both to themselves and to others. Hence many, no doubt from excessive impatience of mind and a false zeal for religion, have preferred to live among the beasts rather than among men; like boys or young men who cannot bear their parents' scolding with equanimity, run off to the army, choose the hardships of war and the rule of a tyrant over the comforts of home and paternal admonitions, and allow any burden whatever to be imposed on them, provided they can take revenge on their parents.

Chapter XIV. Although, therefore, men generally govern everything by their own lust,[358] still far more advantages than harms follow from their *common society*. So it is better to bear their injuries with equanimity, and to apply our zeal to those things which serve to bring about concord and friendship.

Chapter XV. The things which beget *concord* are those which are related to *justice*, *equity* and

[354] The right of nature of Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]; on the use of animals, Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399].
[355] Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395].
[356] Prop. 46 [p. 413] and its Scholium [p. 413].
[357] The words of Prop. 63, Schol. [p. 433] about the superstitious; on those who praise a rustic life and admire the beasts, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 395].
[358] *ex sua libidine*: here in the wide sense of whim or caprice; the word is rendered 'lust' throughout (see Part III, Def. Aff. 48 [p. 337]).

referuntur. Nam homines praeter id, quod iniustum et iniquum est, etiam aegre ferunt, quod turpe habetur, sive quod aliquis receptos civitatis mores aspernatur. Amori autem conciliando illa apprime necessaria sunt, quae ad *religionem* et *pietatem* spectant. De quibus vide schol. 1. et 2. prop. 37. et schol. prop. 46. et schol. prop. 73. P. 4.

Caput XVI. Solet praeterea concordia ex metu plerumque gigni; sed sine fide. Adde, quod metus ex animi impotentia oritur et propterea ad rationis usum non pertinet, ut nec commiseratio, quamvis pietatis speciem prae se ferre videatur.

[G II 271] Caput XVII. Vincuntur praeterea homines etiam largitate, praecipue ii, qui non habent unde comparare possint illa, quae ad vitam sustentandam necessaria sunt. Attamen unicuique indigenti auxilium ferre, vires et utilitatem viri privati longe superat. Divitiae namque viri privati longe impares sunt ad id suppeditandum. Unius praeterea viri facultas limitatior est,[mf] quam ut omnes sibi possit amicitia iungere; quare *pauperum cura* integrae societati incumbit et ad communem tantum utilitatem spectat.

Caput XVIII. In beneficiis accipiendis et gratia referenda alia prorsus debet esse cura, de qua vide schol. prop. 70. et schol. prop. 71. P. 4.

Caput XIX. Amor praeterea meretricius, hoc est generandi libido, quae ex forma oritur, et absolute omnis amor, qui aliam causam praeter animi libertatem agnoscit, facile in odium transit, nisi, quod peius est, species delirii sit, atque tum magis discordia, quam concordia fovetur.[mg] Vide schol. prop. 31. P. 3.[mh]

Caput XX. Ad *matrimonium* quod attinet, certum est, ipsum cum ratione convenire, si cupiditas miscendi corpora non ex sola forma, sed etiam ex amore liberos procreandi et sapienter educandi, ingeneretur; et praeterea, si utriusque, viri scilicet et feminae, amor non solam formam, sed animi praecipue libertatem pro causa habeat.

[G II 272] Caput XXI. Gignit praeterea adulatio concordiam, sed foedo servitutis crimine vel perfidia; nulli quippe magis adulatione capiuntur, quam superbi, qui primi esse volunt, nec sunt.

Caput XXII. Abiectioni falsa pietatis et religionis species inest. Et quamvis abiectio superbiae sit contraria, est tamen abiectus superbo proximus. Vide schol. prop. 57. P. 4.

Caput XXIII. Confert praeterea concordiae *pudor* in iis tantum, quae celari non possunt.

[mf] The 1677 edition (OP p. 227) prints *facultas ingenii*, and its *Sphalmata corrigenda* strike *ingenii*; the older editions follow, except Paulus. Land would restore *ingenii*, and Van Vloten–Land print it. Gebhardt (G II 271; Textgestaltung II 387–388) keeps the corrected text, with the Dutch (*de bequaamheit van een enig man*): he sees a veiled polemic against monarchy, and thinks Spinoza replaced an original *ingenium* by the more general *facultas*, since friendship is not won by intellectual means alone.

[mg] The 1677 edition has *discordiâ* and *concordiâ* (ablative), with love as the subject. Van Vloten–Land would read the nominatives ('discord rather than concord is fostered'); Gebhardt (G II 271; Textgestaltung II 388) keeps the ablatives, as the Dutch understands them (*dan zal zy meer door twist, dan door enigheit gevoed worden*).

[mh] The 1677 edition has *Coroll. Prop. 31. p. 3.*; Baensch rightly observes that hatred arising from love is spoken of only in the Scholium, and Appuhn, Halpern and Gebhardt (G II 271; Textgestaltung II 388) correct accordingly.

honourableness. For besides what is unjust and inequitable, men also take badly what is held to be base, or the fact that someone spurns the accepted customs of the state. But for winning love, those things are above all necessary which concern *religion* and *piety*. On these see Schols. 1 [p. 399] and 2 of Prop. 37 [p. 401], Schol. of Prop. 46 [p. 413], and Schol. of Prop. 73 of Part IV [p. 449].

Chapter XVI. Concord, moreover, is usually begotten from fear, but without good faith. Add that fear arises from lack of power of mind, and therefore does not pertain to the use of reason; nor does pity, although it seems to present a show of piety.[359]

Chapter XVII. Men are also conquered by largesse, especially those who do not have the means to procure what is necessary to sustain life. Yet to bring help to everyone in need far surpasses the powers and the advantage of a private man. For the riches of a private man are far from sufficient to supply it. Moreover, one man's capacity is too limited for him to be able to join all men to himself in friendship; so *care of the poor* falls on the whole of society and concerns only the common advantage.

Chapter XVIII. In accepting favours and returning thanks an altogether different care must be taken, on which see Schol. of Prop. 70 [p. 445] and Schol. of Prop. 71 of Part IV [p. 447].

Chapter XIX. Further, meretricious love, that is, the lust to procreate which arises from bodily beauty, and absolutely every love which recognizes any cause other than freedom of mind, easily passes into hatred, unless, which is worse, it is a species of madness; and then discord rather than concord is fostered. See Schol. of Prop. 31 of Part III [p. 275].

Chapter XX. As for *marriage*, it is certain that it agrees with reason if the desire for bodily union is generated not from beauty alone but also from love of begetting children and educating them wisely; and if, moreover, the love of each, namely of the man and of the woman, has as its cause not beauty alone but chiefly freedom of mind.

Chapter XXI. Flattery, too, begets concord, but by the foul crime of servitude, or by perfidy; for none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who want to be first and are not.

Chapter XXII. Self-abasement has a false appearance of piety and religion. And although self-abasement is contrary to pride, the self-abased man is still very near to the proud. See Schol. of Prop. 57 of Part IV [p. 423].

Chapter XXIII. *Shame*, too, contributes to concord, but only in matters which cannot be

[359] On fear, Props. 47 [p. 415] and 63 [p. 433]; on pity, Prop. 50 [p. 417].

Deinde, quia ipse pudor species est tristitiae, ad rationis usum non spectat.

Caput XXIV. Ceteri tristitiae erga homines affectus directe iustitiae, aequitati, honestati, pietati et religioni opponuntur, et quamvis indignatio aequitatis speciem prae se ferre videatur, ibi tamen *sine lege vivitur* ubi unicuique de factis alterius iudicium ferre, et suum vel alterius ius vindicare licet.

Caput XXV. *Modestia*, hoc est, cupiditas[mi] hominibus placendi, quae ex ratione determinatur, ad pietatem (ut in schol. 1. prop. 37. P. 4. diximus[mj]) refertur. Sed si ex affectu oriatur, ambitio est sive cupiditas, qua homines falsa pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant.

Nam qui reliquos consilio aut re iuvare cupit, ut simul summo fruantur bono, is apprime studebit, eorum sibi amorem conciliare; non autem eos in admirationem traducere, ut disciplina ex ipso habeat vocabulum, nec ullas absolute invidiae causas dare. In communibus deinde colloquiis cavebit hominum vitia referre, et de humana impotentia non nisi parce loqui curabit; at largiter de humana virtute seu potentia, et qua via possit perfici, ut sic homines non ex metu aut aversione, sed solo laetitiae affectu, moti ex rationis praescripto, quantum in se est, conentur vivere.[mk]

[G II 273] Caput XXVI. Praeter homines nihil singulare in natura novimus, cuius mente gaudere et quod nobis amicitia aut aliquo consuetudinis genere iungere possumus; adeoque quicquid in rerum natura extra homines datur, id nostrae utilitatis ratio conservare non postulat, sed pro eius vario usu conservare, destruere, vel quocumque modo ad nostrum usum adaptare nos docet.

Caput XXVII. Utilitas, quam ex rebus, quae extra nos sunt, capimus, est praeter experientiam et cognitionem, quam acquirimus ex eo, quod easdem observamus et ex his formis in alias mutamus, praecipua corporis conservatio; et hac ratione res illae imprimis utiles sunt, quae corpus ita alere et nutrire possunt, ut eius omnes partes officio suo recte fungi queant. Nam quo corpus aptius est, ut pluribus modis possit affici et corpora externa pluribus modis afficere, eo mens ad cogitandum est aptior. Vide prop. 38. et 39. P. 4.

At huius notae perpauca in natura esse videntur. Quare ad corpus, ut requiritur, nutriendum necesse est multis naturae diversae alimentis uti. Quippe humanum corpus ex plurimis diversae naturae partibus componitur, quae continuo alimento indigent et vario, ut totum corpus ad omnia, quae ex ipsius natura sequi possunt, aeque aptum sit, et consequenter ut mens etiam aeque apta sit ad plura concipiendum.

[G II 274] Caput XXVIII. Ad haec autem comparandum vix uniuscuiusque vires sufficerent nisi

[mi] *Modestia*, hoc est, cupiditas] *transcr.* Modestia, hoc est, cupiditas. The transcription sets the whole chapter in italics; only the defined term is meant.
[mj] The 1677 edition (OP p. 229) has *Schol. Prop. 37.*; the Dutch has *het eerste Byvoegsel* (as Land pointed out), and Van Vloten–Land and Gebhardt (G II 273; Textgestaltung II 388) read *Schol. 1.*
[mk] quantum in se est, conentur vivere.] *transcr.* quantum in se est, conentur vivere. See the preceding emendation.

concealed. Next, because shame itself is a species of sadness, it does not pertain to the use of reason.

Chapter XXIV. The other affects of sadness towards men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honourableness, piety and religion; and although indignation seems to present an appearance of equity, yet men *live without law* where each one is permitted to pass judgment on the deeds of another and to vindicate his own or another's right.

Chapter XXV. *Modesty*, that is, the desire to please men which is determined by reason, is related to piety (as we said in Schol. 1 of Prop. 37 of Part IV [p. 399]). But if it arises from affect, it is ambition, or a desire by which men, under a false image of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions.

For he who desires to help others by counsel or deed, so that they may enjoy the highest good together, will above all strive to win their love, not to lead them into wonder so that a school may take its name from him, nor absolutely to give any causes for envy. Then in common conversation he will take care not to report men's vices, and to speak only sparingly of human lack of power, but abundantly of human virtue, or power, and of the way in which it can be perfected, so that men, moved not by fear or aversion but only by the affect of joy, may strive, as far as it is in them, to live according to the prescription of reason.

Chapter XXVI. Apart from men, we know no singular thing in nature whose mind we can enjoy, and which we can join to ourselves in friendship or in any kind of association; and so whatever there is in the nature of things apart from men, the principle of our advantage does not require us to preserve, but teaches us to preserve it, destroy it, or adapt it to our use in any way whatever, according to its various uses.

Chapter XXVII. The advantage which we take from things outside us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another, is chiefly the preservation of the body; and in this respect those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body that all its parts can perform their function properly. For the more capable the body is of being affected in many ways, and of affecting external bodies in many ways, the more capable the mind is of thinking. See Props. 38 [p. 405] and 39 of Part IV [p. 405].

But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature. So to nourish the body as it requires, it is necessary to use many foods of different natures. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which need continual and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind also may be equally capable of conceiving many things.

Chapter XXVIII. But to procure these things the powers of each one would hardly suffice, if

homines operas mutuas traderent. Verum omnium rerum compendium *pecunia* attulit.[ml] Unde factum, ut eius imago mentem vulgi maxime occupare soleat; quia vix ullam laetitiae speciem imaginari possunt, nisi concomitante nummorum idea tamquam causa.

Caput XXIX. Sed hoc vitium eorum tantum est, qui non ex indigentia, nec propter necessitates nummos quaerunt, sed quia lucri artes didicerunt, quibus se magnifice efferunt. Ceterum corpus ex consuetudine pascunt; sed parce, quia tantum de suis bonis se perdere credunt, quantum sui corporis conservationi impendunt. At qui verum nummorum usum norunt et divitiarum modum ex sola indigentia moderantur, paucis contenti vivunt.

[G II 275] Caput XXX. Cum igitur res illae sint bonae, quae corporis partes iuvant, ut suo officio fungantur, et laetitia in eo consistat, quod hominis potentia, quatenus mente et corpore constat, iuvatur vel augetur, sunt ergo illa omnia, quae laetitiam afferunt, *bona*. Attamen quoniam contra non eum in finem res agunt, ut nos laetitia afficiant, nec earum agendi potentia ex nostra utilitate temperatur, et denique quoniam laetitia plerumque ad unam corporis partem potissimum refertur, habent ergo plerumque laetitiae affectus (nisi ratio et vigilantia adsit), et consequenter cupiditates, etiam quae ex iisdem generantur, excessum.
Ad quod accedit, quod ex affectu id primum habeamus, quod in praesentia suave est,[mm] nec futura aequali animi affectu aestimare possumus. Vide schol. prop. 44. et schol. prop. 60. P. 4.[mn]

Caput XXXI. At superstitio id contra videtur statuere bonum esse, quod tristitiam, et id contra malum, quod laetitiam affert. Sed, ut iam diximus[mo] (vide schol. 2. prop. 45. P. 4.), nemo, nisi invidus, mea impotentia et incommodo delectatur. Nam quo maiore laetitia afficimur, eo ad maiorem perfectionem transimus, et consequenter eo magis de natura divina participamus; nec laetitia unquam mala esse potest, quam nostrae utilitatis vera ratio moderatur. At qui contra metu ducitur et bonum, ut malum vitet, agit, is ratione non ducitur. Vide prop. 63. P. 4.

[G II 276] Caput XXXII. Sed humana potentia admodum limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur; atque adeo potestatem absolutam non habemus, res, quae extra nos sunt, ad nostrum usum aptandi. Attamen ea quae nobis eveniunt contra id, quod nostrae utilitatis ratio postulat, aequo animo feremus, si conscii simus nos functos nostro officio fuisse,

[ml] The 1677 edition prints *Verùm*, taking it as the particle ('But money has furnished …'), and the Dutch translates *Doch*. W. Meijer, followed by Baensch and Appuhn, finds a gap between the first and second sentences of this chapter. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 388) answers that the thought runs on: money is the true regulator of mutual help, harmful when it becomes an end in itself, good when it serves need; and a *Verum* at the beginning of a sentence can only be the adjective, as Kirchmann already took it. The translation follows Gebhardt.
[mm] The 1677 edition and the older editions have *in praesenti*; Leopold, recognizing the line of Terence, proposes *in praesentia*, which Gebhardt (G II 275; Textgestaltung II 388) prints, comparing *in praesentia suaves* at Part IV, Prop. 62, Schol.
[mn] The 1677 edition has *p. 3*; the Dutch has *in 't vierde deel*, which certainly gives the reference as Spinoza wrote it. Van Vloten–Land, without reference to the Dutch, correct to *p. 4.*, and Gebhardt (G II 275; Textgestaltung II 388–389) follows.
[mo] Sed, ut iam diximus] *transcr.* Sed, ut iamdiximus. Word division.

men did not give their labour to one another. But *money* has furnished a compendium of all things. Hence it has come about that its image usually occupies the mind of the multitude most, because they can hardly imagine any species of joy except one accompanied by the idea of coins as its cause.

Chapter XXIX. But this vice belongs only to those who seek coins not from need or for necessities, but because they have learned the arts of gain, on which they pride themselves greatly. For the rest, they feed the body according to habit, but sparingly, because they believe that they lose as much of their goods as they spend on the preservation of their body. But those who know the true use of coins, and set the measure of their wealth by need alone, live content with little.

Chapter XXX. Since, therefore, those things are good which help the parts of the body to perform their function, and joy consists in this, that man's power, insofar as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all those things which bring joy are *good*. Yet since, on the other hand, things do not act with the aim of affecting us with joy, nor is their power of acting tempered to our advantage, and finally since joy is generally related chiefly to one part of the body, the affects of joy (unless reason and watchfulness are present), and consequently also the desires which are generated from them, are generally excessive.
Add to this that from affect we hold first what is pleasant in the present,[360] and cannot value future things with an equal affect of mind. See Schol. of Prop. 44 [p. 409] and Schol. of Prop. 60 of Part IV [p. 429].

Chapter XXXI. But superstition, on the contrary, seems to maintain that what brings sadness is good, and what brings joy evil. But, as we have already said (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 45 of Part IV [p. 411]), no one but an envious man takes pleasure in my lack of power and misfortune. For the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, and consequently the more we participate in the divine nature; nor can joy ever be evil which the true principle of our advantage moderates. But he who, on the contrary, is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason. See Prop. 63 of Part IV [p. 433].

Chapter XXXII. But human power is very limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; and so we do not have an absolute power of adapting things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear with equanimity whatever happens to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage requires, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the

[360] The words echo Terence, *Heauton Timorumenos* 962–963: 'suavia in praesentia / Quae essent prima habere, neque consulere in longitudinem' ('to hold first what was pleasant in the present, and not to take thought for the long run'), as Leopold noticed.

et potentiam, quam habemus, non potuisse se eo usque extendere, ut eadem vitare possemus, nosque partem totius naturae esse, cuius ordinem sequimur.
Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri, quae *intelligentia* definitur, hoc est, pars melior nostri, in eo plane acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur. Nam quatenus intelligimus, nihil appetere nisi id quod necessarium est, nec absolute, nisi in veris acquiescere possumus; adeoque quatenus haec recte intelligimus, eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine totius naturae convenit.

power we have could not have extended so far as to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow.

If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be entirely content with it, and will strive to persevere in that contentment. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing but what is necessary, nor be content absolutely with anything but what is true; and so, insofar as we understand these things rightly, to that extent the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.[361]

[361] The Part closes where it began, with man as a part of nature (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]), but now seen from the side of understanding. 'The better part of us' is the intellect; Part V calls it the eternal part of the mind (Part V, Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]).

Ethices Pars Quinta
De Potentia Intellectus seu de Libertate Humana

Fifth Part of the Ethics
Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom

Introduction to the Fifth Part

The last Part is called *De potentia intellectus, seu de libertate humana*, "Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom." Part IV ended by describing a free man and admitting that no one is born free; Part V asks how far the mind can make itself free, and in what that freedom consists. Its Preface states both questions: Spinoza will treat of the power of reason, "showing what reason itself can do against the affects, and then what *freedom of mind*, or *blessedness*, is; from which we shall see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant" (Preface [p. 469]). The answer to the first question occupies Props. 1–20 [p. 473]; the answer to the second, Props. 21–42 [p. 503].

Part V is the shortest Part of the *Ethics*, less than half the length of Part IV, and it is the most disputed. Its first half is a practical psychology, sober and close to experience, and most readers find it among the most useful things in the book. Its second half, on the eternity of the mind and the intellectual love of God, is the culmination toward which Spinoza says everything has been leading, and it has been read as the summit of his philosophy, as a mystical appendage to it, and as a failure. This introduction describes both halves, the essay before Prop. 21 [p. 503] introduces the second more fully, and Appendix E [p. 672] describes how modern interpreters have read it.

The Preface: the Stoics and Descartes

The Preface begins by marking the limits of the Part. How the intellect is to be perfected belongs to logic, and how the body is to be cared for belongs to medicine; neither is treated here. Spinoza will treat only of the power of the mind, "and above all I shall show how great and of what kind its dominion over the affects is, for restraining and moderating them. For we have already demonstrated above that we do not have absolute dominion over them."

Two answers are then set aside. The Stoics thought that the affects depend absolutely on our will and that we can command them absolutely, yet they were compelled "by the protests of experience and not by their own principles" to admit that no little practice is needed to restrain them; someone, Spinoza recalls, tried to show this with two dogs, a house dog trained to hunt and a hunting dog trained to leave hares alone. Descartes inclines to the same opinion. Spinoza summarizes the doctrine of the *Passions of the Soul* at length and with evident care: the mind is united chiefly to the pineal gland, which it can move by willing; each motion of the gland is joined by nature to a certain thought, but can be joined to others by habit; and so, by determining the will through firm judgments and joining to them the motions of the passions we want to

have, "we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions." From this Descartes concluded "that there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when it is well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions" (Preface [p. 469]).

Spinoza's reply is one of the sharpest passages he wrote. He can hardly believe that so great a man should have put the doctrine forward, "if it had been less acute." A philosopher who had resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles, and who had so often reproached the scholastics for explaining obscure things by occult qualities, assumed "a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality." "What clear and distinct concept, I say, has he of a thought most closely united to a certain small portion of quantity?" How many degrees of motion can the mind give the gland, and with what force can it hold it? Might not the motions joined to firm judgments be disjoined again by corporeal causes, so that a man who had resolved to face danger would, at the sight of it, think only of flight? "And indeed, since there is no ratio of will to motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body." The anatomy is wrong as well: the gland is not so placed that it can be moved so easily, and not all the nerves reach the cavities of the brain. "Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, we shall determine the remedies for the affects ... by the knowledge of the mind alone, and from that same knowledge we shall deduce all that concerns its blessedness."

The Preface thus states the program of the whole Part. There is no will that can master the passions by moving the body; there is only understanding, and whatever power the mind has over the affects must come from it.

The axioms and the first propositions

The Part has two axioms. If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change must take place in both or in one until they cease to be contrary (Axiom 1 [p. 473]); and the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause (Axiom 2 [p. 473]). The first propositions lay the foundation for the remedies. "In just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected exactly in the body" (Prop. 1 [p. 473]), which is Part II's parallelism applied to the affects: if the mind orders its thoughts, the body's affections are ordered correspondingly. "If we separate a commotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause ... will be destroyed" (Prop. 2 [p. 475]), since love and hatred are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Then comes the central proposition of the first half: "An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it" (Prop. 3 [p. 475]). The demonstration is short: a passion is a confused idea, and when we form a clear and distinct idea of it, it will be distinguished from the affect only by reason, and so will cease to be a passion. "An affect, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind is acted on by it the less, the better it is known to us" (Prop. 3, Cor. [p. 475]). And "there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept" (Prop. 4 [p. 475]), since whatever is common to all things can only be conceived adequately. The scholium concludes that "no remedy for the affects which depends on our power can be thought of that is more excellent than this one, which consists in a true knowledge of them, since there is no other power of the mind than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas" (Prop. 4, Schol. [p. 477]).

The remedies

The next propositions describe the ways in which understanding changes the force of the affects. An affect toward a thing imagined simply, not as necessary, possible or contingent, is the greatest (Prop. 5 [p. 479]); and "insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects" (Prop. 6 [p. 479]). The scholium appeals to experience. The sadness over a good that has been lost is eased as soon as a man considers that it could not have been kept; and "no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk or reason," but if most men were born adults and only a few infants, everyone would pity infants, regarding infancy as a fault of nature rather than as natural and necessary (Prop. 6, Schol. [p. 479]).

Affects that arise from reason are, over time, more powerful than those related to singular things contemplated as absent, since reason is concerned with the common properties of things, which are always present (Prop. 7 [p. 479]). An affect is greater the more causes concur in arousing it (Prop. 8 [p. 481]), and an affect related to many causes is less harmful than an equally great affect related to one (Prop. 9 [p. 481]). "So long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect" (Prop. 10 [p. 483]).

The scholium to Prop. 10 turns this into practical advice, and it is the passage of the *Ethics* that comes closest to a manual of conduct. "The best thing, therefore, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a right way of living, or sure principles of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life, so that in this way our imagination may be widely affected by them, and they may always be ready to hand for us." The example is the precept of Part IV that hatred is to be conquered by love, or nobility, and not repaid with hatred: to have it ready when needed, we must often meditate on the common injuries of men and on how they are best warded off by nobility, so that the image of an injury is joined to the image of the precept (Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 483]). The same scholium applies the method to fear, by imagining the common dangers of life and how presence of mind and strength of character overcome them, and advises that in ordering our thoughts we attend to what is good in each thing, so as to be moved by joy: a man who pursues glory too much should think of its right use, and not of its abuse and emptiness and the inconstancy of men, "about which no one thinks except from sickness of mind." The remedies of the *Ethics* are not acts of will; they are habits of thought, formed by understanding and maintained by practice.

The love of God

The first half of the Part ends with a new affect. "The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God" (Prop. 14 [p. 487]), since there is no affection of the body of which it cannot form a clear and distinct concept. "He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects" (Prop. 15 [p. 489]), since such understanding is accompanied by joy and by the idea of God as its cause. "This love towards God must occupy the mind most" (Prop. 16 [p. 489]), because it is joined to all the affections of the body and encouraged by all of them.

The love Spinoza describes is not reciprocal. "God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness" (Prop. 17 [p. 489]), and so, "strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one" (Prop. 17, Cor. [p. 489]). No one can hate God (Prop. 18 [p. 491]). "He who

loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return" (Prop. 19 [p. 491]), since he would then desire that God, whom he loves, should not be God. And this love "cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or of jealousy; but it is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love" (Prop. 20 [p. 491]). Unlike the loves analysed in Part III, which are troubled by rivals, loss and change, the love of God is shared without diminution and directed at an object that cannot be lost.

The scholium to Prop. 20 gathers the results into five remedies. The power of the mind over the affects consists "1. In the knowledge itself of the affects ... 2. In its separating the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly ... 3. In time, by which the affections related to things which we understand surpass those related to things which we conceive confusedly, or in a mutilated way ... 4. In the multitude of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are encouraged ... 5. Finally, in the order in which the mind can order its affects and connect them with one another" (Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]). The scholium ends with a sentence that divides the Part in two: "And with these I have completed everything which concerns this present life. ... It is time, therefore, to pass to those things which pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body."

The eternity of the mind

The second half begins with the denial of what most readers expect. "The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures" (Prop. 21 [p. 503]). But there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity (Prop. 22 [p. 503]), and so "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal" (Prop. 23 [p. 503]). The eternity in question is not endless duration but the eternity defined in Part I, and the essay before Prop. 21 explains the doctrine and its difficulties.

From it Spinoza derives an account of the third kind of knowledge and its fruits. "The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God" (Prop. 24 [p. 505]). "The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge" (Prop. 25 [p. 505]), and "from this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be" (Prop. 27 [p. 507]). The desire to know things in this way cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second (Prop. 28 [p. 507]): reason prepares the way for intuition, and imagination does not.

"Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause" (Prop. 32 [p. 511]). From this "there necessarily arises the *intellectual love of God*," the love of God not insofar as we imagine him as present, "but insofar as we understand God to be eternal" (Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511]). This love is eternal (Prop. 33 [p. 511]), though the scholium explains that Spinoza speaks of it as if it had come into being, for ease of exposition. "God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love" (Prop. 35 [p. 513]), and "the intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love of God by which God loves himself ... that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself" (Prop. 36 [p. 515]). Hence "God, insofar as he loves himself, loves men, and consequently ... the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same" (Prop. 36, Cor. [p. 515]).

The scholium to Prop. 36 draws the conclusion toward which the whole book has moved. "From these things we understand clearly in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom

consists: namely, in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God towards men." This love "is called glory in the sacred books, and not without reason." And Spinoza adds a remark about the third kind of knowledge itself: he has shown generally in Part I that all things depend on God according to essence and existence, but that demonstration, though certain, does not affect the mind as much as when the same conclusion is drawn from the essence of a singular thing that we say depends on God (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). The difference between the second and third kinds of knowledge is the difference between knowing that everything follows from God and seeing how this thing, oneself, does.

Body, death and degrees of eternity

The last propositions draw consequences for the life of the body. "There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away" (Prop. 37 [p. 517]). "The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death" (Prop. 38 [p. 517]). "He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal" (Prop. 39 [p. 519]), so that eternity is not given to every mind in the same measure, and the scholium returns to the infant and the corpse, the changes of life by which we are called happy or unhappy. "The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on" (Prop. 40 [p. 521]), and the part of the mind that remains, however great it may be, is more perfect than the rest (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]).

An ethics that does not depend on immortality

Then Spinoza does something surprising. Having argued that something of the mind is eternal, he insists that the ethics of Part IV does not depend on it. "Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility" (Prop. 41 [p. 521]). The scholium attacks the common view that piety and religion are burdens to be laid down after death, borne only in hope of reward and fear of punishment, and calls it no less absurd than if someone, because he did not believe he could nourish his body with good food for eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons (Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523]).

The last proposition answers that view directly. "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts, but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts" (Prop. 42 [p. 523]). The final scholium contrasts the ignorant man, driven about by external causes and never possessing true contentment of mind, who "as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he also ceases to be," with the wise man, who, "being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true contentment of mind." And it ends with the most famous sentences of the book: "If the way which I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, it can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is so rarely found must be hard. For how could it happen, if salvation were ready to hand and could be found without great labour, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare" (Prop. 42, Schol. [p. 523]).

Questions the reader will meet

The first concerns God's love. Prop. 17, Cor. [p. 489] says that strictly speaking God loves no one; Prop. 36, Cor. [p. 515] says that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves men. The contradiction is apparent. The first denies that God has passions, joy or sadness that arise from external causes; the second describes an intellectual love that is not a passion and has no external object, the love by which God, conceived through the essence of the human mind, enjoys his own perfection. The phrase "strictly speaking" in the corollary to Prop. 17 is a warning that the word "love" will be used again in another sense.

The second concerns the relation between the two halves of the Part. The remedies of the first half concern "this present life"; the second half concerns the mind "without relation to the body." Yet the second half speaks of what the mind can do now, and its account of the intellectual love of God continues the account of the love of God in Props. 14–20. Readers have asked whether the two halves describe two kinds of freedom, a practical one and a contemplative one, or two aspects of one.

The third concerns the value of the second half. Jonathan Bennett judged that "the final three doctrines" of the *Ethics*, the mind's eternity, intuitive knowledge and the intellectual love of God, cannot be rescued, and that this part of the *Ethics* "has nothing to teach us" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, § 85, p. 372). Others, among them Stuart Hampshire, whom Bennett quotes, have read the doctrine sympathetically as an account of what it is to understand things completely and to know oneself, in such moments, as part of the eternal order of nature. The reader will have to decide; the essay before Prop. 21 tries to make clear what the doctrine claims and what it does not.

A last question concerns how hard the way is. Spinoza ends by saying that it is very hard and rarely found, and the remedies of Part V are modest: knowledge of the affects, separation of them from their external causes, time, the multitude of causes, and order. None of them promises a sudden liberation. The freedom of Part V is a matter of degree, and so is its blessedness, and the book's last word is not a promise but an encouragement.

The place of Part V in the whole

Part V gathers the threads of the whole *Ethics*. Its God is the God of Part I, who acts from the necessity of his nature and loves himself with an intellectual love; its theory of knowledge is that of Part II, with the third kind of knowledge at last put to work; its remedies apply the theory of the affects of Part III; and its blessedness is the end toward which the free man of Part IV was striving. The Preface to Part II promised that the work would explain only what could lead us, as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness. Part V is where that promise is kept.

The text begins with the Preface, with its criticism of the Stoics and of Descartes, and then with the two axioms. The first propositions are short and depend closely on Parts II and III; the reader who has followed those Parts will find the opening of Part V easy going.

Praefatio

[G II 277] Transeo tandem ad *alteram ethices partem, quae est de modo sive via, quae ad libertatem ducit*. In hac ergo de *potentia rationis* agam ostendens, quid ipsa ratio in affectus possit, et deinde, quid *mentis libertas* seu *beatitudo* sit; ex quibus videbimus, quantum sapiens potior sit ignaro.

Quomodo autem et qua via debeat intellectus perfici, et qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum, ut possit suo officio[mp] recte fungi, huc non pertinet; hoc enim ad *medicinam*, illud autem ad *logicam* spectat.[mq] Hic igitur, ut dixi, de sola mentis seu rationis potentia agam, et ante omnia, quantum et quale imperium in affectus habeat ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum, ostendam. Nam nos in ipsos imperium absolutum non habere, iam supra demonstravimus.

Stoici tamen putarunt, eosdem a nostra voluntate absolute pendere, nosque iis absolute imperare posse. Attamen ab experientia reclamante, non vero ex suis principiis coacti sunt fateri, usum et studium non parvum requiri ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum. Quod quidam exemplo duorum canum (si recte memini), unius scilicet domestici, alterius venatici, conatus est ostendere; nempe quia usu efficere tandem potuit ut domesticus venari, venaticus contra a leporibus sectandis abstinere assuesceret.

Huic opinioni non parum favet *Cartesius*. Nam statuit animam seu mentem unitam praecipue esse cuidam parti cerebri, glandulae scilicet pineali dictae, cuius ope mens motus omnes, qui in corpore excitantur, et obiecta externa sentit, quamque mens eo solo, quod vult, varie movere potest. Hanc glandulam in medio cerebri ita suspensam esse statuit, ut minimo spirituum animalium motu possit moveri.
Deinde statuit, quod haec glans tot variis modis in medio cerebro suspendatur, quot variis modis spiritus animales in eandem impingunt, et quod praeterea tot varia vestigia in eadem imprimantur, quot varia obiecta externa ipsos spiritus animales versus eandem propellunt; unde fit, ut si glans postea ab animae voluntate illam diversimode movente hoc aut illo modo suspendatur, quo semel fuit suspensa a spiritibus hoc aut illo modo agitatis, tum ipsa glans ipsos spiritus animales eodem modo propellet et determinabit, ac antea a simili glandulae suspensione repulsi fuerant.

Praeterea statuit, unamquamque mentis voluntatem natura esse unitam certo cuidam glandis motui. Ex. gr. si quis voluntatem habet obiectum remotum intuendi, haec voluntas efficiet, ut pupilla dilatetur; sed si de sola dilatanda pupilla cogitet, nihil proderit eius rei habere voluntatem,

[mp] qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum, ut possit suo officio] *transcr.* qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum; ut possit suo officio. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition (OP p. 233) and Gebhardt (G II 277).
[mq] hoc enim ad *medicinam*, illud autem ad *logicam* spectat] *transcr.* hoc enim ad *medicinam, illud autem ad logicam* spectat. Italics confined to the two disciplines.

I pass, finally, to the other part of ethics, *which concerns the manner, or way, which leads to freedom*. In this Part, therefore, I shall treat of the *power of reason*, showing what reason itself can do against the affects, and then what *freedom of mind*, or *blessedness*, is; from which we shall see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.

But how and by what way the intellect must be perfected, and then by what art the body must be cared for so that it can perform its function properly, does not belong here; for the latter pertains to *medicine*, the former to *logic*. Here, therefore, as I have said, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason, and above all I shall show how great and of what kind its dominion over the affects is, for restraining and moderating them. For we have already demonstrated above that we do not have absolute dominion over them.[362]

The *Stoics*, however, thought that they depend absolutely on our will, and that we can command them absolutely. Yet they were compelled, by the protests of experience and not by their own principles, to admit that no little practice and effort are required to restrain and moderate them. Someone tried to show this by the example of two dogs (if I remember rightly), one a house dog, the other a hunting dog; namely, because by practice he was finally able to bring it about that the house dog grew accustomed to hunting, and the hunting dog, on the contrary, to refraining from chasing hares.[363]

Descartes inclines not a little to this opinion. For he maintained that the soul, or mind, is united chiefly to a certain part of the brain, namely the so-called pineal gland,[364] by means of which the mind senses all the motions excited in the body, and external objects, and which the mind can move in various ways merely by willing. He maintained that this gland is so suspended in the middle of the brain that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits.

Next, he maintained that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many different ways as there are different ways in which the animal spirits strike against it, and that, besides, as many different traces are impressed on it as there are different external objects which drive the animal spirits towards it; from which it comes about that if the gland is afterwards suspended in this or that way by the will of the soul, which moves it in different ways, in the way in which it was once suspended by the spirits agitated in this or that way, then the gland itself will drive and determine the animal spirits in the same way as they had been repelled before by a similar suspension of the gland.

Besides, he maintained that each will of the mind is united by nature to a certain motion of the gland. For example, if someone has the will to look at a distant object, this will brings it about that the pupil is dilated; but if he thinks only of dilating the pupil, it will be of no use to have the

[362] In Part IV: man is necessarily always subject to passions (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]), and an affect can be restrained only by a contrary and stronger affect (Prop. 7 [p. 365]), not by true knowledge insofar as it is true (Prop. 14 [p. 373]).

[363] Spinoza does not say who told the story. In the article of the *Passions of the Soul* he goes on to cite, Descartes gives a similar example of training: setters are taught to stop at the sight of a partridge and to run towards it at the sound of the gun, although by nature they do the opposite (art. 50, AT XI 370).

[364] The account that follows summarizes the *Passions of the Soul* (1649), which Spinoza read in the Latin translation of 1650 (*Passiones animae*) and quotes from it almost word for word: the gland in the middle of the brain, through which the soul exercises its functions (arts. 31–32, AT XI 351–353), moved by the spirits and by the soul (art. 34), every volition joined by nature to some movement of the gland (art. 44), and the power of habit to join them otherwise (art. 50).

quia natura non iunxit motum glandis, qui inservit impellendis spiritibus versus nervum opticum modo conveniente dilatandae vel contrahendae pupillae, cum voluntate eandem dilatandi vel contrahendi; sed demum cum voluntate intuendi obiecta remota vel proxima.
Denique statuit, quod, etsi unusquisque motus huius glandulae videatur connexus esse per naturam singulis ex nostris cogitationibus ab initio nostrae vitae, aliis tamen per habitum possunt iungi, quod probare conatur artic. 50. P. 1. de passionibus animae. Ex his concludit, nullam esse tam imbecillem animam quae non possit, cum bene dirigitur, acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas passiones.
Nam hae, ut ab eo definiuntur, sunt perceptiones aut sensus aut commotiones animae, quae ad eam speciatim referuntur, quaeque NB. producuntur,[mr,ms] conservantur et corroborantur per aliquem motum spirituum. Vide Cartes. artic. 27. P. 1. passionum animae.
At quandoquidem cuilibet voluntati possumus iungere motum quemcumque glandis, et consequenter spirituum, et determinatio voluntatis a sola nostra potestate pendet, si igitur nostram voluntatem certis et firmis iudiciis, secundum quae nostrae vitae actiones dirigere volumus, determinemus et motus passionum, quas habere volumus, hisce iudiciis iungamus, imperium acquiremus absolutum in nostras passiones.
Haec est clarissimi huius viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis coniicio), quam ego vix credidissem a tanto viro prolatam esse, si minus acuta fuisset. Profecto mirari satis non possum, quod vir philosophus, qui firmiter statuerat, nihil deducere nisi ex principiis per se notis, et nihil affirmare nisi quod clare et distincte perciperet, et qui toties scholasticos reprehenderat, quod per occultas qualitates res obscuras voluerint explicare, hypothesin sumat omni occulta qualitate occultiorem.

Quid, quaeso, per mentis et corporis unionem intelligit? Quem, inquam, clarum et distinctum conceptum habet cogitationis arctissime unitae cuidam quantitatis portiunculae? Vellem sane, ut hanc unionem per proximam suam causam explicuisset. Sed ille mentem a corpore adeo distinctam conceperat, ut nec huius unionis, nec ipsius mentis ullam singularem causam assignare potuerit, sed necesse ipsi fuerit, ad causam totius universi, hoc est, ad Deum recurrere.

Deinde pervelim scire: quot motus gradus potest glandulae isti pineali mens tribuere, et quanta

[mr] quaeque NB. producuntur] *transcr.* quaeque nota bene producuntur. Gebhardt (G II 279) prints 'NB.', the reading of the 1677 errata; the transcription expands it.
[ms] The 1677 edition prints *quaeque producuntur* in the text and adds in its *Sphalmata corrigenda*: *ita Auctor scripserat, NB. produ[cuntur]*; the Dutch has *(merk)*. Gebhardt (G II 279; Textgestaltung II 389) prints *NB.*, which has the force of a critical exclamation mark.

will to do so,[365] because nature has not joined the motion of the gland which serves to drive the spirits towards the optic nerve in the way suitable for dilating or contracting the pupil with the will to dilate or contract it, but only with the will to look at distant or near objects.

Finally, he maintained that although each motion of this gland seems to have been connected by nature from the beginning of our life with each of our thoughts, they can nevertheless be joined to others by habit, which he tries to prove in art. 50 of Part I of *The Passions of the Soul*. From this he concludes that there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when it is well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions.[366]

For these, as he defines them, are perceptions, or feelings, or commotions of the soul, which are related to it in particular, and which (note well!) are produced, preserved and strengthened by some motion of the spirits. See Descartes, art. 27 of Part I of *The Passions of the Soul*.[367]

But since we can join any motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, to any will, and the determination of the will depends on our power alone, if, therefore, we determine our will by sure and firm judgments according to which we want to direct the actions of our life, and join to these judgments the motions of the passions which we want to have, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions.

This is the opinion of this most distinguished man (so far as I can conjecture from his words); and I would hardly have believed it to have been put forward by so great a man, if it had been less acute. Indeed, I cannot wonder enough that a philosopher who had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing except what he perceived clearly and distinctly, and who had so often reproached the scholastics for wanting to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should assume a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality.

What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct concept, I say, has he of a thought most closely united to a certain small portion of quantity? I should indeed have liked him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind to be so distinct from the body that he could assign no singular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, but had to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God.[368]

Next, I should very much like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can give to this

[365] The example and its wording come from art. 44 (AT XI 361–362), in the Latin of 1650: 'si solum cogitetur de pupilla dilatanda, nihil proderit ejus rei habere voluntatem'.

[366] The title of art. 50 (AT XI 368), in the Latin of 1650: 'Nullam tam imbecillem esse animam, quae non possit cum bene dirigitur acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas passiones'. The preceding sentence follows the opening of the same article. Spinoza had promised this examination in the Preface to Part III [p. 229]. In this Part 'power' renders both of Spinoza's words: *potentia*, the power by which the mind acts, and *potestas*, what is in someone's power, at his disposal (see the note on Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]). The question of Part V is how far the affects are in our power in the second sense (Prop. 3, Cor. [p. 475]), and the answer is given in terms of the mind's power in the first (Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]).

[367] Art. 27 (AT XI 349), quoted from the Latin of 1650: 'Perceptiones, aut sensus, aut commotiones animae, quae ad eam speciatim referuntur, quaeque producuntur, conservantur et corroborantur per aliquem motum spirituum'. Spinoza's 'NB.' marks the word that undoes the claim: if the passions are produced by motions of the spirits, they cannot depend on the will alone.

[368] Descartes explains the correspondence of particular movements of the gland with particular thoughts by 'the institution of nature' (arts. 36 and 50), and by nature, 'generaliter spectatam', he understands 'vel Deum ipsum, vel rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institutam' ('either God himself, or the order of created things instituted by God', *Meditations* VI, AT VII 80). For Spinoza mind and body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]; Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]).

cum vi eandem suspensam tenere potest? Nam nescio an haec glans tardius vel celerius a mente circumagatur, quam a spiritibus animalibus, et an motus passionum, quos firmis iudiciis arcte iunximus, non possint ab iisdem iterum a causis corporeis disiungi; ex quo sequeretur, ut, quamvis mens firmiter proposuerit contra pericula ire, atque huic decreto motus audaciae iunxerit, viso tamen periculo glans ita suspendatur, ut mens non nisi de fuga possit cogitare.

Et sane cum nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter mentis et corporis potentiam seu vires; et consequenter huius vires nequaquam viribus illius determinari possunt. His adde, quod nec haec glans ita in medio cerebro sita reperiatur, ut tam facile totque modis circumagi possit, et quod non omnes nervi ad cavitates usque cerebri protendantur. Denique omnia, quae de voluntate eiusque libertate asserit, omitto, quandoquidem haec falsa esse satis superque ostenderim. Igitur quia mentis potentia, ut supra ostendi, sola intelligentia definitur, affectuum remedia, quae omnes experiri quidem, sed non accurate observare, nec distincte videre credo, sola mentis cognitione determinabimus, et ex eadem illa omnia, quae ad ipsius beatitudinem spectant, deducemus.

Axiomata

[G II 281] I. Si in eodem subiecto duae contrariae actiones excitentur, debebit necessario vel in utraque, vel in una sola mutatio fieri, donec desinant contrariae esse.

II. Effectus potentia definitur potentia ipsius causae, quatenus eius essentia per ipsius causae essentiam explicatur vel definitur. Patet hoc axioma ex prop. 7. P. 3.

Propositiones

Propositio I

Prout cogitationes rerumque ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente, ita corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines ad amussim ordinantur et concatenantur in corpore.

Demonstratio. Ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per prop. 7. P. 2.) ac ordo et connexio

pineal gland, and with how much force it can hold it suspended. For I do not know whether this gland is driven about more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions which we have closely joined to firm judgments cannot be disjoined from them again by corporeal causes; from which it would follow that, although the mind had firmly resolved to go against dangers, and had joined the motions of daring to this decree, nevertheless, at the sight of the danger, the gland would be so suspended that the mind could think only of flight.

And indeed, since there is no ratio of will to motion,[369] there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body; and consequently the forces of the latter can by no means be determined by the forces of the former. Add to this that this gland is not found to be so situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend as far as the cavities of the brain. Finally, I pass over everything he asserts about the will and its freedom, since I have shown more than enough that it is false.[370]

Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, we shall determine the remedies for the affects, which I believe all experience but do not observe accurately or see distinctly, by the knowledge of the mind alone, and from that same knowledge we shall deduce all that concerns its blessedness.

Cited in 2P47S [p. 199], 2P49S [p. 209]

Axioms

I. If two contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will necessarily have to take place either in both or in one only, until they cease to be contrary.[371]

Cited in 5P7D [p. 481]

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, insofar as its essence is explained or defined through the essence of its cause. This axiom is evident from Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243].

Cited in 5P8S [p. 481]

Propositions

Proposition I

In just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected exactly in the body.[372]

Cited in 5P10D [p. 483]

Demonstration. The order and connection of ideas is the same (by Prop. 7 of Part II [p. 129])

[369] *ratio* in its mathematical sense, a proportion between magnitudes of the same kind. Will and motion belong to different attributes and have no common measure, as Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235] states: the body cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to motion.

[370] In Part II, Props. 48–49 [p. 207] and the long Scholium [p. 209] to Prop. 49.

[371] Used in Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 481].

[372] The parallelism of Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 129] turned into a principle of practice: whatever order the mind gives its thoughts, the body's affections receive the same order. The remedies of Part V work through this correspondence, not through any action of the mind on the body (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235]).

rerum, et vice versa ordo et connexio rerum idem est (per coroll. prop. 6. et 7. P. 2.) ac ordo et connexio idearum. Quare sicuti ordo et connexio idearum in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis (per prop. 18. P. 2.), sic vice versa (per prop. 2. P. 3.) ordo et connexio affectionum corporis fit, prout cogitationes rerumque ideae ordinantur et concatenantur in mente. Q. E. D.

Propositio II

Si animi commotionem seu affectum a causae externae cogitatione amoveamus et aliis iungamus cogitationibus, tum amor seu odium erga causam externam, ut et animi fluctuationes, quae ex his affectibus oriuntur, destruentur.

[G II 282] Demonstratio. Id enim, quod formam amoris vel odii constituit, est laetitia vel tristitia concomitante idea causae externae (per aff. defin. 6. et 7.). Hac igitur sublata amoris vel odii forma simul tollitur; adeoque hi affectus, et qui ex his oriuntur, destruuntur. Q. E. D.

Propositio III

Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque eius claram et distinctam formamus ideam.

Demonstratio. Affectus, qui passio est, idea est confusa (per gener. aff. defin.). Si itaque ipsius affectus claram et distinctam formemus ideam, haec idea ab ipso affectu, quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, non nisi ratione distinguetur (per prop. 21. P. 2. cum eiusdem schol.[mt]); adeoque (per prop. 3. P. 3.) affectus desinet esse passio. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Affectus igitur eo magis in nostra potestate est et mens ab eo minus patitur, quo nobis est notior.

Propositio IV

Nulla est corporis affectio, cuius aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum.

Demonstratio. Quae omnibus communia sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adaequate (per prop. 38. P. 2.). Adeoque (per prop. 12. et lemm. 2.[mu] quod habetur post schol. prop. 13. P. 2.) nulla

[mt] The 1677 edition and the Dutch have *Prop. 22.*; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder, Saisset and Van Vloten–Land correct to 21, and Gebhardt (G II 282; Textgestaltung II 389) follows.
[mu] et lemm. 2.] *transcr.* etlemm. 2. Word division.

as the order and connection of things, and conversely the order and connection of things is the same (by Cors. of Props. 6 [p. 129] and 7 of Part II [p. 129]) as the order and connection of ideas. Hence, just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind happens according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163]), so conversely (by Prop. 2 of Part III [p. 235]) the order and connection of the affections of the body happens as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind. Q.E.D.

Proposition II

If we separate a commotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as the fluctuations of mind which arise from these affects, will be destroyed.
Cited in 5P4S [p. 477], 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. For what constitutes the form of love or hatred is joy or sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (by Defs. Aff. 6 [p. 321] and 7 [p. 323]). When this is taken away, therefore, the form of love or hatred is taken away at the same time; and so these affects, and those which arise from them, are destroyed. Q.E.D.

Proposition III

An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.[373]
Cited in 5P18S [p. 491], 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. An affect which is a passion is a confused idea (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea will be distinguished from the affect itself, insofar as it is related to the mind alone, only by reason (by Prop. 21 of Part II [p. 167] with its Schol. [p. 167]); and so (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]) the affect will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

Corollary. An affect, therefore, is the more in our power, and the mind is acted on by it the less, the better it is known to us.
Cited in 5P42D [p. 523]

Proposition IV

There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.
Cited in 5P4C [p. 477], 5P14D [p. 487]

Demonstration. Those things which are common to all can only be conceived adequately (by Prop. 38 of Part II [p. 183]). And so (by Prop. 12 [p. 141] and Lemma 2 [p. 151], which is found

[373] The idea of an affect is not a second thing beside it but the affect itself conceived as an idea (Part II, Prop. 21, Schol. [p. 167]). To know an affect clearly is therefore to have, in place of a confused idea, an adequate one, of which the mind is the adequate cause; and that is no longer a passion (Part III, Def. 2 [p. 231], Prop. 3 [p. 241]). The Scholium to Prop. 20 [p. 491] adds the qualification: clear knowledge, if it does not take away the passions absolutely, at least makes them constitute the smallest part of the mind.

est corporis affectio, cuius aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, nullum esse affectum, cuius non possumus aliquem clarum et distinctum formare conceptum. Est namque affectus corporis affectionis idea (per gener. aff. defin.), quae propterea (per prop. praeced.) aliquem clarum et distinctum involvere debet conceptum.

[G II 283] Scholium. Quandoquidem nihil datur, ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur (per prop. 36. P. 1.), et quicquid ex idea, quae in nobis est adaequata, sequitur, id omne clare et distincte intelligimus (per prop. 40. P. 2.); hinc sequitur, unumquemque potestatem habere, se suosque affectus, si non absolute, ex parte saltem clare et distincte intelligendi, et consequenter efficiendi, ut ab iisdem minus patiatur. Huic igitur rei praecipue danda est opera, ut unumquemque affectum, quantum fieri potest, clare et distincte cognoscamus, ut sic mens ex affectu ad illa cogitandum determinetur, quae clare et distincte percipit, et in quibus plane acquiescit; atque adeo ut ipse affectus a cogitatione causae externae separetur et veris iungatur cogitationibus. Ex quo fiet, ut non tantum amor, odium etc. destruantur (per prop. 2. huius), sed ut etiam appetitus seu cupiditates, quae ex tali affectu oriri solent, excessum habere nequeant (per prop. 61. P. 4.).[mv]

Nam apprime notandum est, unum eundemque esse appetitum, per quem homo tam agere quam pati dicitur. Ex. gr. cum natura humana ita comparatum esse ostendimus, ut unusquisque appetat, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant (vide schol. prop. 31. P. 3.[mw]);[mx] qui quidem appetitus in homine, qui ratione non ducitur, passio est, quae ambitio vocatur, nec multum a superbia discrepat; et contra in homine, qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, actio seu virtus est, quae pietas appellatur (vide schol. 1. prop. 37. P. 4. et 2. demonstr. eiusdem prop.).

Et hoc modo omnes appetitus seu cupiditates eatenus tantum passiones sunt, quatenus ex ideis inadaequatis oriuntur; atque eaedem virtuti accensentur, quando ab ideis adaequatis excitantur vel generantur. Nam omnes cupiditates, quibus ad aliquid agendum determinamur, tam oriri possunt ab adaequatis, quam ab inadaequatis ideis (vide prop. 59. P. 4.). Atque hoc (ut eo, unde digressus sum, revertar) affectuum remedio, quod scilicet in eorum vera cognitione consistit, nullum praestantius aliud, quod a nostra potestate pendeat, excogitari potest, quandoquidem nulla alia mentis potentia datur, quam cogitandi et adaequatas ideas formandi, ut supra (per prop. 3. P. 3.) ostendimus.

[mv] The 1677 edition and the Dutch have *Prop. 62.*; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land correct to 61, and Gebhardt (G II 283; Textgestaltung II 389) follows.

[mw] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 239) and Bartuschat. Gebhardt's text (G II 283) prints *Coroll.*, but his Textgestaltung (II 389) calls Schmidt's and Auerbach's *Coroll.* unjustified and approves Van Vloten–Land's keeping of the 1677 reading; the passage meant is the Scholium.

[mx] (vide schol. prop. 31. P. 3.)] *transcr.* (vide coroll. prop. 31. P. 3.). The 1677 edition (OP p. 239) and Bartuschat read 'Schol.'; Gebhardt's text (G II 283) prints 'Coroll.', but his Textgestaltung (II 389) rejects Schmidt's and Auerbach's 'Coroll.' and approves Van Vloten–Land's keeping of the 1677 reading.

after the Schol. of Prop. 13 of Part II) there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.[374] Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. For an affect is the idea of an affection of the body (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]), which therefore (by the preceding Prop. [p. 475]) must involve some clear and distinct concept.

Scholium. Since there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by Prop. 36 of Part I [p. 93]), and whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (by Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 185]), it follows that each one has the power of understanding himself and his affects clearly and distinctly, if not absolutely, at least in part, and consequently of bringing it about that he is acted on less by them. To this, therefore, we must above all devote our effort, that we know each affect, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, so that the mind may be determined by the affect to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and in which it is fully content; and so that the affect itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts. From this it will come about not only that love, hatred, etc. are destroyed (by Prop. 2 of this Part [p. 475]), but also that the appetites, or desires, which usually arise from such an affect cannot be excessive (by Prop. 61 of Part IV [p. 431]).
For it should be noted above all that it is one and the same appetite through which a man is said both to act and to be acted on. For example, since we have shown that human nature is so constituted that each one wants the others to live according to his temperament (see Schol. of Prop. 31 of Part III [p. 275]), this appetite, in a man who is not led by reason, is a passion, which is called ambition and does not differ much from pride; and on the other hand in a man who lives from the dictate of reason it is an action, or virtue, which is called piety (see Schol. 1 of Prop. 37 of Part IV [p. 399] and the second demonstration of the same Prop. [p. 399]).
And in this way all appetites, or desires, are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and the same are counted as virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to do something can arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (see Prop. 59 of Part IV [p. 427]). And (to return to the point from which I digressed) no remedy for the affects which depends on our power can be thought of that is more excellent than this one, which consists in a true knowledge of them, since there is no other power of the mind than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]).
Cited in 5P20S [p. 491]

[374] Every affection of the body involves what is common to all bodies (extension, motion and rest: Lemma 2 [p. 151]), and the mind perceives whatever happens in its body (Part II, Prop. 12 [p. 141]); so every affection contains something that is conceived adequately. The clear concept is 'some' (*aliquem*), not a complete one.

Propositio V

[G II 284] *Affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter et non ut necessariam neque ut possibilem, neque ut contingentem imaginamur, ceteris paribus omnium est maximus.*

Demonstratio. Affectus erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, maior est, quam erga necessariam (per prop. 49. P. 3.), et consequenter adhuc maior, quam erga illam, quam ut possibilem vel contingentem imaginamur (per prop. 11. P. 4.). At rem aliquam ut liberam imaginari nihil aliud esse potest, quam quod rem simpliciter imaginamur, dum causas, a quibus ipsa ad agendum determinata fuit, ignoramus (per illa quae in schol. prop. 35. P. 2. ostendimus). Ergo affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter imaginamur, ceteris paribus maior est, quam erga necessariam, possibilem vel contingentem, et consequenter maximus. Q. E. D.

Propositio VI

Quatenus mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit, eatenus maiorem in affectus potentiam habet, seu minus ab iisdem patitur.

Demonstratio. Mens res omnes necessarias esse intelligit (per prop. 29. P. 1.), et infinito causarum nexu determinari ad existendum et operandum (per prop. 28. P. 1.). Adeoque (per prop. praeced.) eatenus efficit, ut ab affectibus, qui ex iis oriuntur, minus patiatur et (per prop. 48. P. 3.) minus erga ipsas afficiatur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Quo haec cognitio, quod scilicet res necessariae sint, magis circa res singulares, quas distinctius et magis vivide imaginamur, versatur, eo haec mentis in affectus potentia maior est, quod ipsa etiam experientia testatur. Videmus enim tristitiam boni alicuius, quod periit, mitigari simulac homo, qui id perdidit, considerat bonum illud servari nulla ratione potuisse. Sic etiam videmus, quod nemo miseretur infantis, propterea quod nescit loqui, ambulare, ratiocinari, et quod denique tot annos quasi sui inscius vivat. At si plerique adulti, et unus aut alter infans nascerentur, tum unumquemque misereret infantum, quia tum ipsam infantiam non ut rem naturalem et necessariam, sed ut naturae vitium seu peccatum consideraret. Et ad hunc modum plura alia notare possemus.

Propositio VII

[G II 285] *Affectus, qui ex ratione oriuntur vel excitantur, si ratio temporis habeatur, potentiores sunt iis, qui ad res singulares referuntur, quas ut absentes contemplamur.*

Proposition V

An affect towards a thing which we imagine simply, and not as necessary, or as possible, or as contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.
Cited in 5P6D [p. 479]

Demonstration. An affect towards a thing which we imagine to be free is greater than towards a necessary thing (by Prop. 49 of Part III [p. 293]), and consequently still greater than towards one which we imagine as possible or contingent (by Prop. 11 of Part IV [p. 369]). But to imagine a thing as free can be nothing other than to imagine the thing simply, while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to act (by what we showed in Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part II [p. 181]). Therefore an affect towards a thing which we imagine simply is, other things being equal, greater than towards a necessary, possible or contingent thing, and consequently the greatest. Q.E.D.

Proposition VI

Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them.
Cited in 5P10S [p. 483]

Demonstration. The mind understands all things to be necessary (by Prop. 29 of Part I [p. 81]) and to be determined to exist and to operate by an infinite connection of causes (by Prop. 28 of Part I [p. 79]). And so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 479]) to that extent it brings it about that it is acted on less by the affects which arise from them, and (by Prop. 48 of Part III [p. 293]) that it is less affected towards them. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, concerns singular things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects, as experience itself also testifies. For we see that the sadness over a good which has perished is eased as soon as the man who has lost it considers that the good could not have been kept in any way. So also we see that no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk or reason, and because, finally, it lives so many years as if unconscious of itself. But if most men were born adults, and only one or another an infant, then everyone would pity infants, because he would then consider infancy itself not as a natural and necessary thing, but as a vice or fault of nature. And we could note many other things of this kind.

Proposition VII

Affects which arise from or are aroused by reason are, if account is taken of time,[375] *more powerful than those which are related to singular things which we contemplate as absent.*
Cited in 5P10S [p. 483], 5P20S [p. 491]

[375] This qualifies Part IV, Props. 14–17 [p. 373]: in the moment, desires from knowledge of the good are easily overcome; over time, affects related to what is always present, the common properties of things, prevail over affects whose objects are imagined as absent.

Demonstratio. Rem aliquam ut absentem non contemplamur ex affectu, quo eandem imaginamur, sed ex eo, quod corpus alio afficitur affectu, qui eiusdem rei existentiam secludit (per prop. 17. P. 2.). Quare affectus, qui ad rem, quam ut absentem contemplamur, refertur, eius naturae non est, ut reliquas hominis actiones et potentiam superet (de quibus vide prop. 6. P. 4.), sed contra eius naturae est, ut ab iis affectionibus, quae existentiam externae eius causae secludunt, coerceri aliquo modo possit (per prop. 9. P. 4.).

At affectus, qui ex ratione oritur, refertur necessario ad communes rerum proprietates (vide rationis definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), quas semper ut praesentes contemplamur (nam nihil dari potest, quod earum praesentem existentiam secludat), et quas semper eodem modo imaginamur (per prop. 38. P. 2.). Quare talis affectus idem semper manet, et consequenter (per axiom. 1. huius) affectus, qui eidem sunt contrarii, quique a suis causis externis non foventur, eidem magis magisque sese accommodare debebunt, donec non amplius sint contrarii, et eatenus affectus, qui ex ratione oritur, est potentior. Q. E. D.

Propositio VIII

[G II 286] *Quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul concurrentibus excitatur, eo maior est.*

Demonstratio. Plures causae simul plus possunt, quam si pauciores essent (per prop. 7. P. 3.). Adeoque (per prop. 5. P. 4.) quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul excitatur, eo fortior est. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec propositio patet etiam ex axiom. 2. huius partis.

Propositio IX

Affectus, qui ad plures et diversas causas refertur, quas mens cum ipso affectu simul contemplatur, minus noxius est, et minus per ipsum patimur, et erga unamquamque causam minus afficimur, quam alius aeque magnus affectus, qui ad unam solam vel pauciores causas refertur.

Demonstratio. Affectus eatenus tantum malus seu noxius est, quatenus mens ab eo impeditur, quominus possit cogitare (per propositiones 26. et 27. P. 4.). Adeoque ille affectus, a quo mens ad plura simul obiecta contemplandum determinatur, minus noxius est, quam alius aeque magnus affectus, qui mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum obiectorum contemplatione ita detinet,[my] ut de aliis cogitare nequeat; quod erat primum.
Deinde quia mentis essentia, hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) potentia, in sola cogitatione consistit (per prop. 11. P. 2.);[mz] ergo mens per affectum, a quo ad plura simul contemplandum determinatur,

[my] The 1677 edition (OP p. 242) has *qui Mentem vi solâ unius, aut pauciorum objectorum contemplatione ita detinet*; the Dutch has *in d'enige aanschouwing*, and Gebhardt (G II 286; Textgestaltung II 389) reads *in solâ*, as Van Vloten–Land had already printed.
[mz] The 1677 edition and the Dutch have *p. 3.*; Schmidt, Auerbach and Van Vloten–Land correct to *p. 2.*, and Gebhardt (G II 286; Textgestaltung II 389) follows.

Demonstration. We contemplate a thing as absent not from the affect by which we imagine it, but from the fact that the body is affected with another affect which excludes the existence of the thing (by Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]). Hence the affect which is related to a thing which we contemplate as absent is not of such a nature that it surpasses the other actions and power of a man (on which see Prop. 6 of Part IV [p. 365]), but on the contrary is of such a nature that it can be restrained in some way by those affections which exclude the existence of its external cause (by Prop. 9 of Part IV [p. 367]).
But an affect which arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]), which we always contemplate as present (for there can be nothing which excludes their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same way (by Prop. 38 of Part II [p. 183]). Hence such an affect always remains the same, and consequently (by Axiom 1 of this Part [p. 473]) the affects which are contrary to it, and which are not encouraged by their external causes, will have to accommodate themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary; and to that extent an affect which arises from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

Proposition VIII

The more causes concurring at the same time by which some affect is aroused, the greater it is.
Cited in 5P10S [p. 483], 5P11D [p. 487]

Demonstration. Many causes together can do more than if they were fewer (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]). And so (by Prop. 5 of Part IV [p. 363]) the more causes at the same time by which some affect is aroused, the stronger it is. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This Proposition is also evident from Axiom 2 of this Part [p. 473].

Proposition IX

An affect which is related to many and different causes, which the mind contemplates together with the affect itself, is less harmful, and we are acted on less by it and are affected less towards each cause, than by another equally great affect which is related to one only or to fewer causes.
Cited in 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. An affect is evil, or harmful, only insofar as the mind is prevented by it from being able to think (by Props. 26 [p. 385] and 27 of Part IV [p. 387]). And so that affect by which the mind is determined to contemplate many objects at once is less harmful than another equally great affect which so holds the mind in the contemplation of one or a few objects alone that it cannot think of others; which was the first point.
Next, because the essence of the mind, that is (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]), its power, consists in thought alone (by Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]), the mind is acted on less by an affect by which

minus patitur, quam per aeque magnum affectum, qui mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum obiectorum contemplatione occupatam tenet; quod erat secundum. Denique hic affectus (per prop. 48. P. 3.) quatenus ad plures causas externas refertur, est etiam erga unamquamque minor. Q. E. D.

Propositio X

[G II 287] *Quamdiu affectibus, qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, non conflictamur, tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum.*

Demonstratio. Affectus, qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, hoc est (per prop. 30. P. 4.) qui mali sunt, eatenus mali sunt, quatenus impediunt, quominus mens intelligat (per prop. 27. P. 4.). Quamdiu igitur affectibus, qui nostrae naturae contrarii sunt, non conflictamur, tamdiu mentis potentia, qua res intelligere conatur (per prop. 26. P. 4.) non impeditur. Atque adeo tamdiu potestatem habet claras et distinctas ideas formandi et alias ex aliis deducendi (vide schol. 2. prop. 40. et schol. prop. 47. P. 2.); et consequenter (per prop. 1. huius) tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi affectiones corporis secundum ordinem ad intellectum. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hac potestate recte ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones efficere possumus, ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur. Nam (per prop. 7. huius) maior vis requiritur ad affectus secundum ordinem ad intellectum ordinatos et concatenatos coercendum, quam incertos et vagos. Optimum igitur, quod efficere possumus, quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vitae dogmata concipere, eaque memoriae mandare, et rebus particularibus in vita frequenter obviis continuo applicare, ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur, et nobis in promptu sint semper.

Ex. gr. inter vitae dogmata posuimus (vide prop. 46. P. 4. cum eiusdem schol.), odium amore seu generositate vincendum, non autem reciproco odio compensandum. Ut autem hoc rationis praescriptum semper in promptu habeamus, ubi usus erit, cogitandae et saepe meditandae sunt communes hominum iniuriae, et quomodo et qua via generositate optime propulsentur. Sic enim imaginem iniuriae imaginationi huius dogmatis iungemus, et nobis (per prop. 18. P. 2.) in promptu semper erit, ubi nobis iniuria afferetur.

Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis ac etiam boni, quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur, et praeterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi

it is determined to contemplate many things at once than by an equally great affect which keeps the mind occupied in the contemplation of one or a few objects alone; which was the second point. Finally, this affect (by Prop. 48 of Part III [p. 293]), insofar as it is related to many external causes, is also less towards each. Q.E.D.

Proposition X

So long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting[376] *the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.*
Cited in 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. Affects which are contrary to our nature, that is (by Prop. 30 of Part IV [p. 389]), which are evil, are evil insofar as they prevent the mind from understanding (by Prop. 27 of Part IV [p. 387]). So long, therefore, as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, the power of the mind by which it strives to understand things (by Prop. 26 of Part IV [p. 385]) is not hindered. And so for that long it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas and of deducing some from others (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 [p. 189] and Schol. of Prop. 47 of Part II [p. 199]); and consequently (by Prop. 1 of this Part [p. 473]) for that long we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. Q.E.D.

Scholium. By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the body we can bring it about that we are not easily affected by evil affects. For (by Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 479]) a greater force is required to restrain affects ordered and connected according to the order of the intellect than to restrain uncertain and random ones. The best thing, therefore, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a right way of living, or sure principles of life, to commit them to memory,[377] and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life, so that in this way our imagination may be widely affected by them, and they may always be ready to hand for us.
For example, we have laid down among the principles of life (see Prop. 46 of Part IV [p. 413] with its Schol. [p. 413]) that hatred is to be conquered by love, or nobility, and not repaid with reciprocal hatred. But in order that we may always have this prescription of reason ready to hand when it is needed, we must think about and often meditate on the common injuries of men, and on how and by what way they are best warded off by nobility. For in this way we shall join the image of an injury to the imagination of this principle, and it will always be ready to hand for us (by Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163]) when an injury is done to us.
If we also have ready to hand the principle of our true advantage, and also of the good which follows from mutual friendship and common society, and besides that the highest contentment

[376] *potestatem habemus*: 'power' here renders *potestas*, what is at our disposal, rather than *potentia*; see the notes on Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67] and on the Preface to this Part [p. 469].
[377] *certa vitae dogmata*. Short of perfect knowledge, the principles of reason are learnt and rehearsed so that they work through the imagination, by the association of images (Part II, Prop. 18 [p. 163]), until they can be understood. The examples that follow are the precepts of Part IV: hatred conquered by love (Prop. 46 [p. 413]), tenacity against fear (Prop. 69 [p. 445]), attention to the good rather than to the evil in things (Prop. 63, Cor. [p. 433]).

acquiescentia[na] oriatur (per prop. 52. P. 4.), et quod homines, ut reliqua, ex naturae necessitate agant; tum iniuria sive odium, quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit et facile superabitur; vel si ira, quae ex maximis iniuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen, quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione longe minore temporis spatio, quam si haec non ita praemeditata habuissemus, ut patet ex prop. 6., 7. et 8. huius partis.

De animositate ad metum deponendum eodem modo cogitandum est; enumeranda scilicet sunt et saepe imaginanda communia vitae pericula, et quomodo animi praesentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt. Sed notandum, quod nobis in ordinandis nostris cogitationibus et imaginibus semper attendendum est (per coroll. prop. 63. P. 4. et prop. 59. P. 3.) ad illa, quae in unaquaque re bona sunt, ut sic semper ex laetitiae affectu ad agendum determinemur.

Ex. gr. si quis videt, se nimis gloriam sectari, de eius recto usu cogitet, et in quem finem sectanda sit, et quibus mediis acquiri possit; sed non de ipsius abusu et vanitate et hominum inconstantia vel aliis huiusmodi, de quibus nemo nisi ex animi aegritudine cogitat. Talibus enim cogitationibus maxime ambitiosi se maxime afflictant,[nb] quando de assequendo honore, quem ambiunt, desperant; et dum iram evomunt, sapientes videri volunt. Quare certum est, eos gloriae maxime esse cupidos, qui de ipsius abusu et mundi vanitate maxime clamant. Nec hoc ambitiosis proprium, sed omnibus commune est, quibus fortuna est adversa, et qui animo impotentes sunt.[nc]

Nam pauper etiam avarus de abusu pecuniae et divitum vitiis non cessat loqui; quo nihil aliud efficit, quam se afflictare et aliis ostendere, se non tantum paupertatem suam, sed etiam aliorum divitias iniquo animo ferre. Sic etiam qui male ab amasia excepti sunt, nihil cogitant,[nd] quam de mulierum inconstantia et fallaci animo et reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis, quae omnia statim oblivioni tradunt, simulac ab amasia iterum recipiuntur.

Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo libertatis amore moderari studet, is, quantum potest, nitetur, virtutes earumque causas noscere, et animum gaudio, quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere; at minime hominum vitia contemplari, hominesque obtrectare et falsa libertatis specie gaudere. Atque haec qui diligenter observabit[ne] (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, nae ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.

[na] summa animi acquiescentia] *transcr.* summa animi cquiescentia. Misprint in the transcription.

[nb] Baensch, and W. Meijer in his second edition, would strike the first *maxime*. Gebhardt (G II 288; Textgestaltung II 389) keeps it, as the Dutch does (*de genen, die meest roemzuchtig, pijnigen zich meest*): the sentence is parallel to *maxime ... cupidos, qui ... maxime clamant* in the next.

[nc] The 1677 edition has *et animo impotentes sunt*; Gebhardt (G II 288; Textgestaltung II 389–390) supplies *qui* with Baensch (second edition).

[nd] excepti sunt, nihil cogitant] *transcr.* excepti sunt, nihil aliud cogitant. The 1677 edition (OP p. 245), Gebhardt (G II 289) and Bartuschat have no 'aliud'.

[ne] The 1677 edition has *observavit*, beside *exercebit*; the Dutch has *zal waarneemen ... en oeffenen*, and Gebhardt (G II 289; Textgestaltung II 390) reads *observabit*, as Van Vloten–Land, after Saisset, had already printed.

of mind arises from the right way of living (by Prop. 52 of Part IV [p. 419]), and that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature, then the injury, or the hatred which usually arises from it, will occupy the least part of the imagination and will easily be overcome; or if the anger which usually arises from the greatest injuries is not so easily overcome, it will still be overcome, though not without fluctuation of mind, in a far shorter space of time than if we had not thus meditated on these things beforehand, as is evident from Props. 6 [p. 479], 7 [p. 479] and 8 of this Part [p. 481].

Of tenacity, for laying aside fear, we must think in the same way: the common dangers of life must be enumerated and often imagined, and how they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character. But it should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images we must always attend (by Cor. of Prop. 63 of Part IV [p. 433] and Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]) to those things which are good in each thing, so that in this way we are always determined to act from an affect of joy.

For example, if someone sees that he pursues glory too much, let him think of its right use, and for what end it is to be pursued, and by what means it can be acquired; but not of its abuse and emptiness, and of the inconstancy of men, or other things of this kind, about which no one thinks except from sickness of mind. For with such thoughts the most ambitious torment themselves most, when they despair of attaining the honour which they are seeking; and while they vomit up their anger, they want to seem wise. So it is certain that those are most desirous of glory who cry out most about its abuse and the emptiness of the world. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious, but it is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are lacking in power of mind.

For the poor man too, who is greedy, does not cease to speak of the abuse of money and the vices of the rich; by which he achieves nothing but to torment himself and to show others that he bears resentfully not only his own poverty but also the riches of others. So also those who have been badly received by a mistress think of nothing but the inconstancy of women, their deceitful hearts and their other much-sung vices, all of which they at once consign to oblivion as soon as they are received again by the mistress.

He, therefore, who strives to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of freedom alone will strive as far as he can to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge of them, but by no means to contemplate the vices of men, to disparage men, and to rejoice in a false appearance of freedom. And he who observes these things diligently (for they are not difficult) and practises them will certainly in a short space of time be able to direct his actions for the most part by the rule of reason.

Propositio XI

[G II 289] *Quo imago aliqua ad plures res refertur, eo frequentior est seu saepius viget, et mentem magis occupat.*

Demonstratio. Quo enim imago seu affectus ad plures res refertur, eo plures dantur causae, a quibus excitari et foveri potest, quas omnes mens (per hypothesin) ex ipso affectu simul contemplatur. Atque adeo affectus eo frequentior est seu saepius viget, et (per prop. 8. huius) mentem magis occupat. Q. E. D.

Propositio XII

Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus, quae ad res referuntur, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, iunguntur, quam aliis.

Demonstratio. Res, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, vel rerum communes proprietates sunt, vel quae ex iis deducuntur (vide rationis definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), et consequenter saepius (per prop. praeced.) in nobis excitantur. Adeoque facilius fieri potest, ut res alias simul cum his, quam cum aliis contemplemur, et consequenter (per prop. 18. P. 2.) ut facilius cum his, quam cum aliis iungantur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XIII

[G II 290] *Quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis iuncta est, eo saepius viget.*[nf]

Demonstratio. Nam quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis iuncta est, eo (per prop. 18. P. 2.) plures causae dantur, a quibus excitari potest. Q. E. D.

Propositio XIV

Mens efficere potest, ut omnes corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines ad Dei ideam referantur.

Demonstratio. Nulla est corporis affectio, cuius aliquem clarum et distinctum non possit mens formare conceptum[ng] (per prop. 4. huius). Adeoque efficere potest (per prop. 15. P. 1.), ut

[nf] The 1677 edition and the older editions have *saepius viget* without *eo*; Gebhardt (G II 290; Textgestaltung II 390) supplies it, by analogy with Prop. 11.

[ng] The 1677 edition has *aliquod*; as Baensch pointed out, the wording of Prop. 4 requires *aliquem*, which the Dutch also implies (*enige klare en onderscheide bevatting*, glossed *Conceptus*). W. Meijer (second edition), Appuhn and Gebhardt (G II 290; Textgestaltung II 390) read *aliquem*.

Cited in 5P20S [p. 491]

Proposition XI

The more things an image is related to, the more frequent it is, or the more often it is vivid, and the more it occupies the mind.

Cited in 5P12D [p. 487], 5P16D [p. 489], 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. For the more things an image, or affect, is related to, the more causes there are by which it can be aroused and encouraged, all of which the mind (by hypothesis) contemplates at once from the affect itself. And so the affect is the more frequent, or the more often vivid, and (by Prop. 8 of this Part [p. 481]) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.

Proposition XII

The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others.

Cited in 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. Things which we understand clearly and distinctly are either the common properties of things or what is deduced from them (see the definition of reason in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]), and consequently (by the preceding Prop. [p. 487]) they are aroused in us more often. And so it can more easily happen that we contemplate other things together with these than with others, and consequently (by Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163]) that they are more easily joined with these than with others. Q.E.D.

Proposition XIII

The more other images an image is joined to, the more often it is vivid.

Cited in 5P20S [p. 491]

Demonstration. For the more other images an image is joined to, the more causes there are (by Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 163]) by which it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

Proposition XIV

The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.[378]

Cited in 5P15D [p. 489], 5P16D [p. 489], 5P20S [p. 491], 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 475]). And so it can bring it about (by Prop. 15

[378] Not by seeing God in things through the imagination, but because every affection of the body admits some clear concept (Prop. 4 [p. 475]), and whatever is conceived is conceived through God (Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 49]). The love of God of Props. 15–16 is the affect that accompanies this relating.

omnes ad Dei ideam referuntur. Q. E. D.

Propositio XV

Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amat, et eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit.

Demonstratio. Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, laetatur (per prop. 53. P. 3.), idque concomitante idea Dei (per prop. praeced.). Atque adeo (per aff. defin. 6.) Deum amat, et (per eandem rationem) eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XVI

Hic erga Deum amor mentem maxime occupare debet.

Demonstratio. Est enim hic amor iunctus omnibus corporis affectionibus (per prop. 14. huius), quibus omnibus fovetur (per prop. 15. huius). Atque adeo (per prop. 11. huius) mentem maxime occupare debet. Q. E. D.

Propositio XVII

[G II 291] *Deus expers est passionum, nec ullo laetitiae aut tristitiae affectu afficitur.*

Demonstratio. Ideae omnes, quatenus ad Deum referuntur, verae sunt (per prop. 32. P. 2.), hoc est (per defin. 4. P. 2.) adaequatae; atque adeo (per gener. aff. defin.) Deus expers est passionum. Deinde Deus neque ad maiorem neque ad minorem perfectionem transire potest (per coroll. 2. prop. 20. P. 1.); adeoque (per aff. defin. 2. et 3.) nullo laetitiae neque tristitiae affectu afficitur. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat, neque odio habet. Nam Deus (per prop. praeced.) nullo laetitiae neque tristitiae affectu afficitur, et consequenter (per aff. defin. 6. et 7.) neminem etiam amat, neque odio habet.

of Part I [p. 49]) that they are all related to the idea of God. Q.E.D.

Proposition XV

He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God,[379] *and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects.*
Cited in 5P16D [p. 489], 5P20S [p. 491], 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly rejoices (by Prop. 53 of Part III [p. 301]), and that accompanied by the idea of God (by the preceding Prop. [p. 487]). And so (by Def. Aff. 6 [p. 321]) he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) the more so the more he understands himself and his affects. Q.E.D.

Proposition XVI

This love towards God must occupy the mind most.
Cited in 5P20S [p. 491], 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. For this love is joined to all the affections of the body (by Prop. 14 of this Part [p. 487]), by all of which it is encouraged (by Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 489]). And so (by Prop. 11 of this Part [p. 487]) it must occupy the mind most. Q.E.D.

Proposition XVII

God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.[380]
Cited in 5P17C [p. 489]

Demonstration. All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by Prop. 32 of Part II [p. 179]), that is (by Def. 4 of Part II [p. 121]), adequate; and so (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]) God is without passions. Next, God can pass neither to a greater nor to a lesser perfection (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 20 of Part I [p. 73]); and so (by Defs. Aff. 2 [p. 319] and 3 [p. 319]) he is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one. For God (by the preceding Prop. [p. 489]) is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness, and consequently (by Defs. Aff. 6 [p. 321] and 7 [p. 323]) he also loves no one and hates no one.
Cited in 5P19D [p. 491]

[379] This love is joy accompanied by the idea of God, and insofar as it is related to the body it lasts only as long as the body (Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]). The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge and is eternal, comes later (Props. 32–33 [p. 511]).

[380] Against every anthropomorphic picture of God (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]): God has no passions because all ideas, as they are in God, are adequate, and no joy or sadness because he cannot pass to a greater or lesser perfection. Yet Part V will say that God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love, and that insofar as he loves himself he loves men (Props. 35–36 [p. 513] and Prop. 36, Cor. [p. 515]); that love is not a passion and involves no transition.

Propositio XVIII

Nemo potest Deum odio habere.

Demonstratio. Idea Dei, quae in nobis est, est adaequata et perfecta (per prop. 46. et 47. P. 2.).[nh] Adeoque quatenus Deum contemplamur, eatenus agimus (per prop. 3. P. 3.), et consequenter (per prop. 59. P. 3.) nulla potest dari tristitia concomitante idea Dei, hoc est (per aff. defin. 7.) nemo Deum odio habere potest. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit.

Scholium. At obiici potest, quod dum Deum omnium rerum causam intelligimus, eo ipso Deum tristitiae causam consideramus. Sed ad hoc respondeo, quod quatenus tristitiae causas intelligimus, eatenus (per prop. 3. huius) ipsa desinit esse passio, hoc est (per prop. 59. P. 3.) eatenus desinit esse tristitia; atque adeo quatenus Deum tristitiae causam esse intelligimus, eatenus laetamur.

Propositio XIX

[G II 292] *Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet.*

Demonstratio. Si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo (per coroll. prop. 17. huius) ut Deus, quem amat, non esset Deus, et consequenter (per prop. 19. P. 3.) contristari cuperet; quod (per prop. 28. P. 3.) est absurdum. Ergo qui Deum amat etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XX

Hic erga Deum amor neque invidiae neque zelotypiae affectu inquinari potest; sed eo magis fovetur, quo plures homines eodem amoris vinculo cum Deo iunctos imaginamur.

Demonstratio. Hic erga Deum amor summum bonum est, quod ex dictamine rationis appetere possumus (per prop. 28. P. 4.), et omnibus hominibus commune est (per prop. 36. P. 4.), et omnes ut eodem gaudeant, cupimus (per prop. 37. P. 4.). Atque adeo (per aff. defin. 23.) invidiae affectu maculari nequit, neque etiam (per prop. 18. huius et definitionem zelotypiae, quam vide in schol. prop. 35. P. 3.) zelotypiae affectu; sed contra (per prop. 31. P. 3.) eo magis foveri debet, quo plures homines eodem gaudere imaginamur. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Possumus hoc eodem modo ostendere, nullum dari affectum, qui huic amori directe sit contrarius, a quo hic ipse amor possit destrui: atque adeo concludere possumus, hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum esse constantissimum,[ni] nec quatenus ad corpus refertur,

[nh] (per prop. 46. et 47. P. 2.)] *transcr.* (per prop. 46. et 47 P. 2.). Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 291).

[ni] hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum esse constantissimum] *transcr.* hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum est constantissimum. The 1677 edition (OP p. 249), Gebhardt (G II 293) and Bartuschat read 'esse'.

Proposition XVIII

No one can hate God.
Cited in 5P20D [p. 491]

Demonstration. The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (by Props. 46 [p. 199] and 47 of Part II [p. 199]). And so insofar as we contemplate God, to that extent we act (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]), and consequently (by Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]) there can be no sadness accompanied by the idea of God, that is (by Def. Aff. 7 [p. 323]), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Love towards God cannot be turned into hatred.

Scholium. But it can be objected that while we understand God as the cause of all things, by that very fact we consider God to be the cause of sadness. But to this I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of sadness, to that extent (by Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 475]) it ceases to be a passion, that is (by Prop. 59 of Part III [p. 311]), to that extent it ceases to be sadness; and so insofar as we understand God to be the cause of sadness, to that extent we rejoice.

Proposition XIX

He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.[381]

Demonstration. If a man strove for this, he would therefore desire (by Cor. of Prop. 17 of this Part [p. 489]) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently (by Prop. 19 of Part III [p. 259]) he would desire to be saddened, which (by Prop. 28 of Part III [p. 269]) is absurd. Therefore he who loves God, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XX

This love towards God cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or of jealousy; but it is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love.

Demonstration. This love towards God is the highest good which we can want from the dictate of reason (by Prop. 28 of Part IV [p. 387]), and is common to all men (by Prop. 36 of Part IV [p. 397]), and we desire that all should enjoy it (by Prop. 37 of Part IV [p. 397]). And so (by Def. Aff. 23 [p. 327]) it cannot be stained by the affect of envy, nor (by Prop. 18 of this Part [p. 491] and the definition of jealousy, which see in Schol. of Prop. 35 of Part III [p. 277]) by the affect of jealousy; but on the contrary (by Prop. 31 of Part III [p. 273]) it must be the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to enjoy it. Q.E.D.

Scholium. We can show in the same way that there is no affect which is directly contrary to this love and by which this love itself could be destroyed; and so we can conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all the affects, and that, insofar as it is related to the body, it

[381] To want God to love us back would be to want God to be affected with joy, that is, not to be God. The love that is returned is of another kind: God's love of men and the mind's intellectual love of God are one and the same (Prop. 36, Cor. [p. 515]).

posse destrui, nisi cum ipso corpore. Cuius autem naturae sit, quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, postea videbimus. Atque his omnia affectuum remedia, sive id, omne quod mens in se sola considerata adversus affectus potest, comprehendi.
Ex quibus apparet, mentis in affectus potentiam consistere 1. in ipsa[nj] affectuum cognitione. Vide schol. prop. 4. huius. 2. In eo, quod affectus a cogitatione causae externae, quam confuse imaginamur, separat. Vide prop. 2. cum eodem schol.[nk] prop. 4. huius.[nl] 3. In tempore, quo affectiones, quae ad res quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant, quae ad res referuntur, quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus. Vide prop. 7. huius. 4. In multitudine causarum, a quibus affectiones, quae ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur. Vide prop. 9. et 11. huius. 5. Denique in ordine, quo mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest. Vide schol. prop. 10. et insuper prop. 12., 13. et[nm] 14. huius.

Sed ut haec mentis in affectus potentia melius intelligatur, venit apprime notandum, quod affectus a nobis magni appellantur, quando unius hominis affectum cum affectu alterius comparamus, et unum magis, quam alium eodem affectu conflictari videmus; vel quando unius eiusdemque hominis affectus ad invicem comparamus, eundemque uno affectu magis, quam alio affici sive moveri comperimus. Nam (per prop. 5. P. 4.) vis cuiuscumque affectus definitur potentia causae externae cum nostra comparata. At mentis potentia sola cognitione definitur; impotentia autem seu passio a sola cognitionis privatione, hoc est, ab eo, per quod ideae dicuntur inadaequatae, aestimatur.
Ex quo sequitur, mentem illam maxime pati, cuius maximam partem ideae inadaequatae constituunt, ita ut magis per id, quod patitur, quam per id quod agit, dignoscatur; et illam contra maxime agere, cuius maximam partem ideae adaequatae constituunt, ita ut, quamvis huic tot inadaequatae ideae, quam illi insint, magis tamen per illas, quae humanae virtuti tribuuntur, quam per has, quae humanam impotentiam arguunt, dignoscatur.
Deinde notandum, animi aegritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio amore erga rem, quae multis variationibus est obnoxia, et cuius nunquam compotes esse possumus. Nam nemo de re ulla, nisi quam amat, sollicitus anxiusve est, neque iniuriae, suspiciones, inimicitiae etc. oriuntur, nisi ex amore erga res, quarum nemo potest revera esse compos.
Ex his itaque facile concipimus, quid clara et distincta cognitio, et praecipue tertium illud cognitionis genus (de quo vide schol. prop. 47. P. 2.), cuius fundamentum est ipsa Dei cognitio, in affectus potest, quos nempe, quatenus passiones sunt, si non absolute tollit (vide prop. 3. cum schol. prop. 4.[nn] huius), saltem efficit, ut minimam mentis partem constituant. Vide prop. 14. huius. Deinde amorem gignit erga rem immutabilem et aeternam (vide prop. 15. huius), et cuius

[nj] consistere 1. in ipsa] *transcr.* consistere *1. in ipsa. The transcription sets the rest of the Scholium in italics; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 293–294) do not.
[nk] cum eodem schol.] *transcr.* cumeodem schol. Word division.
[nl] The 1677 edition has *vide Prop. 2. cum eodem Schol. & Prop. 4. hujus*; the Dutch reads *the second Proposition, with the same Scholium of the fourth Proposition*, and Gebhardt (G II 293; Textgestaltung II 390) corrects accordingly, as Van Vloten–Land had done without reference to the Dutch.
[nm] 13. et] *transcr.* 13.et. Word division.
[nn] cum schol. prop. 4.] *transcr.* cumschol. prop. 4. Word division.

cannot be destroyed except with the body itself. What its nature is insofar as it is related to the mind alone, we shall see afterwards. And with these I have covered all the remedies for the affects, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects.

From which it is evident that the power of the mind over the affects consists: 1. In the knowledge itself of the affects (see Schol. of Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 477]). 2. In its separating the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly (see Prop. 2 [p. 475] with the same Schol. of Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 477]). 3. In time, by which the affections related to things which we understand surpass those related to things which we conceive confusedly, or in a mutilated way (see Prop. 7 of this Part [p. 479]). 4. In the multitude of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are encouraged (see Props. 9 [p. 481] and 11 of this Part [p. 487]). 5. Finally, in the order in which the mind can order its affects and connect them with one another[382] (see Schol. of Prop. 10 [p. 483], and besides Props. 12 [p. 487], 13 [p. 487] and 14 of this Part [p. 487]).

But in order that this power of the mind over the affects may be better understood, it should above all be noted that we call affects great when we compare the affect of one man with that of another, and see that one is troubled more than another by the same affect; or when we compare the affects of one and the same man with one another, and find that he is affected, or moved, more by one affect than by another. For (by Prop. 5 of Part IV [p. 363]) the force of any affect is defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone, and its lack of power, or passion, is judged by the privation of knowledge alone, that is, by that through which ideas are called inadequate.

From this it follows that that mind is acted on most whose greatest part is constituted by inadequate ideas, so that it is known more by what it undergoes than by what it does; and that that mind, on the contrary, acts most whose greatest part is constituted by adequate ideas, so that, although it may have as many inadequate ideas in it as the other, it is still known more by those which are attributed to human virtue than by those which show human lack of power.

Next, it should be noted that sicknesses of the mind and misfortunes take their origin chiefly from excessive love towards a thing which is subject to many variations, and which we can never possess. For no one is anxious or troubled about anything unless he loves it, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities, etc. arise except from love towards things which no one can really possess. From these things, therefore, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (on which see Schol. of Prop. 47 of Part II [p. 199]),[383] whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself, can do against the affects: namely, that if it does not take them away absolutely insofar as they are passions (see Prop. 3 [p. 475] with Schol. of Prop. 4 of this Part [p. 477]), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the mind

[382] The five remedies sum up Props. 1–14. All are forms of knowledge, in keeping with the Preface: the mind's power is defined by understanding alone, and it acts on the affects not by will but by forming clear ideas, separating, ordering and connecting.

[383] The third kind of knowledge, intuitive knowledge, is defined in Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]; the Scholium to Prop. 47 cited here shows that men have an adequate knowledge of God's essence, which is its foundation.

revera sumus compotes (vide prop. 45. P. 2.), et qui propterea nullis vitiis,[no] quae in communi amore insunt, inquinari, sed semper maior ac maior esse potest (per prop. 15. huius), et mentis maximam partem occupare (per prop. 16. huius) lateque afficere.

Atque his omnia, quae praesentem hanc vitam spectant, absolvi. Nam quod in huius scholii principio dixi, me his paucis omnia affectuum remedia amplexum esse, facile poterit unusquisque videre qui ad haec quae in hoc scholio diximus, et simul ad mentis eiusque affectuum definitiones, et denique ad prop. 1. et 3. P. 3. attenderit. Tempus igitur iam est, ut ad illa transeam quae ad mentis durationem sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.[np,nq]

[no] The 1677 edition has *& propterea nullis vitiis … inquinari; sed qui major, ac major esse potest*; the Dutch implies a *qui* before *propterea*. Van Vloten–Land repunctuate, Leopold would strike the *qui*, W. Meijer (second edition) and Appuhn move it. Gebhardt (G II 294; Textgestaltung II 390) keeps *et* and corrects only what he takes to be a transposition of *qui*.
[np] W. Meijer (second edition), followed by Appuhn, would read *sine relatione ad Corporis existentiam*, after the parallel in the Scholium to Prop. 40. Gebhardt (G II 294; Textgestaltung II 390) keeps the manuscript's inconcinnity, since the Dutch has *zonder betrekking tot het lighaam* here and *zonder de betrekking tot de wezentlijkheit van 't lighaam* there.
[nq] sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.] *transcr.* sine relatione ad corpus pertinent. See the preceding emendation.

(see Prop. 14 of this Part [p. 487]). Next, it begets love towards an immutable and eternal thing (see Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 489]), which we really possess (see Prop. 45 of Part II [p. 197]); a love which therefore cannot be tainted by any of the vices which are in common love, but can always become greater and greater (by Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 489]), and occupy the greatest part of the mind (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 489]) and affect it widely.

And with these I have completed everything which concerns this present life. For anyone will easily be able to see what I said at the beginning of this Scholium, that I have covered all the remedies for the affects in these few words, if he attends to what we have said in this Scholium, and at the same time to the definitions of the mind and its affects, and finally to Props. 1 [p. 233] and 3 of Part III [p. 241]. It is time, therefore, to pass to those things which pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.[384]

[384] The turning point of Part V. What follows concerns the mind not as the idea of the actually existing body, which endures, but as the idea of the body's essence, which is in God from eternity (Props. 22–23 [p. 503]); see the essay before Prop. 21 [p. 503].

The Eternity of the Mind

The Scholium to Prop. 20 [p. 491] closes the account of the remedies with the words: "with these I have completed everything which concerns this present life. ... It is time, therefore, to pass to those things which pertain to the duration of the mind without relation to the body." The phrase is paradoxical on purpose, since what follows denies that this part of the mind has any duration at all, and the Scholium to Prop. 40 [p. 521] closes the account with a more exact one: "the mind insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body." The propositions between them are the most disputed in the *Ethics*. They come here because they keep earlier promises: Part II had deferred to Part V an account of the excellence and usefulness of the third kind of knowledge (Part II, Prop. 47, Schol. [p. 199]), Part IV the question how far the death of the body can harm the mind (Part IV, Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 405]), and the Scholium to Prop. 20 itself the nature of the love of God "insofar as it is related to the mind alone." The reader should know in advance what they claim and how the argument is built.

What the doctrine denies

They begin by taking away what the reader might expect. "The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures" (Prop. 21 [p. 503]). The demonstration rests entirely on Part II: the mind expresses the actual existence of its body only while the body endures (Part II, Prop. 8, Cor. [p. 133]), and imagination and memory are defined by the affections of the body (Part II, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 161]; Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 165]). They belong to the mind as the idea of an actually existing body, and they end with it.

Whatever is eternal in the mind, therefore, remembers nothing, and Spinoza says so: "it cannot happen that we should remember that we existed before the body, since there can be no traces of this in the body, nor can eternity be defined by time or have any relation to time" (Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503]). Men, he says, are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but "they confuse it with duration and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death" (Prop. 34, Schol. [p. 513]). The common opinion is the confused form of something true, but the life after death of popular religion, in which a person remembers his earthly life and is rewarded or punished for it, is precisely what the doctrine excludes. The eternal part will prove to be the idea of this body and of no other, but it has no memory, no imagination and no relation to time, and Spinoza does not try to show that it is a self in the sense in which we care about our own survival. Steven Nadler argues that on Spinoza's principles it could not be (*Spinoza's Heresy*, 2001, pp. 123–129), and Appendix E [p. 672] takes up the question.

The idea of the body's essence

What remains? In God there is necessarily an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity (Prop. 22 [p. 503]). The demonstration returns to Part I: God is the cause of the essence of things as well as of their existence (Part I, Prop. 25 [p. 77]), so the essence of this or that human body must be conceived through the essence of God, by a certain eternal necessity, and this concept must be in God (Part II, Prop. 3 [p. 125]). Part II had prepared the doctrine: the ideas of things which do not exist are comprehended in God's infinite idea as their formal essences are contained in his attributes (Part II, Prop. 8 [p. 133]). Its corollary distinguishes two ways in which the ideas of things are in God: as comprehended in

God's infinite idea, and, when the things endure, as involving the existence "through which they are said to endure" (Part II, Prop. 8, Cor. [p. 133]). The demonstrations of Props. 21 and 23 cite it for the second; Prop. 22 asserts of the human body what the first says of every thing.

The demonstration of Prop. 23 [p. 503] then takes the step on which everything turns. The idea in God which expresses the essence of the human body "is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind," since the mind is the idea of the body (Part II, Prop. 13 [p. 141]); duration belongs to the mind only insofar as it expresses the body's actual existence; and since this idea is conceived by an eternal necessity through God's essence, "this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal" (Prop. 23, Dem. [p. 503]). Hence "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal" (Prop. 23 [p. 503]).

The argument is asymmetrical. Its premise concerns the essence of the body, its conclusion the mind, and Spinoza never says that something of the body remains. Yet nothing in the demonstration of Prop. 22 is peculiar to human bodies, and Part II had said that what holds of the idea of the human body "must necessarily be said of the idea of any thing" (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]). Whether the doctrine then reduces to the truism that every essence is eternal, as Jonathan Bennett thought Edwin Curley's "symmetrical" reading made it (Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, pp. 358–359), is one of the questions Appendix E [p. 672] takes up. Nadler distinguishes two eternities of the mind: one that the idea of every body has as the idea of its essence, no more personal in a man than in a tree, and one acquired by rational minds alone, which consists in their adequate ideas (Nadler, pp. 111–122). On this reading, the rest of the argument is about the second, of which a mind can have more or less.

Eternity, not duration

The word "remains" is misleading if it is taken to mean "continues afterwards." Eternity here has the sense of Part I, Def. 8 [p. 27]: existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing, which "cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end" (Part I, Def. 8, Expl. [p. 27]). On the strict reading, which Appendix E [p. 672] sets beside more temporal ones, the eternal part of the mind does not exist at all times, or after the body's death; it exists in a way that has no relation to time. So "our mind … can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body," and insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, its existence "cannot be defined by time or explained through duration" (Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503]).

The claim is not only deduced but felt. "But nevertheless we feel and experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things which it conceives in understanding no less than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves" (Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503]). The passage is often quoted, and it is easily misread as an appeal to mystical experience. Read with the sentence that follows it, it seems to point the other way. The experience of eternity is the experience of understanding something by demonstration, of seeing that it must be so; when we understand in this way, we are aware of a kind of knowing that is not tied to the moment at which it occurs, as "he who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea" (Part II, Prop. 43 [p. 191]). The demonstrations are the eyes with which the mind sees, and what it sees, when it sees anything necessary, is the eternal.

The phrase "under a species of eternity" (*sub specie aeternitatis*) first appeared, as "under a certain species of eternity," in Part II, Prop. 44, Cor. 2 [p. 197], where it is said to be of the nature of reason to perceive things in this way, because the necessity it perceives "is the very necessity of God's eternal nature," and because the common notions on which it rests "must therefore be conceived without any relation to time" (Part II, Prop. 44, Cor. 2, Dem. [p. 197]). Part V joins this strand to Props. 22–23. Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands "not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity" (Prop. 29 [p. 507]). The demonstration shows how Spinoza builds: it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under a species of eternity, it pertains to the mind to conceive the essence of the body so, "and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind" (Prop. 29, Dem. [p. 507]). The power which Part II ascribed to reason belongs to the mind, then, only insofar as the mind is eternal. The scholium explains the phrase: "Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature" (Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 509]). To conceive the essence of one's body under a species of eternity is not to imagine it lasting forever, but to understand it as following from the nature of God, and so to know that one "is in God and is conceived through God" (Prop. 30 [p. 509]).

The third kind of knowledge

Props. 24–28 turn from what the mind is to what it strives for. "The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God" (Prop. 24 [p. 505]), since singular things are modes by which God's attributes are expressed (Part I, Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]). The Dutch version of 1677 adds "or have more understanding of God"; the note to the proposition gives Gebhardt's account of that reading. The demonstration of Prop. 25 [p. 505] joins this to earlier results: the third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]), and the highest virtue of the mind, that is, its power and its striving, is to know God (Part IV, Prop. 28 [p. 387]). Hence "the highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge" (Prop. 25 [p. 505]). The more capable of this the mind is, the more it desires it (Prop. 26 [p. 505]); from it arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be (Prop. 27 [p. 507]); and the desire for it "cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second" (Prop. 28 [p. 507]). Don Garrett notes that human beings generally reach the third kind only after the second (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, 2018, p. 211).

What distinguishes the third kind from the second? Bennett observed that Part II gives little help, since it contrasts the first kind with the other two, never the second with the third (Bennett, p. 364). In the Scholium to Prop. 36 Spinoza says that he has noted how our mind follows from the divine nature in order to show "how much the knowledge of singular things which I have called intuitive, or of the third kind ..., can do": the general demonstration of Part I that all things depend on God is certain, but it "does not affect our mind as much as when this same thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God" (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). On Garrett's reading, the demonstration of Part I gives knowledge of the second kind because it rests on a property common to everything, not on the mind's own essence (p. 208); the third kind is more powerful because it runs from essences to what follows

from them, as from causes to effects, in the order in which God himself knows (pp. 212–213). Spinoza's conclusion is that the third kind of knowledge "depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal" (Prop. 31 [p. 509]): insofar as it is eternal, the mind has the adequate knowledge of God which every idea involves (Part II, Prop. 46 [p. 199]), and can know whatever follows from it.

The intellectual love of God

From here on, Spinoza warns, he will speak of the mind, as he has done so far, "as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under a species of eternity," although we are certain that it is eternal; this may be done "without any danger of error, provided we take care to conclude nothing except from clear premises" (Prop. 31, Schol. [p. 511]). The language of growth and acquisition that follows describes, in temporal terms, relations that are not temporal. Bennett saw in the device an attempt to hide a split in the doctrine: how much of my mind is eternal seems fixed by eternal truths, yet the same pages speak of self-improvement (p. 363).

Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, with the idea of God as its cause (Prop. 32 [p. 511]); by the definition of love (Part III, Def. Aff. 6 [p. 321]) this is a love of God, "not insofar as we imagine him as present ..., but insofar as we understand God to be eternal; and this is what I call the intellectual love of God" (Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511]). It is not the love of God of Props. 15–16 as related to the body: that love arose as the mind related the affections of the body to the idea of God, and in that relation, the Scholium to Prop. 20 said, it cannot be destroyed except with the body. This love arises from the third kind of knowledge, and since that knowledge is eternal, so is the love (Prop. 33 [p. 511]). The scholium corrects the corollary: this love has had no beginning, but "it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come into being" (Prop. 33, Schol. [p. 511]). It also resolves a difficulty left by Part III, which defined joy as a passage to a greater perfection and warned that "joy is not perfection itself" (Part III, Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]). The scholium concludes: "if joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself" (Prop. 33, Schol. [p. 511]). H. A. Wolfson noted that the difficulty was old: Crescas had held that the delight of knowing lies in passing from potentiality to actuality, and found the answer in a pleasure of constant possession (*The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1934, II 307–308).

Only while the body endures is the mind subject to passions, and so "no love except intellectual love is eternal" (Prop. 34, Cor. [p. 513]). But "God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love" (Prop. 35 [p. 513]), and the mind's intellectual love of God "is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself" (Prop. 36 [p. 515]). The demonstration, by way of Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139], makes the mind's contemplation of itself "an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself" (Prop. 36, Dem. [p. 515]). The essay before Part V explains why this does not contradict the denial that God loves anyone (Prop. 17, Cor. [p. 489]). The demonstration of Prop. 17 [p. 489] gives the reason: what is denied of God is joy as a passage, and what is affirmed here is perfection possessed, which the Scholium to Prop. 36 calls joy only "if we may still use this word" (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). Nothing in nature can take this love away (Prop. 37 [p. 517]), for the axiom of Part IV, that every singular thing can be destroyed by a stronger one, "concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place" (Prop. 37,

Schol. [p. 517]).

The measure of the eternal part

The argument returns to the body. "The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death" (Prop. 38 [p. 517]), because the more it knows in these ways, "the greater the part of it that remains" (Prop. 38, Dem. [p. 517]). The scholium names the promise of Part IV which this keeps, "that death is the less harmful, the greater the mind's clear and distinct knowledge" (Prop. 38, Schol. [p. 517]).

Then comes the most troubling proposition: "He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal" (Prop. 39 [p. 519]). Its demonstration runs through the first half of the Part. Such a man is least troubled by evil affects, and so he can order the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect (Prop. 10 [p. 483]), relate them all to the idea of God (Prop. 14 [p. 487]), and love God (Prop. 15 [p. 489]) with a love that occupies the greatest part of the mind (Prop. 16 [p. 489]); "and accordingly (by Prop. 33 of this Part) he has a mind whose greatest part is eternal" (Prop. 39, Dem. [p. 519]). The scholium explains why the body matters. An infant, whose body is capable of very few things, has a mind which "is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things"; and so "in this life" we strive that the body of infancy may change into one capable of a great many things (Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 519]). The principle is Part II's: the more a body can do and undergo, the more its mind can perceive (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]).

The part that remains is the intellect, the part that perishes the imagination (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]). The intellect, the corollary says, is that "through which alone we are said to act," so that, as Bennett and Garrett both note, the mind's eternity is tied to reason as well as to intuition (Bennett, p. 369; Garrett, p. 212). The vocabulary is old. Aristotle had said of the intellect that makes all things: Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον ("when separated it is only what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal"); and he added, in a remark that invites comparison with Spinoza's, that we do not remember: Οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός ("but we do not remember, because this is not acted on, while the passive intellect is perishable"; *De anima* III.5, 430a22–25). Appendix E [p. 672] describes the medieval doctrine of the acquired intellect, which, as Wolfson notes, is not found in Aristotle but grew out of medieval expositions of his account of the intellect (II 54). Spinoza's last word is the Scholium to Prop. 40: our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking determined by another, and that by another, and so to infinity, "so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God" (Prop. 40, Schol. [p. 521]). Part II had called the human mind "part of the infinite intellect of God" (Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]); the end of Part V shows which part, and why it can be greater or smaller.

The remedies seen from eternity

Prop. 39 shows how closely the two halves of Part V are joined. On the reading offered here, the second adds no new remedy, but regards the remedies of the first from the side of eternity. The Scholium to Prop. 20 had already said that clear and distinct knowledge, "and especially that third kind of knowledge ..., whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself," begets "love towards an immutable and eternal thing ..., which we really possess" (Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]). The second half explains how we possess that thing, and why the love of it is eternal, and its

demonstrations draw on the first: Prop. 39 runs through Props. 10 and 14–16, and the last demonstration of the book cites the corollary of Prop. 3 [p. 475], that an affect is the more in our power the better it is known (Prop. 42, Dem. [p. 523]). What the first half describes as a process in time, in which adequate ideas come to make up more of the mind and the passions less, the second describes as a fact about those ideas: they are in God, they are eternal, and the more of the mind they constitute, the less of it can be destroyed. The essay before Part V asks whether the two halves describe two kinds of freedom or two aspects of one. The demonstrations suggest one freedom, conceived in the two ways the Scholium to Prop. 29 distinguished; Bennett, as noted above, saw instead a split that cannot be healed (p. 363).

An ethics that does not wait for it

Spinoza adds at once that the ethics of Part IV does not depend on any of this. "Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility" (Prop. 41 [p. 521]). In determining what reason dictates, he recalls, "we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to know only in this fifth Part" (Prop. 41, Dem. [p. 521]). The doctrine is not offered as a reward for virtue, or as a motive for it, but as a further truth about what the mind is. The scholium, which attacks the belief that piety is a burden to be repaid after death, contains the only occurrence of the word "immortal" in the *Ethics*, in the absurd reasoning of someone who "sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal," and so prefers to live without reason (Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523]). Nadler notes how carefully the book avoids the traditional vocabulary (pp. 108–111). The early *Short Treatise* still had a chapter "Of the Immortality of the Soul," *Van des Ziels Onsterfelykheid*, in which the soul's fate depends on whether it is united with the body alone or with God (KV II.23; G I 102–103); the *Ethics* speaks of eternity instead. Whatever the reader concludes about the doctrine, the remedies of the first half of Part V and the ethics of Part IV stand on their own.

The text resumes with Prop. 21, whose demonstration rests on Part II, as that of Prop. 22 rests on Parts I and II; the main claim comes in Prop. 23 [p. 503] and its scholium. Props. 24–31 treat the third kind of knowledge, Props. 32–37 the intellectual love of God, and Props. 38–40 the measure of the eternal part. After Prop. 40 the last two propositions of the *Ethics* turn from the eternity of the mind back to the life of virtue, and conclude that "blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself" (Prop. 42 [p. 523]).

Propositio XXI

[G II 294] *Mens nihil imaginari potest, neque rerum praeteritarum recordari, nisi durante corpore.*

Demonstratio. Mens actualem sui corporis existentiam non exprimit, neque etiam corporis affectiones ut actuales concipit, nisi durante corpore (per coroll. prop. 8. P. 2.), et consequenter (per prop. 26. P. 2.) nullum corpus ut actu existens concipit, nisi durante suo corpore. Ac proinde nihil imaginari (vide imaginationis definitionem in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), neque rerum praeteritarum recordari potest, nisi durante corpore (vide definitionem memoriae in schol. prop. 18. P. 2.). Q. E. D.

Propositio XXII

[G II 295] *In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quae huius et illius corporis humani essentiam sub aeternitatis specie exprimit.*

Demonstratio. Deus non tantum est causa huius et illius corporis humani existentiae, sed etiam essentiae (per prop. 25. P. 1.), quae propterea per ipsam Dei essentiam necessario debet concipi (per axiom. 4. P. 1.), idque aeterna quadam necessitate (per prop. 16. P. 1.), qui quidem conceptus necessario in Deo dari debet (per prop. 3. P. 2.). Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIII

Mens humana non potest cum corpore absolute destrui, sed eius aliquid remanet quod aeternum est.

Demonstratio. In Deo datur necessario conceptus seu idea, quae corporis humani essentiam exprimit (per prop. praeced.), quae propterea aliquid necessario est, quod ad essentiam mentis humanae pertinet (per prop. 13. P. 2.). Sed menti humanae nullam durationem, quae tempore definiri potest, tribuimus, nisi quatenus corporis actualem existentiam, quae per durationem explicatur et tempore definiri potest, exprimit, hoc est (per coroll. prop. 8. P. 2.) ipsi durationem non tribuimus nisi durante corpore. Cum tamen aliquid nihilominus sit id, quod aeterna quadam necessitate per ipsam Dei essentiam concipitur (per prop. praeced.), erit necessario hoc aliquid, quod ad mentis essentiam pertinet, aeternum. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Est, uti diximus, haec idea, quae corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus, qui ad mentis essentiam pertinet, quique necessario aeternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla eius vestigia dari,[nr] nec aeternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest.

[nr] From the following *potest* a *possunt* must be understood after *dari*; the Dutch seems to have the same inconcinnity. W. Meijer (second edition), followed by Appuhn, would put *possunt* into the text. Gebhardt (G II 296; Textgestaltung II 390–391) leaves the text, and rejects Halpern's view that Spinoza meant only that there are no such traces (*dantur*), not that there can be none.

Proposition XXI

The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures.
Cited in 5P29D [p. 507], 5P31D [p. 509], 5P34D [p. 513], 5P38S [p. 517], 5P40C [p. 521]

Demonstration. The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it conceive the affections of the body as actual, except while the body endures (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of Part II [p. 133]), and consequently (by Prop. 26 of Part II [p. 173]) it conceives no body as actually existing except while its body endures. And so it can imagine nothing (see the definition of imagination in Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]), nor recollect past things, except while the body endures (see the definition of memory in Schol. of Prop. 18 of Part II [p. 165]). Q.E.D.

Proposition XXII

Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity.
Cited in 5P23D [p. 503]

Demonstration. God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (by Prop. 25 of Part I [p. 77]), which therefore must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (by Axiom 4 of Part I [p. 29]), and that by a certain eternal necessity (by Prop. 16 of Part I [p. 65]); and this concept must necessarily be in God (by Prop. 3 of Part II [p. 125]). Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIII

The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.
Cited in 5P29D [p. 507], 5P31D [p. 509], 5P38D [p. 517], 5P40C [p. 521]

Demonstration. In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding Prop. [p. 503]), and which therefore is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind (by Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 141]). But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and can be defined by time; that is (by Cor. of Prop. 8 of Part II [p. 133]), we do not attribute duration to it except while the body endures. Since, however, there is nevertheless something which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (by the preceding Prop. [p. 503]), this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking which pertains to the essence of the mind and which is necessarily eternal. And yet it cannot happen that we should remember that we existed before the body, since there can be no traces of this in the body, nor can eternity be defined by time or

At nihilominus sentimus experimurque, nos aeternos esse. Nam mens non minus res illas sentit, quas intelligendo concipit, quam quas in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi, quibus res videt observatque, sunt ipsae demonstrationes.
Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen mentem nostram, quatenus corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie involvit, aeternam esse, et hanc eius existentiam tempore definiri sive per durationem explicari non posse. Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare, eiusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest, quatenus actualem corporis existentiam involvit, et eatenus tantum potentiam habet rerum existentiam tempore determinandi, easque sub duratione concipiendi.

Propositio XXIV

[G II 296] *Quo magis res singulares intelligimus, eo magis Deum intelligimus.*[ns]

Demonstratio. Patet ex coroll. prop. 25. P. 1.

Propositio XXV

Summus mentis conatus summaque virtus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere.

Demonstratio. Tertium cognitionis genus procedit ab adaequata idea quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum (vide huius definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), et quo magis hoc modo res intelligimus, eo magis (per prop. praeced.) Deum intelligimus. Ac proinde (per prop. 28. P. 4.) summa mentis virtus, hoc est (per defin. 8. P. 4.) mentis potentia seu natura, sive (per prop. 7. P. 3.) summus conatus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVI

[G II 297] *Quo mens aptior est ad res tertio cognitionis genere intelligendum, eo magis cupit res eodem hoc cognitionis genere intelligere.*

Demonstratio. Patet. Nam quatenus concipimus mentem aptam esse ad res hoc cognitionis genere intelligendum, eatenus eandem determinatam[nt] concipimus ad res eodem cognitionis genere intelligendum, et consequenter (per aff. defin. 1.) quo mens ad hoc aptior est, eo magis

[ns] The Dutch has *hoe wy ook God meer verstaan, of meer verstant van God hebben* ('the more we also understand God, or have more understanding of God'), as if the Latin had been *eo magis Deum intelligimus sive eo magis Dei intellectum habemus*. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 391) takes the Dutch to give the key to this much-disputed proposition: the more we understand of things, the greater our share in the infinite intellect.
[nt] genere intelligendum, eatenus eandem determinatam] *transcr.* genere intelligendum eatenus, eandem determinatam. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 297).

have any relation to time.
But nevertheless we feel and experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things which it conceives in understanding no less than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves.
Although, therefore, we do not remember that we existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of it cannot be defined by time or explained through duration. Our mind, therefore, can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body, and only to that extent does it have the power of determining the existence of things by time and of conceiving them under duration.

Proposition XXIV

The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.
Cited in 5P25D [p. 505], 5P27D [p. 507]

Demonstration. This is evident from Cor. of Prop. 25 of Part I [p. 77].

Proposition XXV

The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
Cited in 5P27D [p. 507]

Demonstration. The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]); and the more we understand things in this way, the more (by the preceding Prop. [p. 505]) we understand God. And so (by Prop. 28 of Part IV [p. 387]) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (by Def. 8 of Part IV [p. 357]), the power, or nature, of the mind, or (by Prop. 7 of Part III [p. 243]) its highest striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVI

The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.

Demonstration. This is evident. For insofar as we conceive the mind to be capable of understanding things by this kind of knowledge, to that extent we conceive it to be determined to understand things by the same kind of knowledge; and consequently (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]),

hoc cupit. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVII

Ex hoc tertio cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, mentis acquiescentia oritur.[nu]

Demonstratio. Summa mentis virtus est Deum cognoscere (per prop. 28. P. 4.), sive res tertio cognitionis genere intelligere (per prop. 25. huius); quae quidem virtus eo maior est, quo mens hoc cognitionis genere magis res cognoscit (per prop. 24. huius). Adeoque qui res hoc cognitionis genere cognoscit, is ad summam humanam perfectionem transit, et consequenter (per aff. defin. 2.) summa laetitia afficitur, idque (per prop. 43. P. 2.) concomitante idea sui suaeque virtutis; ac proinde (per aff. defin. 25.) ex hoc cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, oritur acquiescentia. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXVIII

Conatus seu cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere oriri non potest ex primo, at quidem ex secundo cognitionis genere.

Demonstratio. Haec propositio per se patet. Nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel per se vel per aliud, quod per se concipitur, intelligimus; hoc est, ideae, quae in nobis clarae et distinctae sunt, sive quae ad tertium cognitionis genus referuntur (vide schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), non possunt sequi ex ideis mutilatis et confusis, quae (per idem schol.) ad primum cognitionis genus referuntur, sed ex ideis adaequatis, sive (per idem schol.) ex secundo et tertio cognitionis genere. Ac proinde (per aff. defin. 1.) cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere non potest oriri ex primo, at quidem ex secundo. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXIX

[G II 298] *Quicquid mens sub specie aeternitatis intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit, quod corporis praesentem actualem existentiam concipit; sed ex eo, quod corporis essentiam concipit sub specie aeternitatis.*

Demonstratio. Quatenus mens praesentem sui corporis existentiam concipit, eatenus durationem concipit, quae tempore determinari potest, et eatenus tantum potentiam habet concipiendi res cum relatione ad tempus (per prop. 21. huius et prop. 26. P. 2.). At aeternitas per durationem explicari nequit (per defin. 8. P. 1. et ipsius explic.).

Ergo mens eatenus potestatem non habet concipiendi res sub specie aeternitatis; sed quia de

[nu] mentis acquiescentia oritur] *transcr.* mentis acquiescentia, oritur. Punctuation as in the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 297).

the more capable the mind is of this, the more it desires it. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVII

From this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be.[385]
Cited in 5P32D [p. 511], 5P36S [p. 515], 5P38S [p. 517]

Demonstration. The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (by Prop. 28 of Part IV [p. 387]), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (by Prop. 25 of this Part [p. 505]); and this virtue is the greater, the more the mind knows things by this kind of knowledge (by Prop. 24 of this Part [p. 505]). And so he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection, and consequently (by Def. Aff. 2 [p. 319]) is affected with the highest joy, and that (by Prop. 43 of Part II [p. 191]) accompanied by the idea of himself and of his virtue; and accordingly (by Def. Aff. 25 [p. 327]) from this kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment there can be. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXVIII

The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second.

Demonstration. This proposition is evident through itself. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself or through something else which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to the third kind of knowledge (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]), cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas, which (by the same Schol. [p. 189]) are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, or (by the same Schol. [p. 189]) from the second and third kind of knowledge. And accordingly (by Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]) the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but it can from the second. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXIX

Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity.
Cited in 5P31D [p. 509], 5P32C [p. 511], 5P37D [p. 517], 5P38D [p. 517], 5P40C [p. 521]

Demonstration. Insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, to that extent it conceives duration, which can be determined by time, and to that extent only does it have the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 503] and Prop. 26 of Part II [p. 173]). But eternity cannot be explained by duration (by Def. 8 of Part I [p. 27] and its Explanation [p. 27]).
Therefore to that extent the mind does not have the power of conceiving things under a species

[385] What Part IV, Prop. 52 [p. 419] said of the self-contentment that arises from reason is here said of the third kind of knowledge, with the same words *summa, quae dari potest*.

natura rationis est, res sub specie aeternitatis concipere (per coroll. 2. prop. 44. P. 2.), et ad mentis naturam etiam pertinet, corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipere (per prop. 23. huius), et praeter haec duo nihil aliud ad mentis essentiam pertinet (per prop. 13. P. 2.), ergo[nv] haec potentia concipiendi res sub specie aeternitatis ad mentem non pertinet, nisi quatenus corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipit. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Res duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur, vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere, vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri et ex naturae divinae necessitate consequi concipimus. Quae autem hoc secundo modo ut verae seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub aeternitatis specie concipimus, et earum ideae aeternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt, ut prop. 45. P. 2. ostendimus, cuius etiam schol. vide.

Propositio XXX

[G II 299] *Mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub aeternitatis specie cognoscit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque se in Deo esse et per Deum concipi.*

Demonstratio. Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam (per defin. 8. P. 1.). Res igitur sub specie aeternitatis concipere est res concipere, quatenus per Dei essentiam ut entia realia concipiuntur, sive quatenus per Dei essentiam involvunt existentiam. Adeoque mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub specie aeternitatis concipit, eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet, scitque etc. Q. E. D.

Propositio XXXI

Tertium cognitionis genus pendet a mente, tamquam a formali causa, quatenus mens ipsa aeterna est.

Demonstratio. Mens nihil sub aeternitatis specie concipit, nisi quatenus sui corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie concipit (per prop. 29. huius), hoc est (per prop. 21. et 23. huius) nisi quatenus aeterna est. Adeoque (per prop. praeced.) quatenus aeterna est, Dei habet cognitionem, quae quidem cognitio est necessario adaequata (per prop. 46. P. 2.); ac proinde mens quatenus aeterna est, ad illa omnia cognoscendum est apta, quae ex data hac Dei cognitione consequi possunt (per prop. 40. P. 2.), hoc est, ad res tertio cognitionis genere cognoscendum (vide huius definitionem in schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), cuius propterea mens (per defin. 1. P. 3.) quatenus aeterna est, causa est adaequata seu formalis. Q. E. D.

[nv] The 1677 edition puts a full stop after *pertinet* and begins a new sentence with *Ergo*; the Dutch (*behoort; … zo*) shows that the sentence runs on, and Gebhardt (G II 298; Textgestaltung II 391) corrects the punctuation, as Leopold asked.

of eternity; but because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under a species of eternity (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 44 of Part II [p. 197]), and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under a species of eternity (by Prop. 23 of this Part [p. 503]), and besides these two nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind (by Prop. 13 of Part II [p. 141]), therefore this power of conceiving things under a species of eternity does not pertain to the mind except insofar as it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature.[386] But those which are conceived as true, or real, in this second way, we conceive under a species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Prop. 45 of Part II [p. 197]; see also its Schol. [p. 197].

Proposition XXX

Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

Cited in 5P31D [p. 509], 5P32D [p. 511]

Demonstration. Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves necessary existence (by Def. 8 of Part I [p. 27]). To conceive things under a species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things insofar as they are conceived as real beings through the essence of God, or insofar as through the essence of God they involve existence. And so our mind, insofar as it conceives itself and the body under a species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc. Q.E.D.

Proposition XXXI

The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.

Cited in 5P33D [p. 511]

Demonstration. The mind conceives nothing under a species of eternity except insofar as it conceives the essence of its body under a species of eternity (by Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 507]), that is (by Props. 21 [p. 503] and 23 of this Part [p. 503]), except insofar as it is eternal. And so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 509]) insofar as it is eternal it has knowledge of God, which is necessarily adequate (by Prop. 46 of Part II [p. 199]); and accordingly the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which can follow from this given knowledge of God (by Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 185]), that is, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see its definition in Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]), of which the mind, insofar as it is

[386] The two ways correspond to existence as duration and existence as it follows from God's nature. Part II, Prop. 45, Schol. [p. 197] had already drawn the line: 'by existence I do not here understand duration, that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly and as a certain species of quantity', but 'the very nature of existence which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature'.

[G II 300] Scholium. Quo igitur unusquisque hoc cognitionis genere plus pollet, eo melius sui et Dei conscius est, hoc est, eo est perfectior et beatior, quod adhuc clarius ex seqq. patebit. Sed hic notandum, quod, tametsi iam certi sumus, mentem aeternam esse, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit, nos tamen, ut ea, quae ostendere volumus, facilius explicentur et melius intelligantur, ipsam, tamquam iam inciperet esse, et res sub aeternitatis specie intelligere iam inciperet, considerabimus, ut hucusque fecimus; quod nobis absque ullo erroris periculo facere licet, modo nobis cautio sit nihil concludere, nisi ex perspicuis praemissis.

Propositio XXXII

Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur, et quidem concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa.

Demonstratio. Ex hoc cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, mentis acquiescentia (per prop. 27. huius),[nw] hoc est (per aff. defin. 25.) laetitia oritur, eaque concomitante idea sui, et consequenter (per prop. 30. huius) concomitante etiam idea Dei tamquam causa. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur necessario *amor Dei intellectualis*. Nam ex hoc cognitionis genere oritur (per prop. praeced.) laetitia concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa, hoc est (per aff. defin. 6.) amor Dei, non quatenus ipsum ut praesentem imaginamur (per prop. 29. huius), sed quatenus Deum aeternum esse intelligimus, et hoc est, quod amorem Dei intellectualem voco.

Propositio XXXIII

Amor Dei intellectualis, qui ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur, est aeternus.

[G II 301] Demonstratio. Tertium enim cognitionis genus (per prop. 31. huius et axiom. 3. P. 1.) est aeternum; adeoque (per idem axiom. P. 1.) amor, qui ex eodem oritur, est etiam necessario aeternus. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Quamvis hic erga Deum amor principium non habuerit (per prop. praeced.), habet

[nw] The 1677 edition and the Dutch put *per Prop. 27. hujus* after *concomitante ideâ sui* instead of after *acquiescentia*; W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) give the reference its right place, and Gebhardt (G II 300; Textgestaltung II 391) follows.

eternal, is therefore (by Def. 1 of Part III [p. 231]) the adequate, or formal, cause.[387] Q.E.D.

Scholium. The more, therefore, each one is capable in this kind of knowledge, the better he is conscious of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect and blessed he is, as will be evident still more clearly from what follows. But it should be noted here that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity, nevertheless, so that what we wish to show may be explained more easily and better understood, we shall consider it, as we have done so far, as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under a species of eternity; which we may do without any danger of error, provided we take care to conclude nothing except from clear premises.

Proposition XXXII

Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause.

Cited in 5P32C [p. 511], 5P36D [p. 515], 5P42D [p. 523]

Demonstration. From this kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 507]), that is (by Def. Aff. 25 [p. 327]), joy, and this accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (by Prop. 30 of this Part [p. 509]) accompanied also by the idea of God as its cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary. From the third kind of knowledge there necessarily arises the *intellectual love of God*. For from this kind of knowledge there arises (by the preceding Prop. [p. 511]) joy accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, that is (by Def. Aff. 6 [p. 321]), the love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by Prop. 29 of this Part [p. 507]), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal; and this is what I call the intellectual love of God.[388]

Cited in 5P33S [p. 511], 5P35D [p. 513], 5P36D [p. 515], 5P42D [p. 523]

Proposition XXXIII

The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Cited in 5P33S [p. 511], 5P37D [p. 517], 5P39D [p. 519]

Demonstration. For the third kind of knowledge (by Prop. 31 of this Part [p. 509] and Axiom 3 of Part I [p. 29]) is eternal; and so (by the same Axiom of Part I [p. 29]) the love which arises from it is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Although this love towards God has had no beginning (by the preceding

[387] *causa formalis* is here equated with the adequate cause of Part III, Def. 1 [p. 231]: a cause whose effect can be perceived clearly and distinctly through it. The third kind of knowledge follows from the mind's own nature insofar as that nature is eternal.

[388] The love of God of Props. 15–16 [p. 489] was joy accompanied by the idea of God as one relates the affections of the body to him, and lasted with the body. This love arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal (Prop. 33 [p. 511]), and is an action of the mind, not a passion (Prop. 36, Dem. [p. 515]); the Scholium to Prop. 33 explains why it can still be called joy.

tamen omnes amoris perfectiones, perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in coroll. prop. praeced. finximus. Nec ulla hic est differentia, nisi quod mens easdem has perfectiones, quas eidem iam accedere finximus, aeternas habuerit, idque concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa aeterna. Quod si laetitia in transitione ad maiorem perfectionem consistit, beatitudo sane in eo consistere debet, quod mens ipsa perfectione sit praedita.

Propositio XXXIV

Mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur.

Demonstratio. Imaginatio est idea, qua mens rem aliquam ut praesentem contemplatur (vide eius definitionem in schol. prop. 17. P. 2.), quae tamen magis corporis humani praesentem constitutionem, quam rei externae naturam indicat (per coroll. 2. prop. 16. P. 2.). Est igitur affectus (per gener. aff. defin.) imaginatio, quatenus corporis praesentem constitutionem indicat; atque adeo (per prop. 21. huius) mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur nullum amorem praeter amorem intellectualem esse aeternum.

Scholium. Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus, eos suae mentis aeternitatis esse quidem conscios, sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere, eamque imaginationi seu memoriae tribuere, quam post mortem remanere credunt.

Propositio XXXV

[G II 302] *Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat.*

Demonstratio. Deus est absolute infinitus (per defin. 6. P. 1.), hoc est (per defin. 6. P. 2.) Dei natura gaudet infinita perfectione, idque (per prop. 3. P. 2.) concomitante idea sui, hoc est (per prop. 11. et defin. 1. P. 1.[nx]) idea suae causae, et hoc est, quod in coroll. prop. 32. huius amorem intellectualem esse diximus.

[nx] The 1677 edition and the Dutch have *Axiom. 1.*; Van Vloten–Land rightly correct to *Defin. 1.*, and Gebhardt (G II 302; Textgestaltung II 391–392) follows. He keeps *Prop. 11.*, which Halpern would change to 25: what matters here is God as necessarily existing, that is, as cause of himself, not as cause of things. W. Meijer and Baensch (second editions) would add *tanquam causa* after *concomitante ideâ sui*, and Appuhn does; Gebhardt finds the addition unnecessary.

Prop. [p. 511]), it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come into being, as we feigned in the Cor. of the preceding Prop. [p. 511]. Nor is there any difference here, except that the mind has had eternally these same perfections which we feigned to be now accruing to it, and that accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. But if joy consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.[389]

Proposition XXXIV

Only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions.

Demonstration. An imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates some thing as present (see its definition in Schol. of Prop. 17 of Part II [p. 161]), but which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing (by Cor. 2 of Prop. 16 of Part II [p. 159]). An affect, therefore (by the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]), is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body; and so (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 503]) only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that no love except intellectual love is eternal.

Scholium. If we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse it with duration and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death.[390]

Proposition XXXV

God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.[391]
Cited in 5P36D [p. 515], 5P36S [p. 515]

Demonstration. God is absolutely infinite (by Def. 6 of Part I [p. 27]), that is (by Def. 6 of Part II [p. 123]), the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection, and that (by Prop. 3 of Part II [p. 125]) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (by Prop. 11 [p. 41] and Def. 1 of Part I [p. 25]), by the idea of his own cause; and this is what we said in the Cor. of Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 511] is intellectual love.

[389] Joy was defined as a passage to a greater perfection, not perfection itself (Part III, Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]). Blessedness is not a passage at all: it is the possession of the perfection to which joy is a passage.
[390] The common belief in survival is not simply rejected: men are aware of something true, the eternity of the mind, but imagine it as continued duration with memory, which Prop. 21 [p. 503] excludes.
[391] This does not contradict Prop. 17 [p. 489], which denied that God has passions or any joy or sadness: intellectual love is defined by the idea of a perfection possessed, not by a passage to a greater one, and the Scholium to Prop. 36 [p. 515] calls it joy only with an apology ('if we may still use this word').

Propositio XXXVI

Mentis amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei amor, quo Deus se ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per essentiam humanae mentis sub specie aeternitatis consideratam explicari potest, hoc est, mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum amat.

Demonstratio. Hic mentis amor ad mentis actiones referri debet (per coroll. prop. 32. huius et per prop. 3. P. 3.), qui proinde actio est, qua mens se ipsam contemplatur concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa (per prop. 32. huius et eius coroll.), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 25. P. 1. et coroll. prop. 11. P. 2.) actio, qua Deus, quatenus per mentem humanam explicari potest, seipsum contemplatur concomitante idea sui. Atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) hic mentis amor pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus seipsum amat. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, quod Deus, quatenus seipsum amat, homines amat, et consequenter quod amor Dei erga homines et mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis unum et idem sit.

[G II 303] Scholium. Ex his clare intelligimus, qua in re nostra salus[ny] seu beatitudo seu libertas consistit, nempe in constanti et aeterno erga Deum amore, sive in amore Dei erga homines. Atque hic amor, seu beatitudo in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur;[nz,oa] nec immerito.

Nam sive hic amor ad Deum referatur sive ad mentem, recte animi acquiescentia, quae revera a gloria (per aff. defin. 25. et 30.) non distinguitur, appellari potest. Nam quatenus ad Deum refertur, est (per prop. 35. huius) laetitia (liceat hoc adhuc vocabulo uti) concomitante idea sui, ut et quatenus ad mentem refertur (per prop. 27. huius).

Deinde quia nostrae mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit, cuius principium et fundamentum Deus est (per prop. 15. P. 1. et schol. prop. 47. P. 2.), hinc perspicuum nobis fit, quomodo et qua ratione mens nostra secundum essentiam et existentiam ex natura divina sequatur et continuo a Deo pendeat; quod hic notare operae pretium duxi, ut hoc exemplo ostenderem, quantum rerum singularium cognitio, quam intuitivam sive tertii generis appellavi (vide schol. 2. prop. 40. P. 2.), polleat, potiorque sit cognitione universali, quam secundi generis esse dixi.

Nam quamvis in prima parte generaliter ostenderim, omnia (et consequenter mentem etiam humanam) a Deo secundum essentiam et existentiam pendere, illa tamen demonstratio tametsi legitima sit et extra dubitationis aleam posita, non ita tamen mentem nostram afficit, quam

[ny] qua in re nostra salus] *transcr.* qua in re nostra salus. The transcription opens an italic span here that closes after 'gloria'; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 303) have no italics.
[nz] in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur] *transcr.* in sacris codicibus gloria* appellatur. See the preceding emendation.
[oa] Ies. 6. 3., Ps. 8. 6., 113. 4., Ioh. 11. 40., Rom. 3. 23., Eph. 1. 17.-18. [Bruder]

Proposition XXXVI

The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered under a species of eternity; that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.

Cited in 5P42D [p. 523]

Demonstration. This love of the mind must be related to the actions of the mind (by Cor. of Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 511] and by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]); it is therefore an action by which the mind contemplates itself, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (by Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 511] and its Cor. [p. 511]), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 25 of Part I [p. 77] and Cor. of Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]), an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind, contemplates himself, accompanied by the idea of himself. And so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 513]) this love of the mind is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves men, and consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same.

Scholium. From these things we understand clearly in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists: namely, in a constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God towards men. And this love, or blessedness, is called glory in the sacred books, and not without reason.[392]

For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called contentment of mind, which in reality is not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. 25 [p. 327] and 30 [p. 331]). For insofar as it is related to God, it is (by Prop. 35 of this Part [p. 513]) joy (if we may still use this word), accompanied by the idea of himself, as it is also insofar as it is related to the mind (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 507]).

Next, because the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, of which God is the principle and foundation (by Prop. 15 of Part I [p. 49] and Schol. of Prop. 47 of Part II [p. 199]), it becomes clear to us how and in what way our mind follows from the divine nature according to essence and existence, and continually depends on God, which I thought it worthwhile to note here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things which I have called intuitive, or of the third kind (see Schol. 2 of Prop. 40 of Part II [p. 189]), can do, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge which I have said is of the second kind. For although I have shown generally in Part I that all things (and consequently the human mind also) depend on God according to essence and existence, that demonstration, although it is legitimate and placed beyond the hazard of doubt, still does not affect our mind as much as when

[392] Bruder's note in the Latin lists the passages, beginning with Isaiah 6:3: 'מְלֹא כָל־הָאָרֶץ כְּבוֹדוֹ' ('the whole earth is full of his glory'; Vulgate *plena est omnis terra gloria ejus*). The justification follows: blessedness is contentment of mind, and contentment of mind is not really distinguished from glory (Part III, Defs. Aff. 25 [p. 327] and 30 [p. 331]).

quando id ipsum ex ipsa essentia rei cuiuscumque singularis, quam a Deo pendere dicimus, concluditur.

Propositio XXXVII

Nihil in natura datur, quod huic amori intellectuali sit contrarium, sive quod ipsum possit tollere.

Demonstratio. Hic intellectualis amor ex mentis natura necessario sequitur, quatenus ipsa ut aeterna veritas per Dei naturam consideratur (per prop. 33. et 29. huius). Si quid ergo daretur, quod huic amori esset contrarium, id contrarium esset vero, et consequenter id, quod hunc amorem posset tollere, efficeret, ut id, quod verum est, falsum esset; quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nihil in natura datur etc. Q. E. D.

[G II 304] Scholium. Partis quartae axioma res singulares respicit, quatenus cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum considerantur, de quo neminem dubitare credo.

Propositio XXXVIII

Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur et mortem minus timet.[ob]

Demonstratio. Mentis essentia in cognitione consistit[oc] (per prop. 11. P. 2.); quo igitur mens plures res cognoscit secundo et tertio cognitionis genere, eo maior eius pars remanet (per prop. 23. et 29. huius),[od] et consequenter (per prop. praeced.) eo maior eius pars non tangitur ab affectibus, qui nostrae naturae sunt contrarii, hoc est (per prop. 30. P. 4.) qui mali sunt. Quo itaque mens plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere intelligit, eo maior eius pars illaesa manet, et consequenter minus ab affectibus patitur etc. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Hinc intelligimus id quod in schol. prop. 39. P. 4. attigi et quod in hac parte explicare promisi; nempe quod mors eo minus est noxia, quo mentis clara et distincta cognitio maior est, et consequenter quo mens magis Deum amat. Deinde quia (per prop. 27. huius) ex tertio cognitionis genere summa, quae dari potest, oritur acquiescentia, hinc sequitur mentem humanam posse eius naturae esse, ut id, quod eius cum corpore perire ostendimus (vide prop. 21. huius), in respectu

[ob] W. Meijer pointed out that this last clause is strictly proved only in the Scholium and may be a later addition; Leopold, Baensch and Appuhn agree. Gebhardt (Textgestaltung II 392) grants the inconcinnity but notes that the Dutch already had the text of the 1677 edition.

[oc] Mentis essentia in cognitione consistit] *transcr.* Mentis essentia in ognitione consistit. Misprint in the transcription; the 1677 edition and Gebhardt (G II 304) read 'cognitione'.

[od] W. Meijer (second edition) and Baensch read *per Prop. 23., 29. et 33.*; Gebhardt (G II 304; Textgestaltung II 392) keeps the transmitted reference, since in the same context the Corollary to Prop. 40 cites only Props. 23 and 29.

this same thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God.[393]

Cited in 5P42D [p. 523]

Proposition XXXVII

There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Cited in 5P38D [p. 517]

Demonstration. This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, insofar as the mind is considered as an eternal truth through the nature of God (by Props. 33 [p. 511] and 29 of this Part [p. 507]). If, therefore, there were anything which was contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the true; and consequently that which could take this love away would bring it about that what is true would be false, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in nature, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. The axiom of Part IV [p. 357] concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place,[394] of which I believe no one has any doubt.

Proposition XXXVIII

The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death.

Cited in 5P42D [p. 523]

Demonstration. The essence of the mind consists in knowledge (by Prop. 11 of Part II [p. 139]); the more things, therefore, the mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains (by Props. 23 [p. 503] and 29 of this Part [p. 507]), and consequently (by the preceding Prop. [p. 517]) the greater the part of it that is not touched by affects which are contrary to our nature, that is (by Prop. 30 of Part IV [p. 389]), which are evil. The more things, therefore, the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains unharmed, and consequently the less it is acted on by affects, etc. Q.E.D.

Scholium. From this we understand what I touched on in Schol. of Prop. 39 of Part IV [p. 405], and what I promised to explain in this Part: namely, that death is the less harmful, the greater the mind's clear and distinct knowledge, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Next, because (by Prop. 27 of this Part [p. 507]) the greatest contentment there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows from this that the human mind can be of such a nature

[393] The difference between the second and the third kind of knowledge is not in certainty but in object and force: the same truth, known from universal premises, convinces; known in the essence of a singular thing, here our own mind, it affects us. Compare the example of the proportional numbers in Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189].

[394] The axiom said that for every singular thing there is another more powerful by which it can be destroyed. It holds of things as they exist in duration, not of the mind insofar as it is an eternal truth.

ad id, quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti. Sed de his mox prolixius.

Propositio XXXIX

Qui corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is mentem habet, cuius maxima pars est aeterna.

[G II 305] Demonstratio. Qui corpus ad plurima agendum aptum habet, is minime affectibus, qui mali sunt, conflictatur (per prop. 38. P. 4.), hoc est (per prop. 30. P. 4.) affectibus qui naturae nostrae sunt contrarii. Atque adeo (per prop. 10. huius) potestatem habet ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum, et consequenter efficiendi (per prop. 14. huius) ut omnes corporis affectiones ad Dei ideam referantur, ex quo fiet (per prop. 15. huius) ut erga Deum afficiatur amore, qui (per prop. 16. huius) mentis maximam partem occupare sive constituere debet; ac proinde (per prop. 33. huius) mentem habet, cuius maxima pars est aeterna. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Quia corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est, quin eius naturae possint esse, ut ad mentes referantur, quae magnam sui et Dei habeant cognitionem, et quarum maxima seu praecipua pars est aeterna, atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant. Sed ut haec clarius intelligantur, animadvertendum hic est, quod nos in continua vivimus variatione, et prout in melius sive in peius mutamur, eo *felices* aut *infelices* dicimur.

Qui enim ex infante vel puero in cadaver transiit, infelix dicitur, et contra id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vitae spatium mente sana in corpore sano percurrere potuerimus. Et revera qui corpus habet, ut infans vel puer, ad paucissima aptum et maxime pendens a causis externis, mentem habet, quae in se sola considerata nihil fere sui, nec Dei, nec rerum sit conscia; et contra, qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet, quae in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia.

In hac vita igitur apprime conamur, ut corpus infantiae in aliud, quantum eius natura patitur eique conducit, mutetur, quod ad plurima aptum sit, quodque ad mentem referatur, quae sui et Dei et rerum plurimum sit conscia; atque ita ut id omne, quod ad ipsius memoriam vel imaginationem refertur, in respectu ad intellectum vix alicuius sit momenti, ut in schol. prop. praeced. iam dixi.

that what of it we have shown perishes with the body (see Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 503]) is of no importance in relation to what of it remains. But of these things more fully presently.
Cited in 5P39S [p. 519]

Proposition XXXIX

He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.

Demonstration. He who has a body capable of doing a great many things is least troubled by affects which are evil (by Prop. 38 of Part IV [p. 405]), that is (by Prop. 30 of Part IV [p. 389]), by affects which are contrary to our nature. And so (by Prop. 10 of this Part [p. 483]) he has the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect, and consequently of bringing it about (by Prop. 14 of this Part [p. 487]) that all the affections of the body are related to the idea of God; from which it will come about (by Prop. 15 of this Part [p. 489]) that he is affected with a love towards God which (by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 489]) must occupy, or constitute, the greatest part of the mind; and accordingly (by Prop. 33 of this Part [p. 511]) he has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. Q.E.D.

Scholium. Because human bodies are capable of a great many things, there is no doubt that they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whose greatest, or principal, part is eternal, so that they hardly fear death. But in order that these things may be understood more clearly, it should be noted here that we live in continual change, and are called *happy* or *unhappy* according as we change for the better or for the worse.
For he who has passed from being an infant or a child into a corpse is called unhappy, and on the other hand it is counted as happiness if we have been able to pass through the whole span of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And in truth, he who, like an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few things and very greatly dependent on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things;[395] and on the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is very much conscious of itself and of God and of things.
In this life, therefore, we strive above all that the body of infancy may change, as far as its nature allows and is conducive to it, into another which is capable of a great many things, and which is related to a mind very much conscious of itself and of God and of things; and so that everything which is related to its memory or imagination may be of hardly any importance in relation to the intellect, as I have already said in the Schol. of the preceding Prop. [p. 517].

[395] The infant of Part IV, Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 405], whose nature the old man can hardly believe was ever his, returns here as the measure of what education and understanding change. The mind is the idea of the body (Part II, Prop. 13 [p. 141]), so what the body is capable of sets the range of what the mind can know (Part II, Prop. 14 [p. 159]; Part IV, Prop. 38 [p. 405]).

Propositio XL

[G II 306] *Quo unaquaeque res plus perfectionis habet, eo magis agit et minus patitur, et contra quo magis agit, eo perfectior est.*

Demonstratio. Quo unaquaeque res perfectior est, eo plus habet realitatis (per defin. 6. P. 2.),[oe] et consequenter (per prop. 3. P. 3. cum eius schol.) eo magis agit et minus patitur; quae quidem demonstratio inverso ordine eodem modo procedit; ex quo sequitur, ut res contra eo sit perfectior, quo magis agit. Q. E. D.

Corollarium. Hinc sequitur, partem mentis, quae remanet, quantacumque ea sit, perfectiorem esse reliqua. Nam pars mentis aeterna (per prop. 23. et 29. huius) est intellectus, per quem solum nos agere dicimur (per prop. 3. P. 3.); illa autem, quam perire ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio (per prop. 21. huius), per quam solam dicimur pati (per prop. 3. P. 3. et gener. aff. defin.). Atque adeo (per prop. praeced.) illa, quantacumque ea sit, hac est perfectior. Q. E. D.

Scholium. Haec sunt, quae de mente, quatenus sine relatione ad corporis existentiam consideratur, ostendere constitueram. Ex quibus et simul ex prop. 21. P. 1.[of] et aliis apparet, quod mens nostra, quatenus intelligit, aeternus cogitandi modus sit, qui alio aeterno cogitandi modo determinatur,[og] et hic iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum; ita ut omnes simul Dei aeternum et infinitum intellectum constituant.

Propositio XLI

Quamvis nesciremus, mentem nostram aeternam esse, pietatem tamen et religionem et absolute omnia, quae ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus in quarta parte, prima haberemus.

Demonstratio. Primum et unicum virtutis seu recte vivendi rationis fundamentum (per coroll. prop. 22. et per prop. 24. P. 4.) est suum utile quaerere. Ad illa autem determinandum, quae ratio utilia esse dictat, nullam rationem habuimus mentis aeternitatis, quam demum in hac quinta parte novimus. Quamvis igitur tum temporis ignoraverimus, mentem esse aeternam, illa tamen, quae ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus, prima habuimus. Atque adeo quamvis etiam nunc hoc ipsum ignoraremus, eadem tamen rationis praescripta prima haberemus.[oh] Q. E. D.

[oe] The 1677 edition and the Dutch have *per Axiom. 6*; Schmidt, Auerbach, Bruder and Van Vloten–Land rightly correct to *Defin. 6.*, and Gebhardt (G II 305; Textgestaltung II 392) follows.

[of] ex prop. 21. P. 1.] *transcr.* ex prop. 21 P. 1. Punctuation as in Gebhardt (G II 306).

[og] qui alio aeterno cogitandi modo determinatur] *transcr.* qui alio cogitandi modo determinatur. The 1677 edition (OP p. 262), Gebhardt (G II 306) and Bartuschat read 'alio aeterno cogitandi modo'; the transcription omits 'aeterno'.

[oh] eadem tamen rationis praescripta prima haberemus] *transcr.* eadem tamen praescripta prima haberemus. The 1677 edition (OP p. 263), Gebhardt (G II 307) and Bartuschat read 'rationis praescripta'; the transcription omits 'rationis'.

Proposition XL

The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.

Cited in 5P40C [p. 521]

Demonstration. The more perfect each thing is, the more reality it has (by Def. 6 of Part II [p. 123]), and consequently (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241] with its Schol. [p. 241]) the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and this demonstration proceeds in the same way in reverse order, from which it follows that, conversely, a thing is the more perfect the more it acts. Q.E.D.

Corollary. Hence it follows that the part of the mind which remains, however great it may be, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (by Props. 23 [p. 503] and 29 of this Part [p. 507]) is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241]); but the part which we have shown perishes is the imagination itself (by Prop. 21 of this Part [p. 503]), through which alone we are said to be acted on (by Prop. 3 of Part III [p. 241] and the General Definition of the Affects [p. 339]). And so (by the preceding Prop. [p. 521]) the former, however great it may be, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.

Scholium. These are the things I had decided to show concerning the mind insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body. From these, and at the same time from Prop. 21 of Part I [p. 73] and other places, it is evident that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so to infinity; so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.[396]

Proposition XLI

Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion,[397] *and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility.*

Demonstration. The first and only foundation of virtue, or of the principle of living rightly (by Cor. of Prop. 22 [p. 383] and by Prop. 24 of Part IV [p. 383]), is to seek one's own advantage. But in determining those things which reason dictates to be useful, we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we have come to know only in this fifth Part. Although, therefore, we were at that time ignorant that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless regarded as of first importance those things which we showed to be related to tenacity and nobility. And so, even if we were still now ignorant of this, we would still regard the same prescriptions of reason as of first importance.

[396] Part II had said that 'the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God' (Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]). Here the parts are seen together: the eternal part of each mind is one link in an infinite chain of eternal modes of thinking, and the chain as a whole is God's infinite intellect, an infinite mode that follows from the absolute nature of the attribute of thought (Part I, Prop. 21 [p. 73]).

[397] The ethics of Part IV was derived from the striving to persevere in being alone (Part IV, Prop. 22, Cor. [p. 383]; Prop. 24 [p. 383]), and needs no support from the eternity of the mind. Spinoza says so in order to separate his ethics from the common view, set out in the Scholium, that piety is a burden borne for a reward after death.

[G II 307] Scholium. Communis vulgi persuasio alia videtur esse. Nam plerique videntur credere, se eatenus liberos esse, quatenus libidini parere licet, et eatenus de suo iure cedere, quatenus ex legis divinae praescripto vivere tenentur. Pietatem igitur et religionem[oi] et absolute omnia, quae ad animi fortitudinem referuntur, onera esse credunt, quae post mortem deponere, et pretium servitutis, nempe pietatis et religionis, accipere sperant.

Nec hac spe sola, sed etiam et praecipue metu, ne diris scilicet suppliciis post mortem puniantur, inducuntur, ut ex legis divinae praescripto, quantum eorum fert tenuitas et impotens animus, vivant; et nisi haec spes et metus hominibus inessent, at contra si crederent, mentes cum corpore interire, nec restare miseris pietatis onere confectis, vivere longius, ad ingenium redirent, et ex libidine omnia moderari et fortunae potius, quam sibi parere vellent.

Quae mihi non minus absurda videntur, quam si quis propterea, quod non credit se posse bonis alimentis corpus in aeternum nutrire, venenis potius et letiferis se exsaturare vellet; vel quia videt mentem non esse aeternam seu immortalem, ideo amens mavult esse et sine ratione vivere; quae adeo absurda sunt, ut vix recenseri mereantur.

Propositio XLII

Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus; nec eadem gaudemus, quia libidines coercemus; sed contra quia eadem gaudemus, ideo libidines coercere possumus.

Demonstratio. Beatitudo in amore erga Deum consistit (per prop. 36. huius et eius schol.), qui quidem amor ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur (per coroll. prop. 32. huius). Atque adeo hic amor (per prop. 59. et 3. P. 3.) ad mentem, quatenus agit, referri debet, ac proinde (per defin. 8. P. 4.) ipsa virtus est; quod erat primum.

Deinde quo mens hoc amore divino seu beatitudine magis gaudet, eo plus intelligit (per prop. 32. huius), hoc est (per coroll. prop. 3. huius) eo maiorem in affectus habet potentiam, et (per prop. 38. huius) eo minus ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur. Atque adeo ex eo, quod mens hoc amore divino seu beatitudine gaudet, potestatem habet libidines coercendi; et quia humana potentia ad coercendos affectus in solo intellectu consistit, ergo nemo beatitudine gaudet, quia affectus coercuit, sed contra potestas libidines coercendi ex ipsa beatitudine oritur. Q. E. D.

[G II 308] Scholium. His omnia, quae de mentis in affectus potentia, quaeque de mentis libertate

[oi] The 1677 edition prints *Pietas et Religio … onera esse credunt*, a slip of Spinoza's which its *Sphalmata corrigenda* correct (Gebhardt, G II 307; Textgestaltung II 392).

Q.E.D.

Scholium. The common persuasion of the multitude seems to be otherwise. For most seem to believe that they are free insofar as they are permitted to obey their lust, and that they give up their right insofar as they are bound to live according to the prescription of the divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion, and absolutely all the things which are related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to lay down after death, and to receive the reward of their servitude, namely of their piety and religion.

And they are induced, not by this hope alone but also and chiefly by fear, namely the fear of being punished with dreadful punishments after death, to live according to the prescription of the divine law as far as their feebleness and lack of power of mind allow; and if this hope and fear were not in men, but if, on the contrary, they believed that minds perish with the body, and that no longer life remains for the wretched who are worn out by the burden of piety, they would return to their own temperament, and would want to govern everything according to their lust and to obey fortune rather than themselves.

These things seem to me no less absurd than if someone, because he does not believe that he can nourish his body with good food for eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons and deadly things; or because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, should prefer to be out of his mind and to live without reason; which are so absurd that they hardly deserve to be mentioned.

Proposition XLII

Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself;[398] *nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts, but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts.*

Demonstration. Blessedness consists in love towards God (by Prop. 36 of this Part [p. 515] and its Schol. [p. 515]), which love arises from the third kind of knowledge (by Cor. of Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 511]). And so this love (by Props. 59 [p. 311] and 3 of Part III [p. 241]) must be related to the mind insofar as it acts; and accordingly (by Def. 8 of Part IV [p. 357]) it is virtue itself; which was the first point.

Next, the more the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, the more it understands (by Prop. 32 of this Part [p. 511]), that is (by Cor. of Prop. 3 of this Part [p. 475]), the greater the power it has over the affects, and (by Prop. 38 of this Part [p. 517]) the less it is acted on by affects which are evil. And so, from the fact that the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts; and because human power to restrain the affects consists in the intellect alone, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained the affects, but on the contrary the power of restraining lusts arises from blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Scholium. With these I have completed all that I wished to show concerning the power of the

[398] The answer to the view described in the preceding Scholium, and the conclusion announced at the end of Part II, where the doctrine of the mind was said to teach that our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists in the knowledge of God alone, and that virtue and the service of God are happiness itself and the highest freedom (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 217]).

ostendere volueram, absolvi. Ex quibus apparet, quantum sapiens polleat, potiorque sit ignaro, qui sola libidine agitur. Ignarus enim, praeterquam quod[oj] a causis externis multis modis agitatur, nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius, et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur, sed sui et Dei et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit, sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur.

Si iam via, quam ad haec ducere ostendi, perardua videatur, inveniri tamen potest. Et sane arduum debet esse, quod adeo raro reperitur. Qui enim posset fieri, si salus in promptu esset et sine magno labore reperiri posset, ut ab omnibus fere negligeretur? Sed omnia praeclara tam difficilia, quam rara sunt.

[oj] The 1677 edition has *praeterquam* alone; Gebhardt (G II 308; Textgestaltung II 392) reads *praeterquam quod*, as Leopold proposed.

mind over the affects and concerning the freedom of the mind. From which it is evident how much the wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than the ignorant man, who is driven by lust alone. For the ignorant man, besides being driven about in many ways by external causes and never possessing true contentment of mind, lives as if unconscious of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he also ceases to be. The wise man, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly moved in mind, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true contentment of mind.

If the way which I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, it can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is so rarely found must be hard. For how could it happen, if salvation were ready to hand and could be found without great labour, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

Epistolae
ad Ethicam pertinentes

Letters
on the Ethics

Introduction to the Letters

Spinoza published nothing of the *Ethics* in his lifetime, but parts of it circulated among his friends, first as drafts and later as a nearly finished manuscript, and some of those who read it wrote to him with questions. His answers are the nearest thing we have to his own commentary on the book. The twenty-seven letters printed here are those in which he explains doctrines of the *Ethics*, or the views on which it rests, to readers who had found them difficult, together with the letters of his correspondents to which he replies point by point. They are numbered, as in the editions of Van Vloten and Land and of Gebhardt, in the order of their dates; the *Opera Posthuma* of 1677, which first printed them, used a different order and numbering, given in the notes.

The text

The Latin is that of Carl Gebhardt's edition (*Spinoza Opera*, vol. IV, Heidelberg, 1925), whose page numbers are given in the Latin in the form [G IV 42]. Where Gebhardt prints both the text of the 1677 edition and a surviving original or copy, the 1677 text is followed, as for the *Ethics*, and the textual notes report what the manuscript adds; the one exception is Letter 8, whose original survives and of which Gebhardt prints only that. Passages that are found only in the Dutch version of 1677 (*De Nagelate Schriften*), which Gebhardt gives in Dutch, are left out of the Latin and translated in the notes. The orthography has been brought into line with that of the Latin of the *Ethics* in this edition: accents are dropped, *j* is printed as *i*, and capitals within a sentence are reduced, except in names. A few slips of the digital text used here have been corrected from the edition of Van Vloten and Land and from the 1677 edition, Greek words which it transliterates are restored from the 1677 pages, and two small drawings in Letter 9 and the figure of the two circles in Letter 12 are not reproduced.

As in the *Ethics*, numbered notes belong to the English and lettered notes to the Latin, and references to the *Ethics* are followed, in square brackets, by the page of this edition on which the passage cited begins.

Nine of the letters were written in Dutch: the exchange with Blyenbergh (Letters 18–24 and 27) and the letter to Jelles (Letter 50). The 1677 edition printed them in a Latin version, headed *Versio*, and the Dutch in the Dutch edition of the same year; Gebhardt prints both. Here, as for

the other letters, the Latin of 1677 is the text translated, so that the English renders a translation; the notes give the Dutch where the two differ in sense, and translate the passages, such as the closing paragraphs of Letters 19 and 23, which only the Dutch has.

The translation follows the conventions of the translation of the *Ethics*, and renders Spinoza's technical vocabulary in the same way. The letters of De Vries, Blyenbergh and Tschirnhaus are not always polished Latin; where they are awkward or incomplete, the English is too.

Simon de Vries, 1663 (Letters 8–10)

Simon Joosten de Vries, born around 1634 into an Amsterdam merchant family of Mennonite background, was one of the circle of friends whom Spinoza had known since the 1650s (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 166, 200). In 1663, while Spinoza was living at Rijnsburg, the circle met to read the drafts he sent them, taking turns to explain and demonstrate the propositions; Letter 8 [p. 531], of February 1663, describes these meetings and reports their difficulties with the definitions. What they were reading was an early version of Part I: De Vries quotes its third definition, which then defined substance and attribute together, and the scholium that became the scholium to Prop. 10 [p. 39]. Spinoza's reply, Letter 9 [p. 535], distinguishes a definition that must be true of its object from one that need only be conceivable, restates the definition of substance and attribute, and explains, with the examples of Israel and Jacob, how one thing can bear two names. Letter 10 [p. 539] answers two further questions, about the place of experience in knowing the attributes and about eternal truths.

Lodewijk Meyer, 1663 (Letter 12)

Letter 12 [p. 541], the 'letter on the infinite', was written to Lodewijk Meyer, the Amsterdam physician who wrote the preface to Spinoza's *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy* in the same year and who did more than anyone to bring Spinoza's writings into print (Nadler, pp. 202–203). It distinguishes three pairs of infinites that the philosophers had confused, explains the difference between eternity and duration, and argues that measure, time and number are aids of the imagination. Much of it reappears, sometimes word for word, in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 51], and its closing remarks on an argument of Hasdai Crescas bear on Part I, Prop. 28 [p. 79]. Thirteen years later Tschirnhaus asked Spinoza to explain one of its examples (Letters 80 [p. 645] and 81 [p. 647]).

Willem van Blyenbergh, 1664–1665 (Letters 18–24, 27)

Willem van Blyenbergh was a grain merchant and broker of Dordrecht with a taste for theology and philosophy, the author of a book of 1663 defending the knowledge of God and religion against the atheists (Nadler, pp. 251–252). In December 1664 he wrote to Spinoza, whom he did not know, after reading the *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy* and its appendix, the *Metaphysical Thoughts*; it was all he knew of Spinoza's work, and he could not always tell where Spinoza gave his own views and where Descartes's. His question (Letter 18 [p. 549]) was how, if God continually creates every thing and every motion of the will, there can be evil that God does not himself bring about. Spinoza's reply (Letter 19 [p. 553]), written in January 1665 at a farm near Schiedam where he was staying during the plague (Nadler, p. 251), sets out his account of evil: everything, considered in itself, has as much perfection as it has reality; imperfection appears only when things are compared, and the privation we ascribe to them belongs to our way of thinking, not to

God's intellect, the account given in the Preface to Part IV [p. 351].

Blyenbergh's answer (Letter 20 [p. 561]) made clear that he held two rules of philosophy, the clear and distinct conceptions of the intellect and the revealed word of God, and that the second must prevail; Spinoza replied that they disagreed about first principles themselves, and explained the difference between privation and negation (Letter 21 [p. 583]; Nadler, pp. 253–254). In Letter 23 [p. 601] he gives the example of Nero, whose matricide was outwardly the same act as that of Orestes, refuses to speak philosophically of God in the language of theology, and refers to his *Ethics*, 'not yet published'. After a visit, Blyenbergh asked for the definitions, postulates and axioms of the *Ethics* (Letter 24 [p. 607]), and Spinoza declined (Letter 27 [p. 611]). Nine years later Blyenbergh published a refutation of the *Theological-Political Treatise* (Nadler, p. 255).

Henry Oldenburg, 1665 (Letter 32)

Henry Oldenburg, born in Bremen about 1620, visited Spinoza at Rijnsburg in the summer of 1661 and began a correspondence that, after a long interruption, was renewed in the last years of Spinoza's life; he was secretary of the Royal Society in London, and passed on to Spinoza the work of Robert Boyle (Nadler, pp. 213, 217, 225, 382–383). In Letter 32 [p. 611], of November 1665, Spinoza answers Oldenburg's question how each part of nature agrees with its whole and coheres with the rest. He imagines a little worm living in the blood, which would take each particle for a whole, as we take the bodies around us, and could not know how the parts of the blood are governed by its nature as a whole; and he concludes that every body is a part of the whole of nature, and the human mind a part of an infinite intellect. The letter is the fullest statement outside the *Ethics* of the physics of Part II and of the doctrine of the corollary to Part II, Prop. 11 [p. 139].

Jarig Jelles, 1674 (Letter 50)

Jarig Jelles, an Amsterdam grocer in spices and dried fruit of Mennonite family, who had given up business for a life of religious reflection, was a close and lifelong friend of Spinoza's (Nadler, pp. 198–199). Letter 50 [p. 617], dated 1674 in its Latin version, answers three of his questions: how Spinoza's politics differs from Hobbes's (he keeps natural right intact, so that the sovereign has right over its subjects only in proportion to its power); why God can be called one or unique only improperly, since we number things only after bringing them under a common kind, and God's essence is not a kind; and why figure is a negation, since it is nothing but determination, and 'determination is negation'. It ends with Spinoza's opinion of a refutation of the *Theological-Political Treatise* he had seen in a bookseller's window.

Henry Oldenburg, 1675 (Letters 73–75)

After an interruption of several years, which followed his first, hostile reaction to the *Theological-Political Treatise*, Oldenburg wrote to Spinoza again in June 1675 (Nadler, pp. 382–383). In the autumn he told him which passages of the *Treatise* troubled its readers: those that seemed to confuse God with nature, to take away the authority of miracles, and to keep silent about Christ. Spinoza answered (Letter 73 [p. 635]) that he held God to be the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things (Part I, Prop. 18 [p. 71]), but did not take God to be a mass of corporeal matter; that the certainty of revelation rests on the wisdom of its teaching, not on miracles, which are ignorance; and that it is not necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh, but only

the eternal wisdom of God, which showed itself most of all in Christ. Oldenburg replied (Letter 74 [p. 637]) that readers thought Spinoza asserted a fatal necessity of all things, and asked about the raising of Lazarus and the Word made flesh; Spinoza's answer (Letter 75 [p. 641]) explains the necessity of all things by the way in which God understands himself necessarily and yet freely, and reads the resurrection as spiritual. Appendix D [p. 667] describes how Don Garrett's case for reading Spinoza as a necessitarian starts from this exchange.

Tschirnhaus and Schuller, 1674–1676 (Letters 57–58, 63–66, 80–83)

Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, born in 1651 into a noble German family, had studied law at Leiden, where he lodged with a medical student, Georg Hermann Schuller; by 1674 both were in Amsterdam, Schuller now a physician who knew Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus was allowed to take a manuscript of the *Ethics* with him when he left for London and Paris, on condition that he show it to no one (Nadler, pp. 260, 349). Schuller served as the go-between, and some of the letters pass through his hands. They raise some of the hardest questions the *Ethics* poses. Letter 57 [p. 619], on free will, prompted Spinoza's Letter 58 [p. 623], with its account of freedom as free necessity and its image of a stone that, set in motion and conscious of its striving, would think itself free. In 1675 Schuller, writing for Tschirnhaus, asked whether we can know attributes other than thought and extension, and for examples of the infinite modes (Letter 63 [p. 627]); Spinoza's answer (Letter 64 [p. 629]) names examples of them, which the *Ethics* does not give. Tschirnhaus then put the question why the mind, if each thing is expressed under infinitely many attributes, perceives only the body (Letter 65 [p. 633]), and Spinoza's short reply (Letter 66 [p. 633]) is the starting point of the discussion of this question in Appendix C [p. 663]. The last exchange, of 1676, concerns whether the variety of bodies can be deduced from extension as Descartes conceived it, and whether more than one property can be deduced from a definition (Letters 80–83 [p. 645]); Spinoza answers that matter is wrongly defined by extension, and promises to explain more clearly 'if life lasts'. He died seven months later.

Epistola VIII

Simon de Vries.

Amice Integerrime,

[G IV 38] Iamdudum exoptavi tibi semel adesse,[ok] sed tempus, magnaque hyems non satis mihi propitia fuerunt. Aliquando de sorte mea queror, quod nobis intercedit spatium, quod nos ab invicem tam longe dividit.
Felix, imo Felicissimus tuus socius Casuarius sub eodem tecto remorans, qui inter prandendum, coenandum, ambulandumque tecum optimis de rebus sermones habere potest.
Quamvis autem corpora ab invicem tam longe divisa sint, animo tamen saepissime praesens adfuisti meo, praesertim tuis in scriptis cum versor, manibusque tracto. Sed cum nobis collegis non omnia satis clara appareant, (ideoque iterum colegii initium fecimus) neque me tui immemorem esse putes, animum ad hasce litteras scribendas appuli.

[G IV 39] Collegium quod attinet, eo instituitur modo: Unus (sed suae cuique vices) perlegit, pro suo conceptu explicat, porroque omnia demonstrat, secundum tuarum propositionum seriem, ac ordinem; tum si accidat, ut alter alteri satisfacere non possit, operae pretium esse duximus, illud annotare, atque ad te scribere, ut, si possibile, nobis clarius reddatur, et duce te contra superstitiose religiosos, Christianosque veritatem defendere, tum totius impetum mundi stare possimus. Quare, cum prius perlegentibus, explicantibusque, definitiones, non omnes nobis clarae videbantur, non idem de natura definitionis iudicium tulimus.

Interim te absente authorem quendam, mathematicum scil., qui Borellus vocatur, consuluimus; ille dum definitionis naturae, axiomatis, et postulati mentionem facit, atque aliorum de ea re sententias adfert.
Ipsius vero sententia sic sonat: Definitiones adhibentur in demonstratione, ut praemissae. Quare necesse est, ut sint evidenter cognitae, alias cognitio scientifica, seu evidentissima ex eis acquiri non potest. alio loco: Non temere, sed maxima cautione eligi debet ratio structurae, aut essentialis passio prima, et notissima alicuius subiecti. Nam si constructio, et passio nominata sit impossibilis, tunc non efficietur definitio scientifica, ut si quis diceret: Duae rectae lineae spatium comprehendentes, vocentur figurales, essent definitiones non entium, et impossibiles; et propterea potius ignorantia, quam scientia ex iis deduceretur. Deinde si constructio, aut passio nominata sit quidem possibilis et vera, sed nobis ignota, aut dubia; tunc bona definitio non erit: Nam conclusiones ab ignoto, et dubio ortae, incertae quoque, et dubiae erunt; et ideo suspisionem, aut opinionem; non autem scientiam certam afferent.

[ok] The original of this letter survives, and Gebhardt prints its text (G IV 38–41), which is followed here. The version printed in the *Opera Posthuma* (OP pp. 459–461, Letter 26 of that edition) is shortened and revised: it leaves out De Vries's complaint about the distance between them and the passage on Casearius, the remark that the group had begun to meet again, and the account of how it worked (Ep8.2, sentences 1–2), which Van Vloten and Land print in square brackets (VVL^3 III 27).

Letter 8

Simon de Vries to Spinoza

Simon de Vries

Most upright friend,

For a long time I have wished to be with you once, but the season and the hard winter have not been kind enough to me. Sometimes I complain of my lot, that there lies between us a distance which separates us so far from one another.

Happy, indeed most happy, is your companion Casearius,[399] who lives under the same roof and can talk with you of the best things at dinner, at supper and on your walks.

But although our bodies are separated so far from one another, you have very often been present to my mind, especially when I am occupied with your writings and have them in my hands. But since not everything appears clear enough to us members of the group[400] (and for this reason we have begun our meetings again), and so that you should not think me forgetful of you, I have set myself to write this letter.

As for the group, it is arranged in this way. One of us (each in his turn) reads the text through, explains it as he understands it, and then demonstrates everything, following the sequence and order of your propositions. Then, if it happens that one cannot satisfy another, we have thought it worth while to note the point and write to you, so that, if possible, it may be made clearer to us, and so that under your guidance we may defend the truth against those who are superstitiously religious and Christian, and withstand the onslaught of the whole world. So, since not all the definitions seemed clear to us when we first read them through and explained them, we did not all form the same judgment about the nature of definition.

Meanwhile, in your absence, we consulted an author, namely a mathematician called Borelli;[401] he, while he mentions the nature of definition, of axiom and of postulate, and brings forward the opinions of others on the subject.

His own opinion runs thus: 'Definitions are used in demonstration as premises. So it is necessary that they should be evidently known; otherwise scientific, or most evident, knowledge cannot be acquired from them.' And in another place: 'The principle of the construction, or the first and best-known essential property of a subject,[402] must be chosen not rashly but with the greatest caution. For if the construction and the property named are impossible, then no scientific definition will be produced; as if someone were to say, *Let two straight lines enclosing a space be called figurals*: these would be definitions of non-beings, and impossible, and so ignorance rather than knowledge would be deduced from them. Next, if the construction or the property named is indeed possible and true, but unknown or doubtful to us, then the definition will not be a good one; for conclusions which arise from what is unknown and doubtful will also be uncertain

[399] Johannes Casearius, born in Amsterdam in 1642, a student of theology at Leiden, who moved into Spinoza's house at Rijnsburg to be taught the philosophy of Descartes (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 231–233). Spinoza's reply, in a passage the 1677 editors left out, warns De Vries not to envy him: see the note at the start of Letter 9 [p. 535].

[400] *collegis*, *collegium*: the circle of Spinoza's friends in Amsterdam who met to read and discuss the drafts of his philosophy that he sent them (Nadler, p. 237). What they were reading was an early version of Part I of the *Ethics*, whose numbering differs from the final text: see the notes on Ep8.3.

[401] Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, author of *Euclides restitutus* (1658), as Van Vloten and Land note (VVL[3] III 28).

[402] *passio*: in the scholastic sense of a property that belongs to a subject, not Spinoza's 'passion'.

A cuius opinione dissentire videtur Tacquet, qui autumat ex falso pronuntiato directe ad veram conclusionem procedi posse, uti tibi notum.
Clavius vero, cuius etiam sententiam introducit, sic sentit: Definitiones sunt artis vocabula, neque opus est, ut ratio afferatur, cur res aliqua hoc aut illo definiatur modo; sed satis esse, ut nunquam res definita asseratur alicui convenire, nisi prius definitionem traditam eidem convenire demonstretur. Ita ut Borellus velit, quod definitio alicuius subiecti debeat constare ex passione sive structura prima, essentiali, nobis notissima, et vera; Clavius non ita, sive prima, sive notissima, sive vera nec ne, nihil refert, modo ne definitionem, quam tradidimus, alicui convenire asseratur, nisi prius definitionem traditam eidem convenire demonstretur.

Nos potius pedibus in sententiam Borelli iremus; utri dominus, an neutri horum concinnat, non bene scimus: Igitur, cum tales de definitionis natura, quae inter principia demonstrationis numeratur, disceptationes variae moventur, et, si animus non vindicatus est ab eius difficultatibus, etiam non de iis, quae de ea deducuntur; magnum nobis esset desiderium, ut dominatio vestra ad nos, multum nimis negotium tibi si non facessamus, perque otium tuum liceat, scriberet, quid ipsa de ea re sentiat, etiam quae est distinctio inter axiomata et definitiones; Borellus vero nullam veram admittit, nisi quoad nomen, sed te aliam ponere credo.

[G IV 40] Porro definitio 3tia nobis non satis constat, in exemplum attuli, quod dominus mihi dixit Hagaecomitis, scil.: quod res duobus modis potest considerari, vel prout in se est, vel prout respectum habet ad aliud, uti intellectus, vel enim potest considerari sub cogitatione, vel ut constans ideis. Sed, quaenam hic esset distinctio, non bene videmus; nam existimamus, quod nos, si cogitationem recte concipiamus, oporteat comprehendere sub ideis, quia remotis ab ea omnibus ideis cogitationem destrueremus. Qua de re, cum exemplum nobis satis clarum non est, manet adhuc res ipsa aliquo modo obscura, et ulteriore explicatione indigemus.

Novissime, in scholio 3tio prop. 8. habetur ab initio, sic scl: Ex his apparet, quod quamvis duo attributa, realiter distincta concipiantur (hoc est unum sine alterius ope) neque ideo ipsa duo entia sive duas diversas substantias constituunt; ratio est, quia de natura substantiae est, ut omnia eius attributa, unumquodque inquam, per se concipiatur, quandoquidem simul in ipsa fuerunt.

Sic dominus videtur supponere, substantiae naturam ita esse constitutam, ut plura possit habere attributa, quod nondum demonstravit, nisi quintam definitionem substantiae absolute infinitae, sive Dei respiceret; alias, si dicam, unamquamque substantiam tantum habere unum attributum, et mihi esset idea duorum attributorum, recte concludere possem, quod ubi duo diversa attributa,

and doubtful, and so will produce suspicion or opinion, but not certain knowledge.'
Tacquet seems to dissent from this opinion, who maintains, as you know, that one can proceed directly from a false statement to a true conclusion.[403]
Clavius, however, whose opinion he also introduces, thinks thus: 'Definitions are terms of art, and there is no need to give a reason why a thing is defined in this way or in that; it is enough that the thing defined should never be asserted to agree with anything unless it is first demonstrated that the definition given agrees with it.' So Borelli holds that the definition of a subject must consist of a property, or construction, that is first, essential, best known to us, and true; Clavius not so: whether it is first, or best known, or true or not, makes no difference, provided that the definition we have given is not asserted to agree with anything unless it is first demonstrated that the definition given agrees with it.
We would rather side with Borelli's opinion; but which of the two you, Sir, agree with,[404] or whether with neither, we do not well know. Since, therefore, such various disputes are raised about the nature of definition, which is counted among the principles of demonstration, and since, if the mind is not freed from its difficulties, it is not freed from those either which concern what is deduced from it, we should very much like you, Sir, to write to us, if we are not giving you too much trouble and your leisure allows, what you think of the matter, and also what the distinction is between axioms and definitions. Borelli admits no true distinction except as to the name; but I believe that you posit another.

Further, the third definition is not clear enough to us.[405] As an example I brought forward what you, Sir, told me at The Hague, namely that a thing can be considered in two ways, either as it is in itself, or as it has a relation to something else; as the intellect, for it can be considered either under thought or as consisting of ideas. But we do not well see what the distinction would be here; for we think that if we conceive thought rightly, we must comprehend it under ideas, since if all ideas were removed from it we would destroy thought. On this account, since the example is not clear enough to us, the matter itself still remains somewhat obscure, and we need a further explanation.
Lastly, at the beginning of the third scholium to Prop. 8 there is this: 'From these things it is apparent that although two attributes are conceived as really distinct (that is, one without the aid of the other), they do not on that account constitute two beings, or two different substances; the reason is that it is of the nature of substance that all its attributes, each one, I say, should be conceived through itself, since they have been in it together.'[406]
So you seem to suppose that the nature of substance is so constituted that it can have several attributes, which you have not yet demonstrated, unless you are referring to the fifth definition,[407] of absolutely infinite substance, or God. Otherwise, if I were to say that each substance has only one attribute, and I had the idea of two attributes, I could rightly conclude that where there are

[403] André Tacquet's *Elementa geometriae planae ac solidae* (Antwerp 1654) has an appendix demonstrating that a truth can be deduced directly from a falsehood (VVL[3] III 28).
[404] *dominus*, *dominatio vestra*: De Vries uses the respectful third person, as in Dutch (*U.E.*), alongside the familiar 'you'.
[405] The draft's third definition, which Spinoza quotes in his reply (Letter 9 [p. 537]), defined substance and attribute together; the final text separates them as Part I, Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 4 [p. 25].
[406] In the final text this is the scholium to Part I, Prop. 10 [p. 39], with small changes of wording.
[407] In the final text the definition of God is Part I, Def. 6 [p. 27].

ibi duae diversae sint substantiae: in quod etiam clariorem explicationem te rogemus.

[G IV 41] Porro gratias ago maximas pro tuis scriptis, mihi a P. Balling communicatis; quae magno me gaudio affecerunt. Sed potissimum scholium prop. 19.; si hic et tibi, in aliquo, quod in mea potestate sit, servire possim, ibi tibi sum, tantum opus, ut me scientem facias. Ego collegium annotomiae inivi, medium fere absolvi, absoluto, incipiam chimicum, sicque suasore te percurram totam medicinam.
Desino, et exspecto responsionem, et a me sis salutatus, qui sum

Tibi addictissimus S. I. de Vries.
Datum Amstelodami die 24 februarii 1663.

Epistola IX

Doctissimo Iuveni
Simoni de Vries

Amice colende,

[G IV 42] Quod ad quaestiones a te propositas attinet.[ol] Video te iis haerere, propterea quod non distinguis inter genera definitionum. Nempe inter definitionem, quae inservit ad rem, cuius essentia tantum quaeritur, et de qua sola dubitatur, explicandam, et inter definitionem, quae ut solum examinetur, proponitur. Illa enim, quia determinatum habet obiectum, vera debet esse; haec vero id non requirit.
Ex. gr. si quis templi Solomonis descriptionem me roget, ipsi veram templi descriptionem tradere debeo, nisi cum ipso cupiam garrire. Sed si ego templum aliquod in mente concinnavi, quod aedificare cupio: ex cuius descriptione concludo me talem fundum, totque millia lapidum, aliorumque materialium emere debere, aliquisne sanae mentis mihi dicet, me male conclusisse, ex eo quod forte falsam adhibui definitionem? vel an aliquis a me exiget, ut meam definitionem probem? Is sane nihil aliud mihi dicit, quam quod id, quod conceperam, non conceperim, vel a me exiget, ut id, quod conceperam, probem, me concepisse, quod sane est nugari.

Quare definitio vel explicat rem, prout est extra intellectum, et tum vera debet esse, et a propositione, vel axiomate non differre, nisi quod illa tantum circa rerum, rerumve affectionum essentias versatur; hoc vero latius, nempe ad aeternas veritates etiam se extendit: Vel explicat rem, prout a nobis concipitur, vel concipi potest, tumque in eo etiam differt ab axiomate et propositione, quod

[ol] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP, Letter 27), as Gebhardt prints it first (G IV 42–46). The original, which he prints after it, addresses the whole group in the plural where the printed text has the singular (*dicitis*, *noluistis*, *adfertis*, *proni estis* for *dicis*, *noluisti*, *adfers*, *pronius es*), and has the opening passage translated in the note to the English.

two different attributes, there are two different substances. On this too we ask you for a clearer explanation.

Further, I thank you very much for your writings, which P. Balling[408] passed on to me, and which delighted me greatly. But above all the scholium to Prop. 19;[409] if here too I can serve you in anything that is in my power, I am at your service; you have only to let me know. I have begun a course in anatomy and am nearly halfway through it; when it is finished I shall begin chemistry, and so, on your advice, I shall go through the whole of medicine.

I stop, and await your reply; and receive my greetings, as from one who is

Yours most devotedly, S. J. de Vries.

Given at Amsterdam, 24 February 1663.

Letter 9

Spinoza to Simon de Vries

To the most learned young man
Simon de Vries

Esteemed friend,

As for the questions you have put to me.[410] I see that you are held up by them because you do not distinguish between the kinds of definition: namely between a definition which serves to explain a thing whose essence alone is sought, and about which alone there is doubt, and a definition which is proposed only in order to be examined. For the former, because it has a determinate object, must be true; the latter does not require this.

For example, if someone asks me for a description of Solomon's temple, I must give him a true description of the temple, unless I want to talk nonsense with him. But if I have devised in my mind some temple which I want to build, and conclude from its description that I must buy such a piece of ground and so many thousand stones and other materials, will anyone of sound mind tell me that I have concluded badly because I have perhaps used a false definition? Or will anyone require me to prove my definition? He would certainly be telling me nothing other than that I have not conceived what I had conceived, or requiring me to prove that I have conceived what I had conceived; which is certainly to trifle.

So a definition either explains a thing as it is outside the intellect, and then it must be true, and must not differ from a proposition, or axiom, except in that the former is concerned only with the essences of things, or of the affections of things, whereas the latter extends more widely, namely to eternal truths as well; or it explains a thing as it is conceived by us, or can be conceived, and then

[408] Pieter Balling, one of Spinoza's close friends among the Amsterdam Collegiants (Nadler, p. 166).

[409] Again the numbering of the draft; which scholium of the final text it became cannot be told from this mention.

[410] The original letter survives (G IV 42–46, second text) and opens with a passage the 1677 editors left out: 'I have received your long-awaited letter, for which, and for your affection towards me, I thank you very much. Your long absence has been no less irksome to me than to you; meanwhile I am glad that my little night-labours are of use to you and our friends, for in this way I speak to you while you are away. There is no reason for you to envy Casearius. For no one is more tiresome to me, nor is there anyone of whom I have taken more care to beware; so I should like you and all our acquaintances to be warned not to communicate my opinions to him until he has reached a more mature age. He is still too much a boy, too little constant to himself, and more eager for novelty than for truth. But I hope that he will correct these childish faults in a few years; indeed, as far as I can judge from his character, I am almost certain of it. So his nature bids me love him' (VVL[3] III 31). On Casearius see Letter 8 [p. 531].

non exigit, nisi ut concipiatur absolute, non ut axioma sub ratione veri. Quare mala definitio illa est, quae non concipitur.

Quod ut intelligatur, Borelli exemplum capiam. Nempe si quis diceret, duae rectae lineae, spatium comprehendentes, vocentur figurales. Si is per lineam rectam, intelligit id, quod omnes per lineam curvam, tum bona est definitio, (per illam enim definitionem intelligeretur figura, ut [figurae], aut similes[om]) modo quadrata, et alias postea non intelligat figuras. Verum si per lineam rectam intelligat id, quod communiter intelligimus, res est plane inconceptibilis, ideoque nulla est definitio. Quae omnia a Borello, in cuius sententia amplectenda pronius es, plane confunduntur.

Aliud exemplum addo, id nempe, quod in fine adfers. Si dicam unamquamque substantiam unum tantum habere attributum, mera est propositio, et eget demonstratione. Si vero dicam per substantiam intelligo id, quod uno tantum attributo constat, bona erit definitio, modo postea entia pluribus attributis constantia alio nomine a substantia diverso insigniantur.

Quod autem dicis, me non demonstrare substantiam (sive ens) plura habere posse attributa, forte ad demonstrationes noluisti attendere. Duas enim adhibui, prima quod nihil nobis evidentius, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo a nobis concipiatur, et quo plus realitatis, aut esse aliquod ens habet, eo plura attributa ei sunt tribuenda. Unde ens absolute infinitum definiendum, etc. Secunda, et quam ego palmariam iudico, est, quod quo plura attributa alicui enti tribuo, eo magis cogor, ipsi existentiam tribuere, hoc est, eo magis sub ratione veri ipsum concipio, quod plane contrarium esset, si ego chymaeram, aut quid simile finxissem.

Quod autem dicis, te non concipere cogitationem, nisi sub ideis, quia remotis ideis cogitationem destruis, credo id tibi contingere propterea, quod dum tu, res scilicet cogitans, id facis, omnes tuas cogitationes et conceptus seponis. Quare non mirum est, quod ubi omnes tuas cogitationes seposuisti, nihil postea tibi cogitandum supersit.
Quod autem ad rem attinet, puto me satis clare, et evidenter demonstrasse, intellectum, quamvis infinitum, ad naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem pertinere. Porro quid hoc ad tertiam definitionem intelligendum faciat, nondum video, nec etiam cur ea moram iniiciat.

[G IV 46] Ipsa enim definitio, ut ipsam, ni fallor, tibi tradidi, sic sonat: Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur, hoc est, cuius conceptus non involvit conceptum alterius rei. Idem per attributum intelligo, nisi quod attributum dicatur respectu intellectus, substantiae certam talem naturam tribuentis. Haec, inquam, definitio satis clare, quid per substantiam, sive

[om] Spinoza draws two small figures here (G IV 44), which are not reproduced.

it differs from an axiom and a proposition in this too, that it requires only that it be conceived absolutely, not, like an axiom, under the aspect of the true. So a bad definition is one which is not conceived.

To make this understood, I shall take Borelli's example: namely, if someone were to say, *Let two straight lines enclosing a space be called figurals*. If by a straight line he understands what everyone understands by a curved line, then the definition is good (for by that definition would be understood figures such as [figures], or similar ones), provided that he does not afterwards understand by it squares and other figures. But if by a straight line he understands what we commonly understand, the thing is entirely inconceivable, and so it is no definition. All these things are completely confused by Borelli, to whose opinion you are more inclined.

I add another example, namely the one you bring forward at the end. If I say that each substance has only one attribute, it is a mere proposition, and needs demonstration. But if I say, *By substance I understand that which consists of only one attribute*, it will be a good definition, provided that afterwards beings consisting of several attributes are designated by another name, different from substance.

As for your saying that I do not demonstrate that substance (or being) can have several attributes, perhaps you did not want to attend to the demonstrations. For I used two. The first: that nothing is more evident to us than that each being is conceived by us under some attribute, and that the more reality, or being, a being has, the more attributes must be attributed to it.[411] Hence a being absolutely infinite must be defined, etc. The second, which I judge the chief one,[412] is that the more attributes I attribute to a being, the more I am compelled to attribute existence to it, that is, the more I conceive it under the aspect of the true; which would be quite the contrary if I had feigned a chimera or something similar.

As for your saying that you do not conceive thought except under ideas, because when the ideas are removed you destroy thought, I believe this happens to you because, while you, a thinking thing, do this, you set aside all your thoughts and concepts. So it is no wonder that when you have set aside all your thoughts, nothing afterwards remains for you to think.

As for the matter itself, I think I have demonstrated clearly and evidently enough that the intellect, even though infinite, pertains to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans*.[413] Further, I do not yet see what this has to do with understanding the third definition, nor why it should hold you up.

For the definition itself, as I gave it to you, if I am not mistaken, runs thus: 'By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, whose concept does not involve the concept of another thing. By attribute I understand the same, except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such a definite nature to substance.'[414] This

[411] In the final text: Part I, Prop. 9 [p. 39] and the scholium to Prop. 10 [p. 39], 'nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute'.

[412] Compare the scholium to Part I, Prop. 11 [p. 43]: 'the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist'.

[413] Part I, Prop. 31 [p. 83], with the distinction drawn in the scholium to Prop. 29 [p. 81].

[414] The draft's third definition. The final text gives substance and attribute separate definitions (Part I, Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 4 [p. 25]), and defines attribute as 'that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence'; the relation to the intellect remains. Appendix B [p. 660] discusses how this relation has been read.

attributum intelligere volo, explicat.
Vis tamen, quod minime opus est, ut exemplo explicem, quomodo una, eademque res duobus nominibus insigniri possit. Sed ne parcus videar duo adhibebo.
Primo dico per Israelem intelligi tertium patriarcham, idem per Iacobum intelligo, quod nomen Iacobi ipsi imponebatur propterea, quod calcem fratris apprehenderat. Secundo per planum intelligo id, quod omnes radios lucis sine ulla mutatione reflectit, idem per album intelligo, nisi quod album dicatur respectu hominis planum intuentis. etc.[on]

Epistola X

Doctissimo Iuveni,
Simoni de Vries

Amice colende,

[G IV 47] Petis a me, an egeamus experientia ad sciendum, utrum definitio alicuius attributi sit vera? Ad hoc respondeo, nos nunquam egere experientia, nisi ad illa, quae ex rei definitione non possunt concludi, ut, ex. gr. existentia modorum: haec enim a rei definitione non potest concludi. Non vero ad illa, quorum existentia ab eorundem essentia non distinguitur, ac proinde ab eorum definitione concluditur.
Imo nulla experientia id unquam nos edocere poterit: nam experientia nullas rerum essentias docet; sed summum, quod efficere potest, est mentem nostram determinare, ut circa certas tantum rerum essentias cogitet. Quare, cum existentia attributorum ab eorum essentia non differat, eam nulla experientia poterimus assequi.

Quod porro petis, anne res etiam, rerumve affectiones sint aeternae veritates? Dico omnino.

Si regeris, cur eas aeternas veritates non voco? respondeo, ut eas distinguam, uti omnes solent, ab iis, quae nullam rem, reive affectionem explicant, ut, ex. gr. a nihilo nihil fit; haec, inquam, similesque propositiones vocantur absolute aeternae veritates, sub quo nihil aliud significare volunt, quam quod talia nullam sedem habent extra mentem etc.[oo]

[on] The Dutch version of 1677 ends the letter with a sentence the Latin lacks (G IV 46): 'I think that with this I have answered your questions. Meanwhile I shall wait to hear your judgment; and if there is anything that you think is not demonstrated well or clearly enough, do not hesitate to point it out to me, etc.'
[oo] The letter survives only in the 1677 edition (OP p. 464, Letter 28), without a date. The questions it answers are not those of Letter 8 [p. 531]; De Vries's letter that put them is lost.

definition, I say, explains clearly enough what I want to understand by substance, or attribute.
You want me nevertheless, though there is no need, to explain by an example how one and the same thing can be designated by two names. But so as not to seem stingy, I shall give two.
First, I say that by Israel is understood the third patriarch; I understand the same by Jacob, the name Jacob having been given to him because he had seized his brother's heel.[415] Second, by plane I understand that which reflects all rays of light without any change; I understand the same by white, except that it is called white in relation to a man looking at the plane, etc.

Letter 10

Spinoza to Simon de Vries

To the most learned young man
Simon de Vries

Esteemed friend,

You ask me whether we need experience to know whether the definition of some attribute is true. To this I answer that we never need experience except for those things which cannot be inferred from the definition of the thing, as, for example, the existence of modes;[416] for this cannot be inferred from the definition of the thing. But not for those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence, and is therefore inferred from their definition.
Indeed no experience will ever be able to teach us this; for experience teaches no essences of things, but the most it can do is to determine our mind to think only about certain essences of things. So, since the existence of the attributes does not differ from their essence,[417] we shall not be able to attain it by any experience.

As for your further question, whether things too, or the affections of things, are eternal truths: I say, certainly.
If you reply, why then do I not call them eternal truths? I answer: to distinguish them, as everyone usually does, from those which explain no thing, or affection of a thing, as, for example, *nothing comes from nothing*; these and similar propositions, I say, are called eternal truths absolutely, by which they mean nothing else than that such things have no seat outside the mind, etc.[418]

[415] Genesis 25:26: וְיָדוֹ אֹחֶזֶת בַּעֲקֵב עֵשָׂו וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ יַעֲקֹב ('and his hand took hold of Esau's heel, and his name was called Jacob'), the name יַעֲקֹב ('Jacob') being heard in עָקֵב ('heel'). The second name is given in Genesis 32:29. (Verses as numbered in the Hebrew; the Vulgate numbers them 25:25 and 32:28.)

[416] Compare Part I, Prop. 24 [p. 75]: the essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

[417] Part I, Prop. 20 [p. 71] and its demonstration: the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence explain at the same time his eternal existence.

[418] Descartes's example in the *Principles of Philosophy* I.49: the proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit* is considered 'not as some existing thing, nor as a mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth which has its seat in our mind', and is called a common notion, or axiom (AT VIII-1 23). Compare the eternal truth of the existence of substance in Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35].

Epistola XII

Viro Doctissimo, atque Expertissimo,
Ludovico Meyer P. M. Q. D.

Amice singularis,

[G IV 52] Duas abs te accepi epistolas,[op] unam die 11 Ianuarii datam, et ab amico N.N. mihi traditam; alteram vero 26 die Martii, et ab amico, nescio quo, Leida missam. Pergratae mihi ambae fuerunt; praecipue, ubi ex iis, omnia tua optime se habere, teque mei saepe memorem intellexi. Porro pro tua erga me humanitate, et honore, quo semper me dignatus es afficere, maximas, quas debeo, ago gratias; simulque precor, ut me tibi non minus addictum credas, quod semper data occasione, quantum mea ferre poterit tenuitas, ostendere conabor. Atque hoc ut incipiam, ad id, quod in tuis epistolis ex me quaeris, respondere curabo.

Petis autem, ut, quae de infinito excogitata habeam, tibi communicem, quod libentissime faciam. Quaestio de infinito omnibus semper difficillima, imo inextricabilis visa fuit, propterea quod non distinxerunt inter id, quod sua natura, sive vi suae definitionis sequitur esse infinitum; et id, quod nullos fines habet, non quidem vi suae essentiae; sed vi suae causae. Ac etiam, quia non distinxerunt inter id, quod infinitum dicitur, quia nullos habet fines; et id, cuius partes, quamvis eius maximum et minimum habeamus; nullo tamen numero adaequare, et explicare possumus. Denique quia non distinxerunt inter id, quod solummodo intelligere, non vero imaginari; et inter id, quod etiam imaginari possumus.

Ad haec, inquam, si attendissent, nunquam tam ingenti difficultatum turba obruti fuissent. Clare enim tum intellexissent, quale infinitum in nullas partes dividi, seu nullas partes habere potest; quale vero contra, idque sine contradictione. Porro etiam intellexissent, quale infinitum maius alio infinito sine ulla implicantia; quale vero non item concipi potest; quod ex mox dicendis clare apparebit.

Verum prius haec quatuor paucis exponam, videlicet substantiam, modum, aeternitatem, et durationem. Quae circa substantiam considerari velim, sunt.
Primo, quod ad eius essentiam pertinet existentia, hoc est, quod ex sola eius essentia, et definitione sequatur eam existere; quod, nisi me mea fallit memoria, antehac tibi viva voce absque ope aliarum propositionum demonstravi. Secundum, et quod ex hoc primo sequitur, est, quod substantia non multiplex; sed unica duntaxat eiusdem naturae existat. Tertium denique, quod omnis substantia non nisi infinita possit intelligi.

[op] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP, Letter 29), as Gebhardt prints it first (G IV 52–62); he also prints a manuscript copy, which begins only at 'Quaestio de infinito' and differs in a number of readings. The date of the letter is given only in the Dutch version: 'Rijnsburg, 20 April 1663'.

Letter 12

Spinoza to Lodewijk Meyer

To the most learned and expert man
Lodewijk Meyer, Doctor of Philosophy and Medicine

My special friend,

I have received two letters from you,[419] one dated 11 January and handed to me by our friend N.N., the other dated 26 March and sent from Leiden by some friend, I do not know whom. Both were very welcome to me, especially since I learned from them that all is well with you and that you often think of me. Further, I give you the greatest thanks I owe for the kindness and honour which you have always deigned to show me; and at the same time I beg you to believe that I am no less devoted to you, which, whenever the opportunity is given, I shall try to show, as far as my slender abilities allow. And to make a beginning, I shall see to answering what you ask of me in your letters.

You ask, then, that I communicate to you what I have thought out concerning the infinite, which I shall most gladly do. The question of the infinite has always seemed to everyone most difficult, indeed inextricable, because they have not distinguished between that which follows to be infinite by its own nature, or by the force of its definition, and that which has no limits, not indeed by the force of its essence, but by the force of its cause.[420] And also because they have not distinguished between that which is called infinite because it has no limits, and that whose parts, though we have its maximum and minimum, we cannot equal or explain by any number. And finally because they have not distinguished between that which we can only understand, but not imagine, and that which we can also imagine.

If they had attended to these things, I say, they would never have been overwhelmed by so great a crowd of difficulties. For they would then have understood clearly what kind of infinite cannot be divided into any parts, or can have no parts, and what kind, on the contrary, can, and that without contradiction. Further, they would also have understood what kind of infinite can be conceived greater than another infinite without any contradiction, and what kind cannot; as will appear clearly from what I am about to say.

But first I shall briefly explain these four: namely substance, mode, eternity and duration. What I should like to be considered concerning substance is this.

First, that existence pertains to its essence, that is, that it follows from its essence and definition alone that it exists; which, if my memory does not deceive me, I demonstrated to you earlier by word of mouth, without the help of other propositions. Second, and following from the first, that substance does not exist as many, but only as one of the same nature. Third, finally, that every substance can only be understood as infinite.[421]

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[419] Lodewijk Meyer, born in Amsterdam in 1629, who took doctorates in philosophy and in medicine at Leiden in 1660 (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 202–203); hence the superscription's *P. M. Q. D.*, *Philosophiae Medicinaeque Doctori*. He wrote the preface to Spinoza's *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy* (1663), and was, more than anyone, responsible for bringing Spinoza's writings to publication, in his lifetime and after his death (Nadler, pp. 202, 233).

[420] The first kind is substance (Part I, Prop. 8 [p. 35]); the second, the infinite modes, which follow from the absolute nature of an attribute and are infinite by the force of their cause (Part I, Props. 21–23 [p. 73]). The three distinctions are taken up again at the end of the letter (Ep12.7).

[421] In the *Ethics*: Part I, Prop. 7 [p. 33], that existence pertains to the nature of substance; Prop. 5 [p. 31] and the second scholium to Prop. 8 [p. 35], that there is only one substance of the same nature; Prop. 8 [p. 35], that every substance is necessarily infinite.

Substantiae vero affectiones modos voco, quorum definitio, quatenus non est ipsa substantiae definitio, nullam existentiam involvere potest. Quapropter, quamvis existant, eos ut non existentes concipere possumus: ex quo porro sequitur, nos, ubi ad solam modorum essentiam; non vero ad ordinem totius naturae attendimus, non posse concludere ex eo, quod iam existant, ipsos postea exstituros, aut non exstituros, vel antea exstitisse, aut non exstitisse. Unde clare apparet, nos existentiam substantiae toto genere a modorum existentia diversam concipere.

Ex quo oritur differentia inter aeternitatem, et durationem; per durationem enim modorum tantum existentiam explicare possumus; substantiae vero per aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem.

[G IV 55] Ex quibus omnibus clare constat, nos modorum existentiam et durationem, ubi, ut saepissime fit, ad solam eorum essentiam; non vero ad ordinem naturae attendimus, ad libitum, et quidem propterea nullatenus, quem eorum habemus conceptum, destruendo, determinare, maiorem minoremque concipere, atque in partes dividere posse: Aeternitatem vero, et substantiam, quandoquidem non nisi infinitae concipi possunt, nihil eorum pati posse; nisi simul eorum conceptum destruamus.

Quare ii prorsus garriunt, ne dicam insaniunt, qui substantiam extensam ex partibus, sive corporibus ab invicem realiter distinctis conflatam esse putant. Perinde enim est, ac si quis ex sola additione, et coacervatione multorum circulorum quadratum, aut triangulum, aut quid aliud, tota essentia diversum, conflare studeat.

Quare omnis illa farrago argumentorum, quibus substantiam extensam finitam esse ostendere philosophi vulgo moliuntur, sua sponte ruit: Omnia enim illa substantiam corpoream ex partibus conflatam supponunt. Ad eundem etiam modum alii, qui postquam sibi persuaserunt, lineam ex punctis componi, multa invenire potuerunt argumenta, quibus ostenderent lineam non esse in infinitum divisibilem.

[G IV 56] Si tamen quaeras, cur naturae impulsu adeo propensi simus ad dividendam substantiam extensam: ad id respondeo, quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipiatur; abstracte scilicet, sive superficialiter, prout ope sensuum eam in imaginatione habemus; vel ut substantia, quod non nisi a solo intellectu fit. Itaque si ad quantitatem, prout est in imaginatione, attendimus, quod saepissime, et facilius fit, ea divisibilis, finita, ex partibus composita, et multiplex reperietur. Sin ad eandem, prout est in intellectu, attendamus, et res, ut in se est, percipiatur, quod difficillime fit, tum, ut satis antehac tibi demonstravi, infinita, indivisibilis, et unica reperietur.

Porro ex eo, quod durationem, et quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur tempus, et mensura; tempus nempe ad durationem; mensura ad quantitatem tali modo determinandam, ut, quoad fieri potest, eas facile imaginemur.

But the affections of substance I call modes, whose definition, insofar as it is not the very definition of substance, can involve no existence.[422] So, even though they exist, we can conceive them as not existing; from which it further follows that, when we attend only to the essence of modes and not to the order of the whole of nature, we cannot conclude from their existing now that they will exist afterwards or will not exist, or that they existed before or did not exist. From this it is clearly apparent that we conceive the existence of substance as entirely different in kind from the existence of modes.

From this arises the difference between eternity and duration; for by duration we can explain only the existence of modes, but that of substance by eternity, that is, the infinite enjoyment of existing, or, in defiance of Latinity, of being.[423]

From all this it is clearly established that when, as very often happens, we attend only to the essence of modes and not to the order of nature, we can determine at will the existence and duration of modes, conceive it as greater or less, and divide it into parts, without thereby in any way destroying the concept we have of them; but that eternity and substance, since they can only be conceived as infinite, can undergo none of these things unless we destroy their concept at the same time.

So those who think that extended substance is put together from parts, or bodies really distinct from one another, are talking utter nonsense, not to say raving. For it is just as if someone were to try, by the mere addition and heaping up of many circles, to put together a square, or a triangle, or something else entirely different in its whole essence.

So that whole jumble of arguments by which philosophers commonly strive to show that extended substance is finite collapses of its own accord;[424] for all of them suppose that corporeal substance is put together from parts. In the same way others too, having persuaded themselves that a line is composed of points, have been able to find many arguments to show that a line is not divisible to infinity.

If, however, you ask why we are so inclined by the impulse of nature to divide extended substance, I reply that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: namely abstractly, or superficially, as we have it in the imagination with the help of the senses; or as substance, which is done only by the intellect. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which is done very often and more easily, it will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts, and many. But if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and the thing is perceived as it is in itself, which is done with great difficulty, then, as I have sufficiently demonstrated to you before, it will be found infinite, indivisible, and unique.[425]

Further, from the fact that we can determine duration and quantity at our pleasure, namely when we conceive the latter abstracted from substance and separate the former from the way in which it flows from eternal things, there arise time and measure: time, namely, for determining duration, and measure for determining quantity, in such a way that we may imagine them easily,

[422] Part I, Def. 5 [p. 25] and Prop. 24 [p. 75]; compare Part I, Ax. 7 [p. 29].

[423] *essendi*, the gerund of *esse*, which classical Latin does not use, hence the apology. On eternity and duration in the *Ethics*, see Part I, Def. 8 [p. 27] with its explanation and Part II, Def. 5 [p. 123].

[424] The arguments, and this reply to them, are set out in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 49], which also uses the comparison with a line composed of points.

[425] Almost word for word in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 51].

Deinde ex eo, quod affectiones substantiae ab ipsa substantia separamus, et ad classes, ut eas quoad fieri potest, facile imaginemur, redigimus, oritur numerus, quo ipsas determinamus. Ex quibus clare videre est, mensuram, tempus, et numerum nihil esse praeter cogitandi, seu potius imaginandi modos.
Quare non mirum est, quod omnes, qui similibus notionibus, et quidem praeterea male intellectis, progressum naturae intelligere conati sunt, adeo mirifice se intricarint, ut tandem se extricare nequiverint, nisi omnia perrumpendo, et absurda etiam absurdissima admittendo.

Nam cum multa sint, quae nequaquam imaginatione; sed solo intellectu assequi possumus, qualia sunt substantia, aeternitas, et alia. Si quis talia eiusmodi notionibus, quae duntaxat auxilia imaginationis sunt, explicare conatur: nihilo plus agit, quam si det operam, ut sua imaginatione insaniat.
Neque etiam ipsi substantiae modi, si cum eiusmodi entibus rationis, seu imaginationis auxiliis confundantur, unquam recte intelligi poterunt. Nam cum id facimus, eos a substantia, et modo, quo ab aeternitate fluunt, separamus; sine quibus tamen recte intelligi nequeunt.

Quod ut adhuc clarius videas, cape hoc exemplum: nempe, ubi quis durationem abstracte conceperit, eamque cum tempore confundendo in partes dividere inceperit, nunquam poterit intelligere,[oq] qua ratione hora ex. grat. transire possit. Nam ut hora transeat, necesse erit, eius dimidium prius transire, et postea dimidium reliqui, et deinde dimidium, quod huius reliqui superest; et si sic porro infinite dimidium a reliquo subtrahas, nunquam ad finem horae pervenire poteris.

Quare multi, qui entia rationis a realibus distinguere assueti non sunt, durationem ex momentis componi, ausi sunt asseverare, et sic in Scyllam inciderunt cupientes vitare Charybdim. Idem enim est durationem ex momentis componere, quam numerum ex sola nullitatum additione.

[G IV 58] Porro cum ex modo dictis satis pateat, nec numerum, nec mensuram, nec tempus, quandoquidem non nisi auxilia imaginationis sunt, posse esse infinitos: Nam alias numerus non esset numerus, nec mensura mensura, nec tempus tempus. Hinc clare videre est, cur multi, qui haec tria cum rebus ipsis confundebant, propterea quod veram rerum naturam ignorabant, infinitum actu negarunt.
Sed quam misere ratiocinati sint, iudicent mathematici, quibus huius farinae argumenta nullam moram iniicere potuerunt in rebus, ab ipsis clare, distincteque perceptis. Nam praeterquam quod multa invenerunt, quae nullo numero explicari possunt; quod satis numerorum defectum ad omnia determinandum patefacit: multa etiam habent, quae nullo numero adaequari possunt; sed omnem, qui dari potest, numerum superant.
Nec tamen concludunt, talia omnem numerum superare ex partium multitudine: sed ex eo, quod rei natura non sine manifesta contradictione numerum pati potest, ut ex. grat. omnes inaequalitates spatii duobus circulis AB et CD interpositi,[or] omnesque variationes, quas materia,

[oq] So Van Vloten and Land (VVL^3 III 41); the digital text of Gebhardt used here reads *unquam*.
[or] Spinoza gives a figure here (G IV 59), which is not reproduced: two circles with different centres, the space between them being widest at AB and narrowest at CD, as the text that follows explains.

as far as can be done.
Next, from the fact that we separate the affections of substance from substance itself and reduce them to classes, so that we may imagine them easily, as far as can be done, there arises number, by which we determine them. From these things it can be clearly seen that measure, time and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining.[426]
So it is no wonder that all who have tried to understand the progress of nature by such notions, and moreover badly understood ones, have entangled themselves so marvellously that in the end they could not extricate themselves except by breaking through everything and admitting even the most absurd absurdities.
For since there are many things which we can attain not by the imagination at all, but only by the intellect, such as substance, eternity and others. If anyone tries to explain such things by notions of this kind, which are merely aids of the imagination, he does nothing more than if he were to take pains to go mad with his imagination.
Nor will the modes of substance themselves ever be rightly understood if they are confused with beings of reason of this kind, or aids of the imagination. For when we do this, we separate them from substance and from the way in which they flow from eternity, without which, however, they cannot be rightly understood.
To see this still more clearly, take this example: when someone has conceived duration abstractly and, confusing it with time, has begun to divide it into parts, he will never be able to understand how an hour, for example, can pass. For for an hour to pass, it will be necessary that half of it pass first, and then half of the remainder, and then half of what is left of this remainder; and if you go on in this way, subtracting half from the remainder to infinity, you will never be able to reach the end of the hour.
So many who are not accustomed to distinguish beings of reason from real ones have dared to assert that duration is composed of moments, and so have fallen into Scylla in their desire to avoid Charybdis. For it is the same to compose duration of moments as to compose number by the mere addition of nothings.

Further, since it is sufficiently evident from what has just been said that neither number nor measure nor time can be infinite, since they are only aids of the imagination: for otherwise number would not be number, nor measure measure, nor time time. Hence it can be clearly seen why many who confused these three with the things themselves, because they were ignorant of the true nature of things, denied the actual infinite.
But how wretchedly they have reasoned, let the mathematicians judge, whom arguments of this sort have been unable to hold up at all in matters clearly and distinctly perceived by them. For besides having found many things which cannot be explained by any number, which sufficiently reveals the inadequacy of numbers for determining everything, they also have many things which cannot be equalled by any number, but surpass every number that can be given.
Yet they do not conclude that such things surpass every number from the multitude of their parts, but from the fact that the nature of the thing cannot admit number without manifest contradiction; as, for example, all the inequalities of the space interposed between the two

[426] Compare the account of how we imagine time in the scholium to Part II, Prop. 44 [p. 195], and of universals and transcendental terms in the first scholium to Part II, Prop. 40 [p. 185].

in eo mota, pati debeat, omnem numerum superant.

[G IV 59] Idque non concluditur, ex nimia spatii interpositi magnitudine: Nam quantumvis parvam eius portionem capiamus, huius tamen parvae portionis inaequalitates omnem numerum superabunt.
Neque etiam idcirco concluditur, ut in aliis contingit, quod eius maximum, et minimum non habeamus: utrumque enim in hoc nostro exemplo habemus, maximum nempe AB, minimum vero CD: Sed ex eo tantum concluditur, quod natura spatii inter duos circulos, diversa centra habentes, interpositi nihil tale pati possit. Ideoque siquis omnes illas inaequalitates certo aliquo numero determinare velit, simul efficere debebit, ut circulus non sit circulus.

[G IV 60] Sic etiam, ut ad nostrum propositum revertar, si quis omnes materiae motus, qui hucusque fuerunt, determinare volet, eos scilicet, eorumque durationem ad certum numerum, et tempus redigendo; is certe nihil aliud conabitur, quam substantiam corpoream, quam non nisi existentem concipere possumus, suis affectionibus privare, et, ut naturam, quam habet, non habeat, efficere.
Quae clare demonstrare hic possem, ut et alia multa, quae in hac epistola attigi, nisi id superfluum iudicarem. Ex omnibus iam dictis clare videre est, quaedam sua natura esse infinita, nec ullo modo finita concipi posse; quaedam vero vi causae, cui inhaerent, quae tamen, ubi abstracte concipiuntur, in partes possunt dividi, et ut finita spectari; quaedam denique infinita, vel, si mavis, indefinita dici, propterea quod nullo numero adaequari queant, quae tamen maiora, et minora possunt concipi; quia non sequitur, illa necessario debere esse aequalia, quae numero adaequari nequeunt, ut ex allato exemplo, et aliis multis satis est manifestum.

[G IV 61] Denique causas errorum, et confusionum, quae circa quaestionem de infinito ortae sunt, breviter ob oculos posui, easque, ni fallor, ita explicui omnes, ut non putem ullam superesse circa infinitum quaestionem, quam hic non attigi, aut quae ex dictis facillime solvi non queat. Quare in his te detinere diutius, operae pretium esse non iudico.

Verum hic obiter adhuc notari velim, quod Peripatetici recentiores, ut quidem puto, male intellexerunt demonstrationem veterum, qua ostendere nitebantur Dei existentiam. Nam, ut ipsam apud Iudaeum quendam Rab Ghasdai vocatum, reperio, sic sonat.
Si datur progressus causarum in infinitum, erunt omnia, quae sunt, etiam causata: Atqui nulli, quod causatum est, competit, vi suae naturae necessario existere: Ergo nihil est in natura ad cuius essentiam pertinet necessario existere. Sed hoc est absurdum: ergo et illud.

circles AB and CD, and all the variations which matter moved in it must undergo, surpass every number.[427]

And this is not concluded from the excessive size of the interposed space. For however small a portion of it we take, the inequalities of this small portion will still surpass every number.

Nor, again, is it concluded, as happens in other cases, from our not having its maximum and minimum; for we have both in this example of ours, the maximum, namely AB, and the minimum, CD. It is concluded only from the fact that the nature of the space interposed between two circles having different centres can admit nothing of the kind. And so, if anyone wanted to determine all those inequalities by some definite number, he would at the same time have to bring it about that a circle is not a circle.

So too, to return to our purpose, if anyone wants to determine all the motions of matter that there have been up to now, namely by reducing them and their duration to a definite number and time, he will certainly be attempting nothing else than to deprive corporeal substance, which we can conceive only as existing, of its affections, and to bring it about that it does not have the nature it has.

I could demonstrate these things clearly here, as well as many others which I have touched on in this letter, if I did not judge it superfluous. From all that has now been said it can be clearly seen that some things are infinite by their nature and cannot in any way be conceived as finite; some by the force of the cause in which they inhere, which however, when they are conceived abstractly, can be divided into parts and regarded as finite; and finally some which are called infinite, or, if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be equalled by any number, which can nevertheless be conceived as greater and less; since it does not follow that things which cannot be equalled by number must necessarily be equal, as is sufficiently manifest from the example given and from many others.

I have now briefly set before your eyes the causes of the errors and confusions that have arisen concerning the question of the infinite, and, unless I am mistaken, I have explained them all in such a way that I do not think any question concerning the infinite remains which I have not touched on here, or which cannot very easily be solved from what has been said. So I do not judge it worth while to detain you longer on these matters.

But I should like it to be noted here in passing that the more recent Peripatetics, as I at least think, have misunderstood the demonstration of the ancients by which they strove to show God's existence. For as I find it in a certain Jew called Rab Ghasdai,[428] it runs thus.

If there is a progression of causes to infinity, all things that are will also be caused; but it belongs to nothing that is caused to exist necessarily by the force of its own nature; therefore there is nothing in nature to whose essence it pertains to exist necessarily. But this is absurd; therefore that is too.

[427] Thirteen years later Tschirnhaus asked how this was to be understood, since mathematicians seem always to argue from the multitude of parts (Letter 80 [p. 645]); Spinoza's reply is Letter 81 [p. 647].

[428] Hasdai Crescas, *Or Adonai* (אוֹר ה', 'Light of the Lord'), I.3.2, the third of the 'roots' of the first treatise: אם שיהיו עלות ועלולים ב"ת או בב"ת אין המלט מהיות עלה אחת לכללם ('whether causes and effects be finite or infinite, there is no escaping that there is one cause of them all'), since if all were caused, all would be possible in themselves and would need something to determine their existence rather than their non-existence; and that is God.

Quare vis argumenti non in eo sita est, quod impossibile sit, dari actu infinitum, aut progressus causarum in infinitum: Sed tantum in eo, quod supponatur, res, quae sua natura non necessario existunt, non determinari ad existendum a re sua natura necessario existenti.[os]

[G IV 62] Transirem iam, quia tempus me festinare cogit, ad secundam tuam epistolam: sed ad ea, quae isthac continentur, commodius, cum dignatus fueris me invisere, respondere potero. Quaeso itaque, si fieri potest, ut quamprimum venias; nam tempus migrandi festinanter accedit. Tantum est. Vale, meique memor vive, qui sum, etc.

Epistola XVIII

Clarissimo viro
B. D. S.
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.

Mi Domine, et amice ignote,

[G IV 79] Iam saepiuscule tuum tractatum,[ot] una cum eius appendice, nuper in lucem editum, attente evolvi. Magis me decebit, ut aliis, quam tibi narrem summam, quam in eo reperi, soliditatem, et quam inde percepi voluptatem: id tamen reticere nequeo, quod, quo frequentius cum attentione eum percurro, eo magis mihi placeat, et continuo aliquid observem, quod antea non animadverteram.

Verumenimvero (ne hac in epistola adulator videar) nolo eius auctorem nimium admirari: Novi, deos omnia laboribus vendere.

Ne autem te in admiratione nimis diu detineam, quis sit, et qui fiat, ut tibi ignotus tanta ad te scribendi libertate utatur, dicam tibi, eum esse, qui desiderio purae, et sincerae veritatis impulsus, in brevi hac et fragili vita pedes suos in scientia, quantum humanum nostrum patitur ingenium, figere studet: quique nullum alium, ad indagandum veritatem, scopum sibi praefixit, quam ipsam veritatem: quique scientia nec honores, nec divitias; sed meram veritatem, tranquillitatemque, tanquam veritatis effectum, sibi acquirere conatur: et qui ex omnibus veritatibus, ac scientiis, nullis magis, quam metaphysicis, si non omnibus, saltem aliqua earum parte se oblectat: et qui omnem suam vitae delectationem in eo collocat, ut horas otiosas, et subcisivas in iis transigat.

Verum nec quivis adeo beatus est, nec tantum adhibet studium, quantum mihi persuadeo, te adhibuisse, et propterea quivis eo perfectionis non pervenit, quo te iam pervenisse, ex opere tuo perspicio. Verbo ut absolvam, is ipse est, quem familiarius cognoscere tibi licebit, si eum tibi tantopere devincire placeat, ut aperias, et quasi perfores haerentes eius cogitationes.

[G IV 80] Sed ad tractatum tuum redeo. Quemadmodum inibi multa inveni, quae summopere

[os] The Dutch version adds: 'and which is a cause, not a thing caused' (G IV 62).

[ot] Blyenbergh and Spinoza wrote to each other in Dutch. The text here is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 473–477, Letter 31), headed *Versio*; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 79–85). The translation follows the Latin; notes give the Dutch where the two differ in sense.

So the force of the argument does not lie in the impossibility of there being an actual infinite, or a progression of causes to infinity, but only in the supposition that things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing which exists necessarily by its own nature.[429]

I would now pass on, since time compels me to hurry, to your second letter; but I shall be able to reply more conveniently to what it contains when you deign to visit me. So I beg you to come as soon as possible, if it can be done; for the time of my moving is fast approaching.[430] That is all. Farewell, and remember me, who am, etc.

Letter 18

Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza

To the most distinguished man
B. D. S.
from Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir, and unknown friend,

I have now quite often read attentively your treatise, together with its appendix, recently published.[431] It would become me better to tell others than you of the very great solidity I found in it and the pleasure I took from it; yet I cannot keep silent about this, that the more often I go through it attentively, the more it pleases me, and I continually notice something I had not observed before.

But truly (lest I seem a flatterer in this letter), I do not wish to admire its author too much: I know that the gods sell everything for labour.

But not to keep you too long in wonder as to who he is, and how it comes about that someone unknown to you takes such liberty in writing to you, I shall tell you that he is one who, driven by the desire for pure and sincere truth, strives in this short and fragile life to set his feet firmly in knowledge, as far as our human understanding allows; who has set himself no other goal in seeking out truth than truth itself; who tries to gain by knowledge neither honours nor riches, but truth alone, and tranquillity as the effect of truth; who, of all truths and sciences, delights in none more than in metaphysics, if not in all of it, at least in some part of it; and who places all the delight of his life in spending his idle and spare hours on these things.

But not everyone is so blessed, nor does everyone apply as much study as I am persuaded you have applied; and therefore not everyone arrives at that degree of perfection which I perceive from your work that you have already reached. To finish in a word: he is the man whom you will be able to know more closely, if it please you to oblige him so far as to open up, and as it were bore through, his halting thoughts.

But I return to your treatise. Just as I found many things in it which were very much to my

[429] Compare Part I, Prop. 28 [p. 79], on the infinite series of finite causes, with its scholium [p. 81] on God's causality of finite things.

[430] Spinoza moved from Rijnsburg to Voorburg in the spring of 1663 (Nadler, p. 239).

[431] The *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy* with the *Metaphysical Thoughts* as its appendix, published in 1663 (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 242–243). Blyenbergh, a grain merchant and broker of Dordrecht, had read only this book, and had trouble telling where Spinoza gave his own views and where Descartes's (Nadler pp. 251–252).

palato arridebant, ita etiam quaedam obtulerunt sese, concoctu difficilia, quaeque mihi tibi ignoto ita obiicere haud aequum foret, eoque magis, quod grata, nec ne haec sint futura, me latet: et haec est causa, cur haec praemittam, et rogem, an liceat, si his vesperis Hiemalibus tempus superfuerit, tibique placuerit, ad meas difficultates, quae mihi in libro tuo adhuc restant, respondere, nonnullas earum transmittere; hac tamen lege, et obtestatione, ne ego rei magis necessariae, tibique magis acceptae impedimento sim: quoniam nihil intensius, iuxta promissa in libro tuo facta, quam latiorem opinionum tuarum explicationem, ac editionem desidero.

Ipse id, quod tandem calamo, et chartae credo, coram salute impertita, praestitissem; quia vero primo tuum hospitium mihi ignotum erat, dein morbus contagiosus, et denique munus meum impediebant, hoc ipsum in aliud, ac aliud tempus dilatum est.

[G IV 81] Ne vero haec epistola plane sit vacua, et quia simul spe ducor, non tibi fore ingratum, unicum tantum tibi proponam: nempe, te passim tam in principiis, quam in cogitatis metaphysicis statuere, sive ut propriam sententiam, sive ut Cartesium, cuius philosophiam docebas, explicares, creare, et conservare unum et idem esse, (quod per se adeo clarum est iis, qui eo suas cogitationes direxerunt, ut etiam prima sit notio) et Deum non modo substantias; sed etiam motum in substantiis creasse, hoc est, Deum non solum substantias in statu suo continua creatione; verum etiam earundem motum, ac conatum conservare.

Deus, verbi causa, non tantum efficit, ut anima, immediata Dei voluntate, atque operatione (perinde est, quomodo id nomines) diutius existat, inque suo perseveret statu; verum etiam causa est, ut tali modo sese ad animae motum habeat:[ou] hoc est, quemadmodum continua Dei creatio efficit, ut res diutius existant, ita quoque conatus, vel rerum motus per eandem causam fit in rebus; quandoquidem extra Deum nulla motus datur causa.
Sequitur igitur, Deum non tantum causam esse substantiae mentis, sed etiam cuiuscunque conatus, vel motus mentis, quem voluntatem nuncupamus, veluti passim statuis: ex qua assertione etiam necessario sequi videtur, vel nil mali in motu, sive mentis voluntate esse, vel Deum ipsum illud malum immediate operari. Nam ea quoque, quae mala appellamus, per animam, et consequenter per eiusmodi immediatum influxum, et Dei concursum fiunt.

Exempli gratia, anima Adami vult edere de fructu prohibito, efficitur ergo, iuxta superius tradita; non tantum ut illa Adami voluntas per Dei influxum velit; sed etiam, quemadmodum statim ostendetur, ut tali modo velit; adeo ut ille Adami prohibitus actus, quatenus Deus non modo voluntatem eius movebat, sed et quatenus eam tali modo movebat, vel in se non sit malus, vel ut Deus ipse illud operari videatur, quod nos malum vocamus.
Nec aut tu aut D. Cartesius hunc nodum solvere videris, dicendo malum esse non ens, cum quo Deus non concurrit: unde enim voluntas edendi, aut: voluntas Diabolorum ad superbiam

[ou] The Dutch (G IV 82) says only that God 'also stands in such a way towards the motion of the Soul'; the Latin version makes him the cause of it.

taste, so also some offered themselves that were hard to digest, which it would hardly be fair for me, as one unknown to you, to put to you thus, the more so since I do not know whether they will be welcome or not; and this is the reason why I send this ahead, and ask whether, if time remains on these winter evenings and it pleases you to answer the difficulties which still remain for me in your book, I may send you some of them; on this condition, however, and with this entreaty, that I should not keep you from anything more necessary or more agreeable to you; since there is nothing I desire more intensely than the fuller explanation and publication of your opinions, in accordance with the promises made in your book.

What I now at last entrust to pen and paper I should myself have done in person, with a greeting; but because, first, your lodging was unknown to me, then the contagious disease,[432] and finally my office prevented me, it has been put off from one time to another.

But so that this letter may not be altogether empty, and since I am led at the same time by the hope that it will not be unwelcome to you, I shall put forward just one thing: namely, that in various places, both in the *Principles* and in the *Metaphysical Thoughts*, whether as your own opinion or in explaining Descartes, whose philosophy you were teaching, you maintain that to create and to preserve are one and the same[433] (which is so clear in itself to those who have turned their thoughts to it that it is even a first notion), and that God has created not only substances but also motion in substances; that is, that God preserves by continual creation not only substances in their state, but also their motion and striving.

God, for example, not only brings it about, by his immediate will and operation (it makes no difference what you call it), that the soul continues to exist and perseveres in its state, but is also the cause that he stands in such a relation to the motion of the soul; that is, just as God's continual creation brings it about that things continue to exist, so also the striving or motion of things comes about in things through the same cause; since outside God there is no cause of motion.

It follows, therefore, that God is the cause not only of the substance of the mind, but also of every striving or motion of the mind, which we call will, as you maintain throughout; and from this assertion it also seems necessarily to follow either that there is no evil in the motion or will of the mind, or that God himself works that evil immediately. For the things which we call evil also come about through the soul, and consequently through such an immediate influence and concurrence of God.

For example, Adam's soul wills to eat of the forbidden fruit; it is brought about, therefore, according to what was said above, not only that this will of Adam wills through God's influence, but also, as will be shown presently, that it wills in such a way; so that this forbidden act of Adam, insofar as God not only moved his will but also moved it in such a way, is either not evil in itself, or God himself seems to work what we call evil.

Nor do you or Mr Descartes seem to untie this knot by saying that evil is a non-being, with which God does not concur:[434] for where, then, did the will to eat, or the will of the devils to pride,

[432] The plague, which in the summer of 1664 was 'scattered generally over the whole country', as an English diplomat reported (Nadler p. 250).

[433] *Principles*, Part I, Ax. 10 (G I 157): 'No less a cause is required to preserve a thing than to produce it in the first place'; *Metaphysical Thoughts* II.10 (G I 269): 'the operation of God in creating the world is the same as in preserving it'; and II.11 (G I 273): God 'continually creates a thing as if anew at each moment'.

[434] Compare the *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15 (G I 172): 'Error is not something positive', with its scholium.

procedebat?
Nam quoniam voluntas (ut recte animadvertis) non sit diversum quid ab ipsa mente; sed sit hic, aut ille motus, vel mentis conatus, tam ad hanc, quam ad illam motionem concursu Dei ei opus erit; iam vero Dei concursus, ut ex scriptis tuis intelligo, nihil aliud est, quam rem per suam voluntatem hoc, vel illo pacto determinare: sequitur, ergo Deum aeque cum mala voluntate, quatenus mala est, ac cum bona, quatenus bona est, concurrere, hoc est, eam determinare. Nam voluntas Dei, quae causa absoluta est omnium, quae existunt tam in substantia, quam in conatu, videtur etiam prima causa esse malae voluntatis, quatenus mala est.

Deinde nulla in nobis fit voluntatis determinatio, quin Deus eam ab aeterno sciverit; alioquin, si nesciverit, in Deo imperfectionem statuimus; sed qui Deus illam aliter sciverit, quam ex suis decretis? Sunt igitur eius decreta nostrarum determinationum causa; et ita rursum sequi videtur, malam voluntatem vel non esse malum quid, vel Deum illius mali causam esse immediatam, et id operari.
Neque hic distinctio Theologorum de differentia inter actum, et malum actui adhaerens locum habere potest: nam Deus cum actum, tum modum actus decrevit, hoc est, Deus non solummodo decrevit, ut Adamus ederet, verum etiam ut necessario contra mandatum ederet. Adeo ut iterum sequi videatur, vel τὸ edere Adami[ov] adversus praeceptum non esse malum, vel Deum ipsum illud operari.

[G IV 84] Haec sunt, vir clarissime, quae in praesentia in tractatu tuo percipere nequeo: extrema namque utrinque statuere durum est. Tale autem responsum a perspicaci tuo iudicio et industria, quod mihi faciat satis, exspecto, et spero me sequentibus meis ostensurum, quantum tibi propterea debeam.
Certo tibi, vir Clar. persuadeas, me haec nulla alia de causa, quam studio veritatis quaerere: liber sum, nulli adstrictus professioni, honestis mercaturis me alo, et tempus, quod mihi reliquum est, hisce rebus impendo. Submisse quoque rogo, ut meae difficultates tibi non sint ingratae; si ad hasce respondere animus est, id quod ardentissime cupio, scribe ad, etc.[ow]

[G IV 85] Guil. de Blyenbergh.
Dordraci 12. Decemb. 1664.

Epistola XIX

Viro Doctissimo, ac Prudentissimo
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh

Amice Ignote,

[G IV 86] Epistolam tuam 12. Decembris datam,[ox] et in alia inclusam, scripta 21. eiusdem

[ov] τὸ ('the'): the Greek article, which makes the infinitive a noun, 'the eating of Adam', as printed in 1677 (OP p. 476). The usage recurs in Letters 19–22; the digital text of Gebhardt transliterates it.
[ow] The Dutch gives the address as the initials 'W. v. B.', and signs with them (G IV 85).
[ox] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 477–481, Letter 32), headed *Versio*. Gebhardt prints Spinoza's Dutch after it (G IV 86–95); it is dated 'Op de Lange bogart den 5 Januarii 1665', and has a closing paragraph and a postscript which the Latin lacks (see the note at the end of the letter).

come from?
For since the will (as you rightly observe) is not something different from the mind itself,[435] but is this or that motion or striving of the mind, it will need God's concurrence as much for the one motion as for the other; and God's concurrence, as I understand from your writings, is nothing other than to determine a thing by his will in this or that way: it follows, therefore, that God concurs with the evil will, insofar as it is evil, just as much as with the good will, insofar as it is good, that is, determines it. For the will of God, which is the absolute cause of everything that exists, both in substance and in striving, seems also to be the first cause of the evil will, insofar as it is evil.
Next, no determination of the will occurs in us without God's having known it from eternity; otherwise, if he did not know it, we ascribe an imperfection to God; but how could God have known it otherwise than from his decrees? His decrees, then, are the cause of our determinations; and so again it seems to follow either that the evil will is not something evil, or that God is the immediate cause of that evil and works it.
Nor can the theologians' distinction between the act and the evil adhering to the act have any place here: for God decreed both the act and the manner of the act; that is, God decreed not only that Adam should eat, but also that he should necessarily eat against the command. So that again it seems to follow either that Adam's eating against the command is not evil, or that God himself works it.

These, most distinguished Sir, are the things which at present I cannot understand in your treatise: for it is hard to maintain either extreme. But I expect from your perspicacious judgment and diligence such an answer as will satisfy me, and I hope to show in my following letters how much I shall owe you for it.
Be assured, most distinguished Sir, that I ask these things for no other reason than the pursuit of truth: I am free, bound to no profession; I support myself by honest trade, and spend the time that remains to me on these matters. I humbly ask, too, that my difficulties may not be unwelcome to you; if you have a mind to answer them, which I most ardently desire, write to, etc.

Willem van Blyenbergh.
Dordrecht, 12 December 1664.

Letter 19

Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh

To the most learned and most prudent man
Willem van Blyenbergh

Unknown friend,

Your letter dated 12 December, enclosed in another written on the 21st of the same month, I

[435] *Metaphysical Thoughts* II.12 (G I 279): 'we have shown clearly that the will is nothing but the mind itself, which we call a thinking thing, that is, an affirming and denying thing'.

mensis, 26. Schiedami demum accepi; unde intensum tuum veritatis amorem, eamque solummodo omnium studiorum tuorum scopum esse, intelligebam: quod me, qui etiam in nihil aliud animum intendo, ut concluderem coegit, non tantum tuam petitionem, nempe ut ad tuas, quas iam mittis, et imposterum mittes quaestiones, pro viribus mei intellectus responderem, plene concedere; verum omnia quoque pro mea parte conferre, quae ulteriori notitiae, sinceraeque amicitiae inservire queunt.
Quantum enim ad me attinet: Nullas ex omnibus rebus, quae in potestate mea non sunt, pluris facio, quam cum Viris veritatem sincere amantibus foedus inire amicitiae; quia credo, nos nihil omnino in mundo, quod nostrae potestatis non est, tranquillius, quam istiusmodi homines, posse amare; quoniam tam impossibile est amorem dissolvere, quem ii erga invicem habent, eo quod amore, quem unusquisque erga veritatis cognitionem habet, fundatus est, quam ipsam veritatem semel perceptam non amplecti. Est insuper summus, ac gratissimus, quae in rebus, quae nostri arbitrii non sunt, dari potest; quandoquidem nulla res, praeter veritatem, diversos sensus, et animos penitus unire valet.
Taceo maximas utilitates, quae inde fluunt, ut rebus, quas procul dubio ipse nosti, diutius te non detineam, quod tamen huc usque feci, quo eo melius ostenderem, quam gratum mihi, et imposterum futurum sit, occasionem nancisci ad meum tibi officium praestandum.
Ut autem praesentem captem, propius accedam, et ad quaestionem tuam respondebo, quae in eo vertitur cardine, nimirum; quod clare videatur sequi, tam ex Dei providentia, quae ab eius voluntate non differt, quam ex Dei concursu, rerumque creatione continua, vel nulla dari peccata, nullumve malum, vel Deum ea peccata, atque illud malum efficere. Verum non explicas, quid per malum intelligas, et quantum ex exemplo de determinata voluntate Adami perspicere licet, videris per malum intelligere ipsam voluntatem, quatenus tali modo determinata conciperetur, vel quatenus Dei mandato repugnaret, et propterea ais, magnam esse absurditatem (ut et ego, si se ita res haberet) alterutrum horum statuere, nempe, Deum ipsum res, quae contra suam voluntatem sunt, operari, vel eas bonas fore, licet voluntati Dei repugnarent.

Quoad me, non possum concedere peccata, et malum quid positivum esse, multo minus, aliquid esse, aut fieri contra Dei voluntatem. Econtra dico, non solum peccata non esse quid positivum; verum etiam affirmo, nos non nisi improprie, vel humano more loquendo dicere posse, nos erga Deum peccare, ut cum dicimus, homines Deum offendere.
Nam, primum quod spectat, novimus quicquid est, in se consideratum sine respectu ad aliud quid, perfectionem includere, quae sese eo usque in quacunque re extendit, quo se extendit ipsa rei essentia: nam essentia etiam nihil aliud est.
Sumo, exempli gratia, consilium, sive determinatam Adami voluntatem ad edendum de fructu prohibito: hoc consilium, sive illa determinata voluntas in se sola considerata tantum perfectionis

received at last at Schiedam[436] on the 26th; and from it I understood your intense love of truth, and that truth alone is the aim of all your studies: which compelled me, who also set my mind on nothing else, to resolve not only to grant your request fully, namely to answer, as far as my intellect allows, the questions which you send now and will send in future, but also to contribute everything on my part that can serve further acquaintance and sincere friendship.

For as far as I am concerned, of all the things which are not in my power I value none more highly than to enter into a bond of friendship with men who sincerely love truth; because I believe that of the things in the world which are not in our power we can love nothing at all with more tranquillity than such men; since it is as impossible to dissolve the love which they have for one another, founded as it is on the love which each has for the knowledge of truth, as not to embrace truth itself once it has been perceived. This love is, moreover, the highest and most pleasing that can be had among things not within our choice; since nothing but truth can unite different opinions and minds completely.[437]

I pass over the very great advantages which flow from it, so as not to keep you longer with things which you doubtless know yourself; which I have nevertheless done so far, the better to show how welcome it is to me, and will be in future, to have the opportunity of doing you a service.

But to seize the present one, I shall come closer and answer your question, which turns on this hinge: that it seems clearly to follow, both from God's providence, which does not differ from his will, and from God's concurrence and continual creation of things, either that there are no sins and no evil, or that God brings about those sins and that evil. But you do not explain what you understand by evil, and as far as one can see from the example of Adam's determinate will, you seem to understand by evil the will itself, insofar as it is conceived as determined in such a way, or insofar as it conflicted with God's command; and therefore you say that it is a great absurdity (as I too would, if the matter stood so) to maintain either of these: namely, that God himself works things which are against his will, or that they would be good although they conflicted with God's will.

For my part, I cannot grant that sins and evil are something positive, much less that anything is or happens against God's will. On the contrary, I say not only that sins are not something positive; I also affirm that we can say only improperly, or speaking in human fashion, that we sin against God,[438] as when we say that men offend God.

For as regards the first point, we know that whatever is, considered in itself without relation to anything else, includes perfection, which in each thing extends as far as the very essence of the thing extends: for essence too is nothing else.[439]

Take, for example, the resolve, or determinate will, of Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit: this resolve, or that determinate will, considered in itself alone, includes as much perfection as it

[436] During the plague Spinoza spent the winter of 1664–1665 at De Lange Boogert, a farm near Schiedam owned by Jacob Simons Gijsen, the father-in-law of Simon de Vries's sister (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 251).

[437] Compare Part IV, Prop. 35 [p. 393]: 'Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature'.

[438] In the *Ethics* sin can be conceived only in a state, where what is good and evil is decided by common consent (Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]).

[439] Compare Part II, Def. 6 [p. 123]: 'By reality and perfection I understand the same thing'.

includit, quantum realitatis exprimit; et hoc inde intelligi potest, nempe, quod in rebus nullam imperfectionem possimus concipere, nisi ad alias res attendamus, quae plus habent realitatis; et propterea in Adami decreto, quando illud in se consideramus, nec cum aliis perfectioribus, perfectioremve statum ostendentibus, comparamus, nullam poterimus invenire imperfectionem; imo cum infinitis aliis comparare respectu illius longe imperfectioribus, uti lapidibus, truncis, etc. licet.

Et hoc quivis revera quoque concedit: nam quilibet res, quas in hominibus detestatur, cumque aversione contemplatur, in animalibus cum admiratione intuetur, uti apum bella, atque columbarum zelotypiam, etc. quae in hominibus spernuntur, et nihilominus ob ea animalia perfectiora iudicamus. Haec cum ita sint, clare sequitur, peccata, quandoquidem ea nil nisi imperfectionem indicant, non posse in aliquo consistere, quod realitatem exprimit, sicuti Adami decreto, eiusque executione.

[G IV 90] Praeterea, neque dicere valemus, Adami voluntatem cum lege Dei pugnare, ac ideo illam esse malam, quia Deo displiceret: nam, praeterquam quod magnam in Deo poneret imperfectionem, si quicquam contra eius voluntatem fieret, sique quid desideraret, cuius compos non fieret, eiusque natura tali modo determinata esset, ut, quemadmodum creaturae, cum his sympathiam, cum illis antipathiam haberet; etiam omnino cum voluntatis divinae natura pugnaret, quia enim illa ab eius intellectu non discrepat, impossibile aeque est, aliquid fieri contra eius voluntatem, ac contra eius intellectum, hoc est, id, quod contra eius voluntatem fieret, talis deberet esse naturae, ut eius etiam intellectui repugnaret, ut quadratum Rotundum.

Quandoquidem ergo voluntas, decretumve Adami, in se spectatum, nec malum, nec quoque proprie loquendo contra Dei voluntatem erat; sequitur Deum eius causam posse, immo, iuxta eam rationem, quam animadvertis, debere esse; non vero quatenus malum erat: nam malum, quod in eo erat, non erat aliud, quam privationis perfectioris status, quem propter illud opus Adamus amittere debebat, et certum est, privationem non esse quid positivum, eamque respectu nostri, non vero Dei intellectus ita nominari.

Hoc autem hinc oritur, quia cuncta eiusdem generis singularia, ea omnia, verbi gratia, quae externam hominum figuram habent, una eademque definitione exprimimus, et idcirco iudicamus, ea omnia aeque apta esse ad summam perfectionem, quam ex eiusmodi definitione deducere possumus; quando autem unum invenimus, cuius opera cum ista pugnant perfectione, tunc id ea privatum esse iudicamus, et a sua natura aberrare, quod haud faceremus, si id ad eiusmodi definitionem non retulissemus, talemque ei naturam affinxissemus. Quoniam vero Deus res nec abstracte novit, nec id genus generales format definitiones, nec plus realitatis rebus competit, quam iis divinus intellectus, et potentia immisit, et revera tribuit, manifesto sequitur, privationem istam solummodo respectu nostri intellectus, non vero respectu Dei dici posse.

[G IV 92] Hisce, mihi ut videtur, quaestio penitus soluta est.

Ut vero viam magis planam reddam, omnemque scrupulum evellam, necesse habeo, ad has duas sequentes quaestiones respondere, nempe primo, quare S. Scriptura dicat Deum flagitare, ut

expresses reality; and this can be understood from the fact that we can conceive no imperfection in things unless we attend to other things which have more reality;[440] and therefore in Adam's decree, when we consider it in itself and do not compare it with other things more perfect or showing a more perfect state, we shall be able to find no imperfection; indeed, we may compare it with countless other things, far less perfect in relation to it, such as stones, tree-trunks, etc.

And this, in truth, everyone also concedes: for everyone looks with wonder, in animals, on things which he detests in men and contemplates with aversion, such as the wars of bees and the jealousy of doves, etc., which are despised in men, and yet on account of them we judge the animals more perfect. Since this is so, it clearly follows that sins, since they indicate nothing but imperfection, cannot consist in something which expresses reality, such as Adam's decree and its execution.

Further, neither can we say that Adam's will conflicts with God's law, and that it is evil because it displeases God: for besides the fact that it would posit a great imperfection in God if anything happened against his will, and if he desired something which he did not obtain, and if his nature were so determined that, like creatures, he had sympathy with some things and antipathy towards others; it would also conflict altogether with the nature of the divine will; for since that does not differ from his intellect, it is as impossible for anything to happen against his will as against his intellect; that is, what happened against his will would have to be of such a nature as to conflict with his intellect too, like a round square.

Since, then, Adam's will or decree, regarded in itself, was neither evil nor, properly speaking, against God's will, it follows that God can be its cause, indeed, by the reasoning which you point out, must be; but not insofar as it was evil: for the evil that was in it was nothing other than the privation of a more perfect state which Adam had to lose because of that deed; and it is certain that a privation is not something positive, and that it is so called in relation to our intellect, not God's.

This arises from the fact that we express all singulars of the same kind, for example all those which have the external figure of men, by one and the same definition,[441] and therefore judge that they are all equally fit for the highest perfection which we can deduce from a definition of that kind; but when we find one whose works conflict with that perfection, we judge that it is deprived of it and departs from its nature; which we would not do if we had not referred it to such a definition and ascribed such a nature to it. But since God neither knows things abstractly nor forms general definitions of that kind, and no more reality belongs to things than the divine intellect and power has put into them and really given them, it plainly follows that this privation can be spoken of only in relation to our intellect, not in relation to God.

With this, it seems to me, the question is entirely solved.

But to make the way smoother and remove every scruple, I must answer the two following questions: first, why Holy Scripture says that God demands that the wicked be converted,[442] and

[440] The account of perfection and imperfection as comparisons in the Preface to Part IV [p. 351].

[441] The same explanation, from universal ideas of a kind, in the Preface to Part IV [p. 351].

[442] For example Ezekiel 33:11: *nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua, et vivat* ('I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live').

se improbi convertant, et etiam quare Adamo prohibuerit ex arbore non edere, cum tamen contrarium conclusisset. Secundo, quod ex dictis meis sequi videatur, improbos superbia, avaritia, desperatione. etc. aeque Deum colere, ac probos generositate, patientia, amore, etc. propterea quod Dei voluntatem exsequuntur.

Ad primum ut respondeam, dico Scripturam, quia plebi praecipue convenit, et inservit, continuo humano more loqui: plebs etenim rebus sublimibus percipiendis inepta est; et haec est ratio, cur mihi persuadeam ea omnia, quae Deus prophetis revelavit ad salutem esse necessaria, legum modo scribi; et hoc pacto integras Parabolas prophetae finxerunt, nempe primo Deum, quia salutis, et perditionis media revelarat, quorumque erat causa, instar Regis, ac Legislatoris adumbrarunt; media, quae nil nisi causae sunt, leges appellarunt, et ad modum Legum conscripserunt; salutem, perditionemque, quae nil nisi effectus sunt, qui necessario ex illis mediis fluunt, tanquam praemium, et poenam proposuerunt, atque iuxta hanc Parabolam magis, quam iuxta veritatem omnia sua verba ordinarunt, Deumque ad instar hominis passim expresserunt, modo iratum, modo misericordem, iam futura desiderantem, iam zelo, et suspicione captum, quin ab ipso Diabolo deceptum; adeo ut philosophi, et simul omnes, qui sunt supra legem, hoc est, qui virtutem, non ut legem; sed ex amore, quia praestantissima est, sequuntur, eiusmodi verbis non debeant offendi.

[G IV 93] Edictum ergo Adamo factum in hoc solummodo consistebat, nempe quod Deus Adamo revelavit, τὸ edere ex illa arbore mortem operari, quemadmodum et nobis per naturalem intellectum revelat, venenum esse mortiferum. Si vero roges, in quem finem hoc ei revelaret? responsum do, ut eum tanto scientia perfectiorem redderet.
Deum ergo interrogare, quamobrem ipsi perfectiorem non dederit voluntatem, est aeque absurdum, ac interrogare, cur circulo omnes globi proprietates non fuerit largitus, uti ex supra dictis perspicue sequitur, et ego scholio prop. 15. Partis primae Princip. Cartes. more geometrico demonstrat. demonstravi.

[G IV 94] Secundam difficultatem quod attinet, verum quidem est, impios Dei voluntatem suo modo exprimere; ideo tamen cum probis nullatenus sunt comparandi: quo enim res aliqua plus perfectionis habet, eo etiam magis de Deitate participat, Deique perfectionem exprimit magis.

Quum ergo probi inaestimabiliter plus perfectionis, quam improbi habeant, virtus eorum cum improborum virtute comparari nequit, eo quod improbi amore divino, qui ex Dei profluit cognitione, et quo solo nos pro humano nostro intellectu Dei servi dicimur, carent. Imo, quia Deum non cognoscunt, non sunt nisi instrumentum in manu artificis, quod inscium servit, et serviendo consumitur; probi contra conscii serviunt, et serviendo perfectiores evadunt.[oy]

[oy] Spinoza's Dutch continues (G IV 95): 'This, Sir, is all I can now bring forward to answer your question. I wish for nothing more than that it may satisfy you. But if you still find difficulty, I ask that I may know it too, to see whether I could remove it. You need not hesitate on your part; as long as you think yourself unsatisfied, I would like nothing better than to know the reason, so that the truth may at last appear. I could wish that I might write in the language in which I was brought up; I could perhaps express my thoughts better; but please take it in good part, and correct the mistakes yourself, and hold me for your devoted friend and servant, B. de Spinoza. At the Lange Bogart, 5 January 1665.' A postscript says that he will stay at the farm three or four weeks more and then return to Voorburg, and asks for letters to be sent there, 'to be delivered in the Kerklaan, at the house of Master Daniel Tydeman, the painter'. The language in which he was brought up was Portuguese (Nadler p. 56).

also why he forbade Adam to eat from the tree[443] when he had nevertheless decreed the contrary. Second, that it seems to follow from what I have said that the wicked worship God by their pride, greed, despair, etc., just as much as the good by their nobility, patience, love, etc., because they carry out God's will.

To answer the first, I say that Scripture, because it is suited chiefly to the common people and serves them, continually speaks in human fashion: for the common people are incapable of perceiving sublime things; and this is the reason why I am persuaded that everything which God revealed to the prophets as necessary for salvation is written in the manner of laws; and in this way the prophets devised whole parables: namely, first, because God had revealed the means of salvation and perdition, and was their cause, they represented him as a king and lawgiver; the means, which are nothing but causes, they called laws and wrote down in the manner of laws;[444] salvation and perdition, which are nothing but effects that follow necessarily from those means, they set forth as reward and punishment; and they ordered all their words more according to this parable than according to the truth, and everywhere depicted God after the likeness of a man, now angry, now merciful, now desiring things to come, now seized by jealousy and suspicion, indeed deceived by the Devil himself; so that philosophers, and with them all who are above the law, that is, who follow virtue not as a law but from love, because it is the most excellent thing, ought not to be offended by words of this kind.

The command given to Adam, then, consisted solely in this: that God revealed to Adam that eating of that tree brought about death,[445] just as he also reveals to us through the natural intellect that poison is deadly. If you ask to what end he revealed this to him, I reply: to make him so much the more perfect in knowledge.

To ask God, therefore, why he did not give him a more perfect will is as absurd as to ask why he did not bestow on the circle all the properties of the sphere, as follows clearly from what has been said above, and as I have demonstrated in the Scholium to Prop. 15 of Part I of *Descartes's Principles Demonstrated in the Geometrical Manner*.[446]

As for the second difficulty, it is true indeed that the impious express God's will in their own way; but they are not on that account in any way to be compared with the good: for the more perfection a thing has, the more it also participates in the Deity, and the more it expresses God's perfection.

Since, then, the good have incomparably more perfection than the wicked, their virtue cannot be compared with the virtue of the wicked, because the wicked lack the divine love which flows from the knowledge of God, and by which alone, according to our human intellect, we are said to be servants of God. Indeed, because they do not know God, they are nothing but a tool in the hand of the craftsman, which serves without knowing it and is used up in serving; the good, on

[443] Genesis 2:17.

[444] Developed in the *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 4 (G III 63), where Spinoza says that God revealed to Adam only the evil that would necessarily follow if he ate of the tree, and Adam perceived the revelation as a law.

[445] Compare the reading of the story of Adam in Part IV, Prop. 68, Schol. [p. 443].

[446] *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175): 'God has no more deprived us of a greater intellect, or a more perfect faculty of understanding, than he has deprived the circle of the properties of the globe, and the circumference of those of the sphere'.

Epistola XX

Clarissimo viro
B. D. S.
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.

Mi Domine, et Charissime amice,

[G IV 96] Ubi tua mihi primum tradebatur epistola,[oz] eaque a me cursim evolvebatur, non tantum statim respondere, sed et multa refutare animus erat. Verum quo eam magis volvebam, eo minorem obiectionum materiam inveniebam, et quantum desiderium legendi me ceperat, tantam legendo percepi voluptatem.

Antequam vero ad postulatum accedam, ut nimirum quasdam difficultates solveres, imprimis sciendum est; me duas generales habere regulas, iuxta quas semper studeo philosophari, prior regula est clarus, et distinctus mei intellectus conceptus, posterior est verbum Dei revelatum, vel Dei voluntas. Iuxta priorem amator veritatis, iuxta utramque vero Christianus ut sim philosophus conor; et siquando post longum accideret examen, ut naturalis mea cognitio vel videretur cum hoc verbo pugnare, vel minus bene cum eo convenire, tantum hoc verbum apud me habet auctoritatis, ut conceptus, quos claros esse mihi imaginor, mihi sint potius suspecti, quam ut eos supra et contra illam veritatem, quam in illo libro mihi praescriptam puto, collocarem.

Et quid mirum? nam constanter credere volo, illud verbum esse Dei verbum, hoc est, id provenisse a summo, et perfectissimo Deo, qui plures perfectiones includit, quam ego capere possum; et forte de se ipso, suisque operibus plures voluit perfectiones praedicare, quam ego finito meo intellectu hodie, hodie inquam, percipere queo: fieri enim potest, ut memet operibus meis maioribus perfectionibus privarim; et ideo, si forte ea praeditus essem perfectione, qua actionibus propriis privatus sum, percipere possem omne id, quod in eo verbo nobis proponitur, et docetur, cum sanissimis meae mentis conceptibus congruere; verum quia mihi ipsi suspectus sum, annon continuo errore memet meliore privaverim conditione, et, ut statuis, Princ. Part. 1. Prop. 15. nostra cognitio, licet clarissima, adhuc imperfectionem includat; potius, etiam sine ratione, ad illud verbum inclino, hoc nisus fundamento, quod a perfectissimo prodiit, (hoc quippe iam praesuppono, quia eius probatio hic non haberet locum, vel nimis longa foret) et propterea a me credi debet.

Si iam solo ductu regulae meae primae, exclusa secunda, quasi eam non haberem, aut ea non extaret, de tua epistola iudicarem, multa mihi essent concedenda, ut et concedo, subtilesque conceptus tui essent suspiciendi; secunda vero regula longius a te me dissentire cogit. Verum pro epistolae modo ductu et huius et illius regulae aliquanto latius eos examinabo.

[G IV 98] Primo, iuxta primo positam regulam, rogaveram, quia, secundum tuam positionem,

[oz] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 482–497, Letter 33), headed *Versio*; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 96–125). The 1677 edition prints in italics the words that Blyenbergh takes from the earlier letters and from Spinoza's books; quotation marks mark the verbatim quotations here.

the contrary, serve knowingly, and become more perfect by serving.

Letter 20

Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza

To the most distinguished man
B. D. S.
from Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir, and dearest friend,

When your letter was first handed to me and I ran through it hastily, I had a mind not only to answer at once but also to refute many things. But the more I turned it over, the less matter for objections I found, and as great as the desire to read it that had seized me, so great was the pleasure I took in reading it.

But before I come to my request, namely that you should resolve certain difficulties, you must know first of all that I have two general rules according to which I always try to philosophize:[447] the first rule is the clear and distinct conception of my intellect, the second is the revealed word of God, or the will of God. According to the first I try to be a lover of truth, but according to both a Christian philosopher; and if it should ever happen, after long examination, that my natural knowledge seemed either to conflict with this word or to agree with it less well, this word has so much authority with me that the concepts which I imagine to be clear are rather suspect to me than that I should place them above and against the truth which I think is prescribed to me in that book.

And what wonder? For I wish to believe constantly that this word is the word of God, that is, that it has come from the highest and most perfect God, who includes more perfections than I can grasp; and perhaps he willed to declare more perfections of himself and his works than I can perceive today, today, I say, with my finite intellect: for it may be that I have deprived myself by my works of greater perfections; and therefore, if I were perhaps endowed with the perfection of which I have been deprived by my own actions, I could perceive that everything which is set before us and taught in that word agrees with the soundest concepts of my mind; but because I am suspicious of myself, whether I have not deprived myself of a better condition by continual error, and since, as you maintain in the *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, our knowledge, however clear, still includes imperfection, I incline rather to that word, even without reason, relying on this foundation: that it has come from the most perfect being (this indeed I now presuppose, because its proof would have no place here, or would be too long), and therefore must be believed by me. If I were now to judge your letter by the guidance of my first rule alone, the second excluded, as if I did not have it or it did not exist, I should have to grant many things, as I do grant them, and your subtle concepts would have to be admired; but the second rule compels me to disagree with you more widely. But as far as a letter allows I shall examine them somewhat more fully under the guidance of both the one rule and the other.

First, according to the first rule laid down, I had asked[448] whether, since according to your

[447] Spinoza answers this at the start of his reply (Letter 21 [p. 583]): with the second rule, he says, they disagree about first principles themselves (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 253).
[448] In Letter 18 [p. 551].

creare, et conservare unum, idemque erant, et quia Deus non tantum res; sed motus quoque, et rerum modos in statu suo perseverare faciebat, hoc est, cum iis concurrebat; annon videretur sequi, nullum esse malum, aut, ipsum Deum malum operari; hac nixus regula, quod nihil contra Dei voluntatem potest fieri, alioquin involveret imperfectionem, aut res, quas Deus operatur, (quibus etiam res, quas malas dicimus, comprehensae videntur) etiam deberent malae esse. Verum quia et hoc contradictionem includit, et, quocunque eam verterem modo, me a contradictione statuenda liberare non possem, propterea me ad te recipiebam, utpote optimum tuorum conceptuum interpretem.

In responsione dicis, te persistere in prima sententia, nempe nihil contra Dei voluntatem vel fieri, vel posse fieri: Verum quum huic difficultati respondendum esset, annon igitur Deus nullum faciat malum, negas peccatum quid positivum esse, addisque, non nisi valde improprie dici posse nos in Deum, peccare; et appendicis parte I. Cap. 6. dicis, malum absolutum nullum dari, ut per se est manifestum: Nam quicquid existit, in se consideratum, sine respectu ad aliud quid, perfectionem includit, quae sese semper eo usque in quacunque re extendit, quo se extendit ipsa rei essentia, et propterea evidenter sequitur, peccata, quia ea nihil nisi imperfectionem denotant, non posse in aliquo, quod essentiam exprimit, consistere.

Si peccatum, malum, error, vel quocunque id appelles nomine, nihil aliud est, quam perfectiorem statum amittere, aut eo privari, utique sequi videtur, τὸ existere non quidem malum, aut imperfectionem esse; sed aliquod malum in re existente posse oriri. Nam perfectum per aeque perfectam actionem perfectiore statu non privabitur; sed quidem per id, quod ad aliquod imperfectum, quia concessis nobis viribus abutimur, inclinamus.

Hoc videris non malum; sed bonum minus appellare, quia res in se consideratae perfectionem includunt: deinde, quia rebus, ut ais, non plus essentiae competit, quam divinus intellectus, et potentia eis tribuit, et revera confert; et propterea non plus etiam existentiae in actionibus suis ostendere, quam essentiae accepere, possunt.

Nam si nec plures, nec pauciores possum edere operationes, quam quantum essentiae accepi, nulla perfectioris status privatio fingi potest: si enim nihil contra Dei voluntatem fit, et si solummodo tantum fit, quantum essentiae collatum est, qua via malum, quod melioris conditionis privationem nuncupas, excogitari potest? Quomodo quis per statutum adeo, et dependens opus perfectiorem statum amittere potis est?

Adeo ut mihi persuadeam, Virum clarissimum alterutrum debere statuere, vel aliquod esse malum, vel si minus, nullam esse posse melioris status privationem: Nam nullum esse malum et meliori conditione orbari contradictorium mihi videtur. At dices, per perfectioris status privationem ad minus quidem bonum; sed non ad absolutum malum recidimus; sed (Append. Part. 1. Cap. 3.) me docuisti, non esse de verbis litigandum.

Quare, an id absolutum, nec ne dicendum sit, iam non disputo; sed solum, annon a meliori in peiorem statum delabi apud nos iure peior status, aut status malus dicatur, et dici debeat. At regeres, malus ille status multum adhuc boni continet; ego vero interrogo, annon ille homo, qui

position to create and to preserve were one and the same, and since God made not only things but also the motions and modes of things persevere in their state, that is, concurred with them, it did not seem to follow that there is no evil, or that God himself works evil; relying on this rule, that nothing can happen against God's will, since otherwise it would involve imperfection, or the things which God works (among which the things we call evil also seem to be included) would also have to be evil. But because this too includes a contradiction, and in whatever way I turned it I could not free myself from asserting a contradiction, I had recourse to you, as the best interpreter of your own concepts.

In your reply you say that you persist in your first opinion,[449] namely that nothing either happens or can happen against God's will. But when the difficulty had to be answered whether God then does no evil, you deny that sin is something positive, and add that only very improperly can we be said to sin against God; and in the Appendix, Part I, ch. 6, you say that 'there is no absolute evil, as is self-evident':[450] 'For whatever exists, considered in itself without relation to anything else, includes perfection, which always extends in each thing as far as the very essence of the thing extends; and therefore it evidently follows that sins, because they denote nothing but imperfection, cannot consist in something which expresses essence.'

If sin, evil, error, or whatever name you call it by, is nothing other than to lose a more perfect state, or to be deprived of it, it certainly seems to follow that to exist is not indeed evil or imperfection, but that some evil can arise in a thing that exists. For what is perfect will not be deprived of a more perfect state by an equally perfect action, but by our inclining to something imperfect, because we misuse the powers granted to us.

This you seem to call not evil but a lesser good, because things considered in themselves include perfection; and next because, as you say, no more essence belongs to things than the divine intellect and power attributes to them and really confers; and therefore they can show no more existence in their actions than the essence they have received.

For if I can bring forth neither more nor fewer operations than the essence I have received, no privation of a more perfect state can be feigned: for if nothing happens against God's will, and if only as much happens as there is essence conferred, by what way can evil, which you call the privation of a better condition, be thought up? How can anyone lose a more perfect state through a work so fixed and dependent?

So that I am persuaded that you, most distinguished Sir, must maintain one of two things: either that there is some evil, or, if not, that there can be no privation of a better state: for that there is no evil and that one is bereft of a better condition seem to me contradictory. But you will say that through the privation of a more perfect state we fall back into a lesser good, but not into absolute evil; but you have taught me (Appendix, Part I, ch. 3) that one should not quarrel about words.[451]

Therefore I do not now dispute whether it should be called absolute or not; but only whether falling from a better into a worse state is not rightly called among us, and ought to be called, a worse state, or an evil state. But you will reply that this evil state still contains much good; I,

[449] Letter 19 [p. 553].
[450] *Metaphysical Thoughts* I.6 (G I 247). What follows is pieced together from Letter 19 [p. 553].
[451] *Metaphysical Thoughts* I.3 (G I 242): 'for I am not accustomed to dispute about names'.

per imprudentiam suam in causa fuit, quod perfectiore statu orbatus est, et per consequens nunc minor est, quam antea fuit, malus vocari queat.

[G IV 101] Ut autem antecedens ratiocinium, quia nonnullae circa id supersunt tibi difficultates, declines, affirmas malum quidem esse, et in Adamo fuisse, verum id non esse positivum quid, et respectu nostri, non autem Dei intellectus tale dici, nostrique respectu privationem, (sed tantum quatenus eo optima libertate, quae ad nostram naturam spectat, et in nostra potestate est, nosmet ipsos privamus) Dei vero respectu negationem esse. Hic autem examinemus, an illud, quod malum vocas, siquidem duntaxat nostri respectu malum foret, malum non esset; deinde an malum, ut tu vis, acceptum, Dei respectu tantum negatio dici debeat.

[G IV 102] Ad primum supra aliquo modo videor respondisse: et quamvis concederem, minus alio ente perfectum esse in me nullum ponere posse malum, eo quod meliorem statum a creatore flagitare nequeo, et tantum efficere, ut meus status gradibus differat; non tamen ideo potero concedere, et fateri, si iam imperfectior sum, quam ante fui, eamque imperfectionem mea culpa mihi creavi, me eatenus non tanto peiorem esse;[pa] si, inquam, meipsum, antequam in imperfectionem unquam incideram, considero, et me cum aliis tunc maiore, quam ego praeditis perfectione, comparo, minor illa perfectio non malum; sed secundum gradus minus bonum erit: Si vero me ipsum, postquam perfectiore statu excidi, eoque propria orbatus imprudentia, cum prima mea forma, qua ex manu mei Creatoris prodii, et perfectior eram, comparo, me esse deteriorem, quam antea iudicare debeo: nam non creator; sed ego me ipsum eo redegi; vires enim mihi me ab errore praeservandi, uti et tu fateris, suppetebant.

Quod secundum spectat, nempe an malum, quod statuis consistere in melioris status privatione, quem non tantum Adamus; sed et nos omnes subita, et inordinata nimis actione amisimus, an illud, inquam, respectu Dei mera sit negatio. Ut hoc vero sana mente examinemus, videndum nobis est, quomodo hominem constituas et a Deo ante omnem errorem dependentem facias, et quomodo post errorem eundem hominem constituas.

Ante errorem eum describis, quod non plus ipsi essentiae competit, quam quantum ei divinus intellectus, et potentia tribuit, et revera confert, hoc est, (nisi a mente tua aberrem) quod homo nec plus, nec minus perfectionis potest habere, quam quantum essentiae Deus in ipso posuit: hoc vero est hominem tali modo a Deo dependentem facere, quemadmodum elementa, lapides, herbas, etc. Si autem haec tua sit sententia, quid sibi velint verba Princip. P. 1. Prop. 15. non percipio.

Cum autem voluntas, inquis, libera sit ad se determinandum: sequitur nos potestatem habere facultatem assentiendi intra limites intellectus continendi, ac proinde efficiendi, ne in errorem incidamus. Annon videtur contradictio, voluntatem tam liberam, ut se ab errore possit praeservare, et una a Deo dependentem facere, ut nec plus, nec minus perfectionis queat proferre, quam quantum essentiae Deus ipsi dedit?

Ad secundum, nempe quomodo hominem constituis post errorem, dicis, hominem subita nimis

[pa] So Gebhardt (G IV 102); the 1677 edition (OP p. 485) and Van Vloten and Land (VVL[3] III 73) have *eatenus tanto peiorem* without *non*, which makes Blyenbergh deny what he goes on to assert. Gebhardt explains (G IV 397) that the Latin version, having changed the construction of the Dutch, ought to have added *non*, as Meijer had argued; the Dutch says that he would have to confess that he is so much the worse (G IV 102).

however, ask whether the man who through his imprudence was the cause of his being bereft of a more perfect state, and is consequently now less than he was before, cannot be called evil.

But to evade the preceding reasoning, since some difficulties about it remain for you, you affirm that there is indeed evil, and that it was in Adam, but that it is not something positive, and is so called in relation to our intellect, not God's; and that in relation to us it is privation ('but only insofar as we thereby deprive ourselves of the best freedom, which belongs to our nature and is in our power'[452]), but in relation to God negation. Here, however, let us examine whether what you call evil, if it were evil only in relation to us, would not be evil; and next whether evil, taken as you wish, should be called only negation in relation to God.

To the first I seem to have answered in some way above; and although I would grant that to be less perfect than another being can posit no evil in me, because I cannot demand a better state from the creator, and it only makes my state differ by degrees; yet I shall not on that account be able to grant and confess, if I am now more imperfect than I was before and have created that imperfection for myself by my own fault, that I am not to that extent so much the worse; if, I say, I consider myself before I ever fell into imperfection, and compare myself with others then endowed with greater perfection than I, that lesser perfection will not be an evil but a lesser good according to degree; but if I compare myself, after I have fallen from a more perfect state and been bereft of it by my own imprudence, with my first form, in which I came forth from the hand of my Creator and was more perfect, I must judge that I am worse than before: for not the creator but I myself brought myself to this; for I had the powers to preserve myself from error, as you too confess.

As regards the second: namely whether the evil which you hold to consist in the privation of a better state, which not only Adam but all of us lost by a too sudden and disordered action, whether that, I say, is a mere negation in relation to God. To examine this with a sound mind, we must see how you constitute man and make him dependent on God before all error, and how you constitute the same man after error.

Before error you describe him as having no more essence than the divine intellect and power attributes to him and really confers; that is (unless I mistake your mind), that man can have neither more nor less perfection than the essence God has put in him: but this is to make man dependent on God in the same way as the elements, stones, plants, etc. But if this is your opinion, I do not understand what the words of the *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, mean.

'But since the will', you say, 'is free to determine itself, it follows that we have the power of containing the faculty of assenting within the limits of the intellect, and so of bringing it about that we do not fall into error.'[453] Does it not seem a contradiction to make the will so free that it can preserve itself from error, and at the same time so dependent on God that it can bring forth neither more nor less perfection than the essence God has given it?

As to the second, namely how you constitute man after error, you say that man by too sudden an

[452] *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175), which ends by calling the imperfection of error a privation in relation to man, but in relation to God a negation.

[453] *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 174).

actione, nimirum voluntatem non continendo intra intellectus limites, seipsum perfectiore conditione privare: verum mihi videtur, tibi et hic, et in principiis utraque huius privationis extrema propius fuisse explicanda, quid ante privationem possideret quidque post amissionem perfecti istius status (ut eum appellas) sibi servaret. Dicitur quidem quid perdiderimus; sed non quid retinuerimus Princ. Part. 1. Prop. 15. Tota igitur imperfectio erroris in sola optimae libertatis privatione consistet, quae error vocatur.

Examinemus utcumque hoc ea ratione, qua a te statuitur. Statuis non solum tam diversos cogitandi modos in nobis dari, quorum alios volendi, aliosque intelligendi nuncupamus; sed etiam inter eos talem esse ordinem, ut res non debeamus velle, antequam eas clare intelligamus; affirmas etiam, quod, si voluntatem nostram intra limites intellectus continemus, nunquam errabimus, et quod denique in nostra potestate est voluntatem intra limites intellectus continere.

Cum haec serio mente agito, alterutrum ut verum sit, necessum est; vel omne id, quod ponitur, est fictum, vel Deus eundem ordinem nobis impressit. Si impressit, annon absurdum esset affirmare id sine fine factum esse Deumque, ut ullum ordinem observemus et sequamur, non exigere: nam illud in Deo contradictionem poneret.
Et si ordinem in nobis positum debemus observare, quomodo adeo a Deo dependentes possumus et esse, et manere: si enim nemo nec plus, nec minus perfectionis habet, quam quantum essentiae accepit, et si haec vis ex effectibus debeat cognosci, ille, qui voluntatem suam ultra limites intellectus extendit, non tantum virium a Deo accepit, alioquin eas in effectum deduceret; et per consequens is, qui errat, perfectionem non errandi a Deo non accepit, alias nunquam erraret. Nam secundum te tantum essentiae datum est, quantum perfectionis efficitur.
Deinde si Deus nobis tantum essentiae tribuit, ut eum observare queamus ordinem, ut tu nos eum posse servare affirmas, et si tantum perfectionis producimus, quantum essentiae nacti sumus, qui fit, ut eum transgrediamur, qui, ut eum possimus transgredi ordinem, utque voluntatem non semper intra limites intellectus contineamus.
Tertio, si a Deo tantopere dependeo, ut supra te statuere ostendi, ut nec intra, nec extra limites intellectus voluntatem continere possim, nisi mihi Deus in antecessum tantum dederit essentiae, et sua voluntate prius alterutrum determinaverit: quomodo ergo mihi, si hoc penitius consideremus, voluntatis libertas usu venire potest.
Nonne in Deo contradictionem ponere videtur, nobis praescribere ordinem nostram voluntatem intra limites nostri intellectus continendi, et non praebere tantum essentiae, vel perfectionum, ut eum observemus; et si, iuxta tuam sententiam, tantum perfectionis nobis concessit, nunquam profecto errare possemus: quantum enim essentiae possidemus, tantum perfectionis producere oportet, semperque concessas vires in nostris operationibus ostendere: nostri autem errores sunt argumentum, nos eiusmodi potentiam a Deo ita dependentem (ut statuis) non possidere; adeo ut alterutrum verum esse debeat, vel nos non adeo Deo dependere, vel nos in nobis potentiam non errandi non habere; at potentiam non errandi habemus, prout statuis. Ergo a Deo non adeo dependemus.

action, namely by not containing the will within the limits of the intellect, deprives himself of a more perfect condition; but it seems to me that both here and in the *Principles* you should have explained more closely both extremes of this privation: what he possessed before the privation, and what he kept for himself after the loss of that perfect state (as you call it). We are told indeed what we have lost, but not what we have retained (*Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15): 'The whole imperfection of error, therefore, will consist solely in the privation of the best freedom, which is called error.'[454]

Let us examine this, at any rate, in the way you lay it down. You maintain not only that there are in us such different modes of thinking, of which we call some willing and others understanding, but also that there is such an order between them that we ought not to will things before we understand them clearly; you affirm too that if we contain our will within the limits of the intellect we shall never err, and finally that it is in our power to contain the will within the limits of the intellect.

When I turn this over seriously in my mind, one of two things must be true: either everything that is laid down is feigned, or God has impressed this same order upon us. If he has impressed it, would it not be absurd to affirm that this was done to no purpose, and that God does not require us to observe and follow any order? For that would posit a contradiction in God.

And if we must observe the order placed in us, how can we be and remain so dependent on God? For if no one has more or less perfection than the essence he has received, and if this power must be known from its effects, then he who extends his will beyond the limits of the intellect has not received so much power from God, otherwise he would bring it into effect; and consequently he who errs has not received from God the perfection of not erring, otherwise he would never err. For according to you as much essence has been given as perfection is brought about.

Next, if God has given us so much essence that we can observe that order, as you affirm that we can keep it, and if we produce as much perfection as the essence we have obtained, how does it come about that we transgress it, that we can transgress that order, and that we do not always contain the will within the limits of the intellect.

Third, if I depend on God so much, as I have shown above that you hold, that I can contain the will neither within nor beyond the limits of the intellect unless God has given me so much essence beforehand and has first determined the one or the other by his will: how then, if we consider this more deeply, can freedom of the will fall to me.

Does it not seem to posit a contradiction in God, to prescribe to us the order of containing our will within the limits of our intellect, and not to provide essence or perfection enough for us to observe it; and if, according to your opinion, he has granted us so much perfection, we could certainly never err: for as much essence as we possess, so much perfection we must produce, and always show in our operations the powers granted; but our errors are proof that we do not possess such a power so dependent on God (as you hold); so that one of two things must be true: either we do not depend on God so much, or we do not have in us the power of not erring; but we do have the power of not erring, as you hold. Therefore we do not depend on God so much.

[454] *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175).

Ex dictis iam clare patere videtur, impossibile esse, ut malum aut meliori statu privari respectu Dei esset negatio. Quid enim significat privari, aut perfectiorem statum amittere? nonne est a maiori ad minorem perfectionem, et per consequens a maiori ad minorem essentiam transire; et a Deo in certa mensura perfectionis, et essentiae collocari? nonne est velle, nos alium, praeter sui perfectam notitiam, non posse acquirere statum, nisi aliter decrevisset, ac voluisset?

Fierine potest, ut illa creatura ab omniscio, et summe perfecto ente producta, quod voluit, ut talem essentiae statum retineret, imo, cum qua Deus, ut eam in eo statu retineret, continuo concurrit; ut, inquam, in essentia declinaret, hoc est, in perfectione praeter Dei notitiam minor fieret? Haec res absurditatem involvere videtur.
Annon absurdum est dicere, Adamum perfectiorem amisisse conditionem, et consequenter ineptum fuisse ad eum ordinem, quem Deus in anima eius posuerat, Deumque nullam habere notitiam, qualis, quantaeque perfectionis Adamus iacturam fecerat? Potestne comprehendi, Deum ens aliquod constituere ita dependens, ut non nisi eiusmodi opus produceret, et tum propter illud opus perfectiorem perderet statum: (praeterquam quod eius absoluta esset causa) et tamen nullam eius haberet notitiam?
Concedo inter actum, et malum actui adhaerens dari discrimen; sed vero malum respectu Dei esse negationem superat meum captum. Deum actum scire, eundem determinare, et cum eo concurrere, et tamen malum, quod in illo actu est, eiusque exitum non cognoscere, mihi in Deo impossibile videtur.
Adverte mecum, Deum in actu meo progignendi cum uxore mea concurrere: est enim positivum quid, et per consequens claram eius habet Deus scientiam; verum quatenus eo actu abutor, et cum alterius uxore contra datam fidem, et iusiurandum meum rem habeo, illum actum malum comitatur. Quid iam hic respectu Dei esset negativum? non quod actum progignendi faciam: quatenus etenim is positivus est, cum eodem Deus concurrit. Debet ergo istud malum, quod illum actum comitatur, tantummodo esse, quod ego contra proprium foedus, vel Dei mandatum cum aliena congredior, cum qua non licet.
Iam vero, potestne capi, Deum nostras scire actiones, cum iis concurrere, et tamen ignorare, quacum illam actionem producimus, eo magis quod Deus etiam cum illius foeminae actione, cum qua rem habebam, concurrit? Id de Deo sentire durum videtur. Attende occidendi actum; quatenus est actus positivus, cum eo Deus concurrit; sed vero istius actionis effectum, nempe alicuius entis destructionem, et Dei creaturae dissolutionem anne ignoraret? quasi proprium opus Deo foret incognitum.
(Metuo ne mentem tuam bene percipiam:[pb] Conceptus quippe tui, quam ut tam foedum commitas errorem, perspicaciores sunt) fortasse instabis, eos actus, prout eos pono, mere esse bonos, et nullum eos comitari malum; sed tum, quid malum nuncupes, capere nequeo, quod perfectioris conditionis privationem sequitur; et tum mundus in aeterna, et perpetua poneretur confusione, nosque bestiis similes redderemur. Vide quaeso, quam utilitatem ea sententia mundo conferret.

[G IV 109] Vulgarem hominis descriptionem reiicis, et unicuique homini tantum tribuis per-

[pb] Strictly, *metuo ne … percipiam* means 'I fear that I do perceive'; the sense requires the negative, which the Dutch has: 'ick vreese dat ick hier U E meeninge niet wel moet verstaen' (G IV 109).

From what has been said it now seems clearly evident that it is impossible that evil, or being deprived of a better state, should be a negation in relation to God. For what does it mean to be deprived, or to lose a more perfect state? Is it not to pass from greater to lesser perfection, and consequently from greater to lesser essence, and to be placed by God in a certain measure of perfection and essence? Is it not his willing that we can acquire no other state outside his perfect knowledge, unless he had decreed and willed otherwise?

Can it be that this creature, produced by an omniscient and supremely perfect being which willed that it should retain such a state of essence, indeed, with which God continually concurs in order to keep it in that state, can it be, I say, that it should decline in essence, that is, become less in perfection, without God's knowledge? This seems to involve absurdity.

Is it not absurd to say that Adam lost a more perfect condition, and was consequently unfit for the order which God had placed in his soul, and that God has no knowledge of what kind and how great a perfection Adam had lost? Can it be understood that God should constitute some being so dependent that it could produce no work but such a one, and that it should then lose a more perfect state because of that work (besides the fact that he would be its absolute cause), and yet that he should have no knowledge of it?

I grant that there is a distinction between the act and the evil adhering to the act; but that evil should be a negation in relation to God surpasses my understanding. That God should know the act, determine it and concur with it, and yet not know the evil which is in that act, and its outcome, seems to me impossible in God.

Consider with me: God concurs in my act of begetting with my wife; for it is something positive, and consequently God has clear knowledge of it; but insofar as I misuse this act, and have to do with another man's wife against my given faith and oath, evil accompanies that act. What here would now be negative in relation to God? Not that I perform the act of begetting: for insofar as it is positive, God concurs with it. This evil, then, which accompanies that act, must be only this: that against my own covenant, or God's command, I go with another's wife, with whom it is not lawful.

Now can it be grasped that God knows our actions and concurs with them, and yet does not know with whom we produce that action, the more so since God also concurs with the action of the woman with whom I had to do? It seems hard to think this of God. Consider the act of killing: insofar as it is a positive act, God concurs with it; but would he be ignorant of the effect of this action, namely the destruction of some being and the dissolution of God's creature? As if his own work were unknown to God.

(I fear that I do not perceive your mind well: for your concepts are too perspicacious for you to commit so foul an error.) Perhaps you will insist that these acts, as I put them, are purely good, and that no evil accompanies them; but then I cannot grasp what you call the evil which follows the privation of a more perfect condition; and then the world would be placed in eternal and perpetual confusion, and we should be made like the beasts. See, I pray, what benefit this opinion would bring the world.

You reject the common description of man, and attribute to each man as much perfection

fectionis, quantum Deus ipsi, ut operetur, largitus est. Sed ea ratione mihi videris statuere impios Deum aeque, ac pios, suis operibus colere: Quare? quia utrique perfectiora nequeunt producere opera, quam quantum utrisque essentiae datum est, et suis demonstrant effectibus.
Nec mihi quaestioni satisfacere in secunda responsione videris, dicendo, quo res aliqua plus perfectionis habet, eo etiam magis de Deitate participat, Deique perfectionem exprimit magis. Quum ergo probi inaestimabiliter plus perfectionis, quam improbi habeant, virtus eorum cum improborum virtute comparari nequit. Improbi, quia Deum non cognoscunt, non sunt nisi instrumentum in manu artificis, quod inscium servit et serviendo consumitur: Probi contra conscii serviunt, et serviendo perfectiores evadunt.

In utrisque tamen hoc verum est, eos amplius non posse operari; quanto etenim plus perfectionis hic prae illo efficit, tanto plus essentiae unus prae alio accepit. Annon igitur exigua sua perfectione impii aeque, ac pii, Deum colunt? Nam, secundum tuam sententiam, nihil amplius ab impiis Deus flagitat, alioquin plus essentiae in eos contulisset; sed vero plus essentiae non dedit, uti ex effectibus liquet. Ergo amplius ab eis non petit.

Et siquando unusquisque in specie, nec plus, nec minus, quam Deus vult, facit, cur is, qui parum operatur, sed tamen tantum, quantum Deus ab ipso exigit, Deo aeque, ac probus, non esset acceptus?
Insuper, quemadmodum per malum, quod actum comitatur, nostra imprudentia, ex tua sententia, perfectiorem perdimus statum, ita et hic videris statuere, quod, continendo voluntatem intra limites intellectus, non tantum adeo perfecti manemus, ac sumus; sed quod praeterea serviendo perfectiores evadimus; quod contradictionem involvere mihi persuadeo, si modo tantopere a Deo dependemus, ut nec plus, nec minus perfectionis queamus efficere, quam quantum essentiae accepimus, hoc est, quam Deus voluit, ut tunc per imprudentiam peiores, aut per prudentiam meliores fiamus. Adeo ut nihil aliud statuere videris, quam, si homo talis sit, ac eum describis, impios suis operibus, aeque, ac pios suis, Deum colere, et hac ratione ita, ut elementa, herbae, lapides etc. a Deo dependentes reddimur.
Cui rei igitur inserviet noster intellectus? cui voluntatem intra limites intellectus continendi potestas? qua de causa ordo ille nobis infixus est? Et vide, quaeso ab alia parte, qua re nos privemus, nempe anxia, et seria meditatione ad nos ipsos secundum regulam perfectionis Dei, et ordinem nobis impressum perfectos reddendum: nosmet precatione, et ad Deum suspiriis, quibus tam saepe extraordinariam confortationem accepisse percepimus, orbamus: nosmet tota religione, ac omni illa spe, et acquiescentia, quam ex precibus, et religione speramus, orbamus.

Enimvero, si nullam mali habet Deus cognitionem, multo minus credibile est, eum malum puniturum. Quaenam ergo supersunt rationes, quo minus facinora quaevis (si modo iudicem effugio) avide perpetrem? cur non detestandis mediis divitias mihi acquiro? cur absque discrimine, et, quo caro nos trahit, id, quod lubet, non perpetro?
Dices, quia virtus propter se est amanda. Qui vero virtutem amare possum? mihi tantum essentiae,

as God has bestowed on him for acting. But in that way you seem to me to maintain that the impious worship God by their works as much as the pious: Why? Because neither can produce more perfect works than the essence given to each, as they show by their effects.
Nor do you seem to me to satisfy the question in your second answer,[455] by saying: 'the more perfection a thing has, the more it also participates in the Deity, and the more it expresses God's perfection. Since, then, the good have incomparably more perfection than the wicked, their virtue cannot be compared with the virtue of the wicked. The wicked, because they do not know God, are nothing but a tool in the hand of the craftsman, which serves without knowing it and is used up in serving: the good, on the contrary, serve knowingly, and become more perfect by serving.'
Yet in both this is true, that they cannot do more; for the more perfection the one brings about compared with the other, the more essence the one has received compared with the other. Do not the impious, then, with their slight perfection, worship God as much as the pious? For according to your opinion God demands nothing more from the impious, otherwise he would have conferred more essence on them; but he has not given more essence, as is clear from the effects. Therefore he does not ask more of them.
And if each one in particular does neither more nor less than God wills, why should he who does little, but yet as much as God requires of him, not be as acceptable to God as the good man?

Moreover, just as through the evil which accompanies the act we lose a more perfect state by our imprudence, according to your opinion, so here too you seem to maintain that by containing the will within the limits of the intellect we not only remain as perfect as we are, but besides become more perfect by serving; which I am persuaded involves a contradiction, if only we depend on God so much that we can bring about neither more nor less perfection than the essence we have received, that is, than God has willed, so that we should then become worse through imprudence or better through prudence. So that you seem to maintain nothing other than that, if man is such as you describe him, the impious worship God by their works as much as the pious by theirs, and in this way we are made dependent on God as the elements, plants, stones, etc. are.
To what purpose, then, will our intellect serve? To what purpose the power of containing the will within the limits of the intellect? For what reason has that order been fixed in us? And see, I pray, on the other side, of what we deprive ourselves: namely, of anxious and serious meditation on making ourselves perfect according to the rule of God's perfection and the order impressed on us; we bereave ourselves of prayer and of sighs to God, by which we have so often perceived that we received extraordinary strengthening; we bereave ourselves of all religion, and of all the hope and contentment which we hope for from prayers and religion.
Indeed, if God has no knowledge of evil, it is much less credible that he will punish evil. What reasons, then, remain why I should not eagerly commit any crimes (if only I escape the judge)? Why should I not acquire riches by detestable means? Why should I not do whatever I please, without distinction, wherever the flesh draws us?
You will say: because virtue is to be loved for its own sake.[456] But how can I love virtue? So much

[455] Letter 19 [p. 559].
[456] Spinoza answers in Letter 21 [p. 589]. Compare Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]: 'virtue is to be wanted for its own sake', and Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523].

ac perfectionis non est tributum; et si tantum acquiescentiae, et ex hoc et ex illo habere licet, cur mihi vim, ut voluntatem intra limites intellectus contineam, infero? cur id non facio, quo me affectus trahunt? cur non hominem, qui mihi alicubi obest, clam occido? etc.

Ecce quam cunctis impiis, et impietati demus occasionem? nos truncis, omnesque nostras actiones motibus horologiorum similes reddimus.
Ex dictis valde durum mihi videtur, quod improprie tantum in Deum peccare possimus dici: cui enim rei data nobis voluntatem intra limites intellectus continendi potentia inservit, si, ubi eam transgredimur, contra eum peccamus ordinem? Regeres forte, id non esse peccatum in Deum; sed in nos ipsos: nam si proprie erga Deum peccare diceremur, etiam dicendum esset, aliquid contra Dei voluntatem fieri; quod iuxta te est impossibile: Ergo etiam peccatum.

Interim alterutrum verum sit necesse est, Deum vel velle, vel nolle. Si vult, quomodo nostri respectu malum esse potest? Si non vult, id, ex tua opinione, non fieret. Quamvis autem hoc aliquam, ut tua fert sententia, involveret absurditatem, praedictas tamen absurditates admittere periculosissimum videtur. Quis novit, si anxie inquirerem, annon remedium posset inveniri his aliquo modo conciliandis.

[G IV 113] Atque sic tuae epistolae examen iuxta regulam meam primam generalem finiam: antequam vero ad examen iuxta secundam regulam accedam, duo adhuc proponam, quae epistolam tuam spectant, quaeque scripsisti Princ. Part. 1. Prop. 15 prius est, quod affirmas, nos potestatem volendi, et iudicandi intra limites intellectus retinere posse: quod absolute concedere nequeo.
Nam hoc si foret verum, certe ex innumerabilibus vel unus reperiretur homo, qui se ea praeditum potestate ostenderet: etiam quivis apud se experiri potest, se quantas etiam impendat vires, eum scopum attingere non posse. Et si quis de hoc negotio dubitat, seipsum examinet, quoties invito intellectu passiones rationem suam vincant, etiam tum quum summis obnititur viribus.

At dices, quod hoc minus praestamus, non est, quia nobis impossibile est; sed quia sufficientem non adhibemus diligentiam; regero, quod, si hoc possibile esset, saltem ex tot millibus vel unus inveniretur; sed ne unus omnium hominum exstitit, vel existit, qui auderet gloriari, se in errores haud incidisse. Quaenam vero huius rei certiora, quam ipsa exempla, possunt adduci argumenta? Si pauci essent, unus esset; iam vero quum nullus sit, nulla eius quoque datur probatio.

Instabis et dices; si fieri potest, ut iudicium suspendendo, et voluntatem intra terminos intellectus continendo, semel, ne errem, efficere queo, quare, ubi eandem adhibeo diligentiam, semper id efficere non possem? Respondeo, me videre non posse, nos hodie tantum virium habere, ut in eo semper perseveremus; semel una hora, quando omnes intendo nervos, iter duorum milliarium conficere potis sum, verum semper id praestare non possum; ita me summo studio ab errore semel praeservare possum, sed vires ad id semper praestandum deficiunt.
Clarum mihi videtur, primum hominem, e manu perfecti illius artificis prodeuntem, iis praeditum fuisse viribus; sed (ut in hoc tecum sentio) eum, illis viribus non satis utendo, vel abutendo, statum suum amisisse perfectum ad praestandum, quod antea sui erat arbitrii. Haecque multis rationibus,

essence and perfection has not been given me; and if I may have as much contentment from the one as from the other, why should I do violence to myself to contain the will within the limits of the intellect? Why should I not do what my affects draw me to? Why should I not secretly kill a man who stands in my way somewhere? etc.
See what occasion we give to all the impious and to impiety? We make ourselves like tree-trunks, and all our actions like the motions of clocks.
From what has been said it seems to me very hard that we can be said to sin against God only improperly: for to what purpose does the power given us of containing the will within the limits of the intellect serve, if, when we transgress it, we sin against that order? You will perhaps reply that it is not a sin against God but against ourselves: for if we were said to sin properly against God, it would also have to be said that something happens against God's will; which according to you is impossible: therefore so is sin.
Meanwhile, one of two things must be true: God either wills it or does not will it. If he wills it, how can it be evil in relation to us? If he does not will it, on your opinion it would not happen. But although this, as your opinion has it, would involve some absurdity, it still seems most dangerous to admit the absurdities stated above. Who knows, if I were to inquire anxiously, whether a remedy could not be found for reconciling these in some way.

And so I shall finish the examination of your letter according to my first general rule; but before I come to the examination according to the second rule, I shall put forward two more points which concern your letter and what you wrote in the *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15. The first is that you affirm that we can keep the power of willing and judging within the limits of the intellect: which I cannot grant absolutely.
For if this were true, surely among countless men at least one would be found who showed himself endowed with that power; and anyone can find by experience in himself that, however much force he applies, he cannot reach that goal. And if anyone doubts this matter, let him examine himself, how often, against the will of his intellect, the passions conquer his reason, even when he resists with all his might.
But you will say that our failing to do this is not because it is impossible for us, but because we do not apply sufficient diligence; I reply that if this were possible, at least one out of so many thousands would be found; but not one of all men has existed or exists who would dare to boast that he has not fallen into errors. And what more certain arguments for this can be brought than the examples themselves? If there were a few, there would be one; but now, since there is none, there is no proof of it either.
You will insist and say: if it can happen that by suspending judgment and containing the will within the bounds of the intellect I can once bring it about that I do not err, why could I not always bring it about when I apply the same diligence? I answer that I cannot see that we today have so much strength that we can always persevere in it; once, in one hour, when I strain every nerve, I am able to cover a journey of two miles, but I cannot always do it; so I can once preserve myself from error with the greatest effort, but the strength to do so always is lacking.
It seems clear to me that the first man, coming forth from the hand of that perfect craftsman, was endowed with those powers; but (as I agree with you in this) that by not using those powers enough, or by misusing them, he lost his perfect state for doing what had before been within his

ni nimius essem, firmarem.
Et hoc in negotio omnem Sacrae Scripturae essentiam, quae propterea apud nos in honore esse debet, sitam esse opinor, quoniam nos id, quod tam clare intellectus noster naturalis confirmat, docet: nempe, lapsum ex nostra prima perfectione nostra imprudentia factum esse. Quid igitur istius lapsus emendatione magis necessarium? Atque hominem lapsum ad Deum reducere Sacrae Scripturae unicus quoque est scopus.
Posterius est, Princip. Part. 1. Prop. 15. quod affirmas, res clare et distincte intelligere repugnare naturae hominis, unde tandem concludis, longe melius esse rebus, quamvis confusis assentiri, et libertatem exercere, quam semper indifferentem, hoc est, in infimo gradu libertatis manere.

Quam ut concedam conclusionem, impedit in me obscuritas: nam suspensum iudicium nos in eo statu, in quo a creatore sumus creati, conservat; verum rebus confuse est rebus non intellectis assentiri,[pc] et ita aeque facile vero ac falso assentiri.
Et si (ut D. Des Cartes alicubi docet) eum ordinem in assentiendo non usurpamus, quem Deus inter nostrum intellectum, nostramque voluntatem constituit, nempe ut non nisi clare perceptis assentiamur: quamvis tunc casu in veritatem incidamus, tamen quia verum non eo, quo Deus voluit ordine, amplectimur, peccamus; et per consequens, ut assensus cohibitio nos in statu, in quo a Deo constituti sumus, conservat, ita confusus assensus nostrum statum peiorem reddit; erroris quippe ponit fundamentum, quo perfectum deinceps amittimus statum.
Sed te dicentem audio: nonne praestat, ut nos perfectiores reddamus, rebus licet confusis assentiendo, quam ut non assentiendo semper in infimo perfectionis, et libertatis gradu maneamus? At praeterquam quod hoc negaverimus, et aliquo modo ostenderimus, nos nosmet non meliores; sed deteriores reddidisse; nobis etiam impossibile, et quasi contradictio videtur, Deum cognitionem rerum, ab ipso determinatarum, longius extendere, ac eam, quam nobis dedit; imo Deum tunc absolutam nostrorum errorum causam involvere.

Nec huic contrarium est, quod nos Deum, ut plura in nos conferret, quam contulit, non possumus accusare; quia ad id non tenebatur. Verum quidem est, Deum non teneri, ut plura, quam dedit, daret; sed summa Dei etiam infert perfectio, ut creatura ab ipso procedens nullam contradictionem involveret, prout tum videretur sequi.
Nullibi namque in creata natura, praeterquam in nostro intellectu, deprehendimus scientiam. In quem alium finem ille nobis concessus esset, nisi ut Dei opera contemplaremur et cognosceremus? Et quidnam evidentius sequi videtur, quam quod harmonia inter res cognoscendas, nostrumque intellectum dari debet?
Si tuam epistolam circa ea, quae modo diximus, ad meam secundam regulam generalem examinarem, magis, quam in prima, discreparemus. Mihi namque videtur, (aberranti commonstra viam) te Sacrae Scripturae eam infallibilem veritatem et divinitatem non adscribere, quam ego in ea esse

[pc] So the 1677 edition (OP p. 492) and Gebhardt, evidently for *rebus confuse assentiri est rebus non intellectis assentiri*; the translation gives that sense.

choice. And this I would confirm by many reasons, if I were not being too long.
And in this matter I think the whole essence of Holy Scripture lies, which is why it ought to be held in honour among us, since it teaches us what our natural intellect so clearly confirms: namely, that the fall from our first perfection came about through our imprudence. What, then, is more necessary than the amendment of this fall? And to bring fallen man back to God is also the sole aim of Holy Scripture.
The second is what you affirm in the *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15: that to understand things clearly and distinctly is contrary to the nature of man;[457] from which you finally conclude that it is far better to assent to things, even if confused, and to exercise freedom, than always to remain indifferent, that is, in the lowest degree of freedom.
An obscurity in me prevents me from granting this conclusion: for suspended judgment keeps us in the state in which we were created by the creator; but to assent to things confusedly is to assent to things not understood, and so to assent as easily to the false as to the true.
And if (as Mr Descartes teaches somewhere[458]) we do not use in assenting the order which God has established between our intellect and our will, namely that we assent only to things clearly perceived, then, although we may by chance hit upon the truth, yet because we do not embrace the truth in the order God willed, we sin; and consequently, just as the withholding of assent keeps us in the state in which we were placed by God, so confused assent makes our state worse; for it lays the foundation of error, through which we then lose our perfect state.
But I hear you saying: is it not better to make ourselves more perfect by assenting to things, though confused, than by not assenting always to remain in the lowest degree of perfection and freedom? But besides the fact that we have denied this, and have shown in some way that we have made ourselves not better but worse, it also seems to us impossible, and as it were a contradiction, that God should extend the knowledge of things determined by him further than the knowledge which he has given us; indeed, that God would then be involved as the absolute cause of our errors.
Nor is it contrary to this that we cannot accuse God of not conferring more on us than he has conferred, because he was not bound to do so. It is true indeed that God is not bound to give more than he has given; but God's supreme perfection also implies that a creature proceeding from him should involve no contradiction, as would then seem to follow.
For nowhere in created nature, except in our intellect, do we find knowledge. To what other end would it have been granted us, unless that we should contemplate and know God's works? And what seems to follow more evidently than that there must be harmony between the things to be known and our intellect?
If I were to examine your letter, as regards what we have just said, by my second general rule, we should differ more than under the first. For it seems to me (show the way to one who strays) that you do not ascribe to Holy Scripture the infallible truth and divinity which I am persuaded is in

[457] The *Principles* (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol., G I 175) draws this conclusion only on the supposition 'that it is contrary to man's nature to perceive things clearly and distinctly'.
[458] Descartes, *Meditations* IV (AT VII 60): if I affirm what I do not clearly perceive and it is true, 'I shall indeed hit upon the truth by chance, but I shall not on that account be free of blame, since it is manifest by the natural light that the perception of the intellect must always precede the determination of the will'.

mihi persuadeo. Verum quidem est, quod te credere ais, Deum res Sacrae Scripturae prophetis revelasse; sed modo adeo imperfecto, ut, si factum est, prout tu statuis, in Deo contradictionem involveret.
Si enim Deus suum verbum, ac voluntatem hominibus manifestavit, certum in finem, idque clare iis manifestavit. Si iam prophetae ex illo verbo, quod acceperant, Parabolam finxissent, id Deus vel voluisset, vel noluisset. Si voluisset, ut exin Parabolam fingerent, hoc est, ut ab eius mente aberrarent; Deus istius erroris esset causa, aliquidque quod contrariaretur sibi, vellet. Si noluisset, impossibile erat, ut prophetae inde Parabolam effingerent.

Praeterea credibile est, si supponitur, Deum verbum suum prophetis dedisse, quod ita eis dedit, ut illud accipiendo non erraverint: nam Deus in verbo suo revelando certum finem habere debebat; at sibi finem, ut homines in errorem duceret, proponere nequit: Id enim in Deo esset contradictio. Etiam homo contra Dei voluntatem errare non poterat; nam id, secundum te, fieri nequit.

Praeter haec omnia, de illo summe perfecto Deo credi non potest, eum permittere, ut suo verbo, prophetis dato, ad illud populo explicandum, alius a prophetis tribueretur sensus, quam Deus voluit: Si enim statuimus, Deum prophetis suum concessisse verbum, simul asserimus, Deum modo extraordinario prophetis apparuisse, vel cum iis loquutum fuisse.
Si iam prophetae de hoc tradito verbo Parabolam fingunt, hoc est, alium ei sensum tribuunt, quam, ut tribuerent, voluit, Deus hanc rem eos edocuisset. Est etiam tam respectu prophetarum impossibile, quam respectu Dei contradictio, prophetas alium sensum potuisse habere, quam eos habere voluit Deus.

[G IV 119] Deum suum ita revelasse verbum, uti tu vis, parum probas, nempe eum salutem, et perditionem tantum revelasse, certa eum in finem decrevisse media, atque salutem, ac perditionem non nisi decretorum mediorum effectus esse.
Nam profecto, si prophetae Dei verbum isthoc sensu acceperant, quas rationes, ad alium illi adscribendum sensum, habuissent? Sed et nullam adducis probationem, qua nos, ut hanc tuam supra prophetarum sententiam poneremus, convinceres.
Si vero existimas, hanc esse probationem, quod alioquin illud verbum multas imperfectiones, et contrarietates includeret, dico, hoc duntaxat dici, non vero probari. Et quis novit, si uterque sensus produceretur, uter minores includeret imperfectiones? Denique Enti summe perfecto bene perspectum erat, quid populus caperet, quaeque optima esset methodus, iuxta quam populus institui deberet.

[G IV 120] Quantum ad secundum primae tuae quaestionis membrum attinet, quaeris ex te ipso, quare Deus Adamo, ne ex arbore ederet, cum tamen contrarium decrevisset, edixit; respondes vero, edictum Adamo factum in hoc solo consistere, quod nimirum Deus Adamo revelavit τὸ edere ex arbore mortis esse causam, quemadmodum nobis per naturalem rationem venenum mortiferum esse revelat.
Si statuitur, Deum aliquid Adamo interdixisse, quaenam rationes sunt, quo magis crederem

it. It is true indeed that you say you believe that God revealed the things of Holy Scripture to the prophets; but in so imperfect a manner[459] that, if it happened as you maintain, it would involve a contradiction in God.

For if God has manifested his word and will to men, he has manifested it to a certain end, and clearly. If, then, the prophets had devised a parable from the word they had received, God either willed it or did not will it. If he had willed that they should devise a parable from it, that is, that they should stray from his mind, God would be the cause of that error, and would will something contrary to himself. If he had not willed it, it was impossible for the prophets to devise a parable from it.

Moreover, it is credible, if it is supposed that God gave his word to the prophets, that he gave it to them in such a way that they did not err in receiving it: for God must have had a certain end in revealing his word; but he cannot set himself the end of leading men into error: for that would be a contradiction in God. Nor could man err against God's will; for that, according to you, cannot happen.

Besides all this, it cannot be believed of that supremely perfect God that he would allow a sense other than he willed to be given by the prophets to his word, given to the prophets for explaining it to the people: for if we maintain that God granted his word to the prophets, we assert at the same time that God appeared to the prophets in an extraordinary way, or spoke with them.

If, then, the prophets devise a parable from this word handed down to them, that is, give it a sense other than he willed them to give, God would have taught them this. It is also as impossible with respect to the prophets as it is a contradiction with respect to God that the prophets could have had a sense other than God willed them to have.

That God revealed his word in the way you would have it, namely that he revealed only salvation and perdition, that he decreed certain means to that end, and that salvation and perdition are nothing but the effects of the decreed means, you prove poorly.[460]

For surely, if the prophets had received God's word in this sense, what reasons would they have had for ascribing another sense to it? But you also bring no proof by which to convince us to set this opinion of yours above that of the prophets.

And if you think the proof is that otherwise that word would include many imperfections and contrarieties, I say that this is merely said, not proved. And who knows, if both senses were brought forward, which would include fewer imperfections? Finally, the supremely perfect Being well understood what the people could grasp, and what was the best method by which the people ought to be instructed.

As regards the second part of your first question, you ask yourself why God commanded Adam not to eat from the tree when he had nevertheless decreed the contrary; and you answer that 'the command given to Adam consisted only in this, that God revealed to Adam that eating from the tree was the cause of death, just as he reveals to us by natural reason that poison is deadly'.[461]

If it is maintained that God forbade Adam something, what reasons are there why I should believe

[459] Spinoza had said that the prophets devised parables (Letter 19 [p. 559]).
[460] See Letter 19 [p. 559].
[461] Letter 19 [p. 559].

modum prohibitionis, quem tu adfers, quam quem adducunt prophetae, quibus Deus ipse modum prohibitionis revelavit? Dices, mea prohibendi ratio magis naturalis est, et ideo magis veritati, Deoque conveniens. Sed hoc omne nego.

Nec capio, quod Deus per naturalem intellectum nobis, venenum lethale esse, revelavit; nec rationes video, quibus unquam scirem, aliquid esse venenatum, nisi malos veneni effectus in aliis vidissem, et audivissem. Quod homines, quia venenum non noscunt, inscii edant et moriantur, quotidiana nos docet experientia.
Dices, si homines scirent, id venenum esse, etiam malum id esse, eos non lateret; sed respondeo neminem veneni habere notitiam, aut posse habere; nisi qui vidit, aut audivit, aliquem eius usu damnum sibi dedisse; et si ponimus, nos ad hunc usque diem nunquam audivisse, vel vidisse, aliquem eius usu sibi nocuisse, non tantum nunc quoque ignoraremus; sed et sine metu in proprium damnum id usurparemus, quemadmodum tales veritates indies docemur.

[G IV 121] Quid magis in hac vita candidum atque erectum animum, quam illius perfectae Deitatis contemplatio, delectat? Nam quemadmodum circa perfectissimum versatur, ita etiam perfectissimum, quod in finitum nostrum intellectum cadere potest, involvere debet. Nec mihi in vita quicquam est, quod cum ea mutarem delectatione.
In hac, caelesti instigatus appetitu, multum temporis insumere possum; sed et simul tristitia affici, quando intueor tam multa finito meo intellectui deesse: verum tristitiam sedo spe ea, quam possideo, quae mihi vita charior est, quod posthac existam, et permanebo et eam Deitatem maiori perfectione, quam nunc, intuebor.
Ubi brevem, praetervolantemque considero vitam, in qua singulis momentis mortem exspecto; si deberem credere me finem habiturum, sanctaque illa, et praestantissima cariturum contemplatione, certe omnium creaturarum, quibus cognitio finis sui deest, miserrimus essem. Quippe metus mortis ante obitum miserum me redderet, et post cum plane nihil, et per consequens miser essem, quia divina illa contemplatione privatus essem. Huc vero me tuae videntur ducere opiniones, quod ubi hic esse desino, etiam in aeternum desinam, cum econtra illud verbum, et Dei voluntas consolentur interno suo in anima mea testimonio, quod post hanc vitam in statu perfectiore me aliquando, contemplando summe perfectam Deitatem, oblectabo.

Profecto licet spes ista aliquando falsa esse deprehenderetur, me tamen, dum spero, beatum reddit.
Unicum hoc est, quod precibus, suspiriis, et seriis votis a Deo peto, et petam, (utinam ad id plus conferre liceret!) quamdiu spiritus hos reget artus, ut ipsi placeat, me sua bonitate tam beatum reddere, ut, quando hoc corpus dissolvitur, ens intellectuale ad perfectissimam illam Deitatem contemplandum maneam, et si hoc tantum nanciscor, mihi, quomodo hic credatur, quid invicem persuadeatur, an aliquid naturali intellectu fundetur, et percipi ab eo possit, nec ne, perinde est.

the manner of prohibition which you bring forward rather than the one which the prophets adduce, to whom God himself revealed the manner of prohibition? You will say: my account of the prohibition is more natural, and therefore more in keeping with truth and with God. But all this I deny.
Nor do I grasp that God has revealed to us through the natural intellect that poison is deadly; nor do I see reasons by which I would ever know that something is poisonous, unless I had seen and heard of the bad effects of poison in others. That men, because they do not know poison, eat it unknowingly and die, daily experience teaches us.
You will say that if men knew that it is poison, it would not be hidden from them that it is also evil; but I answer that no one has, or can have, knowledge of poison except one who has seen or heard that someone has done himself harm by using it; and if we suppose that up to this day we had never heard or seen that anyone had harmed himself by using it, not only would we still be ignorant of it now, but we would also use it to our own harm without fear, as we are taught such truths daily.

What delights a candid and upright mind more in this life than the contemplation of that perfect Deity? For as it is concerned with what is most perfect, so it must also involve the most perfect that can fall within our finite intellect. Nor is there anything in my life for which I would exchange that delight.
In it, moved by a heavenly appetite, I can spend much time; but I can also at the same time be affected with sadness when I see how much is lacking to my finite intellect: but I calm the sadness with the hope I possess, which is dearer to me than life, that I shall exist hereafter and remain, and shall behold that Deity with greater perfection than now.
When I consider this short and fleeting life, in which I expect death at every moment, if I had to believe that I would have an end and be deprived of that holy and most excellent contemplation, I would certainly be the most miserable of all creatures, which lack knowledge of their end. For fear of death before my death would make me miserable, and after it I would be altogether nothing, and consequently miserable, because I would be deprived of that divine contemplation. And this is where your opinions seem to lead me: that when I cease to be here, I shall also cease for eternity;[462] whereas, on the contrary, that word and the will of God console me with their inner testimony in my soul that after this life I shall one day delight, in a more perfect state, in contemplating the supremely perfect Deity.
Certainly, though this hope should one day be found false, yet while I hope it makes me blessed.

This is the one thing that I ask and shall ask of God with prayers, sighs and earnest vows (would that I could contribute more to it!), as long as breath shall rule these limbs:[463] that it may please him, in his goodness, to make me so blessed that when this body is dissolved I may remain an intellectual being to contemplate that most perfect Deity; and if I obtain only this, it is all the same to me how it is believed here, what people persuade one another of, whether something is

[462]Nadler quotes this passage as Blyenbergh's perceptive recognition that Spinoza's views make it hard to see how the soul is immortal (*Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 252). Spinoza's own doctrine is in Part V, Props. 21–23 [p. 503] and the scholium to Prop. 34 [p. 513].
[463]Virgil, *Aeneid* IV.336: *dum spiritus hos regit artus*.

Hoc, hoc solummodo est votum meum, meum desiderium, continuaeque preces, ut Deus hanc certitudinem in anima mea confirmet, et, si eam possideo, (ah me miserrimum, si eo destituar!) prae desiderio anima mea exclamet, quemadmodum cervus anhelat aquarum rivos, ita te, o Deus vivens, anima mea desiderat: ah! quando veniet dies, quod tecum ero, et te adspiciam. Si hoc tantum obtineo, omne animae meae studium, et desiderium possideo.
Quia vero nostrum opus Deo displicet,[pd] spem istam, ex tua sententia, non video: Nec intelligo, Deum, (siquidem de eo humano more loqui liceat) si nullam ex opere nostro, et laudatione capit voluptatem, nos produxisse, et conservasse. Si vero a tua sententia aberro, tuam explicationem expeto.
Verum me, et forte te solito diutius moratus sum; quia vero mihi chartam deesse video, finiam. Horum solutionem videre aveo. Forte hic illic aliquam ex epistola tua eduxi conclusionem, quae fortassis tua non erit opinio; sed super ea re explicationem tuam audire cupio.

[G IV 124] Nuper occupatus fui in quibusdam Dei attributis perpendendis, in quo me tua non parum iuvit appendix. Mentem tuam solummodo fusius explicui, quae mihi non nisi demonstrationes exhibere videtur, et ideo demiror in praefatione affirmari, te illa non sentire; sed obligatum fuisse, ut ita tuum, uti promiseras, Cartesii philosophiam discipulum doceres; et te longe aliam, tam de Deo, quam de anima, speciatim de animae voluntate fovere opinionem: video quoque in illa praefatione dici, te haec cogitata metaphysica brevi prolixiora editurum, quae duo avide desidero: nam de iis aliquid singulare spero.

Mea autem non fert consuetudo aliquem laudibus extollere. Scripsi haec sincero animo, et amicitia non fucata, prout in epistola tua petiisti, utque veritas detegeretur. Excusa nimiam, praeter intentionem, prolixitatem. Si ad has responderis, me tibi summopere devincies.
Non recuso, si ea lingua, in qua educatus sum, scribere animus est, vel alia, modo Latina, aut Gallica sit; hoc vero responsum, ut eadem exares lingua, peto, quia mentem tuam in ea bene, quod forte in lingua Latina non fieret, percipiebam.
Ita me tibi devincies, egoque ero, ac permanebo, Mi Domine, tibi addictissimus atque officiosissimus,

G. de Blyenbergh.
Dordraci 16. Ianuarii 1665.

[G IV 125] In responsione tua prolixius,[pe] quid per negationem in Deo intelligas, erudiri exopto.

[pd] The Dutch has 'because our service is not pleasing to God' (G IV 123–124).
[pe] Printed after the date, as a postscript (OP p. 497).

founded on the natural intellect and can be perceived by it or not.
This, this alone, is my vow, my desire and my continual prayer: that God may confirm this certainty in my soul, and, if I possess it (ah, most wretched me, if I should lack it!), that my soul may cry out in longing: As the hart pants after the brooks of water, so my soul longs for thee, O living God:[464] ah! when will the day come that I shall be with thee and behold thee? If I obtain only this, I possess all that my soul strives for and desires.
But since our work displeases God, I do not see this hope on your opinion: nor do I understand that God (if we may speak of him in human fashion) produced and preserved us if he takes no pleasure in our work and praise. But if I stray from your opinion, I ask for your explanation.

But I have detained myself, and perhaps you, longer than usual; and since I see that I am running out of paper, I shall end. I am eager to see the solution of these things. Perhaps here and there I have drawn from your letter some conclusion which will perhaps not be your opinion; but I wish to hear your explanation of it.

I have lately been occupied in weighing certain attributes of God, in which your appendix has helped me not a little. I have merely set out your view more fully, which seems to me to present nothing but demonstrations; and so I am surprised that it is affirmed in the preface[465] that you do not hold these views, but were obliged to teach your pupil Descartes's philosophy as you had promised, and that you hold a very different opinion both of God and of the soul, especially of the soul's will: I see also that it is said in that preface that you will shortly publish these *Metaphysical Thoughts* at greater length, both of which I eagerly desire: for I hope for something singular from them.
But it is not my custom to extol anyone with praises. I have written this with a sincere mind and unfeigned friendship, as you asked in your letter, and so that the truth may be uncovered. Excuse the excessive length, beyond my intention. If you answer this, you will oblige me greatly.
I do not object if you have a mind to write in the language in which I was brought up,[466] or in another, provided it is Latin or French; but this reply I ask you to compose in the same language, because I understood your mind well in it, which perhaps would not happen in Latin.
So you will oblige me, and I shall be and remain, Sir, your most devoted and most dutiful

W. van Blyenbergh.
Dordrecht, 16 January 1665.

In your reply I should like to be taught more fully what you understand by negation in God.[467]

[464] Psalm 42:1–2 (Vulgate 41:2–3): *Quemadmodum desiderat cervus ad fontes aquarum, ita desiderat anima mea ad te, Deus ... quando veniam, et apparebo ante faciem Dei?*
[465] Lodewijk Meyer's preface to the *Principles* (G I 131–132): since Spinoza had promised to teach his pupil Descartes's philosophy, he made it a matter of conscience not to depart from Descartes's opinions by a hair's breadth; many things in it he rejects as false, and holds an opinion far different from them.
[466] Dutch, in which Spinoza had written Letter 19 [p. 559] (see the note there).
[467] Spinoza explains it in Letter 21 [p. 585].

Epistola XXI

Viro Doctissimo, ac Ornatissimo,
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh.

Mi Domine, et amice,

[G IV 126] Quum primam tuam epistolam legebam,[pf] existimabam nostras opiniones fere concordare; sed vero ex secunda, quae 21 huius mensis mihi tradita est, longe aliter se rem habere intelligo, videoque nos non tantum dissentire de iis, quae longe ex primis principiis sunt petenda; sed etiam de eisdem ipsis principiis: adeo ut vix credam fore, ut nos epistolis invicem erudire possimus.

Video namque nullam demonstrationem, licet pro demonstrationis legibus solidissimam, apud te valere, nisi conveniat cum ea explicatione, quam vel ipse, vel alii theologi, tibi haud ignoti, sacrae Scripturae tribuunt. Verum si deprehendas, Deum per sacram Scripturam clarius, et efficacius loqui, quam per lumen naturalis intellectus, quod nobis etiam concessit, ac assiduo sapientia sua divina firmiter, et incorrupte conservat, validas habes rationes, ut intellectum flectas ad opiniones, quas sacrae Scripturae tribuis, quin ipse haud aliter facere possem.

Quod vero me spectat, quia plane, et sine ambagibus profiteor, me S. Scripturam non intelligere, licet aliquot annos in ea insumpserim, et quia me haud fugit, quando solidam nactus sum demonstrationem, me non posse in tales cogitationes incidere, ut unquam de ea dubitare queam, omnino in eo, quod mihi intellectus monstrat, acquiesco sine ulla suspicione, me ea in re deceptum esse, nec Sacram Scripturam, quamvis eam non investigem, ei contradicere posse; quia veritas veritati non repugnat, ut iam ante in appendice mea (caput indicare nequeo, nec enim liber hic ruri penes me est) clare indicavi; et si fructum, quem iam ex intellectu naturali cepi, vel semel falsum esse deprehenderem, me fortunatum redderet, quoniam fruor, et vitam non maerore et gemitu, sed tranquillitate, laetitia, et hilaritate transigere studeo et subinde gradum unum adscendo.

Agnosco interim (id, quod summam mihi praebet satisfactionem, et mentis tranquillitatem) cuncta potentia entis summe perfecti, ac eius immutabili ita fieri decreto.

[G IV 127] Ad tuam vero ut redeam epistolam, dico me tibi summas ex animo agere gratias, quod mihi tuam in tempore philosophandi rationem aperuisti; sed quod tu talia, qualia vis ex mea epistola educere, mihi affingas, pro eo nullas tibi gratis ago. Quam, quaeso, materiam mea praebuit epistola has mihi affingendi opiniones, homines nempe bestiis esse similes, homines bestiarum more mori, et interire, nostra Deo displicere opera, etc. (licet in postremo hoc summopere dissentiamus, quia aliter te non percipio, quam quod intelligis, Deum nostris operibus delectari, tanquam qui finem suum assecutus est, eo quod res ex voto successit).

[pf] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 497–505, Letter 34), headed *Versio*; the letter is undated, but Blyenbergh's reply gives its date as 28 January 1665 (Letter 22 [p. 593]). Gebhardt prints only this Latin (G IV 126–133), adding twice from the Dutch edition of 1677 the words *over Deskartes Beginselen* ('on Descartes's Principles') after *Appendice*; they are left out here.

Letter 21

Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh

To the most learned and most accomplished man
Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir and friend,

When I read your first letter, I thought our opinions almost agreed; but from the second, which was delivered to me on the 21st of this month,[468] I understand that the matter stands far otherwise, and I see that we disagree not only about the things that must be derived at long remove from first principles, but also about the principles themselves: so that I hardly believe that we can instruct each other by letters.

For I see that no demonstration, however solid according to the laws of demonstration, has weight with you unless it agrees with the explanation which either you yourself or other theologians known to you attribute to Holy Scripture. But if you find that God speaks more clearly and effectively through Holy Scripture than through the light of the natural intellect, which he has also granted us and constantly preserves, firm and uncorrupted, by his divine wisdom, you have strong reasons for bending your intellect to the opinions you attribute to Holy Scripture; indeed, I myself could not do otherwise.

But as for me, since I profess plainly and without circumlocution that I do not understand Holy Scripture, though I have spent some years on it, and since it does not escape me that when I have obtained a solid demonstration I cannot fall into such thoughts that I could ever doubt it, I acquiesce entirely in what the intellect shows me, without any suspicion that I have been deceived in it, or that Holy Scripture, even though I do not search it, can contradict it; because truth does not conflict with truth, as I have already clearly indicated in my appendix[469] (I cannot give the chapter, for the book is not with me here in the country[470]); and if I were even once to find that the fruit which I have already gathered from the natural intellect was false, it would still make me fortunate, since I enjoy it, and try to pass my life not in sorrow and sighing but in tranquillity, joy and cheerfulness, and from time to time I climb a step higher.

Meanwhile I recognize (which gives me the greatest satisfaction and tranquillity of mind) that all things happen thus by the power of a supremely perfect being and by his immutable decree.

But to return to your letter, I thank you most heartily for opening to me in time your manner of philosophizing; but for imputing to me such things as you wish to draw out of my letter, I give you no thanks. What material, I ask, did my letter offer for imputing to me these opinions: namely, that men are like beasts, that men die and perish in the manner of beasts, that our works displease God,[471] etc. (though on this last we disagree greatly, since I do not understand you otherwise than as meaning that God delights in our works, as one who has attained his end because the thing has turned out as he wished).

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[468] Letter 20 [p. 561], dated 16 January 1665. Nadler quotes this paragraph as showing how far apart the two men stood (*Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 253–254).

[469] *Metaphysical Thoughts* II.8 (G I 265): 'for truth does not conflict with truth, nor can Scripture teach the trifles commonly feigned'.

[470] Spinoza was still at the farm near Schiedam (see the note to Letter 19 [p. 553]).

[471] See Letter 20 [p. 579].

Quantum ad me, ego profecto clare, dixi, probos Deum colere, et assidue colendo perfectiores evadere, Deum amare; hoccine est eos bestiis similes reddere; aut eos instar bestiarum perire, vel denique eorum opera Deo non placere?
Si meas literas maiore cum attentione legisses, clare perspexisses, nostrum dissensum in hoc solo positum esse; scilicet an Deus, ut Deus, hoc est, absolute, nulla ei humana attributa adscribendo, perfectiones, quas probi accipiunt, eis communicet; (ut ego intelligo) anve ut iudex, quod ultimum tu statuis; et ea de causa defendis impios, quia iuxta Dei decretum, quicquid possunt, faciunt, Deo aeque, ac pios servire. Sed vero secundum mea dicta id nullatenus sequitur: quia Deum tanquam iudicem non introduco, et ideo ego opera ex operis qualitate, non vero ex potentia operatoris aestimo, et merces, quae opus consequitur, tam necessario id consequitur, quam ex natura trianguli sequitur, tres eius angulos duobus rectis aequales esse debere.

Et hoc unusquisque intelliget, qui tantum ad id, quod summa nostra beatitudo in amore erga Deum consistit, attendit, quodque ille amor necessario ex Dei cognitione, quae nobis tantopere commendatur, fluit. Hoc autem generaliter facillime demonstrari potest, si modo ad naturam Decreti Dei attendatur, quemadmodum in mea appendice explicui: Verum fateor, eos omnes, qui divinam naturam cum humana confundunt, valde ad id intelligendum ineptos esse.

[G IV 128] Hisce literis finem hic imponere animus erat, ne tibi amplius essem molestus iis rebus, quae tantummodo (uti clarum est ex valde devoto additamento fini tuae epistolae affixo) pro ioco, et risu inserviunt, nulli autem usui sunt. Ne vero petitionem tuam omni modo reiiciam, ulterius ad explicationem vocum negationis, et privationis, et breviter ad id, quod necessarium est ad sensum praecedentis meae epistolae dilucidius enucleandum, progrediar.

Dico igitur primo privationem non esse privandi actum; sed tantum simplicem, et meram carentiam, quae in se nihil est: est quippe ens rationis tantum, vel modus cogitandi, quem formamus, quum res invicem comparamus. Dicimus, exempli gratia, caecum visu privatum esse, quia eum facile, ut videntem imaginamur, sive imaginatio haec hinc oriatur, quod cum aliis, qui vident, sive quod praesentem suum statum cum praeterito, quum videbat, comparamus; et cum hunc virum ea ratione consideramus, nempe comparando suam naturam cum natura aliorum, vel cum praeterita sua, tunc affirmamus, visum ad suam naturam pertinere, et propterea dicimus, eum eo privatum esse.
Verum quum Dei decretum, eiusque natura consideratur, non magis de illo homine, quam de Lapide possumus affirmare, eum visu orbatum esse, quia illo tempore non magis sine contradictione illi homini visus, quam lapidi competit; quoniam ad hominem illum nil amplius pertinet, et suum est, quam id, quod divinus intellectus et voluntas ei tribuit. Et propterea Deus non magis est causa τοῦ illius non videre,[pg] quam τοῦ non videre lapidis: id quod mera est negatio.
Ita etiam, cum ad naturam hominis, qui appetitu libidinis ducitur, attendimus, praesentemque appetitum cum eo, qui in probis est, vel cum eo, quem ipse alias habuit, comparamus; affirmamus, eum hominem meliore appetitu privatum esse, quia tunc isti virtutis appetitum competere iudicamus; quod facere non possumus, si ad naturam Divini decreti, et intellectus attendimus:

[pg] τοῦ: the Greek article in the genitive, 'of the not-seeing', as printed in 1677 (OP p. 500); see the note to Letter 18 [p. 551].

As for me, I certainly said clearly that the good worship God, and by constantly worshipping become more perfect, and love God; is this to make them like beasts, or to have them perish like beasts, or finally to say that their works do not please God?

If you had read my letter with greater attention, you would have seen clearly that our disagreement lies in this alone: namely, whether God, as God, that is, absolutely, without ascribing any human attributes to him, communicates to the good the perfections which they receive (as I understand it), or as a judge, which is what you maintain; and for that reason you maintain that the impious, because according to God's decree they do whatever they can, serve God as much as the pious. But according to what I said this by no means follows: because I do not introduce God as a judge, and therefore I value works by the quality of the work, not by the power of the worker; and the reward which follows the work follows it as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles must be equal to two right angles.

And everyone will understand this who attends only to this, that our highest blessedness consists in love towards God,[472] and that this love flows necessarily from the knowledge of God which is so much commended to us. This can be demonstrated very easily in general, if only one attends to the nature of God's decree, as I have explained in my appendix: but I confess that all who confuse the divine nature with the human are very unfit to understand it.

I had intended to put an end to this letter here, so as not to trouble you further with things which serve only (as is clear from the very devout addition appended to the end of your letter[473]) for jest and laughter, and are of no use. But so as not to reject your request altogether, I shall go on further to the explanation of the words negation and privation, and briefly to what is necessary to unfold more clearly the sense of my preceding letter.

I say, then, first, that privation is not the act of depriving, but only a simple and mere lack, which in itself is nothing: it is indeed only a being of reason, or mode of thinking, which we form when we compare things with one another. We say, for example, that a blind man is deprived of sight, because we easily imagine him as seeing, whether this imagination arises from our comparing him with others who see, or his present state with his past one, when he saw; and when we consider this man in that way, namely by comparing his nature with the nature of others or with his own past nature, then we affirm that sight belongs to his nature, and therefore say that he is deprived of it.

But when God's decree and its nature are considered, we can no more affirm of that man than of a stone that he is bereft of sight, because at that time sight belongs to that man no more without contradiction than to the stone; since nothing more belongs to that man, and is his, than what the divine intellect and will attribute to him. And therefore God is no more the cause of that man's not seeing than of the stone's not seeing: which is mere negation.

So also, when we attend to the nature of a man who is led by the appetite of lust, and compare his present appetite with that which is in the good, or with the one he himself had at another time, we affirm that this man is deprived of a better appetite, because we then judge that the appetite of virtue belongs to him; which we cannot do if we attend to the nature of the divine decree and

[472] Compare Part V, Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]: 'our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists in a constant and eternal love of God'.

[473] Blyenbergh's prayer for the life to come (Letter 20 [p. 579]).

nam eo respectu melior ille appetitus non magis ad naturam istius hominis eo tempore, quam ad naturam Diaboli, vel lapidis pertinet, et idcirco eo respectu melior appetitus non est privatio, sed negatio. Adeo ut privatio nihil aliud sit, quam aliquid de re negare, quod iudicamus ad suam naturam pertinere, et negatio nil aliud, quam aliquid de re negare, quia ad suam naturam non pertinet.

Et hinc liquet, quare Adami appetitus rerum terrenarum nostri, non vero intellectus Dei respectu tantum malus esset. Licet enim Deus praeteritum et praesentem Adami statum sciret, non idcirco Adamum praeterito statu privatum esse intelligebat, hoc est, praeteritum ad suam naturam pertinere: Nam tunc Deus aliquid contra suam voluntatem, hoc est, contra proprium suum intellectum intelligeret.

Hoc si bene percepisses, simulque me illam libertatem, quam Cartesius menti adscribit, non concedere, quemadmodum L. M. in praefatione meo nomine testatus est, vel minimam in meis verbis non invenires contradictionem.

Sed video, me melius multo facturum fuisse, si in prima mea epistola Cartesii verbis respondissem, dicendo, nos non posse scire, quomodo nostra libertas, et quicquid ab ea dependet cum Dei providentia et libertate congruat, (sicuti in appendice diversis locis feci) adeo ut ex Dei creatione nullam in libertate nostra queamus invenire contradictionem, quia capere haud possumus, quomodo Deus res creavit, et (quod idem est) quomodo eas conservat. Verum putabam, te praefationem legisse, meque, si ex animi sententia non responderem, in amicitiae officium, quam animitus offerebam, peccaturum fuisse. Sed haec susque deque fero.

[G IV 129] Quia tamen video, te Cartesii mentem hactenus non bene percepisse, peto, ut haec duo attendas: Primo neque me, neque Cartesium unquam dixisse, quod ad nostram naturam pertinet, ut nostram voluntatem intra limites intellectus contineamus; sed tantum, quod Deus nobis intellectum determinatum, et voluntatem indeterminatam dedit, ita tamen, ut ignoremus, in quem finem nos creavit; porro, quod istiusmodi indeterminata, vel perfecta voluntas nos non solum perfectiores reddit; sed quoque, ut tibi in sequentibus dicam, quod ea nobis sit valde necessaria.

Secundo quod nostra libertas nec in quadam contingentia, nec in quadam indifferentia sita est; sed in modo affirmandi, et negandi; adeo ut, quo rem aliquam minus indifferenter affirmamus, aut negamus, eo liberiores simus: Verbi causa, si Dei natura nobis est cognita, tam necessario ex natura nostra τὸ affirmare sequitur, Deum existere, quam ex natura trianguli eius tres angulos duobus rectis aequari fluit; et tamen nunquam magis liberi sumus, quam quum rem tali modo affirmamus.

Quia vero haec necessitas nihil aliud est, quam Dei decretum, veluti in mea appendice clare ostendi; hinc quodammodo intelligere licet, quo pacto rem libere agamus, eiusque causa simus, non obstante, quod eam necessario, et ex Dei decreto agamus.

Hoc, inquam, aliquo modo possumus intelligere, cum quid affirmamus, quod clare, et distincte percipimus, ubi vero quicquam, quod clare ac distincte non capimus, asserimus, hoc est, cum

intellect: for in that respect that better appetite no more belongs to the nature of this man at that time than to the nature of the Devil or of a stone; and therefore in that respect the better appetite is not a privation but a negation. So that privation is nothing other than to deny of a thing something which we judge to belong to its nature, and negation nothing other than to deny of a thing something because it does not belong to its nature.
And from this it is clear why Adam's appetite for earthly things was evil only in relation to our intellect, and not to God's. For although God knew Adam's past and present state, he did not on that account understand Adam to be deprived of his past state, that is, the past state to belong to his nature: for then God would understand something against his will, that is, against his own intellect.
If you had perceived this well, and at the same time that I do not grant the freedom which Descartes ascribes to the mind, as L. M. testified in my name in the preface,[474] you would not find the least contradiction in my words.
But I see that I should have done much better if in my first letter I had answered in Descartes's words, saying that we cannot know how our freedom, and whatever depends on it, agrees with God's providence and freedom (as I did in several places in the appendix), so that we can find no contradiction to our freedom in God's creation, because we cannot grasp how God created things and (what is the same) how he preserves them. But I thought that you had read the preface, and that if I did not answer according to my real view I should sin against the duty of the friendship which I was heartily offering. But I care little for all this.

Since, however, I see that you have not so far perceived Descartes's mind well, I ask you to attend to these two points. First, that neither I nor Descartes ever said that it belongs to our nature to contain our will within the limits of the intellect; but only that God has given us a determinate intellect and an indeterminate will, in such a way, however, that we do not know to what end he created us; further, that such an indeterminate or perfect will not only makes us more perfect, but also, as I shall tell you below, is very necessary to us.

Second, that our freedom lies neither in a certain contingency nor in a certain indifference, but in the manner of affirming and denying; so that the less indifferently we affirm or deny something, the freer we are:[475] for example, if the nature of God is known to us, the affirming that God exists follows from our nature as necessarily as it flows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and yet we are never more free than when we affirm a thing in this way.
But because this necessity is nothing other than God's decree, as I have shown clearly in my appendix, it can in some way be understood from this how we act freely and are the cause of the action, notwithstanding that we do it necessarily and from God's decree.
This, I say, we can understand in some way when we affirm something which we perceive clearly and distinctly; but when we assert anything which we do not grasp clearly and distinctly, that

[474] Lodewijk Meyer's preface to the *Principles* (G I 132), which gives as an example of what Spinoza rejects the account of the will in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 15, of the *Principles* and in *Metaphysical Thoughts* II.12: 'for he does not think it distinct from the intellect, much less endowed with such freedom'.
[475] So the *Principles*, Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. (G I 175), where indifference is 'the lowest degree of freedom'.

patimur, ut voluntas extra nostri intellectus limites exspatietur, tum illam necessitatem, Deique decreta non ita percipere possumus; sed nostram quidem libertatem, quam nostra voluntas semper includit, (quo respectu opera nostra solummodo bona, vel mala appellantur) et si tunc conamur libertatem nostram cum Dei decreto, et continua creatione conciliare, confundimus id, quod clare, et distincte intelligimus, cum eo, quod non percipimus, et propterea frustra id conamur.
Sufficit ergo nobis, quod scimus nos liberos esse, et nos tales esse posse non obstante Dei decreto, nosque mali causam esse, eo quod nullus actus, nisi respectu nostrae libertatis, tantum malus nominari potest. Haec sunt, quae Cartesium spectant, ut demonstrarem eius dicta ab ea parte nullam pati contradictionem.

[G IV 130] Iam ad ea, quae me attinent, me convertam, ac primo breviter referam utilitatem, quae ex mea opinione nascitur, quae praecipue in eo est sita, quod scilicet noster intellectus Deo mentem, et corpus extra omnem superstitionem offert, nec preces nobis valde utiles esse nego: nam meus intellectus est nimis parvus ad omnia media determinandum, quae Deus habet, quibus homines ad sui amorem, hoc est, ad salutem perducat; adeo ut tantum absit hanc opinionem noxiam futuram esse, ut econtra iis, qui nullis praeiudiciis nec puerili superstitione praeoccupati sunt, unicum sit medium ad summum beatitudinis gradum perveniendi.

[G IV 131] Quod vero ais, me homines, eos a Deo tam dependentes faciendo, ideo elementis, herbis, et lapidibus similes reddere, id sufficienter ostendit te meam opinionem perversissime intelligere, et res, quae intellectum spectant, cum imaginatione confundere.
Si enim puro intellectu percepisses, quid sit a Deo dependere, certe non cogitares, res, quatenus a Deo dependent, mortuas, corporeas, et imperfectas esse, (quis unquam de ente summe perfecto tam viliter ausus fuit loqui) econtra caperes, ea de causa, et quatenus a Deo dependent, perfectas esse. Adeo ut hanc dependentiam, atque necessariam operationem quam optime per Dei decretum intelligamus, quando non ad truncos, et herbas; sed ad maxime intelligibiles, et res creatas perfectissimas attendimus, ut ex illo, quod secundo de Cartesii mente iam ante memoravimus, clare apparet, quod attendere debuisses.

Nec reticere possum, me id summopere mirari, quod dicis: si Deus delictum non puniret, (hoc est, tanquam iudex tali poena, quam ipsum delictum non inferret: Id enim solum nostra est quaestio.) quaenam ratio impedit, quo minus quaevis scelera avide perpetrem?

Certe qui illud tantum (quod de te non spero) formidine poenae omittit, is nulla ratione ex amore operatur, et quam minime virtutem amplectitur. Quantum ad me, ea omitto, vel omittere studeo, quia expresse cum mea singulari natura pugnant, meque a Dei amore, et cognitione aberrare facerent.

Porro si ad naturam humanam paulum attendisses, et naturam Dei decreti, prout in appendice explicui, percepisses, tandemque scivisses, quomodo res esset deducenda, antequam ad conclusionem perveniatur, non adeo temere dixisses, hanc opinionem nos truncis, etc. similes reddere;

is, when we allow the will to stray beyond the limits of our intellect, then we cannot perceive that necessity and God's decrees in the same way, but we do indeed perceive our freedom, which our will always includes (in which respect alone our works are called good or evil); and if we then try to reconcile our freedom with God's decree and continual creation, we confuse what we understand clearly and distinctly with what we do not perceive, and therefore we try in vain.

It is enough for us, then, that we know that we are free, and that we can be so notwithstanding God's decree, and that we are the cause of evil, because no act can be called evil except in relation to our freedom alone. These are the things that concern Descartes, to show that his words suffer no contradiction on that side.

Now I shall turn to what concerns me, and first I shall briefly report the usefulness which arises from my opinion,[476] which lies chiefly in this, that our intellect offers mind and body to God free of all superstition; nor do I deny that prayers are very useful to us: for my intellect is too small to determine all the means God has by which to bring men to love of him, that is, to salvation; so that this opinion is so far from being harmful that, on the contrary, for those who are not taken up with prejudices and childish superstition, it is the only means of reaching the highest degree of blessedness.

But when you say that by making men so dependent on God I make them like the elements, plants and stones, this shows sufficiently that you understand my opinion most perversely, and confuse the things that concern the intellect with the imagination.

For if you had perceived with pure intellect what it is to depend on God, you would certainly not think that things, insofar as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal and imperfect (who ever dared to speak so meanly of the supremely perfect being?); on the contrary, you would grasp that they are perfect for that reason, and insofar as they depend on God. So that we understand this dependence and necessary operation best through God's decree when we attend not to tree-trunks and plants but to the most intelligible and most perfect created things, as is clear from what we mentioned second above concerning Descartes's mind, to which you should have attended.

Nor can I keep silent that I am greatly surprised at what you say: if God did not punish wrongdoing (that is, as a judge, with such a punishment as the wrongdoing itself does not bring with it: for that alone is our question), what reason prevents me from eagerly committing any crimes?[477]

Certainly he who refrains from them only for fear of punishment (which I do not hope of you) in no way acts from love, and embraces virtue as little as possible. As for me, I refrain from them, or try to refrain, because they are expressly contrary to my singular nature, and would make me stray from the love and knowledge of God.

Further, if you had attended a little to human nature, and had perceived the nature of God's decree as I explained it in the appendix, and had known, finally, how a thing must be deduced before one comes to the conclusion, you would not have said so rashly that this opinion makes

[476] Compare the uses of the doctrine set out at the end of Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 209].

[477] Letter 20 [p. 569]. Compare Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523], on those who would give way to their lusts if they did not believe that the mind outlives the body.

nec tam multas absurditates, quam imaginaris, mihi affinxisses.

De duabus illis rebus, quas ais, priusquam ad secundam tuam regulam pergis, te percipere haud valere, respondeo primo Cartesium sufficere ad conclusionem tuam faciendam, quod nempe, si modo attendis ad naturam tuam, experiris, te posse iudicium tuum suspendere; si vero dicas, te in te ipso non experiri, nos tantum virium hodie in rationem obtinere, ut hoc semper continuare possemus, id idem Cartesio esset, ac nos hodie non posse videre, nos, quamdiu existimus, futuros semper res cogitantes, vel naturam rei cogitantis retenturos, quod profecto contradictionem involvit.

Ad secundum cum Cartesio dico, si voluntatem nostram extra limites intellectus nostri valde limitati extendere non possemus, nos miserrimos futuros, neque in nostra potestate fore vel frustum panis comedere, vel passum progredi, vel subsistere: omnia enim incerta, atque periculis sunt plena.

[G IV 132] Transeo nunc ad secundam tuam regulam, asseroque, me quidem credere, quod ego eam veritatem, quam tu in scriptura esse credis, illi non tribuam, et tamen credo, quod ego illi tantum, si non plus adscribam authoritatis; quodque longe cautius, quam alii, caveam, ne illi pueriles quasdam, et absurdas sententias affingam, quod nemo praestare potest, nisi is, qui philosophiam bene intelligit, vel Divinas habet revelationes; adeo ut me valde parum moveant explicationes, quas vulgares theologi de scriptura adferunt, praesertim si istius sint farinae, ut Scripturam semper iuxta litteram, sensumque externum sumant; et nunquam, praeter Socinianos, crassum adeo vidi theologum, qui non percipit Sacram Scripturam creberrime more humano de Deo loqui, ac suum sensum Parabolis exprimere; et quod ad contradictionem, quam frustra (mea quidem opinione) conaris ostendere, credo te per Parabolam omnino aliud quid, quam vulgo fit, intelligere: nam quis unquam audivit, eum, qui suos conceptus parabolis exprimit, a suo sensu aberrare.

Quum Micha Regi Aghabo diceret, se Deum in solio suo sedentem vidisse, ac exercitus caelestes a dextra, et sinistra stantes, Deumque ex illis quaerere, quisnam Aghabum deciperet, illud ipsum certe erat Parabola, qua propheta praecipuum, quod ea occasione (quae non erat, ut sublimia theologiae dogmata doceret) Dei nomine debebat manifestare, sufficienter exprimebat; adeo ut nullo modo a sensu suo aberraret.

Sic etiam caeteri prophetae Dei verbum iussu Dei ea ratione populo manifestarunt, tanquam optimo medio, non vero tanquam illo, quod Deus petebat, populum ad scopum Scripturae primarium ducendi, qui iuxta ipsius Christi dictum in hoc consistit, nimirum in amore Dei supra omnia, et proximi tanquam sui ipsius. Sublimes speculationes, credo, Scripturam minime tangunt. Me quod spectat, nulla Dei aeterna attributa ex sacra scriptura didici, nec discere potui.

[G IV 133] Quantum vero quintum attinet argumentum (scilicet prophetas Dei verbum tali ratione manifestum fecisse, quoniam veritas veritati non est contraria) nihil reliqui est, quam ut (quemadmodum quivis, qui demonstrandi methodum percipit, iudicabit) demonstrem, Scripturam, prout est, esse Dei verum verbum revelatum. Cuius mathematicam demonstrationem, nisi

us like tree-trunks, etc.; nor would you have imputed to me so many absurdities as you imagine.

Of those two things which you say you cannot perceive[478] before you go on to your second rule, I answer, first, that Descartes suffices for drawing your conclusion: namely, that if only you attend to your nature, you find by experience that you can suspend your judgment; but if you say that you do not find in yourself that we today have so much power over reason that we could always continue this, that would be the same for Descartes as that we cannot see today that we shall always, as long as we exist, be thinking things, or retain the nature of a thinking thing; which certainly involves a contradiction.

To the second I say with Descartes that if we could not extend our will beyond the limits of our very limited intellect, we should be most miserable, and it would not be in our power either to eat a piece of bread, or to take a step forward, or to stand still: for all things are uncertain and full of dangers.

I pass now to your second rule, and assert that I do indeed believe that I do not attribute to Scripture the truth which you believe is in it, and yet I believe that I ascribe to it as much authority, if not more; and that I take far more care than others not to impute to it certain childish and absurd opinions, which no one can achieve unless he understands philosophy well or has divine revelations; so that I am very little moved by the explanations which the common theologians bring to Scripture, especially if they are of the sort that always take Scripture according to the letter and the outward sense; and, apart from the Socinians, I have never seen a theologian so dull as not to perceive that Holy Scripture very often speaks of God in human fashion and expresses its sense in parables; and as for the contradiction which you try in vain (in my opinion at least) to show, I believe that by a parable you understand something altogether different from what is commonly understood: for who ever heard that he who expresses his concepts in parables strays from his own sense.

When Micaiah told King Ahab that he had seen God sitting on his throne, and the heavenly hosts standing on the right and on the left, and that God asked them which of them would deceive Ahab,[479] that was certainly a parable, by which the prophet sufficiently expressed the chief thing which he had to make known in God's name on that occasion (which was not one for teaching the sublime dogmas of theology); so that he in no way strayed from his own sense.

So too the other prophets made God's word known to the people at God's command in that way, as the best means, but not as the means which God required, of leading the people to the primary aim of Scripture, which according to the saying of Christ himself consists in this: namely, in the love of God above all things, and of one's neighbour as oneself.[480] Sublime speculations, I believe, do not touch Scripture at all. As for me, I have not learned, nor could I learn, any eternal attributes of God from Holy Scripture.

As for the fifth argument (namely, that the prophets made God's word known in such a way, since truth is not contrary to truth), nothing remains for me (as anyone who perceives the method of demonstrating will judge) but to demonstrate that Scripture, as it is, is the true revealed word of God. Of this I can have no mathematical demonstration except by divine revelation.

[478] Letter 20 [p. 573].
[479] I Kings 22:19–22.
[480] Matthew 22:37–39.

divina Revelatione, habere nequeo.
Et ideo dixi, credo, sed non more mathematico scio, omnia, quae Deus prophetis etc. quia firmiter credo, non vero mathematice scio, prophetas Dei intimos Consiliarios, et Legatos fuisse fidos; adeo ut in iis, quae ego affirmavi, nulla omnino sit contradictio; cum e contrario ab altera parte haud paucae inveniantur.

Reliquum tuae epistolae, nempe ubi dicis: Denique ens summe perfectum noverat, etc. et deinde quod contra exemplum de veneno adfers, ac ultimo, quod appendicem, et id, quod sequitur, spectat, dico hanc praesentem quaestionem non respicere.
Praefationem L. M. quod attinet, in ipsa certe simul ostenditur, quid Cartesio adhuc probandum esset, ut solidam de libero arbitrio demonstrationem formaret, additurque, me contrariam fovere sententiam, et quomodo eam foveam: quam forte suo tempore indicabo, nunc vero animus non est.

De opere vero super Cartesium nec cogitavi, nec ulteriorem eius gessi curam, postquam sermone Belgico prodiit: et quidem non sine ratione, quam hic recensere longum foret. Adeo ut nihil dicendum restet, quam me etc.

Epistola XXII

Clarissimo viro
B. D. S.
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.

Mi Domine, et chare amice,

[G IV 134] Epistolam tuam, 28 Ianuarii scriptam,[ph] suo tempore accepi; aliae occupationes praeter studia impediverunt, quo minus ad tuam citius responderim: et quoniam hic illic acribus tua referta est reprehensionibus, quid de ea iudicarem, vix sciebam: nam in prima, 5 Ianuarii exarata, tam liberaliter amicitiam tuam ex animo mihi obtuleras, hac addita obtestatione, meam non solum illo tempore scriptam; sed et subsequentes valde gratas fore; quin amice flagitabas, ut libere, si quas insuper movere possem difficultates, obiicerem, uti in mea, 16 Ianuarii data, prolixius paulo praestiti.
Ad eam amicam, et erudientem, iuxta postulatum, et promissum tuum, exspectabam responsionem; sed econtra talem, quae nimiam non redolet amicitiam, accepi; nempe quod nullae demonstrationes, licet validissimae apud me valent, quod mentem Cartesii non percipio, quod res spirituales nimium cum terrenis confundo, etc. ita ut invicem epistolis diutius erudire non possemus.
Ad quae amice respondeo, me firmiter credere, te supra dicta melius me intelligere, et assue-

[ph] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 505–510, Letter 35), headed *Versio*; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 134–144). The 1677 edition prints in italics the words that Blyenbergh takes from Spinoza's letters; quotation marks mark them here.

And therefore I said, 'I believe', but not 'I know in the mathematical manner', 'that all the things which God [revealed] to the prophets',[481] etc.; because I firmly believe, but do not know mathematically, that the prophets were God's intimate counsellors and faithful ambassadors; so that in what I have affirmed there is no contradiction at all, whereas on the other side not a few are found.

The rest of your letter, namely where you say, 'Finally, the supremely perfect Being knew',[482] etc., and then what you bring against the example of poison, and lastly what concerns the appendix and what follows, does not, I say, bear on the present question.

As for L. M.'s preface, it certainly shows at the same time what Descartes still had to prove in order to form a solid demonstration of free will, and adds that I hold the contrary opinion, and how I hold it: which I shall perhaps make known in due time, but now I have no mind to.

As for the work on Descartes, I have neither given it a thought nor taken any further care of it since it came out in Dutch:[483] and indeed not without reason, which it would take long to recount here. So that nothing remains to be said but that I am, etc.

Letter 22

Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza

To the most distinguished man
B. D. S.
from Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir, and dear friend,

Your letter written on 28 January[484] I received in due time; occupations other than my studies prevented me from answering it sooner; and since it is filled here and there with sharp reproofs, I hardly knew what to think of it: for in the first, written on 5 January,[485] you had so generously offered me your friendship from the heart, adding the assurance that not only my letter written at that time but also later ones would be very welcome; indeed you asked me in friendly fashion to put forward freely any further difficulties I could raise, as I did at somewhat greater length in mine of 16 January.

To that I expected a friendly and instructive reply, in accordance with your request and promise; but instead I received one which does not smell of much friendship:[486] namely, that no demonstrations, however strong, have weight with me, that I do not perceive Descartes's mind, that I confuse spiritual things too much with earthly ones, etc., so that we could no longer instruct each other by letters.

To which I reply in friendly fashion that I firmly believe that you understand the things mentioned

[481] Letter 19 [p. 559].
[482] Letter 20 [p. 577].
[483] The translation of the *Principles* by Pieter Balling (Nadler p. 250).
[484] Letter 21 [p. 583].
[485] Letter 19 [p. 553].
[486] Nadler quotes this passage on Blyenbergh's being taken aback by Spinoza's tone (*Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 254).

tum magis esse res corporeas a spiritualibus discernere: in metaphysica enim, quam ego inchoo, summum adscendisti gradum, et ideo, ut erudirer, favorem tuum captabam; nunquam vero existimabam, me obiectionibus, libere factis, offensionis causam praebiturum.

Summas tibi ex animo ago gratias, quod tantum laborem in duabus epistolis exarandis, praecipue in secunda, suscepisti; ex posteriore, quam ex priore, tuam mentem clarius percepi, et nihilominus ei assensum praebere nequeo, nisi difficultates, quas adhuc in ea invenio, tollantur: nec hoc offensionis causam dare potest. Nam illud vitium in intellectu nostro arguit, si veritati sine fundamento necessario assentimur: Licet tui veri essent conceptus, iis assensum praebere non licet, quamdiu in me quaedam obscuritatis, vel dubitationis rationes supersunt, quamvis dubitationes non ex re proposita, sed ex mei intellectus imperfectione orirentur.
Et quia hoc abunde tibi notum est, aegre ferre non debes, si rursus quasdam formem obiectiones: cogor ita facere, quamdiu rem clare percipere nequeo; nam hoc in alium non fit finem, quam ad veritatem inveniendam; non vero ad tuam mentem praeter intentionem tuam detorquendam; et propterea ad haec pauca amicam peto responsionem.
Dicis, nihil ad essentiam rei amplius pertinere, quam id, quod divina voluntas, potentiaque ei concedit, et revera tribuit; et cum ad naturam hominis, qui appetitu libidinis ducitur, attendimus, praesentemque appetitum cum eo, qui in probis est, vel cum eo, quem ipse alias habuit, comparamus, affirmamus eum hominem meliore appetitu privatum esse, quia tunc isti virtutis appetitum competere iudicamus; quod facere non possumus, si ad naturam divini decreti et intellectus attendimus: nam eo respectu melior ille appetitus non magis ad naturam istius hominis eo tempore, quam ad naturam Diaboli, aut lapidis pertinet, etc. Licet enim Deus praeteritum, et praesentem Adami statum sciret, non idcirco Adamum praeterito statu privatum esse intelligebat, hoc est, praeteritum ad suam praesentem naturam pertinere, etc.
Ex quibus verbis clare sequi videtur, iuxta tuam sententiam, nihil aliud ad essentiam pertinere, quam quod eo momento, quo percipitur, res habet, hoc est, si me voluptatis desiderium tenet, illud desiderium ad meam illo tempore pertinet essentiam, et si me non tenet, illud non-desiderium ad meam eo, quo non desidero, tempore essentiam pertinet, unde infallibiliter consequitur, me tum respectu Dei aeque perfectionem in meis operibus includere, (solummodo gradu differentibus) quando voluptatum cupiditate, quam quando ea non teneor; quando omnis generis scelera perpetro, quam quando virtutem, et iustitiam exerceo.
Ad meam enim essentiam eo tempore tantum duntaxat, quantum operor, pertinet: nec enim plus, nec minus, secundum tuam positionem, operari possum, quam quantum revera accepi perfectionis, quia voluptatum, scelerumque cupiditas ad meam eo tempore, quo facio, pertinet essentiam, et eo tempore illam, non vero maiorem, a divina potentia accipio: Exigit ergo divina potentia eiusmodi duntaxat opera. Et ita ex tua positione clare videtur sequi, Deum scelera una, eademque ratione velle, qua ea vult, quae tu nomine virtutis insignis.
Ponamus iam, quod Deus, ut Deus, non vero ut iudex, piis, et impiis talem, et tantum essentiae largitur, quantum vult, ut illi efficiant; quaenam rationes dantur, ut unius opus non eodem modo, quam alterius velit? Nam quoniam unicuique ad opus suum qualitatem concedit, sequitur utique,

above better than I, and are more accustomed to distinguish corporeal things from spiritual: for in metaphysics, which I am only beginning, you have climbed to the highest degree, and that is why I sought your favour, to be instructed; but I never thought that by objections freely made I would give cause for offence.

I thank you most heartily for undertaking so much labour in writing two letters, especially the second; from the later I perceived your mind more clearly than from the earlier, and nevertheless I cannot give it my assent unless the difficulties which I still find in it are removed: nor can this give cause for offence. For it argues a fault in our intellect if we assent to the truth without a necessary foundation: even if your concepts were true, I may not give them assent so long as some reasons for obscurity or doubt remain in me, even if the doubts arose not from the matter proposed but from the imperfection of my intellect.

And since this is abundantly known to you, you ought not to take it ill if I again form some objections: I am compelled to do so as long as I cannot perceive the matter clearly; for this is done to no other end than to find the truth, and not to twist your mind against your intention; and therefore I ask a friendly reply to these few points.

You say that nothing more belongs to the essence of a thing than what the divine will and power grants and really attributes to it; and 'when we attend to the nature of a man who is led by the appetite of lust,[487] and compare his present appetite with that which is in the good, or with the one he himself had at another time, we affirm that this man is deprived of a better appetite, because we then judge that the appetite of virtue belongs to him; which we cannot do if we attend to the nature of the divine decree and intellect: for in that respect that better appetite no more belongs to the nature of this man at that time than to the nature of the Devil or of a stone', etc. 'For although God knew Adam's past and present state, he did not on that account understand Adam to be deprived of his past state, that is, the past state to belong to his present nature', etc. From these words it seems clearly to follow, according to your opinion, that nothing else belongs to the essence than what the thing has at the moment at which it is perceived; that is, if the longing for pleasure holds me, that longing belongs to my essence at that time, and if it does not hold me, that non-longing belongs to my essence at the time when I do not long for it; from which it follows infallibly that, in relation to God, I include perfection in my works equally (differing only in degree) when I am held by the desire for pleasures as when I am not; when I commit crimes of every kind as when I practise virtue and justice.

For only so much belongs to my essence at that time as I do: for according to your position I can do neither more nor less than the perfection I have really received, since the desire for pleasures and crimes belongs to my essence at the time when I act, and at that time I receive that essence, and not a greater, from the divine power: the divine power, then, requires only works of that kind. And so from your position it seems clearly to follow that God wills crimes in one and the same way as he wills the things which you mark with the name of virtue.

Let us now suppose that God, as God and not as judge, bestows on the pious and the impious such and so much essence as he wills them to bring about; what reasons are there why he should not will the work of the one in the same way as that of the other? For since he grants each one the

[487] Letter 21 [p. 585], where the last words read 'to his nature'.

quod, quibus minus largitus est, eadem ratione tantum ab ipsis petit, quantum ab illis, quibus plus dedit; et per consequens Deus sui ipsius respectu maiorem, minoremve nostrorum operum perfectionem, voluptatum et virtutum cupiditatem eodem modo exigit.

Adeo ut, qui scelera patrat, necessario eadem patrare debeat, quia nihil aliud ad suam eo tempore essentiam spectat; uti is, qui virtutem exercet, ideo virtutem exercet, quia Dei potentia voluit, ut ad suam eo tempore essentiam id pertineret: Rursum mihi videtur Deum aeque, et eodem modo scelera, quam virtutem velle, quatenus autem utraque vult, tam huius, quam illius est causa, ipsique eatenus grata esse debent. Quod de Deo concipere durum est.

Dicis, ut video, probos Deum colere; verum ex tuis scriptis nihil aliud percipio, quam quod Deo servire tantum sit talia efficere opera, quae Deus, ut operaremur, voluit; idem adscribis impiis, et libidinosis; quaenam ergo est differentia, respectu Dei, inter proborum, et improborum cultum?

Ais etiam, probos Deo servire, et serviendo continuo perfectiores evadere; sed non percipio, quid per τὸ perfectiores evadere intelligas, nec quid significet τὸ continuo perfectiores evadere. Nam et impii, et pii suam essentiam, et conservationem, aut continuam creationem a Deo, ut Deo, non vero, ut iudice, nanciscuntur, voluntatemque eius iuxta Dei decretum utrique eodem modo exequuntur. Quaenam ergo differentia, respectu Dei, inter utrosque potest esse?

Nam τὸ perfectiores continuo evadere non ex opere; sed ex Dei voluntate fluit; adeo ut, si impii per opera sua imperfectiores fiunt, illud non fluat ex operibus; sed ex sola Dei voluntate; et utrique voluntatem Dei tantum exequuntur: nequit ergo in his duobus, ratione Dei, dari discrimen. Quaenam sunt ergo rationes, ut hi per opus suum continuo perfectiores, illi vero deteriores evadant?
Sed vero discrimen operis horum supra alterorum opus in hoc ponere videris, quod hoc opus plus perfectionis, quam illud includit. In his tuum, vel meum certo confido latere errorem: nam nullam in tuis scriptis reperire licet regulam, secundum quam res magis, minusve perfecta dicitur, quam quando plus, minusve habet essentiae.
Si iam haec sit perfectionis regula, sunt igitur scelera, Dei respectu, ei aeque, ac opera proborum grata: nam Deus ea, ut Deus, hoc est, sui respectu, eodem modo vult, quia utraque ex Dei fluunt decreto. Si haec sit sola perfectionis regula, errores non nisi improprie tales dici possunt; sed revera nulli errores, nulla dantur scelera: et quicquid est, illam tantummodo, et talem, quam Deus dedit, essentiam complectitur, quae semper, utcunque ea se habeat, perfectionem involvit.

Me hoc clare non posse percipere, fateor, et tu quaerenti, an occidere Deo aeque placeat, ac eleemosynas largiri? an furtum committere, Dei respectu, aeque bonum sit, ac iustum esse? condona. Si neges, quaenam sunt rationes? si affirmes, quae apud me existunt rationes, quibus moverer, ut hoc opus, quod tu virtutem appellas, magis, quam aliud operarer? quaenam lex magis hoc, quam illud, prohibet?

quality for his work, it surely follows that from those to whom he has given less he asks, in the same proportion, as much as from those to whom he has given more; and consequently God, in relation to himself, requires the greater or lesser perfection of our works, the desire for pleasures and for virtues, in the same way.

So that he who commits crimes must necessarily commit them, because nothing else belongs to his essence at that time; just as he who practises virtue practises virtue because God's power willed that it should belong to his essence at that time: again it seems to me that God wills crimes equally and in the same way as virtue, and insofar as he wills both, he is the cause of the one as much as of the other, and to that extent they must both be pleasing to him. Which is hard to conceive of God.

You say, as I see, that the good worship God; but from your writings I perceive nothing else than that to serve God is only to bring about such works as God willed us to bring about; you ascribe the same to the impious and lustful; what difference is there, then, in relation to God, between the worship of the good and of the wicked?

You also say that the good serve God and by serving become continually more perfect;[488] but I do not perceive what you understand by 'becoming more perfect', nor what 'becoming continually more perfect' means. For both the impious and the pious obtain their essence, and their preservation or continual creation, from God as God, not as judge, and both carry out his will in the same way according to God's decree. What difference, then, can there be between the two in relation to God?

For becoming continually more perfect flows not from the work but from God's will; so that if the impious become more imperfect through their works, this flows not from the works but from God's will alone; and both only carry out God's will: there can be no distinction between these two, then, in respect of God. What, then, are the reasons why these become continually more perfect through their work, and those worse?

But you seem to place the distinction between the work of the one and the work of the others in this, that this work includes more perfection than that. In this, I am confident, your error or mine certainly lies: for in your writings no rule can be found according to which a thing is called more or less perfect, except when it has more or less essence.

If this, then, is the rule of perfection, crimes are as pleasing to God, in relation to him, as the works of the good: for God, as God, that is, in relation to himself, wills them in the same way, because both flow from God's decree. If this is the only rule of perfection, errors can be called errors only improperly; but in truth there are no errors, there are no crimes: and whatever is includes only that essence, and such as God gave it, which always, however it stands, involves perfection.

I confess that I cannot perceive this clearly; and you must pardon me for asking whether killing is as pleasing to God as giving alms?[489] Whether to commit theft is, in relation to God, as good as to be just? If you deny it, what are the reasons? If you affirm it, what reasons do I have by which I should be moved to do this work which you call virtue rather than another? What law forbids this rather than that?

[488] Letter 19 [p. 559].

[489] Spinoza answers these questions in Letter 23 [p. 603].

Si ipsam nomines virtutis legem, fatendum mihi certe est, me nullam apud te reperire, iuxta quam virtus moderanda, et ex qua cognoscenda sit. Quicquid enim est, a Dei voluntate inseparabiliter dependet, et per consequens et hoc, et illud ex aequo virtuosum est. Et, quid tibi virtus, vel lex virtutis sit, non capio; ideo etiam, quod asseris, nos ex amore virtutis debere operari, non intelligo.

Dicis quidem, te scelera, et vitia omittere, quia ea cum singulari tua natura pugnant, et te ab divina cognitione, et amore seducunt; verum nullam horum in omnibus tuis scriptis invenio vel regulam, vel probationem. Quin excusa me, si contrarium ex illis sequi dicam.

Omittis ea, quae vitia appello, quia cum singulari tua natura pugnant, non autem quia vitia complectuntur; omittis ea, quemadmodum cibus, a quo natura nostra abhorret, relinquitur. Certe qui mala omittet, eo quod sua natura ab eis abhorret, parum de virtute gloriari poterit.

[G IV 141] Hic iam rursum quaestio moveri potest, an, si daretur animus, cum cuius singulari natura non pugnaret; sed conveniret voluptates, sceleraque patrare, an, inquam, ratio virtutis sit, quae ipsum ad virtutem praestandam, malumque omittendum moveret? Sed qui fieri potest, ut quis cupiditatem voluptatis amitteret, quum eius cupiditas eo tempore de sua sit essentia, ipsamque iam modo acceperit, neque dimittere possit?

[G IV 142] Hanc etiam consequentiam in tuis scriptis non video, quod nimirum eae actiones, quas scelerum nomine insignio, te a Dei cognitione, et eius amore seducerent. Nam voluntatem Dei tantum exequutus es, neque amplius praestare poteras, quia ad tuam isto tempore essentiam constituendam a divina voluntate, ac potentia nihil amplius datum erat.

Quomodo sic determinatum, ac dependens opus te a divino amore aberrare facit? aberrare est confusum, et independens esse, et hoc secundum te est impossibile. Nam sive hoc, sive illud, sive plus, sive minus perfectionis edimus, illud ad esse nostrum pro illo tempore immediate a Deo accipimus: quomodo ergo possumus aberrare? vel ego, per errorem quid intelligatur, non capio. Attamen in hoc, in hoc, inquam, solo causa vel mei, vel tui erroris latere debet.

Hic multa alia dicerem, et quaererem, primo, an substantiae intellectuales alio modo, quam vitae expertes a Deo dependeant? licet enim entia intellectualia plus essentiae, quam vita carentia involvant, annon utraque Deo, Deique decreto ad suum motum in genere, et ad talem motum in specie conservandum opus habent, et per consequens, quatenus dependent, annon una, eademque ratione dependeant?

Secundo, quia, quam ei D. des Cartes adsignavit, libertatem animae non concedis, quaenam sit differentia inter dependentiam intellectualium, et anima carentium substantiarum? et si nullam volendi habent libertatem, quomodo tu eas a Deo dependere concipias? et quo pacto anima a Deo dependeat? Tertio, siquidem nostra anima ea non sit praedita libertate, anne nostra actio proprie Dei actio, et nostra voluntas proprie Dei sit voluntas?

Plura alia quaerere possem, sed tam multa a te petere non ausim: solummodo ad praecedentia responsum tuum brevi exspecto, an forte hoc medio adhibito sententiam tuam melius intelligam, ut postea de hac re coram tecum pluribus agerem. Ubi enim tuum nactus fuero responsum, Leydam profectus, si gratum sit, in transitu te salutabo.

If you name the law of virtue itself, I must certainly confess that I find none in you according to which virtue is to be regulated and from which it is to be known. For whatever is depends inseparably on God's will, and consequently this and that are equally virtuous. And I do not grasp what virtue, or the law of virtue, is for you; and so I also do not understand what you assert, that we ought to act from love of virtue.

You do say that you refrain from crimes and vices[490] because they conflict with your singular nature and lead you away from the divine knowledge and love; but in all your writings I find neither rule nor proof of these things. Indeed, forgive me if I say that the contrary follows from them.

You refrain from what I call vices because they conflict with your singular nature, not because they contain vices; you refrain from them as one leaves alone food which our nature abhors. Certainly he who refrains from evils because his nature abhors them can boast little of virtue.

Here again the question can be raised whether, if there were a mind with whose singular nature it did not conflict, but agreed, to pursue pleasures and commit crimes, whether, I say, there is a reason of virtue which would move it to practise virtue[491] and refrain from evil? But how can it happen that someone should lose the desire for pleasure, when that desire belongs at that time to his essence, and he has only just received it, and cannot let it go?

Nor do I see in your writings this consequence, namely that those actions which I mark with the name of crimes would lead you away from the knowledge of God and from his love. For you have only carried out God's will, and could do no more, because nothing more had been given by the divine will and power to constitute your essence at that time.

How does a work so determined and dependent make you stray from the divine love? To stray is to be confused and independent, and this according to you is impossible. For whether we bring forth this or that, more or less perfection, we receive it for our being at that time immediately from God: how, then, can we stray? Or else I do not grasp what is understood by error. And yet in this, in this alone, I say, the cause of either my error or yours must lie.

Here I would say and ask many other things: first, whether intellectual substances depend on God in another way than lifeless ones? For although intellectual beings involve more essence than lifeless ones, do not both need God, and God's decree, to preserve their motion in general and such a motion in particular, and consequently, insofar as they depend, do they not depend in one and the same way?

Second, since you do not grant the soul the freedom which Mr Descartes assigned to it, what difference is there between the dependence of intellectual substances and of soulless ones? And if they have no freedom of willing, how do you conceive that they depend on God? And in what way does the soul depend on God? Third, if our soul is not endowed with that freedom, is not our action properly God's action, and our will properly God's will?

I could ask many other things, but I would not dare to ask so much of you: I only await your reply to the preceding points soon, to see whether by this means I may perhaps understand your opinion better, so that I may afterwards treat this matter at more length with you in person. For when I have obtained your reply, I shall go to Leiden, and, if it is agreeable, I shall greet you on

[490] Letter 21 [p. 589].

[491] Answered in Letter 23 [p. 605].

His nixus, dico ex animo, tibi salute dicta, me manere tibi addictissimum, atque officiosissimum

G. de Blyenbergh.

[G IV 144] Dordraci 19. Febr. 1665.

P.S. Nimia festinatione hanc inserere quaestionem oblitus sum: an quod alias nobis eveniret, prudentia nostra non impedire queamus.

Epistola XXIII

Viro Doctissimo, ac Ornatissimo,
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh

Mi Domine et amice,

[G IV 144] Duas abs te hac septimana accepi epistolas;[pi] posterior, 9 Martii exarata, tantum ei inserviebat, ut me de priore, 19 Februarii scripta, et mihi Schiedamo missa, certiorem redderet. In hac priore te de eo queri video, quod dixerim nullam apud te demonstrationem locum habere posse etc. quasi illud mearum rationum respectu, quia statim tibi non fecerunt satis, locutus fuerim, quod a mente mea longe abest: respiciebam propria tua verba, quae sic habent. Et siquando post diutinam investigationem accideret, ut naturalis mea scientia videretur cum hoc verbo vel pugnare, vel non satis bene etc. illud verbum tantae apud me est authoritatis, ut conceptus, quos existimo clare percipere, mihi potius suspecti sint, etc.

Adeo ut tua tantum verba breviter repetierim, nec propterea credo, me ulla in re irae causam praebuisse, eo magis, quod ea, tanquam rationem, adducebam, quibus magnum nostrum dissensum ostenderem.

[G IV 145] Porro, quia in calce secundae epistolae scripseras, te tantummodo sperare, et optare, ut in fide, ac spe perseveres, atque reliqua, quae nobis invicem de intellectu naturali persuademus, tibi esse indifferentia; animo volvebam, uti et iam revolvo, meas nulli usui futuras, mihique ea de causa consultum magis esse, ut studia (quae alioqui tamdiu intermittere cogor) non negligerem propter res, quae nullum fructum possunt largiri.

Nec hoc primae epistolae meae contrariatur: quia ibi te, ut merum philosophum, qui (sicuti haud pauci, qui se Christianos autumant, concedunt) nullum alium veritatis Lydium habet lapidem, praeter naturalem intellectum, non vero theologiam, considerabam. Sed de hac re me aliter edocuisti, simulque ostendisti, quod fundamentum, cui nostram amicitiam superaedificare animus erat, non, ut arbitrabar, esset iactum.

Denique reliqua quod attinet, ea plerumque tali modo inter disputandum contingunt, ut prop-

[pi] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 511–515, Letter 36), headed *Versio*. Gebhardt prints Spinoza's Dutch after it (G IV 144–152); it is dated 'Voorburgh den 13 Maart 1665' and ends otherwise than the Latin (see the note at the end of the letter).

the way.[492]
Relying on this, I say from my heart, with greetings to you, that I remain your most devoted and most dutiful

W. van Blyenbergh.
Dordrecht, 19 February 1665.

P.S. In too great haste I forgot to insert this question: whether we cannot by our prudence prevent what would otherwise happen to us.[493]

Letter 23

Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh

To the most learned and most accomplished man
Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir and friend,

I received two letters from you this week; the later, written on 9 March, served only to inform me of the earlier, written on 19 February[494] and sent on to me from Schiedam.
In the earlier I see that you complain of my having said that no demonstration could have a place with you, etc., as if I had said it with regard to my reasons, because they did not satisfy you at once; which is far from my mind: I had in view your own words, which run thus:[495] 'And if it should ever happen after long investigation that my natural knowledge seemed either to conflict with this word, or not well enough, etc., that word has such authority with me that the concepts which I think I perceive clearly are rather suspect to me', etc.
So that I only repeated your words briefly, and I do not therefore believe that I gave you cause for anger in anything, the more so since I adduced them as a reason, to show our great disagreement.

Further, because at the end of your second letter[496] you had written that you only hoped and wished to persevere in faith and hope, and that the rest, which we persuade each other of concerning the natural intellect, was indifferent to you, I turned it over in my mind, as I still do, that my letters would be of no use, and that for that reason it would be wiser for me not to neglect my studies (which I am otherwise forced to interrupt for so long) for the sake of things which can yield no fruit.
Nor does this contradict my first letter: for there I considered you as a pure philosopher, who (as not a few who call themselves Christians grant) has no other touchstone of truth than the natural intellect, and not theology. But on this matter you have taught me otherwise, and at the same time shown that the foundation on which I intended to build our friendship had not, as I thought, been laid.
Finally, as for the rest, such things mostly happen in disputing in such a way that we do not on

[492] The visit took place: see the beginning of Letter 24 [p. 607], and Nadler pp. 254–255.
[493] Spinoza declines to answer it at the end of Letter 23 [p. 605].
[494] Letter 22 [p. 593].
[495] Letter 20 [p. 561]. The Latin wording differs a little from that of the Latin version of Letter 20, since both translate the Dutch.
[496] Letter 20 [p. 579].

terea humanitatis limites non transgrediamur, et hac de causa in secunda tua epistola, nec non in hac his similia, tanquam non animadversa, praetermittam. Haec de tua offensione, ut, me ei nullam dedisse causam, ostenderem, multo minus me ferre haud posse, ut mihi quisquam obloquatur. Nunc, quo ad tuas obiectiones rursus respondeam, me converto.
Statuo ergo primo, Deum absolute, et revera causam esse omnium, quae essentiam habent, quaecunque etiam illa sint. Si iam poteris demonstrare, malum, Errorem, Scelera, etc. quicquam esse, quod essentiam exprimit, tibi penitus concedam, Deum scelerum, mali, erroris, etc. causam esse. Videor mihi sufficienter ostendisse id, quod formam mali, erroris, sceleris ponit, non in aliquo, quod essentiam exprimit, consistere, ideoque dici non posse, Deum eius esse causam.

Neronis, verbi gratia, matricidium, quatenus aliquid positivum comprehendebat, scelus non erat: nam facinus externum fecit, simulque intentionem ad trucidandam Matrem Orestes habuit, et tamen, saltem uti Nero, ita non accusatur. Quodnam ergo Neronis scelus? Non aliud, quam quod hoc facinore ostenderet se ingratum, immisericordem, ac inobedientem esse. Certum autem est, nihil horum aliquid essentiae exprimere, et idcirco Deum eorum etiam non fuisse causam, licet causa actus, et intentionis Neronis fuerit.
Porro velim hic notari, nos, dum philosophice loquimur, non debere Phrasibus theologiae uti: Nam, quia theologia Deum passim, nec temere, ut hominem perfectum repraesentat, propterea oportunum est, ut in theologia dicatur Deum quicquam cupere, Deum taedio operibus improborum affici, et proborum delectari; in philosophia vero, ubi clare percipimus, quod Deo illa attributa, quae hominem perfectum reddunt, tam aegre possunt tribui, et adsignari, quam si ea, quae elephantum, asinumve perficiunt, homini tribueremus: Ibi haec, et his similia verba nullum obtinent locum, nec ibi sine nostrorum conceptuum summa confusione ea usurpare licet.

Quare philosophice loquendo, dici nequit, Deum a quoquam quicquam petere, neque ei taediosum, aut gratum quid esse; haec quippe omnia humana sunt attributa, quae in Deo locum non habent.

[G IV 148] Notari tandem voluissem, quod, quamvis opera proborum, (hoc est, eorum, qui claram Dei habent ideam, ad quam cuncta eorum opera, ut et cogitationes determinantur) et improborum, (hoc est, eorum, qui Dei ideam haud possident, sed tantum rerum terrenarum ideas, ad quas eorum opera, cogitationesque determinantur) et denique omnium eorum, quae sunt, ex Dei aeternis legibus, et decretis necessario profluant, continuoque a Deo dependeant, attamen non solum gradibus; sed et essentia ab invicem differunt: licet etenim mus aeque, ac angelus, et aeque tristitia, ac laetitia, a Deo dependeant, nequit tamen mus species angeli, et tristitia species laetitiae esse.
Hisce opinor me tuis Obiectionibus (si eas probe intellexi; quippe interdum dubius haereo, num conclusiones, quas inde deducis, non differant ab ipsa propositione, quam demonstrare suscipis) respondisse.

[G IV 149] Verum illud clarius patebit, si ad quaestiones propositas ex his fundamentis respondeam. Prima est, an occidere Deo adeo acceptum sit, ac eleemosynas elargiri? altera est, an furari

that account transgress the limits of courtesy; and for this reason I shall pass over things of this kind in your second letter, and also in this one, as if I had not noticed them. So much for your offence, to show that I gave no cause for it, much less that I cannot bear anyone to contradict me. Now I turn to answering your objections again.

I maintain, then, first, that God is absolutely and really the cause of all things that have essence, whatever they may be. If you can now demonstrate that evil, error, crimes, etc. are anything that expresses essence, I shall grant you entirely that God is the cause of crimes, of evil, of error, etc. I seem to myself to have shown sufficiently that what posits the form of evil, error or crime does not consist in anything that expresses essence, and that therefore it cannot be said that God is its cause.

Nero's matricide, for example, insofar as it comprehended something positive, was not a crime:[497] for Orestes did the same outward deed, and at the same time had the intention of killing his mother, and yet he is not accused, at least not as Nero is. What, then, was Nero's crime? Nothing other than that by this deed he showed himself ungrateful, unmerciful and disobedient. But it is certain that none of these expresses any essence, and therefore God was not their cause either, though he was the cause of Nero's act and intention.

Further, I should like it noted here that when we speak philosophically we ought not to use the phrases of theology: for because theology often, and not without reason, represents God as a perfect man, it is fitting that in theology it should be said that God desires something, that God is affected with distaste by the works of the wicked and takes delight in those of the good; but in philosophy, where we perceive clearly that the attributes which make a man perfect can be ascribed and assigned to God as little as if we were to ascribe to a man those which make an elephant or an ass perfect,[498] there these and similar words have no place, nor may we use them there without the greatest confusion of our concepts.

Therefore, speaking philosophically, it cannot be said that God asks anything of anyone, nor that anything is distasteful or pleasing to him; for all these are human attributes, which have no place in God.

Finally, I should have wished it noted that although the works of the good (that is, of those who have a clear idea of God, to which all their works and thoughts are determined), and of the wicked (that is, of those who do not possess the idea of God, but only ideas of earthly things, to which their works and thoughts are determined), and finally of all things that are, flow necessarily from God's eternal laws and decrees and depend continually on God, yet they differ from one another not only in degree but also in essence: for although a mouse depends on God as much as an angel, and sadness as much as joy, yet a mouse cannot be a species of angel, nor sadness a species of joy.

With this I think I have answered your objections (if I have understood them properly; for at times I am in doubt whether the conclusions you draw from them do not differ from the very proposition you undertake to demonstrate).

But this will be clearer if I answer the questions proposed on these foundations. The first is whether killing is as acceptable to God as giving alms?[499] The second is whether stealing is,

[497] Compare Part IV, Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 429], on the act of striking, which considered physically is a virtue.
[498] Nadler quotes this passage (*Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 254).
[499] Letter 22 [p. 593].

Dei respectu aeque bonum sit, ac iustum esse? tertia denique est, an, si daretur animus, cum cuius singulari natura non pugnaret; sed conveniret, libidinibus obtemperare, et scelera perpetrare, an in eo, inquam, ratio virtutis daretur, quae ipsi, ut bonum faceret, et malum omitteret, persuaderet?
Ad primam hoc do responsum, me (Philosophice loquendo) quid his verbis, Deo acceptum esse, velis, nescire. Si roges, an Deus hunc non odio habeat, illum vero diligat? an Deum alius contumelia affecerit, alius favore prosecutus fuerit? respondeo, quod non.
Si vero quaestio est, numne homines, qui occidunt, et eleemosynas distribuunt, aeque probi, et perfecti sint? Rursus negando respondeo.

[G IV 150] Ad secundam regero: si bonum respectu Dei inferat, iustum aliquid boni Deo praestare, et furem aliquid mali, respondeo neque iustum, neque furem in Deo delectationem, aut taedium posse causari; si vero quaeratur, an utrumque illud opus, quatenus aliquid reale, et a Deo causatum est, aeque sit perfectum? dico, si ad opera tantum animum advertamus, et ad talem modum, posse fieri, ut utrumque aeque fit perfectum.
Si igitur interroges, numne fur, et iustus aeque sint perfecti, beatique? respondeo, non. Per iustum namque eum intelligo, qui constanter cupit, ut unusquisque, quod suum est, possideat; quam cupiditatem ego in mea Ethica (necdum edita) in piis ex clara, quam de seipsis, et Deo habent, cognitione necessario originem ducere, demonstro. Et quoniam eius generis cupiditatem fur non habet, necessario Dei, et sui ipsius cognitione, hoc est, primario, quod nos homines reddit, destituitur.
Si tamen ulterius quaeras, quid te queat movere, ut magis hoc opus, quod virtutem nuncupo, quam aliud facias? dico, me non posse scire, qua via, ex infinitis, Deus utatur, ut te ad hoc opus determinet. Posset esse, ut Deus tibi clare sui ideam impresserit, ut mundum oblivioni propter sui amorem traderes, reliquosque homines, sicut te ipsum, amares; et perspicuum est huiusmodi animi constitutionem cum caeteris omnibus, quae malae vocantur, pugnare, et ea de causa in uno subiecto non posse esse.
Porro fundamenta ethices explicandi, et etiam cuncta mea dicta demonstrandi non est hic locus, quia tantum in eo sum, ut ad quaestiones tuas responsum dem, et eas a me avertam, arceamque.

Quantum denique tertiam quaestionem attinet, ea contradictionem supponit, mihique aeque videbatur, ac si quis rogaret: Si melius cum alicuius natura conveniret, ut seipsum suspenderet, an rationes darentur, ut se non suspenderet? Verum, eiusmodi dari naturam, sit possibile, tunc affirmo, (etiamsi liberum arbitrium concederem, sive non concederem) si quis videt, se commodius in cruce posse vivere, quam mensae suae accumbentem, eum stultissime agere, si se ipsum non suspenderet; et is, qui clare videret, se scelera patrando revera perfectiore et meliore vita, vel essentia, quam virtutem sectando, posse frui, is etiam stultus foret, si illa non faceret. Nam scelera respectu istiusmodi naturae humanae perversae virtus essent.
Ad aliam quaestionem, quam calci epistolae addidisti, quia una hora vel centum eius generis quae-

in relation to God, as good as being just? The third, finally, is whether, if there were a mind with whose singular nature it did not conflict, but agreed, to obey its lusts and commit crimes, whether, I say, there would be in it a reason of virtue which would persuade it to do good and refrain from evil?

To the first I give this answer: that (speaking philosophically) I do not know what you mean by these words, 'to be acceptable to God'. If you ask whether God does not hate the one and love the other? Whether one has affronted God and the other shown him favour? I answer no.

But if the question is whether men who kill and men who give alms are equally good and perfect? Again I answer in the negative.

To the second I reply: if 'good in relation to God' implies that the just man does God some good and the thief some evil, I answer that neither the just man nor the thief can cause God delight or distaste; but if it is asked whether both those works, insofar as they are something real and caused by God, are equally perfect, I say that if we attend only to the works, and in such a way, it may be that both are equally perfect.

If, then, you ask whether the thief and the just man are equally perfect and blessed? I answer no. For by a just man I understand one who constantly desires that each should possess what is his; and I demonstrate in my *Ethics* (not yet published)[500] that this desire necessarily arises in the pious from the clear knowledge which they have of themselves and of God. And since the thief does not have a desire of that kind, he necessarily lacks the knowledge of God and of himself, that is, the chief thing that makes us men.

If, however, you ask further what could move you to do this work which I call virtue rather than another, I say that I cannot know which way, out of infinitely many, God uses to determine you to this work. It could be that God has impressed on you so clear an idea of himself that for love of him you would consign the world to oblivion and love other men as yourself; and it is plain that such a constitution of mind conflicts with all the others that are called evil, and for that reason they cannot be in one subject.

Further, this is not the place to explain the foundations of ethics and also to demonstrate all that I have said, since I am only concerned to answer your questions, and to turn them aside and ward them off from me.

As for the third question, finally, it supposes a contradiction, and seemed to me just as if someone were to ask: If it agreed better with someone's nature to hang himself, would there be reasons why he should not hang himself? But suppose it possible that there is such a nature; then I affirm (whether I granted free will or not) that if someone sees that he can live more comfortably on the gallows than sitting at his table, he would act most foolishly if he did not hang himself; and he who saw clearly that by committing crimes he could really enjoy a more perfect and better life or essence than by pursuing virtue would also be a fool if he did not commit them. For crimes would be virtue in relation to such a perverted human nature.

To the other question which you added at the foot of your letter,[501] since we could ask a hundred

[500] In the *Ethics* as published, Part IV, Prop. 37 [p. 397]: 'The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men, and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has'; justice is explained in its second scholium [p. 401].

[501] The postscript of Letter 22 [p. 601].

rere possemus, nec tamen unquam ad conclusionem unius perveniremus, et ipse responsionem non adeo urges, non respondebo: hoc tempore tantum dicam, etc.[pj]

Epistola XXIV

Viro clarissimo,
B. D. S.
Guilielmus de Blyenbergh.

Mi Domine, et amice.

[G IV 153] Ubi tua honorabar praesentia,[pk] ut in ea perseverarem non tempus, multo minus memoria permittebat, ut quae colloquentes tractavimus, ei mandarem; licet ego quam primum a te discesseram, omnes memoriae vires, quo audita retinerem, colligerem.

In proximum ergo profectus locum tuas opiniones chartae mandare conabar; sed experiebar tunc, me revera ne quartam quidem tractatorum partem retinuisse; adeo ut tibi sim excusandus, si adhuc semel, tantum quaerendo de iis, in quibus mentem tuam, vel non bene perceperim, vel non bene retinuerim, tibi molestus sim. Optem, ut hunc laborem aliquo beneficio tibi compensare facultas daretur.

Primum erat, quomodo, ubi principia, et cogitata tua metaphysica lego, quae tua, quaeque Cartesii sit sententia, internoscere possim?

[G IV 154] Secundum, an proprie detur error, et in quo consistat?

Tertium, qua ratione statuas, voluntatem non esse liberam.

Quartum, quid his verbis, quae L. M. in praefatione tuo nomine scripsit, intelligas, nempe. Cum contra author noster admittat quidem in rerum natura esse substantiam cogitantem: attamen neget illam constituere essentiam mentis humanae; sed statuat, eodem modo, quo extensio nullis limitibus determinata est, cogitationem etiam nullis limitibus determinari; adeoque quemadmodum corpus humanum non est absolute, sed tantum certo modo secundum leges naturae extensae per motum et quietem determinata extensio; sic etiam mentem, sive animam humanam non esse absolute, sed tantum secundum leges naturae cogitantis per ideas certo modo determinatam cogitationem; quae necessario dari concluditur, ubi corpus humanum existere incipit.

Unde sequi videtur, sicut corpus humanum ex millenis compositum est corporibus, ita etiam humanam mentem ex millenis constare cogitationibus;. et quemadmodum humanum corpus in millena resolvitur, unde componebatur, corpora, sic etiam mentem nostram, ubi corpus deserit, in tam multiplices, ex quibus constabat, cogitationes resolvi: et sicuti resolutae humani nostri corporis partes non amplius unitae manent; sed alia corpora inter ea se insinuant; ita sequi quoque videtur, mente nostra dissoluta, illas innumeras cogitationes, quibus constabat, non amplius

[pj] Spinoza's Dutch ends (G IV 152): '... and for this time only say that I shall expect you at the time which you appoint, and that you will be very welcome to me. But I should like it to be soon, because I am already intending to go to Amsterdam for a week or two. Meanwhile, after hearty greetings, I remain', followed by the initials U. E. V. E. D. and the signature 'B. de Spinoza'.

[pk] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 515–517, Letter 37), headed *Versio*; Gebhardt prints the Dutch first (G IV 153–157). The digital text of Gebhardt reads *honorabor*; the 1677 edition has *honorabar*.

of that kind in an hour without ever coming to a conclusion about one, and you yourself do not press much for an answer, I shall not reply: at this time I shall only say, etc.

Letter 24

Willem van Blyenbergh to Spinoza

To the most distinguished man
B. D. S.
from Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir and friend,

When I was honoured with your presence,[502] time did not allow me to remain in it, much less did memory allow me to commit to it what we discussed together; although as soon as I had left you I gathered all the powers of my memory to retain what I had heard.

Having gone on to the next place, then, I tried to commit your opinions to paper; but I then found that I had in fact retained not even a quarter of what was discussed;[503] so that you must excuse me if I trouble you once more, asking only about those things in which I either did not perceive your mind well or did not retain it well. I wish that I had the means of repaying this labour to you with some favour.

The first was: how, when I read your *Principles* and *Metaphysical Thoughts*, can I distinguish which is your opinion and which Descartes's?

The second: whether there is properly error, and in what it consists?

The third: on what ground you maintain that the will is not free.

The fourth: what you understand by these words which L. M. wrote in your name in the preface, namely: 'Whereas our author admits indeed that there is in nature a thinking substance, yet denies that it constitutes the essence of the human mind; but maintains that, in the same way in which extension is determined by no limits, thought too is determined by no limits; and so, just as the human body is not extension absolutely, but only extension determined in a certain way according to the laws of extended nature by motion and rest, so also the human mind or soul is not thought absolutely, but only thought determined in a certain way according to the laws of thinking nature by ideas; which is concluded to exist necessarily when the human body begins to exist.'[504]

From which it seems to follow that, just as the human body is composed of thousands of bodies, so also the human mind consists of thousands of thoughts;[505] and as the human body is resolved into the thousands of bodies of which it was composed, so also our mind, when it leaves the body, is resolved into the many thoughts of which it consisted; and as the resolved parts of our human body no longer remain united, but other bodies insinuate themselves between them, so it seems to follow too that when our mind is dissolved, those countless thoughts of which it consisted are

[502] Blyenbergh had visited Spinoza, as he proposed at the end of Letter 22 [p. 599]; they talked about freedom, sin and the nature of the soul (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., pp. 254–255).

[503] Nadler quotes this passage (p. 255).

[504] Meyer's preface to the *Principles* (G I 132). Compare, in the *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 11 [p. 139] and Prop. 13 [p. 141]: the mind is the idea of the body.

[505] Compare Part II, Prop. 15 [p. 159]: the idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas.

combinatas, sed divisas esse: et quemadmodum corpora soluta corpora quidem manent; sed non humana, ita a morte quoque nostram substantiam cogitantem quidem resolvi, ut cogitationes, vel substantiae cogitantes maneant, non vero ita, ut essentia erat earum, quum mens humana dicebantur.
Unde mihi videtur, ac si statueres, substantiam hominis cogitantem mutari, et instar corporum resolvi, quin imo quasdam ita, ut de impiis (ni me fallat memoria) affirmabas, omnino perire, nullamque sibi retinere cogitationem reliquam. Et sicut D. des Cartes, ut L. M. habet, mentem esse substantiam absolute cogitantem tantum praesupponit, ita et Tu, et L. M. praesupponitis maximam partem uti mihi videmini: quare tuam hoc in negotio mentem clare non percipio.

[G IV 156] Quintum est, quod tam in colloquio, quam in postrema tua epistola, 13. Martii scripta, statuis, ex clara Dei, et nostri cognitione oriri constantiam, qua, ut quilibet suum sibi habeat, cupimus: Verum hic explicandum restat, qua ratione Dei, et nostri cognitio in nobis constantem voluntatem producat, ut unusquisque, quod suum est, possideat, hoc est, qua via id ex Dei cognitione fluat, vel nos obstringat, ut virtutem amemus, et ea negligamus opera, quae vitia dicimus; et unde procedat (quandoquidem occidere, et furari, iuxta te, aeque quid positivum, ac eleemosynas dare, comprehendant) cur caedem committere non tantum perfectionis, beatitudinis, et acquiescentiae, quantum eleemosynas distribuere, involvat.
Dices forte, ut in postrema, quae 13. Martii consignata est, hanc quaestionem ad Ethicam spectare, eamque inibi a te moveri; verum quum sine huius quaestionis, ut et praecedentium elucidatione, ego tuam nequeam percipere mentem, quin semper absurditates supersint, quas conciliare non possum, amice rogo ut latius mihi ad eas respondeas; praesertim ut praecipuas quasdam definitiones, postulata, et axiomata, quibus tua Ethica, et haec imprimis quaestio innititur, proponas, et explanes. Forte, quia labor deterret, te excusabis, verum ut meae satisfacias petitioni saltem hac vice flagito, eo quod absque ultimae quaestionis solutione mentem tuam nunquam recte sim percepturus.
Optem, ut laborem tuum aliquo beneficio compensare liceret. Tempus duarum, triumve septimanarum praescribere non audeo; tantum ut ante iter tuum Amstelaedamense ad has responsum des, requiro.
Hoc ubi praestiteris, me tibi summopere devincies, egoque ostendam me esse et permanere, Mi Domine, tuum ad quaevis officia paratissimum,

G. de Blyenberg.

[G IV 157] Dordraci 27. Martii 1665.

no longer combined but divided; and as dissolved bodies remain bodies but not human ones, so too after death our thinking substance is resolved in such a way that thoughts or thinking substances remain, but not such as their essence was when they were called a human mind.

From which it seems to me as if you maintained that the thinking substance of man is changed and resolved like bodies, indeed some of them in such a way that, as you affirmed of the impious[506] (if my memory does not deceive me), they perish altogether and retain no thought left to them. And just as Mr Descartes, as L. M. has it, only presupposes that the mind is an absolutely thinking substance,[507] so you too and L. M. presuppose for the most part, as it seems to me: therefore I do not perceive your mind clearly in this matter.

The fifth is that, both in conversation and in your last letter, written on 13 March,[508] you maintain that from the clear knowledge of God and of ourselves arises the constancy by which we desire that each should have his own: but here it remains to be explained in what way the knowledge of God and of ourselves produces in us the constant will that each should possess what is his; that is, by what way this flows from the knowledge of God, or binds us to love virtue and to neglect the works which we call vices; and whence it comes (since killing and stealing, according to you, comprehend something positive as much as giving alms) that committing murder does not involve as much perfection, blessedness and contentment as distributing alms. You will perhaps say, as in your last letter, dated 13 March, that this question belongs to the *Ethics* and is treated there by you; but since without the elucidation of this question, as of the preceding ones, I cannot perceive your mind without absurdities always remaining which I cannot reconcile, I ask you in friendly fashion to answer me more fully on them; especially to set out and explain certain chief definitions, postulates and axioms on which your *Ethics*, and this question above all, rests. Perhaps you will excuse yourself because the labour deters you; but I beg you to satisfy my request at least this once, because without the solution of the last question I shall never perceive your mind rightly.
I wish that I could repay your labour with some favour. I do not dare prescribe a time of two or three weeks; I only ask that you answer this before your journey to Amsterdam.[509]

When you have done this, you will oblige me greatly, and I shall show that I am and remain, Sir, most ready for any service to you,

W. van Blyenbergh.
Dordrecht, 27 March 1665.

[506] Compare Part V, Prop. 38, Schol. [p. 517], on the part of the mind which perishes with the body.
[507] Meyer's preface (G I 132): Descartes 'only supposes, does not prove, that the human mind is an absolutely thinking substance'.
[508] Letter 23 [p. 605].
[509] Announced at the end of Spinoza's Dutch letter of 13 March (see the note at the end of Letter 23 [p. 605]).

Epistola XXVII

Humanissimo, Ornatissimoque viro,
Guilielmo de Blyenbergh

Mi Domine, et amice.

[G IV 160] Ubi tua, 27. Martii ad me data,[pl] mihi tradebatur, ut Amstelaedamum proficiscerer, in procinctu stabam. Quare, ubi dimidium eius perlegeram, domi relinquebam, donec rediissem, ut tum responderem; quoniam putabam, eam nihil, nisi quaestiones, ad primam spectantes controversiam, comprehendere.

Ego vero postea eam perlegens longe aliud eius argumentum esse deprehendebam, in eaque non modo probationem eorum, quae in praefatione mearum demonstrationum Geometricarum in Cartesii principia curavi scribi, eo tantum fine, ut meam sententiam cuilibet indicarem, non vero probarem, et hominibus persuaderem; sed etiam magnam ethices partem, quae, ut cuivis notum, metaphysica, et Physica fundari debet, desiderari.

Qua de causa, ut tuis facerem satis quaestionibus, a me impetrare non potui; sed occasionem exspectare volui, quo amicissime coram, ut postulato desistas, a te peterem, meae negationis rationem darem, et denique ostenderem eas ad primae nostrae controversiae solutionem non facere; sed econtra maximam partem a solutione istius litis pendere. Tantum ergo abest, ut mea opinio, rerum necessitatem spectans, sine iis non possit percipi; quia hae revera percipi nequeunt, antequam ea in antecessum intelligatur.

Antequam vero offerebatur occasio, hac hebdomada alterum adhuc mihi tradebatur epistolium, quod aliquam displicentiam, ex nimia mora, prae se ferre videtur. Et ideo haec pauca ad te scribere necessitas me coegit, ut de proposito, et decreto meo certiorem, ut iam reddidi, te redderem.

Spero te, negotio perpenso, ultro a tua petitione destiturum, et tamen animum in me propensum servaturum. Ego a mea parte pro viribus meis in omnibus demonstrabo, me esse, etc.

Epistola XXXII

Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo viro,
Henrico Oldenburgio

Vir Nobilissime,

[G IV 169] Quod me ad philosophandum tu,[pm] et Nobilissimus D. Boylius benigne hortamini, maximas habeo gratias; ego quidem pro tenuitate mei ingenii, quantum queo, pergo, non dubitans interim de vestro auxilio, et benevolentia.

[pl] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 518–519, Letter 38), headed *Versio*. Gebhardt prints Spinoza's Dutch after it (G IV 160–162), dated 'Voorburg den 3. Juni' (1665); it says that the second letter came under cover to Spinoza's landlord.

[pm] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 440–442, Letter 15), as Gebhardt prints it first (G IV 169–175). The original, which belongs to the Royal Society of London (VVL[3] III 119), is dated 'Voorburg, 20 November 1665' and ends with a postscript asking whether all the astronomers judge from the comets' motion that there were two comets, or only so as to save Kepler's hypothesis; Gebhardt prints it after the printed text.

Letter 27

Spinoza to Willem van Blyenbergh

To the most courteous and most accomplished man
Willem van Blyenbergh

Sir and friend,

When your letter of 27 March[510] was delivered to me, I was on the point of setting out for Amsterdam. So when I had read half of it, I left it at home until I returned, so as to answer it then; because I thought that it contained nothing but questions concerning our first controversy.

But reading it through afterwards, I found that its argument was quite different, and that in it you ask not only for the proof of what I had had written in the preface to my *Geometrical Demonstrations of Descartes's Principles*,[511] only in order to indicate my opinion to anyone, not to prove it and persuade men of it, but also for a great part of ethics, which, as everyone knows, must be founded on metaphysics and physics.

For this reason I could not bring myself to satisfy your questions; but I wished to wait for an opportunity to ask you in person, in the friendliest way, to desist from your request,[512] to give the reason for my refusal, and finally to show that they do not contribute to the solution of our first controversy, but on the contrary depend for the most part on the solution of that dispute. So far is it, then, from being the case that my opinion concerning the necessity of things cannot be perceived without them, that they in fact cannot be perceived before it is understood.

But before the opportunity offered, another short letter was delivered to me this week, which seems to show some displeasure at the long delay. And so necessity compelled me to write these few lines to you, to inform you of my intention and decision, as I have now done.

I hope that, having weighed the matter, you will of your own accord desist from your request,[513] and yet keep your kindly disposition towards me. For my part I shall show in all things, as far as I can, that I am, etc.

Letter 32

Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg

To the most noble and most learned man
Henry Oldenburg

Most noble Sir,

I give you the greatest thanks that you and the most noble Mr Boyle[514] kindly urge me to philosophize; for my part, I go on as far as I can, according to the slenderness of my talents, not doubting meanwhile your help and goodwill.

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[510] Letter 24 [p. 607].

[511] Meyer's preface, from which Blyenbergh had quoted in Letter 24 [p. 607].

[512] Nadler quotes this as Spinoza's polite but unmistakable request to be left alone (p. 255).

[513] The correspondence ends here. Nine years later Blyenbergh published a refutation of the *Theological-Political Treatise* (Leiden, 1674) (Nadler p. 255).

[514] Robert Boyle, the chemist, some of whose essays Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, had sent Spinoza at Rijnsburg in 1661 (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 225).

Ubi quaeris, quid sentiam circa quaestionem, quae in eo versatur, ut cognoscamus, quomodo unaquaeque pars naturae cum suo toto conveniat, et qua ratione cum reliquis cohaereat, puto te rogare rationes, quibus persuademur unamquamque naturae partem cum suo toto convenire, et cum reliquis cohaerere. Nam cognoscere, quomodo revera cohaereant, et unaquaeque pars cum suo toto conveniat, id me ignorare dixi in antecedenti mea epistola; quia ad hoc cognoscendum requireretur totam naturam, omnesque eius partes cognoscere.

Conabor igitur rationem ostendere, quae me id affirmare cogit; attamen prius monere velim, me naturae non tribuere pulchritudinem, deformitatem, ordinem, neque confusionem. Nam res non, nisi respective ad nostram imaginationem, possunt dici pulchrae, aut deformes, ordinatae, aut confusae.

[G IV 170] Per partium igitur cohaerentiam nihil aliud intelligo, quam quod leges, sive natura unius partis ita sese accommodat legibus, sive naturae alterius, ut quam minime sibi contrarientur. Circa totum, et partes considero res eatenus, ut partes alicuius totius, quatenus earum natura invicem se accommodat, ut, quoad fieri potest, inter se consentiant, quatenus vero inter se discrepant, eatenus unaquaeque ideam ab aliis distinctam in nostra mente format, ac proinde, ut totum, non ut pars, consideratur.

Ex. gr. cum motus particularum lymphae, chyli, etc. invicem pro ratione magnitudinis, et figurae ita se accommodant, ut plane inter se consentiant, unumque fluidum simul omnes constituant, eatenus tantum chylus, lympha, etc. ut partes sanguinis considerantur: quatenus vero concipimus particulas lymphaticas ratione figurae, et motus, a particulis chyli discrepare, eatenus eas, ut totum, non ut partem, consideramus.

[G IV 171] Fingamus iam, si placet vermiculum in sanguine vivere, qui visu ad discernendas particulas sanguinis, lymphae, etc. valeret, et ratione ad observandum, quomodo unaquaeque particula ex alterius occursu, vel resilit, vel partem sui motus communicat, etc. Ille quidem in hoc sanguine, ut nos in hac parte universi, viveret, et unamquamque sanguinis particulam, ut totum, non vero ut partem, consideraret, nec scire posset, quomodo partes omnes ab universali natura sanguinis moderantur, et invicem, prout universalis natura sanguinis exigit, se accommodare coguntur, ut certa ratione inter se consentiant.

Nam si fingamus, nullas dari causas extra sanguinem, quae novos motus sanguini communicarent, nec ullum dari spatium extra sanguinem, nec alia corpora, in quae particulae sanguinis suum motum transferre possent, certum est, sanguinem in suo statu semper mansurum, et eius particulas nullas alias variationes passuras, quam eas, quae possunt concipi ex data ratione motus sanguinis ad lympham, chylum, etc. et sic sanguis semper, ut totum, non vero ut pars, considerari deberet.

Verum quia plurimae aliae causae dantur, quae leges naturae sanguinis certo modo moderantur, et vicissim illae a sanguine, hinc fit, ut alii motus, aliaeque variationes in sanguine oriantur, quae consequuntur non a sola ratione motus eius partium ad invicem, sed a ratione motus, sanguinis, et causarum externarum simul ad invicem: hoc modo sanguis rationem partis, non vero totius habet. De toto, et parte modo dixi.

When you ask what I think about the question which turns on our knowing how each part of nature agrees with its whole and in what way it coheres with the rest, I think you are asking for the reasons by which we are persuaded that each part of nature agrees with its whole and coheres with the rest. For to know how they really cohere, and how each part agrees with its whole, I said in my preceding letter that I do not know, because to know this it would be required to know the whole of nature and all its parts.

I shall try, therefore, to show the reason which compels me to affirm it; but first I should like to point out that I do not attribute to nature beauty, ugliness, order or confusion. For things cannot be called beautiful or ugly, ordered or confused, except in relation to our imagination.[515]

By the coherence of parts, then, I understand nothing else than that the laws, or nature, of one part so adapts itself to the laws, or nature, of another that they are as little contrary to one another as possible. Concerning whole and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole insofar as their natures so adapt themselves to one another that they agree among themselves as far as possible; but insofar as they differ among themselves, to that extent each forms in our mind an idea distinct from the others, and so is considered as a whole, not as a part.

For example, when the motions of the particles of lymph, chyle, etc. so adapt themselves to one another, according to their size and shape, that they agree entirely among themselves and all together constitute one fluid, to that extent only are chyle, lymph, etc. considered as parts of the blood; but insofar as we conceive the lymphatic particles as differing from the particles of chyle by reason of their shape and motion, to that extent we consider them as a whole, not as a part.

Let us now feign, if you please, that a little worm lives in the blood, which had sight sharp enough to distinguish the particles of blood, lymph, etc., and reason to observe how each particle, on meeting another, either rebounds or communicates part of its motion, etc. It would live in this blood as we live in this part of the universe, and would consider each particle of blood as a whole, not as a part, and could not know how all the parts are regulated by the universal nature of the blood and compelled to adapt themselves to one another, as the universal nature of the blood requires, so as to agree among themselves in a certain ratio.

For if we feign that there are no causes outside the blood which would communicate new motions to the blood, nor any space outside the blood, nor other bodies to which the particles of blood could transfer their motion, it is certain that the blood would always remain in its state and its particles would undergo no variations other than those which can be conceived from the given ratio of the motion of the blood to the lymph, chyle, etc.; and so the blood would always have to be considered as a whole, not as a part.

But since there are very many other causes which regulate the laws of the nature of the blood in a certain way, and are in turn regulated by the blood, it comes about that other motions and other variations arise in the blood, which follow not only from the ratio of the motion of its parts to one another, but from the ratio of the motion of the blood and of the external causes together to one another; in this way the blood has the character of a part, not of a whole. I have just spoken of whole and part.

[515] As the Appendix to Part I argues of order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, which are 'only modes of imagining' (Part I, Appendix [p. 107]).

[G IV 172] Iam cum omnia naturae corpora eodem modo possint, et debeant concipi, ac nos hic sanguinem concepimus: omnia enim corpora ab aliis circumcinguntur, et ab invicem determinantur ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione, servata semper in omnibus simul, hoc est, in toto universo eadem ratione motus ad quietem; hinc sequitur omne corpus, quatenus certo modo modificatum existit, ut partem totius universi, considerari debere, cum suo toto convenire, et cum reliquis cohaerere; et quoniam natura universi non est, ut natura sanguinis, limitata; sed absolute infinita, ideo ab hac infinitae potentiae natura eius partes infinitis modis moderantur, et infinitas variationes pati coguntur.
Verum ratione substantiae unamquamque partem arctiorem unionem cum suo toto habere concipio. Nam ut antehac in prima mea epistola, quam Rhenoburgi adhuc habitans tibi scripsi, conatus sum demonstrare, cum de natura substantiae sit esse infinitam, sequi ad naturam substantiae corporeae unamquamque partem pertinere, nec sine ea esse, aut concipi posse.

[G IV 173] Vides igitur, qua ratione, et rationem, cur sentiam corpus humanum partem esse naturae: quod autem ad mentem humanam attinet, eam etiam partem naturae esse censeo; nempe quia statuo, dari etiam in natura potentiam infinitam cogitandi, quae, quatenus infinita, in se continet totam naturam obiective, et cuius cogitationes procedunt eodem modo, ac natura, eius nimirum ideatum.

[G IV 174] Deinde mentem humanam hanc eandem potentiam statuo, non quatenus infinitam, et totam naturam percipientem; sed finitam, nempe quatenus tantum humanum corpus percipit, et hac ratione mentem humanam partem cuiusdam infiniti intellectus statuo.

Verum haec omnia, et quae huic rei annexa sunt, hic accurate explicare, et demonstrare, res esset nimis prolixa, nec puto te id impraesentiarum a me exspectare. Imo dubito, an mentem tuam satis perceperim, atque aliud responderim, ac rogaveris, quod ex te scire desidero.

Quod deinde scribis, me innuisse Cartesii regulas motus falsas fere omnes esse, si recte memini, D. Hugenium id sentire dixi, nec ullam aliam falsam esse affirmavi, quam regulam sextam Cartesii, circa quam D. Hugenium etiam errare me putare dixi; qua occasione petii, ut mihi communicares experimentum, quod secundum eam hypothesin experti estis in vestra Regia societate; sed tibi id non licere iudico, quia de hoc nihil respondes.

Dictus Hugenius totus occupatus fuit, et adhuc est in expoliendis vitris dioptricis; in quem

Now since all the bodies of nature can and must be conceived in the same way as we have here conceived the blood (for all bodies are surrounded by others, and are determined by one another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner, the same ratio of motion to rest being always preserved in all of them together, that is, in the whole universe),[516] it follows that every body, insofar as it exists modified in a certain way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, and that it agrees with its whole and coheres with the rest. And since the nature of the universe is not limited, as the nature of the blood is, but absolutely infinite, its parts are regulated in infinite ways by this nature of infinite power, and are compelled to undergo infinite variations. But with respect to substance I conceive that each part has a closer union with its whole. For, as I tried to demonstrate earlier in my first letter,[517] which I wrote to you while I was still living at Rijnsburg, since it is of the nature of substance to be infinite, it follows that each part pertains to the nature of corporeal substance and can neither be nor be conceived without it.

You see, therefore, in what way, and for what reason, I think that the human body is a part of nature. As for the human mind, I think that it too is a part of nature; namely, because I maintain that there is also in nature an infinite power of thinking which, insofar as it is infinite, contains in itself the whole of nature objectively, and whose thoughts proceed in the same way as nature, namely its object.[518]

Next, I maintain that the human mind is this same power, not insofar as it is infinite and perceives the whole of nature, but insofar as it is finite, namely insofar as it perceives only the human body; and in this way I maintain that the human mind is a part of a certain infinite intellect.[519]

But to explain and demonstrate all these things, and what is connected with them, accurately here would be too long a business, and I do not think you expect it of me at present. Indeed I doubt whether I have grasped your meaning well enough, and whether I have not answered something other than what you asked; which I should like to know from you.

As for your writing next that I hinted that almost all of Descartes's rules of motion are false: if I remember rightly, I said that Mr Huygens thinks so, and I affirmed no other to be false than Descartes's sixth rule,[520] about which I said that I thought Mr Huygens too was in error; on which occasion I asked you to communicate to me the experiment which you made in your Royal Society according to that hypothesis; but I judge that you are not permitted to do so, since you reply nothing about it.

The said Huygens has been, and still is, wholly occupied in polishing dioptrical glasses; for this

[516] The physics of Part II says the same: a composite individual keeps its nature while its parts change, provided they keep the same ratio of motion and rest, and so the whole of nature is one individual whose parts vary in infinite ways without any change of the whole (Part II, Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155]; the definition of an individual is given after Lemma 3 [p. 153]).

[517] Letter 2, in which Spinoza undertook to show, among other things, that every substance must be infinite, or supremely perfect in its kind; in the *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. 8 [p. 35], with the indivisibility of corporeal substance in Props. 12–13 [p. 45] and the scholium to Prop. 15 [p. 49].

[518] *ideatum*: the object of the idea. Compare Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 129] with its corollary [p. 129]: whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and connection.

[519] Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]: 'the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God'.

[520] The rules of collision in Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy*, II.46–52; the sixth (II.51) concerns a body striking another at rest that is exactly equal to it (AT VIII-1 69).

finem fabricam adornavit, in qua et patinas tornare potest, satis quidem nitidam: quid autem ea promoverit, adhuc nescio, nec, ut verum fateor, valde scire desidero. Nam me experientia satis docuit in patinis sphaericis libera manu tutius, et melius expoliri, quam quavis machina. De pendulorum successu, et tempore transmigrationis in Galliam nondum aliquid certi possum scribere. etc.

Epistola L

Viro Humanissimo, atque Prudentissimo,
Jarigh Jelles

Humanissime vir,

[G IV 238] Quantum ad Politicam spectat,[pn] discrimen inter me, et Hobbesium, de quo interrogas, in hoc consistit, quod ego naturale ius semper sartum tectum conservo, quodque Supremo Magistratui in qualibet Urbe non plus in subditos iuris, quam iuxta mensuram potestatis, qua subditum superat, competere statuo, quod in statu naturali semper locum habet.

[G IV 239] Porro, quod demonstrationem attinet, quam ego in appendice Geometricarum in Cartesii principia demonstrationum stabilio, nempe Deum non, nisi valde improprie, unum, vel unicum dici posse; respondeo, rem solummodo existentiae, non vero essentiae respectu unam, vel unicam dici: res enim sub numeris, nisi postquam ad commune genus redactae fuerunt, non concipimus.

Qui, verbi gratia, sestertium, et imperialem manu tenet, de numero binario non cogitabit, nisi hunc sestertium, et imperialem uno, eodemque, nempe nummorum, vel monetarum, nomine vocare queat: nam tunc, se duos nummos, vel monetas habere, potest affirmare; quoniam non modo sestertium; sed etiam imperialem nummi, vel monetae nomine insignit.

Hinc ergo clare patet, nullam rem unam, aut unicam nominari, nisi postquam alia res concepta fuit, quae (ut dictum est) cum ea convenit.

Quoniam vero Dei existentia ipsius sit essentia, deque eius essentia universalem non possimus formare ideam, certum est, eum, qui Deum unum, vel unicum nuncupat, nullam de Deo veram habere ideam, vel improprie de eo loqui.

[G IV 240] Quantum ad hoc, quod figura negatio, non vero aliquid positivum est; manifestum est, integram materiam, indefinite consideratam, nullam posse habere figuram; figuramque in

[pn] The text is the Latin version printed in the 1677 edition (OP pp. 557–558, Letter 50), headed *Versio*, which gives the addressee's name as asterisks; Van Vloten and Land supply it (VVL^3 III 172), and took the Latin to be Spinoza's own translation, except, it seems, the last sentences. The Dutch text, which Gebhardt prints after the Latin (G IV 239–241), is dated ''s Gravenhage, 2 May 1671'; the Latin, The Hague, 2 June 1674. The book by Mansvelt mentioned at the end appeared in 1674.

purpose he has fitted up a workshop, quite a neat one indeed, in which he can also turn dishes;[521] but what he has achieved with it I do not yet know, nor, to tell the truth, do I much wish to know. For experience has taught me well enough that with spherical dishes it is safer and better to polish by free hand than by any machine. Of the success of the pendulums and the time of his moving to France I can write nothing certain yet, etc.

Letter 50

Spinoza to Jarig Jelles

To the most courteous and most prudent man
Jarig Jelles

Most courteous Sir,

With regard to politics, the difference between me and Hobbes, which you ask about, consists in this: that I always keep natural right intact, and that I hold that the supreme magistrate in any city has no more right over its subjects than in proportion to the power by which it exceeds the subject;[522] which is always the case in the natural state.

Further, as regards the demonstration which I establish in the appendix to the *Geometrical Demonstrations of Descartes's Principles*, namely that God cannot be called one or unique except very improperly:[523] I reply that a thing is called one or unique only in respect of its existence, not of its essence; for we do not conceive things under numbers until they have been brought under a common genus.

Whoever, for example, holds a sesterce and an imperial[524] in his hand will not think of the number two unless he can call this sesterce and this imperial by one and the same name, namely that of coins or pieces of money: for then he can affirm that he has two coins or two pieces of money, since he designates not only the sesterce but also the imperial by the name of coin or piece of money.

From this, then, it is clear that no thing is called one or unique until another thing has been conceived which (as has been said) agrees with it.

But since God's existence is his essence itself,[525] and we cannot form a universal idea of his essence, it is certain that whoever calls God one or unique has no true idea of God, or speaks improperly of him.

As to this, that figure is a negation and not something positive: it is evident that matter as a whole, considered indefinitely, can have no figure, and that figure has a place only in finite and

[521] *patinas*: the curved tools, ground to the required sphere, on which lenses are polished; Spinoza himself ground lenses.
[522] The principle of the *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 16 (G III 189): 'the right of each extends as far as its determinate power extends'. On the natural and the civil state in the *Ethics*, see Part IV, Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401].
[523] The appendix is the *Metaphysical Thoughts*, Part I, ch. 6 (G I 246), which says only that God may be called one insofar as we separate him from other beings, and unique insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature, and adds: 'if we wished to examine the matter more accurately, we could perhaps show that God is called one and unique only improperly; but the matter is not of such importance, indeed of none at all, to those who are concerned with things, not with names'. Compare Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 1 [p. 47], 'God is unique', where the word is explained as meaning that there is only one substance.
[524] Roman names for the Dutch coins of the original: 'een stuiver en een rijksdaalder', a stiver and a rix-dollar (G IV 239; VVL[3] III 173).
[525] Part I, Prop. 20 [p. 71]: 'God's existence and his essence are one and the same'.

finitis, ac determinatis corporibus locum tantum obtinere. Qui enim se figuram percipere ait, nil aliud eo indicat, quam se rem determinatam, et quo pacto ea sit determinata, concipere.
Haec ergo determinatio ad rem iuxta suum esse non pertinet: sed econtra est eius non esse. Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, et determinatio negatio est; non poterit, ut dictum, aliud quid, quam negatio, esse.
Librum, quem Ultraiectinus professor in meum scripsit, quique post obitum eius luci expositus est, e fenestra Bibliopolae pendentem vidi: et ex paucis, quae tum temporis in eo legeram, eum lectu, multo minus responsione indignum iudicabam. Relinquebam ergo librum, eiusque authorem.
Mente, subridens volvebam ignarissimos quosque passim audacissimos, et ad scribendum paratissimos esse. Mihi **** merces suas eodem modo, ac propolae, venum exponere videntur, qui semper, quod vilius est, primo loco ostendunt: Ajunt, Diabolum esse vaferrimum; mihi vero, eorum genius longe hunc vafritie superare videtur. Vale.

[G IV 241] Hagae Comitis 2. Iunii 1674.

Epistola LVII

Praestantissimo, Acutissimoque philosopho,
B. D. S.
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.

Praestantissime vir,

[G IV 262] Miror saltem,[po] quod eo ipso, quo demonstrent philosophi, aliquid falsum esse, eadem ratione ostendant eius veritatem: certitudinem enim intellectus in suae methodi initio Cartesius omnibus aequalem esse putat; in meditationibus autem demonstrat. Idem illi probant, qui putant se aliquid certi demonstrare posse hac ratione, ut pro indubitato a singulis hominibus accipiatur.

Sed his missis, experientiam provoco, et, ut ad haec accurate attendas, submisse rogo, sic enim deprehendetur, si ex duobus unus aliquid affirmet, alter vero neget, et ita, ut sibi eius sint conscii, loquantur, quod licet verbis contrarii videantur; attamen perpensis eorum conceptibus, ambo (unusquisque pro suo conceptu) vera dicant.

Quod quidem refero, cum immensae sit in vita communi utilitatis, et possent hoc unico observato innumerae controversiae, et inde sequentes contentiones praecaveri; quamvis veritas haec in conceptu non semper absolute vera sit, sed positis tantum iis, quae in intellectu supponuntur, ut

[po] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 580–582, Letter 61), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 262–264).

determinate bodies. For whoever says that he perceives a figure indicates by this nothing other than that he conceives a determinate thing, and in what way it is determined.
This determination, therefore, does not pertain to the thing according to its being, but on the contrary is its non-being. Since, then, figure is nothing other than determination, and determination is negation,[526] it cannot, as has been said, be anything other than negation.
The book which the Utrecht professor wrote against mine,[527] and which was published after his death, I saw hanging in a bookseller's window; and from the little I read in it at that time I judged it unworthy of being read, much less of being answered. So I left the book, and its author.

Smiling, I turned it over in my mind that the most ignorant are everywhere the boldest and the readiest to write. The ****[528] seem to me to set out their wares for sale in the same way as hucksters, who always show what is cheapest first: they say the Devil is most cunning; but to me their genius seems far to surpass him in cunning. Farewell.

The Hague, 2 June 1674.

Letter 57

Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza

To the most excellent and most acute philosopher
B. D. S.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most excellent Sir,

I am surprised, at least,[529] that philosophers show the truth of something by the very same reasoning by which they demonstrate that it is false. For Descartes, at the beginning of his *Method*, holds that the certainty of the intellect is equal in all; in the *Meditations*, however, he demonstrates it. Those prove the same who think they can demonstrate something certain in such a way that it is accepted by every single man as beyond doubt.

But leaving these things aside, I appeal to experience, and humbly ask you to attend to this carefully. For so it will be found that if, of two people, one affirms something and the other denies it, and they speak in such a way that they are conscious of what they say, then although they seem to contradict each other in words, yet when their concepts are weighed, both speak the truth (each according to his own concept).
I mention this because it is of immense use in common life, and by observing this one thing countless controversies, and the quarrels that follow from them, could be prevented; although this truth in the concept is not always absolutely true, but true only given what is supposed in

[526] Compare Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 1 [p. 35]: 'to be finite is in truth in part a negation, and to be infinite the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature'.
[527] Regnier van Mansvelt (1639–1671), professor of philosophy at Utrecht and a Cartesian: *Adversus anonymum theologico-politicum liber singularis* (Amsterdam, 1674), against the *Theological-Political Treatise* (VVL[3] III 173; Freudenthal, *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza's*, 1899, p. 279; Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 342).
[528] The word is suppressed in the Latin and the Dutch alike (OP p. 558; G IV 241).
[529] The letter answers a letter of Spinoza's on free will that has not survived, and was sent through G. H. Schuller, to whom Spinoza replied (Letter 58 [p. 623]). The 1677 edition prints it without the writer's name, which Gebhardt supplies; the Dutch version signs it 'N.N.'.

vera. Quae regula etiam adeo est universalis, ut apud omnes homines, ne dementibus quidem, ac dormientibus exceptis, reperiatur: quicquid enim hi dicunt, se videre (licet nobis non ita appareat) aut vidisse, certissimum est, haec revera ita se habere.
Quod etiam in casu proposito, de libero nempe arbitrio, clarissime conspicitur. Uterque enim tam qui pro, quam qui contra disputat, verum mihi dicere videtur, prout nimirum quilibet libertatem concipit; liberum enim dicit Cartesius, quod a nulla causa cogitur. Et tu econtra, quod a nulla causa determinatur ad aliquid.
Fateor itaque tecum, nos in omnibus rebus a certa causa ad aliquid determinari, et sic nullum nos habere liberum arbitrium: sed contra quoque puto cum Cartesio in certis rebus (quod statim aperiam) nos nullatenus cogi, atque ita habere liberum arbitrium. Exemplum formabo a praesenti.

[G IV 263] Triplex autem est status quaestionis: primo, an in res, quae extra nos sunt, absolute aliquam habeamus potestatem? Quod negatur. Exempli gratia, quod hanc nunc exaro epistolam non est absolute in mea potestate, quandoquidem certe prius scripsissem, ni vel absentia, vel amicorum praesentia impeditus fuissem.
Secundo, an nos in motus corporis nostri, qui sequuntur, voluntate eos ad id determinante, absolute habeamus potestatem? Respondeo limitando, si nimirum sano corpore vivamus. Si enim valeo, semper me ad scribendum applicare, vel non applicare possum.
Tertio, an, quando mihi meum rationis exercitium usurpare licet, eo liberrime, hoc est, absolute uti possim? Ad quod respondeo affirmative. Quis enim mihi negaret, nisi contradicendo propriae conscientiae, quod non possum in meis cogitationibus cogitare, me velle scribere, aut non scribere. Et quoad operationem quoque, quia hoc externae causae permittunt, (quod secundum concernit casum) quod equidem tam scribendi, quam non scribendi facultatem habeam: fateor quidem tecum, dari causas, quae me ad id determinant, quod iam scribo, quia scilicet primo mihi scripsisti, eademque opera postulavisti, ut prima occasione rescriberem, et, quia impraesentiarum datur occasio, eam non libenter amitterem. Pro certo etiam affirmo, teste conscientia, cum Cartesio, istiusmodi res me propterea non cogere, meque revera (quod negatu videtur impossibile) id nihilominus omittere posse, non obstantibus his rationibus.

Si quoque cogeremur a rebus externis, cui possibile est habitum virtutis acquirere? imo hoc posito omnis malitia excusabilis esset. Sed quot modis non fit, ut, si a rebus externis ad aliquid determinemur, obfirmato tamen, ac constanti ei resistamus animo?

[G IV 264] Ut itaque superioris regulae clariorem dem explicationem. Ambo equidem verum dicitis proprium iuxta conceptum: si autem absolutam veritatem spectemus, haec tantum competit sententiae Cartesii.
Supponis enim in conceptu, ut certum, libertatis essentiam in eo consistere, quod a nulla re determinamur. Hoc sic posito, utrumque verum erit; veruntamen cum essentia cuiuslibet rei in eo consistat, sine quo ne quidem concipi possit, et clare sane concipiatur libertas, licet ab externis causis in nostris actionibus ad aliquid determinemur; sive licet semper causae sint, quae

the intellect as true. This rule is also so universal that it is found among all men, not even the mad and the sleeping excepted; for whatever they say they see (though it does not appear so to us), or have seen, it is most certain that these things really are so.
This is also seen most clearly in the case proposed, namely that of free will. For both he who argues for it and he who argues against it seem to me to speak the truth, according, namely, to how each conceives freedom. For Descartes calls free that which is compelled by no cause; and you, on the contrary, that which is determined to something by no cause.[530]
I agree with you, therefore, that in all things we are determined to something by a certain cause, and so have no free will; but on the other hand I also think, with Descartes, that in certain things (as I shall show at once) we are in no way compelled, and so have free will. I shall take an example from the present case.

The question, then, has three parts. First, whether we have any absolute power over the things which are outside us? This is denied. For example, that I am now writing this letter is not absolutely in my power, since I would certainly have written earlier if I had not been prevented either by absence or by the presence of friends.
Second, whether we have absolute power over the motions of our body which follow when the will determines them to it? I answer with a limitation: namely, if we live with a healthy body. For if I am well, I can always apply myself to writing or not apply myself.
Third, whether, when I am permitted the use of my reason, I can use it most freely, that is, absolutely? To this I answer affirmatively. For who would deny me, unless by contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think in my thoughts that I want to write, or not to write?
And as regards the act too, since external causes permit this (which concerns the second case), namely that I do indeed have the faculty both of writing and of not writing: I admit indeed with you that there are causes which determine me to this, that I am now writing, namely that you wrote to me first, and at the same time asked me to reply at the first opportunity, and since the opportunity now offers, I would not willingly lose it. I also affirm for certain, with Descartes, on the testimony of consciousness, that things of this kind do not on that account compel me, and that I really could (which seems impossible to deny) nevertheless refrain from writing, notwithstanding these reasons.
Again, if we were compelled by external things, who could acquire the habit of virtue? Indeed, on this supposition all wickedness would be excusable. But in how many ways does it not happen that, when we are determined to something by external things, we nevertheless resist it with a firm and constant mind?

So, to give a clearer explanation of the rule stated above. You both speak the truth according to your own concepts; but if we look to absolute truth, it belongs only to Descartes's opinion.

For you suppose in your concept, as certain, that the essence of freedom consists in our being determined by nothing. On this supposition both will be true; but since the essence of any thing consists in that without which it cannot even be conceived, and freedom is certainly conceived clearly even though in our actions we are determined to something by external causes, or even

[530] Spinoza rejects this account of his definition at the start of his reply (Letter 58 [p. 623]); his own is Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27].

incitamento nobis sunt, ut actiones nostras tali modo dirigamus, cum tamen id plane non efficiant; verum nullatenus, posito quod cogamur.[pp]

Vide praeterea Cartesii I. Tom. Epist. 8. et 9. item II. Tom. pag. 4. Sed haec sufficiant. Rogo, ut ad has difficultates respondeas,[pq]

8. Octob. 1674.

Epistola LVIII

Viro Doctissimo, atque Expertissimo
G. H. Schuller

Expertissime Domine,

[G IV 265] Misit mihi amicus noster I. R.[pr] literas, quas ad me dignatus es scribere, una cum iudicio tui amici de mea, et Cartesii de libero arbitrio sententia, quae mihi gratissima fuerunt. Et, quamvis in praesentia, praeterquam quod valetudinem non satis firmam habeam, aliis rebus admodum distrahar, tamen vel singularis tua humanitas, vel quod ego praecipuum puto, veritatis studium, quo teneris, me cogit, ut tuo desiderio pro mei ingenii tenuitate, satisfaciam.

Etenim quid tuus amicus velit, antequam experientiam provocat, et accuratam attentionem petit, nescio. Quod deinde addit, si quando inter duos alter de re quapiam quid affirmat, alter autem neget etc. Verum est, si intelligit illos duos, quamvis iisdem utantur vocabulis, de rebus tamen diversis cogitare, cuius rei exempla aliquot amico I. R. olim misi, cui iam scribo, ut tibi eadem communicet.
Transeo igitur ad illam libertatis definitionem, quam meam esse ait; sed nescio, unde illam sumpserit. Ego eam rem liberam esse dico, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et agit; coactam autem, quae ab alio determinatur, ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione.

Ex. gr. Deus, tametsi necessario, libere tamen existit, quia ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit. Sic etiam Deus se, et absolute omnia libere intelligit, quia ex sola ipsius naturae necessitate sequitur, ut omnia intelligat. Vides igitur me libertatem non in libero decreto; sed in libera necessitate ponere.
Sed ad res creatas descendamus, quae omnes a causis externis determinantur ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione. Quod ut clare intelligatur, rem simplicissimam concipiamus. Ex. gr. Lapis a causa externa, ipsum impellente, certam motus quantitatem accipit,

[pp] The sentence lacks the main clause that should answer *cum essentia … consistat*, as Van Vloten and Land observe (VVL[3] III 194).
[pq] The Latin breaks off here; the Dutch version ends the sentence with a promise of gratitude and the signature 'N.N.' (G IV 264).
[pr] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP, Letter 62), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 265–268). It bears no date; it answers Letter 57, of 8 October 1674.

though there are always causes which serve as incitements to us to direct our actions in such a way, without, however, bringing this about at all; but by no means, on the supposition that we are compelled.
See also Descartes, vol. I, Letters 8 and 9, and vol. II, p. 4. But let this suffice. I ask you to reply to these difficulties,

8 October 1674.

Letter 58

Spinoza to Georg Hermann Schuller

To the most learned and expert man
G. H. Schuller

Most expert Sir,

Our friend J. R.[531] has sent me the letter which you were good enough to write to me, together with your friend's judgment[532] of my opinion and of Descartes's on free will, which were most welcome to me. And although at present, besides not having very firm health, I am much distracted by other matters, yet either your singular kindness or, what I consider the chief thing, the zeal for truth by which you are possessed, compels me to satisfy your wish, as far as my slender talents allow.
For what your friend means before he appeals to experience and asks for careful attention, I do not know. As for what he adds next, if ever, between two people, one affirms something about some matter and the other denies it, etc.: it is true if he means that the two, although they use the same words, are nevertheless thinking of different things; of which I once sent some examples to our friend J. R., to whom I am now writing that he should communicate them to you.
I pass, therefore, to that definition of freedom which he says is mine; but I do not know where he took it from. I say that that thing is free which exists and acts from the necessity of its nature alone; and compelled, that which is determined by another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.[533]
For example, God, though necessarily, nevertheless exists freely, because he exists from the necessity of his nature alone. So too God understands himself and absolutely all things freely, because it follows from the necessity of his nature alone that he understands all things. You see, therefore, that I place freedom not in a free decree, but in a free necessity.[534]
But let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.[535] To understand this clearly, let us conceive a very simple thing. For example, a stone receives from an external cause which impels it a certain

[531] The Amsterdam bookseller Jan Rieuwertsz (VVL[3] III 195), who published Spinoza's *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy* and the *Theological-Political Treatise* (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 124).
[532] Tschirnhaus's letter (Letter 57 [p. 619]), which Schuller had forwarded.
[533] Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27], nearly word for word: 'That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But that thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.'
[534] Compare Part I, Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67], that God alone is a free cause, and Prop. 32 [p. 85], that the will cannot be called a free cause.
[535] Part I, Prop. 28 [p. 79].

qua postea, cessante causae externae impulsu, moveri necessario perget. Haec igitur lapidis in motu permanentia coacta est, non quia necessaria; sed quia impulsu causae externae definiri debet; et quod hic de lapide, id de quacunque re singulari, quantumvis illa composita, et ad plurima apta esse concipiatur, intelligendum est, quod scilicet unaquaeque res necessario a causa externa aliqua determinatur ad existendum, et operandum certa, ac determinata ratione.

[G IV 266] Porro, concipe iam, si placet, lapidem, dum moveri pergit, cogitare, et scire, se, quantum potest, conari, ut moveri pergat. Hic sane lapis, quandoquidem sui tantummodo conatus est conscius, et minime indifferens, se liberrimum esse, et nulla alia de causa in motu perseverare credet, quam quia vult. Atque haec humana illa libertas est, quam omnes habere iactant, et quae in hoc solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitus sint conscii, et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari.
Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit; puer autem iratus vindictam velle, et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit, se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui, quae postea sobrius tacuisse vellet. Sic delirans, garrulus, et huius farinae plurimi se ex libero mentis decreto agere, non autem impetu ferri credunt.

Et quia hoc praeiudicium omnibus hominibus innatum est, non ita facile eodem liberantur. Nam quamvis experientia satis superque doceat, homines nihil minus posse, quam appetitus moderari suos, et quod saepe, dum contrariis affectibus conflictantur, meliora videant, et deteriora sequantur, se tamen liberos esse credunt, idque propterea, quod res quasdam leviter appetant, et quarum appetitus facile potest contrahi memoria alterius rei, cuius frequenter recordamur.

His, quaenam mea de libera, et coacta necessitate, deque ficta humana libertate sit sententia, satis, ni fallor, explicui; ex quibus facile ad tui amici obiectiones respondetur. Nam, quod cum Cartesio ait, illum liberum esse, qui a nulla causa externa cogitur, si per hominem coactum intelligit eum, qui invitus agit, concedo nos quibusdam in rebus nullatenus cogi, hocque respectu habere liberum arbitrium; sed si per coactum intelligit, qui quamvis non invitus, necessario tamen agit, (ut supra explicui) nego nos aliqua in re liberos esse.

[G IV 267] At amicus tuus contra affirmat; nos rationis exercitio liberrime, hoc est, absolute uti posse, qua in re satis, ne dicam nimis confidenter perstat. Quis enim, ait, nisi propriae contradicendo conscientiae, negaret, me cogitationibus meis cogitare posse, quod vellem, et quod non vellem scribere.
Pervelim scire, quam ille conscientiam, praeter illam, quam supra exemplo lapidis explicui, narrat: Ego sane, ne meae conscientiae, hoc est, ne rationi, et experientiae contradicam, et ne praeiudicia, et ignorantiam foveam, nego, me ulla absoluta cogitandi potentia cogitare posse, quod vellem, et quod non vellem scribere.

quantity of motion, by which it will afterwards necessarily continue to move when the impulse of the external cause has ceased.[536] This continuance of the stone in motion is therefore compelled, not because it is necessary, but because it must be defined by the impulse of the external cause; and what is to be understood here of the stone must be understood of any singular thing, however composite and capable of many things it is conceived to be: namely, that each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.

Now conceive, if you please, that the stone, while it continues to move, thinks, and knows that it is striving, as far as it can, to continue to move. This stone, surely, since it is conscious only of its striving, and is by no means indifferent, will believe that it is most free and that it perseveres in motion for no other cause than because it wills to. And this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists only in this, that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.[537]

So the infant believes that it freely wants milk; the angry boy that he wants vengeance, and the timid one flight. The drunk, again, believes that he says from a free decree of the mind what afterwards, when sober, he would wish he had kept silent about. So the delirious man, the chatterer, and very many of this stamp believe that they act from a free decree of the mind, and are not carried away by impulse.[538]

And since this prejudice is innate in all men, they are not so easily freed from it. For although experience teaches more than enough that men can do nothing less than moderate their appetites, and that often, when they are torn by contrary affects, they see the better and follow the worse, they nevertheless believe themselves free; and that because they want some things lightly, and their appetite for these can easily be reduced by the memory of another thing which we frequently recollect.

With these things I have, unless I am mistaken, explained sufficiently what my opinion is of free and compelled necessity, and of feigned human freedom; from which your friend's objections are easily answered. For when he says, with Descartes, that he is free who is compelled by no external cause: if by a man compelled he understands one who acts against his will, I grant that in certain things we are in no way compelled, and in this respect have free will; but if by compelled he understands one who, though not against his will, nevertheless acts necessarily (as I explained above), I deny that we are free in anything.

But your friend, on the contrary, affirms that we can use the exercise of reason most freely, that is, absolutely; in which he persists confidently enough, not to say too confidently. For who, he says, would deny, unless by contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think in my thoughts that I want to write, and that I do not want to write?

I should very much like to know what consciousness he speaks of, other than the one I explained above with the example of the stone. For my part, so as not to contradict my consciousness, that is, reason and experience, and so as not to foster prejudices and ignorance, I deny that I can, by any absolute power of thinking, think that I want to write and that I do not want to write.

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[536] Compare Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151]: a body in motion moves until it is determined to rest by another body.

[537] As in the Appendix to Part I (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]), Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181] and Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]; the stone's striving answers to the *conatus* of Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243].

[538] Almost word for word in Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235].

Sed ipsius conscientiam appello, qui sine dubio expertus est, se in somnis non habere potestatem cogitandi, quod vellet et quod non vellet scribere; nec cum somniat se velle scribere, potestatem habet, non somniandi se velle scribere; nec minus expertum illum esse credo, quod mens non semper aeque apta sit ad cogitandum de eodem obiecto; sed prout corpus aptius est, ut in eo huius, vel illius obiecti imago excitetur, ita mens aptior est ad hoc, vel illud obiectum contemplandum.

Cum praeterea addit, quod causae, cur animum ad scribendum applicuerit, ipsum quidem ad scribendum impulerint; sed non coegerint, nihil aliud significat, (si rem aequo pondere examinare velis) quam quod ipsius animus ita tum erat constitutus, ut causae, quae ipsum alias, cum scilicet magno aliquo affectu conflictatur, non potuissent, nunc facile potuerunt flectere, hoc est, causae, quae ipsum alias non potuissent cogere, coegerunt iam, non ut invitus scriberet; sed ut necessario scribendi esset cupidus.

Quod porro statuit: quod si a causis externis cogeremur, virtutis habitum acquirere possit nemo; nescio, quis ipsi dixerit, non posse ex fatali necessitate; sed tantummodo ex libero mentis decreto, fieri, ut firmato, et constanti simus animo.

Et quod denique addit: quod hoc posito omnis malitia excusabilis esset. Quid inde? Nam homines mali non minus timendi sunt, nec minus perniciosi, quando necessario mali sunt.

Sed de his si placet, vide meae appendicis ad Cartesii principiorum lib. I. et II. ordine geometrico demonstrator. Partis II. Caput VIII.

[G IV 268] Denique tuus amicus, qui haec mihi obiicit, vellem, ut mihi responderet, qua ratione ille humanam virtutem, quae ex libero mentis decreto oritur, simul concipiat cum Dei praeordinatione. Quod si cum Cartesio fatetur, se haec nescire conciliare, ergo telum, quo ipse transfixus iam est, in me vibrare conatur. Sed frustra. Nam si meam sententiam attento animo examinare velis, omnia congruere videbis, etc.

Epistola LXIII

Praestantissimo, acutissimoque philosopho,
B. D. S.
G. H. Schuller.

Praestantissime vir,

[G IV 274] Serio abs te peto,[ps] ut dubitationes hic motas solvere, tuamque ad eas responsionem mittere placeat. Sit, rogo, demonstratio ea ostensiva; non vero ad impossibile deducens, num

[ps] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 590–591, Letter 65), which prints the letter without the writer's name. Gebhardt prints first the original, which survives (G IV 274–276), and then this text. In the original Schuller apologizes for his long silence; writes that their friend Tschirnhaus, still in England, sends his respects and has asked him to put these questions; and adds that Tschirnhaus has removed the strange opinion of Spinoza that Boyle and Oldenburg had formed, so that they now think most highly of him and greatly esteem the *Theological-Political Treatise*. It closes with greetings from 'D. a. Gent' and Jan Rieuwertsz.

But I appeal to his own consciousness. He has no doubt experienced that in sleep he does not have the power of thinking that he wants to write and that he does not want to; nor, when he dreams that he wants to write, does he have the power not to dream that he wants to write. Nor do I believe that he has any less experienced that the mind is not always equally capable of thinking of the same object, but that, as the body is more capable of having the image of this or that object aroused in it, so the mind is more capable of contemplating this or that object.[539]

When he adds, further, that the causes for which he applied his mind to writing impelled him to write but did not compel him, he means nothing else (if you are willing to weigh the matter fairly) than that his mind was then so constituted that causes which at other times, namely when he was torn by some great affect, could not have bent him, now could easily do so; that is, causes which at other times could not have compelled him have now compelled him, not to write against his will, but to be necessarily desirous of writing.

As for his further statement that if we were compelled by external causes, no one could acquire the habit of virtue: I do not know who told him that it cannot happen from fatal necessity, but only from a free decree of the mind, that we are of a firm and constant mind.

And what he finally adds: that on this supposition all wickedness would be excusable. What then? For wicked men are no less to be feared, and no less pernicious, when they are necessarily wicked.

But on these matters see, if you please, Part II, Chapter 8, of my Appendix[540] to the first and second books of Descartes's *Principles* demonstrated in geometrical order.

Finally, I should like your friend, who makes these objections to me, to answer me how he conceives human virtue, which arises from a free decree of the mind, together with God's preordination. If he admits, with Descartes, that he does not know how to reconcile these,[541] then he is trying to hurl at me the weapon by which he himself has already been pierced. But in vain. For if you are willing to examine my opinion attentively, you will see that everything agrees, etc.

Letter 63

Georg Hermann Schuller to Spinoza

To the most excellent and most acute philosopher
B. D. S.
from G. H. Schuller

Most excellent Sir,

I earnestly ask you[542] to be good enough to resolve the doubts raised here, and to send me your reply to them. Let the demonstration, I ask, be ostensive, not one leading to the impossible:[543]

[539] Compare Part II, Prop. 14 [p. 159] and, on dreams, Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235].

[540] The *Metaphysical Thoughts* (*Cogitata Metaphysica*) appended to Spinoza's *Principles of Descartes's Philosophy* (1663); Part II, chapter 8, is 'On the will of God' (G I 264).

[541] Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* I.41: the freedom of our will and God's preordination are both certain, though we cannot comprehend how they agree (AT VIII-1 20).

[542] Georg Hermann Schuller, an Amsterdam physician (Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., p. 260), writes on behalf of their friend Tschirnhaus, then in England; Spinoza's answer is Letter 64 [p. 629].

[543] A direct proof, not a *reductio ad absurdum*; Spinoza remarks in his reply that he prefers the latter for negative propositions (Letter 64 [p. 629]).

scilicet primo nos plura de Deo attributa, quam cogitationem, extensionemque possimus cognoscere? Porro num inde sequatur creaturas, aliis constantes attributis, nullam posse concipere extensionem? Unde sequeretur tot constituendos esse mundos, quot dantur Dei attributa.

Quantae ex. gr. extensionis noster existeret mundus, tantae quoque extensionis mundi, aliis affecti attributis, essent: quemadmodum vero, praeter cogitationem, non nisi extensionem percipimus, ita etiam istius mundi creaturae, non nisi sui mundi attributa, atque cogitationem perciperent.

[G IV 275] Secundo, quoniam Dei intellectus tam essentia, quam existentia a nostro differt intellectu; nihil ergo cum nostro commune habebit; ac proinde (per 3 Ethic. Prop. part. 1.) Dei intellectus nostri causa esse nequit.

Tertio, in schol. 10. Prop. part. 1. Ethic. ais nihil in natura clarius esse, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi; (quod optime capio) et quo plus realitatis, aut esse habeat, eo plura ei competant attributa. Hinc sequi videtur, dari entia, quae tria, quatuor, aliaque plura habent attributa, licet ex demonstratis colligere licuerit, unumquodque ens duobus tantum constare attributis, nimirum certo quodam Dei attributo, eiusdemque attributi idea.

Quarto, eorum, quae a Deo immediate producta sunt, quaeque mediante infinita quadam modificatione producuntur, exempla desiderarem. Prioris generis cogitatio, ac extensio; posterioris vero intellectus in cogitatione, motus in extensione esse videntur.
Haec sunt, quae abs te, siquidem tempus aliquod tibi sit reliquum, peto. Vale etc.

25 Iulii 1675.

Epistola LXIV

Doctissimo, Expertissimoque viro.
G. H. Schuller

Expertissime vir,

[G IV 277] Gaudeo, quod tandem occasio[pt] tibi oblata fuerit, ut me tuis literis, mihi semper gratissimis, recreares, quod ut frequenter facias, enixe rogo, etc.

Ad dubia pergo, et quidem ad primum dico, mentem humanam illa tantummodo posse cognitione assequi, quae idea corporis actu existentis involvit, vel quod ex hac ipsa idea potest concludi. Nam cuiuscunque rei potentia sola eius essentia definitur, (per prop. 7. p. 3. Ethices) mentis autem essentia (per prop. 13. p. 2.) in hoc solo consistit, quod sit idea corporis actu existentis, ac proinde mentis intelligendi potentia ad ea tantum se extendit, quae haec idea corporis in se continet, vel quae ex eadem sequuntur.

[pt] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 591–593, Letter 66), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 277–278).

namely, first, whether we can know more attributes of God than thought and extension? Further, whether it follows from this that creatures consisting of other attributes can conceive no extension? From which it would follow that as many worlds must be constituted as there are attributes of God.

For example, of however great an extension our world exists, of so great an extension also would the worlds be that are affected with other attributes; and just as we perceive, besides thought, nothing but extension, so too the creatures of such a world would perceive nothing but the attributes of their world, and thought.

Second, since God's intellect differs from our intellect both in essence and in existence,[544] it will therefore have nothing in common with ours; and so (by Prop. 3 of Part I of the *Ethics* [p. 31]) God's intellect cannot be the cause of ours.

Third, in the scholium to Prop. 10 of Part I of the *Ethics* [p. 39] you say that nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute (which I understand very well), and that the more reality, or being, it has, the more attributes belong to it. From this it seems to follow that there are beings which have three, four, or still more attributes, although from what has been demonstrated it could be gathered that each being consists of only two attributes, namely a certain attribute of God and the idea of that attribute.

Fourth, I should like examples of those things which are produced immediately by God, and of those which are produced by the mediation of some infinite modification.[545] Of the first kind seem to be thought and extension; of the second, intellect in thought, motion in extension.

These are the things I ask of you, if you have any time left over. Farewell, etc.

25 July 1675.

Letter 64

Spinoza to Georg Hermann Schuller

To the most learned and expert man
G. H. Schuller

Most expert Sir,

I am glad that an opportunity has at last been offered you to refresh me with a letter of yours, always most welcome to me; and I earnestly ask you to do so often, etc.

I proceed to the doubts, and to the first I say that the human mind can attain to knowledge only of those things which the idea of a body actually existing involves, or which can be inferred from this idea itself. For the power of any thing is defined by its essence alone (by Prop. 7, Part III of the *Ethics* [p. 243]), and the essence of the mind (by Prop. 13, Part II [p. 141]) consists only in this, that it is the idea of a body actually existing; and so the mind's power of understanding extends only to those things which this idea of the body contains in itself, or which follow from it.

[544] As argued in the scholium to Part I, Prop. 17 [p. 67]: God's intellect is the cause of our intellect both as to essence and as to existence, and therefore differs from it in both, as the Dog, the heavenly constellation, differs from the dog that barks.

[545] The infinite modes of Part I, Props. 21–23 [p. 73], which the *Ethics* describes without giving examples; Spinoza supplies them in Letter 64 [p. 631].

At haec corporis idea nulla alia Dei attributa involvit, neque exprimit, quam extensionem, et cogitationem. Nam eius ideatum, nempe corpus (per prop. 6. p. 2.) Deum pro causa habet, quatenus sub attributo extensionis, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, atque adeo (per axiom. 6. p. 1.) haec corporis idea Dei cognitionem involvit, quatenus tantummodo sub extensionis attributo consideratur. Deinde haec idea, quatenus cogitandi modus est, Deum etiam (per eandem prop.) pro causa habet, quatenus res est cogitans, et non quatenus sub alio attributo consideratur; adeoque (per idem axiom.) huius ideae idea Dei cognitionem involvit, quatenus sub cogitationis, et non quatenus sub alio attributo consideratur.

Apparet itaque mentem humanam, sive corporis humani ideam praeter haec duo nulla alia Dei attributa involvere, neque exprimere. Caeterum ex his duobus attributis, vel eorundem affectionibus nullum aliud Dei attributum (per prop. 10. p. 1.) concludi, neque concipi potest. Atque adeo concludo mentem humanam nullum Dei attributum praeter haec posse cognitione assequi, ut fuit propositum.
Quod autem addis, an ergo tot mundi constituendi sunt, quot dantur attributa? vide schol. Prop. 7. p. 2. Ethices. Posset praeterea haec propositio facilius demonstrari, deducendo rem ad absurdum; quod quidem demonstrandi genus, quando propositio negativa est, prae altero eligere soleo, quia cum natura similium magis convenit.

Sed quia positivum tantummodo petis, ad alterum transeo, quod est, an id possit ab alio produci, in quo tam essentia, quam existentia discrepat: nam quae ab invicem ita differunt nihil commune habere videntur. Sed cum omnia singularia, praeter illa, quae a suis similibus producuntur, differant a suis causis, tam essentia, quam existentia, nullam hic dubitandi rationem video.

[G IV 278] Quo autem ego sensu intelligam, quod Deus sit causa efficiens rerum, tam essentiae, quam existentiae, credo me satis explicuisse in schol. et coroll. Prop. 25. p. 1. Ethic.

Axioma scholii prop. 10. p. 1. ut in fine eiusd. Scholii innui, formamus ex idea, quam habemus entis absolute infiniti, et non ex eo, quod dentur, aut possint dari entia, quae tria, quatuor, etc. attributa habeant.

Denique exempla, quae petis, primi generis sunt in cogitatione, intellectus absolute infinitus; in extensione autem motus et quies; secundi autem, facies totius universi, quae quamvis infinitis modis variet, manet tamen semper eadem, de quo vide schol. 7. Lemmatis ante prop. 14. p. 2.

His, vir praestantissime, ad tuas, nostrique amici obiectiones respondisse me credo, si tamen

But this idea of the body involves and expresses no attributes of God other than extension and thought. For its object, namely the body (by Prop. 6, Part II [p. 129]), has God for its cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension, and not insofar as he is considered under any other; and so (by Ax. 6, Part I [p. 29])[546] this idea of the body involves the knowledge of God only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension. Next, this idea, insofar as it is a mode of thinking, also has God for its cause (by the same Prop.) insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is considered under another attribute; and so (by the same axiom) the idea of this idea involves the knowledge of God insofar as he is considered under the attribute of thought, and not insofar as he is considered under another attribute.

It is apparent, therefore, that the human mind, or the idea of the human body, involves and expresses no attributes of God besides these two. Moreover, from these two attributes, or from their affections, no other attribute of God can be inferred or conceived (by Prop. 10, Part I [p. 39]). And so I conclude that the human mind can attain to knowledge of no attribute of God besides these, as was proposed.

As for your further question, whether therefore as many worlds must be constituted as there are attributes, see the scholium to Prop. 7, Part II of the *Ethics* [p. 131].[547] This proposition could, moreover, be demonstrated more easily by reducing the matter to absurdity; which kind of demonstration, when the proposition is negative, I usually choose in preference to the other, because it agrees more with the nature of such things.

But since you ask only for a positive one, I pass to the other question, which is whether a thing can be produced by another from which it differs both in essence and in existence: for things which differ from one another in this way seem to have nothing in common. But since all singular things, except those produced by their like, differ from their causes both in essence and in existence, I see no reason for doubt here.

In what sense I understand that God is the efficient cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence, I think I have explained sufficiently in the scholium [p. 77] and corollary of Prop. 25, Part I of the *Ethics* [p. 77].

The axiom of the scholium to Prop. 10, Part I [p. 39] we form, as I indicated at the end of that scholium, from the idea which we have of a being absolutely infinite, and not from there being, or being able to be, beings which have three, four, etc. attributes.

Finally, the examples you ask for: of the first kind are,[548] in thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in extension, motion and rest; of the second, the face of the whole universe, which, although it varies in infinite ways, nevertheless remains always the same;[549] on which see the scholium to Lemma 7, before Prop. 14, Part II [p. 155].

With these I think, most excellent Sir, I have answered the objections of yourself and our

[546] So the Latin. Axiom 6 says that a true idea must agree with its object; the step seems rather to rest on Axiom 4 [p. 29], that the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.

[547] That a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways, and that whether nature is conceived under one attribute or another, one and the same order, or connection of causes, is found.

[548] The *Ethics* describes the infinite modes of Part I, Props. 21–23 [p. 73] without naming any: those that follow from the absolute nature of an attribute (the first kind) and those that follow from an attribute modified by such a mode (the second). This letter supplies the examples.

[549] Compare Part II, Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155]: the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual.

scrupulum adhuc remanere existimas, rogo, ut mihi significare non graveris, ut eum etiam, si possim, evellam. Vale, etc.

Hagae Com. 29 Iulii, 1675.

Epistola LXV

Acutissimo, ac Doctissimo philosopho,
B. D. S.
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.

Vir clarissime,

[G IV 279] Abs te peto demonstrationem[pu] eius, quod dicis; nempe quod anima non possit plura attributa Dei, quam extensionem, et cogitationem percipere. Quod quidem licet evidenter videam, contrarium tamen ex schol prop. 7. part. 2. Ethices posse deduci, mihi videtur, forte non aliam ob causam, quam quia sensum huius scholii non satis recte percipio. Constitui ergo, haec qua ratione deducam, exponere, te, vir Cl. obnixe rogans, ut mihi velis, ubicunque sensum tuum non recte assequor, solita tua humanitate sucurrere. Ea autem sic sese habent.

Quod, licet inde colligam, mundum utique unicum esse, id tamen exinde non minus quoque clarum est, eum ipsum infinitis modis expressum; ac proinde unamquamque rem singularem infinitis modis expressam esse. Unde videtur sequi, quod modificatio illa, quae mentem meam constituit; ac modificatio illa, quae corpus meum exprimit, licet una, et eadem sit modificatio, ea tamen infinitis modis sit expressa, uno modo per cogitationem, altero per extensionem, tertio per attributum Dei mihi incognitum, atque sic porro in infinitum, quia infinita dantur attributa Dei, et ordo, et connexio modificationum videtur esse eadem in omnibus.
Hinc iam quaestio oritur, quare mens, quae certam modificationem repraesentat, et quae eadem modificatio non solum extensione, sed infinitis aliis modis est expressa; quare, inquam, tantum modificationem illam per extensionem expressam, hoc est, corpus humanum, et nullam aliam expressionem per alia attributa percipiat. Sed tempus mihi non permittit, ut ea prolixius prosequar, forte haec dubia omnia crebrioribus meditationibus eximentur.

Londini, 12. August. 1675.

Epistola LXVI

Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo viro,
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus

Nobilissime vir,

[G IV 280] Caeterum, ad tuam obiectionem[pv] ut respondeam, dico, quod quamvis unaquae-

[pu] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 593–594, Letter 67), which prints the letter without the writer's name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 279).
[pv] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 594, Letter 68), which prints the letter without the addressee's name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 280). Its opening *Caeterum* ('But', 'For the rest') suggests that only the end of the letter was printed.

friend; if, however, you think some difficulty still remains, I beg you not to hesitate to tell me of it, so that I may remove it too, if I can. Farewell, etc.

The Hague, 29 July 1675.

Letter 65

Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza

To the most acute and most learned philosopher
B. D. S.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most distinguished Sir,

I ask you for a demonstration of what you say, namely that the soul cannot perceive more attributes of God than extension and thought. Although I see this evidently, it nevertheless seems to me that the contrary can be deduced from the scholium to Prop. 7, Part II of the *Ethics* [p. 131], perhaps for no other reason than that I do not grasp the sense of this scholium rightly enough. I have decided, therefore, to set out how I deduce it, earnestly asking you, distinguished Sir, to be good enough to help me with your usual kindness wherever I do not follow your meaning rightly. The matter stands as follows.

Although I gather from it that the world is certainly one, it is nevertheless no less clear from it that it is expressed in infinite ways, and so that each singular thing is expressed in infinite ways. From this it seems to follow that the modification which constitutes my mind and the modification which expresses my body, although it is one and the same modification, is nevertheless expressed in infinite ways: in one way through thought, in another through extension, in a third through an attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity, since there are infinite attributes of God, and the order and connection of the modifications seems to be the same in all.

Hence the question now arises why the mind, which represents a certain modification, and which same modification is expressed not only in extension but in infinite other ways, why, I say, it perceives only that modification expressed through extension, that is, the human body, and no other expression through the other attributes.[550] But time does not allow me to pursue these things at greater length; perhaps all these doubts will be removed by more frequent meditation.

London, 12 August 1675.

Letter 66

Spinoza to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

To the most noble and most learned man
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most noble Sir,

But, to reply to your objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in infinite ways in

[550] Spinoza's answer is Letter 66 [p. 633]; Appendix C [p. 663] discusses the question and the answer.

que res infinitis modis expressa sit in infinito Dei intellectu, illae tamen infinitae ideae, quibus exprimitur, unam eandemque rei singularis mentem constituere nequeunt; sed infinitas: quandoquidem unaquaeque harum infinitarum idearum nullam connexionem cum invicem habent, ut in eodem scholio propositionis 7. Part. 2. Ethic. explicui, et ex prop. 10. Part. 1. patet. Ad haec si aliquantulum attendas, nihil difficultatis superesse videbis, etc.

Hagae 18 August. 1675.

Epistola LXXIII

Viro Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo,
Henrico Oldenburgio

Nobilissime Domine,

[G IV 306] Perbreves tuas literas,[pw] 15. Nov. ad me datas, die Saturni elapsa accepi: in iis ea tantummodo indicas, quae in tractatu theologico-Politico crucem lectoribus fixere. Cum tamen ex iis etiam cognoscere speraverim, quaenam eae opiniones essent, quae religiosae virtutis praxin labefactare viderentur, de quibus antea monueras.

Sed, ut de tribus illis capitibus, quae notas, mentem meam tibi aperiam, dico, et quidem ad primum, me de Deo, et natura sententiam fovere longe diversam ab ea, quam Neoterici Christiani defendere solent. Deum enim rerum omnium causam immanentem, ut aiunt, non vero transeuntem statuo.

Omnia, inquam, in Deo esse, et in Deo moveri cum Paulo affirmo, et forte etiam cum omnibus antiquis philosophis, licet alio modo; et auderem etiam dicere, cum antiquis omnibus Hebraeis, quantum ex quibusdam traditionibus, tametsi multis modis adulteratis, coniicere licet. Attamen quod quidam putant, tractatum theologico-Politicum eo niti, quod Deus, et natura (per quam massam quandam, sive materiam corpoream intelligunt) unum, et idem sint, tota errant via.

Ad miracula deinde quod attinet, mihi contra persuasum est, divinae revelationis certitudinem sola doctrinae sapientia, non autem miraculis, hoc est, ignorantia adstrui posse, quod satis prolixe cap. VI. de miraculis ostendi.

[pw] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 449–451, Letter 21), where the letter carries no date. Gebhardt prints after it a copy made for Leibniz (G IV 306–309), whose readings include *materiam incorpoream* for *materiam corpoream*, *praecipue agnoscere* for *praecipuam agnoscere*, and *in mente Christi Jesu* ('in the mind of Christ Jesus') for *in Christo Iesu*.

the infinite intellect of God, those infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinite minds; since each of these infinite ideas has no connection with the others,[551] as I explained in the same scholium to Prop. 7, Part II of the *Ethics* [p. 131], and as is evident from Prop. 10, Part I [p. 39]. If you attend to these things a little, you will see that no difficulty remains, etc.

The Hague, 18 August 1675.

Letter 73

Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg

To the most noble and most learned man
Henry Oldenburg

Most noble Sir,

Your very short letter, sent to me on 15 November,[552] I received last Saturday: in it you indicate only those things in the *Theological-Political Treatise* which have been a torment to its readers. Though I had hoped also to learn from it what those opinions were which seemed to undermine the practice of religious virtue, of which you had warned me before.

But to open my mind to you on those three heads which you note, I say, and indeed as to the first, that I hold an opinion of God and nature far different from the one which the modern Christians usually defend. For I hold that God is the immanent cause, as they say, of all things, and not the transitive cause.[553]

All things, I say, are in God and move in God: this I affirm with Paul,[554] and perhaps also with all the ancient philosophers, though in another way; and I would even dare to say, with all the ancient Hebrews, so far as may be conjectured from certain traditions, even though these have been corrupted in many ways. Yet those who think that the *Theological-Political Treatise* rests on this, that God and nature (by which they understand a certain mass, or corporeal matter)[555] are one and the same, are entirely mistaken.

Next, as for miracles, I am on the contrary persuaded that the certainty of divine revelation can be built up only on the wisdom of its teaching, and not on miracles, that is, on ignorance; which I have shown at some length in chapter VI, on miracles.[556]

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[551] Each attribute must be conceived through itself (Part I, Prop. 10 [p. 39]), and the modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes (Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129]); so the idea of a mode of one attribute can neither involve nor be connected with the idea of a mode of another.

[552] Letter 71 (G IV 304), not included here. Spinoza had asked in Letter 68 (G IV 299) which doctrines Oldenburg thought would undermine the practice of religious virtue, and which passages of the *Treatise* had troubled learned men, since he wished to explain the *Treatise* with notes; he had gone to Amsterdam to have a book printed and had put the printing off because of a rumour that in it he tried to show that there is no God. Oldenburg answered in a few lines that the troubling passages were those that seemed to treat God and nature ambiguously, so that many thought he confused the two; those that seemed to take away the authority of miracles, by which alone almost all Christians are persuaded that the certainty of revelation can be established; and his silence about Jesus Christ, his incarnation and his satisfaction. These are the 'three heads' answered here.

[553] Part I, Prop. 18 [p. 71]: 'God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things'.

[554] Paul at Athens, Acts 17:28: *In ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus* ('For in him we live, and move, and are'). Compare Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 49]: 'Whatever is, is in God'.

[555] In the *Ethics* extension is an attribute of God (Part II, Prop. 2 [p. 125]), but corporeal substance 'can be conceived only as infinite, only as unique and only as indivisible' (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 51]), not as a mass made up of parts.

[556] *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 6, 'De Miraculis' (G III 81 ff.).

Hoc tantum hic addo, me inter religionem, et superstitionem hanc praecipuam agnoscere differentiam, quod haec ignorantiam, illa autem sapientiam pro fundamento habeat, et hanc causam esse credo, cur Christiani non fide, neque charitate, neque reliquis spiritus Sancti fructibus; sed sola opinione inter reliquos dignoscuntur; nempe, quia, ut omnes, solis miraculis, hoc est ignorantia, quae omnis malitiae fons est, se defendunt; atque adeo fidem, licet veram, in superstitionem vertunt. Verum an huic malo remedium adhibere reges unquam concedent, valde dubito.

Denique, ut de tertio etiam capite mentem meam clarius aperiam, dico ad salutem non esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere; sed de aeterno illo filio Dei, hoc est, Dei aeterna sapientia, quae sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana, et omnium maxime in Christo Iesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum.
Nam nemo absque hac ad statum beatitudinis potest pervenire, utpote quae sola docet, quid verum et falsum, bonum et malum sit. Et quia, uti dixi, haec sapientia per Iesum Christum maxime manifestata fuit, ideo ipsius discipuli eandem, quatenus ab ipso ipsis fuit revelata, praedicaverunt, seseque spiritu illo Christi supra reliquos gloriari posse ostenderunt.
Caeterum quod quaedam Ecclesiae his addunt, quod Deus naturam humanam assumpserit, monui expresse, me, quid dicant, nescire; imo, ut verum fatear, non minus absurde mihi loqui videntur, quam si quis mihi diceret, quod circulus naturam quadrati induerit.

Atque haec sufficere arbitror ad explicandum, quid de tribus illis capitibus sentiam. An eadem Christianis, quos nosti, placitura sint, id tu melius scire poteris. Vale.

Epistola LXXIV

Clarissimo, Doctissimoque viro,
B. D. S.
Henr. Oldenburgius

S. P.

[G IV 309] Quandoquidem accusare me videris[px] nimiae brevitatis, culpam illam hac vice nimia prolixitate eluam. Exspectaveras, ut video, earum in scriptis tuis opinionum enarrationem, quae religiosae virtutis praxin convellere Lectoribus tuis videantur. Dicam quid sit rei, quod potissimum eos excruciet.

[px] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 451–452, Letter 22), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 309–311). The edition prints the two Greek words in Greek; the digital text of Gebhardt used here transliterates them, and they are restored from the 1677 page.

I add only this here, that I recognize this chief difference between religion and superstition: that the latter has ignorance for its foundation, the former wisdom; and I believe that this is the reason why Christians are distinguished from others not by faith, nor by charity, nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit,[557] but by opinion alone; namely, because, like everyone, they defend themselves by miracles alone, that is, by ignorance,[558] which is the source of all wickedness; and so they turn faith, though true, into superstition. But whether kings will ever allow a remedy to be applied to this evil, I very much doubt.

Finally, to open my mind more clearly on the third head too, I say that for salvation it is not altogether necessary to know Christ according to the flesh;[559] but of that eternal son of God, that is, the eternal wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things, and chiefly in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus,[560] one must think quite otherwise.

For no one can attain to the state of blessedness without this, since it alone teaches what is true and false, good and evil. And because, as I said, this wisdom was manifested most of all through Jesus Christ, his disciples preached it, insofar as it was revealed to them by him, and showed that they could glory in that spirit of Christ above others.

As for what certain Churches add to these things, that God took on human nature, I have expressly pointed out that I do not know what they say;[561] indeed, to confess the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than if someone were to tell me that a circle had put on the nature of a square.[562]

And this, I think, is enough to explain what I think about those three heads. Whether the same will please the Christians you know, you will be able to know better. Farewell.

Letter 74

Henry Oldenburg to Spinoza

To the most distinguished and most learned man
B. D. S.
from Henry Oldenburg

Greetings.

Since you seem to accuse me of excessive brevity, I shall wash that fault away this time with excessive prolixity. You had expected, as I see, an account of those opinions in your writings which seem to your readers to overturn the practice of religious virtue. I shall tell you what the matter is that chiefly torments them.

[557] Galatians 5:22: *Fructus autem Spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax* ... ('But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace ...').

[558] Compare the Appendix to Part I, on those who flee at last to the will of God, 'that is, the asylum of ignorance' (Part I, Appendix [p. 103]).

[559] II Corinthians 5:16: *Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum, sed nunc jam non novimus* ('And if we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer').

[560] Compare the *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 1 (G III 21): God revealed himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ, and 'in this sense we can also say that the Wisdom of God, that is, a wisdom which is above the human, took on human nature in Christ'; and Part IV, Prop. 68, Schol. [p. 443]: 'the spirit of Christ, that is, the idea of God'.

[561] *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 1 (G III 21): 'I must point out here that I am not speaking at all of the things which certain Churches maintain about Christ, nor denying them; for I gladly confess that I do not grasp them'.

[562] The same image of an absurdity in Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 51]: 'as if someone, from having feigned that a circle has the properties of a square, concluded that a circle does not have a centre'.

Fatalem videris rerum, et actionum omnium necessitatem adstruere: atqui illa concessa, assertaque, legum omnium, omnis virtutis, et religionis incidi nervos, omnesque remunerationes, et poenas inanes esse, autumant. Quicquid cogit, vel necessitatem infert, excusare iidem arbitrantur; proindeque neminem inexcusabilem in Dei conspectu fore censent. Si fatis agamur, duraque revoluta manu omnia certo, et inevitabili tramite vadunt, quis culpae, poenarumque sit locus, illi equidem non assequuntur.

Quis huic nodo adhiberi possit cuneus, perquam ardua res dictu est. Tu quid opis hanc in rem suppeditare posses, scire et discere pervelim.

[G IV 310] Ad sententiam illam tuam, quam de tribus capitibus, a me notatis, aperire mihi dignaris, haec inquirenda subeunt. Primo, quonam sensu miracula, et ignorantiam pro Synonymis, et aequipollentibus habeas, ut in Novissimis tuis sentire videris; cum Lazari a mortuis resuscitatio, et Iesu Christi a morte resurrectio omnem naturae creatae vim superare, et soli potentiae divinae competere videatur; neque id ignorantiam culpabilem arguat, quod intelligentiae finitae, certisque repagulis constrictae limites excedat necessum est.

An non convenire censes creatae menti et scientiae, increatae mentis, ac supremi Numinis talem scientiam, potentiamque agnoscere, quae penetrare, ac praestare ea possit, quorum ratio, ac modus a nobis homuncionibus reddi, et explicari nequeat? Homines sumus, humani nihil a nobis alienum ducendum videtur.

Deinde, cum capere te nequire fatearis, Deum revera naturam humanam assumpsisse, quaerere ex te fas sit, quomodo illa Euangelii nostri, et epistolae ad Hebraeos scriptae locos intelligas, quorum prior affirmat, verbum carnem factum esse; posterior, Filium Dei non Angelos, sed semen Abrahae assumpsisse.

Et totius Euangelii tenorem id inferre putem Filium Dei unigenitum λόγον, (qui et Deus, et apud Deum erat) in natura humana se ostendisse, et pro nobis peccatoribus ἀντίλυτρον, redemptionis precium, passione, et morte sua exsolvisse. Quid de his, et similibus dicendum, ut sua constet Euangelio, et Christianae religioni, cui te favere opinor, veritas, lubens edoceri vellem.

Plura scribere statueram, sed interpellant amici invisentes, quibus negare humanitatis officia nefas duco. Sed et haec, quae congessi hac epistola, suffecerint, et fortasse taedium tibi philosophanti creaverint. Vale igitur, et me iugem Eruditionis et scientiae tuae cultorem crede.

You seem to establish a fatal necessity of all things and actions;[563] but if this is granted and asserted, they declare, the sinews of all laws, of all virtue and religion are cut, and all rewards and punishments are empty. Whatever compels, or brings necessity with it, they think excuses; and so they consider that no one will be inexcusable in the sight of God. If we are driven by the fates, and all things, unwound by a hard hand, go along a certain and inevitable path, they for their part cannot see what place there is for blame and punishment.

What wedge can be applied to this knot is a very hard thing to say. What help you could supply in this matter I should very much like to know and to learn.

On that opinion of yours which you deign to open to me on the three heads I noted, these questions occur to me. First, in what sense you hold miracles and ignorance to be synonyms and equivalents, as you seem to think in your last letter;[564] since the raising of Lazarus from the dead[565] and the resurrection of Jesus Christ from death seem to surpass all the power of created nature and to belong to the divine power alone; nor does that which must exceed the limits of a finite intelligence, confined within fixed bounds, argue a culpable ignorance.

Do you not think it fitting for a created mind and knowledge to acknowledge in the uncreated mind and supreme Deity such knowledge and power as can penetrate and accomplish things whose reason and manner cannot be rendered and explained by us little men? We are men; nothing human, it seems, should be thought foreign to us.[566]

Next, since you confess that you cannot grasp that God really took on human nature, may I ask you how you understand those passages of our Gospel and of the Epistle written to the Hebrews, of which the former affirms that the Word was made flesh,[567] the latter that the Son of God took on not angels but the seed of Abraham?[568]

And I should think that the tenor of the whole Gospel implies that the only-begotten Son of God, the λόγον ('Word'), who was both God and with God,[569] showed himself in human nature, and by his passion and death paid for us sinners the ἀντίλυτρον ('ransom'),[570] the price of redemption. What should be said about these and similar things, so that the Gospel and the Christian religion, which I believe you favour, may keep their truth, I should gladly be taught.

I had decided to write more, but friends calling on me interrupt, to whom I hold it wrong to refuse the duties of courtesy. But these things too which I have gathered in this letter will suffice, and will perhaps have wearied you as you philosophize. Farewell, then, and believe me a constant admirer of your learning and knowledge.

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[563] Spinoza answers in Letter 75 [p. 641]. In the *Ethics*, see Part I, Prop. 29 [p. 81] and Prop. 33 [p. 85], with its scholia, and the uses of the doctrine at the end of Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 209].

[564] Letter 73 [p. 635].

[565] John 11:43–44.

[566] Terence, *Heauton Timorumenos* 77: *Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto* ('I am a man; I count nothing human foreign to me').

[567] John 1:14: Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο ('And the Word became flesh'); Vulgate *Et Verbum caro factum est*.

[568] Hebrews 2:16: οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται, ἀλλὰ σπέρματος Ἀβραὰμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται ('For surely he does not take hold of angels, but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham'); Vulgate *Nusquam enim angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit*.

[569] John 1:1: καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος ('and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'). Oldenburg writes λόγον in the accusative, as the grammar of his Latin sentence requires.

[570] The word of I Timothy 2:6: ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων ('who gave himself a ransom for all'); Vulgate *qui dedit redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus*.

[G IV 311] Dab. Londini die 16. Decemb. 1675.

Epistola LXXV

Viro Nobilissimo, ac Doctissimo,
Henr. Oldenburgio

Nobilissime Domine,

[G IV 311] Video tandem,[py] quid id fuerit, quod a me postulabas ne evulgarem; sed quia id ipsum praecipuum est fundamentum eorum omnium, quae in tractatu, quem edere destinaveram, habentur, volo hic paucis explicare, qua ratione ego fatalem omnium rerum, et actionum necessitatem statuam.

Nam Deum nullo modo fato subiicio, sed omnia inevitabili necessitate ex Dei natura sequi concipio eodem modo, ac omnes concipiunt, ex ipsius Dei natura sequi, ut Deus se ipsum intelligat; quod sane nemo negat ex divina natura necessario sequi, et tamen nemo concipit, Deum fato aliquo coactum, sed omnino libere, tametsi necessario se ipsum intelligere.

[G IV 312] Deinde haec inevitabilis rerum necessitas nec iura divina, nec humana tollit. Nam ipsa moralia documenta, sive formam legis, seu iuris ab ipso Deo accipiant, sive non, divina tamen sunt, et salutaria, et si bonum, quod ex virtute, et amore divino sequitur, a Deo tanquam Iudice accipiamus, vel ex necessitate divinae naturae emanet, non erit propterea magis, aut minus optabile, ut nec contra mala, quae ex pravis actionibus, et affectibus sequuntur, ideo, quia necessario ex iisdem sequuntur, minus timenda sunt, et denique sive ea, quae agimus, necessario, vel contingenter agamus, spe tamen, et metu ducimur.

Porro homines coram Deo nulla alia de causa sunt inexcusabiles, quam quia in ipsius Dei potestate sunt, ut lutum in potestate figuli, qui ex eadem massa vasa facit, alia ad decus, alia ad dedecus.

Ad haec pauca si attendere velis aliquantulum, non dubito, quin facili negotio ad omnia argumenta, quae in hanc sententiam obiici solent, respondere possis, ut multi iam mecum experti sunt.

[G IV 313] Miracula, et ignorantiam pro aequipollentibus sumpsi, quia ii, qui Dei existentiam, et religionem miraculis adstruere conantur, rem obscuram per aliam magis obscuram, et quam maxime ignorant, ostendere volunt, atque ita novum argumentandi genus adferunt, redigendo scilicet non ad impossibile, ut aiunt, sed ignorantiam. Caeterum meam de miraculis sententiam

[py] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 452–455, Letter 23), as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 311–313); the letter carries no date.

Given at London, 16 December 1675.

Letter 75

Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg

To the most noble and most learned man
Henry Oldenburg

Most noble Sir,

I see at last what it was that you asked me not to make public; but since this very thing is the chief foundation of everything in the treatise which I had intended to publish,[571] I wish to explain here briefly in what way I hold the fatal necessity of all things and actions.

For I in no way subject God to fate, but I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God in the same way that everyone conceives that it follows from the very nature of God that God understands himself; which surely no one denies follows necessarily from the divine nature, and yet no one conceives that God understands himself compelled by some fate, but that he understands himself altogether freely, although necessarily.[572]

Next, this inevitable necessity of things takes away neither divine nor human laws. For the moral teachings themselves, whether or not they receive the form of law or right from God himself, are nevertheless divine and salutary; and whether we receive the good which follows from virtue and the divine love from God as a judge, or it emanates from the necessity of the divine nature, it will not on that account be more or less desirable;[573] just as, on the other hand, the evils which follow from wicked actions and affects are not less to be feared because they follow from them necessarily; and finally, whether we do what we do necessarily or contingently, we are still led by hope and fear.

Further, men are inexcusable before God for no other reason than that they are in the power of God himself, as clay is in the power of the potter, who from the same lump makes vessels, some for honour, others for dishonour.[574]

If you will attend a little to these few points, I do not doubt that you will easily be able to answer all the arguments that are usually raised against this opinion, as many have already found with me.

I took miracles and ignorance as equivalents because those who try to establish God's existence and religion by miracles want to show something obscure through something else more obscure, of which they are most ignorant, and so bring in a new kind of argument, reducing, namely, not to the impossible, as they say, but to ignorance.[575] For the rest, I have explained my view of

[571] The *Ethics*, whose printing Spinoza had put off in the summer of 1675 (Letter 68, G IV 299; see the note to Letter 73 [p. 635]).

[572] In the *Ethics*, Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27] (that thing is free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone), Prop. 16 [p. 65] and Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67], 'God alone is a free cause'.

[573] Compare Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523] and Prop. 42 [p. 523]: blessedness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself.

[574] Romans 9:21: *an non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam?* ('Has not the potter power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honour and another for dishonour?').

[575] The phrase of the Appendix to Part I [p. 103]: 'a new way of arguing ... namely, reduction not to the impossible, but to ignorance'.

satis, ni fallor, explicui in tractatu theologico-Politico.
Hoc tantum hic addo, quod si ad haec attendas, quod scilicet Christus non Senatui, nec Pilato, nec cuiquam infidelium; sed sanctis tantummodo apparuerit, et quod Deus neque dextram, neque sinistram habeat, nec in loco; sed ubique secundum essentiam sit, et quod materia ubique sit eadem, et quod Deus extra Mundum in spatio, quod fingunt, imaginario, sese non manifestet, et quod denique corporis humani compages intra debitos limites solo aeris pondere coerceatur, facile videbis, hanc Christi apparitionem non absimilem esse illi, qua Deus Abrahamo apparuit, quando tres vidit homines, quos ad secum prandendum invitavit.

At dices, Apostolos omnes omnino credidisse, quod Christus a morte resurrexerit, et ad coelum revera ascenderit: quod ego non nego. Nam ipse etiam Abrahamus credidit, quod Deus apud ipsum pransus fuerit, et omnes Israelitae, quod Deus e coelo igne circumdatus ad montem Sinai descenderit, et cum iis immediate locutus fuerit, cum tamen haec, et plura alia huiusmodi apparitiones, seu revelationes fuerint, captui, et opinionibus eorum hominum accommodatae, quibus Deus mentem suam iisdem revelare voluit.
Concludo itaque Christi a mortuis resurrectionem revera spiritualem, et solis fidelibus ad eorum captum revelatam fuisse, nempe quod Christus aeternitate donatus fuit, et a mortuis, (mortuos hic intelligo eo sensu, quo Christus dixit: sinite mortuos mortuos suos sepelire) surrexit, simulatque vita et morte singularis sanctitatis exemplum dedit, et eatenus discipulos suos a mortuis suscitat, quatenus ipsi hoc vitae eius, et mortis exemplum sequuntur.

Nec difficile esset totam Euangelii doctrinam secundum hanc hypothesin explicare. Imo caput 15. Ep. 1. ad Corinthios ex sola hac hypothesi explicari potest, et Pauli argumenta intelligi, cum alias communem hypothesin sequendo infirma appareant, et facili negotio refelli possint, ut iam taceam, quod Christiani omnia, quae Iudaei carnaliter, Spiritualiter interpretati sunt.

Humanam imbecillitatem tecum agnosco. Sed te contra rogare mihi liceat, an nos homunciones tantam naturae cognitionem habeamus, ut determinare possimus, quousque eius vis, et potentia se extendit, et quid eius vim superat? quod quia nemo sine arrogantia praesumere potest, licet ergo absque iactantia miracula per causas naturales, quantum fieri potest, explicare, et quae explicare non possumus, nec etiam demonstrare, quod absurda sint, satius erit iudicium de iis suspendere, et religionem, uti dixi, sola doctrinae sapientia adstruere.

miracles sufficiently, if I am not mistaken, in the *Theological-Political Treatise*.

I add only this here: that if you attend to these things, namely that Christ appeared not to the Senate, nor to Pilate, nor to any of the unbelievers, but only to the saints;[576] and that God has neither right hand nor left,[577] and is not in a place, but is everywhere according to his essence; and that matter is everywhere the same; and that God does not manifest himself outside the world, in the imaginary space which they feign; and finally that the frame of the human body is held within its due limits by the weight of the air alone: you will easily see that this appearance of Christ is not unlike the one in which God appeared to Abraham, when he saw three men whom he invited to dine with him.[578]

But you will say that the Apostles all believed absolutely that Christ rose from death and really ascended to heaven: which I do not deny. For Abraham himself also believed that God had dined with him, and all the Israelites that God had descended from heaven surrounded by fire onto Mount Sinai and had spoken with them directly;[579] whereas these, and many other things of this kind, were appearances or revelations accommodated to the understanding and opinions of those men to whom God willed to reveal his mind through them.

I conclude, therefore, that Christ's resurrection from the dead was in truth spiritual, and revealed only to the faithful according to their understanding; namely, that Christ was endowed with eternity and rose from the dead (I understand 'the dead' here in the sense in which Christ said: let the dead bury their dead[580]) as soon as he gave, by his life and death, an example of singular holiness; and that he raises his disciples from the dead insofar as they themselves follow this example of his life and death.

Nor would it be difficult to explain the whole teaching of the Gospel according to this hypothesis. Indeed, chapter 15 of the First Epistle to the Corinthians[581] can be explained by this hypothesis alone, and Paul's arguments understood, whereas if the common hypothesis is followed they appear weak and can easily be refuted; to say nothing of the fact that Christians have interpreted spiritually everything that the Jews interpreted carnally.

I acknowledge human weakness with you.[582] But may I in turn ask you whether we little men have such knowledge of nature that we can determine how far its force and power extend, and what surpasses its force? Since no one can presume this without arrogance, it is permissible, then, without boasting, to explain miracles by natural causes as far as possible; and as for those which we cannot explain, nor yet demonstrate to be absurd, it will be better to suspend judgment about them, and to establish religion, as I said, on the wisdom of its teaching alone.[583]

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[576] Compare Acts 10:40–41: God raised him on the third day and made him manifest, *non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo* ('not to all the people, but to witnesses chosen beforehand by God').

[577] Mark 16:19: *assumptus est in caelum, et sedet a dextris Dei* ('he was taken up into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God').

[578] Genesis 18:1–8.

[579] Exodus 19:18, *descendisset Dominus super eum in igne* ('the Lord had descended upon it in fire'); Deuteronomy 5:4, *Facie ad faciem locutus est nobis in monte de medio ignis* ('He spoke to us face to face on the mountain from the midst of the fire').

[580] Matthew 8:22, *dimitte mortuos sepelire mortuos suos*; Luke 9:60.

[581] Paul's chapter on the resurrection; for example I Corinthians 15:44, *seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale* ('it is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body'), and 15:50, 'flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God'.

[582] Answering Oldenburg's 'We are men' in Letter 74 [p. 639].

[583] Letter 73 [p. 635].

Loca denique Euangelii Iohannis et epistolae ad Hebraeos iis, quae dixi, repugnare credis, quia linguarum orientalium phrases Europaeis loquendi modis metiris, et quamvis Iohannes suum Euangelium Graece scripserit, hebraizat tamen.
Quicquid sit, an credis, quando scriptura ait, quod Deus in Nube sese manifestaverit, aut quod in Tabernaculo, et in Templo habitaverit, quod ipse Deus naturam Nubis, Tabernaculi, et templi assumpserit? atqui hoc summum est, quod Christus de se ipso dixit, se scilicet templum Dei esse, nimirum quia, ut in meis praecedentibus dixi, Deus sese maxime in Christo manifestavit, quod Iohannes ut efficacius exprimeret, dixit verbum factum esse carnem. Sed de his satis.

Epistola LXXX

Acutissimo, atque Doctissimo philosopho,
B. D. S.
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.

Vir clarissime,

[G IV 331] Primo difficulter admodum concipere queo,[pz] qui a priori corporum existentia demonstretur, quae motus, et figuras habent; cum in extensione, absolute rem considerando, nil tale occurrat.
Secundo erudiri abs te vellem, quomodo intelligendum sit, cuius meministi epistola de infinito his verbis. Nec tamen concludunt talia omnem numerum superare ex partium multitudine.

Nam revera omnes mathematici mihi videntur circa talia infinita semper demonstrare, quod partium numerus sit tam magnus, ut omnem assignabilem numerum superent, et in exemplo, de duobus circulis ibidem allato, non hoc ipsum declarare videris, quod tamen susceperas. Ibi enim tantum ostendis, quod non hoc ipsum concludunt ex nimia spatii interpositi magnitudine, et quod eius maximum et minimum non habeamus; sed non demonstras prout volebas, quod id non concludant ex partium multitudine.[qa]

2. Maii, 1676.

[pz] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 595, Letter 69), which prints the letter without the writer's name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 331).
[qa] The Dutch version adds (G IV 331): 'Further, I have heard from Mr Leibniz that the tutor of the Dauphin of France, called Huet, a man of outstanding learning, is going to write on the truth of human religion, and to refute your *Theological-Political Treatise*. Farewell.' This is the book Spinoza asks about in Letter 83 [p. 649].

Finally, you believe that the passages of the Gospel of John and of the Epistle to the Hebrews conflict with what I have said, because you measure the phrases of Oriental languages by European ways of speaking; and although John wrote his Gospel in Greek, he nevertheless Hebraizes. However that may be, do you believe, when Scripture says that God manifested himself in a cloud,[584] or that he dwelt in the Tabernacle and in the Temple, that God himself took on the nature of the cloud, the Tabernacle and the Temple? Yet this is the most that Christ said of himself, namely that he was the temple of God;[585] namely because, as I said in my previous letter,[586] God manifested himself most of all in Christ; which John, to express it more forcefully, put by saying that the Word was made flesh.[587] But enough of these things.

Letter 80

Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza

To the most acute and most learned philosopher
B. D. S.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most distinguished Sir,

First, I can only with great difficulty conceive how the existence of bodies which have motion and figure is demonstrated a priori, since in extension, considering the thing absolutely, nothing of the kind is found.[588]

Second, I should like to be taught by you how what you mention in the letter on the infinite [p. 545] is to be understood, in these words: 'Yet they do not conclude that such things surpass every number from the multitude of their parts.'

For in truth all mathematicians seem to me always to demonstrate, concerning such infinites, that the number of parts is so great that it surpasses every assignable number; and in the example of the two circles given there you do not seem to show this very thing, which you had undertaken to do. For there you show only that they do not conclude this from the excessive size of the interposed space, and from our not having its maximum and minimum; but you do not demonstrate, as you wished, that they do not conclude it from the multitude of the parts.

2 May 1676.

[584] For example Exodus 16:10, *et ecce gloria Domini apparuit in nube* ('and behold, the glory of the Lord appeared in a cloud').
[585] John 2:19 and 2:21: 'Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up ... But he spoke of the temple of his body'.
[586] Letter 73 [p. 635].
[587] John 1:14.
[588] Spinoza's answer to this question is in Letter 81 [p. 647], and more fully in Letter 83 [p. 649].

Epistola LXXXI

Nobilissimo, atque Doctissimo viro,
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus

Nobilissime vir,

[G IV 332] Quod in epistola de infinito dixi,[qb] quod partium infinitatem ex earum multitudine non concludant, hinc patet, quod, si ea ex earum multitudine concluderetur, non possemus maiorem partium multitudinem concipere; sed earum multitudo, quavis data, deberet esse maior, quod falsum est: nam in toto spatio, inter duos circulos, diversa centra habentes, duplo maiorem partium multitudinem concipimus, quam in eiusdem dimidio, et tamen partium numerus, tam dimidii, quam totius spatii omni assignabili numero maior est.
Porro ex extensione, ut eam Cartesius concipit, molem scilicet quiescentem, corporum existentiam demonstrare non tantum difficile; ut ais; sed omnino impossibile est. Materia enim quiescens, quantum in se est, in sua quiete perseverabit, nec ad motum concitabitur, nisi a causa potentiori externa; et hac de causa non dubitavi olim affirmare; rerum naturalium principia Cartesiana inutilia esse, ne dicam absurda.

Hagae 5 Maii, 1676

Epistola LXXXII

Acutissimo, Doctissimoque philosopho,
B. D. S.
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus.

Doctissime vir,

[G IV 333] Velim, ut hac in re mihi gratificeris,[qc] indicando, qui ex conceptu extensionis secundum tuas meditationes varietas rerum a priori possit ostendi, quandoquidem meministi opinionis Cartesii, in qua Cartesius statuit, se eam ex extensione nullo alio modo deducere posse, quam supponendo motu a Deo excitato hoc effectum fuisse in extensione: deducit ergo iuxta meam opinionem corporum existentiam non ex quiescente materia, nisi forte suppositionem motoris Dei pro nihilo haberes; quandoquidem, qui illud ex essentia Dei a priori necessario sequi debeat, abs te non sit ostensum; id quod Cartesius ostensurus captum humanum superare credebat.

Quare a te hanc rem requiro, sciens bene, te alias cogitationes habere, nisi alia sontica subsit forte causa, quare illud hactenus manifestum facere nolueris; et si hoc, de quo non dubito, non opus fuisset, non tale quid obscure indicares. Sed certo tibi persuasum habeas, quod sive candide mihi aliquid indices, sive celes, meus tamen erga te affectus immutatus maneat.

Rationes tamen, cur illud specialiter desiderem, hae sunt, quod in mathematicis semper obser-

[qb] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 596, Letter 70), which prints the letter without the addressee's name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 332).
[qc] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP pp. 597–598, Letter 71), which prints the letter without the writer's name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 333–334).

Letter 81

Spinoza to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

To the most noble and most learned man
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most noble Sir,

What I said in the letter on the infinite [p. 545], that they do not conclude the infinity of the parts from their multitude, is evident from this: that if it were concluded from their multitude, we could not conceive a greater multitude of parts, but their multitude would have to be greater than any given one; which is false. For in the whole space between two circles having different centres we conceive a multitude of parts twice as great as in half of it, and yet the number of the parts, both of the half and of the whole space, is greater than any assignable number.[589]

Further, from extension as Descartes conceives it, namely as a mass at rest, it is not only difficult, as you say, but altogether impossible to demonstrate the existence of bodies. For matter at rest, as far as it is in itself,[590] will persevere in its rest, and will not be set in motion except by a more powerful external cause; and for this reason I did not hesitate to affirm once that Descartes's principles of natural things are useless, not to say absurd.

The Hague, 5 May 1676.

Letter 82

Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus to Spinoza

To the most acute and most learned philosopher
B. D. S.
from Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most learned Sir,

I should like you to do me the favour, in this matter, of indicating how, according to your meditations, the variety of things can be shown a priori from the concept of extension; since you mentioned the opinion of Descartes, in which Descartes maintains that he can deduce it from extension in no other way than by supposing that this was brought about in extension by motion excited by God. So in my opinion he deduces the existence of bodies not from matter at rest, unless perhaps you count the supposition of God as mover for nothing; since you have not shown how it must follow necessarily, a priori, from the essence of God, something which Descartes believed it beyond human grasp to show.

So I ask this of you, knowing well that you have other thoughts, unless perhaps there is some other serious cause why you have not wished to make it known until now; and if this, which I do not doubt, had not been necessary, you would not hint at any such thing obscurely. But be assured that whether you tell me something candidly or conceal it, my affection towards you will remain unchanged.

The reasons, however, why I particularly desire this are these: that in mathematics I have always

[589] The third of the distinctions of Letter 12 [p. 547]: things which cannot be equalled by any number, yet can be conceived as greater and less.

[590] *quantum in se est*, the phrase of Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]; compare Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151]: a body at rest remains at rest until it is determined to motion by another.

varim, quod nos ex quavis re in se considerata, hoc est, ex definitione cuiusque rei, unicam saltem proprietatem deducere valeamus; quod si autem plures proprietates desideremus, necesse esse, ut rem definitam ad alia referamus: tunc siquidem ex coniunctione definitionum harum rerum novae proprietates resultant.
Ex. gr. Si circuli peripheriam considerem solam, nihil aliud concludere potero, quam quod ubique sibi similis, sive uniformis existat, qua quidem proprietate ab omnibus aliis curvis essentialiter differt, nec ullas alias unquam potero deducere.
Verum si ad alia referam, nimirum ad radios ex centro deductos, ad duas lineas sese intersecantes, aut plures quoque, plures utique hinc proprietates deducere valebo; quae quidem aliquo modo videntur adversari prop. 16. Ethices, quae praecipua fere est 1 lib. tui tractatus: In qua tanquam notum assumitur, posse ex data cuiuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates deduci, quod mihi videtur impossibile, si non ad alia referamus rem definitam; et quod porro effecit, ut non possim videre, qua ratione ex attributo aliquo solo considerato, ex. gr. extensione infinita corporum varietas exsurgere possit; vel si existimas hoc quoque non posse concludi ex unico solo considerato; sed omnibus simul sumptis, vellem hoc edoceri abs te, et qua ratione hoc concipiendum foret. Vale etc.

[G IV 334] Parisiis, 23 Iun. 1676.

Epistola LXXXIII

Nobilissimo, atque Doctissimo viro,
Ehrenfr. Walth. de Tschirnhaus

Nobilissime vir,

[G IV 334] Quod petis, an ex solo extensionis conceptu[qd] rerum varietas a priori possit demonstrari, credo me iam satis clare ostendisse, id impossibile esse; ideoque materiam a Cartesio male definiri per extensionem; sed eam necessario debere explicari per attributum, quod aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimat.
Sed de his forsan aliquando, si vita suppetit, clarius tecum agam. Nam huc usque nihil de his ordine disponere mihi licuit.
Quod autem addis, nos ex definitione cuiusque rei, in se consideratae, unicam tantum proprietatem deducere valere, locum forsan habet in rebus simplicissimis, vel entibus rationis, (ad quae figuras etiam refero) at non in realibus. Nam ex hoc solo, quod Deum definio esse ens ad cuius essentiam pertinet existentia, plures eius proprietates concludo: nempe quod necessario existit, quod sit unicus, immutabilis, infinitus, etc. et ad hunc modum plura alia exempla adferre possem, quae impraesentiarum omitto.
Denique rogo, ut inquiras, an tractatus D. Huet, (nempe contra tractatum theologico-Politicum)

[qd] The text is that of the 1677 edition (OP p. 598, Letter 72), which prints the letter without the addressee's name, as Gebhardt prints it (G IV 334–335). The Dutch version adds a signature.

observed that from any thing considered in itself, that is, from the definition of any thing, we are able to deduce only a single property; but if we desire more properties, it is necessary to relate the thing defined to other things; for then new properties result from the conjunction of the definitions of these things.
For example, if I consider the circumference of a circle alone, I shall be able to conclude nothing else than that it is everywhere like itself, or uniform, by which property it differs essentially from all other curves; and I shall never be able to deduce any others.
But if I relate it to other things, namely to the radii drawn from the centre, to two lines intersecting each other, or to more, I shall certainly be able to deduce more properties from this; which indeed seems in some way to conflict with Prop. 16 of the *Ethics* [p. 65], which is almost the chief proposition of the first book of your treatise. In it it is taken as known that a number of properties can be deduced from the given definition of any thing,[591] which seems to me impossible if we do not relate the thing defined to others; and this has further brought it about that I cannot see in what way, from some attribute considered alone, for example infinite extension, the variety of bodies can arise; or, if you think that this too cannot be inferred from one attribute considered alone, but from all taken together, I should like to be taught this by you, and in what way it is to be conceived. Farewell, etc.

Paris, 23 June 1676.

Letter 83

Spinoza to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

To the most noble and most learned man
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus

Most noble Sir,

As for your question whether the variety of things can be demonstrated a priori from the concept of extension alone, I believe I have already shown clearly enough that it is impossible; and that therefore matter is badly defined by Descartes through extension, but must necessarily be explained through an attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence.[592]
But perhaps some day, if life lasts,[593] I shall discuss these things with you more clearly. For up to now it has not been possible for me to set anything out in order on these matters.
As for your addition that from the definition of each thing, considered in itself, we can deduce only one property: this perhaps holds in the simplest things, or beings of reason (to which I also refer figures), but not in real things. For from this alone, that I define God to be a being to whose essence existence pertains, I infer a number of his properties: namely that he exists necessarily, that he is unique, immutable, infinite, etc.;[594] and in this way I could bring many other examples, which I omit for the present.
Finally, I ask you to find out whether the treatise of Mr Huet[595] (namely, against the *Theological-*

[591] The demonstration of Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65]: 'from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers a number of properties'.
[592] The language of Part I, Def. 6 [p. 27]; that extension is such an attribute is Part II, Prop. 2 [p. 125].
[593] Spinoza died at The Hague seven months later, on 21 February 1677 (Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, p. 287).
[594] In the *Ethics*: Part I, Prop. 11 [p. 41], Prop. 14, Cor. 1 [p. 47], Prop. 20, Cor. 2 [p. 73] and Prop. 8 [p. 35].
[595] Pierre-Daniel Huet's *Demonstratio evangelica*, which appeared in Paris in 1679 (Israel, pp. 453–455, 731), 'a work intended to combat incredulity, Naturalism, and Spinozism' (Israel, p. 647). Tschirnhaus had passed on the news in Letter 80 [p. 645], in a passage found only in the Dutch version.

de quo antea scripsisti, lucem iam viderit, et an mihi exemplar transmittere poteris, deinde an iam noveris, quaenam ea sint, quae de refractione noviter inventa sint.

Hisce vale, Nobilissime vir, et amare perge, etc.

Hagae Com. 15 Iulii. 1676.

Political Treatise), of which you wrote earlier, has yet seen the light, and whether you could send me a copy; and next, whether you already know what the things are that have recently been discovered about refraction.

Farewell with these, most noble Sir, and continue to love me, etc.

The Hague, 15 July 1676.

Epilogue: The *Ethics* after Spinoza

The *Ethics* was published in a volume that bore only its author's initials, and within a few months it was banned. Its later history is a history of readers who found in it something they feared or something they needed, and often both. This epilogue follows a few of them, from the first generation, which saw in the book a system of atheism, through the German writers who made it a philosophy of the divine, to the scholars of the last century, who have tried to read it on its own terms. It makes no attempt to be complete. The influence of the *Ethics* has been diffuse, and many claims about it are hard to document; what follows is confined to what can be documented from the sources used in preparing this edition.

Publication and prohibition

The publication of the *Opera Posthuma* was itself a clandestine undertaking. After Spinoza's death his landlord sent the chest containing his manuscripts to Amsterdam, where his publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz, and a group of friends who are thought to have included Jelles, Lodewijk Meyer, Glazemaker, Bouwmeester, Schuller and Van Gent decided to publish everything at once, in Latin and in Dutch. The Catholic Vicar Apostolic in the Netherlands, instructed from Rome to prevent the publication of an atheistic work said to exist in manuscript, was told by Rieuwertsz that there was no such work; in January 1678 copies of both versions, bearing only the initials B. D. S., began to appear in the bookshops (Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, pp. 287–291). The reaction was immediate. The Reformed consistory of Leiden, meeting in February 1678, called the volume "a book which, perhaps since the beginning of the world until the present day ... surpasses all others in godlessness and endeavours to do away with all religion and set impiety on the throne" (p. 291). The edict of the States of Holland of June 1678, which the Introduction quotes, banned not only the book but every reprint, summary or extract of it; and Israel notes that its wording dwells on Spinoza's denial of miracles more than on any other feature of his thought (p. 292). The ban was not watertight. Three months after it, the Vicar Apostolic complained to Rome that it had produced "scarcely any other fruit ... than to increase the renown and prices of Spinoza's books" (p. 293).

Israel has argued that the notoriety of the *Ethics* in these decades has been underestimated. "Spinoza, then, emerged as the supreme philosophical bogeyman of Early Enlightenment Europe," and "no one else during the century 1650–1750 remotely rivalled Spinoza's notoriety as the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion, received ideas, tradition, morality, and what was everywhere regarded ... as divinely constituted political authority" (p. 159). His larger thesis, that "Spinoza and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European Radical Enlightenment everywhere" (p. vi), remains disputed, but his account of the publication and suppression of the book rests on the church and state records of the time.

The first readers

Among the first readers of the *Ethics* was Leibniz, who had met its author. He had visited Spinoza in The Hague in November 1676, a few months before Spinoza's death, and wrote to a correspondent the next year: "Spinoza died this winter. I saw him while passing through Holland, and I spoke with him several times and at great length. He has a strange metaphysics, full of paradoxes. Among other things he believes that the world and God are only one thing in substance, that God is the substance of all things, and that creatures are only modes or accidents. But I noticed that some of the purported demonstrations he showed me are not exact" (letter to Gallois, quoted by Gerhardt, *Philosophische Schriften* I 118). Early in 1678 he received a copy of the *Opera Posthuma* and annotated the *Ethics* closely, especially Part I (I 119). He summed up his judgment in a letter to Tschirnhaus the same year: in the *Ethics* Spinoza "does not everywhere explain his views sufficiently," and "sometimes he commits paralogisms, which comes from his having departed from the rigour of demonstration" (I 119).

Leibniz returned to Spinoza's doctrines many times. In his notes on Part I he insisted that the world might have been otherwise, and that God chooses the best freely (Appendix D [p. 667] describes these comments). Some thirty years later, in his remarks on a book by Johann Georg Wachter about Spinoza and the Kabbalah, he returned to the subject. Of the doctrine that the human mind is the idea of the body he wrote that "it is altogether foreign to every appearance of reason that the soul should be an idea," since ideas are something merely abstract, like numbers and figures, and cannot act (p. 44). He also rejected the intellectual love of God of Part V. In a God who produces all things, good and evil alike, by necessity, he wrote, "there is nothing lovable; the true love of God is founded not on necessity but on goodness," and Spinoza's doctrine of that love is "only trappings for the people" (*Animadversiones in Wachterum*, ed. Foucher de Careil, p. 68).

Pierre Bayle, whom Israel calls "probably the single most widely read and influential thinker of the Early Enlightenment" (p. 331), devoted to Spinoza an article of his *Historical and Critical Dictionary* that runs, with its remarks, to more than fifty pages in the edition of 1820. The article opens by calling him "an atheist of system, and of an entirely new method," though "the substance of his doctrine was common to him with several other philosophers, ancient and modern, European and oriental" (1820 ed., XIII 416). His system, Bayle wrote, is "the most monstrous hypothesis that can be imagined, the most absurd, and the most diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our mind" (XIII 418), and he set out his reasons in a remark of many pages, whose central argument is described in Appendix A [p. 657]. Bayle also recorded what those who had known Spinoza said of him: that he was "a man of good company, affable, honest, obliging, and very regular in his morals." "That is strange," Bayle added, "but at bottom one should be no more astonished at it than at seeing people who live very badly although they are fully persuaded of the Gospel" (XIII 417). The two judgments, of a system of unparalleled impiety and of a man of blameless life, stand side by side in Bayle's article, and both were to have a long future.

The German revival

A century after its publication the *Ethics* became the subject of public controversy in Germany, and the controversy began with a conversation. In July 1780 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi visited Gotthold Ephraim Lessing at Wolfenbüttel, and he later published an account of what they said. Jacobi showed Lessing a poem called "Prometheus," a defiant address to the gods, with the remark

that Lessing, who had given offence so often, might for once take some. Lessing replied that he had taken no offence; the point of view of the poem was his own. "The orthodox concepts of the Deity are no longer for me; I cannot enjoy them. Ἓν καὶ Πᾶν [One and All]! I know nothing else." When Jacobi observed that he would then be fairly well in agreement with Spinoza, Lessing answered: "If I am to name myself after anyone, I know no one else" (Jacobi, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*, 1789 ed., p. 22). The next morning Lessing came to Jacobi's room to talk about his "One and All." Jacobi said that he had come in large part to get help from Lessing against Spinoza. "Then there is no help for you," Lessing replied. "Become his friend altogether instead. There is no other philosophy than the philosophy of Spinoza" (pp. 23–24).

Jacobi himself was no Spinozist. His reply to Lessing gives the reason he took Spinoza so seriously: "That may be true. For the determinist, if he wants to be consistent, must become a fatalist; the rest then follows of itself" (p. 24). For Jacobi the *Ethics* showed what a philosophy of demonstration must end in if it is consistent, and so gave a reason to rely instead on what Hegel, reporting Jacobi's position, called "immediate knowledge" (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, tr. Haldane and Simson, III 283). Jacobi made the conversation public in 1785, in a book of letters to Moses Mendelssohn, which appeared in an enlarged edition in 1789. The dispute had begun privately between the two men in the summer of 1783; when it became public it drew in, as Frederick Beiser has written, "almost all the best minds of late eighteenth-century Germany," among them Kant, Herder, Goethe and Hamann (*The Fate of Reason*, p. 44). Mendelssohn, who had defended Spinoza in his first published work, became "the bitter opponent of Spinozism" in his *Morgenstunden* of 1785 (p. 52). Jacobi's charge was that reason, consistently pursued, leads to atheism and fatalism, and finally to what he called "nihilism," from which the only escape is a leap of faith, a *salto mortale* (p. 46). Goethe spoke of the book's effect as "an explosion," and Hegel as "a thunderbolt out of the blue" (p. 46).

The first and most visible effect, in Beiser's account, was a revolution in Spinoza's reputation. "Nearly all the major figures of the classical *Goethezeit*—Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin, Herder, F. Schlegel, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Schelling—became Spinoza enthusiasts in the wake of the controversy. Apparently overnight, Spinoza's reputation changed from a devil into a saint" (p. 44); pantheism became, as Heine later put it, "the unofficial religion of Germany" (p. 45). These writers read the *Ethics* in a new spirit, and found in it, not the atheism Bayle had seen there, but a philosophy of God.

Novalis wrote, in one of his fragments, that "Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man" and that "Spinozism is a surfeit of divinity," where unbelief is a lack of it (*Fragmente*, ed. Kamnitzer, p. 551). Friedrich Schleiermacher, in his speeches *On Religion* to its cultured despisers, called on his readers to "offer reverently with me a lock of hair to the shade of the holy, rejected Spinoza! The high world-spirit pervaded him, the infinite was his beginning and end, the universe his only and eternal love; in holy innocence and deep humility he mirrored himself in the eternal world, and saw how he too was its most lovable mirror; he was full of religion and full of the holy spirit; and so he stands there alone and unequalled, master in his art, but raised above the profane guild, without disciples and without citizenship" (*Über die Religion*, 1806 ed., p. 68). The man Bayle had called an atheist of system had become, in a book written in defence of religion, a model of religious feeling.

Hegel gave the revival its philosophical form. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, he described Spinoza's idea of absolute substance as "in the main true and well-grounded," though "not the whole truth," since substance must also be thought of as active and living, and so as

mind; and he declared that "to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all Philosophy," since the soul must begin "by bathing in this ether of the One Substance, in which all that man has held as true has disappeared" (III 257). He rejected the charge of atheism. If Spinoza is called an atheist because he does not distinguish God from the world, "it is a misuse of the term"; "Spinozism might really just as well or even better have been termed Acosmism," since for Spinoza it is not the world but God alone that is truly real (III 281). And against Jacobi he insisted that Spinoza is "a testing-point in modern philosophy, so that it may really be said: You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all" (III 283). Hegel's reading, on which the attributes are "not independent, but only the forms in which the understanding grasps substance in its differences" (III 269–270), is the source to which Martial Gueroult traced the subjectivist interpretation he was still refuting in 1968 (see Appendix B [p. 660]).

Nietzsche

The most surprising testimony comes from Friedrich Nietzsche, who came to Spinoza only in 1881. In a postcard to his friend Franz Overbeck, postmarked Sils, 30 July 1881, he wrote: "I am utterly astonished, utterly delighted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now was inspired by 'instinct.' Not only is his whole tendency like mine—to make knowledge the most powerful affect—but in five main points of his doctrine I find myself again; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these things: he denies the freedom of the will; purposes; the moral order of the world; the unegoistic; evil." He granted that the differences between them were enormous, but thought they lay rather in differences of time, culture and science. "In sum: my solitude, which, as on very high mountains, often, often left me short of breath and made the blood rush out, is now at least a solitude for two" (*Briefwechsel mit Franz Overbeck*, 1916, pp. 149–150). The list is a fair summary of the negative doctrines of Parts I, II and IV, and the phrase "to make knowledge the most powerful affect" recalls the teaching of Part IV that the true knowledge of good and evil can restrain an affect only "insofar as it is considered as an affect" (Part IV, Prop. 14 [p. 373]).

The *Ethics* in English

Two English translations of the *Ethics* appeared within a year of each other: by William Hale White in 1883, and by R. H. M. Elwes in 1884, in the second volume of his translation of Spinoza's chief works. Both were kept in the repository of this edition for comparison. In the preface to a later edition, White confessed that he did not "pretend to understand the whole of it, and, so far as he can make out, nobody has fully understood it," but argued that the speculative doctrine was not the source of the book's power: "if Spinoza were merely a professional metaphysician, he would not have been what he was to Goethe, to Shelley, to George Eliot, and to the world at large" (White, *Ethic*, 1910 ed., pp. lxi–lxii). His own preface set out "the teaching of the Ethic in so far as it has been a power amongst men outside the schools."

Scholarship

The modern study of the *Ethics* rests on a few great works of scholarship. Jacob Freudenthal collected the sources, records and reports of Spinoza's life in 1899. Carl Gebhardt's critical edition of 1925 established the text that this edition translates, with a full account of its sources in the first edition, the Dutch translation and the earlier editions. H. A. Wolfson's *The Philosophy of*

Spinoza (1934) distinguished the explicit Spinoza of the definitions and propositions, whom he called Benedictus, from the implicit Spinoza, Baruch, whose "mind is crammed with traditional philosophic lore": "Benedictus is the first of the moderns; Baruch is the last of the mediaevals," and "we cannot get the full meaning of what Benedictus says unless we know what has passed through the mind of Baruch" (I vii). His book traced the propositions of the *Ethics* to their sources in medieval Jewish and scholastic philosophy. Martial Gueroult's commentary on Parts I and II (1968, 1974) followed the text "Book by Book and Proposition by Proposition," on the conviction that each of Spinoza's theses, and their close connection, "is the object of a rigorous demonstration" (I 13–14).

Two books in English, to which much later work responds, are cited often in this edition. Edwin Curley's *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (1969) proposed to read Spinoza's terms in the vocabulary of modern philosophy of science, with substance and its attributes as the most general facts and laws of nature; Jonathan Bennett's *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984) treated the *Ethics* as a set of arguments to be tested and, where possible, repaired, and was unsparing where it found them wanting. Among the studies that have answered them are Michael Della Rocca's *Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza* (1996), which argued against Bennett that the identity of mind and body is consistent with the barrier between the attributes, and Yitzhak Melamed's *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (2013), which defended against Curley the view that the modes inhere in God as their subject. The appendices of this edition describe these debates.

What remains

The history sketched here shows the *Ethics* read as atheism and as religion, as the completion of rationalism and as the refutation of it, as a system of metaphysics and as a guide to life. None of these readings is simply wrong, and each found something that is in the text. The book itself does not claim to be easy. It ends with the observation that the way it has shown "seems very hard," but "can nevertheless be found. And indeed what is so rarely found must be hard." "But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare" (Part V, Prop. 42, Schol. [p. 523]).

Appendix A. Substance and Mode

Every reader of Part I must decide what Spinoza means when he says that things are "in" God. The definitions say that a substance is "what is in itself and is conceived through itself," and a mode "that which is in another, through which it is also conceived" (Part I, Defs. 3 [p. 25] and 5 [p. 25]); the first axiom says that "whatever is, is either in itself or in another" (Ax. 1 [p. 29]); and Prop. 15 [p. 49] concludes that "whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God." Particular things, the corollary to Prop. 25 [p. 77] adds, "are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way." But the little word "in" can be read in more than one way, and the choice determines what kind of philosophy the *Ethics* contains. This appendix describes the main readings and the arguments for and against them.

The traditional reading and Bayle's objection

In the philosophy Spinoza inherited, to be "in" something was the mark of an accident or quality: whiteness is in a wall, shape is in a body, a thought is in a mind. A substance is that in which qualities inhere and which does not itself inhere in anything. Descartes kept this structure. Shape and motion are modes of extended substance, ways of being extended, and imagination, sensation and will are modes of thinking substance (*Principles* I.53). Read in this light, Spinoza's doctrine says that stones, trees, human beings and their thoughts are qualities or states of God, as a shape is a state of a body. This is the oldest reading of the *Ethics*, and for a long time the only one.

Pierre Bayle drew from it the consequences that made Spinoza notorious. If all things are modes of one substance, then that substance is the subject of all their properties, including contrary ones. It would be not only the efficient cause of all the follies and crimes of human beings but their passive subject, the *subjectum inhaesionis*, joined to them by an identity, since the mode is not really distinct from the substance it modifies. Wars and battles between men, which are intelligible when men are distinct beings with conflicting interests, become absurd when men are only modifications of the same being: "the same God, numerically one, who modifies himself into a Turk, modifying himself into a Hungarian." Since, Bayle adds, modes do nothing and only substances act and suffer, the sentence "the Germans have killed ten thousand Turks" would have to mean that "God modified into Germans has killed God modified into ten thousand Turks," and every sentence about what men do to each other would come to this: God hates himself, persecutes himself, kills himself, eats himself (*Dictionnaire*, "Spinoza," remark N; 1820 ed. XIII 443–444).

Bayle's argument is a reductio. Assume that modes inhere in substance as qualities in a subject; then God has contradictory properties and acts against himself; so the assumption, or the system, must be absurd. Bayle chose to reject the system. Later readers have tried to reject the assumption.

Curley: causal dependence

The most influential alternative was proposed by Edwin Curley in *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (1969). Curley called the traditional reading the "Bayle–Joachim interpretation," after Bayle and H. H. Joachim, whose *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* (1901) had followed it, and argued that it misunderstands Spinoza's terms. "Spinoza's modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be related to substance in the same way Descartes' modes are related to substance, for they are

particular things (E Ip25c), not qualities. And it is difficult to know what it would mean to say that particular things inhere in substance" (p. 18). A quality can be predicated of a subject; it is not clear what it would mean to predicate a stone or a man of God.

Curley proposed instead that the relation of mode to substance is "a relation of causal dependence which is unlike the relation of predicate to subject and unlike the relation of species to genus" (p. 40). "Modes exist in substance in the sense that they are causally dependent on substance; substance exists in itself in the sense that it is not causally dependent on anything else" (p. 74). On this reading, Spinoza's God is the cause of all things and the things depend on him entirely, but they are not his properties, and the doctrine that everything is "in" God is a doctrine of universal dependence, not of universal inherence. Bayle's objection lapses, since God is not the subject of the properties of the things he causes.

Curley went further. He proposed that substance and its attributes are best understood as the most general facts about the world, described by the fundamental laws of nature, and that the infinite modes are the derivative laws, so that the relation between God and things is the relation between laws and what they explain (pp. 56–59). This "nomological" reading made Spinoza's metaphysics intelligible to readers trained in the philosophy of science, and it has been very widely discussed.

Bennett: modes as properties

Jonathan Bennett, in *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), defended something closer to the traditional reading, on different grounds. Spinoza's word *modus*, he pointed out, means "a way that something can be," and Spinoza "really is saying that ordinary particular things are ways that reality is"; "Spinozistic 'modes' belong on the property side of the line between things and properties" (p. 92). Bennett regarded Curley's thesis as "radical and improbable," since it credits Spinoza with silently depriving "mode" of half the meaning it had for Descartes and in Latin generally (p. 93).

To make the traditional reading plausible, Bennett attributed to Spinoza what he called a "field metaphysic." The one extended substance is space itself, and a body is not a thing in space but a region of space that has certain qualities, or rather a continuous series of regions at successive times, each qualitatively unlike its neighbours. "When a thaw moves across a countryside, as we say, nothing really moves; there are just progressive changes in which bits of the countryside are frozen and which are melted" (p. 89). In the same way, the motion of a body is the progressive change of qualities in the regions of the one substance. On this picture a body really is a state of the extended substance, as the traditional reading says, and yet the oddity Curley found in predicating a stone of God disappears, since the stone is not a thing to be predicated but a way the substance is in a certain place.

Melamed: inherence and predication

More recently Yitzhak Melamed has defended the traditional reading directly. In the first chapter of *Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought* (2013), he argues that Spinozist modes "both inhere in and are predicated of the substance," that Bayle's famous critique "is based on crucial misunderstandings," that the claim involves no category mistake, and that Curley's appeal to the principle of interpretive charity does not justify his reading. He also points out the similarity between Spinoza's modes and the "tropes," or particular properties, of some contemporary metaphysics. A trope is a particular, as Curley insisted Spinoza's modes are, but a particular

property, such as the redness of this rose as opposed to redness in general, and such particulars can inhere in a subject. On this reading the doctrine that all things are in God is just what it seems, a doctrine of inherence, and the reader must face its consequences rather than explain them away.

What is at stake

The disagreement is not merely about a word. If modes inhere in God, the *Ethics* is a form of pantheism in the strict sense: God is not only the cause of all things but the subject of which all things are states, and the world is God in a certain modification. If modes merely depend causally on God, the *Ethics* is closer to a radical version of traditional theism, in which a single necessary being is the cause of everything else and everything else is distinct from it, though wholly dependent on it. The choice affects the reading of Prop. 18 [p. 71], where God is called the immanent and not the transitive cause of all things; of Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139], where the human mind is called a part of God's infinite intellect; and of the doctrine of Part V that the mind's love of God is part of the love with which God loves himself.

The texts give each side something. On the side of inherence are Spinoza's language, which is the language of substance and affection, and his insistence, in the scholium to Prop. 15 [p. 49], that matter is everywhere the same and that its parts are distinguished only modally, not really. On the side of causation are his equation of being in something with being conceived through it, and of being conceived through something with being caused by it (Part I, Ax. 4 [p. 29]), which suggests that inherence and causation may be, for Spinoza, two names for one relation. Michael Della Rocca has drawn this conclusion, arguing that for Spinoza "causation and explanation and the inherence of a property in a subject all amount to the same phenomenon" (*Spinoza*, 2008, p. 7; see Appendix F [p. 677]); if he is right, the choice between the causal and the inherence readings is less sharp than it first appears. Defenders of the inherence reading have also answered Bayle in Spinoza's own terms. The properties of the modes, they point out, are not properties of God considered as infinite, but of God insofar as he is affected by this or that mode, the qualification Spinoza uses again and again (as in Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]); and so God is not the subject of contradictory properties in the same respect, any more than a body is both moving and at rest because one part moves and another does not.

Further reading

The works cited here are the best entry into the debate: Bayle's article "Spinoza" in his *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, especially remark N; Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation* (1969), chapters 1–2; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 20–25; and Melamed, *Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought* (2013), chapter 1. Martial Gueroult's commentary on Part I, *Spinoza I: Dieu* (1968), works through the propositions one by one and is indispensable for the detail of the argument.

Appendix B. The Attributes

The definition of attribute is among the shortest in the *Ethics* and among the most debated: "By *attribute* I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence" (Part I, Def. 4 [p. 25]). It raises three questions. Are the attributes really in the substance, or are they ways in which an intellect perceives a substance that is in itself without distinction? How many attributes are there? And how can one substance have several attributes, each of which constitutes its essence and is conceived through itself, without ceasing to be one? This appendix describes the main answers.

Subjective and objective readings

Jonathan Bennett called the definition "one of the most puzzling passages in the Ethics." It seems to define one of Spinoza's basic metaphysical concepts in terms of thought, and so gives one of the attributes a special place in the definition of all of them (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, p. 62). If the emphasis falls on "what the intellect perceives," the attributes may seem to exist only for the intellect that perceives them; if it falls on "as constituting its essence," they are real features of the substance, which an intellect discovers. The Latin word rendered "as," *tanquam*, can also mean "as if," and the choice of English has sometimes followed the choice of interpretation.

H. A. Wolfson, in *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (1934), translated the phrase "as if constituting its essence" and defended the first view. He set out the alternatives with great clarity. On the first reading, "attributes are only *in intellectu*," "a subjective mode of thinking, expressing a relation to a perceiving subject and having no real existence in the essence"; on the second, they are "*extra intellectum*, real elements out of which the essence of the substance is composed." On both readings the mind perceives the attributes, but on the first "to be perceived by the mind means to be invented by the mind," and on the second it means "only to be discovered by the mind." Wolfson judged that "the abundance of both literary and material evidence is in favor of the subjective interpretation" (I 146).

His main argument was historical. He held that the dispute between the two readings reproduces a controversy among the medieval Jewish philosophers over the "essential attributes" of God, the terms that would stand to God's essence as genus and species stand to the thing defined. Maimonides rejected such attributes, because he held that genus and species have a kind of reality and would introduce composition into God's simple essence. Others admitted them, on the ground that they are purely subjective terms, distinct only in the mind and identical in reality with God's essence: Wolfson names Averroes, Moses ha-Levi, Gersonides, Crescas and Albo, whom he quotes as calling the attributes "nothing but intellectual conceptions" of perfections that "in reality are nothing but Thy essence." Spinoza, Wolfson argued, "consciously and advisedly aligned himself" with this second group (I 147–151). Hence, on his reading, the language of perception in the definition, and Spinoza's statement to Simon de Vries that by attribute he understands the same as by substance, "except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such a definite nature to substance" (Letter 9 [p. 535]; Wolfson I 152).

Martial Gueroult, in the first volume of his commentary (1968), rejected what he called the "idealist, subjectivist or formalist" interpretation, which he traced to Hegel's reading of Spinoza, and devoted an appendix to refuting it (*Spinoza* I 428). One of his arguments is drawn from the demonstration of Part I, Prop. 4 [p. 31], which says that there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished except "substances, or what is the

same (by Def. 4), their attributes, and their affections." By identifying substances with their attributes, and by appeal to the very definition on which the subjectivists rely, the demonstration "ruins irremediably, in advance" the claim that the definition supports their reading (I 117). For Gueroult the attributes are real and really distinct. The first eight propositions of Part I deduce the "constitutive elements of the divine essence, namely the substances of one attribute, which will later turn out to be the very attributes of God" (I 109); and once Prop. 9 has shown that the more reality a being has, the more attributes belong to it, these beings, rightly considered at first as substances of one attribute, prove to be "not different substances, but the attributes of one and the same substance" (I 162).

Bennett proposed a third approach, which keeps the attributes real while explaining the language of the intellect. He read the remark in Letter 9 [p. 535] as saying that "substance differs from attribute only by the difference between a substantival and an adjectival presentation of the very same content." "We use the concept of substance to think of what has the attribute, and we use the concept of attribute to think of what the substance has; but it is the same conceptual content in each case" (pp. 62–63). The phrase "with respect to the intellect" does not make the attribute unreal; it marks a difference in the logical form of our thinking about one and the same reality. Bennett admitted that this does not yet explain why Def. 4 says that an attribute is *perceived* as constituting an essence, and proposed, as most commentators do, to proceed on the assumption that an attribute actually is a basic property of its substance (p. 63).

How many attributes?

Spinoza defines God as "a substance consisting of infinite attributes" (Part I, Def. 6 [p. 27]), and most readers take this to mean infinitely many. He names only two, thought and extension, and when Tschirnhaus asked why we know no others, he answered that the human mind is the idea of a body, and that the idea of a body involves no attributes of God except extension and thought (Letter 64 [p. 629]). The answer seems to take for granted that there are others.

Bennett argued that the text does not require infinitely many attributes. Spinoza "used 'infinite' as a virtual synonym for 'all'": to say that God has infinite attributes is to say that God "exists in every possible basic way," which "does not entail that God exists other than as extended and as thinking" (p. 76). He was careful not to claim that Spinoza believed there were only two. The scholium to Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 131] says that "whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other," we shall find one and the same order of causes, and the correspondence with Tschirnhaus takes seriously the question why we know nothing of the other attributes. So Bennett does "not say that Spinoza thought there were only two attributes" (p. 77). But the doctrine that there are infinitely many is not, on his reading, something the definitions of the *Ethics* assert.

One substance, many attributes

The third difficulty is the deepest. Each attribute of one substance "must be conceived through itself" (Part I, Prop. 10 [p. 39]), so that no attribute can be explained through another. Michael Della Rocca has called this "the conceptual or explanatory barrier that Spinoza erects between thought and extension," from which it follows that "no mental fact can be explained by any physical fact and vice versa" (*Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza*, p. 10). Yet the attributes belong to one substance, and the scholium to Prop. 10 insists that "it is far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance." How can one thing have several essences,

each complete and each unintelligible through the others?

On the subjective reading the problem disappears, since the attributes are only ways of perceiving a single essence. Wolfson presented this as one of its advantages: on the objective reading, he quoted James Martineau as saying, "how that essence can be one and self-identical, while its constituents are many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is a question which is hopeless of solution" (I 153). The price is to make the distinction between thought and extension something the intellect adds; and since the intellect is itself a mode of thought, this seems to give thought a priority over the other attributes that the system denies. Della Rocca pressed a further objection. In the scholium to Prop. 10 Spinoza says that the attributes are conceived as really distinct, and in the scholium to Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 131] he speaks of what can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance. The ideas of an infinite intellect are all true; so if it conceives the attributes as distinct, they are distinct, and Wolfson's view "must therefore be mistaken" (p. 157).

Della Rocca's own solution rests on the idea that certain contexts in Spinoza are what logicians call referentially opaque: whether a sentence of the form "*x* is conceived through extension" is true depends on how *x* is described, and not only on which thing *x* is. The thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance; yet extension constitutes the essence of the substance described as extended, and not of the substance described as thinking, since to say that extension constitutes the essence of the thinking substance would be to say that the thinking substance is conceived through extension, which breaks the barrier between the attributes. The phrase "what the intellect perceives ... as" in Def. 4, on this reading, does not make the attributes unreal; it marks the fact that what constitutes the essence of a substance depends on the attribute under which the substance is conceived (pp. 164–165). The same feature of Spinoza's system, Della Rocca argued, makes it possible for a mode of thought and a mode of extension to be one and the same thing, although neither can be explained through the other: given this opacity, "Spinoza can affirm an identity of modes of thought and modes of extension even while maintaining that there is no causal interaction across attributes" (p. 124). Appendix C [p. 663] takes up this argument.

Why it matters

The question about the attributes is the hinge between Parts I and II. If the attributes are real and really distinct, Spinoza's account of mind and body is a duality of attributes within a single substance: thought and extension are both fully real, and neither can be reduced to the other. If they are subjective, Spinoza is closer to a monism in which the distinction between mind and body belongs to our way of knowing rather than to things. The doctrine of Part II, which Part III restates in the words "the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension" (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]), reads differently on each view.

Further reading

Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (1934), vol. I, chapter 5; Gueroult, *Spinoza I: Dieu* (1968), chapters 3–4, on Props. 1–10, and Appendix 3, "La controverse sur l'attribut"; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 16–19; Della Rocca, *Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza* (1996), chapters 1 and 9.

Appendix C. Mind and Body

Part II states the relation between mind and body in a series of propositions that readers have found both bold and obscure. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 129]). The scholium adds that "a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways" (E2P7S [p. 131]). "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else" (Prop. 13 [p. 141]). And Part III draws the consequence that neither can act on the other: "The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else" (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235]). The doctrine is usually called "parallelism," a word that does not occur in the *Ethics*. This appendix describes the main questions it has raised and the main answers.

Two claims: correspondence and identity

The propositions make two claims that are not obviously the same. One is a claim of correspondence: for every mode of extension there is an idea of it, and the causal order among ideas mirrors the causal order among bodies. Jonathan Bennett stated it in these terms: "there is a one-one relation correlating mental items with physical ones, mapping similarities onto similarities and causal chains onto causal chains" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, p. 127). The other is a claim of identity: the mind and the body are "one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension" (Part II, Prop. 21, Schol. [p. 167]). Correspondence relates two series; identity says that there is only one.

Spinoza plainly holds both, and the question is how they are related. Martial Gueroult argued that the identity is the ground of the correspondence. Just as the substances of one attribute deduced at the beginning of Part I prove to be one and the same substance constituted by different attributes, so "any mode of one attribute and the corresponding modes in the infinity of other attributes make one and the same thing" in different attributes. "From the identity of the connections between things in the various attributes one has passed here to the identity of the things connected; and this latter identity grounds the former ontologically: since the things connected are the same, their connections are only one" (*Spinoza* II 85–86). On this reading, Prop. 7 establishes the correspondence through an axiom about knowledge, and the scholium explains through the unity of substance why the correspondence must hold.

Gueroult insisted at the same time that the identity does not abolish the distinction. The modes of the different attributes, "despite their identity with respect to substance," are caused by God only insofar as he is this or that attribute, and so "remain really distinct from one another," just as the attributes themselves remain really distinct in God (II 86). He also distinguished the relation between ideas and the things outside thought from a second relation within thought itself, between ideas and the ideas of those ideas, which he called "intra-cogitative" parallelism, warning that the expression is his and not Spinoza's (II 15–16). The second relation matters for Spinoza's account of self-knowledge and consciousness (Part II, Props. 20–23 [p. 167]).

The argument for Prop. 7

The demonstration of Prop. 7 is two short sentences: "This is evident from Ax. 4, Part I. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect."

The axiom says that "knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of its cause" (Part I, Ax. 4 [p. 29]). Bennett called this an "offhand 'demonstration'" and argued that it works only if the axiom is read as a claim about mental items, whereas Spinoza's other uses of the axiom read it as a claim about conceptual connection, the word rendered "knowledge," *cognitio*, serving him for "concept" as well as for knowing. He conjectured that Spinoza had better reasons for the doctrine, drawn from the explanatory ambitions of the new science, which "could not easily have been shaped up into the sort of demonstration Spinoza liked to give," and that this is why the text offers instead "the weak, cryptic argument that we find in the text" (p. 127).

Edwin Curley proposed a reading on which the demonstration is less weak. Spinoza says that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, "involves affirmation or negation" (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 209]); so "it would be appropriate in most contexts in Spinoza to substitute the term 'proposition' or 'assertion' for the term 'idea'" (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, p. 122). If ideas are propositions and their objects are facts, the relation between thought and extension can be thought of "as an identity of true proposition and fact" (p. 123), and the correspondence between the order of ideas and the order of things is the correspondence between a complete true description of the world and the world it describes. Bennett granted that ideas are propositionally structured, but objected that the reading "gets Spinoza out of any conceivable trouble with his parallelism, but only by making it so empty as to lack all metaphysical significance." He preferred to credit Spinoza with a real psycho-physical parallelism, adopted "to solve a real problem," rather than "the tame parallelism doctrine to which Curley confines him" (p. 128).

What kind of identity?

The hardest question is what it means to say that a mind and a body are "one and the same thing." The attributes are conceived through themselves, and no mode of one attribute can be explained through a mode of another (Part I, Prop. 10 [p. 39]; Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129]). If my mind and my body are strictly identical, whatever is true of one is true of the other; but my body is conceived through extension and my mind is not. It seems to follow that they cannot be identical after all.

Bennett concluded that Spinoza cannot mean a strict identity of the mental and the physical item. "He cannot be saying that physical P1 = mental M1; that is impossible because they belong to different attributes." He proposed instead that modes, being properties, have a common element: my body is extension combined with a certain "differentia" F, and my mind is thought combined with the same F. "What it takes for an extended world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a thinking world to contain my mind; just as what it takes for a two-dimensional figure to be a circle is exactly what it takes for a three-dimensional figure to be a sphere—namely being bounded by a set of points equidistant from one point" (p. 141). On this reading the identity is the identity of the "trans-attribute" differentia, and the mind and the body are the same in the way a circle and a sphere are the same.

Michael Della Rocca rejected this solution. On Bennett's own account, he pointed out, my body is extension-and-F and my mind is thought-and-F, and neither is identical with F; and "the fact that each of these complex modes contains a constituent in common, namely F, does not, of course, show that my mind and my body are the same mode" (*Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza*, p. 160). Della Rocca defended a strict numerical identity, and answered the objection from the attributes by arguing that the contexts in question are referentially opaque. Whether "*x* is conceived through extension" is true depends on how *x* is described, not only on which thing it is; so the same mode, described as a mode of extension, is conceived through

extension, and described as a mode of thought, is not. The barrier between the attributes is a barrier between ways of conceiving, and it does not prevent one thing from being conceived in both ways. "Given this opacity, Spinoza can affirm an identity of modes of thought and modes of extension even while maintaining that there is no causal interaction across attributes" (p. 124). Appendix B [p. 660] describes how Della Rocca extended the same idea to the definition of attribute.

Ideas of everything

Prop. 7 and its scholium imply that there is an idea in God not only of every human body but of every body whatever, and Spinoza draws the consequence in the scholium to Prop. 13. The things shown so far "are very general and pertain no more to men than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body" (E2P13S [p. 143]). Readers have disagreed about how much this commits Spinoza to.

Bennett took it as a form of panpsychism, and offered Spinoza an argument for it. If some physical systems have minds and others do not, there must be a line somewhere on the scale of physical complexity below which mentality does not occur; but if no physical fact can explain a mental fact, there can be no explanation of why the line falls where it does, and such "unexplainability must be deeply offensive to Spinoza." So he has reason to conclude that the mental realm "never stops," that "there is a mental counterpart to every physical item, however simple and dead," and that the human mind is a complex of simpler mental items related to the parts of the body, especially the brain (pp. 136–137). Bennett added that this does not mean that every physical thing has anything we would recognize as mental. As to what the mental counterparts of simple bodies are like, Spinoza "must admit that he does not know, and this ought to embarrass him"; but Bennett judged that "the problem is not fatal" (p. 138). He noted that Leibniz, who also denied any logical overlap between the mental and the physical, reached a similar conclusion.

Curley read the same passage more deflationarily. If ideas are propositions, then the idea of my watch is the true proposition about it; the scholium "does not imply that my watch has thoughts and sensations, any more than Aristotle's doctrine that plants have souls implies that flowers feel pain." Consciousness, on his reading, requires not only an idea of a body but an idea of that idea (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, p. 126). Spinoza himself says that "ideas differ among themselves as the objects themselves do," and that "the more a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or of being acted on in many ways at once, the more its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once" (E2P13S [p. 143]). On either reading, the human mind is not set apart from nature by a difference of kind.

The other attributes

A further puzzle was raised in Spinoza's lifetime. If the same mode is expressed under infinitely many attributes, and the order and connection of its expressions is the same in all of them, why does my mind perceive only my body, its expression under extension, and not its expressions under the other attributes? Tschirnhaus put this question in a letter of 12 August 1675, arguing that the scholium to Part II, Prop. 7 seemed to imply the contrary of Spinoza's claim that the mind can perceive no attributes of God except extension and thought (Letter 65 [p. 633]). Spinoza replied that although each thing is expressed in infinitely many ways in the infinite intellect of God, "those infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a

singular thing, but infinite minds," since none of these infinite ideas has any connection with the others, as the same scholium and Part I, Prop. 10 [p. 39] show (Letter 66 [p. 633]). There is thus a distinct idea, and so a distinct mind, of each of the thing's expressions, and the mind that is the idea of my body is only one of them. The answer leaves a question that Spinoza did not take up: if the attribute of thought contains an idea of every mode of every attribute, thought seems to have a wider reach than any other attribute, although each attribute is supposed to express the essence of God equally.

What is at stake

Spinoza's doctrine was meant to solve the problem Descartes had left: how an unextended mind and an extended body, really distinct substances, could act on each other, which Spinoza judged that Descartes had explained only through "a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality" (Part V, Preface [p. 469]). Spinoza's solution denies the interaction and explains the correlation, and its interest for modern readers lies in the attempt to hold together three claims that are hard to combine: that the mental is not reducible to the physical, that there is nevertheless only one world, and that the mental and the physical are equally subject to explanation by causes. The disagreements described here concern the price of holding all three.

Further reading

Gueroult, *Spinoza II: L'âme* (1974), chapters 3–5, on Props. 1–13; Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (1969), chapter 4; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 31–36; Della Rocca, *Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza* (1996), chapters 7–9.

Appendix D. Necessity and Purpose

Part I ends with two denials that together have done more than anything else to shape the reputation of the *Ethics*. The first is a denial of contingency: "In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way" (Part I, Prop. 29 [p. 81]), and "things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced" (Prop. 33 [p. 85]). The second, in the Appendix, is a denial of purpose: "nature has no end set before it, and ... all final causes are nothing but human fictions" (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]). Each raises a question of interpretation. How strong is the necessity Spinoza asserts? And does the denial of final causes extend to human action, or only to the purposes popularly ascribed to God and nature? This appendix takes the questions in turn.

How strong is the necessity?

Spinoza explains his terms in the first scholium to Prop. 33. "A thing is called *necessary* either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause," and it is called *contingent* "for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge": we call a thing contingent when we do not know that its essence involves a contradiction, and yet "can affirm nothing with certainty" about its existence, "because the order of causes is hidden from us" (E1P33S1 [p. 87]). Contingency, on this account, is only apparent. But two views are consistent with these words, and readers have been divided between them.

On the first view, Spinoza is a *determinist*. Every event is necessitated by its causes, and they by theirs, and the chain of finite causes runs back without end, as Prop. 28 [p. 79] says: every finite thing is determined to exist and operate by another finite thing, "and so on to infinity." But the chain as a whole might have been different; the necessity of each link is conferred on it by the links before it, and it is necessary only "by reason of its cause." On the second view, Spinoza is a *necessitarian* in the strict sense: the world, in every detail, could not have been otherwise, and the actual world is the only possible world. Prop. 16, which says that "from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect)," and Prop. 33 itself seem to say this, since everything follows from a nature that is itself necessary.

Edwin Curley argued for something close to the first view. On his reading, the attributes and infinite modes of Part I correspond to the laws of nature, which are absolutely necessary, while particular facts are only relatively necessary: each follows from the laws together with other particular facts, which follow in turn from others, without end. He then showed that, on this reading, other complete histories of the world are consistent with the same laws, since one could deny any particular fact provided one also denied, all the way back, the facts that necessitate it: "If every truth is necessary, but some are only relatively necessary, then the actual world is not the only possible world." Whether Spinoza would have accepted the result Curley thought "not so easy to decide" (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, p. 104). If he wished to hold that the actual world is the only possible one in the stronger sense, he would have to answer the question why this series of particular facts rather than another, and to refuse it would be to "accept a limitation on the principle of sufficient reason," a qualification Spinoza "never explicitly makes" (pp. 105–106). Even without strict necessitarianism, Curley concluded, Spinoza's determinism "is quite strong enough to be philosophically interesting" (p. 106).

Jonathan Bennett read the evidence differently. He agreed that many of Spinoza's statements express only determinism, but found others "harder to explain away," above all the second scholium to Prop. 33, "the marvellous scholium" in which Spinoza argues that if God had decreed anything else concerning nature he would have had another intellect and another will, and asks: "what reason is there why he cannot now change his decrees concerning created things and nevertheless remain equally perfect?" "It is hard not to conclude," Bennett wrote, "that in this scholium Spinoza is defending the absolute necessity of all truths." His verdict was divided. Forced to choose, he would say that Spinoza "consciously, explicitly held that this is the only possible world," "though it is not really right"; but the opposite is not right either, for "it seems that Spinoza did not think his situation through" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, pp. 122–123). Bennett suggested that Spinoza was helped to avoid the question by a confusion about "necessary by reason of its cause," supposing that a necessity conferred by something else could be as absolute as a necessity inherent in a thing's own nature (pp. 123–124).

Later readers have pressed the case for the second view. Don Garrett, in an essay first published in 1991, started from a letter of 1675. Oldenburg had warned Spinoza that readers of the *Theological-Political Treatise* thought he asserted "the fatal necessity of all things and actions," and Spinoza answered that "this very thing is the chief foundation of everything in the treatise which I had intended to publish": "I in no way subject God to fate, but I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God" (Letters 74 [p. 637]–75 [p. 641]). Garrett defended three theses: that nothing Spinoza says commits him to denying necessitarianism; that Props. 16, 29 and 33, and independently the doctrine of the attributes in Part II, commit him to it; and that his monism and his account of adequate ideas make better sense if he is a necessitarian (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, pp. 98–100, 119). The argument from Prop. 16 is short. Everything that falls under an infinite intellect follows from the necessity of the divine nature; that nature is itself necessary; whatever follows from what is necessary is necessary; and everything actual falls under an infinite intellect (p. 111). Curley, in a later essay written with Gregory Walski, replied that Spinoza held only a "moderate necessitarianism," on which there could have been, from eternity, other complete series of finite modes equally compatible with the divine nature. Garrett answered that such a view requires "that a crucial fact about the universe—namely, that there is this complete infinite system of finite modes rather than others that were equally possible—has no explanation at all," and so sits uncomfortably with Spinoza's commitment to the principle of sufficient reason (p. 125). Michael Della Rocca reached the same conclusion by the same route. He called necessitarianism "an extremely implausible thesis," but added that this "would not deter Spinoza—bold philosopher that he is—from accepting it if he sees good reasons for doing so" (*Spinoza*, 2008, p. 76); and he found those reasons in Spinoza's refusal to admit any fact without an explanation, the subject of Appendix F [p. 677].

The dispute is older than modern scholarship. Leibniz, who received a copy of the *Opera Posthuma* early in 1678 (Gerhardt I 119), wrote beside Prop. 33 that the proposition is "true or false, according as it is explained": on the hypothesis of a divine will that chooses the best, nothing but these things could have been produced, but "according to the very nature of things considered in themselves, things could have been produced otherwise" (*Ad Ethicam*, Gerhardt I 149). Years later, in his remarks on Wachter's book about Spinoza, he put his alternative more sharply: "There is a middle between the necessary and the fortuitous, namely the free." The world is a voluntary effect of God, produced for reasons that incline without necessitating; "God could have created either not at all or otherwise, but he was not going to." And the claim that

things follow from God as properties follow from a triangle, he added, "is proved by no argument" (*Animadversiones in Wachterum*, ed. Foucher de Careil, pp. 48–50).

Why the necessity matters

The question is not only metaphysical, for Spinoza draws ethical consequences from the necessity of things. "It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary" (Part II, Prop. 44 [p. 195]), and Part V makes this one of the remedies for the passions: "Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them" (Part V, Prop. 6 [p. 479]). The scholium gives an example from experience: "the sadness over a good which has perished is eased as soon as the man who has lost it considers that the good could not have been kept in any way" (E5P6S [p. 479]). For this remedy determinism seems enough, since what eases sadness is the knowledge that the loss followed inevitably from its causes, not the knowledge that no other world was possible.

Leibniz objected to the remedy itself. Spinoza thinks the mind is greatly strengthened if it understands that what happens, happens necessarily; but this constraint "does not make the mind of the sufferer content, nor does he therefore feel his evil any less. He is happy if he understands that good follows from evil, and that what happens is best for us, if we are wise" (*Animadversiones*, pp. 66–68). The objection marks the difference between Spinoza's ethics and a Christian theodicy: Spinoza offers understanding, not the assurance that all is for the best, and the reader must judge whether understanding alone can bear the weight he puts on it.

The denial of purpose

The Appendix to Part I attacks the common supposition that "all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end," and that God directs all things to some definite end. Spinoza offers a diagnosis and several arguments. The diagnosis starts from what he says "must be acknowledged by all: namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have an appetite to seek their own advantage, of which they are conscious." Finding in nature many things useful to them, and accustomed to providing means for their own ends, men conclude "that there is some ruler, or some rulers, of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have taken care of all things for them and made all things for their use." The arguments are that the doctrine of ends "entirely overturns nature," since "what is in reality a cause it considers as an effect, and conversely"; that it takes away God's perfection, "for if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something that he lacks"; and that it ends in an appeal to "the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance" (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]). The Preface to Part IV adds an account of what a final cause is: "what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing." When we say that habitation was the final cause of a house, we mean only that a man, imagining the advantages of domestic life, had an appetite to build one; and this appetite "is really an efficient cause, which is considered as first because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites" (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]).

Most of the Appendix is aimed at cosmic purposes, at the belief that rain falls so that crops may grow. But Bennett argued that two of its arguments, if they work at all, tell against every kind of purposive explanation, including "He raised his hand so as to shade his eyes." One is that whatever has an efficient cause cannot also be explained by a final cause; the other is that a purposive explanation explains an event by its effect, and so makes the cause posterior. Bennett

regarded the denial of all purpose as the more important and more instructive part of Spinoza's attack, and as the key to Part III: "many aspects of Part 3 cannot be understood unless one grasps that Spinoza is trying to develop a nonteleological theory of human motivation. Miss that and you miss most of what is interesting in Part 3" (p. 215). He criticized Schopenhauer, who had numbered Spinoza among those who rejected teleology only because they thought it inseparable from theology, for overlooking the wider attack (p. 213).

On Bennett's reading, Spinoza replaces purpose with appetite. "By the *end for the sake of which we do something* I understand appetite" (Part IV, Def. 7 [p. 357]), and appetite "is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation" (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]). An appetite is an intrinsic state of the person which drives him toward something, and it explains his action without any reference to a future state of affairs: "In Spinozist appetite there is the person's intrinsic state, which is explanatory but not about the future; and there is where he is being driven by his state, which is about the future but does not explain his behaviour" (pp. 222–223). Bennett thought Spinoza mistaken to suppose that purposive explanation requires a freedom from efficient causes, since an action done with an end in view can be fully caused (p. 216); and he went on to sketch a theory of teleology that would meet Spinoza's challenge.

Don Garrett has argued against Bennett that Spinoza, while keeping "a certain rhetorical distance from the Aristotelian vocabulary of final causes," nonetheless "fully and consistently accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations," explanations of a state of affairs by a likely consequence of it that is implicated in its origin (*Nature and Necessity*, pp. 321–323). The Appendix itself says, as part of its own account, that "men do all things for the sake of an end, namely for the sake of the advantage they want." The doctrine that "each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]) extends something like purposive explanation to every finite thing, since the behaviour of each can be explained by its tendency to preserve itself. What the Appendix denies, on this reading, is that nature as a whole acts for an end, which is consistent with holding that each finite thing strives for its own preservation; and the definition of an end as appetite, together with the identification of appetite with the striving of Part III, suggests "that the underlying phenomenon of action for ends is itself nevertheless pervasive throughout nature" (pp. 324–325). Garrett answered in turn the five reasons Bennett had given for the opposite view, and concluded, against the usual picture, that of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz "it is not Leibniz but Spinoza who holds the position on teleology and teleological explanation nearest to that of Aristotle" (p. 323). Bennett, for his part, had suggested that the passages conceding human purposes may reflect Spinoza's acceptance of a harmless reading of purposive talk, or may have been written before he arrived at his more radical view (p. 215). The question bears directly on how Part III should be read: as a psychology that explains action by striving and desire, or as one that replaces the language of ends with the language of causes.

Further reading

Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (1969), chapter 3; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 27–29 on necessity and §§ 50–53 on purpose; Garrett, *Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy* (2018), chapter 4 with its postscript, and chapter 12; Della Rocca, *Spinoza* (2008), chapter 2, sections 5–6; Gueroult, *Spinoza I: Dieu* (1968), chapters 12–14, on Props. 24–36; Leibniz's notes on the *Ethics* in Gerhardt's edition of his philosophical writings, vol. I, and his

Animadversiones on Wachter, ed. Foucher de Careil (1854).

Appendix E. The Eternity of the Mind

No part of the *Ethics* has divided its readers more sharply than the propositions of Part V on the eternity of the mind. The essay that precedes Prop. 21 [p. 503] describes what they say. The mind can imagine and remember nothing except while the body endures; yet there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity, and so "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal" (Prop. 23 [p. 503]). The part that remains is the intellect, the part that perishes the imagination (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]); and "he who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal" (Prop. 39 [p. 519]). This appendix describes how readers have understood these claims and what they have thought of them.

Eternity and time

The first question is what kind of eternity is meant. Part I, Def. 8 [p. 27] defines eternity as existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing, and its explanation adds that such existence "cannot be explained through duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end." Read strictly, this makes the eternal part of the mind something outside time altogether: it neither existed before the body nor survives it, and to say that it "remains" is to say that it is not destroyed when the body is, because it was never the kind of thing that lasts or ends. Many readers have taken this to be the point of the doctrine, and Spinoza's own warning that men "confuse" the eternity of the mind "with duration and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after death" (Prop. 34, Schol. [p. 513]) supports them.

Others have read the doctrine in more temporal terms. H. A. Wolfson, who placed it in the tradition of medieval Jewish philosophy, wrote that the thinking part of the mind "existed from eternity prior to the existence of its particular body, and it remains to eternity even after the death of the body" (*The Philosophy of Spinoza*, II 292). Jonathan Bennett held that eternity in Spinoza's sense "entails sempiternity though it is not entailed by it": what is eternal is necessary, and what is necessary is true at all times, even if being true at all times is not enough to make a thing eternal (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, p. 358). On either of these readings the eternal part of the mind is at least everlasting, whatever more it may be. The disagreement matters, because the more strictly the atemporal reading is held, the less the doctrine resembles a doctrine of immortality, and the more it resembles a claim about the kind of being that belongs to true ideas.

The medieval background

Wolfson argued that Spinoza's doctrine takes one side of an old debate. Philosophers who believed in immortality had held one of two views of the soul. Some held it to be a self-subsisting spiritual substance that dwells for a time in the body, and taught that the whole soul is immortal; others held it to be the inseparable form of the body, and taught that the soul as a whole perishes with the body, except for the part of the intellect that has become, through knowledge, what was called the "acquired intellect." Wolfson found the second view in Ibn Ezra, Maimonides and Gersonides, and noted that Manasseh ben Israel, whom he calls Spinoza's teacher (Nadler thinks this possible but unproven, p. 115), reproduced Maimonides' view with approval in a treatise on the immortality of the soul. Spinoza's doctrine, in which the mind is inseparable from the body

and only the intellect remains, is "more like the second of the two views" (II 289–291).

Wolfson went further, and argued that the doctrine was meant as a defence of immortality against a contemporary denial of it. Uriel da Costa, whose arguments against immortality had been answered in Amsterdam by Samuel da Silva in 1623, had held that the soul dies with the body, and that "it cannot be proven from the Law that the human soul is immortal." Spinoza agreed with him that the mind is united to the body, but, on Wolfson's reading, turned against him in affirming that something of the mind is eternal, so that "we shall thus find Spinoza in the unblemished company of Samuel da Silva and Manasseh ben Israel battling on the side of tradition in defence of immortality" (II 322–324). Whatever one makes of this conclusion, Wolfson's account shows how much of the vocabulary of Part V, in which the intellect alone survives and its survival depends on what it has come to know, had a long history before Spinoza used it.

The symmetrical reading and its difficulties

The demonstration of Prop. 23 rests on the idea in God of the essence of the body, and that idea rests in turn on Part II, Prop. 8 [p. 133], which says that the ideas of things that do not exist are comprehended in God's infinite idea as their formal essences are contained in his attributes. Edwin Curley read the doctrine in this light. Just as the idea of a building that has never existed may be true, so the essence of the building is contained eternally in the attributes of God; and so the eternity of the mind is matched by an eternity of the body. "To say this is to imply that even the human body is not absolutely destroyed in death, that something of it too remains which is eternal." That Spinoza says this only of the mind Curley regarded as "a rather dubious argument from silence" (*Spinoza's Metaphysics*, p. 142).

Curley saw the difficulty this reading faces. Spinoza speaks of only a *part* of the mind as eternal, and he says that the more the mind understands, and the more the body is capable of, the greater the part that is eternal (Props. 38–39 [p. 517]). The apparent implication, Curley wrote, "is that a person could increase the portion of his mind which is eternal by coming to understand more and more things *sub specie aeternitatis* and (Heaven help us!) by improving the fitness of his body." If Spinoza had said only that our *consciousness* of the mind's eternity grows as our understanding grows, there would be no problem. "But Spinoza's language suggests that an increase in our understanding involves, not merely an increase in our consciousness of the eternity of the mind, but an increase in the eternity of the mind itself. And this is a doctrine which, at present, I find completely unintelligible" (pp. 142–143).

Leibniz had made a similar objection. Commenting on Prop. 23 and its scholium, he called these claims "illusory": the idea which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity is like the figure of a sphere, whose eternity has no bearing on the existence of any sphere, since it is only the ideal possibility of one; so it means nothing to say that our mind is eternal insofar as it involves the body under a species of eternity, and it would be just as eternal because it understands eternal truths about the triangle. On Spinoza's principles, he concluded, the mind does not endure beyond the actual existence of the body, and Spinoza in effect holds that it perishes with the body (*Animadversiones in Wachterum*, ed. Foucher de Careil, pp. 54–56). In a letter quoted by Bennett, Leibniz described Spinoza's view as the opinion that "the Platonic idea of my being, which is doubtless as eternal as that of a circle or a triangle, is what properly constitutes our immortality," and that one should perfect oneself in virtue "so as to leave behind at death that much more perfect an eternal essence or Platonic idea," and went on to mock it (Bennett, p.

359).

Bennett's reconstruction and verdict

Bennett rejected the symmetrical reading, because it makes the doctrine "a mere truism (essences are eternal) decorated with a mistake (the suggestion that essences are parts)," and because it cannot explain the asymmetry of the text or its practical conclusion (p. 359). He offered instead a reconstruction that explains, he thought, why Spinoza believed what he did, while showing that it is false. Spinoza has no good account of how a mind can think a necessary truth; the only account available to him is that a thought of a necessary truth is the mental counterpart of something in the body. Applied to the eternal truth that there could be a body of my body's kind, this yields two things that Spinoza cannot tell apart: an eternal truth about my mind, and a thought in my mind of my body's essence. Since the one is eternal and the other is a part of my mind, Spinoza concludes that a part of my mind is eternal (pp. 359–361). And by running the same false identification in the other direction, starting from my thoughts of necessary truths and treating them as eternal items, he concludes that by intellectual effort I can enlarge the eternal part of my mind. "This is dreadful, but not 'completely unintelligible'" (p. 362).

Bennett's final judgment on the last propositions of the *Ethics* was severe. "I don't think that the final three doctrines can be rescued," he wrote, and "the time has come to admit that this part of the Ethics has nothing to teach us and is pretty certainly worthless" (p. 372). He quoted Stuart Hampshire's more sympathetic account, in which "at the more successful moments of completely disinterested, logical thought, we have these glimpses of the possibility of living, not as finite and perishing modes of Nature, but identified or 'united' with God or Nature as a whole," and Hampshire's admission that the reader may find himself "beyond the limits of literal understanding"; Bennett replied that "we should say openly that Spinoza is talking nonsense" (pp. 372–373). He quoted, too, Frederick Pollock's remark that the doctrine "throws a sort of poetical glow over the formality of his exposition," and agreed that the phrase was "exactly right" (p. 374).

Two recent reconstructions

Bennett's verdict did not end the discussion. Don Garrett began an essay on these propositions by quoting both Bennett's description of the last part of the *Ethics* as "an unmitigated and seemingly unmotivated disaster" (Bennett, p. 357) and a later admission of Curley's: "In spite of many years of study, I still do not feel that I understand this part of the *Ethics* at all adequately" (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, p. 243). He then set out three doctrines that seem, on their face, inconsistent with the rest of Spinoza's philosophy: that there is in God an idea of the formal essence of each human body; that this idea remains after the destruction of the body, so that part of the mind is eternal; and that the wiser one is, the greater the part of one's mind that is eternal. His proposal is that the formal essence of a human body is a real infinite mode of extension, a permanent capacity of extended nature, through its general laws, to sustain a body of a particular structure whenever and wherever the series of finite causes requires it, and that all intellection derives from the mind's idea of this essence. The idea exists complete and fully conscious in God; human beings struggle, with limited and varying power, to make its contents their own. "No matter what they do, of course, they cannot achieve personal immortality, with continuing sensation or memory. Their minds perish with their bodies—because these are identical—even though a part of each remains. But to the extent that they are successful in their

struggle, Spinoza holds, human beings understand in the same way that God does. Indeed, they literally participate—for a period of duration—in God's own eternally conscious cognition, and they thereby achieve a mind the greater part of which is eternal" (p. 255).

Michael Della Rocca's reconstruction starts from the principle that every fact has an explanation, the subject of Appendix F [p. 677]. Since everything follows necessarily from God's nature, everything, on Spinoza's definition, is in a sense eternal: "the dog, the rock and my pancreas" as well as my mind. That seems to make the doctrine trivial, and to leave no room for the claim that we can increase the eternal part of our minds by acquiring adequate ideas (*Spinoza*, 2008, pp. 257–260). Della Rocca's answer is that, for Spinoza, existence itself is intelligibility: "For a thing to exist is for it to be intelligible, conceivable, explicable" (p. 261). If existence is intelligibility, then a thing that is only partly intelligible only partly exists; and so Della Rocca denies "that, for Spinoza, my inadequate ideas are genuinely states of God, are genuinely in God" (pp. 260–263). Adequate ideas are fully intelligible, and therefore fully real and eternal; and so the more adequate ideas a mind has, the greater the part of it that is eternal. Della Rocca also stresses what separates this doctrine from traditional ones. It requires something bodily that corresponds to the eternal part of the mind; it does not treat the mind as an indestructible simple substance; and it rejects the idea that virtue needs a reward in another life, since for Spinoza "virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment" (pp. 254–256).

Readings that look for sense

Bennett mentions attempts at "complete salvage" that he found unintelligible (p. 372), and a reader who wants to find a sense in which the doctrine is true has three features of the text to work with. The first is that Spinoza ties eternity to a kind of knowing. The mind "is eternal insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity" (Prop. 31, Schol. [p. 511]), and the third kind of knowledge "depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal" (Prop. 31 [p. 509]). On one natural proposal, the eternal part of the mind is the part that consists of adequate ideas, which are ideas in God as well as in us and which do not depend on the momentary state of the body. A mind that understands more has more of such ideas, and so a greater part of it is eternal in the only sense in which anything is eternal: it is a truth, contained in the infinite intellect of God (Prop. 40, Schol. [p. 521]).

The second feature is the claim that "we feel and experience that we are eternal," since "the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves" (Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503]). This suggests that the eternity of the mind is not a fact about the future that we must take on trust, but a feature of present experience, the experience of seeing that something must be so. Hampshire's reading developed this suggestion, and so in a different spirit did Wolfson's remark that, for Spinoza, we can experience "that state of immortality" during our lifetime, in the love of God (II 297). The third feature is Spinoza's insistence that his ethics does not depend on the doctrine: "even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion" (Prop. 41 [p. 521]). Whatever the doctrine means, it is not offered as a reward, and the readers who think it can be stated without promising survival of any kind are at least in agreement with the text on this point.

The questions that remain are the ones Bennett and Curley pressed: why the eternal part of the mind should be larger in some people than in others, if every essence is eternal; and in what sense something that has no memory and no relation to time can be *mine*. No reading has answered them to the satisfaction of all.

Further reading

Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (1934), vol. II, chapter 20, section 3; Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics* (1969), pp. 137–143; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 82–85; Garrett, *Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy* (2018), chapter 9; Della Rocca, *Spinoza* (2008), chapter 7; Leibniz's comments in his *Animadversiones* on Wachter, ed. Foucher de Careil (1854). Stuart Hampshire's *Spinoza* (1951) and Frederick Pollock's *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy* (1880) are cited here as Bennett quotes them.

Appendix F. The Principle of Sufficient Reason

The second demonstration of Part I, Prop. 11 [p. 41] rests on a principle that Spinoza states almost in passing: "For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for why it exists as for why it does not exist." The principle that everything has a reason, now usually called the principle of sufficient reason, is most often associated with Leibniz, who, in Michael Della Rocca's words, "built his system—as far as he could—around his commitment to the PSR" (*Spinoza*, 2008, p. 4). Spinoza does not name it and does not set it down among his axioms in so many words. Yet some recent readers, Della Rocca above all, have argued that it is the deepest principle of the *Ethics*, and that many of the book's most surprising doctrines follow from it. This appendix describes that reading and some of the questions it raises.

Where the principle appears

The principle is nowhere stated as a separate axiom, but it is implied in several. The second axiom of Part I says that "what cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself" (Part I, Ax. 2 [p. 29]): everything can be conceived through something. The third says that "from a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if no determinate cause is given, it is impossible for an effect to follow" (Ax. 3 [p. 29]). Don Garrett observed that if "effect" in this axiom is read broadly, as any state of affairs, the axiom claims "that a sufficient reason can be given why everything should be as it is"; read strictly, it says less. He adopted the name "Spinoza's principle of sufficient reason" for "the principle that every state of affairs has a sufficient reason or explanation," since "it is clear that Spinoza does believe every state of affairs to have a cause, even if he does not intend to make this claim in the Axioms" (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, p. 34).

The version in Prop. 11 is unusually strong, for it demands a reason not only for what exists but for what does not. Della Rocca, whose short book on Spinoza is the fullest statement of the reading described here, stressed this feature: the principle "is strong because it requires an explanation not only for existence, but also for non-existence." He took the second axiom to express the same commitment, since "for Spinoza, to conceive of a thing is to explain it," and in presupposing that everything can be conceived through something, Spinoza "builds the notion of intelligibility into the heart of his metaphysical system" (pp. 4–5).

Della Rocca's reading

Della Rocca opened his book with a contrast. Almost all philosophers expect explanations to run out somewhere, at facts that simply are so: "almost all philosophers reach this point. Almost all philosophers. But not Spinoza. His spade is never turned." Spinoza's philosophy, he wrote, "is characterized by perhaps the boldest and most thoroughgoing commitment ever to appear in the history of philosophy to the intelligibility of everything" (p. 1).

From the principle of sufficient reason Della Rocca derived what he called Spinoza's naturalism, "his thesis that everything in the world plays by the same rules." Its clearest statement is the Preface to Part III, where Spinoza objects that most writers on the affects "seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion," and insists that "nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form into another, are always and everywhere

the same" (Part III, Preface [p. 229]). If human beings obeyed laws of their own, the relations between them and the rest of nature could be explained neither by the general laws nor by the local ones, and would be brute facts; so the principle of sufficient reason forbids such divisions in reality (pp. 5–7).

The principle, on this reading, drives a series of unifications. It "dictates the collapse of any distinction between necessary truths and possible truths," and so leads to necessitarianism; it dictates that causation, explanation and the inherence of a property in a subject "all amount to the same phenomenon"; it reduces the consciousness of a mental state to the fact that the state represents something; and it dictates "that an action's goodness, rightness, and power all come to the same thing" (pp. 7–8). Della Rocca found in these arguments a characteristic pattern, which he called the "twofold use" of the principle. Spinoza first demands an account of some notion, such as causation, refusing to treat it as primitive; and he then explains it in terms of explanation itself, so that for one thing to cause another is for it to make the other intelligible. The most fundamental case is existence: "For Spinoza, to be is to be intelligible" (pp. 8–9).

Some applications

The reading claims to explain many of the arguments of Part I. The second demonstration of Prop. 11 argues that God must exist, since if he did not there would have to be a reason for his non-existence, and none can be found either in his nature or outside it; Della Rocca called Spinoza's version of the ontological argument "perhaps, unique in the way in which it relies heavily on the PSR" (pp. 51–52). The argument for monism depends on the claim that two substances could be distinguished only by a difference in their attributes or their modes (Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 31]). This, Della Rocca argued, is a form of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, "more often associated with Leibniz than with Spinoza," and its roots lie in the principle of sufficient reason: "Non-identities, by the PSR, require explanation, and the way to explain non-identity is to appeal to some difference in properties" (p. 47).

The same principle underlies the case for necessitarianism described in Appendix D [p. 667]. If an attribute could produce only one finite mode, nothing could explain why it produced that one alone, and "certainly, for Spinoza, it cannot be a brute fact that the attribute produces only this one mode"; so finite modes follow from God only as part of an infinite series, as Prop. 28 [p. 79] says (pp. 71–72). And if more than one series were possible, there would be no reason why this one exists rather than another. Garrett made the same point against Curley's view that Spinoza allows other possible series: such a view leaves "a crucial fact about the universe" with "no explanation at all" (*Nature and Necessity*, p. 125). Della Rocca also used the principle to interpret the doctrine of the eternity of the mind, as Appendix E [p. 672] describes: if existence is intelligibility, then the more fully a mind understands, the more fully it exists, and exists eternally.

Questions the reading raises

The reading has the merit of unity: it shows a single demand at work in doctrines that otherwise seem unrelated, from the existence of God to the nature of the emotions. Its critics and qualifiers have asked whether it attributes to Spinoza a principle stronger than the one he actually uses. Curley, as Appendix D [p. 667] describes, held that Spinoza never explicitly accepts the consequence that there is a reason why this series of finite things exists rather than another, and Garrett described Curley's later work with Gregory Walski as seeking "to downplay the strength of Spinoza's principle of sufficient reason" (p. 125). Della Rocca himself conceded that Spinoza's

ambitions "are, of course, not always fully realized" (p. 2).

There is also the question whether the principle can be true. Jonathan Bennett called the same commitment "explanatory rationalism," "the refusal to admit brute facts," and judged that "the explanatory rationalist's problems are insoluble, and that his position is therefore untenable." But he admitted "the discomfort of this stand," proclaimed "the attractiveness of the idea that everything can in principle be explained," and advised that "disbelief in explanatory rationalism, though perhaps it may be carried out of our study of the Ethics, is not something to be carried into it" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, p. 29). Garrett, for his part, has stressed a related but different feature of Spinoza's method, which he called "incremental naturalism": the attempt to explain human intentionality, desire, belief, understanding and consciousness "as already present in their most rudimentary (and perhaps even initially unrecognizable) forms throughout all of nature," so that humanity appears "as a complex and sophisticated expression of nature rather than as something arising from the introduction of non-natural elements" (p. 405). Both emphases agree that Spinoza refused to treat human beings, or anything else, as an exception to the order of nature; they differ on how far that refusal rests on a single principle.

Further reading

Della Rocca, *Spinoza* (2008), especially chapters 1, 2 and 7; Garrett, *Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy* (2018), chapters 2 and 4 with its postscript, and chapter 14; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), § 8.

Appendix G. Striving

"Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]). Don Garrett has compared the argument for it with the argument for substance monism: as the foundations of Spinoza's metaphysics cannot be understood without the one, so those of his natural philosophy, psychology, politics and ethics cannot be understood without the other (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, p. 352). The introduction to Part III sets out the doctrine, and the Key Concepts follow the word *conatus* through the book; this appendix takes up questions they leave open: whether the argument of Props. 4–6 succeeds, what striving is and what "as far as it is in itself" adds, how a principle that holds of stones as well as of men can ground a psychology and an ethics, and whether the language of striving brings back the purposes that the Appendix to Part I had banished.

The argument

The doctrine is older than the *Ethics*. The *Short Treatise* had identified God's providence with the striving that we find in the whole of nature and in particular things towards the preservation of their own being, and had called it evident "dat geen ding door syn eige natuur zoude konnen tragten tot syn zelfs vernietinge" ("that no thing could, through its own nature, strive towards its own annihilation"; KV I.5, G I 40). In the *Ethics* the claim is demonstrated, but from very little. The demonstration of Prop. 4 begins "This Proposition is evident through itself," and its argument appeals to no earlier axiom or proposition, only to the nature of a definition: "the definition of any thing affirms the essence of the thing itself, but does not deny it" (Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 241]). Jonathan Bennett observed that it is the only proposition of the *Ethics* demonstrated without help from previously declared doctrines (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, p. 234).

Prop. 5 [p. 243] infers from Prop. 4 that things are contrary insofar as one can destroy the other. The demonstration of Prop. 6 adds two propositions of Part I, from which it follows that singular things express in a certain and determinate way the power by which God is and acts (Part I, Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]; Prop. 34 [p. 91]); each thing, having nothing in it by which it could be destroyed and being opposed to whatever could destroy it, therefore strives to persevere (Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 243]). These are the only earlier propositions that the argument of Props. 4–6 cites (Garrett, p. 352). Prop. 7 [p. 243] identifies the striving with the thing's actual essence, and its demonstration says more than its enunciation: "the power of any thing, or the striving by which it, either alone or with others, does anything or strives to do anything" is its striving to persevere (Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 243]). All that a thing does tends to its preservation, a further thesis which, Garrett notes, rests on Part I, Prop. 29 [p. 81] and not on Prop. 6 alone (pp. 388–389). Prop. 8 rests on Prop. 4 again: if the striving involved a limited time, the thing's own power would destroy it when the time was up (Prop. 8, Dem. [p. 245]). Prop. 9 [p. 245] carries the result to the mind, which strives insofar as it has adequate and inadequate ideas alike, and is conscious of its striving because it knows itself through the ideas of the body's affections (Prop. 9, Dem. [p. 245]; Part II, Prop. 23 [p. 169]). The next demonstration gives the mind's striving its first content: "the first and principal thing in the striving of our mind is … to affirm the existence of our body" (Prop. 10, Dem. [p. 247]).

Does the argument work?

"Since the conclusion is false, the argument is faulty," Bennett wrote; but locating the fault was "a nontrivial exercise," and the argument was "a real achievement" (p. 234). He placed the root of the trouble in its neglect of time: causal laws cover stretches of time, and a thing's state at one moment can lead to its non-existence at a later one without any contradiction in its nature; Prop. 8, which brings time in, gets it wrong (p. 235). He found besides a series of shifts of meaning, which Garrett counts as four (Garrett, p. 352). The phrase "external cause" in Prop. 4 may mean external to the thing's essence, the properties it cannot lose, or external to its whole nature; Bennett conjectured that the first reading underlies the sentence about the definition and the second the rest, but "There seems to be no way of deciding which reading is correct" (Bennett, pp. 236–237). The phrase "cannot be in the same subject" in Prop. 5 may mean that the natures of two things cannot belong to one thing, which follows from Prop. 4, or that the things cannot be parts of one larger whole, which does not; Spinoza's later uses of the proposition divide between the two (p. 241). The step in the demonstration of Prop. 6 from being contrary in nature to whatever could destroy a thing to being opposed to it, in the sense of exerting itself against it, Bennett called "glaringly fallacious" (p. 242). The fourth shift, in the word "strives," is taken up at the end of this appendix, and Garrett lists a fifth, found by Della Rocca in an essay of 1996, in the phrase *quantum in se est* (Garrett, pp. 352, 359–360).

Garrett's own defence takes the qualifying phrase at its word. *Quantum in se est* means "insofar as it is in itself" (p. 360), which this edition renders "as far as it is in itself," and it recalls the definition of substance as "what is in itself and is conceived through itself" (Part I, Def. 3 [p. 25]). Singular things, on his reading, are finite approximations to substance, in themselves to limited and varying degrees (pp. 365–366). Whatever is in a thing is conceived through it and so caused by its essence, and a thing's essence cannot cause its destruction; so whatever can destroy a thing is not in it (pp. 367–368). Whatever is in itself is to that extent cause of itself, and since a singular thing cannot bring itself into existence, it can cause itself only by causing its own continuation (p. 371). The five equivocations disappear, but the premises about inherence, conception and causation express "a rigorous Principle of Sufficient Reason," and Garrett's verdict was that "we can defend the validity of Spinoza's argument, as supplemented, but not its soundness" (p. 379). Michael Della Rocca also traces Prop. 4 to that principle, the subject of Appendix F [p. 677]: a thing's essence, which for Spinoza consists in its having certain causes, contains only what posits the thing, so that its non-existence must be explained by something beyond its essence or be a brute fact (*Spinoza*, 2008, p. 139). Since being in a thing comes in degrees (p. 144), Prop. 6 says, in effect, "that a thing strives to persist to the degree to which it is a substance" (p. 323).

Suicide and other counterexamples

Spinoza answers the objection from suicide in Part IV: "No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, but only when compelled by external causes, is averse to food or kills himself." Another may twist a man's hand so that his own sword enters his heart, a tyrant may command him to open his veins, as Seneca was commanded, or hidden causes may give his body another nature; but that a man should strive from the necessity of his own nature not to exist "is as impossible as that something should come from nothing" (Part IV, Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 381]). Bennett compared the tyrant's order with eating the only apple of a man who prefers apples to oranges: no one would say that the man was forced to take an orange, and Spinoza has no means of telling the cases apart. If Seneca was forced, everyone who does anything is forced, and Part III,

Prop. 4, is true only vacuously; if not, his death flowed from his nature as it then was, including his belief that a worse death awaited him in the morning. "I conclude that Seneca falsifies 3p4" (pp. 237–238). Bennett suspected a blind spot: Spinoza could not see that a man may want to die because of how bad it will be for him to live (p. 240). When Blyenbergh asked whether a mind whose nature agreed with crime would have any reason to be virtuous, Spinoza answered that the question "supposes a contradiction," and compared it to asking whether a man should hang himself if that agreed better with his nature (Letter 23 [p. 605]).

The replies share a strategy: they place the cause of every self-destruction partly outside what the thing is. Della Rocca distinguishes a thing's essence from its total state. A time bomb, a burning candle and a suicide are destroyed by their total state, but that state includes what other things have done to them, the setting of the bomb or the lighting of the candle; their destruction never follows from their essence alone, and this is how the scholium treats suicide (pp. 140–141). Against an "essential time bomb," whose essence alone would end it after fifteen minutes, he appeals to the axiom of Part IV: there is always something more powerful (Part IV, Ax. [p. 357]), which could sustain it longer as well as destroy it sooner (pp. 141–143). For Garrett a thing's accidents are only partly in it, as a mind may be called depressed without that quality being fully in it, so that suicides and self-consuming things are destroyed by causes not, or not fully, in them (p. 374). Edwin Curley's candle, burning on Spinoza's table, has already been acted on by whatever lit it (*Behind the Geometrical Method*, 1988, p. 110). To the charge that such replies make the doctrine trivial, he answered that the same could be said of the principle of inertia, which has content because it belongs to a system of laws that say how external forces act; the conatus doctrine has content to the extent that it can be built into a psychology that yields testable results (p. 113). The replies leave open whether a thing's essence can be specified apart from what preserves it. Bennett doubted it: we never know which features belong to an individual's essence, and the "proportion of motion and rest" is a placeholder for an analysis Spinoza did not have (pp. 232, 239).

The inertial reading

The notes to Prop. 6 [p. 243] and Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151] the essay on the physical digression and Appendix I [p. 692] record that *quantum in se est* is the phrase of Descartes' first law of nature (*Principles* II.37), which Spinoza had stated for bodies. The inertial reading takes the conatus to be a principle of the same kind, made general. On Della Rocca's version Spinoza shares with Descartes a "stripped-down" notion of striving: for a thing to strive to do something is for its present state to be such that it will do it unless external causes prevent it (p. 146). The qualification then does the work Prop. 4 requires. Insofar as its total state is concerned, a thing may tend towards its destruction; insofar as it is in itself, that is, as conceived through its essence, it cannot (p. 147).

The text also resists a purely inertial reading. The demonstration of Prop. 6 grounds the striving not in a law of motion but in the power by which God is and acts. Part II, Prop. 45, Schol. [p. 197] had said that "the force by which each perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God," and Part IV calls a man's power "a part of the infinite power of God, or nature" (Part IV, Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 361]). Descartes had ended his statement of the first law with a clause close to Prop. 4, "nihilque ad suum contrarium, sive ad destructionem sui ipsius, ex propria natura ferri potest" ("and nothing can be carried by its own nature towards its contrary, or towards its own destruction"; AT VIII-1 63); but he derived the law from the

immutability of God, whereas Spinoza, as Garrett observes, derives the striving from his own premises about inherence, essence and causation (pp. 378–379). And the striving belongs to minds as much as to bodies (Part III, Prop. 9 [p. 245]); Della Rocca remarks that it is not clear how Descartes could have accounted in these terms for the striving of minds (p. 322).

From striving to the affects

Will, appetite and desire are names of one striving (Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]), and the essay on the definitions of the affects describes how the first definition widens desire to cover them all. Three questions arise.

The first is how a striving to persevere becomes a striving to increase one's power. "The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body's power of acting" (Prop. 12 [p. 249]), and the demonstration rests the striving on Prop. 6 or 9, which speak only of persevering. Della Rocca found it "far from clear" how the one follows from the other, and noted that the *Ethics* asserts the striving for more power only of human beings (p. 155). His solution is that a being able to anticipate future threats has reason to gather as much power as it can now, while simpler things, which cannot anticipate, strive only to persist; he called the answer "clearly Spinozistic, even if not Spinoza's" (p. 172). Curley drew the same conclusion from the axiom of Part IV: since powerful external forces are ranged against us, a striving for self-preservation must also be a striving for increased power (p. 115). The *Short Treatise* had joined the two without argument: each thing has in itself a striving "om zig zelfs en in syn stand te bewaaren, en tot beter te brengen" ("to preserve itself in its state, and to bring itself to a better one"; KV I.5, G I 40).

The second question is where desire belongs among the affects. Joy and sadness are passages, changes in the power of striving (Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]); desire is the striving itself. Bennett argued that the definitions collide: if appetite is a man's nature insofar as it causes what he does, and whatever he does from his own nature raises his power, every desire is a rise in power, so that "desire is a species of pleasure!" (Bennett's word for joy) and is left "with no work to do" (p. 259). In practice, he concluded, Spinoza mainly uses "desire" in its ordinary teleological sense (pp. 260, 262), as when he argues that the greater the sadness, "the greater the desire, or appetite, with which he will strive to remove the sadness" (Prop. 37, Dem. [p. 281]).

The third question concerns the clause of Prop. 9 [p. 245] that the mind "is conscious of this striving of its own." If it means that in everything we desire we consciously desire our own preservation, Spinoza is a psychological egoist of a very simple kind, and Michael LeBuffe calls that view "a patently bad account of human desire" (*From Bondage to Freedom*, 2010, p. 108). He argues that the clause says only that the mind is conscious of its striving "in some way and not necessarily veridically" (p. 123). Part of his evidence is that the demonstration rests on Part II, Prop. 23 [p. 169], a proposition about the limits of the mind's knowledge of itself (pp. 127–128).

Striving and virtue

Part IV joins striving to virtue by a definition: "By virtue and power I understand the same thing" (Part IV, Def. 8 [p. 357]). Several of the propositions that follow are short because their demonstrations run through Part III, Prop. 7 [p. 243]. Desire is the essence of man, that is, the striving (Part IV, Prop. 18, Dem. [p. 377]); virtue is human power, defined by the striving alone, and whoever neglects to preserve his being lacks power, by Props. 4 and 6 of Part III (Prop. 20, Dem. [p. 381]); that no one can desire to live well without desiring to exist is "evident through itself, and also from the definition of desire" (Prop. 21, Dem. [p. 381]); a virtue prior to the

striving would make the essence conceived "prior to itself" (Prop. 22, Dem. [p. 383]); and since the striving is defined by the thing's essence alone, "No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing" (Prop. 25 [p. 385]).

If every thing strives to persevere as far as it is in itself, what can an ethics of striving ask? The text answers in terms of degree and of adequacy. Virtue grows as one "strives, and is able" (Part IV, Prop. 20 [p. 381]), and a man can be said absolutely to act from virtue "only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands" (Prop. 23 [p. 383]), since only then does what he does follow from his essence alone. If, as Garrett and Della Rocca hold, being in oneself is a matter of degree, the standard of virtue is the qualification in Part III, Prop. 6, itself: a man is virtuous to the extent that he is in himself, and the ethics asks him to become more so. Bennett objected that Prop. 21 of Part IV assumes that every motive aims at a state of affairs that essentially involves oneself, whereas a man who wants the starving fed might be prepared to stay still, or to die, if that were the best way to feed them (p. 246). Whether this makes the ethics egoistic is a question this appendix leaves aside. The same principle, "ut unaquaeque res in suo statu, quantum in se est, conetur perseverare" ("that each thing strive, as far as it is in itself, to persevere in its state"), is the highest law of nature from which the *Theological-Political Treatise* derives natural right (ch. 16, G III 189).

Does purpose return?

Appendix D [p. 667] describes the dispute over whether the Appendix to Part I denies all purposes or only those ascribed to God and nature, and whether the striving of Part III is compatible with it. The doctrine of striving also raises a narrower question, about the logical form of Prop. 6 of Part III. Bennett put it as the difference between a conditional and its converse: "If he does it, it will help him" and "If it would help him, he will do it." The difference is "though simple, enormous," since only the second, the teleological form, supports positive predictions of what a man will do (p. 244). The argument from Prop. 4 can yield at most the first, which Prop. 7 fits (pp. 243–244); but Spinoza uses the second. The qualifying phrase of Prop. 6, which Bennett cites as "as far as it can," attaches naturally only to the second; the scholium to Prop. 9 [p. 245] says that from man's nature "there necessarily follow those things which serve his preservation," that is, all the helpful things and not only helpful things; and, by his count, eleven propositions of Part III, beginning with Prop. 12, infer what we strive for from what would help us (p. 245). The demonstration of Prop. 12 shows the move. Since "as long as the mind imagines those things which increase or aid our body's power of acting, so long is the body affected in ways which increase or aid its power of acting," and so the mind's power of thinking is increased, Spinoza concludes that "the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things" (Prop. 12, Dem. [p. 251]).

Curley accepted the teleological reading but distinguished it from a stronger one. Prop. 6 has the form "If it would help him, he will do it," not "If he thinks it would help him, he will do it," since it applies to things that cannot think about the future. Prop. 28 [p. 269], "We strive to promote the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy," has the stronger form; it does not follow from the doctrine of striving, and since we sometimes mistake our interests, it is inconsistent with it (p. 164). Garrett's reconstruction yields a teleological reading "with a crucial qualification": a thing strives to do what would preserve it, provided that it is sufficiently in itself to have that action within its repertoire in the circumstances (p. 376). The dispute over Prop. 6 suggests that whether purpose returns depends less on Spinoza's vocabulary than on

the direction of a conditional, and that the psychology of Part III needs the direction that the argument of Props. 4–6 has most difficulty in supplying.

Further reading

Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 54–60; Curley, *Behind the Geometrical Method* (1988), chapter III, §§ 12–18; Garrett, *Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy* (2018), chapter 13; Della Rocca, *Spinoza* (2008), chapter 4; LeBuffe, *From Bondage to Freedom* (2010), chapters 5–6.

Appendix H. Virtue, Self-Interest and the Free Man

Part IV builds its ethics on the striving of each thing to preserve its being, and ends with the portrait of a man who lives by reason alone. The introduction to Part IV follows the argument from the one to the other, and the essay before Prop. 67 [p. 443] describes the portrait. Three questions are left open: in what sense the ethics of Part IV is egoistic, and whether a concern for others can be derived from it; how the good, defined as the useful, is related to the "model of human nature" of the Preface; and whether the free man is a possible human being at all. This appendix describes how readers have answered them. The questions are connected: on several of the readings described here, the place where the derivation of concern for others is weakest is the place where the free man becomes impossible.

What kind of egoism?

Two theses must be kept apart. The first is psychological: "No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing" (Prop. 25 [p. 385]), and no one neglects his own advantage "unless he is conquered by external causes contrary to his nature" (Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 381]). The second is evaluative. Virtue is power (Def. 8 [p. 357]), and so "the more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue" (Prop. 20 [p. 381]). Spinoza set out the dictates of reason before demonstrating them, he says, to win the attention of "those who believe that this principle, that each is bound to seek his own advantage, is the foundation of impiety, not of virtue and piety" (Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 379]).

That the evaluative thesis is a form of ethical egoism is common ground among the readers discussed here. Bennett calls individual egoism "Spinoza's only moral premiss," and reads the argument that follows the scholium to Prop. 18 as saying, in effect, that "since the only possible value system is egoism, the only rational value system is informed egoism" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, pp. 298–299). Della Rocca, who calls the system "fundamentally egoistic," traces it to the principle of sufficient reason, the subject of Appendix F [p. 677]. Any standard of goodness taken from outside the thing evaluated, even the utilitarian standard of general happiness, would be arbitrary; the only standard that is not is the success of the thing's own striving, so that a thing is good and virtuous to the extent that it is powerful (*Spinoza*, 2008, pp. 175–183). Kisner likewise ascribes to Spinoza "ethical egoism, the view that the right action best promotes our self-interest" (*Spinoza on Human Freedom*, 2011, p. 135).

The psychological thesis raises a puzzle. If everyone necessarily seeks his own advantage, what is reason asking for when it "demands ... that each man love himself, seek his own advantage" (Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377])? Bennett thought the passage from necessity to evaluation reasonable only if the egoism says that a man will do what he *thinks* will preserve him, and for that "teleological and cognitive" version Spinoza had, in his view, laid no foundation (pp. 294–295, 298). LeBuffe denies that the striving of Part III is a conscious desire for self-preservation. The view that "I always and only consciously desire perseverance or its means" is, he says, "a patently bad account of human desire," and it is not Spinoza's, since there would be no point in telling people to preserve their being, as the scholium to Prop. 18 does, if they always consciously did so (*From Bondage to Freedom*, 2010, pp. 106, 108, 123). On his reading what men strive for and what they consciously want can come apart, and reason's demand has content because they do. Garrett adds that Spinoza need not deny the phenomena of altruism, even of self-sacrifice; he holds only that their causal origin always lies in the individual's striving for his own preservation, which

circumstances can direct onto the welfare of others (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, 2018, pp. 491–492).

What makes the egoism unusual is the self it serves. A man acts from virtue only "insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands" (Prop. 23 [p. 383]), and what the mind strives for from reason is understanding (Prop. 26 [p. 385]). Hence Garrett's verdict: "Although its basis is undeniably egoistic, the ethical theory that Spinoza provides in these terms is nevertheless a cooperative rather than a competitive one," since one person's knowledge of God leaves no less for others (p. 24).

From one's own advantage to the good of others

The argument of Props. 29–37 has two stages. The first, which the introduction to Part IV summarizes, runs from agreement in nature. The corollary to Prop. 31 [p. 391] states that "the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful, or the better, it is for us"; men always agree in nature only insofar as they live by reason (Props. 32–35 [p. 391]), since "things which agree only in a negation, or in what they do not have, really agree in nothing" (Prop. 32, Schol. [p. 391]); and so nothing is more useful to a man than a man who lives by reason (Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395]). The second stage turns this into a desire for the good of others: "Men, insofar as they live from the guidance of reason, are most useful to man (by Cor. 1 of Prop. 35 of this Part); and so (by Prop. 19 of this Part) we shall necessarily strive, from the guidance of reason, to bring it about that men live from the guidance of reason" (Prop. 37, Dem. [p. 397]). Since the good the virtuous man wants for himself is to understand, he wants it for others too.

The second demonstration takes another route, through the psychology of Part III. "The good which a man wants for himself and loves he will love more constantly if he sees that others love the same thing (by Prop. 31 of Part III)"; he will therefore strive that others love it too, and, since this good is common to all, that all may enjoy it (Prop. 37, second Dem. [p. 399]). The mechanism is the one stated in the corollary to Part III, Prop. 31 [p. 273]: "each strives, as far as he can, that everyone should love what he loves." The first scholium to Prop. 37 calls the man who strives for this from affect alone "hateful," and observes that the highest good men want from affect "is often such that only one can possess it," whereas he who strives to lead others by reason "acts not by impulse but humanely and kindly" (Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]). What the second demonstration adds is the object: a good which, by Prop. 36 [p. 397], is common to all. Della Rocca distinguishes the two arguments. On the first, a rational person benefits me simply by acting from a nature I share, whether or not he knows of me; the second requires me to observe his desire for the good and imitate it, and is "less sweeping." Neither depends, as the argument Della Rocca calls Hobbesian does, on others' returning the help I give them (pp. 193–199).

The gaps in the derivation

The derivation has been severely criticized. Bennett found that the first stage rests on a premiss about the logic of helping and harming: that these are relations to natures, so that whatever helps or harms one thing must help or harm anything with the same nature. From this premiss, in Bennett's reconstruction, Spinoza infers that "out of utter egoism flows a collaborative morality, without help from politics." But even if the premiss is accepted, it covers only things exactly alike; and it is false, since what helps or harms me depends also on such facts as where I am: if floodwaters are rising in a mine and the lift has room for only one, our likeness does us no good, and when we compete for food it makes us rivals (pp. 300–301). Spinoza knew this in Part III,

where we strive that another shall not possess "some thing which only one can possess" (Part III, Prop. 32 [p. 275]); but in Part IV, Bennett says, "he forgets 3p32," and the scholium to Prop. 34 [p. 393] considers only the man who has lost what his rival possesses, whose hatred can be traced to a difference between them (p. 301). Bennett judged the argument of Props. 33–34 "flatly invalid" (p. 303), and the demonstration of Prop. 36, which, as he read it, infers that all can have the greater knowledge of God because all have the knowledge of Part II, Prop. 47 [p. 199], "on a par with arguing that because all men eat, it is possible for them all to eat well." "I am afraid," he concluded, "that Spinoza fails at every step in his journey towards his collaborative morality" (p. 306). Della Rocca, more sympathetic, found the first argument "deeply problematic" for another reason: it implies that every rational person benefits me, however remote in space or time (p. 197).

Kisner has answered several of these objections. To agree in nature, on his reading, is not to have the same nature but to share essential properties, so that the argument does not confuse one individual with another (pp. 136–139). Bennett's rivals compete for what Kisner calls competing goods, and reason does not direct us to such goods, since its good is understanding, which, as the demonstration of Prop. 36 [p. 397] says, can be possessed equally by all (p. 140). Indeed reason, on his reading of Part II, Props. 38–39 [p. 183], grasps adequately only what is common, and is "blind" to what distinguishes one person from another (p. 142). And because the argument is a priori, not an appeal to the good will that kindness usually earns, it makes benevolence part of one's own good, not merely a means to it (pp. 143–146).

Even this defence concedes something. To the objection that understanding itself requires competing goods, such as money, Kisner replies that reason does not direct us to them, although it may be in our interest to seek them (pp. 140–141). Garrett is plainer: because individuals must stay alive to pursue even understanding, they may compete for limited resources, and "a complete coincidence of human interests is not possible" (p. 492). The text, too, limits its conclusion, for "it rarely happens that men live from the guidance of reason" (Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 395]). On these readings the derivation is exact for men who live by reason alone, and holds of actual men in the measure that they do.

The good, the useful and the model

Part IV defines the good twice: in the Preface as "that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which we set before ourselves" (Preface [p. 353]), in the first definition as "that which we certainly know to be useful to us" (Def. 1 [p. 355]). The word *exemplar* occurs in the *Ethics* only in this Preface and in the second scholium to Part I, Prop. 33 [p. 87], which rejects the view that God attends to something "as to a model in operating"; the model of Part IV is one "which we set before ourselves." Bennett called the Preface's definition "a relic of a time when Spinoza planned to make the concept of a favoured model of mankind do some work for him in the body of Part 4," and thought that the two definitions "differ greatly in content" (p. 296). Spinoza had taken this approach, Bennett noted, in the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (p. 296, n. 3). There a man whose weakness cannot grasp the eternal order of nature conceives "naturam aliquam humanam sua multo firmiorem" ("some human nature much stronger than his own"); whatever can be a means of reaching it is called a true good, and the highest good is to enjoy such a nature "cum aliis individuis, si fieri potest" ("with other individuals, if possible"; § 13, G II 8). The early treatise joins the model and the concern for others in a single sentence.

Other readers have not set the model aside. Curley, replying to Bennett, held that "the whole of Part IV of the *Ethics* is the construction of the idea of a model human being," and that the talk of models is "a guide to the interpretation" of the definitions (*Behind the Geometrical Method*, 1988, p. 123, and p. 167, n. 44). Garrett argued that the model is developed through Part IV and culminates in the free man, and suggested that the definition speaks only of what is useful "to us" because the model has not yet been specified. He also drew a distinction: a man is perfect to the extent that he now resembles the model, whereas a thing is good to the extent that it helps him become like it; what one must do to reach a state is not always what one would do in it, as a poor man who aspires to the life of the idle rich must work (pp. 450–451). Kisner, who found Bennett's account of the passage's origin plausible, held that it was nonetheless kept for a reason (p. 163, n. 3); he reads the model as the object of rational desire, so that what helps us towards it, what satisfies our active desires and what is useful to our striving come to the same thing (pp. 97–99). LeBuffe sees a pragmatic decision: Spinoza keeps the ordinary words of value, to which men are accustomed, but replaces the providential model behind them with one founded on changes in our power of striving (pp. 160, 171, 188). On these readings, unlike Bennett's, the model belongs to Spinoza's account of the good, though for Kisner the reference to it is "more or less implied" by his general theory of the good as what increases our power (p. 99); and the question becomes what the model is. Most readers have answered that it is the free man.

Can there be a free man?

"I have said that he is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas" (Prop. 68, Dem. [p. 443]). But a man cannot undergo only those changes of which he is the adequate cause (Prop. 4 [p. 361]), and so "man is necessarily always subject to passions" (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]). The scholium to Prop. 68 appeals to Prop. 4 to show that the hypothesis of a man born free "is false and cannot be conceived except insofar as we attend to human nature alone" (Prop. 68, Schol. [p. 443]). It may be asked whether what is false is only that a man could be born free, or that a man could be free in this sense at all. Kisner is inclined to read the scholium as rejecting both, since Prop. 4 rules out any man's being entirely self-determined (p. 167, n. 6), and the demonstration of Prop. 4 supports him: a man who underwent only the changes he himself causes could never perish, and would have to be infinite (Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 361]). The contrast with the early treatise is instructive. There the man who conceives a stronger human nature "nihil obstare videat, quominus talem naturam acquirat" ("sees nothing to prevent his acquiring such a nature"; § 13, G II 8); in the *Ethics*, Prop. 4 names what prevents it.

The portrait itself shows the strain. The free man must decline or overcome dangers (Prop. 69 [p. 445]), and among the ignorant declines their favours "as far as he can" (Prop. 70 [p. 445]), so as not to be hated by them; he is, it seems, exposed to the power of other men. Bennett found Spinoza "in a bind about the place of sense perception in the life of a free man": an intelligently self-interested man must inform himself about his circumstances, yet his freedom consists in being self-caused, and that would require him not to use his senses (p. 324). Kisner asks the same question: since a free man has only adequate ideas, how can he have sensations, which are necessarily inadequate (pp. 165–166)?

Ideal, limiting case or thought experiment

The readers discussed here agree that no human being is, or could be, free in the sense of the demonstration of Prop. 68. They differ about what the figure is for.

On the most common view, which the essay on the free man adopts, he is an ideal to be approached. Garrett calls the concept of the free man "the concept of a model of human nature that we properly strive to exemplify," and adds that human beings can approximate more or less closely to the freedom that God alone has absolutely (p. 23). For Della Rocca he is "an impossible ideal" which nonetheless "presents for us the character our aspirations should take" (p. 196; see p. 189). The text supports them: men are more or less perfect "insofar as they come nearer to or are further from this same model" (Preface [p. 353]), and the last scholium of the portrait promises to show "how far human virtue extends in attaining these things" (Prop. 73, Schol. [p. 449]).

Bennett proposed a more austere version. Since only God is free, "when he says that a free man is F, he must mean that a man is F to the extent that he is free," and the concept of the free man might be seen as "a theoretically convenient limiting case, like the concept of an 'ideal gas'" (p. 317). Garrett's essay of 1990 on the free man's honesty gives a fuller account of such a limit. The concept of a completely free man "involves a contradiction," since a man is necessarily a part of nature; it is "the concept of a limit that can be approached but not completely attained by finite human beings," and statements about it say that one characteristic is fully explained by another and varies with it, as honesty with freedom (p. 452). On this reading the case of Prop. 72, Schol. [p. 447], which the essay on the free man describes, loses its paradox. The ideal free man never deceives, but deception may still be good for an actual man who must choose between it and death, since the good is what brings us nearer the model, not what the model would do (pp. 451–452). Della Rocca reaches a similar result: a completely free man would never be in a situation that called for a lie, and the obligation not to lie comes in degrees, strictest for the most free (pp. 200–201). Bennett thought the scholium simply mistaken: reason must speak generally, but why can it not say "No one should lie except to save his life" (pp. 317–318)?

LeBuffe takes the propositions about the free man to be neither directly action-guiding nor accounts of the means to perseverance, but "tools for the diagnosis of our particular situations" (p. 176). When we think of death, accept the favours of the ignorant or deceive, we are to that extent not free (p. 188). The proposition on good faith thus "does not recommend any particular kind of action directly"; it tells a man who lies that he lacks power in that circumstance, and in some circumstances deceiving may well be best for him (p. 189). Spinoza "does not argue at 4p72, that we should always be honest" (p. 190).

Kisner goes furthest, rejecting "the nearly universally accepted reading, that the free man is the model of human nature" (p. 162). The text never identifies them (p. 163), and the identification would make Spinoza inconsistent three times over: reason would bid us strive for what it knows to be impossible; every passivity would be an imperfection, though food, the information of the senses and the help of others increase our power; and we would be held to a standard we cannot meet, though at the opening of the *Political Treatise* Spinoza mocks the philosophers who conceive men not as they are but as they would like them to be (pp. 166–171). The model, for Kisner, is "the most active and perfect human being possible," whose description occupies the whole *Ethics* (pp. 172–173). The free man is "a kind of thought experiment," a perfectly rational being by which Spinoza determines what reason prescribes and which affects are rational, comparable to Hume's perfect reasoner (p. 175). He remains a model only in the sense that he shows what reason is and prescribes, not one whose conduct we should simply copy (pp. 172,

177).

The readings differ over the identity of the model and the use of the portrait more than over the facts. All agree that what is said of the free man holds of actual men only to the extent that they are free, and all except Bennett, including those that keep him as a model to approach, use in some form the distinction that Garrett drew: what the free man would do is not always what a man not yet free should do. The readings also join the two halves of this appendix. The derivation of concern for others is exact only for men who live by reason alone; for actual men, who compete for food and may have to choose between a lie and death, interests diverge. "If we were perfectly guided by reason," Garrett writes, "our good and the good of others would indeed perfectly coincide" (p. 454), and Della Rocca supposes that at the ideal point two rational men would act solely from their shared nature and become indistinguishable (p. 196). On these readings the free man is the one in whom self-interest and the good of others coincide entirely, and he is impossible for the same reason that in everyone else the coincidence is incomplete.

Further reading

Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), §§ 67–74; Della Rocca, *Spinoza* (2008), chapter 5; Garrett, *Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy* (2018), chapters 1, 16 and 17; LeBuffe, *From Bondage to Freedom* (2010), chapters 5–6 and 9–10; Kisner, *Spinoza on Human Freedom* (2011), chapters 5, 7 and 8; Curley, *Behind the Geometrical Method* (1988), chapter 3.

Appendix I. Spinoza and Descartes

Descartes is named in three passages of the *Ethics*. Once he is the subject of Spinoza's own first book, when a scholium sends the reader for a second proof of God's eternity to "Prop. 19 of the Principles of Descartes" (Part I, Prop. 19, Schol. [p. 71]); twice he is an opponent, "the most celebrated Descartes" of the Preface to Part III (Part III, Preface [p. 229]) and the man whose doctrine Spinoza "would hardly have believed ... to have been put forward by so great a man, if it had been less acute" (Part V, Preface [p. 469]). The Introduction calls him the book's constant interlocutor, and this edition meets him at every turn: in the notes, in the introductions to Parts I, II, III and V, in the essay before Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207], and in Appendix A [p. 657] and Appendix C [p. 663]. This appendix does not repeat these encounters. It asks what pattern they form.

Spinoza gave his own summary early. In 1661 Henry Oldenburg asked him what defects he saw in the philosophy of Descartes and of Bacon (Letter 1; VVL[3] III 4), and Spinoza named three errors: "Primus itaque et maximus est, quod tam longe a cognitione Primae Causae et originis omnium rerum aberrarint. Secundus, quod veram naturam humanae Mentis non cognoverint. Tertius, quod veram causam Erroris nunquam assecuti sint" ("The first and greatest is that they strayed so far from the knowledge of the first cause and origin of all things; the second, that they did not know the true nature of the human mind; the third, that they never grasped the true cause of error"; Letter 2; VVL[3] III 6). These are the first three subjects of this appendix: substance, mind and body, will and intellect. The fourth, the passions, is the subject on which the *Ethics* names Descartes. In all four the same movement recurs. Spinoza accepts a Cartesian principle, often a Cartesian definition, and applies it without the exceptions Descartes allowed himself, so that the conclusion is anti-Cartesian and the argument Descartes' own. Edwin Curley made this the method of a book, which tries to show how "some of the most distinctive features of Spinoza's philosophy arose from internal tensions within the Cartesian system" (*Behind the Geometrical Method*, 1988, pp. 3–4); Michael Della Rocca puts it more sharply, calling Descartes' acceptance of mind–body causation that cannot be understood "a sign of Descartes's failure to be truly a rationalist" (*Spinoza*, 2008, p. 45).

The *Principles* of 1663

The Introduction tells how Spinoza's only book published under his name, a geometrical exposition of the first two parts of Descartes' *Principles*, came to be written, and how Lodewijk Meyer's preface warned that its author did not share Descartes' view of the will. The book shows how exactly Spinoza could speak in Descartes' voice. Its definitions are copied, with small changes, from those Descartes set at the head of the arguments he arranged in geometrical order at the end of the Replies to the Second Objections (AT VII 160–162; *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* I, Defs. 1–10, G I 149–151). Mind is the substance in which thought inheres, body the subject of extension, "but whether the substance called mind and the substance called body are one and the same, or two different ones, will have to be inquired afterwards" (Def. 7); two substances are really distinct when each can exist without the other (Def. 10). On this basis Spinoza demonstrated, in Descartes' name, that mind and body are really distinct (I, Prop. 8, G I 167); that God is incorporeal, since body is divisible and divisibility is an imperfection (I, Prop. 16, G I 176); and that the will is free, so that it is in our power to keep it within the limits of the intellect and never err (I, Prop. 15, Schol., G I 173–174). The *Ethics* denies the first and the third; of the second it

keeps only the denial that God is a body, and makes extension, which it holds to be indivisible, an attribute of God (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 49]).

Spinoza did not hide the distance. He asked Meyer to tell the reader that he demonstrated many things otherwise than Descartes, "non ut Cartesium corrigam, sed tantum ut meum ordinem melius retineam" ("not to correct Descartes, but only to keep my own order better"; Letter 15; VVL[3] III 52), and Meyer did (G I 131). The preface then traces the disagreement about the will to a deeper one, and adds a second. Descartes, it says, only supposes, and does not prove, that the human mind is a substance that thinks absolutely; the author admits a thinking substance in nature but denies that it constitutes the essence of the human mind, holding that "just as the human body is not extension absolutely, but only extension determined in a certain way according to the laws of extended nature by motion and rest, so also the human mind or soul is not thought absolutely, but only thought determined in a certain way according to the laws of thinking nature by ideas" (G I 132, as Blyenbergh quoted it back to Spinoza in Letter 24 [p. 607]). That is the doctrine of Part II, Props. 11 and 13 [p. 139] in outline, in print in 1663, and from this definition, the preface says, the author thinks it not hard to demonstrate that the will is not distinct from the intellect (G I 132). Further, whatever the book says surpasses human understanding is said only from Descartes' mind: the author thinks that such things can be clearly conceived and explained if the intellect is led by another way than the one Descartes opened, and that the foundations Descartes laid do not suffice for the hardest questions of metaphysics (G I 132–133). When Blyenbergh confused the two voices, Spinoza told him he would have done better to answer "in Descartes's words" (Letter 21 [p. 585]). The *Ethics* keeps the language and changes the doctrine.

Substance and attribute

The introduction to Part I describes how Spinoza takes Descartes' definition of substance and refuses his concession. In the *Principles* substance is a thing that needs no other thing in order to exist; strictly only God is such, and so, Descartes says, the name does not apply to God and to creatures "univoce, ut dici solet in Scholis" ("univocally, as they say in the Schools"; I.51, AT VIII-1 24). Minds and bodies are substances in a second sense, needing only God's concurrence. Spinoza joins conception to existence in his definition, and with the added clause makes the word univocal again: on Martial Gueroult's account he restores its univocity by conceiving every substance as a divine being, in itself and conceived through itself (*Spinoza I: Dieu*, 1968, p. 55). Della Rocca describes the step as the refusal of an escape clause: if only God meets the requirements, one should "have the courage of one's convictions" and call finite things modes (Della Rocca, pp. 42–43), as Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47] does with Descartes' thinking and extended things.

The same holds of attribute. Descartes held that a substance is known not from the bare fact that it exists, but through any of its attributes (I.52, AT VIII-1 25); that each has one principal attribute which constitutes its nature and essence (I.53); and that between a substance and that attribute there is only a distinction of reason (I.62, AT VIII-1 30), so that thought and extension, taken as constituting the natures of mind and body, "non aliter concipi debent, quam ipsa substantia cogitans et substantia extensa" ("must be conceived in no other way than as thinking substance itself and extended substance itself"; I.63, AT VIII-1 30–31). Spinoza's attribute, "what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence" (Part I, Def. 4 [p. 25]), the same as substance "except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect" (Letter 9 [p. 537]), stands in this line. Gueroult argued that Spinoza reserves the word for what Descartes called the

principal attribute, and keeps most of its Cartesian marks: it is known clearly by abstraction from everything else, constitutes an essence, and differs from its substance only by reason. What he adds is infinity; the attributes become the constituents of God, and the intelligibility Descartes had confined to the finite is carried to the absolute (Gueroult, p. 56). Curley drew the consequence: if a substance cannot be conceived apart from its principal attribute, nothing remains by which two substances of one attribute could be told apart, and the demonstration of Part I, Prop. 5 [p. 31] seems effective at least against Descartes (Curley, pp. 13–16). Appendix B [p. 660] describes the modern debate over the attributes.

The real distinction is the plainest case of an argument taken over and turned. For Descartes two things are really distinct, and so two substances, when each can be clearly and distinctly understood without the other (I.60, AT VIII-1 28); the Sixth Meditation uses the test to conclude that the mind can exist without the body (AT VII 78). The *Ethics* keeps the test and refuses the inference: "although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct, that is, one without the aid of the other, we still cannot infer from this that they constitute two beings, or two different substances" (Part I, Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 39]). Don Garrett has said what Spinoza must think goes wrong (*Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy*, 2018, pp. 221–225). Spinoza "takes the Cartesian test as constitutive of a real distinction" (p. 224), which can therefore hold between attributes of one substance; and Descartes' argument slides from conceiving one thing without conceiving the other to conceiving the one as existing without the other. The slide overlooks the case in which neither depends on the other for its conception, and yet neither can exist without the other because both exist necessarily; and that is Spinoza's case.

Extension shows the same movement. Descartes made extension the nature of body (*Principles* II.4) and denied that God is a body, since divisibility goes with extension and to be divisible is an imperfection (I.23, AT VIII-1 13). The scholium to Part I, Prop. 15 [p. 49] answers an argument of this form, and its conclusion, that the parts of matter "are distinguished only modally, but not really" (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 51]), reverses the article in which Descartes had said that every part of extended substance marked out in thought is really distinct from the others (I.60, AT VIII-1 28). Late in life Spinoza went further: from extension "as Descartes conceives it, namely as a mass at rest," the existence of bodies cannot be demonstrated, and "matter is badly defined by Descartes through extension, but must necessarily be explained through an attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (Letters 81 [p. 647] and 83 [p. 649]). Descartes had needed God to put motion into matter and conserve it (*Principles* II.36, AT VIII-1 61), as Tschirnhaus observed (Letter 82 [p. 647]); for Spinoza motion and rest is the infinite mode that follows from the nature of extension itself (Letter 64 [p. 631]). He keeps the Cartesian identification of matter with extension and makes the extension divine, indivisible and active.

Mind and body

The introduction to Part II, Appendix C [p. 663] and the notes describe Descartes' two substances, their union and their interaction through the gland, and Spinoza's doctrine that the mind is the idea of the body. What should be added is how much of the Cartesian argument survives inside Spinoza's. Spinoza rules out any conceptual connection between the attributes, as Della Rocca says, "just as Descartes does" (p. 43): no concept of extension enters the concept of thought (Part I, Prop. 10 [p. 39]; Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129]). The two differ about what follows. For Descartes the barrier separates two substances which nonetheless act on each other. For Spinoza, who holds that the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of its cause (Part I, Ax.

4 [p. 29]), conceptual independence is causal independence, and the barrier forbids interaction: "The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else" (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235]). It is, in Della Rocca's words, "precisely because thought and extension are conceptually separate" that they cannot causally interact (p. 43). The premise by which Descartes divided the mind from the body becomes the premise by which Spinoza denies that either acts on the other.

What then of the union on which Descartes also insisted, that I am not in my body as a sailor in a ship but closely joined and as it were intermingled with it (AT VII 81)? Curley has argued that this, more than the difficulty of interaction, is what moved Spinoza: he was answering the tension between the Cartesian real distinction and the Cartesian substantial union, and the intuitions of unity Descartes tried to express were "more important in the genesis of the Spinozistic position than any concerns about the intelligibility of interaction" (Curley, pp. 59–60). The Preface to Part V bears him out in part, for its first question is not how the mind moves the body but "What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body?" Spinoza would have liked Descartes "to explain this union through its proximate cause," but Descartes had conceived the mind as so distinct from the body that "he could assign no singular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, but had to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God" (Part V, Preface [p. 469]). Spinoza had answered the question in Part II: once the mind is shown to be the idea of the body, "we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body" (Part II, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]), and the two are "one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension" (Part II, Prop. 21, Schol. [p. 167]). The question Descartes' definitions left open, whether mind and body are one substance or two (AT VII 162), and which the fourth Meditation gives as an example of indifference (AT VII 59), receives the answer Descartes rejected: "the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is comprehended now under this attribute, now under that" (Part II, Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]).

There is also a difference of order. Descartes found the mind first and God afterwards, and titled his Second Meditation "Of the nature of the human mind: that it is better known than the body" (AT VII 23); Spinoza holds that the mind knows itself only through the ideas of the body's affections (Part II, Prop. 23 [p. 169]), and says of those who believed the divine nature "to be last in the order of knowledge" that they "did not keep to the order of philosophizing" (Part II, Prop. 10, Cor., Schol. [p. 137]). The complaint is aimed at many, and fits Descartes only in part, for he put the mind, not the objects of the senses, first, and held that his perception of God was in a certain way prior to his perception of himself (AT VII 45); but the *Meditations* reach God only after the mind, and the complaint is close to the first of the errors he named to Oldenburg.

Will and intellect

The essay before Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207] sets out the Cartesian theory of judgment, in which a finite intellect perceives and an infinite will assents. Spinoza had told Oldenburg that all the causes of error Bacon assigned reduce to Descartes' one, "quia voluntas humana est libera, et latior intellectu" ("because the human will is free, and wider than the intellect"; Letter 2; VVL[3] III 6), and answered it at once with the argument of Part II, Prop. 48, Schol. [p. 207]. Three further points show the Cartesian doctrine turned rather than simply refused.

The first is that Descartes himself placed the perfection of freedom in determination. "Neque

enim opus est me in utramque partem ferri posse, ut sim liber, sed contra, quo magis in unam propendeo, ... tanto liberius illam eligo" ("For in order to be free I need not be capable of being moved either way; on the contrary, the more I incline to one side, ... the more freely I choose it"); indifference "est infimus gradus libertatis" ("is the lowest degree of freedom"); and when he found that he existed, "non potui quidem non iudicare illud quod tam clare intelligebam verum esse" ("I could not but judge that what I understood so clearly was true"), because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the will (*Meditations* IV, AT VII 57–59). Spinoza expounded this faithfully: when we perceive something clearly and distinctly we cannot but assent, and the will is never more free than when it determines itself entirely (*Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* I, Prop. 15, Schol., G I 174). To Blyenbergh he put Descartes' view thus: "our freedom lies neither in a certain contingency nor in a certain indifference, but in the manner of affirming and denying; so that the less indifferently we affirm or deny something, the freer we are" (Letter 21 [p. 587]). In the autograph of a later letter he credited Descartes again with the view "nos tum maxime liberos esse, cum rebus clare et distincte perceptis assentimus, tametsi impossibile est, iisdem non assentire, quando eas ita percepimus" ("that we are most free when we assent to things clearly and distinctly perceived, although it is impossible not to assent to them when we have perceived them so"), and struck the sentence out (Letter 43; Gebhardt's apparatus, G IV 413). The *Ethics* keeps this part of Descartes and lets it absorb the rest. A thing is free which "exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone" (Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27]); "I place freedom," Spinoza wrote, "not in a free decree, but in a free necessity" (Letter 58 [p. 623]). What Descartes called the highest degree of freedom becomes the only kind, the indifference he called the lowest becomes none, and since the necessity of assent belongs to the clear idea itself, the will that was to give the assent has nothing left to do (Part II, Prop. 49 [p. 209]).

The second point concerns the feeling of freedom. In the same passage Descartes says that freedom consists in our being so moved to affirm or deny, pursue or avoid, "ut a nulla vi externa nos ad id determinari sentiamus" ("that we feel that we are determined to it by no external force"; AT VII 57). Spinoza grants the feeling and explains it: men think themselves free "since they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to want and to will, because they are ignorant of them" (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]). To Tschirnhaus's claim that "Descartes calls free that which is compelled by no cause" (Letter 57 [p. 619]) he answered that we are in some things not compelled, if that means acting against one's will, but free in nothing, if it means acting necessarily (Letter 58 [p. 625]).

The third concerns the limits of understanding. Descartes held that our freedom and God's preordination are both certain, though we cannot comprehend how they agree (*Principles* I.41, AT VIII-1 20), and the *Metaphysical Thoughts* repeat that how human freedom is preserved "captum nostrum excedit" ("exceeds our grasp"; I.3, G I 243). Later Spinoza used the admission as a weapon. To Velthuysen's charge of fatalism he replied by asking what Velthuysen thought of his own Descartes, who held that we do nothing God has not preordained and yet act from free will, "quod profecto, ipso Cartesio fatente, comprehendere nemo potest" ("which, as Descartes himself confesses, no one can comprehend"; Letter 43; VVL[3] III 160–161). Of Tschirnhaus he said that if he admits, with Descartes, that he cannot reconcile the two, "then he is trying to hurl at me the weapon by which he himself has already been pierced," whereas on Spinoza's view "everything agrees" (Letter 58 [p. 627]). Della Rocca suggests that the Cartesian division of the mind into passive ideas and an active will would be "an objectionable replication within the mind

itself of the mind–body problem" (p. 126). The identity of will and intellect removes the second dualism on the principle that removed the first.

The passions

The introductions to Parts III and V, the essay on the definitions of the affects and the notes describe what Part III takes from *The Passions of the Soul* and what it rejects: the derivation of all passions from a few primitive ones, Descartes' six reduced to three, wonder demoted, love and generosity redefined. Three further features deserve notice.

The first is a shared project and a reversed correlation. Descartes said that he meant to explain the passions not as an orator, nor even as a moral philosopher, "mais seulement en Physicien" ("but only as a natural philosopher"; AT XI 326), and Spinoza credits him with trying "to explain human affects through their first causes" (Part III, Preface [p. 229]). Descartes began from the received doctrine that action and passion are one thing with two names, referred to two subjects, and inferred that, since nothing acts more immediately on the soul than the body, "ce qui est en elle une Passion, est communément en luy une Action" ("what is a passion in the soul is commonly an action in the body"; arts. 1–2, AT XI 328). Spinoza keeps the thought that one event can be described in two relations and inverts the correlation: "the order of actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of actions and passions of the mind" (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]). The mind is passive when and as the body is, and acting is defined by whether we are the adequate cause of what happens (Part III, Def. 2 [p. 231]), not by which substance acts on the other. With this the Cartesian picture of inner conflict goes. For Descartes the combats imagined between the lower and the higher part of the soul are only the opposition of the movements that the spirits and the will excite at once in the gland, for there is one soul, "& tous ses appétits sont des volontez" ("and all its appetites are volitions"; art. 47, AT XI 364). Spinoza reverses the reduction. Will is appetite, the striving by which each thing perseveres in its being "when it is related to the mind alone," and so "we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it" (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]).

The second feature is Part IV's reply to a single article. In article 48 Descartes measures the strength of souls by the outcome of the will's combats with the passions. Some never let it fight "avec ses propres armes, mais seulement avec celles que luy fournissent quelques passions pour resister à quelques autres" ("with its own arms, but only with those which some passions furnish it to resist others"); its own arms are "des jugemens fermes & déterminez touchant la connoissance du bien & du mal" ("firm and determinate judgments concerning the knowledge of good and evil"); and the weakest souls, pulled by one passion after another, are made "esclave & malheureuse" ("slave and unhappy"; AT XI 366–367). Spinoza answers that "An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained" (Part IV, Prop. 7 [p. 365]), and that "The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect" (Part IV, Prop. 14 [p. 373]). Jonathan Bennett saw the target: Descartes said that misguided people fight passions with passions, "and Spinoza replies that there is no other way to win" (*A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 1984, p. 286). What Descartes reserved for the weakest souls, and called slavery, Spinoza makes the human condition, the bondage of the title of Part IV. Bennett thought the reply went too far, since Spinoza also holds that affects can be changed by knowledge, for instance by separating an affect from the thought of its external cause (Part V, Prop. 2 [p. 475]), and he could not reconcile the two (p. 286). Yet the last clause of Prop. 14 can be read as the reconciliation: knowledge

restrains an affect not as true but as itself an affect, and the remedies of Part V work because the clear idea of an affect is itself an affect, and an active one (Part V, Prop. 3 [p. 475]). What Spinoza denies is a power of judgment that is not also a power of feeling, which is what the Cartesian will was meant to be.

The third feature is how much of the Cartesian therapy survives, relocated. Descartes taught that the will acts on a passion only indirectly (art. 45; see the note on Part IV, Prop. 7 [p. 365]), that habit can join the movements of the gland to other thoughts (art. 50), and, in the article on a general remedy, that we can correct the defects of our nature by "la premeditation, & l'industrie ... en s'exerçant à separer en soy les mouvemens du sang & des esprits, d'avec les pensées ausquelles ils ont coustume d'estre joins" ("premeditation, and the industry ... by exercising ourselves to separate within ourselves the movements of the blood and spirits from the thoughts to which they are usually joined"; art. 211, AT XI 486). Spinoza's remedies separate an affect from the thought of its external cause and join it to other thoughts (Part V, Prop. 2 [p. 475]), and recommend that, so long as we lack perfect knowledge of our affects, we "conceive a right way of living, or sure principles of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life," rehearsing beforehand the common injuries and dangers (Part V, Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 483]). This is premeditation and habit, and the sure principles of life are not far from the firm judgments of article 48. What has changed is the mechanism. The joining and separating take place among ideas and images, and the affections of the body follow because the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things (Part II, Prop. 7 [p. 129]; Part V, Prop. 1 [p. 473]), not because a will moves a gland. The limit Descartes admitted in the same article, that the movements of the blood follow so promptly that no human wisdom can resist them in one who is unprepared (AT XI 486), is written into Spinoza's proposition: we can order the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect "so long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature" (Part V, Prop. 10 [p. 483]).

The Preface to Part V

The introduction to Part V summarizes the Preface's account of Descartes, and the notes trace it to its articles in the *Passions*. What the comparison adds is that nearly every objection applies Descartes' own rules. Descartes "had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing except what he perceived clearly and distinctly," and had reproached the scholastics for explaining obscure things by occult qualities; by these standards a thought "most closely united to a certain small portion of quantity" is "a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality" (Part V, Preface [p. 469]). The decisive objection, "since there is no ratio of will to motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body," turns against the doctrine the barrier between thought and extension that Descartes himself had set up. Only the anatomical objections come from outside his system. The root of the error, for Spinoza, is the premise that "the determination of the will depends on our power alone."

What Spinoza kept

A list of Spinoza's debts to Descartes would be long: the vocabulary of substance, attribute and mode, of formal and objective being and degrees of reality; the distinctions real, modal and of reason; clear and distinct ideas as the standard of truth; matter as extension; the law that each thing, "quantum in se est" ("as far as is in it"), remains in the same state (*Principles*

II.37, AT VIII-1 62), which returns in the *conatus* of Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243]. Della Rocca traces Spinoza's striving to Descartes' *conatus* of bodies that have no thought (*Principles* III.56), freed from Descartes' restriction to things simple and undivided (pp. 145–147). The list of rejections would be as long: created substances, the real distinction of mind and body and their interaction, the free will, the freely created eternal truths discussed in the essay before Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65], and Descartes' modest reason for excluding final causes from physics. The two lists are connected. Again and again Descartes stopped short, by a concession or by a declaration that something exceeds our grasp: substance in a second sense for things that are not strictly substances; a union whose only cause is God; a freedom whose agreement with God's decree no one can comprehend; an infinite will in a finite mind. Meyer's preface said in 1663 that Spinoza thought such things could be understood by another way than Descartes', and the way, as Spinoza told Oldenburg, begins from the first cause. The *Ethics* starts with God and arrives at the mind. It applies Descartes' principles without his exceptions and finds that they yield another philosophy, which is why it can be read, as Curley read it, as a long argument with Descartes in Descartes' terms, and why the author it names in only three passages is present on nearly every page.

Appendix J. The *Ethics* and the *Short Treatise*

The *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being* is the nearest thing to a first draft of the *Ethics* that survives. The Introduction, the chronology, a few notes, two essays and Appendix G [p. 680] mention it; the essay before Part V, Prop. 21 recalls its chapter on immortality. This appendix asks what the *Ethics* kept of the treatise and what it changed. H. A. Wolfson called it "nothing but a tentative draft" of the philosophy completed in the *Ethics*, and held that in Spinoza's essential doctrines "no change or even development is to be noticed" from one work to another (*The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1934, I 32, 34). Edwin Curley thought it an immature work, in which Spinoza often seems confused and had not yet reached many of the views of the *Ethics*, and valuable as the record of a stage on the way (*Behind the Geometrical Method*, 1988, p. xii). A comparison bears out something of both: most of the main theses are already present, and almost all of them are argued differently.

The manuscripts

The treatise was long known only by report. In 1704 Gottlieb Stolle was shown by the younger Jan Rieuwertsz a manuscript of "the Ethics, in Dutch, as Spinoza first composed it," in chapters, without demonstrations, and with a chapter on the devil (Gebhardt, Textgestaltung I 409–410). After Eduard Boehmer had published a summary of it in 1852, the bookseller Frederik Muller found a manuscript of the whole, and Johannes van Vloten published it in 1862 with a Latin translation, helped by a second manuscript lent by Adriaan Bogaers. Van Vloten rejected the report that the work had first been written in Dutch: a note at its head and its many Latinisms said otherwise (*Supplementum*, 1862, pp. I–II; Textgestaltung I 411–413).

Both manuscripts are now in the Royal Library at The Hague. The older, Bogaers's, was neatly copied in the seventeenth century by an unlearned hand; the younger was copied from it in the eighteenth by Johannes Monnikhoff, an Amsterdam surgeon, who emended it freely, though not without skill (VVL² III v). Gebhardt's edition of 1925 rests on the older alone, Monnikhoff's copy being "a redaction or paraphrase" of it (Textgestaltung I 424).

The title calls the work "voor deze in de Latynse taal beschreven door B. D. S. … En nu in de Neërduytse spraak overgezet" ("formerly written in Latin by B. D. S. … and now translated into the Dutch tongue"; G I 11). Gebhardt noticed that the closing words address "the friends to whom I write this," while a marginal note calls the treatise dictated to them at their request. He concluded that Spinoza first dictated it in Dutch in Amsterdam, then rewrote it in Latin as a series of treatises sent from Rijnsburg and translated as they arrived, and went on adding to it; a friend, probably Jarig Jelles, who had no Latin, arranged the whole as a handbook for his own use (Textgestaltung I 425–432). Nadler, after Filippo Mignini, has Spinoza write it in Latin in Amsterdam between the middle of 1660 and his move to Rijnsburg, and rework it when his friends asked for a Dutch version (*Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed., 2018, pp. 219–220 and n. 16). In 1662 Spinoza told Oldenburg that he had written a whole little work ("integrum opusculum") on how things began to be and on the emendation of the intellect, which he was copying out and correcting, and that he feared to publish it lest the theologians take offence (Letter 6; VVL³ III 25).

God, substance and attribute

The first part moves from the existence of God to his essence, to his "proper" attributes, mere adjectives that tell us nothing of what he is, to those falsely ascribed to him, to *Natura naturans* and *naturata*, and to good and evil. It goes, as Gueroult put it, from *quod* to *quid*, from whether God is to what he is; the *Ethics* goes from *quid* to *quod* (*Spinoza I: Dieu*, 1968, p. 479).

The first chapter proves God's existence a priori, in two forms, and a posteriori. The first a priori proof argues that whatever we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the nature of a thing may truly be affirmed of it, and that existence belongs to the nature of God; the a posteriori proof argues from the idea of God in us, which a finite intellect could not have produced by its own fiction (KV I.1; G I 15–18). Wolfson traced them to Descartes' ontological argument and to the first proof of the Third Meditation (I 178). The chapter judges the a priori proof the better, against the dictum of Aquinas that God cannot be proved a priori because he has no cause (G I 18). The *Ethics* keeps the a priori argument as the first demonstration of Part I, Prop. 11 [p. 41]. The proof from the idea of God has gone; the a posteriori demonstration argues from power (third Dem. [p. 43]), and was given, the scholium says, only "so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily" (Schol. [p. 43]).

The second chapter defines God as "een wezen van de welke alles, ofte oneyndelyke eigenschappen gezeid worden, van welke eigenschappen een yder des zelfs in syn geslagte oneyndelyk volmaakt is" ("a being of which all, or infinite, attributes are predicated, each of which is infinitely perfect in its kind"; G I 19), close to Part I, Def. 6 [p. 27]. What differs is the place of the word substance. The chapter proves that there is no limited substance; that there are no two equal substances; that one substance cannot produce another; and that there is no substance in God's infinite intellect which is not formally in Nature (G I 19–22). The substances are the attributes (G I 21, 115). The treatise speaks of "substantial thinking" and "substantial extension" (G I 51), and of the being they constitute as God, or Nature; only rarely, as in a sentence of the second part, is the whole of Nature "one single substance" (G I 101). In Gueroult's formula, the treatise identifies God with Nature, the *Ethics* God with substance; in the latter, on his reading, the substances of one attribute of Props. 5–8 are a provisional stage (p. 480). The order of proof changes too: the treatise shows each substance unique in its kind because it is infinite, the *Ethics* infinite because it is unique (Part I, Prop. 8, Dem. [p. 35]; Gueroult, p. 475).

Much of the early argument turns a creator's attributes against him. A limited substance must have been limited by God, because he could give no more, which contradicts his omnipotence, or would not, which "smacks of envy" (G I 20–21). God has created everything that was in his infinite intellect, and to the objection that he could then create nothing more Spinoza replies that it is the greater perfection to have created it all (G I 22). Objection and reply return in Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67], where the adversaries "are compelled to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things which he will nevertheless never be able to create." But in the treatise God brings about everything "as perfectly as it is conceived in his Idea" (G I 36), and Gueroult saw in this the last trace of a "creative intellect" (pp. 482–483).

Other doctrines are only recast. Providence is "the striving which we find both in the whole of Nature and in particular things, tending to the preservation and maintenance of their own being" (G I 40), the doctrine of Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243] without the theological name, as Appendix G [p. 680] notes; and extension is defended against the charge of divisibility with the example of Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 51]: to divide water is to divide only a mode of substance (G I 26).

The two dialogues

After the second chapter stand two dialogues, which Gebhardt assigned to the period of the additions, since, as Freudenthal had seen, they presuppose the finished treatise (Textgestaltung I 430, 455). In the first, Love asks Understanding whether it has conceived a supremely perfect being in which Love too is comprehended; Reason answers that Nature is an eternal unity; Desire objects that thinking substance has nothing in common with extended substance (G I 28). Reason's reply goes further: infinite extension and thought, "or, in your style, substances," are nothing but modes "van dat eenige, eeuwige, oneyndige, door zig zelfs bestaande Wezen" ("of that one, eternal, infinite Being, existing through itself"; G I 29–30). Gueroult, who took the dialogues to be the oldest layer of the work (p. 472 and n. 4), read this as a doctrine of its own, in which the attributes constitute Nature without constituting God, leaving a distance between the cause and its effects (pp. 472–473). Desire's last objection draws from Reason the account of the immanent cause, on the model of the intellect and its ideas (G I 30), part of which the note on Part I, Prop. 18 [p. 71] quotes.

In the second, between Erasmus and Theophilus, "serving partly for the preceding, partly for the second part that follows," God is called a remote cause only by contrast with the things he has produced immediately, the qualification of Part I, Prop. 28, Schol. [p. 81]; his essence does not grow by the effects united with him; and Erasmus recalls Theophilus's claim that the human intellect is immortal, because God has produced it in himself (G I 31–33). The *Ethics* has no dialogues.

Nature naturing and the infinite modes

Chapters 8 and 9 divide Nature into *Natura naturans*, which is God, and *Natura naturata*. The Thomists, the treatise adds, also understood God by the first, "but their *Natura naturans* was a being (as they called it) outside all substances" (G I 47), a remark Wolfson traced to Aquinas (I 254). *Natura naturata* is general or particular. The general consists of the modes that depend immediately on God, of which we know two, motion in matter and understanding in the thinking thing, eternal and immutable, each a Son of God, motion being "een Zone, maakzel, of uytwerkzel, onmiddelyk van God geschapen" ("a Son, product, or effect, created immediately by God"; G I 48); the particular, of the singular things these cause. A note warns that what is said of motion is not said in earnest, a reservation, Gebhardt thought, that Spinoza made in speaking (Textgestaltung I 427); later the treatise counts motion and rest together (G I 91).

In the *Ethics* the two terms occur only in the scholium to Prop. 29 and in Prop. 31 and its demonstration; Prop. 31 refers the actual intellect, finite or infinite, to *Natura naturata*, as the treatise had done (Part I, Prop. 31 [p. 83]). The general modes become what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute and is eternal and infinite (Part I, Prop. 21 [p. 73]), exemplified by "the idea of God in thought" (Dem. [p. 73]) and, in a letter, by "absolutely infinite intellect" in thought and "motion and rest" in extension (Letter 64 [p. 631]). The intellect is no longer a son. The treatise itself glosses the name: a note explains the infinite intellect, "which we called the Son of God," as God's idea of himself (G I 101), and the appendix calls it an infinite idea, containing objectively the formal essence of all things (G I 117).

Mind, body and knowledge

The preface to the second part, with its note, describes the mind. The soul is not a substance, since no substance is limited, but a mode of thinking, the idea of a body that is itself a certain proportion of motion and rest; when other bodies destroy the proportion, the soul, insofar as it is only the idea of that body, perishes with it (G I 51–52). The preface also lays down that there belongs to the nature of a thing that without which it can neither be nor be understood, but only if the relation is reciprocal, since without God nothing can be or be understood (G I 53): the rule and the reason of Part II, Def. 2 [p. 121] and Part II, Prop. 10, Cor., Schol. [p. 137]. The appendix adds that the essences of modes that do not exist are comprehended in their attributes without distinction, which arises only when they exist (G I 119), as in Part II, Prop. 8, Schol. [p. 133]; and the soul is "a part of the infinite Idea arising immediately from God" (G I 121), as in Part II, Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139].

Curley observed that the treatise nowhere explicitly states that mind and body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes, and that, while it finds full interaction unacceptable, it admits a limited one (p. 153 nn. 8, 11): the soul, like the body, can turn the animal spirits from one side to the other (G I 92). The *Ethics* withdraws even this (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235] and Schol. [p. 235]), as the essay on Spinoza and Descartes describes.

The treatise counts three kinds of knowledge: belief, from experience or hearsay, which can err; true belief; and clear and distinct conception. Four men find the fourth proportional by hearsay, by trial, by reason and by seeing the proportion at once (KV II.1; G I 54–55). Elsewhere it counts four, and calls clear knowledge "the fourth and last" (G I 61, 100; Wolfson II 132). What changes is what each kind is. True belief shows us "what the thing ought to be, but not what it really is," and so cannot unite us with what it knows (G I 59). There are no common notions; Gueroult noted that their place is taken by general concepts, such as the idea of a perfect man, which the *Ethics* treats as products of imagination (*Spinoza II: L'âme*, 1974, p. 374). Clear knowledge comes "niet … door overtuyging van reeden maar door een gevoelen, en genieten van de zaake zelve" ("not by conviction of reason but by a feeling and enjoyment of the thing itself"; G I 55); apart from the example, its only object seems to be God (Gueroult, pp. 593–594), whereas the third kind of the *Ethics* proceeds from the idea of God's attributes to the essence of things (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]).

The deepest change concerns the activity of the mind. Understanding, "though the word sounds otherwise," is "een zuyvere of pure lyding" ("a pure passion"; G I 79): "it is never we who affirm or deny something of the thing, but the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us" (G I 83). The treatise already denies free will, the will being a being of reason formed from particular volitions (KV II.16; G I 82–83). The *Ethics* keeps the conclusion, as the essay before Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207] shows, but reverses the premise: Spinoza says concept rather than perception "because the word perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind" (Part II, Def. 3, Expl. [p. 121]), and insofar as it has adequate ideas the mind acts (Part III, Prop. 1 [p. 233]). One doctrine passes over unchanged: truth makes manifest both itself and falsity, so that whoever has it cannot doubt it (G I 79; Part II, Prop. 43, Schol. [p. 191]).

The passions

Van Vloten found the principles of the *Ethics* "minus adhuc elaborata" in the treatise, "as yet less worked out," above all in the doctrine of the passions (*Supplementum*, p. II). The treatise

derives the passions from knowledge, not from a striving: knowledge is "the proximate cause of all the passions in the soul" (G I 56). Opinion produces the passions contrary to reason, true belief good desires, clear knowledge true love (G I 55–56); good and evil are measured against the idea of a perfect man (G I 60). The first passions treated are wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, Descartes' six primitive passions in his order (*Passions*, art. 69), and the definition of love as "een zaak te genieten, en daar mede vereenigt te worden" ("to enjoy a thing and be united with it"; G I 62) also comes from Descartes (Wolfson II 279). The *Ethics* founds the affects on the striving of Part III, Prop. 6 [p. 243] and on three primary affects (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]), excludes wonder (Def. Aff. 4, Expl. [p. 321]), and says that the definition of love by union "expresses not the essence of love but a property of it" (Def. Aff. 6, Expl. [p. 321]).

Chapters 5 to 14 judge each passion by reason, and many verdicts stand. Hatred has no place in one who uses his reason rightly (G I 67); hope and fear arise from a bad opinion, and confidence and despair too can have no place in a perfect man (G I 72); remorse and repentance are harmful and evil (G I 73); compare Part IV, Prop. 45 [p. 411], Prop. 47 [p. 415] and Prop. 54 [p. 421]. Others change. The treatise praises true humility, a man's knowing his imperfection without regard to contempt of himself, as "the true step by which we climb to our highest salvation" (G I 69–70); the *Ethics* says that "humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason" (Part IV, Prop. 53 [p. 419]). The treatise denies that gratitude can have any place in a perfect man, who helps his neighbour from necessity alone, and the more, the greater the misery he finds, even in the most godless (G I 76); the *Ethics* holds that "only free men are most grateful to one another" (Part IV, Prop. 71 [p. 447]). Nor has the treatise anything like the scholium which grants that humility, repentance, hope and fear do more good than harm among men who rarely live by reason (Part IV, Prop. 54, Schol. [p. 421]). Its verdicts are pronounced for a perfect man; the later book provides also for those who are not.

Union with God and true freedom

Reason, the treatise argues, can destroy the opinions we have from hearsay, but not those we have from experience, for what we enjoy in ourselves cannot be overcome by what reason shows us without letting us enjoy it (KV II.21; G I 99–100). Only the fourth kind of knowledge can free us. If we know God "at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we know our body," we must be united with him more closely than with the body, and as it were released from it (G I 93). Then we are born again: our first birth was our union with the body, the second, the *wedergeboorte*, a union with an incorporeal object, from which an eternal and unchangeable constancy follows (KV II.22; G I 102). The *Ethics* has its own form of the first point: an affect is restrained only by a stronger affect (Part IV, Prop. 7 [p. 365]), and true knowledge of good and evil restrains none insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is itself an affect (Prop. 14 [p. 373]); its remedies begin with the knowledge of the affects themselves (Part V, Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]); and it keeps "regenerated" only for the body, which needs other bodies "by which it is continually, as it were, regenerated" (Part II, Post. 4 [p. 157]).

The chapter on immortality draws the consequence, but the thought runs through the work: the soul, uniting itself with substances that always remain the same, "could have made itself eternal" (G I 52); "the true intellect can never perish" (G I 111). Nadler found the language, which calls the soul both "immortal" and "eternal," ambiguous, and the union with God at once a union in being and in knowing (*Spinoza's Heresy*, 2001, pp. 109–110).

The last chapters anticipate the end of the *Ethics*. God does not love men, since no modes

of thinking can be ascribed to him besides those in creatures, and such love would make him mutable (KV II.24; G I 103–104; Wolfson II 286–288); the *Ethics* agrees that "strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one" (Part V, Prop. 17, Cor. [p. 489]), but then lets God love men insofar as he loves himself (Prop. 36, Cor. [p. 515]). The chapter on true freedom denies that the passions must be curbed before we can come to the knowledge and love of God, which would be as if an ignorant man had to give up his ignorance before he could come to knowledge; knowledge alone destroys them (KV II.26; G I 108). That is the thesis of Part V, Prop. 42 [p. 523]. Theologians who would seek their own good elsewhere if the love of God brought no eternal life are likened to a fish that would leave the water on the same condition (G I 109), as the multitude of Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523] are likened to someone who would fill himself with poisons. Freedom the treatise defines as "a firm existence which our intellect acquires through immediate union with God" (G I 112), and it calls it true freedom to be bound "met de lieffelyke ketenen van syne liefde" ("with the lovely chains of his love"; G I 109); men are "servants, indeed slaves, of God," and that is their greatest perfection (G I 87). In the *Ethics* bondage names the condition described in Part IV, and the man led by reason is free (Part IV, Prop. 66, Schol. [p. 437]).

The appendix in geometrical form

After the closing words to the friends comes an appendix in two parts, the second on the human soul. The first sets out seven axioms and four propositions with a corollary in geometrical order (G I 114–116). The first axiom, that substance by its nature is prior to all its modifications, is Part I, Prop. 1 [p. 29]. The propositions prove that no two substances can share an attribute, that one substance cannot cause the existence of another, that "alle eigenschappen of zelfstandigheid" ("every attribute, or substance") is by its nature infinite and supremely perfect in its kind, and that existence so belongs to the essence of every substance that no infinite intellect can contain the idea of a substance that does not exist in Nature: in substance Props. 5 [p. 31], 6 [p. 33], 8 [p. 35] and 7 [p. 33] of Part I. The corollary concludes that Nature, consisting of infinite attributes, to whose essence existence belongs, agrees exactly with the essence of "the only glorious and blessed God." In 1661 Spinoza had sent Oldenburg, separately, demonstrations "more Geometrico" of theses close to these (Letter 2; VVL[3] III 5–6). Nadler thinks the appendix later than the body of the treatise, and perhaps part of an early draft of the *Ethics* (*Spinoza: A Life*, pp. 234–235).

Gueroult saw in it progress and a gap. The appendix no longer proves first that God is and then what he is: existence belongs to each substance by its nature, and God's existence follows by a corollary. But the principle that the more reality a being has, the more attributes belong to it, which becomes Part I, Prop. 9 [p. 39], is absent, and nothing proves that the substances form one being; the *Ethics* closes the gap by proving God to be a substance of infinite attributes (*Spinoza* I 484–487).

What the *Ethics* kept

An eighteenth-century note in the copy of Colerus that held the summary says that the treatise, though not in mathematical order, contains "the same thoughts and things" as the *Ethics*, which, more polished and expanded, is for most readers much more obscure, because geometrical order is unusual in metaphysics (Textgestaltung I 412). The *Ethics* kept the one being of infinite attributes, God's immanent and necessary causality, the denial of free will, the soul as the idea of the body, the ways of knowing with their example, the love of God as the highest good, and knowledge, not restraint, as the way to it. It changed the place of substance, the activity of the

mind, the foundation of the affects and several verdicts on them, God's love and the language of immortality; and it dropped the dialogues, the Son of God, regeneration and the chapter on devils (KV II.25; G I 107–108) that Stolle had noticed in 1704. The note's second claim may be turned around: Gueroult's analysis suggests that several of these changes, above all in the doctrine of substance, came with the geometrical order itself (*Spinoza* I 481, 484–487).

Appendix K. Right, Power and the State

The *Ethics* contains a political philosophy in a few pages. The second scholium to Part IV, Prop. 37 [p. 401] describes the natural and the civil state and defines sin, merit, justice and injustice; Prop. 40 [p. 407] calls useful whatever brings it about that men live harmoniously; the scholium to Prop. 54 [p. 421] explains why humility and fear are of use among men who rarely live by reason; and the portrait of the free man ends with the proposition that a man led by reason "is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone" (Prop. 73 [p. 449]). Spinoza set the *Ethics* aside in 1665 to write the *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670), whose last chapters argue the same principles at length, and he was at work on the *Political Treatise* when he died. The introduction to Part IV summarizes the second scholium, and the essay on the free man discusses Prop. 73. This appendix takes up three questions about these pages on which modern readers have divided: what Spinoza means by saying that right extends as far as power; whether, having said so, he can found the state on a contract; and what, for him, the state is for.

Right and power

In the *Ethics* the thesis on which Spinoza's politics turns appears only in passing. Defending the use of animals, he remarks that "the right of each is defined by the virtue, or power, of each," so that "men have far greater right against beasts than beasts against men" (Prop. 37, Schol. 1 [p. 399]); and the account of the natural state in the next scholium begins: "Each one exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently by the highest right of nature each one does what follows from the necessity of his own nature" (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]). The *Theological-Political Treatise* gives the argument. Nature considered absolutely "has the highest right to everything it can do, that is, the right of nature extends as far as its power extends; for the power of nature is the very power of God, who has the highest right to everything"; and since the power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all individuals together, "each individual has the highest right to everything it can do." So fish are determined by nature to swim, and the large ones to eat the smaller, and by the highest natural right fish possess the water and the large eat the small (*jus naturae eo usque se extendere, quo usque ejus potentia se extendit*; TTP ch. 16, G III 189). The *Political Treatise* repeats the principle, "each has as much right as he has power" (*unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentia valet*; TP II.8), and applies it to the state, whose body and mind have as much right as they have power (TP III.2).

Edwin Curley, for whom Spinoza is arguably the most Machiavellian of the great modern political philosophers, grants that at first glance he can look like an eccentric Hobbesian. Like Hobbes he imagines a state of nature in which each may do whatever he can, and in which justice and injustice have no place until there is a civil law to obey; but his thesis is stronger than Hobbes's, since it applies to every individual, not only to human beings, and it is not confined to the state of nature (Curley, "Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan," in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, 2nd ed., 2022, pp. 309–312). The argument of the *Treatise*, Curley observes, depends on identifying the power of God with the power of nature, which Spinoza's readers had no reason to grant. He finds a stronger argument in its fourth chapter, where a law in the proper sense is a command that can be disobeyed, and therefore a human command: as far as God or nature is concerned, "what we can do, we may do" (pp. 313–315).

To many readers the thesis has seemed to make right a mere name for force. Curley quotes

Alexandre Matheron's example: a new Genghis Khan who overran a small Spinozist republic would have the right to conquer it, and to oppress its people for as long as fear kept them from resisting; Matheron adds that Spinoza does not mean by this to justify tyranny. Curley agrees, if to justify means to impose on the conquered a duty to submit. But he denies that Spinoza identifies right with power. Spinoza says that right extends as far as power, and the claim has normative force: there is no transcendent standard of justice by which the conqueror's acts can be judged unjust, and that is compatible with judging that he acts against the law of reason (pp. 315–316). The *Ethics* bears the distinction out. In the natural state "sin cannot be conceived," and "just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which explain the nature of the mind" (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]); yet the same Part measures every action by reason, by which "there is no singular thing in the nature of things which is more useful to man than a man who lives from the guidance of reason" (Prop. 35, Cor. 1 [p. 395]). Natural right marks out what nothing forbids; reason, what is good. Étienne Balibar stresses the other edge of the thesis. Since both treatises define right as power, every right except God's is limited, not by a prohibition or an obligation, but by the limits of a real power; and a state that cannot impose its authority on its subjects, by constraint or by consent, has no right over them (Balibar, *Spinoza and Politics*, 1998, ch. 5, section "Power and Freedom"). The principle that seems to license the conqueror also deprives every ruler of a right that outlasts his power.

A contract that binds only while it is useful

The second scholium seems to describe a covenant: men must "give up their natural right and make one another confident that they will do nothing which could lead to harm to another," and the confidence is secured by threats, not by reason (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]; the introduction to Part IV summarizes the argument). The *Theological-Political Treatise* tells the same story as a contract by which men transfer their right to the sovereign. Yet the same chapter lays down that "a contract can have no force except by reason of its utility; when that is taken away, the contract is taken away with it, and remains void" (*pactum nullam vim habere posse, nisi ratione utilitatis, qua sublata pactum simul tollitur, et irritum manet*; TTP ch. 16, G III 192).

Commentators have often concluded, Curley reports, that the contract does no work. If no promise binds without utility, the sovereign's right depends only on his power to persuade his subjects that obedience is in their interest; and the *Political Treatise*, which no longer founds the state on a contract, would show that Spinoza came to see this (Curley, p. 317). Curley himself denies that Spinoza changed his mind in any fundamental way about political legitimacy. Even in the earlier work the contract is odd, since the act of promising cannot by itself give the sovereign authority. Spinoza reconceives it, on Curley's reading, as a transfer not of right but of power, so that a ruler governs with right just so far as his subjects consent to his rule by obeying it (pp. 317–320). The next chapter of the *Treatise* draws the limit at once: "no one will ever be able to transfer his power, and consequently his right, to another in such a way that he ceases to be a man" (*nemo unquam suam potentiam et consequenter neque suum jus ita in alium transferre poterit, ut homo esse desinat*; TTP ch. 17, G III 201). A sovereign would command in vain that a subject hate his benefactor, or not be offended by insults, or not wish to be freed from fear; and what his power cannot reach, his right does not reach either (Curley, p. 323). This is the sense of the remark to Jelles that the Introduction quotes: "I always keep natural right intact," and the supreme magistrate "has no more right over its subjects than in proportion to the power by which it exceeds the subject" (Letter 50 [p. 617]).

The *Ethics* adds what the treatises, which take men as they are, can leave aside. What holds the man led by reason to his agreements is not the promise but reason itself, which cannot advise anyone to make agreements deceptively, since it would then advise all men "not really to have common rights, which is absurd" (Prop. 72, Schol. [p. 447]); the essay on the free man discusses the case. The threats of the second scholium are for the others.

Fear, hope and concord

Balibar reads Prop. 37 as giving two accounts of how a city comes to be. The first demonstration and the first scholium give a rational genesis: men led by reason want for others the good they want for themselves, since nothing is more useful to a man than other men. The alternative demonstration and the second scholium give an affective one, in which a good is loved more constantly when others are imagined to love it too (Prop. 37, second Dem. [p. 399]), and fear restrains those who would otherwise harm one another (Appendix H [p. 686] discusses the two demonstrations as ethics). The affective genesis is real, but ambivalent: the shared love rests on each one's sense of his own impotence, on hope and on fear, and so can change at any moment into its contrary. Balibar's conclusion is that the two are not two kinds of city, an ideal and a real one, but two aspects of a single process: every actual city is founded at once on a rational agreement and on an imagined agreement that needs constraint, and the state obliges individuals to behave as if they lived by reason by working on their passions (Balibar, ch. 5, section "Desire Is Man's Very Essence").

The *Ethics* is candid about the use of fear. Humility and repentance, and with them hope and fear, "bring more advantage than harm"; "The mob is a terror, unless it is afraid," and that is why the prophets commended humility, repentance and reverence (Prop. 54, Schol. [p. 421]). Justin Steinberg takes the passage as an instance of the accommodation that Spinoza demands of any ethics or politics meant for use: where conditions are not ideal, affects that are not good in themselves are to be encouraged (Steinberg, *Spinoza's Political Psychology*, 2018, p. 119). Yet the same Part denies that fear can found an agreement in good faith. "Concord, moreover, is usually begotten from fear, but without good faith" (Part IV, Appendix, ch. 16 [p. 455]); the affects of hope and fear "cannot be good in themselves" (Prop. 47 [p. 415]); and he who does good in order to avoid evil "is not led by reason" (Prop. 63 [p. 433]). Steinberg and Susan James both cite the chapter of the Appendix to mark the limit of fear in politics (Steinberg, p. 92 n. 34; James, *Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics*, 2012, p. 194 n. 28). For Steinberg the security that the state exists to provide is not physical safety only but a condition of social trust, the firm hope of citizens that they will benefit from the order in which they live; a hopeful citizenry is both more stable and more powerful than a fearful one (pp. 92–93). The *Treatise* says as much: the ultimate end of the state "is not to dominate, nor to restrain men by fear and make them subject to another's right, but on the contrary to free each one from fear, so that he may live securely, as far as possible" (*finem ejus ultimum non esse dominari, nec homines metu retinere, et alterius juris facere, sed contra unumquemque metu liberare, ut secure, quoad ejus fieri potest, vivat*; TTP ch. 20, G III 240–241).

What the state is for

The *Treatise* draws its conclusion in the sentence that the introduction to Part IV quotes: "the end of the state, therefore, is really freedom" (*Finis ergo Reipublicae revera libertas est*; TTP ch. 20, G III 241). Just before, it says what this means: the end of the state is not to turn men

from rational beings into beasts or automata, "but on the contrary that their mind and body may perform their functions safely, and that they themselves may use their reason freely, and not contend with hatred, anger or deceit" (G III 241). Which freedom is meant has divided interpreters. On what Steinberg calls the classical liberal interpretation, the freedom of the political works is weaker than the freedom of the *Ethics*: since it would be utopian to expect a society not moved chiefly by passions, freedom in politics means little more than peace, that is, security and harmony, and the state's task is to keep the peace and leave its citizens free to pursue their own desires. Steinberg quotes Douglas Den Uyl for this view, and the *Political Treatise* seems to support it when it says that the end of the civil state "is nothing other than peace and security of life" (*qui scilicet nullus alius est, quam pax, vitaeque securitas*; TP V.2); Balibar takes the change from the earlier treatise to mean that freedom is no longer the declared purpose of the state (ch. 5, section "The Aporia of the Community and the Question of Knowledge"). But the same chapter adds that peace "is not the absence of war, but a virtue that arises from strength of mind" (*Pax enim non belli privatio, sed virtus est, quae ex animi fortitudine oritur*; TP V.4), and that the life it means is a human life, defined "above all by reason, the true virtue and life of the mind" (*maxime ratione, vera Mentis virtute, et vita*; TP V.5). Against the deflationary reading Steinberg defends a thesis of continuity: the state has a single directive, to liberate or empower its citizens as far as possible, so that the aim of politics is continuous with the aim of ethics, and a state can achieve peace and security only by empowering its citizens (Steinberg, pp. 64–65).

The *Ethics* gives each reading something to hold. For the man led by reason the state is the condition of a freer life: he "is not led to obey by fear," but desires, "in order to live more freely, to keep the common laws of the state" (Prop. 73, Dem. [p. 449]), and whatever brings it about that men live harmoniously is useful (Prop. 40 [p. 407]). The state of the second scholium, on the other hand, asks of its citizens obedience, not understanding: sin "is nothing but disobedience," and obedience "is counted as *merit* in a citizen" (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]), and the scholium to Prop. 54 is written for the many who rarely live by reason.

The *Political Treatise* opens by mocking the philosophers who "conceive men not as they are, but as they would like them to be," and so have for the most part written satire instead of ethics, and never conceived a politics that could be put to use (*Homines namque, non ut sunt, sed, ut eosdem esse vellent, concipiunt: unde factum est, ut plerumque pro Ethica Satyram scripserint*; TP I.1). Curley sees in this pragmatic attitude a likeness between Spinoza and Machiavelli more fundamental than any agreement about right and power (Curley, pp. 321–322), though the most important, for him, is their common preference for a republic in which the people check their rulers (p. 325). He also reports Matheron's argument that the criticism, taken strictly, reaches Hobbes too, and finds some justice in it, since Hobbes, in some moods, founds the sovereign's power on men's willingness to stand by their promise come what may (pp. 322–323). The *Ethics* explains why the criticism holds, since men are "necessarily subject to affects" and "inconstant and changeable" (Prop. 37, Schol. 2 [p. 401]); but it also says what such men may become. Those who are subject to humility and repentance "can be led far more easily than others to live, in the end, from the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and to enjoy the life of the blessed" (Prop. 54, Schol. [p. 421]). The treatises show how a state may be built from men as they are; the *Ethics* shows what the best of them can be, and why even he is more free in a state than alone.

Key Concepts

The essays in this book follow the *Ethics* in its own order, Part by Part. The entries below cut across that order. Each takes one of the terms on which the argument turns and follows it from the place where it is defined or first introduced through the Parts that develop, apply or transform it, with links to the passages, so that a reader who meets a word in Part IV can find where its sense was fixed in Part I or II and where it leads in Part V. The entries do not argue a case; they say where to look. The English terms are those of the translation, as the glossary records them, with Spinoza's Latin. The entries are in alphabetical order, and each ends by naming the essays or appendices that treat its subject at length.

Action and passion

The pair *actio* and *passio*, acting and being acted on, runs through the whole book but is defined only at the head of Part III. Part I prepares it: the free thing of Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27] is determined "to act" by itself alone, the compelled thing "to operate" by another. Part III, Def. 2 [p. 231] then says that we act when something follows from our nature of which we are the adequate cause, that is, through which alone it can be clearly and distinctly understood (Def. 1 [p. 231]), and that we are acted on when we are only its partial cause. The definition mentions no will. The theory of ideas of Part II decides instead: the mind acts insofar as it has adequate ideas and is acted on insofar as it has inadequate ones (Part III, Props. 1 [p. 233] and 3 [p. 241]). An affect is an action or a passion by the same test (Def. 3, Expl. [p. 231]), and there are active affects of joy and desire, but none of sadness (Props. 58–59 [p. 309]). Part IV measures the reach of passion. We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature that cannot be conceived through itself (Prop. 2 [p. 361]), and so man is "necessarily always subject to passions" (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]); yet to every action to which a passion determines us, reason could determine us without it (Prop. 59 [p. 427]). Part V turns the definition into a remedy, since a passion ceases to be one as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it (Prop. 3 [p. 475]), and ends by naming the intellect as the part of the mind through which we act and the imagination as the part through which we are acted on (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]). The introduction to Part III treats the definitions at length.

Adequate idea

An adequate idea (*idea adaequata*) is one which, "insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to its object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations, of a true idea" (Part II, Def. 4 [p. 121]). Part I had laid down that a true idea must agree with its object (Part I, Ax. 6 [p. 29]); adequacy is, on Spinoza's own account to Tschirnhaus, the same perfection seen from within the idea (Letter 60; VVL[3] III 199–200), and the explanation expressly sets the extrinsic mark aside (Part II, Def. 4, Expl. [p. 121]). Part II then shows how adequacy is distributed. Every idea is true insofar as it is related to God (Prop. 32 [p. 179]); it is inadequate in a human mind when God has it not only insofar as he constitutes that mind but together with the idea of another thing (Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]), and so the mind's knowledge of itself and of bodies is confused and mutilated whenever it perceives things "from the common order of nature" (Prop. 29, Cor. [p. 175]). Falsity is the privation of knowledge that such ideas involve (Prop. 35 [p. 179]). Yet every human mind has some adequate ideas: of what is common to all things (Prop. 38 [p. 183]), of whatever follows from ideas already adequate in it (Prop. 40 [p. 185]),

and of the eternal and infinite essence of God (Prop. 47 [p. 199]). Part III makes the distinction practical, defining the adequate cause by the same clarity (Def. 1 [p. 231]) and grounding action in adequate ideas and passion in inadequate ones (Prop. 3 [p. 241]). Part IV holds that a man acts from virtue only insofar as he is determined by what he understands (Prop. 23 [p. 383]), and Part V rests its remedies on the claim that we can form some clear and distinct concept of every affection of the body (Prop. 4 [p. 475]). The introduction to Part II discusses the definition and the relation of adequacy to truth.

Affect

Affectus is rendered "affect" so that its tie to *affectio*, "affection," is kept. Part I uses the word only in passing, of those who ascribe human affects to God (Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2 [p. 35]), and Part II counts love and desire among modes of thinking that require an idea of the thing loved or desired (Part II, Ax. 3 [p. 123]). The definition comes in Part III, Def. 3 [p. 231]: affects are affections of the body by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, together with the ideas of these affections. An affect is therefore bodily and mental at once, and an action or a passion according as we are or are not its adequate cause (Def. 3, Expl. [p. 231]). The Preface [p. 229] announces that human actions and appetites will be considered "just as if the question were of lines, planes or bodies." The Part derives every affect from three primary ones, desire, joy and sadness (Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]), and closes with a General Definition [p. 339] of the affect that is a passion of the mind as "a confused idea." Part IV turns on the principle that an affect can be restrained only by a contrary and stronger affect (Prop. 7 [p. 365]), so that the true knowledge of good and evil restrains nothing except insofar as it is considered as an affect (Prop. 14 [p. 373]), and goes on to judge each affect by reason. Part V applies the definition as a remedy: a passion ceases to be a passion once we form a clear and distinct idea of it (Prop. 3 [p. 475]), and the scholium to Prop. 20 [p. 491] gathers the mind's power over the affects under five heads. The introduction to Part III and the essay before the definitions of the affects treat the subject at length.

Blessedness

Beatitudo is named at the start of Part II, which will explain only what can lead us "as if by the hand, to the knowledge of the *human mind* and its highest blessedness" (Part II, Preface [p. 121]), and the last proposition of the book is devoted to it. The scholium closing Part II gives a first account: the doctrine of the will teaches "in what our highest happiness, or blessedness, consists: namely in the knowledge of God alone," and those who expect God to reward their virtue forget that virtue is itself happiness and the highest freedom (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 217]). Part III does not use the word, but it supplies the measure of it, joy being a man's passage from a lesser to a greater perfection (Part III, Def. Aff. 2 [p. 319]). Part IV observes that no one can desire to be blessed who does not desire to be, to act and to live (Prop. 21 [p. 381]), and its Appendix says that blessedness "is nothing but the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God" (ch. 4 [p. 451]). Part V takes "*freedom of mind*, or *blessedness*" as its subject (Preface [p. 469]). If joy is the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness consists in the mind's being endowed with perfection itself (Prop. 33, Schol. [p. 511]); it is identified with salvation and freedom, and placed in a constant and eternal love towards God (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). The last proposition draws the consequence for the ethics of Part IV: "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself" (Prop. 42 [p. 523]). The introduction to Part V and the essay on the

eternity of the mind before Part V, Prop. 21 [p. 503] treat it at length.

Bondage

Servitus gives Part IV its title, *De servitute humana*, and is defined in the first sentence of its Preface: "Man's lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects I call *bondage*." A man subject to the affects is under the control of fortune, and often sees the better and follows the worse (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]). Before Part IV the word occurs only twice, both times in one sentence of the scholium closing Part II, where it is rendered "servitude": those who expect rewards for virtue as if for "the utmost servitude" stray far from the true estimate of virtue, as if "servitude to God" were not happiness itself and the highest freedom (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 217]). Yet the condition was described earlier: the Appendix to Part I traces men's belief in their freedom to their ignorance of causes (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]); Part II shows that the mind perceiving things from the common order of nature has only confused knowledge (Part II, Prop. 29, Cor. [p. 175]); and Part III ends its account of the passions with men driven about by external causes, "like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds" (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]). Part IV explains why bondage cannot be escaped altogether: the force by which a man perseveres in existing is infinitely surpassed by external causes (Prop. 3 [p. 361]), he is necessarily always subject to passions (Prop. 4, Cor. [p. 363]), and a desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil can be restrained by other desires, above all by desires for things present (Props. 15–17 [p. 373]). The scholium to Prop. 66 [p. 437] calls the man led by affect or opinion a slave. Part V turns the popular view round: the multitude think themselves free when they may obey their lust, and bear piety as a servitude for which they hope to be rewarded after death (Part V, Prop. 41, Schol. [p. 523]). The introduction to Part IV treats the subject at length.

Cause

Causa is for Spinoza a principle of explanation as much as of production. The first definition of the book is of cause of itself, "that whose essence involves existence" (Part I, Def. 1 [p. 25]); the axioms bind effect to cause by necessity, and knowledge of the effect to knowledge of the cause (Axs. 3–4 [p. 29]); and the second proof of God's existence requires that for each thing "there must be assigned a cause, or reason" (Prop. 11, second Dem. [p. 41]). God is the efficient cause of all things (Prop. 16, Cor. 1 [p. 65]), the only free cause (Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67]), their immanent, not transitive, cause (Prop. 18 [p. 71]), and their cause "in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself" (Prop. 25, Schol. [p. 77]); each finite thing is determined by another finite cause, and so to infinity (Prop. 28 [p. 79]). Part II confines causation within each attribute: modes have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes (Part II, Prop. 6 [p. 129]), and so body and mind cannot determine one another (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235]). Part III defines the adequate cause, whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it, and makes it the measure of action (Defs. 1–2 [p. 231]). Part IV reduces the final cause to an efficient one, an appetite whose own causes are unknown (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]). Part V states as an axiom that the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause (Part V, Ax. 2 [p. 473]), and calls the mind, insofar as it is eternal, the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge (Prop. 31 [p. 509]), "formal" being equated in the demonstration with "adequate" in the sense of Part III (Prop. 31, Dem. [p. 509]). The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65] discusses God's causality, and Appendix F [p. 677] the principle of sufficient reason behind the equation of cause and reason.

Common notions

Notiones communes are first mentioned in the second scholium to Part I, Prop. 8 [p. 35], which says that if men attended to the nature of substance, the proposition that existence pertains to it would be numbered among the common notions. Their theory belongs to Part II. What is common to all things and equally in the part and in the whole constitutes the essence of no singular thing (Part II, Prop. 37 [p. 183]) and can only be conceived adequately (Prop. 38 [p. 183]), so that there are notions common to all men (Prop. 38, Cor. [p. 183]). The first scholium to Prop. 40 [p. 185] calls these notions "the foundations of our reasoning" and sets them apart from transcendental terms and universals, which arise from images confused in the body; the second makes them, with adequate ideas of the properties of things, the starting point of reason, the second kind of knowledge (Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]). Because they explain no singular essence, they must be conceived "without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity" (Prop. 44, Cor. 2, Dem. [p. 197]). The term does not recur after Part II. Part IV holds that the highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all (Part IV, Prop. 36 [p. 397]), and Part V, which speaks instead of the common properties of things (Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 481]), puts the notions to work. Because what is common to all can only be conceived adequately, there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept (Part V, Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 475]); and affects that arise from reason, being related to common properties that we always contemplate as present, are in time more powerful than those related to things absent (Prop. 7 [p. 479]). The introduction to Part II discusses the common notions with the three kinds of knowledge.

Eternity

Eternity (*aeternitas*) is "existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing" (Part I, Def. 8 [p. 27]), which cannot be explained through duration or time, "even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning and an end" (Def. 8, Expl. [p. 27]). God and all his attributes are eternal (Prop. 19 [p. 71]), as are the infinite modes (Prop. 21 [p. 73]), and "in eternity there is no *when*, *before*, or *after*" (Prop. 33, Schol. 2 [p. 87]). Part II defines duration as "an indefinite continuation of existing" (Part II, Def. 5 [p. 123]), distinguishes the essences of things as contained in God's attributes from their existence in duration (Prop. 8 [p. 133] and Cor. [p. 133]), and introduces the phrase *sub quadam aeternitatis specie*, which Part V shortens to *sub specie aeternitatis*: "It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity" (Prop. 44, Cor. 2 [p. 197]). Part IV understands perfection as reality without any regard to duration (Part IV, Preface [p. 353]), and holds that the mind which conceives things from the dictate of reason is equally affected by the idea of a future, past or present thing (Prop. 62 [p. 431]). Part V applies the doctrine to the mind itself. There is in God an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity (Part V, Prop. 22 [p. 503]), and so something of the mind remains which is eternal (Prop. 23 [p. 503]): "we feel and experience that we are eternal" (Prop. 23, Schol. [p. 503]), though men confuse this eternity with duration (Prop. 34, Schol. [p. 513]). The eternal part of the mind is the intellect (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]), and it is greater in a mind whose body is capable of a great many things (Prop. 39 [p. 519]). The essay on the eternity of the mind before Part V, Prop. 21 [p. 503] and Appendix E [p. 672] treat the doctrine at length.

Final cause

The final cause (*causa finalis*) is the target of the Appendix to Part I. All the prejudices it exposes depend on one, "that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as they themselves do, for the sake of an end"; Spinoza traces this to men's ignorance of causes and their conscious appetite for their own advantage (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]), and argues that the doctrine of ends "entirely overturns nature," and that its defenders finally take refuge in the will of God, "the sanctuary of ignorance" (Appendix [p. 103]). The demonstrations had already excluded it, since everything follows necessarily from God's nature (Prop. 16 [p. 65]) and God does not operate from freedom of the will (Prop. 32, Cor. 1 [p. 85]). Part III, without naming final causes, reverses the order they presuppose: "we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it" (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]). Part IV gives the positive account. Nature acts for no end, since the being we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists; and "what is called a final cause is nothing but human appetite itself, insofar as it is considered as the principle, or primary cause, of some thing," an efficient cause taken for a first one because its own causes are unknown (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]). The definitions accordingly understand by the end for the sake of which we do something nothing but appetite (Def. 7 [p. 357]), and the Appendix can still name the final end of a man led by reason, the desire to conceive adequately himself and all things that fall within his understanding (ch. 4 [p. 451]). The essay before the Appendix to Part I and Appendix D [p. 667] discuss whether Spinoza denies all purposes or only those ascribed to God and nature.

Freedom

The definition of freedom (*libertas*) opposes the free not to the necessary but to the compelled: "That thing will be called *free* which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone" (Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27]). In this sense "God alone is a free cause" (Prop. 17, Cor. 2 [p. 67]), though he does not operate from freedom of the will (Prop. 32, Cor. 1 [p. 85]); Spinoza told a correspondent that he placed freedom "not in a free decree, but in a free necessity" (Letter 58 [p. 623]). The freedom men commonly claim rests on ignorance: they think themselves free because they are conscious of their actions and appetites and ignorant of their causes (Part I, Appendix [p. 101]; Part II, Prop. 35, Schol. [p. 181]; Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]), and there is in the mind no absolute, or free, will (Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207]). Human freedom is freedom in the sense of the definition, possessed in degrees: a man is free insofar as he is the adequate cause of what he does, that is, insofar as he has adequate ideas (Part III, Prop. 3 [p. 241]). Part IV calls the man led by reason free and the man led by affect a slave (Prop. 66, Schol. [p. 437]), portrays the free man in its last seven propositions, and declares the hypothesis that men are born free to be false (Prop. 68, Schol. [p. 443]). Part V, "Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom," shows what the intellect can do against the affects, and places "our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom" in a constant and eternal love towards God (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65] and the essays on will and intellect and on the free man treat freedom at length.

Free man

The free man (*homo liber*) is usually taken to be the figure announced in the Preface to Part IV, where Spinoza keeps the words "good" and "evil" because "we desire to form an idea of man, as

a model of human nature which we may look to" (Part IV, Preface [p. 353]); Spinoza does not make the identification himself, and Appendix H [p. 686] considers it. The figure takes its sense from the definition of freedom in Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27], and Part IV puts it briefly: "he is free who is led by reason alone" (Part IV, Prop. 68, Dem. [p. 443]). The scholium to Prop. 66 [p. 437] introduces him by contrast with the slave, who "whether he will or not, does the things of which he is most ignorant." The free man thinks of nothing less than of death (Prop. 67 [p. 443]). If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil (Prop. 68 [p. 443]); the scholium declares the hypothesis false, and reads the story of the first man as signifying what has been shown (Prop. 68, Schol. [p. 443]). The free man's virtue is as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them (Prop. 69 [p. 445]); he strives to decline the favours of the ignorant (Prop. 70 [p. 445]); only free men are most grateful to one another (Prop. 71 [p. 447]); he never acts deceptively (Prop. 72 [p. 447]); and he is more free in a state than in solitude (Prop. 73 [p. 449]). The closing scholium (Prop. 73, Schol. [p. 449]) refers all this to strength of character, that is, to the tenacity and nobility defined in Part III, Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]. The term does not return in Part V, but the wise man of its last scholium, "conscious of himself, and of God, and of things by a certain eternal necessity," recalls the figure (Part V, Prop. 42, Schol. [p. 523]). The essay on the free man before Part IV, Prop. 67 [p. 443] treats the portrait at length, and Appendix H [p. 686] the question whether the free man is possible.

God, or nature

The formula *Deus seu natura* occurs only in Part IV, in the Preface and in the demonstration of Prop. 4, but the identification it states is made in Part I. God is "a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes" (Part I, Def. 6 [p. 27]); he necessarily exists (Prop. 11 [p. 41]), he is the only substance (Prop. 14 [p. 47]), and whatever is, is in him (Prop. 15 [p. 49]). The scholium to Prop. 29 [p. 81] distinguishes *Natura naturans*, God considered as a free cause, from *Natura naturata*, all the modes that follow from him, and so gives "nature" a sense wide enough to cover both. Part II shows that God is a thinking thing and an extended thing (Part II, Props. 1–2 [p. 125]), and conceives the whole of nature as one individual whose parts vary in infinitely many ways without any change of the whole (Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155]). The Preface to Part III insists that "nature is always the same," its power of acting everywhere one and the same (Part III, Preface [p. 229]). Part IV uses the formula to draw two consequences: "that eternal and infinite being which we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity by which it exists," and so for no end (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]); and the power by which a man preserves his being is "the very power of God, or nature" (Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 361]). Part V speaks of God in the language of love, as the object of the mind's intellectual love and as loving himself with an infinite intellectual love (Part V, Props. 35–36 [p. 513]). The introduction to Part I and the essay before Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65] discuss what Spinoza means by God, and Appendix A [p. 657] and Appendix B [p. 660] how his modes and his attributes are related to him.

Good and evil

Bonum and *malum* are first discussed in the Appendix to Part I, among the notions men formed after persuading themselves that everything happens for their sake; such notions are "only modes of imagining," which indicate the constitution of the imagination and not the nature of anything (Part I, Appendix [p. 109]). Part III gives them a psychological origin: "we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it" (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]), and

by good Spinoza understands "every kind of joy, and whatever, further, leads to it," so that "each judges, or evaluates, from his own affect what is good, what evil" (Prop. 39, Schol. [p. 283]). The Preface to Part IV repeats that good and evil indicate nothing positive in things, yet keeps the words, calling good what we certainly know to be a means of approaching nearer to the model of human nature we set before ourselves (Part IV, Preface [p. 353]). The definitions make good what we certainly know to be useful to us, and evil what we certainly know prevents us from possessing some good (Defs. 1–2 [p. 355]). The knowledge of good and evil is itself an affect of joy or sadness of which we are conscious (Prop. 8 [p. 367]). Reason narrows the certain good to what leads to understanding (Prop. 27 [p. 387]) and places the highest good of the mind in the knowledge of God (Prop. 28 [p. 387]); the knowledge of evil is inadequate (Prop. 64 [p. 433]). Part V advises us, in ordering our thoughts, to attend to what is good in each thing, so as to be determined to act from joy (Part V, Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 483]). The essay before the Appendix to Part I treats the origin of these notions, and the introductions to Parts III and IV their definitions.

Imagination

Imaginatio is defined in Part II, but Part I already sets it against understanding: we divide quantity into parts when we attend to it "as it is in the imagination" (Part I, Prop. 15, Schol. [p. 51]), and the notions by which the common people explain nature are "only modes of imagining" (Appendix [p. 109]). Part II, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 161] calls the affections of the body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us "images of things," and says that when the mind contemplates bodies in this way it imagines. Imagination thus covers sense perception as well as fancy, and "the *imaginations of the mind*, considered in themselves, contain no error." Memory follows the order of the affections of the body, not that of the intellect (Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 165]); imagination gives its name to the first kind of knowledge, which comprises knowledge from random experience and from signs and is the only cause of falsity (Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]; Prop. 41 [p. 189]); and it depends on the imagination alone that we contemplate things as contingent (Prop. 44, Cor. 1 [p. 195]). Part III builds the passions from it: the mind strives to imagine whatever increases or aids the body's power of acting (Part III, Prop. 12 [p. 249]), and hope and fear arise from the image of a thing of doubtful outcome (Prop. 18, Schol. 2 [p. 259]). Part IV explains why knowing the truth does not remove an imagination, as the sun still looks near when we know its distance (Part IV, Prop. 1, Schol. [p. 359]). Part V sets the order of the intellect against it (Part V, Prop. 10 [p. 483]), confines imagination and memory to the duration of the body (Prop. 21 [p. 503]), and identifies the imagination as the part of the mind that perishes (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]). The introduction to Part II treats the theory at length.

Intellectual love of God

The *amor Dei intellectualis* is named in Part V, Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511], but its elements are prepared from Part I on. Part I refers love, with intellect, will and desire, to *Natura naturata* and not to *Natura naturans* (Part I, Prop. 31 [p. 83]). Part III defines love as "joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (Part III, Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 251]). Part IV makes the knowledge of God the mind's highest good (Part IV, Prop. 28 [p. 387]). Part V first derives a love of God from the remedies: he who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God (Part V, Prop. 15 [p. 489]), and this love must occupy the mind most (Prop. 16 [p. 489]). Yet God is without passions (Prop. 17 [p. 489]): "Strictly speaking, God loves no one and hates no one" (Prop. 17, Cor. [p. 489]). The intellectual love arises from the third kind of knowledge,

whose delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (Prop. 32 [p. 511]); it is the love of God not insofar as we imagine him as present but insofar as we understand him to be eternal (Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511]), and it is itself eternal (Prop. 33 [p. 511]). God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love (Prop. 35 [p. 513]), of which the mind's intellectual love towards God is part (Prop. 36 [p. 515]), so that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same (Prop. 36, Cor. [p. 515]). In this love our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). The introduction to Part V explains how this love differs from the love that God, strictly speaking, does not have, and the essay on the eternity of the mind before Part V, Prop. 21 [p. 503] places it in the second half of the Part.

Joy, sadness and desire

Laetitia, *tristitia* and *cupiditas* are the three primary affects of Part III, from which all the others are derived (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]). Desire is defined first. The striving of each thing to persevere in its being is called appetite when it is related to mind and body together, and "desire is appetite together with consciousness of it" (Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]). Joy and sadness are the passions by which the mind passes to a greater or a lesser perfection (Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]), and the definitions of the affects insist that they are passages, not states: "joy is not perfection itself" (Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]). Desire is there redefined as "the very essence of man, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something" (Def. Aff. 1 [p. 319]). Love and hatred are joy and sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 251]), and the other affects follow; there are also active affects of joy and desire, but none of sadness (Props. 58–59 [p. 309]). Part IV evaluates them. A desire arising from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than one arising from sadness (Part IV, Prop. 18 [p. 377]); joy is not directly evil but good, and sadness directly evil (Prop. 41 [p. 407]); "the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass" (Prop. 45, Schol. 2 [p. 411]); and a desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive (Prop. 61 [p. 431]). Part V ends with the joy that accompanies the third kind of knowledge, from which the intellectual love of God arises (Part V, Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511]), and with blessedness, which is not a passage to perfection but the possession of it (Prop. 33, Schol. [p. 511]). The introduction to Part III treats the primary affects at length.

Mind

Mens is the subject of Part II, which will lead us to "the knowledge of the *human mind* and its highest blessedness" (Part II, Preface [p. 121]). Part I has made the thinking thing an attribute of God or an affection of one (Part I, Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]). Part II defines the human mind as an idea: "The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing" (Part II, Prop. 11 [p. 139]). The mind is therefore part of the infinite intellect of God (Prop. 11, Cor. [p. 139]), and the thing of which it is the idea is a body (Prop. 13 [p. 141]). A mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways (Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]), and minds differ as their bodies differ in what they can do and undergo (Prop. 13, Schol. [p. 143]). The mind knows its body, and itself, only through the ideas of the body's affections (Props. 19 [p. 165] and 23 [p. 169]). Part III concludes that neither mind nor body can determine the other (Part III, Prop. 2 [p. 235]), that whatever increases the body's power of acting increases the mind's power of thinking (Prop. 11 [p. 247]), and that the mind acts insofar as it has adequate ideas (Prop. 3 [p. 241]). Part IV places the mind's

highest good and highest virtue in the knowledge of God (Part IV, Prop. 28 [p. 387]). Part V shows that something of the mind remains which is eternal (Part V, Prop. 23 [p. 503]), namely the intellect, while the imagination perishes (Prop. 40, Cor. [p. 521]), and says that "the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone" (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]). The introduction to Part II, the essay on the physical digression and Appendix C [p. 663] treat the mind and its body at length.

Necessity

Necessity (*necessitas*) is first defined by contrast: a free thing exists "from the necessity of its own nature alone," while a thing determined by another is called "*necessary*, or rather *compelled*" (Part I, Def. 7 [p. 27]). Part I then makes it universal. From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily (Ax. 3 [p. 29]); from the necessity of the divine nature infinitely many things follow in infinitely many modes (Prop. 16 [p. 65]), as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles (Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]); nothing in the nature of things is contingent (Prop. 29 [p. 81]); and things could have been produced in no other way and in no other order (Prop. 33 [p. 85]). A thing is called contingent "for no other reason than a defect in our knowledge" (Prop. 33, Schol. 1 [p. 87]). Part II extends necessity to thought, inadequate ideas following "with the same necessity" as adequate ones (Part II, Prop. 36 [p. 181]), and makes it the nature of reason to contemplate things as necessary (Prop. 44 [p. 195]); its closing scholium teaches us to bear both faces of fortune with an equal mind (Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 217]). The Preface to Part III [p. 229] applies the same necessity to the affects. Part IV defines the contingent and the possible by what we find, or do not know, when we attend to the essence of singular things or to their causes (Part IV, Defs. 3–4 [p. 355]), and observes that an affect towards a thing imagined as necessary is the more intense (Prop. 11 [p. 369]). Part V makes the understanding of necessity a remedy: "Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects" (Part V, Prop. 6 [p. 479]). The essay before Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65] and Appendix D [p. 667] treat the question at length.

Perfection

Perfectio is joined to reality in Part I's proof that God exists: things produced by external causes owe "all the perfection, or reality, they have" to those causes, and perfection "does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary posits it" (Part I, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 43]). The Appendix denies that things are more or less perfect because they please or offend us, for "the perfection of things is to be judged from their nature and power alone" (Appendix [p. 109]). Part II makes the equation a definition: "By *reality* and *perfection* I understand the same thing" (Part II, Def. 6 [p. 123]). Part III uses it to define the primary passions, joy and sadness being the mind's passage to a greater or a lesser perfection (Part III, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]), a passage and not perfection itself (Def. Aff. 3, Expl. [p. 319]). The Preface to Part IV explains how the words arose, from comparing works with the aims of their makers and natural things with universal models, and calls perfection and imperfection "only modes of thinking" (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]). It keeps them nonetheless: men are more or less perfect as they come nearer to the model of human nature or are further from it, and to pass to a greater perfection is not to be changed into another essence but to have one's power of acting increased (Preface [p. 353]). Part V carries the notion to its limit. If joy is the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness consists in the mind's being endowed with perfection itself (Part V, Prop. 33, Schol. [p. 511]), and the more perfection a

thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on (Prop. 40 [p. 521]). The introductions to Parts I and IV discuss the equation of perfection with reality.

Power

Power (*potentia*) enters the *Ethics* with the third proof of God's existence: "To be able not to exist is lack of power, and conversely, to be able to exist is power" (Part I, Prop. 11, third Dem. [p. 43]). Part I ends by identifying God's power with his essence (Prop. 34 [p. 91]), so that whatever we conceive to be in his power necessarily is (Prop. 35 [p. 91]) and nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow (Prop. 36 [p. 93]). Spinoza distinguishes *potentia* from *potestas*, what lies within someone's power; both are rendered "power," with notes where the difference matters, as at Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]. Part II makes God's power of thinking equal to his actual power of acting (Part II, Prop. 7, Cor. [p. 129]). In Part III each singular thing expresses God's power in a certain and determinate way, and its power, or striving, to persevere in its being is its actual essence (Part III, Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 243]; Prop. 7, Dem. [p. 243]); affects are changes in the body's power of acting (Def. 3 [p. 231]). Part IV defines bondage as lack of power (Part IV, Preface [p. 351]), measures human power against external causes, which infinitely surpass it (Prop. 3 [p. 361]), makes a man's power a part of the infinite power of God, or nature (Prop. 4, Dem. [p. 361]), and identifies virtue with power (Def. 8 [p. 357]). Part V, whose title names the power of the intellect, holds that the power of the mind is defined by understanding alone (Part V, Preface [p. 469]), and ends by showing how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant (Prop. 42, Schol. [p. 523]). The introduction to Part I and the essay before Part I, Prop. 16 [p. 65] discuss God's power, and the introduction to Part III the power of things to persevere.

Reason

Reason (*ratio*), as a kind of knowledge, is defined in the second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40 [p. 189]: knowledge that arises "from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things," which Spinoza calls "reason, and knowledge of the second kind." In Part I the word often means a ground, as in the formula "a cause, or reason" of Part I, Prop. 11, second Dem. [p. 41]. Reason is necessarily true (Part II, Prop. 41 [p. 189]); it contemplates things not as contingent but as necessary (Prop. 44 [p. 195]), and under a certain species of eternity (Prop. 44, Cor. 2 [p. 197]). Part III introduces its dictates: tenacity and nobility are desires by which each strives, "from the dictate of reason alone," to preserve his being and to join others to himself in friendship (Part III, Prop. 59, Schol. [p. 311]). Part IV states those dictates in advance, that each love himself, seek his own advantage and strive to preserve his being (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]), and then demonstrates them: whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding (Prop. 26 [p. 385]); men always agree in nature only insofar as they live from the guidance of reason (Prop. 35 [p. 393]); and to every action to which a passion determines us, reason could determine us without it (Prop. 59 [p. 427]). Its Appendix places man's highest happiness in perfecting "the intellect, or reason" (ch. 4 [p. 451]). Part V treats "the *power of reason*" (Part V, Preface [p. 469]), shows that affects arising from reason are, if account is taken of time, the more powerful (Prop. 7 [p. 479]), and that the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge can arise from the second kind, though not from the first (Prop. 28 [p. 507]). The introductions to Parts II and IV treat reason at length.

Self-contentment

Acquiescentia in se ipso, "self-contentment," and *animi acquiescentia*, "contentment of mind," name a joy in which the mind comes to rest in itself. Part III introduces it as "joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause" (Part III, Prop. 30, Schol. [p. 271]), more exactly the joy that arises from the contemplation of ourselves (Prop. 55, Schol. [p. 303]), and defines it as "joy arising from a man's contemplating himself and his power of acting" (Def. Aff. 25 [p. 327]), the opposite of humility (Def. Aff. 26, Expl. [p. 329]). Part IV shows that self-contentment can arise from reason, and that only the self-contentment which so arises is the greatest there can be (Part IV, Prop. 52 [p. 419]); the scholium calls it "in truth the highest thing we can hope for" (Prop. 52, Schol. [p. 419]). The Appendix to Part IV identifies blessedness with "the very contentment of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God" (ch. 4 [p. 451]), and its last chapter says that the better part of us, which is defined by understanding, will be entirely content once it understands that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow (ch. 32 [p. 459]). Part V derives "the greatest contentment of mind there can be" from the third kind of knowledge (Part V, Prop. 27 [p. 507]); it says that the intellectual love of God, whether related to God or to the mind, can rightly be called contentment of mind, which is not distinguished from glory (Prop. 36, Schol. [p. 515]); and it closes by contrasting the ignorant man, who never possesses true contentment of mind, with the wise man, who always possesses it (Prop. 42, Schol. [p. 523]). The introduction to Part IV discusses self-contentment among the affects that reason approves.

Striving

Conatus, rendered "striving" (the Latin is also used in the notes and essays), is the centre of Part III, but its ground is laid earlier. Part I ends with the claim that nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow (Part I, Prop. 36 [p. 93]), and the physical digression of Part II gives the corresponding law of bodies: a body in motion moves until another determines it to rest, and a body at rest remains at rest until another determines it to motion (Part II, Lemma 3, Cor. [p. 151]). Part III states the doctrine. No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause (Part III, Prop. 4 [p. 241]); "Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Prop. 6 [p. 243]), because singular things express God's power in a certain and determinate way (Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 243]); and this striving is "nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself" (Prop. 7 [p. 243]), involving an indefinite time, not a finite one (Prop. 8 [p. 245]). Related to the mind alone it is called will, related to mind and body together appetite, and appetite with consciousness of it is desire (Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]). Part IV builds its ethics on it: reason demands that each strive to preserve his own being (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]); "The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue" (Prop. 22, Cor. [p. 383]); no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing (Prop. 25 [p. 385]); and whatever we strive for from reason is understanding (Prop. 26 [p. 385]). Part V names the end of the mind's striving: "The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge" (Part V, Prop. 25 [p. 505]). The introduction to Part III treats the doctrine at length, and Appendix G [p. 680] the questions it raises.

Substance, attribute and mode

Substantia, *attributum* and *modus* are defined together at the head of Part I. Substance is "what is in itself and is conceived through itself" (Part I, Def. 3 [p. 25]); an attribute is "what the intellect

perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence" (Def. 4 [p. 25]); and a mode is an affection of a substance, "that which is in another, through which it is also conceived" (Def. 5 [p. 25]). The first half of Part I argues that there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (Prop. 5 [p. 31]), that the real distinction of attributes does not make them distinct substances (Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 39]), and that except God no substance can be or be conceived (Prop. 14 [p. 47]). Thought and extension are therefore attributes of God or affections of his attributes (Prop. 14, Cor. 2 [p. 47]), and particular things are modes expressing God's attributes in a certain and determinate way (Prop. 25, Cor. [p. 77]). Part II applies the scheme to man: the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, which is constituted by certain modifications of God's attributes (Part II, Prop. 10 [p. 135] and Cor. [p. 137]); and a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two ways (Prop. 7, Schol. [p. 131]). Part III restates this of mind and body (Part III, Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]) and grounds striving in the status of singular things as modes (Prop. 6, Dem. [p. 243]); Part IV infers that a man cannot but be a part of nature (Part IV, Prop. 4 [p. 361]); and Part V distinguishes conceiving things in relation to a time and place from conceiving them as contained in God (Part V, Prop. 29, Schol. [p. 509]). The introduction to Part I treats the definitions at length, Appendix A [p. 657] the relation of substance to mode, and Appendix B [p. 660] the attributes.

Three kinds of knowledge

The kinds of knowledge (*cognitionis genera*) are distinguished in the second scholium to Part II, Prop. 40 [p. 189]. The first, "opinion, or imagination," comprises knowledge from random experience and from signs; the second, "reason," proceeds from common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things; the third, "intuitive knowledge" (*scientia intuitiva*), "proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." The first kind is the only cause of falsity, the second and third are necessarily true (Prop. 41 [p. 189]), and the third rests on the adequate knowledge of God's essence that every human mind has (Prop. 47 [p. 199] and Schol. [p. 199]). Part III does not name the kinds, but its distinction between action and passion rests on that between adequate and inadequate ideas (Part III, Prop. 3 [p. 241]); Part IV turns it into the contrast between the man led by affect or opinion and the man led by reason (Part IV, Prop. 66, Schol. [p. 437]), and its Appendix places blessedness in the contentment that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God (ch. 4 [p. 451]). Part V puts the third kind to work. The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God (Part V, Prop. 24 [p. 505]); to understand by the third kind is the mind's highest striving and highest virtue (Prop. 25 [p. 505]); the desire for it can arise from the second kind but not from the first (Prop. 28 [p. 507]); it depends on the mind as its formal cause insofar as the mind is eternal (Prop. 31 [p. 509]); and from it arise the greatest contentment of mind (Prop. 27 [p. 507]) and the intellectual love of God (Prop. 32, Cor. [p. 511]). The introduction to Part II and the essay on the eternity of the mind treat the doctrine at length.

Virtue

Virtus first appears in the sense of causal power, and in Part I, Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 43] the translation renders it "power," with a note. The scholium closing Part II uses it in the ethical sense, rebuking those who expect God to reward their virtue, "as if virtue itself and servitude to God were not happiness itself and the highest freedom" (Part II, Prop. 49, Schol. [p. 217]). The Preface to Part III speaks of nature's "virtue and power of acting" as everywhere one and

the same (Part III, Preface [p. 229]). Part IV joins the two senses by definition: "By *virtue* and *power* I understand the same thing," virtue in man being his very essence insofar as he has the power of bringing about what can be understood through the laws of his nature alone (Part IV, Def. 8 [p. 357]). The dictates of reason follow: the foundation of virtue is the striving to preserve one's own being, and virtue is to be desired for its own sake (Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]); the more each one seeks his own advantage, the more he is endowed with virtue (Prop. 20 [p. 381]); a man acts from virtue only insofar as he understands (Prop. 23 [p. 383]); and "the highest virtue of the mind is to know God" (Prop. 28 [p. 387]). The same standard decides which affects are virtues: humility and repentance are not, since they do not arise from reason (Props. 53–54 [p. 419]), and the virtue of a free man is as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them (Prop. 69 [p. 445]). Part V makes understanding by the third kind of knowledge the mind's highest virtue (Part V, Prop. 25 [p. 505]), and ends: "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself" (Prop. 42 [p. 523]). The introduction to Part IV treats virtue at length, and Appendix H [p. 686] the question whether its ethics is egoistic.

Will

Will (*voluntas*) is in the *Ethics* chiefly the object of a denial. Part I refuses it to God's nature: if intellect and will pertained to God, they would agree with ours in nothing except the name, as the Dog, a heavenly constellation, agrees with the dog, a barking animal (Part I, Prop. 17, Schol. [p. 67]). Will belongs to *Natura naturata* (Prop. 31 [p. 83]), it is a necessary and not a free cause (Prop. 32 [p. 85]), and "God does not operate from freedom of the will" (Prop. 32, Cor. 1 [p. 85]); the Appendix calls the will of God, in which the defenders of final causes take refuge, "the sanctuary of ignorance" (Appendix [p. 103]). Part II denies that there is any absolute, or free, will in the mind (Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207]), treats the faculty of willing as a universal formed from singular volitions (Prop. 48, Schol. [p. 207]), and identifies each volition with the affirmation or negation an idea involves (Prop. 49 [p. 209]), concluding: "Will and intellect are one and the same" (Prop. 49, Cor. [p. 209]). Part III gives the word a second sense, the striving to persevere "when it is related to the mind alone" (Part III, Prop. 9, Schol. [p. 245]), and argues that the decrees of the mind "are nothing but the appetites themselves" (Prop. 2, Schol. [p. 235]). Part IV accordingly speaks not of what the will chooses but of what reason demands (Part IV, Prop. 18, Schol. [p. 377]). Part V rejects in its Preface the view of the Stoics, and of Descartes, that the will can acquire absolute dominion over the affects (Part V, Preface [p. 469]), and seeks the mind's power over them in understanding instead. The essay on will and intellect before Part II, Prop. 48 [p. 207] treats the doctrine at length.

Summary Tables

These tables set out in summary four structures that the *Ethics* builds over many pages: the order of what exists, from substance to singular things; the derivation of the affects from desire, joy and sadness; the three kinds of knowledge; and the remedies for the affects that Part V gathers in one scholium. They are aids to finding one's way, not substitutes for the text: each row gives the passage where the matter is stated, and the wording in the third column is abbreviated from it.

The order of being

Part I distinguishes substance, its attributes and its modes (Defs. 3–5 [p. 25]), and then the modes that follow from God's nature without limit from those that are finite. Spinoza names an example of each kind of infinite mode in a letter, at Tschirnhaus's request (Letter 64 [p. 631]).

Level	*What it is*	*Where stated*	*Examples*
Substance	what is in itself and is conceived through itself; there is only one, God	Part I, Def. 3 [p. 25]; Prop. 14 [p. 47]	God, or nature (Part IV, Preface [p. 351])
Attributes	what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence; God consists of infinite attributes	Part I, Def. 4 [p. 25]; Def. 6 [p. 27]	thought and extension, the two we know (Part II, Ax. 5 [p. 123]; Props. 1–2 [p. 125])
Immediate infinite modes	what follows from the absolute nature of an attribute, eternal and infinite	Part I, Prop. 21 [p. 73]	in thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in extension, motion and rest (Letter 64 [p. 631])
Mediate infinite modes	what follows from an attribute modified by such a mode, necessary and infinite	Part I, Prop. 22 [p. 75]	the face of the whole universe, which varies in infinite ways yet remains the same (Letter 64 [p. 631]; Part II, Lemma 7, Schol. [p. 155])
Finite modes	singular things, each determined to exist and act by another finite cause, and so to infinity	Part I, Prop. 28 [p. 79]; Part II, Def. 7 [p. 123]	a human body and the mind that is its idea (Part II, Props. 11–13 [p. 139])

The affects and their derivation

Part III recognizes three primary affects, desire, joy and sadness (Prop. 11, Schol. [p. 247]), and defines the others from them (Definitions of the Affects [p. 319]). The tables follow the definitions, grouped by the primary affect each one is a form of; the affects defined from love

or hatred are listed with joy and sadness, since love is a joy and hatred a sadness. Wonder and contempt (Def. Aff. 4–5 [p. 321]) are defined as imaginations, and Spinoza does not number wonder among the affects (Def. Aff. 4, Expl. [p. 321]).

Def.	*Affect*	*A joy ...*
2 [p. 319]	joy	a passage from a lesser to a greater perfection
6 [p. 321]	love	accompanied by the idea of an external cause
8 [p. 323]	inclination	accompanied by the idea of what is accidentally its cause
11 [p. 323]	mockery	from imagining something we despise in a thing we hate
12 [p. 323]	hope	inconstant, from a future or past thing of doubtful outcome
14 [p. 325]	confidence	from such a thing when the cause of doubt is removed
16 [p. 325]	gladness	from a past thing that turned out contrary to expectation
25 [p. 327]	self-contentment	from contemplating oneself and one's power of acting
30 [p. 331]	glory	from an action of ours we imagine others to praise
10 [p. 323]	devotion	love towards one whom we wonder at
19 [p. 327]	favour	love towards one who has done good to another
21 [p. 327]	overestimation	thinking more highly of someone than is just, out of love
24 [p. 327]	compassion	love rejoicing in another's good, saddened by another's ill
28 [p. 329]	pride	thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of self-love

Def.	*Affect*	*A sadness ...*
3 [p. 319]	sadness	a passage from a greater to a lesser perfection
7 [p. 323]	hatred	accompanied by the idea of an external cause
9 [p. 323]	aversion	accompanied by the idea of what is accidentally its cause
13 [p. 323]	fear	inconstant, from a future or past thing of doubtful outcome
15 [p. 325]	despair	from such a thing when the cause of doubt is removed
17 [p. 325]	remorse	from a past thing that turned out contrary to expectation

Def.	*Affect*	*A sadness ...*
18 [p. 325]	pity	from an evil that has happened to another like us
26 [p. 329]	humility	from contemplating one's lack of power, or weakness
27 [p. 329]	repentance	from a deed we believe we did from a free decree of the mind
29 [p. 331]	self-abasement	thinking less highly of oneself than is just, out of sadness
31 [p. 331]	shame	from an action of ours we imagine others to blame
20 [p. 327]	indignation	hatred towards one who has done evil to another
22 [p. 327]	scorn	thinking less highly of someone than is just, out of hatred
23 [p. 327]	envy	hatred saddened by another's happiness, rejoicing in his ill

Def.	*Affect*	*A desire ...*
1 [p. 319]	desire	the very essence of man, determined to do something
32 [p. 333]	longing	to possess a thing, fostered and restrained by memory
33 [p. 333]	emulation	for a thing, because we imagine others to desire it
34 [p. 333]	thankfulness	to do good to one who has done good to us from love
35 [p. 333]	benevolence	to do good to one we pity
36 [p. 335]	anger	from hatred, to do evil to one we hate
37 [p. 335]	vengeance	from reciprocal hatred, to do evil to one who has harmed us
38 [p. 335]	cruelty	to do evil to one whom we love or pity
39 [p. 335]	timidity	to avoid a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser
40 [p. 335]	daring	to act in a danger which one's equals fear to face
41 [p. 335]	cowardice	restrained by timidity before a danger one's equals dare to face
42 [p. 335]	consternation	to avoid an evil, restrained by wonder at the evil feared
43 [p. 337]	courtesy	to do what pleases men and omit what displeases them
44 [p. 337]	ambition	an immoderate desire for glory
45 [p. 337]	gluttony	an immoderate desire, or love, of feasting

Def.	*Affect*	*A desire ...*
46 [p. 337]	drunkenness	an immoderate desire and love of drinking
47 [p. 337]	greed	an immoderate desire and love of riches
48 [p. 337]	lust	a desire and love in the joining of bodies

The three kinds of knowledge

Part II distinguishes the kinds of knowledge in one scholium and illustrates them all with a single example: three numbers are given, and a fourth is sought which is to the third as the second is to the first (Part II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2 [p. 189]).

Kind	*Name*	*Arises from*	*The example*	*Truth*
First	opinion, or imagination	singulars presented confusedly through the senses (random experience), and signs	merchants multiply the second by the third and divide by the first, because a teacher told them so or because it held in simple cases	the only cause of falsity (Prop. 41 [p. 189])
Second	reason	common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things	from the demonstration of Euclid, Book VII, Prop. 19, the common property of proportionals	necessarily true; teaches us to distinguish the true from the false (Props. 41–42 [p. 189])
Third	intuitive knowledge	an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God, proceeding to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things	given 1, 2 and 3, everyone sees at a glance that the fourth is 6	necessarily true; the mind's highest striving and virtue (Part V, Prop. 25 [p. 505])

The remedies for the affects

At the close of the first half of Part V, Spinoza sums up what the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects (Part V, Prop. 20, Schol. [p. 491]).

	The power of the mind over the affects consists ...	*Where shown*
1	in the knowledge itself of the affects	Part V, Prop. 4, Schol. [p. 477]
2	in separating the affects from the thought of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly	Prop. 2 [p. 475]; Prop. 4, Schol. [p. 477]
3	in time, by which affections related to things we understand surpass those related to things conceived confusedly	Prop. 7 [p. 479]
4	in the multitude of causes by which affections related to the common properties of things, or to God, are fostered	Props. 9 [p. 481] and 11 [p. 487]
5	in the order in which the mind can order its affects and connect them with one another	Prop. 10, Schol. [p. 483]; Props. 12–14 [p. 487]

The second half of Part V shows what the mind can do insofar as it is related to itself alone, without relation to the body; the essay before Part V, Prop. 21 follows it.

Synopsis of the Propositions

The enunciation of every proposition of the *Ethics*, with the lemmas of the physical digression in Part II (L1–L7), in the order of the text; the page on which each begins is given at the right.

First Part of the Ethics: Of God

1 Substance is prior in nature to its affections. . . . 29
2 Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another. . . . 31
3 Of things that have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other. 31
4 Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by a diversity of the attributes of the substances or by a diversity of their affections. . . . 31
5 In the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute. 31
6 One substance cannot be produced by another substance. . . . 33
7 It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist. . . . 33
8 Every substance is necessarily infinite. . . . 35
9 The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it. . . . 39
10 Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself. . . . 39
11 God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. . . . 41
12 No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that the substance can be divided. . . . 45
13 A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible. . . . 45
14 Except God, no substance can be or be conceived. . . . 47
15 Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God. . . . 49
16 From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite modes (that is, everything that can fall under an infinite intellect). . . . 65
17 God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one. . . . 65
18 God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. . . . 71
19 God, or all of God's attributes, are eternal. . . . 71
20 God's existence and his essence are one and the same. . . . 71
21 All the things that follow from the absolute nature of any of God's attributes have had to exist always and as infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite. . . . 73
22 Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which, through the same attribute, exists both necessarily and as infinite, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite. . . . 75
23 Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists both necessarily and as infinite. . . . 75
24 The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence. . . . 75
25 God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence. . . . 77
26 A thing which has been determined to produce some effect has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to operate. . . . 77
27 A thing which has been determined by God to produce some effect cannot render itself undetermined. . . . 79
28 Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined to exist and to operate by another,

	which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on to infinity.	79
29	In the nature of things there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to operate in a certain way.	81
30	An intellect, actually finite or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else.	83
31	The actual intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans*.	83
32	The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.	85
33	Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than that in which they have been produced.	85
34	God's power is his very essence.	91
35	Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily is.	91
36	Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.	93

SECOND PART OF THE ETHICS: OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

1	*Thought* is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.	125
2	*Extension* is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.	125
3	In God there is necessarily an idea both of his essence and of all things that necessarily follow from his essence.	125
4	The idea of God, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many ways, can only be unique.	127
5	The formal being of ideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of God's attributes and of singular things admit as their efficient cause not the objects themselves, or the things perceived, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.	127
6	The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other.	129
7	The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.	129
8	The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God's infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God's attributes.	133
9	The idea of a singular thing actually existing has God for its cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing actually existing, of which God is also the cause insofar as he is affected by another, third idea, and so on to infinity.	135
10	The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.	135
11	The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of some singular thing actually existing.	139
12	Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body that is not perceived by the mind.	141
13	The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else.	141
L1	Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.	151
L2	All bodies agree in certain things.	151
L3	A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body, which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on	

to infinity. . . . 151
L4 If from a body, or individual, which is composed of several bodies, certain bodies are separated, and at the same time as many other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature as before, without any change of its form. . . . 153
L5 If the parts composing an individual become greater or smaller, but in such proportion that all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to one another as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, as before, without any change of form. . . . 155
L6 If certain bodies composing an individual are compelled to turn aside the motion they have towards one part towards another, but in such a way that they can continue their motions and communicate them to one another in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature without any change of form. . . . 155
L7 Further, an individual so composed retains its nature whether it moves as a whole or is at rest, or moves towards this part or towards that, provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it to the others as before. . . . 155
14 The human mind is capable of perceiving very many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in more ways. . . . 159
15 The idea that constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas. . . . 159
16 The idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body. . . . 159
17 If the human body is affected in a mode that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body. . . . 161
18 If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also. . . . 163
19 The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through the ideas of affections by which the body is affected. . . . 165
20 There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God in the same way, and is related to God in the same way, as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body. 167
21 This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. . . . 167
22 The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections. . . . 169
23 The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body. . . . 169
24 The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. . . . 171
25 The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body. . . . 171
26 The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through the ideas of the affections of its own body. . . . 173
27 The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself. . . . 173
28 The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused. . . . 173
29 The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind. . . . 175
30 We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body. . . . 177
31 We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things that are outside us. . . . 177

32 All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true. . . . 179
33 There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false. . . . 179
34 Every idea which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true. . . . 179
35 Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve. . . . 179
36 Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas. . . . 181
37 That which is common to all things (on which see Lemma 2 [p. 151] above), and which is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing. . . 183
38 Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately. . . . 183
39 Of that which is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and which is equally in the part of each of these and in the whole, there will also be an adequate idea in the mind. . . . 183
40 Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in it are also adequate. . . 185
41 Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, but knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true. . . . 189
42 Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false. . . . 191
43 He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing. . . . 191
44 It is of the nature of reason to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary. . . . 195
45 Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. . . . 197
46 The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect. . . . 199
47 The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. . . . 199
48 In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will; but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity. . . . 207
49 There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, besides that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. . . . 209

THIRD PART OF THE ETHICS: OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS

1 Our mind acts in some things and is acted on in others; namely, insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts in some things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily acted on in some things. . . . 233
2 The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to motion, or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else). . . . 235
3 The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone. . . . 241
4 No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause. . . . 241
5 Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other. . . . 243
6 Each thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being. . . . 243
7 The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. . . . 243
8 The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time. . . . 245
9 The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this striving of its

	own.	245
10	An idea which excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.	247
11	Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting of our body, the idea of that same thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of thinking of our mind.	247
12	The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things which increase or aid the body's power of acting.	249
13	When the mind imagines those things which diminish or restrain the body's power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things which exclude their existence.	251
14	If the mind has once been affected by two affects at the same time, then when it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.	253
15	Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of joy, sadness or desire.	253
16	From the mere fact that we imagine some thing to have something similar to an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sadness, we shall love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these affects.	255
17	If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an affect of sadness has something similar to another which usually affects us with an equally great affect of joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.	255
18	A man is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same affect of joy and sadness as by the image of a present thing.	257
19	He who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will be saddened; but if he imagines that it is preserved, he will rejoice.	259
20	He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice.	259
21	He who imagines that what he loves is affected with joy or sadness will also be affected with joy or sadness; and each of these affects will be greater or less in the lover as it is greater or less in the thing loved.	261
22	If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with sadness, we shall, on the contrary, also be affected with hatred towards him.	261
23	He who imagines that what he hates is affected with sadness will rejoice; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened; and each of these affects will be greater or less as its contrary is greater or less in what he hates.	263
24	If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with hatred towards him also. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect that same thing with sadness, we shall be affected with love towards him.	263
25	We strive to affirm of ourselves and of the thing loved whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with joy; and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect us or the thing loved with sadness.	265
26	We strive to affirm of a thing we hate whatever we imagine to affect it with sadness, and, on the other hand, to deny whatever we imagine to affect it with joy.	265
27	From the fact that we imagine a thing like us, towards which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.	267
28	We strive to promote the occurrence of whatever we imagine leads to joy; but whatever we imagine is opposed to it, or leads to sadness, we strive to remove or destroy.	269
29	We shall also strive to do whatever we imagine men to look on with joy, and, on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men to be averse to.	271
30	If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will contemplate himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he imagines affects others with sadness, he will, on the contrary, contemplate himself with sadness.	271
31	If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something which we ourselves love, desire or	

hate, we shall thereby love it, etc., more constantly. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the contrary, then we shall suffer fluctuation of mind. 273

32 If we imagine that someone enjoys some thing which only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it. 275

33 When we love a thing like us, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return. 275

34 The greater the affect with which we imagine a thing we love to be affected towards us, the more we shall exult in glory. 277

35 If someone imagines that a thing he loves joins another to itself with the same bond of friendship, or a closer one, than that by which he alone possessed it, he will be affected with hatred towards the thing loved, and will envy that other. 277

36 He who recollects a thing in which he once took delight desires to possess it with the same circumstances as when he first took delight in it. 279

37 The desire which arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is the greater, the greater the affect is. 281

38 If someone begins to hate a thing he loved, so that the love is completely destroyed, he will, from an equal cause, hate it with a greater hatred than if he had never loved it, and with a hatred the greater, the greater the love had been before. 281

39 He who hates someone will strive to do him evil, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from it; and, on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive, by the same law, to do him good. 283

40 He who imagines that he is hated by someone, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate him in return. 285

41 If someone imagines that he is loved by someone, and does not believe that he has given any cause for it (which can happen by Cor. of Prop. 15 [p. 253] and by Prop. 16 of this Part [p. 255]), he will love him in return. 287

42 He who has conferred a benefit on someone, moved by love or by hope of glory, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with an ungrateful spirit. 287

43 Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and can, on the other hand, be destroyed by love. . 289

44 Hatred which is completely conquered by love passes into love; and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it. 289

45 If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hatred towards a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate him. 291

46 If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, accompanied by the idea of him under the universal name of the class or nation as cause, he will love or hate not only him, but all of the same class or nation. 291

47 The joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed or affected with some other evil does not arise without some sadness of mind. 291

48 Love and hatred, for example towards Peter, are destroyed if the sadness which the latter involves, and the joy which the former involves, are joined to the idea of another cause; and each is diminished insofar as we imagine that Peter was not the only cause of either. 293

49 Love and hatred towards a thing we imagine to be free must both, from an equal cause, be greater than towards a necessary thing. 293

50 Any thing can be, accidentally, the cause of hope or fear. 295

51 Different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be affected in different ways by one and the same object at different times. . . . 295

52 An object which we have previously seen together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many, we shall not contemplate for as long as one which we imagine to have something singular. 297

53 When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting, it rejoices; and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting. 301

54 The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting. 301
55 When the mind imagines its lack of power, it is thereby saddened. 301
56 There are as many species of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of each affect which is composed of these, like fluctuation of mind, or which is derived from them, namely love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected. 305
57 Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. 307
58 Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act. 309
59 Among all the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none but those which are related to joy or desire. 311

FOURTH PART OF THE ETHICS: OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR OF THE POWERS OF THE AFFECTS

1 Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true, insofar as it is true. 359
2 We are acted on insofar as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others. 361
3 The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. 361
4 It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause. 361
5 The force and increase of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own. 363
6 The force of some passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man. 365
7 An affect can be neither restrained nor removed except by an affect contrary to it and stronger than the affect to be restrained. 365
8 The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it. 367
9 An affect whose cause we imagine as now present to us is stronger than if we imagined it not to be present. 367
10 We are affected more intensely towards a future thing which we imagine will soon be present than if we imagined its time of existing to be further distant from the present; and we are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago than if we imagined it to have passed long ago. 369
11 An affect towards a thing which we imagine as necessary is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a thing possible or contingent, or not necessary. 369
12 An affect towards a thing which we know not to exist at present, and which we imagine as possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than one towards a contingent thing. . . . 371
13 An affect towards a contingent thing which we know not to exist at present is, other things being equal, less intense than an affect towards a past thing. 371
14 The true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect. 373
15 A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires which arise from the affects by which we are troubled. 373
16 A desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this knowledge looks to the future, can be more easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for things which are pleasant in the present. 375
17 A desire which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns

contingent things, can be restrained still much more easily by a desire for things which are present. . . . 375

18 A desire which arises from joy is, other things being equal, stronger than a desire which arises from sadness. . . . 377

19 Each one, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily wants or is averse to what he judges to be good or evil. . . . 379

20 The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; and on the contrary, insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being, to that extent he lacks power. . . . 381

21 No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live, that is, actually to exist. . . . 381

22 No virtue can be conceived prior to this one (namely, the striving to preserve oneself). . . . 383

23 A man, insofar as he is determined to do something from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands. . . . 383

24 To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve our being (these three signify the same) from the guidance of reason, and that from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage. . . . 383

25 No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of another thing. . . . 385

26 Whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; and the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judges nothing else to be useful to itself except what leads to understanding. . . . 385

27 We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what really leads to understanding, or what can prevent us from understanding. . . . 387

28 The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God. . . . 387

29 Any singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can neither aid nor restrain our power of acting, and absolutely, nothing can be good or evil for us unless it has something in common with us. . . . 387

30 No thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, to that extent it is contrary to us. . . . 389

31 Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good. . . . 389

32 Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot, to that extent, be said to agree in nature. . . . 391

33 Men can differ in nature insofar as they are troubled by affects which are passions, and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconstant. . . . 391

34 Insofar as men are troubled by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another. 393

35 Only insofar as men live from the guidance of reason do they always necessarily agree in nature. 393

36 The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it equally. . . . 397

37 The good which each one who follows virtue wants for himself he will also desire for other men, and the more so, the greater the knowledge of God he has. . . . 397

38 What so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is useful to man; and the more useful, the more capable it renders the body of being affected in many ways and of affecting other bodies; and on the contrary, that is harmful which renders the body less capable of these things. . . . 405

39 Those things which bring it about that the ratio of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to one another is preserved are good; and on the contrary, those are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different ratio of motion and rest to one another. . . . 405

40 Things which conduce to the common society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; and on the contrary, those are evil which introduce discord into the state. . . . 407

41 Joy is not directly evil, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil. 407
42 Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good; and on the contrary, melancholy is always evil. 407
43 Pleasure can be excessive and be evil; but pain can be good insofar as pleasure, or joy, is evil. . 409
44 Love and desire can be excessive. 409
45 Hatred can never be good. 411
46 He who lives from the guidance of reason strives as far as he can to repay another's hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him with love in return, or nobility. 413
47 The affects of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves. 415
48 The affects of overestimation and scorn are always evil. 415
49 Overestimation easily makes the man who is overestimated proud. 415
50 Pity, in a man who lives from the guidance of reason, is in itself evil and useless. 417
51 Favour is not opposed to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it. 417
52 Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only that self-contentment which arises from reason is the greatest there can be. 419
53 Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason. 419
54 Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power. 421
55 The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of oneself. 421
56 The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest lack of power of mind. 421
57 The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates that of the noble. . . . 423
58 Glory is not opposed to reason, but can arise from it. 425
59 To all the actions to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason without it. 427
60 A desire which arises from a joy or sadness that is related to one or several, but not to all, of the parts of the body has no regard for the advantage of the whole man. 429
61 A desire which arises from reason cannot be excessive. 431
62 Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one. 431
63 He who is led by fear, and does good in order to avoid evil, is not led by reason. 433
64 The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge. 433
65 Of two goods we shall follow, from the guidance of reason, the greater, and of two evils the lesser. 435
66 From the guidance of reason we shall want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one. 435
67 A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life. 443
68 If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free. 443
69 The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in declining dangers as in overcoming them. . . 445
70 A free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to decline their favours. . . . 445
71 Only free men are most grateful to one another. 447
72 A free man never acts deceptively, but always in good faith. 447
73 A man who is led by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to the common decree, than in solitude, where he obeys himself alone. 449

FIFTH PART OF THE ETHICS: OF THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM

1 In just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ordered and connected exactly in the body. 473
2 If we separate a commotion of the mind, or affect, from the thought of an external cause, and

	join it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as the fluctuations of mind which arise from these affects, will be destroyed.	475
3	An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.	475
4	There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.	475
5	An affect towards a thing which we imagine simply, and not as necessary, or as possible, or as contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest of all.	479
6	Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or is acted on less by them.	479
7	Affects which arise from or are aroused by reason are, if account is taken of time, more powerful than those which are related to singular things which we contemplate as absent.	479
8	The more causes concurring at the same time by which some affect is aroused, the greater it is.	481
9	An affect which is related to many and different causes, which the mind contemplates together with the affect itself, is less harmful, and we are acted on less by it and are affected less towards each cause, than by another equally great affect which is related to one only or to fewer causes.	481
10	So long as we are not troubled by affects which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.	483
11	The more things an image is related to, the more frequent it is, or the more often it is vivid, and the more it occupies the mind.	487
12	The images of things are more easily joined to images related to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others.	487
13	The more other images an image is joined to, the more often it is vivid.	487
14	The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.	487
15	He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects.	489
16	This love towards God must occupy the mind most.	489
17	God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.	489
18	No one can hate God.	491
19	He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.	491
20	This love towards God cannot be tainted by the affect of envy or of jealousy; but it is the more encouraged, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love.	491
21	The mind can imagine nothing, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures.	503
22	Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a species of eternity.	503
23	The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.	503
24	The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.	505
25	The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.	505
26	The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge.	505
27	From this third kind of knowledge arises the greatest contentment of mind there can be.	507
28	The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but it can from the second.	507
29	Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity.	507
30	Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.	509

31 The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as on its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal. 509
32 Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause. 511
33 The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal. 511
34 Only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions. . . . 513
35 God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love. 513
36 The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered under a species of eternity; that is, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself. 515
37 There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. 517
38 The more things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death. 517
39 He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. . 519
40 The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is. 521
41 Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of first importance piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we showed in Part IV to be related to tenacity and nobility. 521
42 Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts, but on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we can restrain our lusts. 523

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Glossary

The glossary records the renderings adopted for Spinoza's technical vocabulary, with notes on the choices and on the senses in which some terms are rendered in more than one way.

abiectio self-abasement
: Thinking less highly of oneself than is just, out of sadness (E3DA29), the opposite of pride; 'despondency' suggested hopelessness and sat close to *desperatio* (despair). *Abiectus* → 'self-abased'.

absolute absolutely
: 'Without qualification'; in *absolute infinitum* opposed to *in suo genere* (infinite in its own kind).

acquiescentia in se ipso / animi self-contentment / contentment of mind
: Root sense is coming to rest (*quies*) in oneself. 'Self-esteem' imports a modern psychological sense.

actuosus active

adaequatus adequate

admiratio / contemptus wonder / contempt
: Wonder is not an affect (E3DA4Ex); note at E3P52S.

aemulatio / benevolentia emulation / benevolence

affectio affection
: A state or modification of a thing; must be kept distinct from *affectus*.

affectus affect
: 'Affect' keeps the link with *affectio* and covers active affects (E3P58–59), which 'emotion' and 'passion' do not.

affectuum imitatio imitation of the affects

agere / actio act / action
: From E3D2, acting is being the adequate cause of an effect; opposed to *pati*.

ambitio / humanitas ambition / courtesy
: *Humanitas* is identified with *modestia* in E3DA43.

amor / odium love / hatred

anima soul
: Rare; kept distinct from *mens*.

animi in periculis praesentia presence of mind in dangers

animi pathema passion of the mind
: From the Greek πάθημα ('something undergone').

animositas / generositas tenacity / nobility

appetitus appetite

attributum attribute

beatitudo blessedness

beneplacitum good pleasure

bonum / malum good / evil
Defined relative to joy and desire in E3P39S, from the standpoint of reason in E4D1–2. 'Bad' where the context is non-moral.

causa efficiens efficient cause
The producing cause, as distinct from material, formal and final causes.

causa finalis / finis final cause / end
Propter finem → 'for the sake of an end'.

causa immanens / transiens immanent / transitive cause

causa per se / per accidens cause through itself / by accident

causa sui cause of itself

certus certain
In the older sense 'definite, fixed' (*certa ac determinata ratione*, 'in a certain and determinate manner'); 'definite' where 'certain' would mislead.

civitas / cives state / citizens

classis / natio class / nation

cogitatio / res cogitans thought / thinking thing

cognitio knowledge
Also 'cognition' is possible; 'knowledge' is used throughout, including for the three kinds of knowledge (E2P40S2).

commiseratio / misericordia pity / compassion
E3DA18Ex: they differ only as the single affect and the habit; E3DA24 redefines *misericordia*, 'against the meaning of the word', as love that rejoices in another's good and is saddened by his ill.

conatus / conari striving / strive
The noun is also used untranslated in the notes and essays, as is customary.

conceptus / perceptio concept / perception

concipere / conceptus conceive / concept

constituere constitute

contingens contingent

contrarii affectus contrary affects

convenire agree
Also 'agree in nature' (E4P31–35).

corpus body

crudelitas cruelty

crudelitas seu saevitia cruelty, or savagery

cupiditas desire

dari / datur be / there is (idiomatic)
Literally 'to be given'. Rendered idiomatically ('there is', 'there can be', 'exist'); 'be given' where Spinoza contrasts a given cause with its effect (*ex data causa*, E1A3).

decretum (mentis) / determinatio (corporis) decree / determination
One thing under two attributes (E3P2S).

denominatio intrinseca / extrinseca intrinsic / extrinsic denomination

desiderium longing

determinare determine

Deus God

Deus seu natura God, or nature
Only at E4Pref.2 (twice: *Deum seu naturam*, *Deus seu natura*) and E4P4D (*Dei sive naturae*, *Dei seu naturae*). The Dutch omits *seu natura* at E4Pref.2.

dictamen rationis dictate of reason
Rationis dictamina (E4P18S): the precepts of reason stated in advance of Props. 19–37.

duratio duration

ens being
Also used for *esse* as a noun (*realitas aut esse*, 'reality or being', E1P9).

ens imaginationis being of imagination
Coined against *ens rationis*; note at E1App.4.

ens rationis being of reason

esse formale / esse obiectivum formal being / objective being
Note at E2P5; see *formaliter / obiective*.

essentia essence

exemplar model
The universal idea against which things are judged perfect or imperfect; *naturae humanae exemplar* (E4Pref.3).

explicare explain
Root sense 'unfold'; note where the image matters.

exprimere express

extensio / res extensa extension / extended thing

fastidium / taedium disgust / weariness

favor / indignatio favour / indignation

felicitas happiness
E4P18S: happiness consists in a man's being able to preserve his being. Distinct from *beatitudo* ('blessedness').

fingere / fictio feign / fiction
Technical sense from the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*: forming an idea that is not grounded in knowledge of the thing.

fluctuatio (imaginationis, animi) fluctuation (of the imagination, of mind)
E3P17S: *animi fluctuatio* is related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination.

formaliter / obiective formally / objectively
Scholastic-Cartesian pair: a thing as it is in itself vs. as it is represented in an idea. 'Objectively' is the reverse of the modern sense.

fortitudo strength of character

gaudium / conscientiae morsus gladness / remorse
Gaudium must be kept apart from *laetitia* (joy). *Conscientiae morsus* is not moral remorse but sadness at a past outcome contrary to hope (E3DA17); note at E3P18S2.

gloria / pudor glory / shame

gratia / gratitudo thankfulness / gratitude

homo man / men

Generic, as the Note on the Text says; Spinoza's word for a male is *vir*. 'Man' keeps the uniformity of phrases like *homo liber*, 'the free man', and *hominem homini Deum esse*, 'man is a God to man' (E4P35S).

honestas / honestum / turpe honourableness / honourable / base

humilitas / philautia humility / self-love

idea / ideatum idea / object (of the idea)

Ideatum is 'that of which the idea is an idea'; 'object' with a note at first occurrence.

imaginatio / imaginari imagination / imagine

Technical: thinking through images (bodily affections), the first kind of knowledge (E2P17S, E2P40S2).

imperium dominion / rule

'Dominion' in *imperium in imperio*, 'a dominion within a dominion' (E3Pref), and for the mind's dominion over the affects or the body (E3P2S, E5Pref); 'rule' elsewhere (*ex rationis imperio*, 'by the rule of reason', E5P10S; E4App9, E4App13).

impietas impiety

Opposed to *pietas* ('morality') at E4P18S.2; see the note there.

impossibilis impossible

impotentia lack of power

Opposed to *potentia*; Part IV calls human lack of power in moderating the affects bondage (E4Pref).

impudentia / clementia shamelessness / clemency

in alio esse be in another

in se esse be in itself

in suo genere in its own kind

infinitus infinite

infinita attributa: 'infinite attributes', keeping the Latin's ambiguity between 'infinitely many' and 'each infinite' (note at E1D6).

ingenium temperament

A person's characteristic make-up of mind; 'ingenuity' or 'talent' where it means wit or ability (E1App.2, E3Pref, E4App9).

intellectio intellection

intellectus / intelligere intellect / understand

intellectus actu / potentia actual / potential intellect

Note at E1P31S.

intrepidus / audax / timidus / pusillanimis fearless / daring / timid / cowardly

invidia envy

involvere involve

Conceptual containment: to conceive A one must conceive B. Never rendered 'imply'; the one 'implies' in the translation renders *implicat* (Part I, Prop. 13, Schol.), the only occurrence of *implicare*.

ira / vindicta anger / vengeance

irrisio / dedignatio mockery / disdain

ius naturae right of nature; natural right
Summo naturae iure → 'by the highest right of nature'. Right is defined by power (E4P37S1; TP II.3).

iustum / iniustum just / unjust

laetitia / tristitia joy / sadness
Defined as the passage to greater or lesser perfection (E3P11S); 'pleasure/pain' suggests bodily sensation, which Spinoza names separately (*titillatio*, *dolor*).

laus / vituperium praise / blame

liber / libertas free / freedom

luxuria / ebrietas / libido / avaritia gluttony / drunkenness / lust / greed

mens mind

modificatio modification

modus mode
Also 'way, manner' in non-technical uses (*nullo alio modo*), translated accordingly.

natura nature
in rerum natura: 'in the nature of things' (idiomatic for 'in reality'); 'nature' is kept in lower case throughout, also in *Deus seu natura* ('God, or nature').

natura naturans / naturata *Natura naturans / Natura naturata*
Left in Latin, as is customary, with a note.

necessitas / necessarius necessity / necessary

norma standard
veritas norma sui et falsi; compare Letter 76, *verum index sui et falsi*.

notiones communes common notions

nutus (Dei) bidding
ex solo Dei nutu agere; 'will' and 'decree' are kept for *voluntas* and *decretum*.

omen (bonum / malum) (good / bad) omen

operari operate
Kept distinct from *agere* (act); note at E1D7. 'Operate' when it stands alone, 'produce an effect' when it takes an object (note at E1P26).

pati / passio be acted on / passion

peccatum / meritum sin / merit
Disobedience / obedience in the civil state; extrinsic notions (E4P37S2.2).

per accidens accidentally

per se concipi be conceived through itself

per se notum / manifestum self-evident

perfectio perfection

pietas piety
In Part IV, the desire to do good born of living by the guidance of reason (E4P37S1). The traditional word is kept, as with *religio*, and a note there gives Spinoza's sense: not religious observance.

poenitentia repentance

ponere / tollere posit / take away

possibilis possible
Distinguished from *contingens* in E4D3–4.

potentia power

potestas power
Spinoza distinguishes *potentia* (the power by which things are and act) from *potestas* (what is in someone's power, at his disposal). Both are 'power', with notes where the distinction matters: E1P17S, E1P33S2.2, E1P35; E5Pref, E5P10.

praeiudicium prejudice

propensio / aversio inclination / aversion

quantum in se est as far as it is in itself
The phrase of Descartes' first law of nature (*Principles* II.37); note at E3P6.

quatenus insofar as

ratio reason
Also 'manner, way' (*certa ac determinata ratione*) and 'account, ground'; *causa seu ratio*: 'cause, or reason'.

realitas reality

realiter distinctus really distinct
The Cartesian 'real distinction' (between substances), opposed to modal distinction (E1P15S).

religio religion
Whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we know God (E4P37S1).

res thing

res singularis singular thing

scientia intuitiva intuitive knowledge

securitas / desperatio confidence / despair

sentire feel / sense / think
By context: 'feel' for feeling and experience (E2A4–5, E5P23S), 'sense' for sense perception (E2P49S.3, E5Pref), 'think' for holding an opinion, above all *de se plus (minus) iusto sentire*, 'think more (less) highly of oneself than is just' (E3DA21–29).

servitus bondage
Man's lack of power in moderating and restraining the affects (E4Pref). Title of Part IV: *De servitute humana*. In the non-technical sense of E2P49S.4 (*summa servitute*; *Dei servitus*) rendered 'servitude'.

spes / metus hope / fear

status naturalis / civilis natural / civil state

sub specie aeternitatis under a species of eternity
First as *sub quadam aeternitatis specie* ('under a certain species of eternity'); Part V drops *quadam*. *Species* is 'look, aspect' as well as 'kind'.

substantia substance

sui iuris under his own control
Literally 'of his own right'; see TP II.9–11 (note at E4Pref). *Alterius iuris*: 'under another's control'.

superbia / existimatio / despectus pride / overestimation / scorn
All three are joys (E3P26S); *despectus* is kept apart from *contemptus* (contempt, E3DA5).

superstitio superstition

suspendere iudicium / assentiri suspend judgment / assent

temperantia / sobrietas / castitas temperance / sobriety / chastity

terminare limit

timor / verecundia / consternatio timidity / shamefacedness / consternation

Timor is 'timidity' as the affect defined in E3DA39, and 'fear' where Spinoza uses it in its ordinary sense (E4P1S, with a note; E4P37S2.2, E4P63D, E4P63CS); 'fear' otherwise renders *metus*. *Verecundia* is kept apart from *modestia*.

titillatio / hilaritas / dolor / melancholia pleasure / cheerfulness / pain / melancholy

Joy and sadness as related to one part of the body (*titillatio*, *dolor*) or to all parts equally (*hilaritas*, *melancholia*).

utile advantage / useful

The noun (*suum utile*, *commune utile*) → 'his own advantage', 'the common advantage'; the adjective → 'useful' (*suum utile, quod revera utile est* → 'his own advantage, what is really useful to him', E4P18S).

veneratio / horror / devotio veneration / horror / devotion

virtus virtue

Identified with power at E4D8. In Parts I–II, where *virtus* means causal efficacy (E1P11S), it is rendered 'power' with a note.

vitium vice

voluntas / volitio will / volition

zelotypia jealousy

English–Latin Index

absolutely *absolute*
accidentally *per accidens*
act *agere*
action *actio*
active *actuosus*
actual *intellectus actu*
adequate *adaequatus*
advantage *utile*
affect *affectus*
affection *affectio*
agree *convenire*
ambition *ambitio*
anger *ira*
appetite *appetitus*
as far as it is in itself *quantum in se est*
assent *assentiri*
attribute *attributum*
aversion *aversio*
base *turpe*
be *dari*
be acted on *pati*
be conceived through itself *per se concipi*
be in another *in alio esse*
be in itself *in se esse*
being *ens*
being of imagination *ens imaginationis*

being of reason *ens rationis*
benevolence *benevolentia*
bidding *nutus (Dei)*
blame *vituperium*
blessedness *beatitudo*
body *corpus*
bondage *servitus*
by accident *per accidens*
cause of itself *causa sui*
cause through itself *causa per se*
certain *certus*
chastity *castitas*
cheerfulness *hilaritas*
citizens *cives*
civil state *civilis*
class *classis*
clemency *clementia*
common notions *notiones communes*
compassion *misericordia*
conceive *concipere*
concept *conceptus*
confidence *securitas*
consternation *consternatio*
constitute *constituere*
contempt *contemptus*
contentment of mind *animi*
contingent *contingens*
contrary affects *contrarii affectus*
courtesy *humanitas*
cowardly *pusillanimis*
cruelty *crudelitas*
cruelty, or savagery *crudelitas seu saevitia*
daring *audax*
decree *decretum (mentis) / determinatio (corporis)*
desire *cupiditas*
despair *desperatio*
determination *decretum (mentis) / determinatio (corporis)*
determine *determinare*
devotion *devotio*
dictate of reason *dictamen rationis*
disdain *dedignatio*
disgust *fastidium*
dominion *imperium*
drunkenness *ebrietas*
duration *duratio*
efficient cause *causa efficiens*
emulation *aemulatio*
end *finis*
envy *invidia*
essence *essentia*

evil *malum*
explain *explicare*
express *exprimere*
extended thing *res extensa*
extension *extensio*
extrinsic denomination *extrinseca*
favour *favor*
fear *metus*
fearless *intrepidus*
feel *sentire*
feign *fingere*
fiction *fictio*
final cause *causa finalis*
fluctuation (of the imagination, of mind) *fluctuatio (imaginationis, animi)*
formal being *esse formale*
formally *formaliter*
free *liber*
freedom *libertas*
gladness *gaudium*
glory *gloria*
gluttony *luxuria*
God *Deus*
God, or nature *Deus seu natura*
good *bonum*
good pleasure *beneplacitum*
gratitude *gratitudo*
greed *avaritia*
happiness *felicitas*
hatred *odium*
honourable *honestum*
honourableness *honestas*
hope *spes*
horror *horror*
humility *humilitas*
idea *idea*
imagination *imaginatio*
imagine *imaginari*
imitation of the affects *affectuum imitatio*
immanent *causa immanens*
impiety *impietas*
impossible *impossibilis*
in its own kind *in suo genere*
inclination *propensio*
indignation *indignatio*
infinite *infinitus*
insofar as *quatenus*
intellect *intellectus*
intellection *intellectio*
intrinsic *denominatio intrinseca*
intuitive knowledge *scientia intuitiva*

involve *involvere*
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joy *laetitia*
just *iustum*
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lack of power *impotentia*
limit *terminare*
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love *amor*
lust *libido*
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men *homo*
merit *meritum*
mind *mens*
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mode *modus*
model *exemplar*
modification *modificatio*
nation *natio*
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Natura naturata *naturata*
natural *status naturalis*
natural right *ius naturae*
nature *natura*
necessary *necessarius*
necessity *necessitas*
nobility *generositas*
object (of the idea) *ideatum*
objective being *esse obiectivum*
objectively *obiective*
(good / bad) omen *omen (bonum / malum)*
operate *operari*
overestimation *existimatio*
pain *dolor*
passion *passio*
passion of the mind *animi pathema*
perception *perceptio*
perfection *perfectio*
piety *pietas*
pity *commiseratio*
pleasure *titillatio*
posit *ponere*
possible *possibilis*
potential intellect *potentia*
power *potentia; potestas*
praise *laus*
prejudice *praeiudicium*
presence of mind in dangers *animi in periculis praesentia*
pride *superbia*

reality *realitas*
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reason *ratio*
religion *religio*
remorse *conscientiae morsus*
repentance *poenitentia*
right of nature *ius naturae*
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